A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 and Postscript, Zimbabwe, 2001-2008 [1 ed.] 9781443815994, 9781443813600

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A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 and Postscript, Zimbabwe, 2001-2008

A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 and Postscript, Zimbabwe, 2001-2008

By

Chengetai J. M. Zvobgo

A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 and Postscript, Zimbabwe, 2001-2008, by Chengetai J. M. Zvobgo This book first published 2009 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2009 by Chengetai J. M. Zvobgo All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-1360-5, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-1360-0

To Kelebogile Clara and Ruvimbo Heather And to the memory of Eddison.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .................................................................................. xiii Preface ....................................................................................................... xv Summary ................................................................................................. xvii Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 Chapter One............................................................................................. 11 From the Occupation of Mashonaland to the Ndebele and Shona Risings, 1890-1898 Introduction; major developments (1884-1890); the Moffat Treaty, (11 February, 1888); the Rudd Concession (30 October, 1888); the Charter of the British South Africa Company (29 October, 1889); the Pioneer Column’s march to Mashonaland, (June-September, 1890); the occupation of Mashonaland (1890); the occupation of Manicaland (1890); early life of the white settlers in Mashonaland; the administration of Mashonaland, (1891-1895); the planting of Christianity in Mashonaland and Manicaland (1891-1895); the conquest of Matabeleland (1893) and the administration of Matabeleland, (1893-1895); the Ndebele and Shona Risings, (18961897) and their aftermath (1897-1898); summary and conclusion. Chapter Two ............................................................................................ 33 From the Establishment of the Native Reserves to Responsible Government, 1897-1923 Introduction; the establishment of the Native Reserves, (18981923); economic developments, (1897-1923); the contribution of Christian Missions to African Education, (1899-1923); Government, Christian Missions and African education (1899-1923); Christian Missions and the Ministry of Healing (1893-1923); the road to Responsible Government (1898-1923); summary and conclusion.

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Chapter Three.......................................................................................... 54 From Responsible Government to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1923-1953 Introduction; the land problem (1923-1953); the franchise question (1923-1953); economic developments, (1923-1953); developments in African Education (1924-1953); summary and conclusion. Chapter Four ........................................................................................... 71 The Rise and Fall of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953-1963 Introduction; the origins of the Federation, (1938-1953); major political developments, (1953-1960); the policy of partnership, (1953-1960); the Monckton Commission’s Report on the future of the Federation (1960); the major developments, (1961-1963); summary and conclusion. Chapter Five .......................................................................................... 101 Southern Rhodesia: From the Launching of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), 1953 -1965 Introduction; the premiership of Mr. Garfield Todd, (1953-1958); African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia, (1957-1965); the road to Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1963-1965); the Unilateral Declaration of Independence; summary and conclusion. Chapter Six ............................................................................................ 128 From the Unilateral Declaration of Independence to the Pearce Commission, 1965-1972 Introduction; British economic sanctions against Rhodesia (19651966); the Tiger proposals for a settlement and its aftermath, (19661968); the Fearless proposals for a settlement (1968); the United Nations mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1966 and in 1968; the Rhodesian Government’s Proposals For A New Constitution For Rhodesia, (1969), the Land Tenure Act, (1969), and their aftermath, (1969-1970); the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals For A Settlement of the Rhodesian problem (1971); the formation of the African National Council (ANC) in 1971; the appointment of the Pearce Commission (1971); the Pearce Commission’s Report and its aftermath, (1972); summary and conclusion.

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Chapter Seven........................................................................................ 153 From the Pearce Commission to the Internal Settlement Agreement, 1972-1978 Introduction; the struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia (19661972); the developments in Mozambique and their impact on Rhodesia (1972-1976); Dr. Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in southern Africa and its aftermath (1976); the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia and its aftermath (1976-1977); the road to the Internal Settlement (1977-1978); the major provisions of the Internal Settlement Agreement; summary and conclusion. Chapter Eight......................................................................................... 181 From the Internal Settlement to the Lancaster House Conference, 3 March, 1978-10 September, 1979 Introduction; the response to the Internal Settlement Agreement inside Rhodesia and abroad; the major developments (4 March-27 April, 1978); the dismissal of Minister Byron Hove from the Transitional Government and its aftermath (28 April-14 May, 1978); the Executive Council’s call for a ceasefire and the response of the Patriotic Front leaders to the call for a ceasefire; major developments (September-November, 1978); the impact of the war on Salisbury (11-20 December, 1978); the provisions of the Draft Constitution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia (January, 1979); Mr. Smith’s campaign for acceptance of the Draft Constitution by white voters in a referendum on 30 January, 1979 and the results of the referendum; the debate in Parliament on the Draft Constitution and the approval of the Draft Constitution by Parliament (February, 1979); the response abroad to the new Constitution; the ‘majority rule’ election and its aftermath (April-June, 1979); the major developments (May-July, 1979); the search for a ceasefire and an end to the war (March-July, 1979); the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference (August, 1979); the opening of the Lancaster House Conference (10 September, 1979); summary and conclusion.

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Chapter Nine.......................................................................................... 218 From Lancaster House to independence, December, 1979-April, 1980 Introduction; the opening speeches at the Lancaster House conference; the British constitutional proposals for Zimbabwe; the response of the Patriotic Front and of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia delegation to the British constitutional proposals; the transitional arrangements; the appointment of Lord Christopher Soames as interim Governor of Rhodesia; the British proposals for a ceasefire and the Patriotic Front’s response; the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (15 December, 1979) and the Constitutional Agreement (21 December, 1979); the campaign for the independence election (January-February, 1980); the independence election and its aftermath (March-April, 1980). Chapter Ten ........................................................................................... 255 The Post-Independence Period (1980-2000) Introduction; the stresses and strains in the Government of National Unity (1980-1982); the problem of dissidents in Matabeleland and the Government’s response (1982-1984); the road to the Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU (1985-1987); the land problem (1980-1998); the developments which led to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (1992-1998); the launching of the Movement for Democratic Change (1999); the June, 2000 Parliamentary election and its aftermath (JulyDecember, 2000); Women’s rights in Zimbabwe, (1980-2000); Human rights in Zimbabwe (1984-2000); summary and conclusion. Postscript................................................................................................ 306 Zimbabwe, 2001-2008 Introduction; the arrests and harassment of the leading members of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) by the Government prior to, and after the presidential elections of March 9-11, 2002; the presidential elections; reports of four observer groups to the presidential elections; other developments (20022004); the March, 2005 parliamentary elections and their aftermath (March-December, 2007); the food crisis (July, 2001-March, 2008); economic mismanagement (April, 2001-February, 2008); the March, 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections and their aftermath (April-June, 2008); reports of three observer groups to the run-off presidential election and its aftermath; the major developments (June-September, 2008) and in particular the

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Memorandum of Understanding signed between the ruling party (ZANU-PF) and the MDC (21 July, 2008); the food crisis (MarchAugust, 2008); the 15 September, 2008 agreement signed between ZANU (PF) and the MDC; economic mismanagement (MarchAugust, 2008); summary and conclusion. Bibliography........................................................................................... 359 Index ....................................................................................................... 376

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I did the research for this book in Zimbabwe and at the Honnold Library of the Claremont Colleges of California. I would like to thank the proprietors and librarians of the Honnold Library and in particular the reference librarian, Mr. Adam Rosenkranz, for assisting me in many ways. I would also like to thank the proprietors and librarians at the Claremont School of Theology for allowing me to use their facilities. The images below are from the following sources: Map of Zimbabwe: (safarinow.com) ([email protected]) 1. Harare: Free. jpg 2. Victoria Falls: akademifantasia.org ([email protected]) 3. Lake Kariba: Debby Caselton, 'Notes from Zambia', January 8-13, 2009. 4. Outer Wall Surrounding the Great Enclosure: geocities.com (photo by Dr. Hendrik Clarke) 5. Cecil John Rhodes: Sir Lewis Mitchell, The Life of the Rt. Hon .Cecil John Rhodes. 6. Dr. Leander Starr Jameson: free from commons.wikimedia.org. 7. Nehanda and Kagubi: National Archives of Zimbabwe. 8. Lt. General J. C. Smuts, 1917: Jan Christian Smuts by his son, J. C. Smuts. 9. Mr. Herbert S. Keigwin: National Archives of Zimbabwe. 10. Mr. Harry Nkumbula: R. I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. 11. Dr. Hastings Banda: T. R. Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership. 12. Sir Roy Welensky: Welensky’s 4000 Days. 13. Mr. Herbert Chitepo: National Archives of Zimbabwe. 14. Mr. Garfield Todd: Ruth Weiss, Sir Garfield Todd and the Making of Zimbabwe. 15. Mr. Joshua Nkomo: T. R. Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership. 16. Sir Edgar Whitehead: T. R. Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership. 17. Sir Robert Tredgold: The Rhodesia That Was My Life. 18. The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole: African Nationalism. 19. Mr. Ian Smith: Frontline Office ([email protected]) 20. Mr. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970. 21. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda: Government of the Republic of Zambia.

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Acknowledgements

22. Mr. John Vorster: South Africa: A Visual History, 1976. 23. Ken Flower, Serving Secretly. 24. Reverend Canaan Banana: National Archives of Zimbabwe. 25. Bishop Abel Muzorewa: National Archives of Zimbabwe. 26. Mr. Byron Hove: National Archives of Zimbabwe. 27. Dr. Eddison J. M. Zvobgo: National Archives of Zimbabwe. 28. Burning petrol storage tanks in Salisbury’s industrial sites, December, 1978: Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe. 29. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania: Freedom and Unity. 30. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher: free photo from commons.wikimedia.org 31. General Josiah Tongogara: Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe. 32. Lord Carrington signing the Lancaster House Agreement: Anthony Verrier, The Road to Zimbabwe. 33. Mr. P. W. Botha, Africa Report, September-October, 1979. 34. Mr. Mugabe and Lord Soames after the election results: Ken Flower, Serving Secretly. 35. The Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Joshua Nkomo: Ken Flower, Serving Secretly. 36. Mr. Emmerson Mnangagwa: Ministry of Information, Government of Zimbabwe. 37. Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa: National Archives of Zimbabwe. 38. Dr. Bernard Chidzero: National Archives of Zimbabwe. 39. Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai: free photo from commons.wikimedia.org 40. President Robert Mugabe: free photo from commons.wikimedia.org

PREFACE

The extant literature on the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history of Zimbabwe is enormous. This work covers the history of Zimbabwe from the advent of British settlers in 1890 to 2000; it is a political, social and economic history. It combines in one volume the period from 1890 to 2000 including women’s rights and human rights. I hope it will make a significant contribution to the history of Zimbabwe.

SUMMARY

In this work, I have studied the history of Zimbabwe from the advent of British settlers in 1890 to 2000. The study begins with the background of the country: its size, geography, climate and the natural resources; the African people of Zimbabwe and their past. The major contours of this study comprise of the occupation of Mashonaland and Manicaland by the British settlers (1890); the conquest of the Ndebele kingdom (1893); the administration of Mashonaland (18901895) and of Matabeleland (1893-1895); the Ndebele and Shona risings (1896-1897) and their aftermath (1897-1898); the road to the granting of Responsible Government to the white settlers (1898-1923); from Responsible Government to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1923-1953); the rise and fall of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963); Southern Rhodesia: From the Launching of the Federation to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1953-1965); Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain (1965); the struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia (1966-1972); the Pearce Commission (1972); the developments in Mozambique and their impact on Rhodesia (19721976); the shuttle diplomacy of the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, in southern Africa (1976); the Geneva conference on Rhodesia (1976); the road to Rhodesia’s internal settlement (1977-1978) and its aftermath (1978-1979); the decisive phase of the liberation war (1972-1979); the Commonwealth summit in Lusaka (Zambia); the Lancaster House conference (1979); the campaign for the Independence election (January-February, 1980) and its aftermath (March-April, 1980); the vicissitudes of the Government of National Unity (1980-1982); the problem of ‘dissidents’ in Matabeleland and the Government’s response (1982-1984); the road to the Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU (1985-1987); the land problem (1980-1998); the developments leading to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (19921998); the launching of the MDC (1999); the June, 2000 general election and its aftermath (June-December, 2000); women’s rights (1980-2000) and human rights in Zimbabwe (1984-2000); the overall summary and conclusion.

INTRODUCTION

Size and Borders Zimbabwe, a land-locked country of nearly 400, 000 square kilometers (154, 446 square miles) or about the size of California, is located in southcentral Africa. The Zambezi River demarcates its northern border with Zambia while the Limpopo River forms the country’s southern border with South Africa. Zimbabwe’s other neighbours are Botswana in the West and South West and Mozambique in the East. (See map on wild life heritage).

Geography About a quarter of Zimbabwe consists of the Highveld or central ridge, an upland plateau which runs diagonally across the country from the SouthWest to the Nyanga Mountains to the North-East. The Highveld on which Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare, (see photo) is situated, rises some 1, 500 meters (4, 921 feet) above sea level and is the country’s principal watershed. It consists of a geophysical feature known as the Great Dyke, 515 kilometers (320 miles) long and at its narrowest, 11 kilometers (7 miles) wide. The Great Dyke’s ancient rocks contain vast deposits of minerals including gold and nickel. The Middleveld on either side of the Highveld and accounting for two fifths of Zimbabwe, and with an altitude of 600-1, 200 meters (1, 968-3,937 feet), descends to the narrow strip of the Zambezi valley on one side and more gradually, to the hot, dry flat lands of the Kalahari basin and the south-eastern Lowveld on the other. The Nyanga-Chimanimani massif and the Vumba uplands, mark the country’s eastern border with Mozambique. In the wide valleys, farmers grow tea, coffee and fruit.

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Introduction

Climate Although Zimbabwe lies to the north of the Tropic of Capricorn, it has a temperate climate with the summer heat moderated by altitude in all but the lowest-lying areas. The weather is characterized by dry winters of warm, sunny days and chilly, often bitter nights especially on the Highveld. June and July are the coldest months while summer from November to January, is the wet season; the rainfall regime is much higher in the north and north-east than in the sandy, semi-arid areas of the south and southeast.

The Victoria Falls and Lake Kariba At the Victoria Falls, the Zambezi River, Africa’s fourth longest river (3, 540 kilometers or 2, 200 miles), plunges a hundred meters (328 feet) down into a maze of narrow, precipitous gorges in a series of gigantic cataracts, the tumultuous descent producing a rising cloud of spray which can be seen from about 40 kilometers (25 miles) away. (See photo). One hundred kilometers (93 miles) downstream is Lake Kariba, one of the largest manmade lakes in the world: 280 kilometers (174 miles) long and 40 kilometers (25 miles) wide. (see photo).

Wild Life Heritage In addition to its enormous mineral deposits, Zimbabwe is blessed with a tremendous wild life heritage located in several national parks (see map below), the largest of which is the Hwange National Park which occupies 15, 000 square kilometers (5, 792 square miles); the Park’s wild life includes the lion, elephant, buffalo, leopard, cheetah, rhino, giraffe, zebra, wildebeest and 16 species of antelope.1

1

Zimbabwe The Beautiful, (Cape Town, Struick Publishers, 1996), 8, 11, 14, 16.

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See the Centrefold for this image in colour.

The People of Zimbabwe Zimbabwe has a population of about 12 million of whom 70 per cent are Shona and 16 per cent are Ndebele. The rest of the population consists of several minority groups including the Tonga of the Zambezi valley, the Venda in the south and people of European descent. The Shona and Ndebele and African minority groups in Zimbabwe, are part of a wider group of the Bantu people of southern Africa. In this introduction, we shall summarize the history and pre-colonial economy of the Shona and Ndebele.

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Introduction

The Shona An outstanding achievement of the Shona people is the monument at Great Zimbabwe after which the country is named. The word ‘Zimbabwe’ derives from the Shona dzimba dza mabwe (houses of stone). Great Zimbabwe was the residence of a powerful ruler in the south-eastern interior of Africa, surrounded by the houses of his family, of the families of his tributary rulers and the officials of his court. The walls of Great Zimbabwe were not designed as a fortification; they were built primarily to display the power of the state and symbolized the achievements of the ruling class. 2 (See photo of Outer Wall surrounding the Great Enclosure). Modern archaeologists tell us that the Shona built and inhabited Great Zimbabwe between 1, 000 and 1, 500 A. D. According to oral tradition, the Shona migrated from their homeland called Mbire in the vicinity of Lake Tanganyika. After crossing the Zambezi River, they first settled in north-central Zimbabwe and gradually moved southwards until they established themselves at what became Great Zimbabwe and introduced the worship of Mwari, the Shona Supreme God.3 According to the same traditions, the Mbire kingdom became afflicted by a shortage of salt. The first Mwene Mutapa, Nyatsimba Mutota, therefore sent emissaries in search of it. Eventually they found it in the Dande area of the middle Zambezi valley whereupon Mutota and his people moved north from Great Zimbabwe, conquered the people of the Zambezi valley and settled in Dande. This was the first of a series of campaigns in which Mutota and his son and successor, Matope, carved out an empire stretching from the Kalahari Desert to the Indian Ocean between the Zambezi and Limpopo Rivers. The new empire consisted of Mbire on the southern plateau of Mashonaland, Guruhuswa in the rich grasslands and goldfields of the South West, Manyika in the Eastern Highlands and Uteve and Madanda on the coastal lowlands between Manyika and the Indian Ocean. (See map below):

2

Peter Garlake, Great Zimbabwe, (Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1982), 13. Peter Garlake, Great Zimbabwe, (Stein and Day Publishers, New York, 1973), 174. 3

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Source: T. O. Ranger, (ed.), Aspects of Central African History.

The appointment of two relatives by Mukombero Nyahuma, son and successor of Matope, to rule his southern provinces, Mbire and Guruhuswa, inadvertently led to the emergence of the Togwa and Changamire dynasties. Within a few years, Changamire succeeded in wresting power from the Togwa dynasty thereby establishing an enlarged Rozvi kingdom that was to pose a formidable challenge to the Mutapa dynasty in the north.4 Thus the Rozvi kingdom grew directly out of the early Mwene 4

D. P. Abraham, ‘ETHNO-HISTORY OF THE EMPIRE OF MWENE MUTAPA’, in J. Vansina, R. Mauny and L. V. Thomas, (eds.), The Historian in Tropical Africa, (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), 109.

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Introduction

Mutapa state, shared the same roots and retained a great deal of its customs and practices. The Rozvi ruler or Mambo, like the Mwene Mutapa, was a military and religious leader, an intercessor with Mwari.5 The Economic Base of the Mutapa State. The economic base of the Mutapa state lay in agriculture, pastoral activities, mining, hunting, small-scale industries and trade but the dominant economic activity of the people was agriculture followed by pastoralism, especially cattle.6 The people of the Mutapa state grew rice, wheat, sugar cane, coconuts, taro, oranges, lemons, figs, vines and kept fowls, pigs and goats. 7 They also traded among themselves; peripatetic professional traders (vashambadzi) hawked and sold their goods to their customers. In areas like iron-working, wood-carving, basketry, weaving and pottery, specialists or nyanzvi produced goods for the market. 8 In addition to agriculture, the Shona mined several minerals including gold and copper. Mining was undertaken as a community enterprise by entire villages early in the wet season when the rivers provided water for washing the ore and before a rising water table flooded the mines.9 From the twelfth to the nineteenth century, gold constituted the most important single export from the Zimbabwe Plateau. 10 Copper was used both for export and for internal consumption in the making of bracelets and bangles. 11 Apart from mining, the people of the Mutapa state hunted elephants for food and ivory especially after the state had lost much of its gold-and cattle-producing areas to the Rozvi in the late seventeenth century.12 Most of the ivory obtained in the Zambezi valley and on the coastal lowlands, was exported.13 They also grew cotton; the weavers of the Zimbabwe Plateau and the Zambezi valley wove cotton into both coarse and fine cloth.14

5

Garlake, Great Zimbabwe, (1973), 179-180. S. I. G. Mudenge, A Political History of Munhumutapa., c. 1400-1902, (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988), 161-166. 7 David Chanaiwa, ‘POLITICS AND LONG-DISTANCE TRADE IN THE MWENE MUTAPA EMPIRE DURING THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY’, in The International Journal of African Historical Studies, V, 3, (1972), 430. 8 Mudenge, A Political History, 188. 9 Garlake, Great Zimbabwe, (1973), 177. 10 D. N. Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900-1850, (London, Heinemann, 1980), 25-26. 11 Garlake, Great Zimbabwe, (1973), 177. 12 Mudenge, A Political History, 177. 13 Garlake, Great Zimbabwe, (1973), 177. 14 Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, 32. 6

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In addition to trading among themselves, the people of the Mutapa state also engaged in external trade first with the Swahili traders from the East African Coast and later with the Portuguese. Although the trade with the Portuguese was quite extensive, it largely benefited a small wealthy class which had developed an appetite for luxury goods such as fine- dyed and embroidered cotton, silks and glass beads; the peasant farmers still depended on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood.15 To the majority of the peasants, external trade was peripheral to their economic activities.16

The Decline of the Zimbabwe State Great Zimbabwe began to decline about the middle of the fifteenth century. At the height of its power, Great Zimbabwe’s population was somewhere between 1,000 and 2, 500 adults. 17 It has been suggested that Great Zimbabwe simply grew too large to be supported by its environment; the presence of so many people at one spot would have seriously affected its ability to supply crops, firewood, game, grazing and other necessities of life.18 From about 1830 onwards, Nguni invaders from the south and in particular the Ngoni under Zwangendaba destroyed the Rozvi kingdom.

History of the Ndebele The epic of Ndebele migrations from Zululand in 1821 until they settled in Western Zimbabwe in 1837 has been studied, among others, by Peter Becker19, J. D. Omer-Cooper 20 and by Julian Cobbing 21 and no further elaboration is called for except to say that the Khumalos, a small Ngunispeaking tribe under the leadership of Mzilikazi, had voluntarily joined the Zulus when Shaka began to build the Zulu kingdom in 1817. In Mzilikazi’s case Shaka made an exception to his usual practice of entrusting military command to commoners by appointing Mzilikazi a regimental commander. Furthermore, the regiment commanded by 15

Garlake, Great Zimbabwe, (1973), 178, 197; Chanaiwa, ‘POLITICS’, 430. Mudenge, A Political History, 186-187. 17 Garlake, Great Zimbabwe, (1973), 195. 18 Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, 50-51. 19 Peter Becker, The Path of Blood, (London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1962). 20 J. D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966). 21 Julian Cobbing, ‘The Ndebele Under the Khumalos, 1820-1896’, (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Lancaster, 1976). 16

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Introduction

Mzilikazi apparently consisted largely of members of his own tribe. This arrangement produced a serious weakness in the Zulu kingdom for Mzilikazi could command the loyalty of his followers not only as a commander appointed by Shaka but also by virtue of his hereditary position. The possibility of secession was inherent in the situation; about 1821 a rupture took place. See map below:

Source: J. D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, 132.

Shaka had sent Mzilikazi to conduct a raid against a Sotho tribe to the north-west of Zululand; Mzilikazi returned with a large booty of cattle but instead of despatching them to his overlord, he kept them for himself. Shaka sent messengers to demand the cattle but Mzilikazi refused and made a bid for independence. The Zulu regiments at once marched against Mzilikazi. The Ndebele beat off the first assault but in a second assault,

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Mzilikazi’s defensive position was stormed. Mzilikazi and his followers fled across the escarpment onto the interior plateau where they encountered numerous Sotho-speaking tribes. In spite of their small numbers, the military discipline and fighting tactics they had learned from the Zulus enabled the Ndebele to smash all opposition to their path. About 1824 they reached the upper Oliphant River where they rested and built a temporary settlement appropriately called Eku Pumuleni (the resting place). From this headquarters Mzilikazi sent his regiments far and wide capturing cattle, destroying towns and returning with captured men to reinforce his fighting force. Because it proved unsuitable, Mzilikazi and his followers abandoned the temporary settlement and moved westward into the central Transvaal. (See map above). Between 1825 and 1834 the Ndebele regiments devastated the central and northern Transvaal, burned captured towns, butchered the inhabitants and seized large herds of cattle to increase their vast stock.22 But no sooner had the Ndebele defeated various chiefdoms in the Transvaal than they encountered the Boers of the Great Trek 23 who fought on horse back and used firearms. Consisting largely of settlers of Dutch descent, the Boers had been emigrating from Cape Colony from 1834 onwards to escape British rule; like the Israelites of old, they were looking for the Promised Land on which to settle. In 1836 several Boer trekking parties including one led by Henrik Potgieter, crossed the Vaal River and entered Ndebele territory. As the intruders came unannounced, the Ndebele regiments descended on them. On a hill later known as Vegkop, the first major clash between the Ndebele and the Boers took place. In close formation, the Ndebele regiments charged the Boer wagons but were unable dislodge the defenders and the Ndebele were forced to withdraw taking Boer cattle with them. On 2 January, 1837 a Boer commando under Potgieter, fell on the Ndebele settlement at Mosega and routed the Ndebele completely and the Ndebele population fled northwards. In October, 1837 Potgieter set out with a strong commando of over 300 men for a decisive attack on the Ndebele. After seven days of fighting, the Boers captured and destroyed Mzilikazi’s two remaining military towns and the Ndebele population streamed out of the Marico valley to the north.24 In the wake of his defeat by the Boers, Mzilikazi decided to move his people to a new site far to the north. After an arduous journey, the Ndebele finally settled in Western 22

Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, 131-134. For details, see Eric A. Walker, The Great Trek, (London, A. C. Black, Ltd, 1934). 24 J. D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, Chapter 9, 144-146. 23

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Introduction

Zimbabwe and established their capital at Bulawayo. Because the Rozvi kingdom had been largely destroyed by the Ngoni under Zvangendaba, the Rozvi were unable to offer serious resistance to the Ndebele or to dislodge the interlopers from their new settlement.

The Ndebele Economy Although the Ndebele were largely a pastoral community whose large herds of livestock, particularly cattle, were captured from defeated tribes, they also engaged in agriculture and other peaceful pursuits. Thomas Morgan Thomas who evangelized among the Ndebele on behalf of the London Missionary Society in the nineteenth century, tells us that the Ndebele grew corn, ground nuts, peas, beans, pumpkins, calabash, maize, sweet cane and water melon. The men hunted and trapped game including the elephant, rhinoceros, giraffe, zebra, hippopotamus, buffalo; several species of antelope including the eland, impala, black, gray and red bucks; the gnu, tsetsebe, wild boar, guinea fowl, pheasants, ostrich, wild turkey, partridges and quails. They also caught several species of fish including trout. The women wove various kinds of mats and baskets while the men were engaged in tailoring, sandal-making and carpentry. With their small axe and knives, they made wooden vessels. They wove baskets of various kinds. From smelted iron, the Ndebele made a variety of iron bangles and other ornaments; they also forged spears, axes, knives and picks. They tanned the skins of the wild animals they hunted and killed and joining one to the other with long needles, they made beautiful karosses. They wove cotton into threads and wove it into useful garments.25 It is clear that in spite of the predatory character of their kingdom, the Ndebele were not averse to peaceful pursuits such as agriculture, hunting game and the making of various crafts.

25 Thomas Morgan Thomas, Eleven Years in Central South Africa, Second Edition, (London, Frank Cass, 1971).

CHAPTER ONE FROM THE OCCUPATION OF MASHONALAND TO THE NDEBELE AND SHONA RISINGS, 1890-1898

Introduction It was on the Shona and Ndebele people of Zimbabwe described in the Introduction that British colonialism intruded in 1890 and in 1893 respectively. This Chapter examines the major contours in the history of Zimbabwe from 1890 to 1898 including the major developments which preceded the establishment of British colonial rule in Zimbabwe (1884 1889) and in particular the Moffat Treaty, the Rudd Concession, the Charter of the British South Africa Company; the march of the ‘pioneers’ to, and the occupation of, Mashonaland (June- September, 1890); the occupation of Manicaland (1890); the early life of the settlers in Mashonaland; the administration of Mashonaland (1891-1895); the planting of Christianity in Mashonaland and Manicaland (1891-1895); the conquest of Matabeleland (1893) and the administration of Matabeleland (1893-1895); the Ndebele and Shona risings (1896-1897) and their aftermath (1897-1898).

Major Developments, 1884-1889 The saga preceding the establishment of British colonial rule in Zimbabwe must be understood in the broader context of the struggle for control of Central Africa by Britain, Germany, Portugal and the South African Republic (Transvaal) which, in the wake of the discovery of vast deposits of gold on its territory in 1886, had become a serious competitor in the scramble for Matabeleland. When in April, 1884 Germany declared a Protectorate over South West Africa (now Namibia), Rhodes was worried that an eastward expansion of the new German Protectorate and a

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westward expansion of the South African Republic would block British expansion northwards.1 To forestall this possibility, the British Governor of Cape Colony, Sir Hercules Robinson, who doubled as British High Commissioner for South Africa, declared a Protectorate over Bechuanaland (now Botswana) in 1885. When a representative of the South African Republic, Pieter Johannes Grobler, signed a treaty of peace and friendship with the Ndebele King, Lobengula, on 30 July, 1887, British officials feared that this treaty might be a prelude to the expansion of the South African Republic into Matabeleland. The putative founder of Rhodesia and the leading spirit behind British colonialism in Zimbabwe, Cecil John Rhodes (see photo) had made a vast fortune for himself in the diamond industry at Kimberley in the Orange Free State and in the gold industry at the Witwatersrand in the South African Republic. An imperialist par excellence and the subject of several biographies2, Rhodes was concerned that the South African Republic on the basis of the Grobler Treaty might thwart British expansion northwards and was prepared to harness his enormous wealth to advance British imperialism into Central Africa especially in light of a persistent tradition handed down from remote antiquity of the existence of vast deposits of gold in Mashonaland and Matabeleland. Because this region was reputed to be as rich in gold as the Witwatersrand, it suddenly became a cockpit for rival powers: Britain, Germany, Portugal and the South African Republic.3 The key to northward expansion was Matabeleland. The British Administrator for Bechuanaland, Sir Sidney Shippard, assigned the task of negotiating with the Ndebele King, Lobengula, to his Assistant, Mr. John Smith Moffat, the son of the Reverend Robert Moffat, the great friend of Lobengula’s father, Mzilikazi, who had permitted the London Missionary Society to open its first mission station at Inyati in 1859. Lobengula signed the Moffat Treaty on 11 February, 1888. 1 Robert Rotberg, The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1988), 169. 2 See for example, Sir Lewis Mitchell, The Life of the Rt. Hon. Cecil J. Rhodes, 1853-1902, (London, Edward Arnold, 1910); Basil Williams, Cecil Rhodes, (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1921); William Plomer, Cecil Rhodes, (New York, Appleton and Company, 1933); Sarah Gertrude Millin, Cecil Rhodes, (New York and London, Harper and Brothers Publishers,1933); J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, Cecil Rhodes, (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1963); Robert Rotberg, The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power, (Oxford University Press, 1988). 3 R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, ( New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1961), 221.

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The Moffat Treaty, (11 February, 1888) Under the Moffat Treaty, Lobengula undertook to refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any foreign State or Power without the previous knowledge of the British High Commissioner for South Africa. 4 The late Professor Stanlake Samkange in his book, Origins of Rhodesia, cast doubt on the authenticity of the Moffat Treaty on the ground that it would have been entirely out of character for Lobengula to have signed a treaty which so manifestly infringed upon his sovereign right to conduct an independent foreign policy.5

The Rudd Concession, (30 October, 1888) While the Moffat Treaty was intended to exclude rival powers from encroaching on Matabeleland, it could not prevent the hordes of concession seekers who, like vultures, were descending on the Ndebele kingdom. Accordingly, Rhodes sent three trusted emissaries, Mr. Charles Dunnell Rudd, a business associate; Mr. Rochfort Maguire, a London lawyer and Mr. Francis Thompson, the group’s expert on African affairs, to negotiate with Lobengula for a mineral concession. After protracted negotiations lasting several months, Lobengula signed the Rudd Concession on 30 October, 1888. Under the Rudd Concession, Messrs. Rudd, Maguire and Thompson (hereafter called the grantees), agreed to pay Lobengula, his heirs and successors, £100 on the first day of every lunar month and 1,000 rifles together with 100,000 rounds of ammunition and to deliver on the Zambezi River a steam boat with guns suitable for defensive purposes or in lieu of the said steam boat, to pay him £500. In return for these presents, Lobengula agreed to grant and assign to the said grantees, their heirs, representatives, and assigns, jointly or severally, ‘the complete and exclusive charge’ over all metals and minerals situated and contained in his kingdom subject to the aforesaid payment.6 When told by disappointed suitors that by signing the Rudd Concession he had signed away his country, Lobengula demanded to see a copy of the original Concession and when the grantees failed to produce it, he suspended and subsequently 4

A copy of the entire Treaty is printed in Sir Lewis Mitchell, The Life, Vol. 1, 240241. 5 Stanlake Samkange, Origins of Rhodesia, (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1969), 66. 6 A copy of the entire Concession is printed in Sir Lewis Mitchell, The Life, Vol. I, 244-245.

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repudiated the Rudd Concession on the ground that it was not a truthful account of what transpired.7

The Charter of the British South Africa Company, (29 October, 1889) Undaunted, on 13 July, 1889 Rhodes and his associates petitioned the British Government for a royal charter incorporating the British South Africa Company whose objects, they stated, were to: promote trade, commerce, civilization and good government in the territories covered by the Rudd Concession; improve materially the condition of the natives inhabiting the said territories and to open up the said territories to European immigration and lawful trade and commerce to British subjects and to other nations. Although the Rudd Concession was never reinstated, it was nevertheless on the basis of this controversial Concession that Queen Victoria granted Rhodes and his associates a Royal Charter incorporating the British South Africa Company on 29 October, 1889. Under the Charter, the principal field of operations of the British South Africa Company was defined as the region lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of Portuguese East Africa. The Charter authorized and empowered the Company to: preserve peace and order in the said territories; make ordinances and establish and maintain a police force; make and maintain roads, railways, telegraphs and harbours and to carry on mining and other industries in its territories. The Crown reserved the right at the end of 25 years and at the end of every succeeding period of ten years, to add to, alter or repeal any of the provisions of the Charter or to enact other provisions in substitution for, or in addition to, any of its existing provisions and to revoke the Charter at any time if it appeared to the Secretary of State that the Company had failed substantially to observe and conform to the provisions of the Charter.8 Armed with the Royal Charter, Rhodes feverishly began to organize a column of European settlers to occupy Mashonaland as soon as possible as a large Portuguese force was rumoured to be preparing to enter Mashonaland from the East. 7

For an analysis of this controversial Concession, see Mary Stocker, ‘The Rudd Concession: An Appraisal of An Intricate Controversy’, Zimbabwean History, X, 1979. 8 The entire text of the Charter of incorporation of the British South Africa Company is printed as an Appendix in Sir Lewis Mitchell, The Life, Vol. 1, 331342.

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The ‘Pioneer Column’ and the occupation of Mashonaland, June-September, 1890 The 200 ‘pioneers’ who were mainly recruited in South Africa were of divers trades and professions and included farmers, artisans, miners, doctors, lawyers, engineers, builders, bakers, soldiers and sailors. The pioneers were offered 3,000 acres of land and fifteen gold claims each on completion of their task. Rhodes entrusted the task of recruiting and equipping the pioneers and the Police to Mr. Frank William Frederick Johnson who had served with the Bechuanaland Border Police. The command of the combined force of 200 pioneers, 500 mounted Police and a few volunteers, was entrusted to Lieutenant- Colonel Edward Graham Pennefather. As guide for the expedition, Rhodes secured the services of Mr. Frederick C. Selous, the intrepid hunter who knew the interior 9 and who agreed to find a route to Mashonaland. Mr. Archibald Ross Colquhoun, a former civil servant in India, was appointed the prospective magistrate for Mashonaland. Rhodes’ representative and alter ego, Dr. (later Sir) Leander Starr Jameson (see photo) who was to gain notoriety as author of an abortive revolution to overthrow the Government of the South African Republic10, accompanied the expedition. Skirting the Ndebele kingdom, the pioneers followed a route starting from the border of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, striking eastward to Tuli, thence north-east and north to Mount Hampden. The expedition began on 27 June, 1890. On 9 July, the pioneers reached the Mzingwane River; on 11 July, they reached Fort Tuli; on 13 July, they reached the banks of the Mtshabezi River; on 1 August, they crossed the Lundi River; on 3 September, they reached Fort Charter; on 11 September they forded the Hunyani River and on 12 September, they reached Fort Salisbury, hoisted the Union Jack and formally took possession of Mashonaland in the name of Queen Victoria.

9

Selous subsequently described his hunting experiences in the interior in a book published in 1907. For details, see F. C. Selous, A Hunter’s Wanderings in Africa, (London, Macmillan and Company, 1907). 10 For details on Jameson’s abortive revolution to overthrow the government of the South African Republic of President Paul Kruger in 1895, see Ian Colvin, The Life of Jameson, Volume II, (London, Edward Arnold and Company, 1923), Chapters XXIV-XXVI.

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The British Occupation of Manicaland, 1890 Meanwhile, before the pioneers reached Mashonaland, Rhodes had asked Mr. Colquhoun to proceed to Manicaland to negotiate with Chief Mutasa for a mineral concession. When the pioneers reached Fort Charter on 3 September, Colquhoun, accompanied by Jameson, Selous and an escort of seven mounted men, dashed for Manicaland. After a long interview, Chief Mutasa signed a concession giving mining and commercial rights to the British South Africa Company and undertook to grant no concession of land to other parties. 11 On the basis of this concession, the Company’s forces occupied Manicaland.

Early Life of the Settlers in Mashonaland Two weeks after its arrival at Fort Salisbury, the pioneer column disbanded and the settlers scattered throughout Mashonaland to open up the farms and the gold claims which Rhodes had promised them; within a few weeks, small white settlements sprouted at Mazoe, Hartley and Charter. For those who remained in Salisbury, a thriving business centre developed near the Kopje while the area around Cecil Square became the military and administrative headquarters of the new settlement. The settlers lived a simple life, either in tents or in pole and daga huts. With the onset of the rains towards the end of November, 1890, however, they suffered enormous hardships; they could not obtain adequate supplies of medicines or clothes as the flooded rivers cut off all communication with the south for almost two months. By the middle of 1891, however, conditions had improved; adequate stocks of all kinds were again available as the road to the south was re-opened and a steady stream of prospective settlers arrived. 12

The Administration of Mashonaland, 1891-1895 The administration of Mashonaland was entrusted to Mr. Colquhoun; when he resigned in July, 1891 he was succeeded by Dr. Jameson. From 1891 to 1894 there was no regular department dealing with African affairs. In 1894 the new regime created a Native Department consisting of the 11

Hugh Marshall Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, (London, Frank Cass and Company, 1967), 162-163. 12 P.E. N. Tindall, A History of Central Africa, (Longmans, Green and Company, 1967), 157.

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Chief Native Commissioner and eleven Native Commissioners and their locally-appointed messengers and police. The sour relations between Company officials and the Shona centred, among other things, on forced labour and the hut tax. European farming and mining depended on African labour; when it was not forthcoming, the Department permitted the use of forced labour in Mashonaland through the agency of the Mashonaland Native Police. According to Professor Ranger, in an effort to raise revenue, the Department drew up instructions for the collection of the hut tax from Africans at the rate of ten shillings per hut per year. The new tax which was collected by mounted Police, was paid to the Civil or Mining Commissioners in outlying districts; in some instances, local white farmers were appointed to collect the tax in the districts in which they lived or to collect cattle, sheep and goats in lieu of cash. Although the inauguration of the Native Department was supposed to regularize the collection of the hut tax, almost everywhere the tax was collected in stock to such an extent that in November, 1895 the Administration decided to suspend the collection of the hut tax for three months and thereafter to cease to collect it in stock in light of the fact that at that rate there would be no livestock to collect in a year or two. 13

The Planting of Christianity in Mashonaland, 1891-1895 Introduction Christian missionary enterprise in Zimbabwe as elsewhere in Africa and in the rest of the world was inspired by Christ’s great command to his disciples to go and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. 14 The expansion of Christianity to various parts of the world from the beginning to 1914 has been studied, among others, by the late Professor K. S. Latourette15 while the planting and expansion of Christianity in Africa have been studied, among others, by C. P. Groves. 16 The expansion of Christianity to Zimbabwe in the nineteenth century came from South Africa. The beginnings, growth and expansion of Christian missions in South Africa 13 For details, see T. O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-97, (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1967), Chapter 2. 14 St. Mathew’s Gospel, 28:19. 15 K. S. Latourette, A History of the Expansion of Christianity, 7 volumes, (New York, Harper and Brothers,1937-1945). 16 C. P. Groves, The Planting of Christianity in Africa, 4 Vols., (London, Lutterworth Press, 1948-1958).

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have been studied by J. A. Du Plessis. 17 It is in this context that the planting of Christianity in Mashonaland and later in Zimbabwe as a whole, must be understood.

The Planting of Christianity in Mashonaland and Manicaland, 1891-1895 When the ‘pioneers’ set off for Mashonaland in 1890, the Jesuit missionary, Father Andrew Hartman, accompanied them as chaplain. In July, 1891 four Dominican Sisters arrived and founded the first hospital in Salisbury. On 9 September, 1891 missionaries of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa led by the Reverend A. A. Louw, reached Salisbury; two months later, Mr. Louw founded Morgenster mission near Great Zimbabwe. In February, 1891 the former Anglican Bishop of Bloemfontein, the Reverend G. W. H. Knight-Bruce, who had visited Mashonaland and Matabeleland in 1888, was appointed the first Anglican Bishop of the newly-constituted Diocese of Mashonaland; accompanying him was Mr. Bernard Mizeki, a native of Cape Colony and a faithful steward of God’s vineyard who was to suffer martyrdom in the Shona rising of 1896-7. 18 They reached Salisbury on 17 September, 1891 and later in the year Knight-Bruce founded St. Augustine’s Mission which was to develop into a premier educational institution for Africans in Zimbabwe. The first Wesleyan missionaries, the Reverends Owen Watkins and Isaac Shimmin, reached Salisbury on 29 September, 1891 and on 15 December, 1891 they founded their first mission station at Hartleyton in Nemakonde’s country north of Salisbury. The Salvation Army missionaries reached Fort Salisbury on 18 November, 1891 and opened their first mission station at Pearson Farm in the Mazoe valley north of Salisbury; they subsequently moved from Pearson Farm to Nyachuru where they founded Howard Institute. In April, 1892 five Dominican Sisters after a stint of missionary work in King Williams Town, arrived at Salisbury on 29 July, 1892; two days later, they founded Chishawasha mission near Salisbury. In 1892 after the 17

J. A. Du Plessis, A History of Christian Missions in South Africa, (Cape Town, Longmans, Green and Company, 1911). 18 In the Anglican Church in Zimbabwe today Bernard Mizeki is still the most celebrated martyr of the Shona rising of 1896. For the career of Bernard Mizeki and his martyrdom in the Shona rising of 1896, see H. P. Thompson, The Martyr of Mashonaland: The Story of Bernard Mizeki, (London, SPG, 1937); Jean Farrant, Mashonaland Martyr: Bernard Mizeki and the Pioneer Church, (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1966).

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departure of Watkins, Shimmin opened a second Wesleyan mission station at Epworth, eight miles from Salisbury. On 18 October, 1892 missionaries of the American Congregational Church arrived at Mount Selinda in Manicaland and opened their first mission station. Dr. W. L. Thompson, an American medical missionary, opened a dispensary at Mount Selinda in 1893. The Dutch Reformed Church missionaries opened a hospital at Morgenster mission when the first medical missionary, Dr. John T. Helm, arrived in 1894. His successor, Dr. M. H. Steyn, was to win fame as an ophthalmologist. The American Congregational Church missionaries opened their second mission at Chikore in 1895. 19 It was from these mission stations that missionaries evangelized the Shona and introduced Western education.

The Conquest of Matabeleland (1893) and the administration of Matabeleland, 1893-1895 Although Lobengula had acquiesced in the European occupation of Mashonaland in 1890, he did not give up his raids into Mashonaland for cattle, grain, women and children. To abandon this lucrative practice would have required a complete economic re-organization of his kingdom; he had no intention of reforming his kingdom on lines which would fit into the new world. 20 One example will suffice. Before white settlers arrived in Mashonaland, Chief Nemakonde who lived some seventy miles north-west of Salisbury had been paying tribute to Lobengula. In 1891 he apparently refused to pay the usual tribute. Accustomed to reap where he didn’t sow, Lobengula sent a party of forty warriors to find out why Nemakonde had defaulted. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation or mitigating circumstances, the Ndebele warriors not only murdered him and his whole family but also seized the remaining women and children and carried them off to Matabeleland.21 Because the incident did not threaten the economic development of Mashonaland, Jameson did nothing about it beyond remonstrating with Lobengula to abandon the abominable practice. On 9 July, 1893, however, a more serious development occurred when a Ndebele army (impi) raided in the vicinity of Fort Victoria to punish a 19 For details, see C. J. M. Zvobgo, A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe, 1890-1939, (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1996), Chapters 1 and 2. 20 Philip Mason, The Birth of A Dilemma, (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), 163. 21 Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, 283-284.

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local Shona chief whose people had stolen Lobengula’s cattle. The major difference between this raid and previous ones was that it was the first to occur in an area occupied by white settlers. Moreover, in the wake of the Ndebele raid, the Company’s Shona employees absconded from the mines and farms and took refuge in Fort Victoria. Jameson could no longer watch this development with equanimity. The impi not only murdered many Shona inhabitants in Fort Victoria and mutilated their bodies but also plundered their cattle and sacked their grain stores. The survivors took refuge in the town and European enterprise came to a halt. When in addition to plundering the town, the Ndebele demanded the surrender of Shona refugees in the town, Captain C. F. Lendy refused. Jameson ordered the Ndebele to retire across the border and at an indaba (conference) gave them an ultimatum to commence within an hour to withdraw from Fort Victoria. After an hour had elapsed, he sent Captain Lendy with a patrol to see whether his instructions were being followed. Lendy’s party of fortyseven men encountered one Ndebele detachment which, instead of complying with Jameson’s ultimatum, was attacking the village of a local headman. Lendy’s troops opened fire and the Ndebele suffered considerable casualties. Although Jameson had long contemplated a war with the Ndebele he lacked a suitable pretext for starting such a war. The Victoria Incident gave him a perfect casus belli for the invasion of Matabeleland. Besides, the expected Eldorado in Mashonaland had turned out to be utterly chimerical; he was optimistic that there might be better prospects in Matabeleland. On 14 August, he drew up an enlistment agreement whereby volunteers in the impending campaign against the Ndebele would receive land in return for their services. Under the Victoria Agreement each man was to be entitled to mark out a farm of 3,000 morgen in any part of Matabeleland and fifteen reef and five alluvial gold claims; Lobengula’s cattle were to be shared equally between the Company on the one hand and the volunteers on the other.22 In September, 1893 with the sanction of the British High Commissioner for South Africa, the Company’s forces were ready to march to Bulawayo in return for gold claims, farms and loot. The campaign which led to the conquest of the Ndebele kingdom has been the subject of considerable literature, among others, by F.Selous23, R.

22

L. H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia, (New York, Humanities Press, 1969), 111- 114. 23 Frederick C. Selous, Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia, (London, Rowland Ward and Company, 1896).

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S. S. Baden-Powell24, Frank W. Sykes25 and by Stafford Glass 26and no further elaboration is necessary except to say that the combined colonial forces from Salisbury, Victoria and Tuli under the command of Major Patrick William Forbes marched from Iron Mine Hill on 17 October. On 24 October, they crossed the Shangani River and the following day, at the Shangani Battle, the Ndebele were beaten. On 1 November, at the Bembesi Battle seventeen miles from Bulawayo, the Ndebele were routed. Lobengula fled from his capital and on 4 November, the victorious forces marched into Bulawayo and hoisted the Union Jack in the middle of the town. 27 With the flight of Lobengula from his capital, the Ndebele kingdom which had been the scourge of its neighbours for more than fifty years, came to an inglorious and violent end. In the first few months of 1894 white settlers poured into Matabeleland in large numbers and many of them were granted rights to farms. In addition to individual grants, a number of land and exploration companies were allowed to select large blocks of land for future development as farms and ranches. By the middle of 1894 practically all the most fertile areas of Matabeleland had been alienated to companies or individuals.28 Because of the alienation of prime areas of Matabeleland to companies and individuals, the Ndebele had very little land on which to live. To cope with this problem, the British Government issued the Matabeleland Order in Council on 18 July, 1894 providing for the appointment of a land commission empowered to deal with all questions relating to land in Matabeleland. The Commission was to assign without delay ‘to the natives inhabiting Matabeleland land sufficient for their occupation, whether as tribes or portions of tribes and suitable for their agricultural and pastoral requirements, including in all cases a fair and equitable proportion of springs or permanent water’. An important provision of this Order in Council stated: ‘A Native may acquire, hold, encumber, and dispose of land on the same conditions as a person who is not a native’.29 24

R. S. S. Baden-Powell, The Matabele Campaign, (London, Methuen and Company, 1897). 25 Frank W. Sykes, With Plumer in Matabeleland, (London, Archibald Constable and Company, 1897). 26 Stafford Glass, The Matabele War, (London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1968). 27 Hugh Marshall Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, 310. 28 Cd. 8674, Great Britain, Papers relating to the Southern Rhodesia Native Reserves Commission, 1915. 29 Public Record Office, London, Colonial Office files, (hereafter C. O.), 417/121, Matabeleland Order in Council, 18 July, 1894.

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After a tour of Matabeleland and after perfunctory interviews with white witnesses, the Commission assigned the Gwaai and Shangani Reserves for Ndebele occupation unaware, as it turned out, that at least five sixths of the Gwaai Reserve had no surface water for nine months of the year and the Shangani Reserve was infested with tsetse fly.30 Upon concluding its Report, the Commission submitted its recommendations to the British High Commissioner for South Africa on 29 October, 1894. The latter forwarded it to London on 19 November, 1894. On receiving the Report, the Secretary of State said he had no objections to the recommendations made by the Commissioners. 31 The Ndebele refused to move into the two Reserves; consequently, they found themselves living on private farms and therefore subject to rental charges and eviction. The cavalier manner in which Ndebele land had been parcelled out to companies and individuals, was a sore grievance which led to the Ndebele rising in 1896. Furthermore, the cattle question and the manner in which it was handled, was a major grievance which led to the Ndebele rising of 1896. After the war of 1893 the Company regarded all cattle in Matabeleland as its property by right of conquest. Accordingly, it embarked on a massive program to confiscate Ndebele cattle. In June, 1894 Jameson sent out large patrols one to the north, another to the south-east and another to the west of Bulawayo in search of Ndebele cattle and from that time onwards, patrols were constantly searching for Ndebele cattle until the end of 1895. The confiscated cattle were either distributed to the volunteers who had participated in the conquest of Matabeleland, or to individuals and syndicates or were sold by auction. Before the war the number of Ndebele cattle was estimated at between 200,000 and 280,000; in the final settlement, only about 40,930 cattle were left in Ndebele hands.32 In addition to the manner in which the cattle question had been handled, was the manner in which labour was recruited. To the Ndebele aristocracy, regular labour was odious but more importantly it was the manner in which it was recruited which led to a great deal of resentment. A senior official of the British South Africa Company, Mr. Hugh Marshall Hole, conceded that the abuse of power by the Matabeleland Native Police in the 30

Cd. 8674, The Southern Rhodesia Native Reserves Commission, Final Report, 16 December, 1915. 31 C. 8130, Great Britain, Matabeleland, Report of the Land Commission of 1894 and Correspondence relating thereto, Judge Vintcent to Sir Henry Loch, 29 October, 1894; Loch to Ripon, 19 November, 1894; Ripon to Loch, 25 January, 1895. 32 Ranger, Revolt, 113.

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recruitment of labour was a serious grievance which led to the Ndebele rising of 1896. He said the Ndebele resented the growing demand for their labour at the mines and still more at the methods adopted to meet it by some Company officials who used to send the Matabeleland Native Police into the districts for recruiting purposes. The latter abused their powers and strutted through the villages ordering young men to go to work and often compelling them by physical force. Moreover, there were definite cases of victimization by some unscrupulous white men who cheated their labourers of their wages and in other ways made the work irksome.33 In addition to these grievances, an epizootic visitation in the form of locusts and rinderpest, descended on Matabeleland in February, 1896. According to an official Report, a new kind of locust, more destructive than any ordinary species, and called ‘Intete za Makiwa’, the white man’s locusts, appeared in swarms, darkening the sky, turning large tracts of farmland into barren wastes and devouring the crops on which the Ndebele depended for food. The rinderpest, a new and unknown disease, was crossing their borders and strewing their pastures with the carcasses of their cattle.34 In order to prevent the spread of the disease, Government veterinary officers recommended the destruction of all herds of cattle which had been affected by the disease; unfortunately in the process they shot down thousands of healthy cattle including those which had been returned to the Ndebele in 1894; it added one more grievance to the mass of troubles which had been accumulating since the occupation of their country and all of which were attributed to the presence of the British.35 The Ndebele regarded the shooting down of the newly-returned cattle simply as an act of spite on the part of the white man.36

The Ndebele and Shona Risings, 1896-1897 According to the Jesuit journal, the Zambezi Mission Record, the Ndebele rising ‘took the whole white population by surprise. No one, and least of all those who knew the natives most intimately, had apprehended any danger from that quarter. The behaviour of the Matabele nation had been such as to favour the general illusion that the swift success of the British arms in 1893 had stunned it into complete submission’.37 33

Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, 349, 354. The ’96 Rebellions, (Bulawayo, Books of Rhodesia, 1975), 6. 35 Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, 348-9. 36 Sykes, With Plumer in Matabeleland, 64-65. 37 Zambezi Mission Record, (hereafter ZMR), (1906-1909), III, 36, April, 1907, 233. 34

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In addition to the grievances already referred to, the Ndebele rose in revolt against the Company regime because although they had been stunned by defeat, they had not been completely subdued in 1893; that is to say, although two or three of their best regiments had been severely mauled at the Shangani and Bembesi battles, the bulk of their forces had never crossed swords with white troops. Furthermore, the country had been denuded of white troops which had accompanied Dr. Leander Starr Jameson on his ill-starred Raid into the Transvaal on 31 December, 1895. Jameson’s surrender and capture became widely known in Matabeleland; the unbeatable Jameson had at last met his Waterloo; this gave the Ndebele a perfect opportunity to organize armed resistance. The Ndebele rising began on Monday, 23 March, 1896 when armed Ndebele suddenly appeared at several camps and stores in the Insiza and Filabusi districts and catching their owners unawares, stabbed or bludgeoned them to death. By the end of the month, the list of victims had swollen to 130; by the end of the first week in April, it had increased to 143.38 The Ndebele military leaders made a fundamental mistake in the early days of the rising; they neglected to block the southern route, the road from Bulawayo south-east to Tati and the regions beyond. This enabled the white settlers to communicate with Bechuanaland and the Cape, and it was over that very road that in May, Major Herbert Plumer hurried with reinforcements and supplies to the hard-pressed population.39 By the beginning of April, the rebel leaders had gathered their forces and were preparing to close in on Bulawayo. ‘Had the rebels pressed speedily forward and combined to deliver a general attack’, the Zambezi Mission Record later reported, ‘the consequences for the beleaguered inhabitants might have been serious in the extreme. It was fortunate, however, that at such a critical moment no leader appeared amongst the rebels with sufficient ability to take in the situation at a glance or powerful enough to assume the supreme command and impose an intelligent plan of concerted action upon the numerous hordes into which the fighting men of the nation were divided’.40 The details of the campaign to suppress the Ndebele rising are beyond the scope of this study. It will suffice to say that at the beginning of the rising, Ndebele impis were concentrated in the north, east and south of Bulawayo and were gradually converging on the town. The authorities using the Rhodesia Horse as a nucleus, formed a Field Force composed of 38

Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, Chapter XXIII. ZMR , (1906-1909), III, 36, April, 1907, 238. 40 ZMR, (1906-1909), III, 38, October, 1907, 309. 39

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25

all civilians capable of bearing arms and realizing the importance of keeping open the route from the south, erected a chain of forts along the road to the border with Bechuanaland in order to ensure the safety of food convoys. Simultaneously, the authorities in Salisbury took steps to despatch reinforcements to Matabeleland and on 6 April, a well-equipped contingent of 150 white troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Beal started for Matabeleland. But it soon became clear to Mr. Andrew Duncan, the senior representative of the Company in Matabeleland and his military advisers that even with the proffered military assistance from Salisbury, the combined forces would be inadequate to cope with the Ndebele rising and appealed to Cape Colony for assistance. On 2 April, Major Plumer, Assistant Military Secretary at the Cape, was ordered to raise and command a force for the relief of Bulawayo. Accordingly, he opened recruiting offices at Kimberley and Mafeking; the first detachment of the Matabeleland Relief Force left Mafeking ten days after recruitment began and by the end of the month the whole host of about 800 men was on the way to Bulawayo. In addition, at the end of May, the Imperial authorities raised mounted Volunteers in Natal and with the consent of Portuguese authorities, despatched them to Rhodesia via Beira. While these preparations were taking place the Bulawayo Volunteers sent out patrols almost daily to drive the Ndebele impis back; in spite of these efforts, however, the Ndebele impis continued to advance on the town. The rebels from Shiloh and Inyati pressed on until they ensconced themselves at the Umguza River some four or five miles north of the town. Several attempts to dislodge them were unsuccessful until 28 April when a column of 115 mounted white volunteers under the command of Captain Ronald Macfarlane defeated them. A patrol under the command of William Napier started on 11 May and after dispersing a Ndebele impi at Ntaba Zinduna, 12 miles away, it marched forward and effected a junction with Lieutenant-Colonel Beal and the Salisbury Column near the Shangani River on 21 May. In a pincers movement through the Insiza and Filabusi districts, the combined forces defeated the Ndebele and reached Bulawayo on 1 June. Meanwhile, Mr. Earl Grey who had been appointed Acting Administrator to succeed Jameson, reached Bulawayo on 2 May and took over control from Mr. Duncan. The Colonial Office appointed Colonel Sir Richard Martin as Deputy Commissioner and Commandant of all military forces in Rhodesia. On 21 May Martin reached Bulawayo and the following day, Major General Sir Frederick Carrington succeeded Martin as supreme commander of all the forces in Rhodesia. With over 2,000 white troops at his command, Carrington cleared the country west and

26

Chapter One

north of Bulawayo and together with Beal’s Column, inflicted a crushing defeat on a large Ndebele impi about six miles from Bulawayo. But just as the combined forces were preparing to attack the Matopo Hills, they received from Salisbury the appalling news of the Shona rising. The Shona rising began on 15 June, 1896. The Zambezi Mission Record later reported: ‘For some days before this date, the community at Chishawasha had been repeatedly told by the school boys that the men were sharpening their assegais and knives with the intention of killing the whites but in the full belief that rebellion was the last thing which this cowardly people would dream of, both Fathers and Brothers had laughed at the warnings, and set them down as the exaggerated reports of the children’. 41 ‘Knowing too well the cowardly nature and history of the natives around us’, Father Francis Richartz later explained, ‘we could not possibly fear the rising’.42 Father Richartz’s contempt for the Shona was widely shared among the Jesuit missionaries at Chishawasha and among the white population at large. The missionaries and the white population generally, were largely ignorant of the Shona past described in the general Introduction. As events were later to prove, this was a costly mistake. ‘We had underrated the Mashonas’, the Native Commissioner for Murehwa District, ‘Wiri’ Edwards tells us. ‘We knew nothing of their past history, who they were, or where they came from, and although many of the Native Commissioners had a working knowledge of their language, none really understood the people or could follow their line of thought’.43 At any rate, once the conflagration began, the Shona rising spread very rapidly. In the first few days of the rebellion, 119 Europeans were killed. Details of the campaign to suppress the Shona rising are beyond the scope of this study; an extant account of the campaign to suppress the Shona rising was provided by Colonel E. A. H. Alderson.44 It will suffice to say that when the Shona rising broke out there were 300 white men in Salisbury capable of bearing arms of whom about 60 were members of the Rhodesia Horse. Twenty-two Volunteers in two detachments led respectively by Lieutenant D. Judson of the Rhodesia Horse and Inspector R. C. Nesbitt of the Police, rode out 27 miles to rescue a party of 14 whites at the Alice Mine in Mazoe District. Five of the beleaguered party including two telegraph clerks, had lost their lives before the rescue party 41

ZMR, (1906-1909), III, 40, April, 1908, 394. Father Richartz’s account of the attack on and defence of Chishawasha Mission was reproduced in the official report, The ’96 Rebellion, Schedule J, 107-109. 43 William Edwards, ‘Wiri’, Part III, NADA, (1959-1963), 39, 1962, 23. 44 E. A. H. Alderson, With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force, (London, Methuen and Company, 1898). 42

From the Occupation of Mashonaland to the Ndebele and Shona Risings

27

arrived. The Acting Administrator, Judge J. Vintcent, declared martial law throughout Mashonaland and organized a citizen force in which all ablebodied men at once enrolled. He also took steps to intercept and recall the troops of the Natal Volunteers who were making their way across the country to Matabeleland and were approaching Charter. General Carrington immediately arranged for additional men to be sent forward. Beal’s Salisbury Column and 70 scouts originally raised by Mr. George Grey but now commanded by Mr. Charles White, reached Salisbury about the middle of July. A detachment of the Matabeleland Relief Force was also sent from Bulawayo to clear the Charter District. Simultaneously, Colonel Alderson with 250 mounted infantry left Cape Town for Beira and with the co-operation of the Portuguese authorities, entered Mashonaland from the East and reached Salisbury on 9 August, 1896. Meanwhile, early in July, a Column of 750 men under Plumer attacked Ntaba Zika Mambo, 60 miles north-east of Bulawayo. Following this engagement, the bulk of Ndebele forces concentrated in the broken granite country forming the Matopo range of hills. According to one account, they proved themselves ‘so resolute and formidable’ that Carrington found himself unable to subdue them with the forces at his command; while he could drive them from the open country, he could not follow them into the thick bush or the mountain fastnesses; he fully appreciated the problems of a protracted war and when Rhodes conceived the great idea of trying to reach a negotiated settlement with the Ndebele by hearing their grievances in person, Carrington approved of the scheme.45 On 21 August, Rhodes accompanied only by Dr. Hans Sauer, an old Kimberley friend and Mr. V. Stent, a special correspondent of the Cape Times and Mr. J. Colenbrander, as interpreter, rode five miles into the Matopo hills to negotiate with the Ndebele military leaders. The first meeting which lasted for several hours, was a prelude to several others. On 9 October, after consulting the Administrator, Mr. Earl Grey, and the Imperial Commissioner, Sir Richard Martin, Rhodes told the Ndebele military leaders that before peace could be achieved, they should surrender all arms and chiefs (indunas) who had remained loyal to the Company during the rebellion would be officially recognized and paid salaries conditional on good behaviour; certain acknowledged Ndebele grievances would be redressed and the Ndebele population generally would be assisted with food and provided with seed in preparation for the next season’s crops. The Ndebele accepted these terms at the fourth and final 45 Sir Thomas E. Fuller, The Right Honourable Cecil John Rhodes: A Monograph And A Reminiscence, (London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1910), 116-117.

28

Chapter One

indaba on 13 October. Immediately thereafter, the Imperial authorities having satisfied themselves that the organization of the new Police Force was proceeding smoothly and that all fear of further hostilities was, so far as the Ndebele were concerned, at an end, sanctioned the disbandment of Plumer’s Column; within a few weeks of the final indaba the rebels laid down their arms.46 A major beneficiary of the final peace settlement of 13 October was Chief Gambo Sithole who had remained steadfastly loyal to the Company regime during the rebellion. The Company Administration rewarded him for his loyalty. He was among the first to be chosen as a salaried induna; moreover, he owned an immense herd of cattle indicating that a large number of cattle had passed into his hands through the agency of the new regime. Gambo had thus managed to exploit a situation from which the majority of his people emerged impoverished.47 With the elusive peace finally achieved in Matabeleland, the military authorities turned their attention to the Shona rising; their mission was to hunt down, capture or kill the principal organizers of the rebellion. On 4 September, 1896 Chief Makoni, an influential rebel leader, was captured and executed by a firing squad on the edge of the precipice on which his kraal stood. On 27 October, Kagubi surrendered and was taken into custody. The capture of Kagubi was greeted with a great deal of euphoria. 48 Nehanda was captured in December, 1896. In spite of the death of Makoni, the surrender of Kagubi and the capture of Nehanda and their imprisonment (see photo) the Shona continued to fight. By March, 1897 the military authorities concluded that the quickest way to suppress the Shona rising was to starve the Shona into submission; accordingly, they went round the countryside burning down the standing crop of maize. Having failed to starve the Shona into submission, they embarked on a campaign to dynamite Shona strongholds. In spite of this, the Shona continued to fight. In April, 1897 the Wesleyan missionary, the Reverend John White, decided to mediate between the rebels and the Government as he feared that a protracted war would lead to great loss of life. Moreover, from the conversations he had had with some of the rebel chiefs, he was convinced that they were tired of fighting and wanted to sue for peace but did not trust the Government. He was sure that if the Government gave him a free 46

Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, Chapter XXIII. Ngwabi Bhebe, Christianity and Traditional Religion in Western Zimbabwe, 1859-1923, (London, Longman, 1979), 117. 48 For a poem which appeared in the Salisbury Nugget to celebrate the event, see Ranger, Revolt, 308. 47

From the Occupation of Mashonaland to the Ndebele and Shona Risings

29

hand in negotiating with the rebels, he would get them out of their caves. The Company Administration, however, turned down the offer and the rising continued. In August, 1897 the Reverend John White tried again to mediate and this time successfully persuaded Chief Nenguwo and his people to surrender to the Government. The Chishawasha missionaries also mediated between the Government and the rebels. As a result, on 6 September, 1897 some rebels from the Jesuit mission at Makumbe arrived at Chishawasha to talk of peace. On 15 September more rebels from Makumbe arrived at Chishawasha to hand in their weapons. On 11 October, other rebels from Makumbe handed in their weapons. Elsewhere in Mashonaland, the rebel chiefs and their people surrendered and handed in their weapons. The surrender of the chiefs and their people brought the Shona rising to an end.

The Aftermath of the Ndebele and Shona Risings, 1896-1898. After languishing for more than a year in prison, the principal leaders of the Shona rising, Mashonganyika, Kagubi and Gutu, ‘a famous chief’, were tried, found guilty of fomenting the rebellion and were hanged in Salisbury prison on 27 April, 1898; so was Nehanda, the famous spirit medium who had risen to prominence at the beginning of the Shona rising. The Jesuit missionary, Father Francis Richartz, who witnessed the executions, remarked afterwards: ‘Everyone felt relieved after the executions as the very existence of the main actors in the horrors of the rebellion, though they were secured in prison, made one feel uncomfortable’.49 The Shona rising was followed by a great famine. The wretchedness of the former residents of Chishawasha mission consequent upon the Shona rising, was provided by the Jesuit missionary, Father Boos: ‘Driven from retreat to retreat; deprived of all means of subsistence save the wild roots and berries they might find, they returned worn-out, famished, and a prey to infectious diseases’.50 Mr. Lawrence Vambe, a Shawasha and a former pupil at Chishawasha mission, tells us that like everyone else, the Shawasha people found themselves at the end of the conflict completely without food. The long struggle had made it impossible for them to 49

F. Richartz, ‘The End of Kagubi and other Condemned Murderers’, ZMR, (18981901), I, 2, November, 1898, 53-55. 50 A. Boos, ‘The Springtime of the Mashonaland Mission’, ZMR, (1898-1901), I, 4, May, 1899, 126.

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Chapter One

cultivate any new crops and what food they had had at the beginning of the rising was exhausted. Until life returned to some order, the tribe as a whole was reduced to a form of existence little better than that of animals, without shelter, without hope or dignity; many families were broken up either temporarily or permanently. The destitution of the Shawasha people, however, did not last long. Father Richartz not only managed to obtain food from the Administration and distributed it among the starving people but also gave them clothes, seeds and hoes.51 In spite of the horrors of the rebellion, Father Richartz saw positive results in the Shona rising. Writing in November, 1898 he said there were once more at Chishawasha at least as many people at the mission as there were before the rising of 1896. ‘Our school boys and catechumens’, he reported, ‘number about 180 altogether; the Sunday instructions are far more numerously attended; the opposition of the older people to the education of their sons and daughters has been broken, especially by reason of the famine which followed the war; belief in superstition and witchcraft has received a severe blow, which is a great assistance to us in convincing the young people of their futility’. In addition to those who had been at Chishawasha before the rebellion, many others, including Kagubi’s wife and children, requested for permission to be admitted onto the mission farm. ‘One of the most welcome changes in consequence of the war’, Father Richartz reported, ‘is the fact that the girls who were always kept away by their parents, come now in great numbers for instruction and while formerly no girl was allowed to think or speak about marrying a catechumen or neophyte, this is altogether changed now. We have our first two happy couples and about twelve engagements are settled which means twelve more Christian couples as all the boys make it a condition of marriage that the girls should be instructed’.52 These developments led Father Boos to write confidently of the period after the Shona rising as ‘the springtime of the Mashonaland mission with its joyous promises of good things to come’.53 In Matabeleland the mission stations of the London Missionary Society at Inyati and at Hope Fountain which had been founded in 1859 and 1870

51

Lawrence Vambe, An Ill-Fated People, (London, Heinemann, 1972), 142-143. F. Richartz, ‘Chishawasha After the Rebellion’, ZMR, (1898-1901), I, 2, November, 1898, 61-62. 53 A. Boos, ‘The Springtime of the Mashonaland Mission’, ZMR, (1898-1901), I, 4, May, 1899, 126. 52

From the Occupation of Mashonaland to the Ndebele and Shona Risings

31

respectively, were completely destroyed and the missionaries had to start de novo after the Ndebele rising.54 The Ndebele rising like the Shona rising was followed by a great famine consequent upon the devastation of large areas of Matabeleland during the fighting. The Jesuit missionary, Father Peter Prestage, said for want of food, thousands of people at Empandeni and in the neighbourhood of the mission were subsisting on diseased meat of rinderpest cattle, dead horses, mules, donkeys, wild berries and roots. This unwholesome food led to dysentery and diarrhoea which were the most common forms of sickness among the people throughout Matabeleland during the famine.55 The Reverend W. A. Elliot of the London Missionary Society said at Hope Fountain and in the neighbourhood of the mission, people were reduced to the most pitiable straits of hunger; they subsisted on the meat and skins of rinderpest cattle; the Company Administration fed nearly two hundred starving people for months at Hope Fountain and many more at other mission stations.56 The missionaries of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, Messrs. Virgil Robinson, I. B. Burton and W. H. Anderson, provided an equally-grim picture of the effects of the famine at Solusi and in the neighbourhood of the mission. Robinson reported that people wandered far and wide searching for practically non -existent food; the condition of the children was especially pitiful. Parents brought their children to the mission requesting permission to leave them there because they could not bear to see them starve. By the time the famine was over, there were thirty children under the care of the missionaries and separate housing was built for them. As the famine increased in severity, so did the number of victims who crowded around missionary homes pleading for food. The mission workers found it extremely difficult to eat their meals when every time they looked up they saw starving men and women staring at them through the windows.57 Burton reported that he had seen people hunting for roots and bulbs and eating different plants which at other times they would never dream of eating. He said he had seen people gather old bones and

54

Mrs. Helm, ‘In Matabeleland’, The Chronicles of the London Missionary Society, (1895-1897), Vols. 4-6, 5, July, 1896, 158. 55 For details, see the Jesuit journal, Letters and Notices, (1895-1898), Volumes 23-24, letters for 27 September and 10 October, 1896 and 18 March, 1897. 56 W. A. Elliot, Gold From The Quartz, (London, Messrs. Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Company, 1910), 172-173. 57 Virgil Robinson, The Solusi Story, (Washington, D. C., Review and Herald Publishing Company, 1979), 55-56.

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Chapter One

pound them into powder, cook them with some greens such as leaves and herbs and eat the mixture.58 Anderson said people were so thin and hungry that they staggered as they walked; yet missionaries were compelled to tell them that they had no food to offer them. He further tells us that on the road to Bulawayo missionaries would find fifteen to twenty dead bodies which had been devoured by vultures or jackals because there was no one to bury them; after the war there were large areas of Matabeleland where all children between three and fifteen years of age had died of starvation or of diseases which came in the wake of the Ndebele rising. 59

Summary and Conclusion This Chapter has examined the major developments in the history of Southern Rhodesia from the occupation of Mashonaland in 1890 to 1898 including the Moffat Treaty, the Rudd Concession, the Charter of the British South Africa Company; the march of the white ‘pioneers’ to, and the occupation of Mashonaland and Manicaland; the early life of the settlers in Mashonaland; the administration of Mashonaland; the planting of Christianity in Mashonaland and Manicaland; the conquest of the Ndebele kingdom and the administration of Matabeleland; the Ndebele and Shona risings and their aftermath. In spite of the ‘horrors’ of the Shona rebellion, the Jesuit missionary, Father Francis Richartz, saw positive results in the Shona rising in so far as many young people broke with their past and began to flock to the missions; this led the Jesuit missionary, Father Anthony Boos, to write confidently of the period after the Shona rising as ‘the springtime of the Mashonaland mission with its joyous promises of good things to come’. It appeared that in the immediate aftermath of the Shona rising, there was a veritable rush by young people in Mashonaland to embrace Christianity if the reports of the Jesuit Fathers are to be believed. It remained to be seen whether the optimism of the Jesuit Fathers was justified in the long term.

58

I.B. Burton, The Reminiscences And Recollections of A Pioneer Or With the Message In The Dark Continent, 1894-1924, (London, 1976), 53-54. 59 W. H. Anderson, On The Trail of Livingstone, (Mountainview, California, Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1969), 116, 121-122.

CHAPTER TWO FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIVE RESERVES TO RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1897-1923

Introduction The majority of the African people of Zimbabwe as elsewhere in Africa live on the land. The land shortage among Africans in Zimbabwe at independence in 1980 was directly traceable to the establishment of the Native Reserves and subsequent legislation. This Chapter examines the origins of the Native Reserves; economic developments and in particular the establishment of railways, mining and European agriculture; the major developments in African education; public health and in particular the ministry of healing and the stages by which the European settlers achieved Responsible Government in 1923.

The Establishment of the Native Reserves, 1898-1923 As already stated in Chapter 1 the Land Commission of 1894 assigned the Gwaai and Shangani Reserves for Ndebele occupation; these Reserves, however, turned out to be profoundly unsuitable for Ndebele occupation on account of lack of surface water in the case of the Gwaai Reserve and the prevalence of tsetse fly in the Shangani Reserve. The majority of the Ndebele therefore refused to move into them; consequently, they found themselves living on private farms and subject to rental charges and eviction. The two basic aims of Imperial land policy were to ensure that adequate Native Reserves were established throughout the country and to protect those Africans who were now living on European-owned land.1 The British South Africa Company accepted these aims and Native 1

R. H. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia, (London, Heinemann, 1977), 56.

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Chapter Two

Commissioners began to survey the Native Reserves in Matabeleland in 1897 and in Mashonaland in 1898. While these surveys were being carried out, the Imperial Government issued the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council on 20 October, 1898 embodying most of the provisions of the Matabeleland Order in Council of 1894; Clause 83 of the Order in Council of 1898 allowed Africans to buy and dispose of land anywhere in the Colony on the same conditions as Europeans.2 The Reserves, however, took time to demarcate and it was not until the end of 1902 that they were incorporated by an order of the Executive Council of the Southern Rhodesia Administration; they were then submitted to the Secretary of State who finally approved them on 11 July, 1908 on condition that they were to be regarded as provisional and therefore subject to possible further consideration. In 1913 the Imperial Government announced its intention to set up a commission to finalize the demarcation of the Native Reserves. On 18 December, 1913 the Under- Secretary of State, Mr. Lambert, on behalf of the Secretary of State, Lord Harcourt, asked the Directors of the British South Africa Company whether they had any proposals they wished to make in the matter.3 The Directors said they had no objections to the appointment of a commission provided it would make a final demarcation of the boundaries of the Native Reserves instead of a provisional settlement as suggested by the High Commissioner for South Africa, Lord Gladstone, in his letter to the Secretary of State on 30 April, 1913. The Secretary of State accepted the Company’s view that the proposed delimitation of the Native Reserves should be final. The Commission under the chairmanship of Mr. R. T. Coryndon, was empowered to examine the existing Native Reserves with special regard to the sufficiency therein of land suitable for the agricultural and pastoral requirements of the natives including in all cases a fair and equitable proportion of springs or permanent water and to report whether any of the said Reserves were sufficient for or in excess of the natives occupying them. The Commission was to take into account ‘not only the existing requirements of the natives but also their probable future necessities consequent upon the spread of white settlements to areas now occupied by natives and to the probable extension of those requirements by reason of the natural increase of population’.

2

C. 9138, Great Britain, Papers relating to the British South Africa Company, The Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 20 October, 1898, Clause 83. 3 Great Britain, Cd. 8674, Colonial Office (C. O. ) to British South Africa Company, 18 December, 1913.

From The Establishment of The Native Reserves To Responsible Government

35

In its Interim Report on 29 November, 1914 the Commission stated that the aggregate area of the Native Reserves was ‘more than sufficient for the present and future needs of the native population’. The Chairman submitted the Interim Report to the High Commissioner for South Africa, who in turn, forwarded it to the Secretary of State on 9 December, 1914. In its Final Report the Commission recommended a reduction of 6, 673, 055 acres of the 20, 491, 151 acres previously assigned as Native Reserves and added 5, 610, 595 acres making a net reduction of the Reserves by 1,062, 460 acres. The Chairman submitted the Commission’s Final Report to the High Commissioner for South Africa on 20 December, 1915. The latter transmitted the Final Report to the Secretary of State on 31 December, 1915. The Secretary of State after considering the observations of the High Commissioner for South Africa accepted the Commission’s recommendations as a whole and on 1 February, 1917 informed the British South Africa Company accordingly. On 9 November, 1920 the Imperial Government issued the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council vesting the Native Reserves in the High Commissioner for South Africa for ‘the sole and exclusive use of the native inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia’.4 In 1921 Earl Buxton’s Committee appointed by the Secretary of State to consider certain questions relating to Rhodesia, recommended that the right of Africans to acquire individual title to land anywhere in the Colony on the same conditions as Europeans, be preserved.5 In the Southern Rhodesia Draft Constitution of 1921 the principle allowing Africans to purchase land anywhere in the Colony on the same conditions as Europeans, was affirmed.6 The Responsible Government Constitution of 1923 vested the Native Reserves in a Board of Trustees for the sole and exclusive use of the indigenous inhabitants of the Colony.7

4

Great Britain, Cmd. 1042, Southern Rhodesia. Native Reserves in Southern Rhodesia, Desptach to the High Commissioner for South Africa Transmitting the Order of His Majesty in Council of the 9th November, 1920. 5 Great Britain, Cmd. 1273, South Africa, First Report of a Committee Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to consider Certain Questions relating to Rhodesia, paragraph 64 (4). 6 Great Britain, Cmd. 1573, Enclosure II, Southern Rhodesia Draft Constitution, paragraph 43. 7 The Southern Rhodesia Constitution Letters Patent, 1923, Clause 42 (1).

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Chapter Two

Economic Developments, 1897-1923 The establishment of Railways A major stimulus to economic development was the establishment of railways. A railway line from Kimberley via Vryburg and Mafeking reached Bulawayo in 1897. From Bulawayo the line was extended to Wankie where a German trader had identified rich coal deposits; production of coal began in 1903 and in 1904 the railway line was extended to Victoria Falls. A railway line from the port of Beira reached Umtali in 1898 linking Salisbury with the Indian Ocean; in 1899 the line was extended from Umtali to Salisbury. In 1902 the line from Salisbury reached Bulawayo thus linking Salisbury with the south. The railways not only speeded up the transportation of goods but also opened up local markets in the towns and mines and to external markets in South Africa, Mozambique and Europe for European produce.

Mining As already stated in Chapter 1 two weeks after reaching Fort Salisbury the European settlers scattered throughout Mashonaland to open up the gold claims which Rhodes and the British South Africa Company had promised them. The yellow metal, however, eluded even the most diligent smallscale prospectors and it was not until large companies brought machinery from South Africa that the gold mining industry began to pick up rapidly. The value of gold produced reached over £1,113,000 in 1905 and over £2 million in 1907. The value of the annual output exceeded £3 million from 1914 to 1917. 8 Meanwhile, extensive deposits of chrome were discovered at Selukwe and mining began at Peak Mine in 1906. High-grade asbestos was mined at Shabani in 1908. The mining of copper began at West Nicholson in 1906 and in 1914 Falcon Mine at Umvuma started production. The results, however, were disappointing; chrome, asbestos and copper produced between 1906 and 1923 were valued at less than £10 million while the total value of coal produced between 1904 and 1923 was only £2.5 million.9

8

Handbook of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1960), 454. 9 Montague Yudelman, Africans on the Land, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964), 40.

From The Establishment of The Native Reserves To Responsible Government

37

Agriculture The failure to find the reputed Eldorado in Mashonaland and Matabeleland led European settlers to devote their energies to agriculture. The country had a dual agricultural economy: the European and the African sectors. This section deals primarily with European agriculture. In 1907 a Land Bank was established to assist white farmers with loans for buying stock and agricultural machinery. The Department of Agriculture distributed various kinds of improved seeds and advised farmers on the growing of tobacco and opened an experimental station at Salisbury. The information gathered was widely distributed among the white farmers. An important cash crop produced during this period was tobacco. In 1910 white farmers produced 200,000 pounds of the crop and the first tobacco auction sales were held in Salisbury; by 1914 the country was producing more than 3, 000, 000 pounds of tobacco annually. Equally important was maize; several varieties of this important crop were imported not only from the Transvaal and Natal but also from the United States of America; by crossing different strains the Department of Agriculture produced new white varieties including Hickory King and Salisbury White which yielded a high percentage of grain per cob and had greater resistance to disease. Maize production increased from 23,308 pounds in 1907 to 5, 911, 123 pounds in 1910 and in 1911 maize was exported for the first time. The Hickory King and Salisbury White varieties were grown in most of Mashonaland while the Potchefstroom Pearl White variety was best adapted to the climatic conditions of Matabeleland. In animal husbandry, Government veterinary officers managed to eradicate the most dangerous cattle diseases; as a result, the number of cattle which had been depleted by rinderpest in 1896 and by the East Coast fever in 1902 rose from 314, 000 head in 1914 to nearly one million in 1923.

Major Developments in African Education, 1899-1923 Introduction We have seen in Chapter 1 that it was from the mission stations established in Mashonaland and Manicaland from 1891 to 1895 that Christian missionaries evangelized the Shona. After the end of the Ndebele rising the London Missionary Society (LMS) expanded its operations in Matabeleland when the Reverend David Carnegie opened a

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Chapter Two

mission station at Centenary 30 miles west of Hope Fountain in October, 1897 on a farm of 6,000 acres which the LMS had been granted by the British South Africa Company.10 Missionaries of the Brethren in Christ Church from the United States of America under the leadership of Bishop Jesse Engel founded Matopo mission near Bulawayo on 7 July, 1898 on a farm of 3, 000 acres which they had been granted by the British South Africa Company.11 In Manicaland the American Methodist Episcopal Church missionaries under the leadership of Bishop Joseph Hartzell12 founded Old Umtali mission in 1898. It was from the older mission stations established in Mashonaland and Manicaland between 1891 and 1895 and the new mission stations founded after the end of Ndebele and Shona risings that Christian missionaries further evangelized the Shona and Ndebele. Although the ministry of preaching was important to the missionaries in their evangelistic work, a potent evangelistic agency was Western education. The following section examines the major trends in African education from 1899 to 1923.

The Rationale for Establishing Schools Initially, the main objective of missionary education was religious. In order to strengthen the faith of the converts, it was necessary to enable them to read the Bible and related religious literature in the vernacular. It was largely for this reason that instruction in reading was begun.13 The rationale for establishing schools in Southern Rhodesia must be understood in the broader context of missionary enterprise elsewhere in Africa. William West, the Chairman of the Methodist Synod in the Gold Coast from 1858 to 1871 defended the schools which his predecessor, Thomas Birch Freeman, had started in the Gold Coast. To the Missionary Committee in London these schools did not justify the expense they entailed. In defence of these schools, West stated that the Methodist 10

W. A. Elliot, Gold From the Quartz, (London, Messrs. Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Company, 1910), 183. 11 J. Hostetter, ‘Mission Education In A Changing Society: The Brethren In Christ Mission Education In Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1959’, (Buffalo, State University of New York, D. Ed. Thesis, 1967), 28. 12 For a biography of Bishop Hartzell, see K. Eriksson, The Life of Bishop Hartzell, (Umtali, Rhodesia Mission Press, 1963). 13 W. R. Peaden, Missionary Attitudes to Shona Culture, 1890-1923, (Salisbury, The Central Africa Historical Association, Local series, 27, 1970), 8-9.

From The Establishment of The Native Reserves To Responsible Government

39

churches in the Gold Coast with but one or two exceptions were the fruits of the schools: ‘If these schools were closed and the teachers withdrawn, the churches in many places would fade away. As places for teaching English and formal school subjects, they were ineffective but as centres for moral and religious teaching they were irreplaceable’.14 In Nigeria missionaries saw in schools the ‘nursery of the infant Church’, the principal hope for the success of their work. ‘If most of the adults were too much wedded to the ideas of their fathers, the children whose minds were as yet unhardened, should provide more fruitful ground for the sowing of the seed of the new religion’.15 For this reason, schools were ‘an evangelistic agency of the highest importance’.16 In Southern Rhodesia, Catholic missionaries, for example, were convinced that without schools there would be no adherents to the new faith they had brought; pupils meant catechumens and converts.17 Among missionaries of the Dutch Reformed Church the main objective of education initially was to teach the converts and potential converts to read the Bible.18 A pioneer missionary of the Brethren in Christ Church at Matopo mission, Miss Frances Davidson, stated that initially to enable the pupils to read and understand the word of God was the main aim of the school work and the Bible was the textbook throughout.19 In Southern Rhodesia as elsewhere in Africa the emphasis was on the children. The Wesleyan missionary, the Reverend Isaac Shimmin, stated on 18 May, 1899: ‘It is with the children that our main, and indeed our sole hope of building up a Christian community in this country rests and from the beginning it is our aim to endeavour to provide them with a Christian education’.20 Another Wesleyan missionary, the Reverend J. 14

F. L. Bartels, The Roots of Ghana Methodism, (London, Cambridge University Press, 1965), 89. 15 J. F. Ajayi, Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841-1891, (London, Longman, 1965), 134. 16 E. A. Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842-1914, (London, Longman, 1966), 285. 17 A. J. Dachs and W. F. Rea, The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe, 1879-1979, (Gwelo, Mambo Press, 1979), 107. 18 O. E. K. Maravanyika, ‘An Investigation into the Evolution and Present State of the Primary School Curriculum in Reformed Church in Zimbabwe: A Case Study in Curriculum Analysis for Planning and Development’, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe, Ph. D. Thesis, 1986), 106. 19 H. Frances Davidson, South and South Central Africa, (Elgin, Illinois, Brethren Publishing House, 1915), 66. 20 Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society Archives, London, Correspondence, Rhodesia, 1899-1904, Isaac Shimmin to M. Hartley, 18 May, 1899.

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Butler, stated that schools offered a wonderful opportunity to instill the teachings of Jesus and the Christian truth into the hearts and minds of African boys and girls, the rising generation.21 In time, the missionaries broadened this narrow religious approach to African education to include academic education. With this background in mind, we should now consider the major developments in African education from 1899 to 1923.

Major Developments in African Education, 1899-1923 The expansion of Western education among Africans in Southern Rhodesia during this period was a result of the partnership between the missions and the British South Africa Company Administration with the missions shouldering the burden of African education and the Company Administration providing grants to the missions. Under the Education Ordinance of 1899 the Company Administration awarded an annual grant of ten shillings in respect of each pupil who during the previous year had attended school on at least two hundred occasions provided that the school devoted at least two out of four hours daily to industrial training and the average daily attendance was not less than fifty.22 Government grants to mission schools, the number of mission schools which qualified for Government grants and the number of pupils enrolled in them between 1901 and 1920 are shown in Table 1. Table 1. Year

Grants to Mission Schools

Number of Mission Schools

Number of Pupils

1901

£

133.00

3

265

1910

£

2,780.00

115

9,873

1920

£

9,467.00

750

43,094

21 J. Butler, ‘Anvil strokes’, The Foreign Field of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, (1920-1921), 245. 22 For details, see The British South Africa Company: Reports on the Administration of Rhodesia, 1898-1900, The Education Ordinance Number 18, 1899.

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Under the Education Ordinance of 1903 the Administration awarded grants to those mission schools where, among other things: (1) at least 40 pupils attended school on 150 days of four hours daily during the year; (2) industrial work was systematically taught; (3) the pupils were taught to speak and understand the English language and (4) instruction was carried on in a satisfactory manner. The amount of grant depending on the efficiency of the school, would not exceed £125 per annum.23 Under the Education Ordinance of 1907 in addition to the conditions listed in the Education Ordinance of 1903, the industrial training required for purposes of earning grants included agriculture, building, carpentry and domestic science for girls. In 1910 the Education Ordinance of 1907 was amended to provide grants of £60 per annum for each European instructor who was qualified to teach industrial subjects and £60 per annum for each European teacher who was qualified to train African teachers. The Acting Director of Education said the Government instituted grants for industrial training ‘solely for the purpose of giving advanced Native pupils real training by instructors holding definite qualifications to teach their respective subjects’.24 The Education Ordinance Number 7 of 19 July, 1912 provided for the inspection of schools by the Director of Education or by an Inspector of Schools for the purposes of examining the state of the school buildings and equipment, ascertaining the progress of the pupils, the qualifications of the teachers and the nature of the instruction given. The Ordinance empowered the Director of Education to close any school if, after a full inquiry, he was dissatisfied with the manner in which it was conducted.25 In 1914 the Company Administration increased the maximum grant a mission school could earn from £125 to £200 per annum. In 1918 in order to encourage the teaching of agriculture in mission schools, the Administrator authorized an increase in Government grants for fullyqualified European agricultural instructors to three quarters of their salary up to a maximum of £225 per annum. Government grants to the missions were a mixed blessing. On the one hand missionaries welcomed them because although they were grossly insufficient relative to their needs, they made possible a wider diffusion of 23 Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the matter of Native Education in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, 1925, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1926), 39. 24 Report of the Acting Director of Education for the year ended 31st December, 1910, 11. 25 British South Africa Company Reports, Ordinance No. 7, July, 1912 To Provide For The Control of Native Schools.

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education among Africans than the meagre resources of the missions themselves could have accomplished.26 On the other hand, they resented what they perceived as an attempt by the Government to control and influence the direction African education should take. This became evident when the Native Commissioner for Sinoia District, Mr. Herbert Keigwin, (see photo) was appointed by the Company Administration as Director of Native Development in 1920. Mr. Keigwin’s primary objective was to evolve an educational policy and development strategy capable of dealing effectively with the problems of African development in the rural areas.27 Following his appointment, Mr. Keigwin unveiled a scheme for African development in the rural areas. While paying tribute to the missionaries for their contribution to African education, Mr. Keigwin argued that with notable exceptions their educational policy had been to improve the lot of the minority among Africans; by contrast the Government was working towards the improvement of the lives of the mass of the people. To achieve this, it was vital to introduce industrial development beginning at the bottom and in the simplest home industries among the people, teaching them to provide things for themselves and to attain comforts and amenities hitherto undreamed of by them. ‘Then, and not till then, when the mind of the people has opened, will the natives themselves of their own free will go out and work without any compulsion to earn the wherewithal to purchase those things which they will have learned to value’. The simplest home industries Keigwin had in mind included hides and skins, agriculture, rope and mat making, basket and chair making, pottery, tiles and carpentry; of these the most important from his point of view, was agriculture. He argued that existing agricultural methods could not continue indefinitely; as the Native Reserves got filled up, the soil was being exhausted faster than was thought possible; it was therefore necessary to introduce better methods of tillage and proper crop rotation. In co-operation with the Native Department ‘an immense improvement in native methods could be

26 J. G. Kamusikiri, ‘African Education under the American Methodist Episcopal Church in Rhodesia: Objectives, Strategies and Impact, 1898-1966’, (Los Angeles, University of California, Los Angeles, Ph. D. Thesis, 1978), 90-91. 27 Rungano J. M. Zvobgo, ‘Government and Missionary Policies on African Secondary Education in Southern Rhodesia with Special Reference to the Anglican and Wesleyan Methodist Churches, 1934-1971’, (Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, Ph. D. Thesis, 1980), 54.

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effected; not only could existing native crops be improved but others such as flax, groundnuts and cotton might be developed under the scheme’.28 To enable Mr. Keigwin to implement his scheme the Government opened two industrial training schools at Domboshawa in the Chinamhora Reserve in Mashonaland and at Tjolotjo in the Gwaai Reserve in Matabeleland in 1920 and 1921 respectively. Domboshawa School was opened in June, 1920 with 14 pupils and by the end of the year 37 pupils drawn from various districts were enrolled. The School offered both academic and industrial training. The daily programme at the Domboshawa School began with breakfast at 6 a.m. followed by roll-call and drill at 6.30 and prayers at 6.50. The junior pupils received academic instruction from 7 to 8.30 a.m. followed by industrial training from 8.30 to 12 noon while the senior pupils were engaged in industrial training from 7 a. m. to 12 noon. Lunch was served at 12 noon. The senior pupils received academic instruction from 1.30 to 3 p m. Industrial training for seniors resumed at 3 and ended at 5.30 p.m. Supper was served at 6 p.m. followed by evening classes for all pupils from 8 to 8.30 p. m. Lights were turned off at 9 p. m. On Saturdays, work ended at noon and in the afternoon, pupils played football. On Sundays after the Service, pupils were free to do as they pleased. On admission into Domboshawa School, all pupils were required to take courses in building, carpentry and vegetable gardening. In addition, 20 acres of land were ploughed with a view to planting wheat and barley. ‘This’, Mr. Keigwin said, ‘is a most important experiment both because, if successful, it will teach the Natives to work a large portion of their Reserves which at present is scarcely touched and because it may open up the way to highly remunerative and desirous crops’.29 At Tjolotjo School, pupils were trained in building and carpentry. In addition to the usual work on the farm, pupils were instructed in special branches of dairy work (milking, separating cream, making butter and cheese); forestry (sowing of tree seeds and care of the beds); hay-making (cutting and stacking grass for winter food for stock); ensilage (digging silo pits, cutting and storing green crops in the pits for winter feeding of stock); pig-keeping, proper care of poultry and vegetable growing. Pupils 28 Southern Rhodesia, Miscellaneous Reports, 1917-1923, Report by Mr. H. S. Keigwin, Esquire, Native Commissioner on suggested Industrial Development of Natives, 1920, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1920), 3-5, 7, 11. 29 An Account written by the Director of Native Development, H. S. Keigwin, to the Chief Native Commissioner, 5 January, 1921, reproduced in N. Atkinson, Teaching Rhodesians: A History of Educational Policy in Rhodesia, (London, Longman, 1972), 213.

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were also given special instruction in the construction and upkeep of windmills similar to those used for supplying water in the Native Reserve.30 While appreciative of the industrial training they were being given, the pupils at both schools soon demanded more academic education in order to increase their earning capacity. Keigwin came to sympathize with this aspiration and found himself having to offer them the same academic subjects taught in first-class mission schools.31 At the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held in Bulawayo in July, 1922 Mr. Keigwin’s scheme was the subject of a heated debate. Speaking on behalf of the Conference’s Executive Committee, the Anglican missionary, the Reverend E. H. Etheridge, stated that when Mr. Keigwin unveiled his scheme at the Missionary Conference of 1920, he had assured the Conference that the schools he proposed to establish for native industrial development would be very different from mission schools. They were to provide something which mission schools could not provide; they were to be native industrial training centres rather than schools in the ordinary sense; on that assurance the Conference had welcomed the scheme. Although he praised the work Mr. Keigwin and his staff had done at the two Government schools, Etheridge lamented the fact that the work at the two schools was becoming increasingly duplicative of the work being done at mission schools. While conceding that building, carpentry and agriculture were being excellently taught at the two Government schools, he maintained that missionaries had taught these industrial subjects at their schools for many years and that nothing was being taught at Domboshawa School which was not being taught or could not be taught equally well in mission schools. Moreover, academic education was assuming an importance it did not have initially in the curriculum of the two Government schools; the same prominence was being given to academic education at the two schools as was given in firstclass mission schools. In defence of Mr. Keigwin’s scheme, the Reverend M. Reyneke of the Dutch Reformed Church stated firstly that good work was being done at the two schools; he did not believe that Mr. Keigwin had lost sight of his original aim. Secondly, the Government was experimenting and the experience gained from the two schools would prove to be of real benefit to mission schools. Thirdly, at Domboshawa School industrial training was being done systematically; the School was in fact, a model mission station. Also in defence of Mr. Keigwin’s scheme, 30

Thomas Jesse Jones, Education in East Africa, (New York, Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1924), 239-240. 31 Franklin Parker, ‘African Community Development and Education in Southern Rhodesia, 1920-1935’, International Review of Missions, (1962), 339.

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the Reverend M. Vlok of the Dutch Reformed Church stated that when Mr. Keigwin introduced his scheme at the Missionary Conference of 1920 he was somewhat skeptical of the scheme but after visiting Domboshawa School any doubts he might have entertained, had been dispelled and urged the Conference to give the scheme a chance. The President of the Conference, the Reverend Neville Jones of the London Missionary Society, said when he visited Domboshawa School, he could not see the difference between this School and a well-conducted mission school. He felt, however, that the work at Domboshawa School complemented their own efforts; for this reason he could not support any motion which tended to stultify the scheme in its experimental stage. The Principal of Tjolotjo School, the Reverend T. T. Alexander, pleaded with the Conference to give the two schools a fair chance and pointed out that his own school had only been operating for a year. In a spirited defence of his scheme at the Conference, Mr. Keigwin argued that one of the major differences between his scheme and mission schools was that although a large measure of academic instruction was given at the two Government schools, the pupils started first and foremost with work; the two schools were essentially schools of work. The teachers were endeavouring to give the pupil something that would be of immediate value to him in his own life; the Government never intended that the new schools should usurp the functions of the mission schools; it simply wanted to suggest the direction which industrial training should take; he hoped to help the missions in their efforts to the same end.32 Although some missionaries were still skeptical of the efficacy of Mr. Keigwin’s scheme, the majority decided to co-operate with the Government in order to make their own educational work among Africans more fruitful.

The Ministry of Healing, 1893-1923 In addition to Western education, a crucial evangelistic agency was the ministry of healing. Christian missionaries started medical missions in colonial Zimbabwe as elsewhere in the world firstly because the ministry of healing was an integral part of the ministry of Jesus. One example will suffice: ‘And Jesus went about in Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the gospel of the Kingdom, and healing all manner of

32 Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held at Bulawayo, 5 to 8 July, 1922, Appendix III, 240.

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disease and all manner of sickness among the people’.33 Secondly, they viewed medical missions as an invaluable evangelistic agency; a few examples will suffice. The Wesleyan medical missionary, Dr. L. Parsons, argued that medical missions constituted ‘an excellent object lesson’ in Christianity: ‘If by skillful treatment a sick native is relieved of pain or cured of his disease he is far more prepared to receive and respond to the Gospel message than if this is presented to him with his pain unrelieved’.34 Miss Frances Davidson of Matopo mission echoed these sentiments when she stated that by ministering to the physical sufferings of the people the missionary paved the way for ministering to their spiritual needs. She added: ‘He who neglects this part of the work makes a grave mistake’.35 In southern Mashonaland, the medicine chest, stethoscope and scalpel accompanied the Gospel and were often invaluable in winning the confidence of the chiefs who were initially reluctant to permit missionaries to enter their area; on numerous occasions the suspicions or antagonism of traditional authorities were overcome after successful medical treatment.36 The expansion of the American Methodist Episcopal Church would have been extremely difficult without the services of Dr. Samuel Gurney, a medical missionary. When Dr. Gurney arrived in Murehwa District in 1909 and opened a clinic, the people had no confidence in white doctors but he soon won them over through his medical skills. On one occasion he treated under anaesthetic a young girl who had been gored by a bull near her home. He placed her on a table, cleaned the wound, administered medicine on it and stitched it up. After three months she completely recovered; she was converted and became a Christian. This incident firmly established Dr. Gurney as a miracle worker and people began to flock to him for medical treatment. In 1910 he reported, ‘From having no confidence in the white medicine man, they have now gone to the other extreme and now seem to think there is nothing he cannot do and if he does not raise the dead, it must be because he does not want to do so’.37

33

St. Matthew’s Gospel, 4: 23, King James’ Version, (Oxford University Press, 1881). 34 L. G. Parsons, ‘Medical Missions’, The Bulletin of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, (1910). 35 H. Frances Davidson, South and South Central Africa, 162. 36 M. L. Daneel, Old and New in Southern Shona Independent Churches, (The Hague, Mouton, Vol. I, 1971), 230. 37 Samuel Gurney, ‘Report of the Missionary in charge of the work in the Murehwa and Mutoko Districts’, in Minutes of the Seventh Session of the East and

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47

Dr. Gurney continued with his ministry of healing. When the worldwide influenza epidemic of 1918 broke out in Southern Rhodesia as a whole and in the Murehwa District in particular, the Native Commissioner for Murehwa requested Dr. Gurney to assist in containing the disease. The Government turned the local church into a hospital and transferred African patients suffering from the disease to a make-shift hospital where Dr. Gurney, assisted by the Principal of Old Umtali mission, the Reverend H. N. Howard and all his African teaching staff, treated them. The Native Commissioner paid tribute to Dr. Gurney for his invaluable services during the influenza epidemic.38 In the Victoria Province as noted in Chapter 1 medical missions among Africans were pioneered by missionaries of the Dutch Reformed Church who opened a hospital at Morgenster mission when the first medical missionary, Dr. John T. Helm, arrived in 1894. In addition to his medical work at Morgenster Hospital, Dr. Helm also ministered to lepers, the outcasts of Shona society when he started a voluntary leper settlement on Morgenster mission farm in 1899. The number of inmates increased from 8 in 1910 to 40 in 1912. 39 The Government took a keen interest in the leper settlement and in June, 1913 ordered the removal of all lepers from Morgenster mission to a new farm which it had acquired on the neighbouring Native Reserve; in 1914 the Medical Director appointed Dr. Helm as Medical Superintendent of the new leper settlement at a salary of £200 per annum. The number of inmates increased from 76 in 1916 to 84 in 1918 to 96 in 1920 to 153 in 1923.40 In ministering to the physical and spiritual needs of the lepers, Dr. Helm made an invaluable contribution to the ministry of healing. It was because of the demonstrated efficacy of the ministry of healing as an invaluable evangelistic agency that Christian missionaries opened clinics, dispensaries and hospitals at their mission stations and people flocked to them for medical treatment. This is not to suggest that the people had abandoned their faith in their traditional doctors but that in treatments which required surgery, for example, Western medical technology proved superior to traditional remedies. Central Africa Mission Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church held at Old Umtali, August 17-September 3, 1910, 51. 38 National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), N/9/1/21, Native Commissioners’ Reports, Murehwa District Report For The Year Ending 31 December, 1918. 39 NAZ, N/9/1/15, Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), Report of the Native Commissioner (NC), Victoria District, for the year ending 31 December, 1912. 40 Southern Rhodesia, Report on the Public Health for the year 1923, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1924), 26.

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From British South Africa Company Rule to Responsible Government, 1898-1923 Introduction This section examines in some detail the structure of the British South Africa Company Administration and the developments which led to the granting of Responsible Government to the European settlers in 1923.

The British South Africa Company Administration, 1898-1923 The Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898 laid down the basis of Company Administration until European settlers achieved Responsible Government in 1923. Mindful of the absence of supervision which had led to the Jameson Raid, the Secretary of State appointed a Resident Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia subordinate to the High Commissioner for South Africa and an Imperial Commandant General to head the Police and armed forces. The Resident Commissioner was to report to the High Commissioner for South Africa on all proposed appointments and ordinances. The High Commissioner had to sanction all administrative appointments and approve all local ordinances before they were submitted to the Secretary of State. The Order in Council established the first Legislative Council and set up a regular civil service headed by an Administrator. In 1898 Mr. William Milton was appointed Administrator for Mashonaland while Sir Arthur Lawley was appointed Administrator for Matabeleland. When the latter resigned in 1901, the entire Executive Council was unified under Milton who supervised the work of all Departments, presided over the Executive and Legislative Councils and also served as Secretary for Native Affairs. Below him was the Chief Native Commissioner who supervised Native Commissioners and Assistant Native Commissioners in the Districts. The chiefs, shorn of most of their traditional powers, stood at the bottom of the administrative pyramid; the Administrator in Council could remove them from office subject to the approval of the High Commissioner for South Africa. In their new role as underlings of the Native Commissioners, the chiefs were responsible for the good conduct of their people, for reporting crimes, deaths and epidemics to the Native Commissioners and for assisting with the collection of taxes and the apprehension of criminals. District Headmen, appointed by the Secretary for Native Affairs on the recommendation of the chiefs, were to assist in this work. In their capacity as auxiliaries to the Native Administration, the

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chiefs received salaries; by 1911 there were 142 salaried chiefs in Mashonaland and 129 in Matabeleland.41

The Road to Responsible Government, 1903-1923 The Order in Council of the Southern Rhodesia Administration of 1903 increased membership of the Legislative Council to seven nominees of the Company and seven settlers. In 1907 the settlers were given a majority in the Legislative Council by a reduction of the Company’s nominees to five; this was ratified by the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1911. In 1914 a Proclamation provided for an automatic increase in the number of elected members to a maximum of fifteen. The number of elected members increased from 12 in 1914 to 13 in 1920.42 While the European settlers were represented in the Legislative Council, Africans had practically no voice in the running of the country. Under the Order in Council of 1898 any male person who was either a British subject by birth or naturalization and had for six months preceding the registration of voters either occupied a building in the electoral district valued at £75 or owned a mining claim or earned not less than £50 per annum, was entitled to vote provided he could write his name, address and occupation.43 These franchise qualifications were beyond the reach of most Africans; as a result, in 1922 out of a total of 18, 810 registered voters only about 60 were Africans most of whom were of South African origin. Meanwhile, the political future of the country remained uncertain. The British South Africa Company’s Charter after twenty-five years was due to expire in 1914. The Rhodesian Constitutional League which demanded an end to Company rule and its replacement by Responsible Government, was formed in Bulawayo in November, 1912 and in Salisbury in January, 1913. In 1914 the Company’s Charter was amended to enable the Company to rule the Colony for another ten years. In 1917 the Responsible Government Association was formed to campaign for the immediate introduction of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia at the end of Company rule. In 1919 those who favoured joining the Union of South Africa formed the Rhodesia Unionist Association but in the April, 1920 41

L.H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia, (Humanities Press, New York, 1969), 142. 42 Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, (Oxford University Press, 1959), 10. 43 Great Britain, C. 9138, Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 20 October, 1898, 20.

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general election 12 out of 13 elected members favoured the introduction of Responsible Government at an early date. In the country at large out of 6, 765 votes 4, 663 were cast in favour of Responsible Government. The result of this election prompted the British Government to appoint a committee under Earl Buxton to recommend: (1) when and with what limitations Responsible Government should be granted to Southern Rhodesia and (2) the procedure to be adopted with a view to working out its constitution. In its report, the Committee stated that the question whether Southern Rhodesia was or was not ready for Responsible Government should be decided one way or the other at the earliest possible moment and recommended that: (1) the electors of Southern Rhodesia should be given an opportunity to express their opinion for or against the adoption of Responsible Government; (2) in light of the results of the April, 1920 general election, the British Government should draw up a scheme for Responsible Government and place it before the voters for their acceptance or rejection; (3) this opinion would be better ascertained by means of a referendum; (4) if the vote in the referendum should favour the introduction of Responsible Government, it would be necessary to issue an Order in Council annexing Southern Rhodesia to the Crown.44 In the proposed referendum, the electors were to vote either for Responsible Government or to join the Union of South Africa. Leaders of the Rhodesia Unionist Association argued that Southern Rhodesia could not stand on its own feet financially and since the British Government was unwilling to grant any loans to Southern Rhodesia, the country had no alternative but to join the Union of South Africa.45 The South African Prime Minister, General Jan Christian Smuts (see photo) made generous offers to the Rhodesians: they would be represented in the Union Parliament by 10 and ultimately by 17 members with 4 seats in the Senate. The Union would take over Rhodesia’s railways and pay special attention to expanding the small Portuguese port of Beira which had now become a vital link in Rhodesia’s communication system.46 These blandishments, however, failed to sway the majority of white Rhodesians to vote in favour of joining the Union of South Africa. Furthermore, Smuts pulled the rug from under the feet of those white Rhodesians who wanted the country to 44 Great Britain, Cmd. 1273, South Africa, First Report of a Committee Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Consider Certain Questions Relating to Rhodesia, 1921. 45 J. A. C. Mutambirwa, The Rise of Settler Power in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1898-1923, (Cranbury, New Jersey, Associated University Press, 1980), 203. 46 Gann, A History, 246.

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join the Union of South Africa. In March, 1922 he suppressed a white miners’ strike in Johannesburg with great brutality47and when he personally visited Rhodesia to canvass white voters to vote in favour of joining the Union, the image of Smuts as a sworn enemy of the workers and a tool of the capitalists, could hardly have endeared him to the majority of Southern Rhodesia’s white workers. Moreover, the supporters of Responsible Government argued that Southern Rhodesia would be better off as an internally self-governing British colony rather than as a junior partner in an enlarged Union of South Africa.48 In the referendum held on 6 November, 1922, 8, 774 votes were cast in favour of Responsible Government and 5, 989 for Union. Accordingly, Southern Rhodesia was annexed as a British Crown Colony by an Order in Council on 30 July, 1923 and by Letters Patent of 1 September, it obtained a Constitution conferring Responsible Government which came into effect on 1 October, 1923. Under the country’s new Constitution, the Secretary of State could disallow discriminatory legislation against the Africans but in deference to white Rhodesian opinion, this power was seldom exercised. The new Administration was headed by a Governor who represented the British Crown, a locally-elected Prime Minister and a Parliament consisting of thirty white members. The former Governor of Mauritius and of the British West Indies, Sir John Chancellor, was appointed the first Governor while a local white politician, Mr. Charles Coghlan, was elected the first Prime Minister. While the Colony was allowed to control its own armed forces, it was forbidden to conduct an independent foreign policy.

Summary and Conclusion This Chapter has examined the history of Southern Rhodesia from the establishment of the Native Reserves in 1898 until the European settlers achieved Responsible Government in 1923 and in particular the establishment of the Native Reserves; economic developments including the establishment of the railways, mining and European agriculture; the major developments in African education; public health and in particular

47

The strike arose from the decision by the Chamber of Mines to replace some of the highly-paid white workers with Africans in order to reduce costs. Smuts took the field in person and in putting down the strike 687 white miners were injured and 153 were killed, four of them by execution. See L. M. Thompson, A History of South Africa, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995), 159-160. 48 Gann, A History, 237.

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the ministry of healing and the stages by which the European settlers achieved Responsible Government in 1923. The two basic aims of Imperial land policy were to ensure that adequate Native Reserves were established throughout the country and to protect Africans who found themselves living on European-owned land. In spite of the establishment of the Native Reserves as separate areas for the indigenous inhabitants, Clause 83 of the Order in Council of 20 October, 1898 allowed Africans to acquire and dispose of land anywhere in the Colony on the same conditions as Europeans. In 1921 Earl Buxton’s Committee appointed by the Secretary of State to consider certain questions relating to Rhodesia, recommended that the right of Africans to acquire individual title to land anywhere in the Colony on the same conditions as Europeans, be preserved. The Southern Rhodesia Draft Constitution of 1921 affirmed the principle allowing Africans to buy and dispose of land anywhere in the Colony on the same conditions as Europeans. The Responsible Government Constitution of 1923 vested the Native Reserves in a Board of Trustees for the sole and exclusive use of the indigenous inhabitants of the Colony. Railways were the life-blood of the economic development of the Colony; they not only speeded up transportation of goods to local markets in the towns and at the mines but also to the external markets in South Africa, Mozambique and Europe. The major minerals discovered and mined during this early period were gold, coal, chrome, asbestos and copper. The modest value of these minerals nevertheless laid the foundation for the future economic development of the country. The expansion of Western education among Africans in Southern Rhodesia during this period was a result of the partnership between the missions and the British South Africa Company Administration with the missions shouldering the burden of African education and the Company Administration providing grants to the missions. Government grants to the missions were a mixed blessing. On the one hand missionaries welcomed them because although they were grossly insufficient relative to their needs, they made possible a wider diffusion of education among Africans than the meagre resources of the missions themselves could have accomplished. On the other hand, they resented what they perceived as an attempt by the Company Administration to control and influence the direction African education should take. This became evident when Mr. H. S. Keigwin, Native Commissioner for Sinoia District was appointed Director of Native Development in 1920. Although some missionaries disagreed with Keigwin’s objectives in establishing two Government

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industrial training schools for Africans at Domboshawa in 1920 and at Tjolotjo in 1921 they decided to co-operate with the Government in order to make their own educational work among Africans more fruitful. Although the ministry of preaching was obviously important to the missionaries in their evangelistic work among Africans in colonial Zimbabwe, the most potent evangelistic agencies were Western education and the ministry of healing. Of all the British colonies in Tropical Africa during this period, Southern Rhodesia occupied a unique place; it was the only Colony which was allowed to have not only an all-white Parliament with a locallyelected Prime Minister but also to control its own armed forces. The African majority had practically no say in the running of the country. In the allocation of prime areas of the country to a small white settler community and the shunting of the African majority to the Native Reserves, lay the seeds of future conflict.

CHAPTER THREE FROM RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT TO THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND, 1923-1953

Introduction This Chapter focuses on the major developments in the history of colonial Zimbabwe from the inauguration of Responsible Government to the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1923-1953) and in particular the land problem; the franchise question; economic developments and the major trends in African education.

The Land Problem, 1923-1953 From 1920 onwards the majority of European farmers in Southern Rhodesia demanded segregation in land ownership because they were strongly opposed to the idea of Africans buying land in their midst.1 Thus a settler delegation which arrived in London in 1921 to discuss the question of Responsible Government for Southern Rhodesia urged the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Winston Churchill, to sanction land segregation. In reply Mr. Churchill stated that Clause 83 of the Order in Council of 1898 which allowed Africans to buy land anywhere in the Colony on the same conditions as Europeans, enshrined ‘a long and accepted principle’ and refused to agree to an alteration the corollary of which was the exclusion of Africans from other areas. He added, however, that if a full and impartial enquiry should show, after Responsible Government had been granted, that some amendment of the law was necessary, His Majesty’s Government might be prepared to consider an amendment.2 1

R. H. Palmer, ‘The Making and Implementation of Land Policy in Rhodesia, 1890-1936’, (London, University of London, Ph. D. Thesis, 1968), 260-261. 2 Great Britain, Cmd. 1573 Despatch to the High Commissioner for South Africa transmitting Draft Letters Patent providing for the Constitution of Responsible

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Accordingly, on 8 January, 1925 the Government appointed a land commission chaired by Sir Morris Carter, former Chief Justice of Uganda and Tanganyika, to ‘enquire into and report upon the expediency and practicability of setting apart defined areas outside of the boundaries of the Native Reserves, (a) within which Natives only shall be permitted to acquire ownership of or interest in land, and (b) within which only Europeans shall be permitted to acquire ownership of or interest in land’. In its Report, the Commission stated that the overwhelming majority of those who were interviewed favoured the establishment of separate areas in which each of the two races, Black and White, should be permitted to acquire ownership of or interest in land and that the establishment of separate areas for the two races was not only expedient but also practicable. The Commission recommended 6, 851, 876 acres as Native Purchase Areas; assigned 17, 423, 815 acres for purchase by Europeans and left 17, 793, 300 acres unassigned.3 The Commission recommended the following acres summarized in Table 1: Table 1 Total area of Southern Rhodesia Existing Native Reserves Matopo National Park Urban Areas Forest Area Native Purchase Areas Land alienated to Europeans Land still available to Europeans

96, 226, 560 21, 594, 957 224, 000 149, 033 670, 000 6, 851, 876 31, 033, 050 17, 423, 815

The European area amounted to 48, 605,898 acres while the Native areas (including the Native Purchase Areas) totaled 28, 933, 362 acres. As a result of the rapid increase in African population from an estimated 936, 000 in 1926 to 1, 081, 000 in 1931 when the Land Apportionment Act came into force, most of the Native Reserves were over-crowded and over-stocked; this in turn led to the exhaustion of both Government in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia and Other Draft Instruments Connected therewith, Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner, 22 December, 1921. 3 Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Land Commission 1925, (Salisbury, Government Printer 1926), paragraph 206.

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arable and grazing land and to severe soil erosion. Because of the overcrowding in the Native Reserves the Government created Special Native Areas from the Unassigned Area which together with the Native Reserves formed the Native Areas. Most of the Native Areas, however, were in low rainfall areas, contained poor and infertile soil while the European Areas covered most of the High Veld with generally superior soil and rainfall. 4 The Land Apportionment Bill incorporating most of the Land Commission’s Report was passed into law as the Land Apportionment Act on 10 October, 1930 and was brought into force on 1 April, 1931 with adjustments in acres shown in Table 2. Table 2. Land Apportionment Act, 1931. European Area Native Reserves Native Purchase Areas Unassigned Forest Area Undetermined Area Total

49,149,174 21,600,000 7,464,566 17,793,000 590,500 88,540 96,686,080

The Land Apportionment Act was amended in 1941 and in 1945. The 1941 amendment allowed local authorities to establish Native Urban Areas in the vicinity of European towns. 5 The 1945 amendment forbade the owner or occupier of land in the European Area from ‘disposing of or attempting to dispose of any such land to a Native; lease any such land to a Native; permit, suffer or allow any Native to occupy such land’. In 1951 the Government passed the Native Land Husbandry Act which was touted as the panacea for land conservation in the Native Reserves. The objects of the Act were to: (i) ‘provide for a reasonable standard of good husbandry and for the protection of natural resources by all Africans using the land’; (ii) ‘limit the number of stock in any area to its carrying capacity and, as far as practicable, to relate stock holding to arable land as a means of improving farming practice’; (iii) ‘allocate individual rights in the arable land and in the communal grazings as far as possible in terms 4

Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1959), 29. 5 Montague Yudelman, Africans on the Land, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964), 79.

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of economic units’; (iv) ‘provide individual security of tenure of arable land and individual security of grazing rights in the communal grazings’.6 The Act allocated to each peasant family eight acres of land two of which were to be used for grazing and the remainder for crops. The allocation of eight acres of sandy soil to each peasant family in the Native Reserves was patently unjust because the minimum economic holding for a European farmer was about 750 acres. 7 Africans were universally opposed to the Act. African opposition to the Native Land Husbandry Act must be understood in the broader context of the land problem in peasant societies in general. Peasants rarely have anything other than land and labour with which to sustain themselves. Without capital, with limited mobility and few alternative opportunities for making a livelihood, they are tied to the land; threats to their position vis-à-vis the land are threats to their security. For this reason, land has an importance that transcends purely economic considerations.8 It is in this broader context that African opposition to the Native Land Husbandry Act in Southern Rhodesia must be understood. Although it was passed as a land conservation measure, Africans were universally opposed to the Native Land Husbandry Act because it required them among other things to de-stock their cattle. To the simple villager, cattle were his wealth, his means of livelihood, his bank account and his insurance in old age; reduction of this asset hit him hard and no arguments about improvement of his stock carried much weight.9 In 1953 the Land Apportionment Act was again amended. Table 3 illustrates the acres assigned to Europeans and Africans under the amendment:

6

What the Native Land Husbandry Act Means to the Rural African and to Southern Rhodesia, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1955). 7 K. E. E. Brown, Land in Southern Rhodesia, (Sinoia, Southern Rhodesia, Africa Bureau, 1959). 8 Yudelman, Africans on the Land, 57, 60. 9 Nathan Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1965), 37.

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Table 3: Land Apportionment, 1953. European Area Native Reserves Native Purchase Areas Special Native Areas Unassigned Areas Wankie Game Reserve Forest Area Undetermined Total

47,407,792 20,859,350 5,657,135 4,135,427 14,207,918 2,989,000 987,745 59,755 96,304,122

Under the Land Husbandry Act, as already stated, most of the areas assigned as Native Reserves were in low rainfall areas, contained poor and infertile soils while the European areas covered most of the High Veld with generally superior soil and high rainfall as shown in the map below for 1955:

Source: Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, 4.

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The Franchise Question, 1923-1953. Introduction From the advent of Responsible Government in 1923 European settlers in Southern Rhodesia managed to keep themselves in power because of the restrictive franchise which prevented the majority of Africans from voting; consequently, Africans had practically no say in the running of the country. This section examines the manner in which European settlers were able to maintain their elite status and to dominate the political life of the country through their supremacy at the polls.

The Franchise Question 1923-1953 Although in 1922 there were only 60 registered African voters out of 18, 810 registered voters before the elections leading to Responsible Government in 1923 the Government doubled the income qualifications from £50 to £100 per annum and the property qualifications from £75 to £150. As a result, between 1928 and 1948 the number of registered African voters was miniscule as shown in Table 4: Table 4 Year 1928 1933 1939 1948

Total Electorate 26,629 28,515 28,894 48,000

Africans on Roll 62 58 39 258

Although 258 registered African voters in 1948 were hardly a threat to European rule, the Electoral Act of 1951 raised the income qualifications from £100 to £240 per annum and the property qualifications from £150 to £500 10 while the average wage of an African was £55 per annum. 11 Consequently, only 380 Africans managed to get on the electoral roll in 1953; by continually raising the electoral qualifications to prevent most 10

Frank C. Clements, Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society, (Praeger, New York and Washington, 1969), Appendix, 277. 11 Eshmael Mlambo, Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright, (London, C. Hurst and Company, 1972), 287.

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Africans from voting, the settlers were able to maintain their supremacy at the polls.

Economic Developments, 1923-1953 Gold production remained the mainstay of the mining industry in Southern Rhodesia until 1929 when the production of base minerals exceeded gold production. In the wake of the establishment of the Electricity Supply Commission in 1936 and the rapid spread of power lines across the gold belt, gold production increased. With sufficient power available, additional machinery was installed and mechanization of operations began. The value of gold produced continued to exceed that of base minerals until 1948 when as a result of the increase in prices of base minerals together with increased production, the value of base minerals overtook gold. The mining of coal, first begun at Wankie in 1903, gradually increased and exceeded a million tons per annum from 1927 to 1930 but declined during the world economic slump and did not exceed the million tonne mark again until 1937. Production was originally from Number 1 Colliery until Number 2 Colliery was opened in 1927. With increasing demand from the Northern Rhodesian copper mines, the capacity of Number 2 Colliery was increased and in 1953 Number 3 Colliery was opened. Lithium and beryllium were discovered in the Bikita District in 1949 and production started the same year; by 1951 Southern Rhodesia had become the world’s second largest producer of lithium and beryllium. The production of chrome originally commenced in 1906 increased up to 1930 when the mineral was badly affected by the world economic slump with production plummeting from 226, 000 tons in 1930 to 17,000 tons in 1932. Production reached over 300,000 tons by 1937 but again declined on eve of the Second World War. Table 5 illustrates the value of minerals produced between 1926 and 1952 in £million. Table 5. Product Gold Asbestos Chrome Coal

1926 2.5 0.7 0.4 0.4

1930 2.3 1.0 0. 5 0.5

1934 4.7 0.4 0.2 0.3

1938 5.8 1.0 0. 2 0.5

1942 6.4 1.5 0.7 0.6

1948 4.7 1.7 0.3 0.7

1950 6.3 4.6 1.2 1.1

1952 6.2 6.7 4.2 1.8

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In 1953 the value of gold produced reached £6, 444, 000; the value of chrome reached £2, 928, 000 while the value of asbestos reached £6, 543, 000.12

Agriculture In 1936 the Government introduced the compulsory auction of tobacco through the Tobacco Marketing Act; under the Act, the Tobacco Marketing Board was made responsible for regulating auctions, classifying and grading the tobacco submitted for sale. On the eve of the Second World War, the annual auction sales of flue-cured tobacco reached £1 million. Meanwhile, in 1931 the Government set up the Maize Marketing Board and the following year it established the Cold Storage Commission to assist the beef and dairy cattle industry. Table 6 illustrates the value of agricultural products produced between 1938 and 1952 in £ million. Table 6. Product Tobacco Maize Cattle Dairy Total

1938

1944 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.2 3.8

1946 3.0 1.2 1.2 0.4 8.0

6.0 1.3 1.4 0.4 11.4

1948 10.3 2.8 1.8 0.6 18.6

1950 16.5 3.2 2.5 0.7 27.1

1952 17.3 5.6 4.0 1.0 34.0

Source for Tables 5 and 6: Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, 18.

Fear of competition from African maize producers prompted white farmers not only to demand a supported price for their maize but also called for discrimination against African maize producers whose sales of maize were sufficiently large to threaten the maintenance of a supported price applied solely to European-grown maize. The Maize Marketing Board instituted a two-price regime for locally-produced maize: all maize delivered to the Maize Marketing Board was assigned either to a local or to an export pool. The amount allocated to the local pool was the amount deemed adequate to meet local demand. Prices paid for this maize were 30 12 William J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961), 121.

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to 50 per cent above world prices; the surplus was exported. The manner in which the allocation was made protected the smaller European producers and discriminated against African producers.13 In the African sector of the economy, African farmers produced several food crops including maize, red millet (rapoko); grey millet (mhunga), sorghum (mapfunde), rice, beans and groundnuts, sweet potatoes, chillies, watermelons and cucumbers. Of these, maize was not only the major staple of the majority of Africans in Zimbabwe but was also an important cash crop.

Developments in African Education, 1924-1953 Up to 1924 African education in Southern Rhodesia was controlled partly by the Education Department and partly by the Native Affairs Department, the two Departments working independently. When Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and his team visited the country in 1924 they recommended, among other things, the establishment of a separate Department of Native Education, greater Government financial support to the missions, the award of grants to mission schools conditional on the quality and quantity of the work done, the immediate organization of a supervisory system of mission schools of all grades and especially the third class or out-schools to enable them to reach their potential. During the course of their visit, they were very impressed with the organization of the two Government industrial training schools at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo. They commented that the objectives and adaptations of education reflected in the principles and methods of these two schools were among the most interesting and significant they had observed in all of Africa.14 The Hadfield Commission which was appointed by the Government in 1925 to inquire into all aspects of African education in Southern Rhodesia also recommended the establishment of a separate Department of Native Education and the termination of the system of dual control as speedily as possible.15 In 1927 the Government finally inaugurated a separate Department of Native Education as recommended by Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and by the Hadfield Commission of 1925. The new 13

Yuldelman, Africans on the Land, 179-180. Thomas Jesse Jones, Education in East Africa, (New York, The Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1924), 251, 253. 15 Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the matter of Native Education in all its bearings in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1926), 12, 14. 14

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Department was headed by Mr. Harold Jowitt (B. A., M. Ed.) assisted by four Inspectors of Schools-J. A. Farquhar (Salisbury Circuit), W. H. Seaton (Umtali Circuit), A. R. Mather (Fort Victoria Circuit) and H. C. Finkle (Bulawayo Circuit). An Organizing Instructress for Domestic Science, Miss M. Waters, was also appointed. The Missionary Conference of 1928 welcomed the advent of the new Department of Native Education and its new Director, Mr. Harold Jowitt, an eminent liberal educator from Natal with fourteen years of experience in African education and whose efficiency and reputation had preceded him.16 In his report for 1928 Jowitt stated that when he was appointed Director of Native Education there were ‘practically no data bearing upon definite conditions in over 90 per cent of the schools, upon the teaching staffs, upon the class or age distribution of the pupils, upon their school leaving age, upon the number of boys and girls in the different parts of the educational system, upon the examination system or its relation to output, upon teacher training in relation to current needs, upon the rate of increase of schools of different types and of different denominations, upon educational facilities on the mines or in the towns and upon many kindred problems’. According to Jowitt, African education had suffered from a lack of clarity and general agreement regarding aims. ‘Many who were directly responsible for educating Natives’, he stated, ‘never defined their objectives, and hence if they missed the mark it was largely because they never had set up a mark at which to aim’; those who defined their educational aims expressed them in different terms and while having much in common, they failed to reach ‘a central unifying principle’ of education. The aims of African education, he stated, should be to develop ‘the potential capacities of the Native into dynamic abilities’; ‘to plan school activities around centres of interest’; ‘to study his environment’ and to keep in touch with developments of suggestive value taking place elsewhere.17 He hoped to remedy these ills among other things, through an efficient system of African education. Although the Government had inaugurated the Department of Native Education in 1927 it was not until the Legislative Assembly passed the Native Development Act on 31 May, 1929 that the new Department was formally established. The Act empowered the Department to issue a series of new regulations to improve African education. 16

Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference, 26-29 March, 1928, 24-25. 17 Harold Jowitt, ‘The Aims of African Education’, in Annual Report of the Director of Native Education for the year 1928.

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Under the new regulations, no grants would be paid to a teacher training school unless its staff had been approved by the Director of Native Education and unless it had an average attendance of 10 students and no grant would be earned by any student who, having failed the teacher training course in two successive years, was permitted to enroll in the same class for the third year. The Director could reduce the amount of grant to any teacher training school if he had reason to be dissatisfied with the work, equipment or the general conduct of the school. According to the new regulations the Director of Native Education reserved the right to approve or withhold the opening of any boarding school for which no adequate provisions were made. Each boarding school was required to have a full-time European headmaster and European or African assistants as might be required. The new regulations fixed the amount of grants to be awarded to boarding schools in respect of teachers’ salaries, equipment for industrial training and general equipment including books, stationery and school furniture approved by the Director. In Central Day Schools the new regulations fixed the school hours exclusive of the hours devoted to industrial work at a minimum of three hours per day. Approved European headmasters and approved European or African assistants were required to give instruction for at least 10 hours per week. The new regulations fixed the amount of grants to be awarded to Central Day Schools in respect of industrial training, domestic science training for girls, the qualifications of approved African teachers, industrial equipment and general school equipment including books, stationery and school furniture approved by the Director. The Government could reduce the amount of grant to any Central Day School if the Director had reason to be dissatisfied with the work, equipment or the general conduct of the school. In Village Schools the new regulations fixed the school hours inclusive of the hours devoted to industrial work at a minimum of three hours daily. The control and regular supervision of Village Schools would devolve upon European superintendents approved by the Director. In exceptional cases where the remoteness and inaccessibility of the country appeared to justify special consideration, the Government could approve for grant purposes, of a number of specified visits by approved African deputy superintendents whose character, record and qualifications were deemed fully satisfactory for the work of this nature provided that approval had been secured before the visits were made. The new regulations fixed the amount of grant in respect of approved African teachers, approved equipment including books and stationery approved by the Director; no grant would be paid in respect of any Village School in which the average

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daily attendance fell below 10. Under these regulations the Government could reduce the amount of grant to a mission school if the Director had reason to be dissatisfied with the work, equipment or the general conduct of the school.18 Jowitt proceeded to use the enormous powers of his Department under the new regulations to tighten the Government’s control of African education. When asked at the Missionary Conference of 1930 whether it was necessary to seek Government authorization before opening unaided schools, Jowitt, after quoting from the Education Ordinance of 1912, said all schools whether aided or not, had to be registered with his Department. Although one section of the Ordinance allowed missionaries a three-month grace period before registering unaided schools, he pointed out that his Department had the right to close such schools or to close any school if it was not satisfied that such a school was meeting the various conditions in the Ordinance. Many missionaries were unhappy at not being allowed to open unaided schools which, though inefficient from an educational point of view, served ‘a most useful purpose in the propagation of the Gospel’. Jowitt stated that if such schools were considered inefficient, it would be necessary for his Department, after due warning, to close them. When the President of the Conference (the Reverend A. A. Louw, Senior) asked for a compromise, Jowitt said he was prepared to adopt a generous interpretation of the regulations in cases where it could be shown that such inefficient schools were not weakening other schools and there was some hope that such schools would become efficient in the future.19 It has been necessary to dwell on the educational reforms initiated by Jowitt because they brought efficiency to African education in Southern Rhodesia. For example, Jowitt reduced the number of untrained teachers from 76 per cent in 1928 to 39 per cent in 1933.20 Furthermore, the quality of the village teacher, the backbone of the entire educational system, improved tremendously.21 From 1931 to 1933 the number of aided Village Schools decreased by 300 partly due to the consolidation of existing schools and the closing down of what were generally regarded as inefficient schools and partly due to the depletion of funds available to missionary societies. Although an 18 Report of the Director of Native Education for the year 1929, Schedule B, Native Development Act, 31 May, 1929, 93-94. 19 Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference held at Bulawayo, 26th to 28th June, 1930, 6-7. 20 Report of the Director of Native Education for the year 1933, 6. 21 Dickson A. Mungazi, Colonial Education For Africans: George Stark’s Policy in Zimbabwe, (New York, Praeger, 1991), 31.

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apostle of efficiency, Jowitt regretted the closure of these schools. ‘To the casual onlooker’, he remarked, ‘the tendency is to say that the matter is of little moment since these schools were lacking in efficiency and in practical results and hence that their disappearance is educationally irrelevant. Against this, however, it should be remembered that efficiency is a relative term; it is never an end in itself and that even in the most rudimentary village school there can issue results of enduring value’.22 Jowitt was a liberal educator with a burning spirit to advance African welfare, a reconstruction philosophy about which he spoke eloquently and wrote boldly. In the end, however, the enormous power amassed by his Department and his liberal philosophy of education incurred official hostility. 23 In frustration, he resigned and accepted a similar post in Uganda. The Missionary Conference of 1934 regretted Jowitt’s resignation and in a tribute to his achievements, said the success of African development during the previous six years was largely due to the ability, energy and foresight of Mr. Jowitt who had won and retained ‘the complete confidence’ of the Missionary Conference. Jowitt who attended the Conference was deeply touched and warmly expressed his appreciation on behalf of himself and his whole Department for this tribute to their efforts. 24 He was succeeded by Mr. George Stark who was initially appointed Acting Director of Native Education in 1934 and Director of Native Education in 1935. Stark had been recruited by Jowitt from Lovedale in South Africa. That he was a hard-working colleague was evident from Jowitt’s Report for 1930: ‘Mr. Stark places on record the various ways in which our endeavours must be tackled effectively. He believes that the road is long and progress along it is slow. But only by keeping sight of the ultimate goal can we avoid being disheartened’.25 When Jowitt resigned, Stark in a tribute to his contribution to African education said the significance of his work would be realized with the passage of time and that his departure was a great loss to the Colony. 26 While acknowledging with ‘deep gratitude’ Jowitt’s contribution to African education, Stark was basically a conservative educator who, instead of building on the educational foundations laid by Jowitt, reversed 22

Report of the Director of Native Development For the Year 1933, 10. Franklin Parker, ‘African Community Development And Education in Southern Rhodesia, 1920-1935’, International Review of Missions, (1962), 345. 24 Proceedings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference, Great Zimbabwe, 21-25 June, 1934, 8-9. 25 Report of the Director of Native Education, 1930, 12. 26 George Stark, Annual Report of the Director of Native Education, 1934. 23

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most of the reforms made by his predecessor. This was evident from his report for 1934 in which he stated that the underlining principle governing Native education, reading and writing, did not matter until the material basis of life had been assured. African education must be confined to helping Africans to relate their educational activities to tribal life. The objective of Native education must therefore be to ‘make an effort to bind more closely the ties between the school and tribal life’ with particular emphasis on the village school system. ‘True education’, he stated, ‘does not come from books, but passes from person to person. The efficacy of the teacher depends on what he is rather than what he knows’. For this reason his Department emphasized character training of African children in the Colony.27 In spite of Stark’s opposition to higher academic education for Africans, a milestone was achieved in the history of education in the Colony with the inauguration of African secondary education at the Anglican mission at St. Augustine’s in January, 1939. Beginning in 1934 missionaries supported the introduction of African secondary education in Southern Rhodesia in the main because the increase in upper primary facilities between 1927 and 1933 enabled more African pupils to acquire a full primary academic education than in the past; consequently, the demand for post-primary education also increased to the point where it became necessary for missionaries to respond. Up to that time African teachers sufficiently qualified to teach upper primary classes in boarding and teacher training schools were recruited from the Union of South Africa. The missionaries found this arrangement unsatisfactory, inter alia, because African teachers born in the Union of South Africa did not settle well in Southern Rhodesia; they did not know the local vernacular while if African youths were sent to South Africa for secondary education, there was always the temptation of the higher wages offered there to entice them to remain in the Union.28 For these reasons, it became necessary to introduce African secondary education in Southern Rhodesia. However, at the Missionary Conference held at Morgenster Mission in July, 1937 the representative of the Anglican Church made it clear that the Anglican Church was not prepared to support a joint effort to provide 27

George Stark, ‘The Aims of African Education’, in The Annual Report of the Acting Director of Native Education for the year 1934. 28 National Archives of Zimbabwe, (hereafter NAZ), Ang. 29/1/1, Secondary Education at St. Augustine’s , South African Institute of Race Relations, J. D. Jones, Edith B. Jones and Brian Grimston, ‘Native Education in Southern Rhodesia: Proposed Post-Primary Courses’, 15 February, 1937, 2.

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African secondary education.29 Instead, after the Conference, the Anglican Church launched a vigorous campaign to raise funds both at home and abroad for the contemplated African secondary education course at St. Augustine’s. The campaign was very successful and in January, 1939 the Anglican Church launched African secondary education at St. Augustine’s with six pupils. Due to Stark’s influence, the Government refused to support the school with a grant. Initially, a class-room in the Primary School was used for lessons but in February, a new block of buildings consisting of two class-rooms and one science room was opened by the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Herbert Stanley. Although the initial intake of pupils was small, Anglican Church officials were pleased that the African secondary education course had finally begun and hoped that in time St. Augustine’s mission might become the leading centre for African secondary education in Southern Rhodesia.30 Following the example of the Anglicans, the Catholic Church opened a junior secondary education course for Africans at Kutama mission in 1945. Another milestone in African education in Southern Rhodesia was the launching of the first Government African secondary school at Goromonzi in 1946. This was partly a result of the unprecedented industrial boom after the Second World War. The increased demand for skilled labour could not be met by the European community alone; consequently, many more Africans were able to secure skilled employment. For example, while factories employed 12, 319 Africans in 1938 the figures rose to 18, 833 in 1942. In these circumstances it was necessary to provide opportunities for higher education for Africans. Quite apart from these pressures, the official policy of gradual development on a broad front was likely before long to produce a need for teachers with some form of secondary education capable of instructing the upper classes in African primary schools.31 For utilitarian reasons and also to enable it to control the growth and development of African education, the Government was compelled to open up limited secondary school opportunities for Africans. Because of the limited number of pupils admitted into St. Augustine’s and 29

NAZ, Ang. 29/1/1, Report of the Findings of the Committee on Higher Education of Natives in Southern Rhodesia held at Morgenster, July 13 and 14, 1937. 30 Rungano J. Zvobgo, ‘Government and Missionary Policies on African Secondary Education in Southern Rhodesia with Special Reference to the Anglican and Wesleyan Methodist Churches, 1934-1971’, (Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, Ph. D. Thesis, 1980), 122. 31 N. D. Atkinson, Teaching Rhodesians, (London, Camelot Press, 1972), 118.

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at Kutama, other Africans who desired to obtain secondary and higher education had to go to the Union of South Africa. But with the war effort slowing down European immigration and with an increasing demand for skilled manpower which could not be met exclusively from whites, it became necessary to introduce African secondary education. Accordingly, in 1946 the Government opened Goromonzi Secondary School about 22 miles east of Salisbury. The School offered courses in English Language, Latin, Greek, Shona, Ndebele, Mathematics, General Science, Biology, History and Geography.32 In 1949 the first post-Junior Certificate education course of the University of South Africa was opened at Kutama to provide qualifications for teachers for upper primary classes. In 1951 the Wesleyans opened a junior secondary course at Tegwani Training Institution in Matabeleland with students taking courses in English Language, English Literature, Mathematics, History, Latin, Geography, Chemistry and Biology for the Junior Certificate of the University of South Africa. In 1952 the Church of Christ opened a junior secondary education course at Dadaya mission; by 1953 seven mission schools were offering a junior secondary education course for Africans in Southern Rhodesia.

Summary and Conclusion This Chapter has examined the major developments in the history of Southern Rhodesia from the inauguration of Responsible Government to the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (19231953) and in particular the land problem, the franchise question, economic developments and the major developments in African education. European settlers in Southern Rhodesia demanded segregation in land ownership because they were strongly opposed to the idea of Africans buying land in their midst. Accordingly, the Government appointed a land commission to determine whether the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole supported segregation in land ownership. In its Report the Commission concluded that the overwhelming majority of those who were interviewed favoured the establishment of separate areas in which each of the two races, Black and White, should be permitted to acquire interest in land and that the establishment of separate areas was not only expedient but also practicable. The Land Apportionment Bill incorporating most of the Land Commission’s recommendations was passed into law as the Land 32 Tendayi J. Kumbula, Education and Social Control in Southern Rhodesia, (Palo Alto, R and E Research Associates, 1979), 95-97.

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Apportionment Act on 10 October, 1930 and brought into force on 1 April, 1931. As a result of the rapid increase in the African population, the Native Reserves became over-crowded and over-stocked which in turn, led to the exhaustion of both arable and grazing land and to severe soil erosion. Accordingly, the Government passed the Native Land Husbandry Act in 1951. Although it was passed as a land conservation measure, Africans were universally opposed to the Act, among other things, because it required them to de-stock their cattle. To this extent, the Act failed to achieve one of its major objectives, namely to arrest soil erosion in the Native Reserves. From the advent of Responsible Government in 1923 European settlers managed to dominate the political life of the country through their manipulation of the franchise qualifications to prevent the majority of the Africans from voting; consequently, Africans had practically no say in the running of the country. The economic developments included mining and agriculture. The minerals produced during this period included gold, asbestos, chrome, coal, lithium and beryllium. In the dual agricultural economy, white farmers grew several cash crops including tobacco and maize and the raising of beef and dairy cattle while African farmers produced several food crops the most important of which was maize. Although the production and export of minerals were relatively modest during this period, they nevertheless laid the foundations for the future economic development of the country. The major trends in African education during this period included the reforms in African education initiated by Mr. Harold Jowitt; the launching of the African secondary education course at St. Augustine’s Anglican mission in 1939 followed by the Catholic Church at Kutama mission in 1945; the establishment of the first Government African secondary school at Goromonzi in 1946; the inauguration of a junior secondary education course by the Wesleyans at Tegwani in 1951 and by the Church of Christ at Dadaya mission in 1952; by 1953 seven mission schools were offering courses for a Junior Certificate of the University of South Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND, 1953-63 Introduction On 1 August, 1953 Queen Elizabeth II signed an Order in Council establishing the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland comprising of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (see map below).

Source: Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free. See the Centrefold for this image in colour.

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Origins of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1938-1953 The genesis as well as the problems of establishing a federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland based on partnership between Europeans and Africans have been studied among others by Thomas M. Franck1, Philip Mason 2 , T. R. M. Creighton 3 , Patrick Keatley 4 and by Sir Roy Welensky. 5 This section examines the origins of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1938 to 1953. In 1938 the British Government appointed a commission chaired by Lord Bledisloe, former Governor-General of New Zealand, to inquire whether any, and if so, what form of closer co-operation or association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was desirable with due regard to the interests of all the inhabitants of the territories concerned and the special responsibility of the British Government for the interests of the Native inhabitants. The Commission spent three months in the three Territories interviewing people of all races, classes and backgrounds. In their Report dated 1 March, 1939 the Commission strongly advised against establishing a federation of the three Territories because firstly Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing Colony while in the two Northern Territories ultimate control still rested with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. They said any attempt at federation between Governments enjoying such different measures of responsibility and in such different stages of social and political development would not, in their opinion, succeed; the wide disparity between them constituted ‘a fundamental objection’ to any scheme of federation; secondly, the ‘unanimity’ of opinion among Africans in the Northern Territories against federation based mainly on their dislike of the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia and their anxiety to retain their Protectorate status, were factors which could not, in their judgment, be ignored and warned that if Africans in the two Northern Territories were brought into a federation with 1

Thomas M. Franck, Race and Nationalism: The Struggle For Power in RhodesiaNyasaland, (New York, Fordham University Press, 1960). 2 Philip Mason, Year of Decision: Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960, (London, Oxford University Press, 1960). 3 T. R. M. Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation, (London, Faber and Faber, 1960). 4 Patrick Keatley, The Politics of Partnership: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (London, Penguin Books, 1963). 5 Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (London, Collins, 1964).

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Southern Rhodesia against their will, it would prejudice any prospects of future cooperation between them and the Europeans.6 Because of the strong African opposition in the two Northern Territories to a federation with Southern Rhodesia and the differing constitutional status of the three Territories, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Conservative Government, Mr. Oliver Stanley, told the House of Commons on 18 October, 1944 that His Majesty’s Government had, after careful consideration, come to the conclusion that a federation of the three Territories under existing circumstances was not practicable.7 Undaunted, the leader of the white settlers in Northern Rhodesia’s Legislative Council, Mr. (later Sir) Roy Welensky, journeyed to London to press the cause of federation of the three Territories. The Colonial Secretary in the Labour Government, Mr. Arthur Creech Jones, told him bluntly that no British Government, either Tory or Socialist, would ever consider either granting Northern Rhodesia a constitution similar to that of Southern Rhodesia or if there were an amalgamation of the two, the kind of constitution which would enable a few hundred thousand white settlers to control several million Africans; the world wouldn’t put up with it. The former Colonial Secretary in the Conservative Government, Mr. Oliver Stanley, confirmed that no British Government, Tory or Socialist would give him what he was asking for. 8 This rebuff notwithstanding, a conference to consider the possibilities of a federal association between the three Territories assembled at Victoria Falls on 16 February, 1949. The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins, led his country’s delegation while the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland sent several senior officials as observers; neither the British Government which held the key to the situation nor African representatives were invited to the conference. The conference unanimously accepted Mr. Welensky’s motion to establish a federation of the three Territories and to set up a committee of technical experts to frame the constitution and work out the financial arrangements. To allay African fears in the Northern Territories over land alienation, a Press communiqué at the end of the conference stated that all existing land rights enjoyed by Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be guaranteed by the Federal Government and that any changes in these rights could only be made with the consent of the Territorial Legislatures. 6

Cmd. 5949, Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, March, 1939. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, (hereafter Parliamentary Debates), Vol. 403, 1943-44, 18 October, 1944, col. 2365. 8 Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days, 23. 7

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On 27 February, 1949 a small group of Africans from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland either studying or working in Britain, at a meeting at the house of Dr. Hastings Banda in Brondesbury Park in London, rejected European proposals for a federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in a memorandum to the Colonial Office drafted by Dr. Banda. The memorandum described federation as ‘the thin end of the wedge of amalgamation’ and said federation would not be in the best interests of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland because firstly it would extend Southern Rhodesia’s racial policies to their Territories; secondly, because of its large white population, Southern Rhodesia would dominate the proposed federation and deprive them of their Protectorate status.9 This opposition to federation was widespread in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. On 15 December, 1949 the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Philip Noel-Baker, told the House of Commons that if the scheme for federation were to be approved, the British Government would be bound to take into account ‘the difficulties inherent in a political federation between the three Territories, in particular, the obligations of the United Kingdom Government to the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the differing constitutional status of the three Territories and the present objection of the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to political integration’.10 Because of the implacable African opposition in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to political integration with Southern Rhodesia, the Colonial Secretary in the Labour Government, Mr. James Griffiths, told the House of Commons on 8 November, 1950 that the British Government had, after careful consideration, decided to re-examine the problem of establishing a federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and would host a conference of officials of the three Central African Governments, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office in London for this purpose early in 1951.11 The first London conference held at the Commonwealth Relations Office on 5 March, 1951 under the chairmanship of Mr. G. Baxter, a senior civil servant in the Commonwealth Relations Office, recommended the establishment of a federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: ‘We believe that this will enable the territories to be knit together effectively for 9

Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965), 224. 10 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 470, 1948-49, 15 December, 1949, col. 2885. 11 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 480, 1950-51, 8 November, 1950, cols. 946-947.

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common action in those spheres where it will be most beneficial to all of them while leaving unimpaired the authority of the individual territories in spheres where this seems most appropriate, and recognizing the responsibility of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom towards the African peoples’. Under the proposed scheme, the Federal Government would be responsible for economic policy, currency, federal taxation and borrowing, customs and excise, European primary and secondary education, all higher education, external trade, railways, aviation, trunk roads, posts and telegraphs while defence, broadcasting, the supply and distribution of electric power, external and certain aspects of inter-territorial trade, African primary and secondary education, health services, agriculture, animal health, forestry, game, fisheries and police services would be Territorial functions. To protect African interests in the three Territories under a federal government the conference recommended the setting up of an African Affairs Board consisting of ten members: a chairman, the three Secretaries for Native Affairs of the Territorial Governments, one elected member drawn from each of the Territorial Legislatures and one African from each Territory. The Board would examine before publication all proposed legislation affecting African interests and to report thereon to the Federal Government. Before publishing a Bill the Federal Government would be obliged to make the view of the Board known to the Federal Legislature in the form of a statement. If the Board was of the opinion that the proposed legislation would be detrimental to African interests, it would be open to the Federal Government to proceed with it and for the Federal Legislature to pass it, but the Governor-General would be required to refer it to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In short, the Board would hold a general watching brief in respect of all matters affecting African interests. The conference recommended a Federal Assembly of 35 members: 17 from Southern Rhodesia, 11 from Northern Rhodesia and 7 from Nyasaland including three members from each Territory chosen to represent African interests; of the nine members, at least four-two from each of the Protectorates- would be Africans; the constitution could be amended only with the consent of all the five Governments: the Federal Government, the three Territorial Governments and the British Government; there would be no amendments to the constitution during the first five years.12 12

Cmd. 8233, Central African Territories: Report of Conference on Closer Association, (London, March, 1951), 16-17.

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In light of the recommendations of the Baxter Report, a conference of 27 officials representing the Governments of the three Territories, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office met at the Victoria Falls on 18 September, 1951 to consider some form of closer association of the three Territories. On 21 November, 1951 the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Conservative Government, Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, told the House of Commons that the Victoria Falls conference unanimously agreed firstly, that in any further consideration of the proposals for federation, the question of land as well as the political advancement of the peoples of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland both in local and Territorial Government must remain under the ultimate authority of the British Government; secondly, the Protectorate status of the two Northern Territories would be preserved; this excluded any consideration now or in the future of an amalgamation of the three Territories unless a majority of the inhabitants desired it; thirdly, economic and political partnership between Africans and Europeans was the only practical policy under which a federation could be successfully brought about in Central Africa; any scheme of closer association would have to give full effect to that principle. He said in light of the conclusions of the Victoria Falls Conference the British Government was convinced of the urgent need to secure a closer association of the three Territories and that this could best be achieved by federation.13 He pointed out that the three Territories were economically inter-dependent; a single port served all the three Territories; the railway system required greater unification; both Southern and Northern Rhodesia needed labour from Nyasaland. He said in order to allay African anxieties in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the constitution would provide safeguards against amalgamation and against the erosion of their Protectorate status; neither amalgamation nor loss of their Protectorate status could come about without the consent of the British Government; security of land tenure would be a matter exclusively of Territorial Governments and not a federal one.14 In spite of the vehement African opposition to the federation in the two Northern Territories, on 23 April, 1952 Mr. Lyttelton convened the Lancaster House conference attended by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins, and the Governors of the two Northern Territories on closer association of the three Territories.

13 14

Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 494, 1951-52, 21 November, 1951, cols. 392-393. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 497, 1951-52, 4 March, 1952, cols. 209-231.

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African representatives from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland who had arrived in London the previous week for informal talks with Mr. Lyttelton were not invited and therefore declined to attend the conference even as observers. In a long letter to the London Times on 29 April, 1952 they said they were strongly opposed to a Central African federation because firstly they feared the extension to their Territories of the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia if the three Territories were federated; secondly, they had no faith in the professed safeguards for African interests; the constitutions of the Union of South Africa and of Southern Rhodesia had proved conclusively that such safeguards were valueless. They said they had come to England for informal talks with Mr. Lyttelton. After the talks, Mr. Lyttleton invited them to attend the conference. When they requested to see the agenda he refused unless they first agreed to attend the conference; they declined to do so because they understood that the conference was being held to consider modifications to the federal scheme formulated by officials at the first London conference. Furthermore, no African had been invited to take part in preparing modifications to the scheme for federation until Mr. Lyttelton belatedly invited them to the conference; only the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were invited to London for that purpose. They said they preferred political reforms in their territories first and demanded a franchise for all the inhabitants of the two Territories and not just for the few British subjects. They pointed out that the inhabitants of other British African territories no more advanced than their own people in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been granted a franchise; in short, they demanded greater participation by their own people in the political institutions of their two countries before they would consider any scheme for federation.15 The Report of the Conference on federation held at Carlton House Terrace in London on 1 January, 1953 accepted most of the recommendations of the Baxter Report with some modifications. Under the Federal Constitution, the seat of the Federal Government would be decided by Federal law but until so decided it would be in Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia. The Federal Assembly would consist of a Speaker and 35 members: 26 Elected Members; 6 Specially Elected African Members and 3 European Members charged with special responsibilities for African interests. Of the 26 seats for Elected Members, 14 would be allocated to Southern Rhodesia, 8 to Northern Rhodesia and 4 to Nyasaland. However, unlike in the Baxter Report, not less than seven and not more than nine 15

The Times, 29 April, 1952.

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years from the date of the coming into force of the Federal Constitution a conference would be convened consisting of delegations from the Federal Government, from each of the three Territories and from the United Kingdom, chosen by their respective Governments to review the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, unlike in the Baxter Report, the African Affairs Board would consist of 6 Members of the Federal Assembly: (a) the two Specially Appointed European Members charged with special responsibility for African interests; (b) the Specially Elected European Member from each of the three Territories responsible for African interests and (c) one Specially Elected African Member from each of the three Territories. The Governor General would, in his discretion appoint a chairman and a deputy chairman from among the members of the Board; any decision of the Board would be by a majority vote of the members present and voting. The function of the Board would be to draw the attention of the Federal Government to any Bill introduced into the Federal Assembly if that Bill was in their opinion, a differentiating measure, that is to say, a Bill by which Africans were subjected to any conditions, restrictions or disabilities to which Europeans were not also subjected, or a Bill which would, in its practical application, have such effect. Before introducing a Bill in the Federal Assembly, the Federal Government would be required to send a copy of the Bill to the Board. If the Board concluded that the Bill was a differentiating measure, it would table before the Federal Assembly a report stating their reasons for considering the Bill to be a differentiating measure. The Governor General might, in his discretion assent to a Bill if he satisfied himself that it was not a differentiating measure but would be required to send to the Colonial Secretary a copy of the Bill to which he had assented together with the Board’s objections and a statement of his reasons for assenting.16 The Draft Federal Scheme incorporated most of the recommendations of the Baxter Report and stated that closer association between the three Territories was essential if they were to develop their resources to the full and reach their proper stature in the world. Individually the three Territories were vulnerable; their individual economies were ill-balanced and ill-equipped to withstand the strong economic pressures of a changing world. Of the three Territories only Southern Rhodesia had any significant secondary industries. Northern Rhodesia largely depended on the copper 16

Cmd. 8754, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland: The Federal Scheme prepared by a Conference held in London in January, 1953, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Secretary of State for the Colonies by command of Her Majesty, February, 1953, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Reprinted 1959).

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industry which provided over four-fifths of her exports. Nyasaland relied largely on a few agricultural products such as tobacco, tea and cotton and could not develop herself unaided. The economies of the three Territories were largely complementary; their closer association was therefore essential if they were to achieve the economic and social development of which they were together capable. Development of the largely- untapped resources of this potentially- wealthy area demanded the combined efforts of the three Territories acting together. It was essential to build railways, to harness rivers, to develop power to meet the needs of industry, to expand food production to meet the ever- growing needs of a steadilyincreasing population; such development required expenditure of capital and material resources on a large scale; only a well-balanced and coordinated economic unit would be able to attract development capital from outside on a scale necessary to achieve the full potentialities of the three Territories; all the inhabitants of the three Territories would benefit if an effective central authority could take major economic decisions in the interests of the whole area. The solution was a federation of the three Territories; in this lay the hope of strengthening that co-operation and partnership between the races by which their peoples could attain a full measure of well-being and contentment; for these reasons, the federal scheme should be carried through.17 (See economic map below):

17 Cmd. 8753, Report of the Conference on Federation held in London in January, 1953.

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In spite of the strong opposition in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to federation, on 24 March, 1953 Mr. Lyttleton asked the House of Commons to approve the proposals for a federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as set out in the Report of January, 1953. He told the House that the Federal Government would be responsible, among other things, for external affairs and defence, fiscal matters, customs and excise, common governmental services such as posts, telegraphs, telephones, railways, shipping, aviation,

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agricultural research and higher education; in short, all matters concerning land tenure and all those subjects which concerned the daily life of the Africans would be the responsibility of the Territorial Governments and outside the ambit of the Federal Government. The Constitution could not be amended except by a two-thirds majority in the Federal Legislature. Finally, a conference would review the Constitution not earlier than seven and not later than ten years after it had come into force. The purpose of the conference would be to make such alterations in the detailed working of the constitution as experience of its work had shown to be necessary during the first decade in its life.18 On 10 April, 1953 in a referendum on federation held in Southern Rhodesia, out of 40,000 votes cast 25,570 were in favour of federation; all three Territorial Legislatures endorsed the plan for a federal state. In spite of the vehement African opposition in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to federation, on 6 May, 1953 the Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. John Foster, commended the Federation Bill to the House of Commons. While 247 members voted for the Bill, 221 voted against. The motion for the Second Reading of the Bill therefore carried. 19 On 24 June, 1953 after considerable debate in the House of Commons, Mr. Lyttelton moved a motion for the Third Reading of the Federation Bill. While 188 members voted for the Third Reading of the Bill, 165 voted against.20 The Enabling Bill therefore carried. On 14 July, 1953 Mr. Lyttleton presented before the House of Commons the Order in Council setting out the Federal Constitution and on 27 July, 1953 moved a motion in the House requesting Her Majesty to issue the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council in terms of the Draft Constitution he presented before the House on 14 July, 1953.21 The Order in Council was published on 1 August, 1953.22 On 4 September, 1953 Lord Llewellin was sworn in as Governor General of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins, (now Lord Malvern) was appointed the first Federal Prime Minister on 7 September, 1953.

18 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 513, 1952-53, 24 March, 1953, cols. 661-662; 667, 669. 19 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 515, 1952-53, 6 May, 1953, col. 510. 20 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 516, 1952-53, 24 June, 1953, cols. 2045, 2050. 21 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 518, 1952-53, 27 July, 1953, col. 899. 22 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council, Statutory Instruments (II), 1804, (1953).

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Major Political Developments, 1953-1960 This section examines the major political and social developments in the Federation from 1953 to 1960 and in particular African opposition in Northern Rhodesia to federation; the Federal Constitution and franchise at the beginning of the Federation in 1953; the Federal Constitution Amendment Bill of July, 1957; the return of Dr. Hastings Banda to Nyasaland; the disturbances which led to the declaration of the State of Emergency in Nyasaland in February, 1959; the appointment of a commission of inquiry into the disturbances in Nyasaland and the Federal Constitutional Review Conference of 1960.

Opposition in Northern Rhodesia to Federation In Northern Rhodesia the opposition to the Federation was led by the President of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr. Harry Nkumbula, (see photo) who charged among other things that the two-thirds majority of Europeans in the Federal Assembly would enable them to achieve both amalgamation and Dominion status.23

The Federal Constitution Amendment Bill of 31 July, 1957 Under the Federal Constitution Amendment Bill of 31 July, 1957 membership of the Federal Assembly would be increased from 35 to 59; the number of elected (European) members would be increased from 26 to 44 of whom 24 would be allotted to Southern Rhodesia, 14 to Northern Rhodesia and 6 to Nyasaland; the number of African members would be increased from 6 to 12 of whom 4 would be elected in Southern Rhodesia, 2 in Northern Rhodesia and 2 in Nyasaland and 4 would continue to be ‘specially elected’ by African electoral colleges in the two Protectorates; the number of European members representing African interests would remain the same (one elected in Southern Rhodesia and one each to be appointed by the Governors of the two Protectorates). The Electoral Amendment Bill created two separate electoral rolls: the higher or general voters’ roll and the lower or special voters’ roll. Under the general voters’ roll, voters were required to have an income of ǧ720 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at ǧ1 500; income of ǧ480 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at ǧ1,000 plus the completion of a primary course of education; income of ǧ300 per 23

Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days, 54-55.

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annum or ownership of immovable property valued at ǧ500 plus the completion of a four-year course of secondary education and Ministers of Religion who had undergone certain stipulated courses of training in the Ministry. To qualify for the special voters’ roll, voters were required to have an income of ǧ150 per annum or immovable property valued at ǧ500; income of ǧ120 per annum plus the completion of a two-year course of secondary education. The 44 elected (European) members would be chosen only by voters on the general voters’ roll; the 8 African elected members would be chosen by the combined vote of the special and general voters’ rolls. These voting qualifications were beyond the reach of most Africans even for the special roll. While the average annual income of an African in employment in 1956 was approximately ǧ70 per annum, the average European income was ǧ1,100. In practical terms under these voting qualifications, virtually all Europeans qualified for the general voters’ roll while the vast majority of Africans could not qualify for the general or for the special voters’ roll. 24 The African Affairs Board reported that to the extent that the Bill proposed to give Europeans 44 seats and Africans and representatives of African interests 15 seats in a House of Assembly of 59 members, it was a differentiating measure. In spite of this adverse report, the Secretary of State for the Colonies told the House of Commons on 31 October, 1957 that he did not consider the measure to be discriminatory and the Bill became law at the end of February, 1958.25 The African Affairs Board also reported that the Electoral Amendment Bill was a differentiating measure because the financial and property qualifications for the franchise both on the general and the special voters’ rolls were beyond the reach of most Africans. After a heated debate, the majority in the House of Commons voted for the Bill on 18 February, 1958 and the Bill was promulgated as the Federal Electoral Amendment Act at the end of February, 1958. By thus conniving at injustice, the British Government unwittingly undermined African confidence in the Federation. Furthermore, following the Federal elections of 1958 the Federal Government lost no time in purging the African Affairs Board; of the 6 appointees, 4 were members of the ruling United Federal Party caucus which could be counted on to uphold the Government’s views.26

24

Franck, Race and Nationalism, 176-177. Mason, Year of Decision, 86-87. 26 Franck, Race and Nationalism, 176-177; 180-181. 25

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The Return of Dr. Hastings Banda to Nyasaland, 6 July, 1958 In 1957 two members of the Nyasaland African National Congress, Mr. H. B. Chipembere (a former junior civil servant) and Mr. M. W. K. Chiume (who in 1943 had obtained a Diploma in Education at Makerere University College in Uganda) appealed to Dr. Banda to return home to lead the party. After some hesitation Dr. Banda who was to be the nemesis of the Federation, crossed the Rubicon and returned home on 6 July, 1958. The return of Dr. Banda (see photo) after a long stint as a physician in Britain, heralded a new era in the struggle not only against the Federation but also for the independence of Nyasaland. On 1 August, 1958 at the annual general meeting of the Nyasaland African National Congress, Dr. Banda was elected President General of the party on his own terms including powers to appoint the other officers and the executive committee. Mr. Chipembere was appointed Treasurer, Mr. Chiume Publicity Secretary and Mr. Dunduza Chisiza, Secretary General. In his account of the trials and tribulations of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky (see photo) claimed that Mr. Chipembere, Mr. Chiume and Mr. Chisiza built up and sustained Dr. Banda’s power and mystique: he had come to deliver his people from bondage. As a result of Dr. Banda’s inflammatory speeches, the security situation in Nyasaland deteriorated rapidly over the next three months; public meetings often broke up in riots; Europeans were insulted and their cars were stoned; whenever Dr. Banda appeared in public, the crowds frequently got out of hand; moderation disappeared from his speeches as he discovered the stimulating effect of mob-oratory; he had put the country in an uproar by the time he left for Accra on 1 December, 1958 to attend the All-African People’s Conference. While he was away for three weeks the tension relaxed but when he returned from Accra, the political temperature rose once more. To Sir Roy Welensky, Dr. Banda was an ogre; undoubtedly courting martyrdom, Dr. Banda had stated repeatedly in public and in private that he would fight the Federation and was ready to die, to go to prison, to the Seychelles, to St. Helena or anywhere and would fight the Federation from prison or from the grave.27

The Declaration of the State of Emergency in Nyasaland, 1959 On 21 February, 1959 because of the growing unrest in Nyasaland the Federal Government decided to fly white troops from Southern Rhodesia 27

Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days, 98-100.

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to Nyasaland to quell the disturbances. In a letter to the Governor of Nyasaland on 23 February, 1959 Dr. Banda protested ‘in the strongest possible terms’ against the sending of white troops from Southern Rhodesia to Karonga, Fort Hill and elsewhere in Nyasaland. ‘The sending of white troops from Southern Rhodesia to Karonga, Fort Hill or any other part of this country’, he protested, ‘confirms our original suspicions and fears about and against Federation. All along, we have argued, among other things, that the Federation means domination of Nyasaland by the European settlers, especially European settlers of Southern Rhodesia, whose political views are the same as those of the European settlers in the Union of South Africa. Our original suspicions and fears about the Federation are now confirmed, beyond any reasonable doubt, and our continued opposition, amply justified’; he demanded the secession of Nyasaland from the Federation and a new constitution to give the country a government by elected representatives of the people.28 On 3 March, 1959 the Governor of Nyasaland, Sir Robert Armitage, declared a State of Emergency throughout the Protectorate on the ground that it had become increasingly clear that the leaders of the Nyasaland African National Congress were bent on pursuing a course of violence, intimidation and disregard for lawful authority. He proscribed as unlawful organizations the Nyasaland African National Congress, the party’s Youth League, the Women’s League and all their branches. Four hours before the declaration of the State of Emergency, the security forces picked up over a hundred important and influential members of the Nyasaland African National Congress beginning with Dr. Banda and Mr. Chipembere.29 They were flown to various jails in Southern Rhodesia. The arrest and detention of Dr. Banda and his colleagues were followed by several days of rioting as a result of which 53 Africans were shot and killed by the security forces. 30 The leaders of the Nyasaland African National Congress who had escaped arrest and detention demanded, among other things, the secession of Nyasaland from the Federation, the immediate release of Dr. Banda and other detainees, the lifting of the State of Emergency and the immediate introduction of a new constitution giving the Africans effective control of both the Legislative and the Executive Councils and the unconditional granting of independence.31 28

Reproduced as Appendix III in Kanyama Chiume, Nyasaland Demands Secession and Independence: An Appeal to Africa, (London, 1959), 29-31. 29 Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days, 126-127. 30 Philip Short, Banda, (London and Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 116. 31 Chiume, Nyasaland demands Secession and Independence, 1, 20.

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The Devlin Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Nyasaland On 4 March, 1959 the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd, announced in the House of Commons that he had decided to appoint a commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Devlin to investigate and report upon the causes which had led to the declaration of the State of Emergency in Nyasaland. Sir Roy Welensky strongly resisted the appointment of a commission of inquiry on the ground that if the commission were to submit an adverse report, it would seriously undermine European confidence in the future of the Federation. The Secretary of State in the Colonial Office, Lord Perth, however, assured him that the Federation’s achievements were such that nothing but good would come of a thorough inquiry with carefully-selected members and terms of reference. At a meeting in Salisbury on 1 April, 1959 the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Lord Home told Sir Roy Welensky that unless some action were taken before 1960 the British Government would be forced to give Nyasaland the option of seceding from the Federation; if that were to happen, the British Government could not see how it could resist giving the same option to Northern Rhodesia; this would lead to a complete break-up of the Federation.32 In their Report published on 23 July, 1959 the Devlin Commission stated that the major cause of the disturbances in Nyasaland was the universal African opposition to the Federation. They reported: ‘Even among the chiefs many of whom are loyal to the Government and dislike Congress methods, we have not heard of a single one who is in favour of Federation. Witness after witness appeared before us for the sole purpose of stating that the cause of all the troubles we were investigating was Federation’.33

The Policy of Partnership, 1953-1960 Introduction The official policy of the Federation was racial partnership between Europeans and Africans. This section examines the prevalence of racial 32

Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days, 140-141. Cmd. 814, Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, (London, Her Majesty Stationery Office, 1959).

33

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discrimination against Africans during the Federation in spite of the Federation’s professed policy of partnership.

The Policy of Partnership, 1953-1960 That racial discrimination against Africans was widely practised in the Federation, is evident from the extant literature. The first five years of Federation saw no relaxation in the administration of public and private colour bars. Post Offices retained separate entrances, hospitals offered separate services for Africans and Europeans and the railways offered differential facilities of all kinds.34 In his autobiography, the then Secretary General of the African National Congress (ANC) in Northern Rhodesia, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, relates numerous instances of racial discrimination against Africans in Northern Rhodesia during the Federation. He tells us, for example, of a white trader in Kasama in Northern Eastern Rhodesia who owned a chain of stores throughout the District. The ANC had received numerous complaints that he bullied, ill-treated and insulted African customers; it instituted a boycott which was so effective that after enduring it for some months, the trader sold out. Mr. Robert Makasa, however, was jailed for eighteen months for organizing the boycott and three other members of the ANC were convicted of conspiracy and served long prison terms. Mr. Kaunda also tells us of the hatch system under which Africans were not allowed to enter European-owned shops and had to take their purchases through a small opening on the street. 35 Early in 1954 after white proprietors had again refused to serve Africans except through hatches, members of the ANC began to picket butcher shops in Lusaka. Despite official intervention on the side of the proprietors, Africans steadfastly maintained their position until at the end of seven weeks butcheries and other shops in Lusaka opened their doors to Africans. 36 Racial discrimination against Africans was also widely practised in industry. On the Copper Belt after the first round of discussions on African advancement, European workers staged a strike in April, 1956 because the mining Company had employed three Africans as underground pipe-fitters to work alongside European workers. On the first day, 70 European workers walked out in sympathy with the fitters who had refused to work with Africans; the following day 600 went on strike and did not return to 34

Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, 255. Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free, 73-76. 36 Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, 265-266. 35

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work until the Africans had been withdrawn. Moreover, there was a great disparity in average wages paid to Europeans and Africans employed on the Copper Belt as shown in Table 1: Table 1. Year 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958

Average European wages in ǧ 1,782 1,734 1,943 2,295 1,910 1,699

Average African wages in ǧ 124 128 134 160 189 200

Source: Philip Mason, Year of Decision, 104-105.

Furthermore, European wages did not include various additional benefits. For example, when a European employee joined a home- ownership scheme and lived in his own house, he was entitled to claim ǧ30 a month in lieu of the benefit he previously received by living in a house rented to him by the Company at a very low rate.37 Africans were also discriminated against in employment in the Federal Civil Service; two examples will suffice. Firstly, African women who qualified as registered nurses were paid a far lower rate than their white counterparts; those few who managed after years of service to transfer to the European pay scale, had to start again at the bottom rung of the new ladder. Secondly, although African women postal clerks had begun to replace European women at the Salisbury Post Office, their rate of pay was much lower than was paid for the same job when it was held by European women. 38 The contradictions in the policy of partnership between Europeans and Africans were thrown into sharp relief in 1958 when the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, announced his intention to appoint one of the two African Federal Members of Parliament for Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Jasper Savanhu, as a Minister in the Federal Government. When Mr. Savanhu’s impending appointment became an election issue in the Federal elections of 1958, Sir Roy Welensky held off the appointment until the 37 38

Mason, Year of Decision, 156-157. Franck, Race and Nationalism, 169.

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following year. This, however, was not the end of Mr. Savanhu’s problems. As a Minister he was entitled to an official house and the Federal Government proposed to build him one in a white suburb of Salisbury near the University College. When the Salisbury City Council objected, the Federal Government built him a showpiece house for ǧ8,000 on the outskirts of Highfields, the new African township near Salisbury.39 In Southern Rhodesia racial discrimination against Africans in general was not only a standard practice; it was also practised against some of the country’s most distinguished African citizens; three examples will suffice. In October, 1956 Mr. Stanlake Samkange, a graduate of Fort Hare University College, a free-lance journalist and public relations consultant, had an appointment with an official of the Salisbury Chamber of Industries; when he attempted to use the elevator to enter the building for his appointment, the door-keeper told him that under no circumstances were ‘natives’ allowed to use it. 40 Furthermore, since under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 all urban areas in Southern Rhodesia were declared white areas, the Government had to pass a special amendment (the Chitepo Amendment) to enable Mr. Herbert Chitepo, (see photo) the first African barrister in Southern Rhodesia, to open chambers in downtown Salisbury. 41 However, Europeans asked him not to use the elevator or the stairs but a fire escape to enter or leave the building where he held his chambers. After this experience, Mr. Chitepo said partnership had failed not only in Parliament where there was not a single African representative but also in industrial relationships, in the shops and at office counters where Europeans denied the African his essential dignity as a person and violated his sense of justice and self-respect. In February, 1958 two prominent African journalists, Mr. Lawrence Vambe and Mr. Nathan Shamuyarira, were invited to a Salisbury restaurant by representatives of a large international firm but when they entered the restaurant, a number of white patrons put down their glasses and headed for the door; in deference to the racial sensibilities of his white customers, the manager asked Mr. Vambe and Mr. Shamuyarira to leave.42 The racial discrimination routinely practised by Europeans against Africans in Southern Rhodesia, was perhaps best summed up by Mr. John Gunther in his monumental study, Inside Africa, published in 1955 in which he stated: ‘The most painful single experience I had in Africa was, I think, a trip to a Native Purchase Area near Salisbury. Here we visited 39

Keatley, The Politics of Partnership, 347-348. Mason, Year of Decision, 175-176. 41 Keatley, The Politics of Partnership, 323. 42 Mason, Year of Decision, 176-177. 40

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among other things, a country school. The poverty, the squalor, the pitiable lack of equipment, were bad enough. But what really hurt was that our white escort, a senior Government official, ostentatiously refused to shake hands with the perfectly decent, perfectly respectable, and perfectly humble black schoolmaster’.43 In spite of the Federation’s much-touted policy of partnership, Africans in Southern Rhodesia continued to suffer enormous hardships under the country’s ubiquitous pass laws. An African coming into any town to look for work, to see friends and relatives, to visit the sick or for any other purpose for longer than twelve daylight hours was required to get a pass from the local authority.44 Every African resident in an urban area was required to carry on his person a myriad of passes showing, for example, a certificate of service if he was employed, or a certificate of selfemployment, or a pass to seek work, among other documents. Failure to produce the required document, constituted an offence; the system created a scandal. When in November, 1956 Mr. Mike Hove, one of the two African Federal Members of Parliament for Southern Rhodesia went to the Salisbury Post Office to collect a parcel, the European clerk asked him to show his situpa (registration certificate) ‘like all the other boys’. Embarrassed, the Federal Government announced a few days later that it would introduce a new system whereby ‘approved Africans’ would be issued with identification cards exempting them from carrying passes. The new regulations laid down specific categories of Africans who would automatically receive identification cards rather than passes; these included police constables, messengers of the Native Affairs Department and all university graduates but it was still an offence to be without the document. In spite of African objections, the Bill to introduce the new system was passed by the Federal Parliament and the new regulations came into force in July, 1957.45 Needless to say, a European qua European was not required to carry a pass or an identification card. Africans were also discriminated against in the allocation of Federal funds for education. According to official figures for 1959-1960 the enrolment of African pupils taking secondary education in the Federation was 3, 300 for Southern Rhodesia; 2, 108 for Northern Rhodesia; 1, 300 for Nyasaland or a total of 6, 708 while the enrolment of European children (including small numbers of Asian and Coloured children) in the three Territories was 21, 671. Thus the white settlers managed to get 43

John Gunther, Inside Africa, (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1955), 634. Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership, 155. 45 Mason, Year of Decision, 184. 44

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secondary education for more than three times as many children as could the African community of eight million people who outnumbered them by a ratio of 26 to 1. The Federal Government spent ǧ6.2 million on the education of 1, 036,000 African children and ǧ6.1 million on the education of 79,000 non-African children. Expressed as expenditure per head the figures for 1960 were ǧ103 for white children in the three Territories; ǧ8 for African children in Southern Rhodesia; ǧ9 for African children in Northern Rhodesia and ǧ3 for African children in Nyasaland; this worked out to a national average of ǧ7 per head spent on African children and fifteen times that sum for European children. Furthermore, African parents paid school fees for their children ranging from ǧ3 to ǧ60 per year; for European children attending Government schools, there were no school fees.46 On 13 July, 1953 Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother laid the Foundation Stone for the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The British Government offered a capital grant of ǧ1,400,000 on condition that it would be a non-racial University College; the Federal Government agreed to provide a grant of ǧ150,000 per annum towards recurrent costs for the first five years beginning on 1 January, 1955.47 In spite of the British Government’s insistence that the University College must be a multi-racial enterprise, racial discrimination against Africans was practised at the University College when classes began in 1957 with 71 students of whom 8 were Africans who were accommodated in a separate hostel. When in the second semester of the first academic year Miss Sarah Chavunduka, the only African woman student, was moved into a separate wing of the white women’s dormitory, 9 of the 17 white women students sent a protest petition to the College Administration objecting to Miss Chavunduka in principle. Gradually, however, segregation by buildings was replaced by integration with the races occupying rooms on separate floors of the same buildings.48 Meanwhile, a controversy erupted over the impending appointment of a distinguished African scholar from Southern Rhodesia, Dr. Bernard Chidzero.49 After studying in Canada and the United States, Dr. Chidzero

46

Keatley, The Politics of Partnership, 316-317. W. V. Brelsford, (ed.), Handbook of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1960), 481-482. 48 Franck, Race and Nationalism, 130. 49 The author of a brilliant Shona novel, Nzvenga Mutsvairo, the late Dr. Bernard Chidzero served as Minister of Finance and Economic Planning for many years after Zimbabwe’s Independence. In recognition of his contribution to national 47

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was completing a post-graduate thesis at Nuffield College at Oxford and was not only in the running, but was also likely to be appointed as a lecturer in Political Science at the University College in Salisbury; he would have been the first African on the staff. When in December, 1958 Dr. Chidzero announced his forthcoming marriage to a French-Canadian girl, the Principal of the University College informed him that his presence with his white wife would cause so much controversy that it would harm the University College and that under the circumstances he could not offer him the appointment.50 It is in this broader context of the prevalence of racial discrimination in the Federation that the report of the Monckton Commission on the future of the Federation must be examined.

The Monckton Commission’s Report, 11 October, 1960 In light of the unrest in Nyasaland which had led to the declaration of the State of Emergency and the persistent African opposition to the Federation not only in Nyasaland but also in Northern Rhodesia, the British Government decided to appoint a commission of inquiry into the future of the Federation. The Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Walter Monckton and which submitted its Report on 11 October, 1960 had examined, among other things, the existing attitudes to the Federation in the Northern Territories and in Southern Rhodesia, racial discrimination, the pass laws in Southern Rhodesia and African advancement in the Federal civil service and in industry. On African attitudes in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the Federation, the Commission reported firstly that the dislike of the Federation among Africans in the two Northern Territories was widespread, sincere and of long standing: ‘It is almost pathological. It is associated almost everywhere with a picture of Southern Rhodesia as a white man’s country’; secondly, while racial discrimination against Africans was practised in some degree throughout the Federation, it was felt to be particularly galling in Southern Rhodesia where it caused such offence as to make any association with Southern Rhodesia insupportable to Africans in the Northern Territories; the indignities many of them had suffered on visits to Southern Rhodesia were very vivid in their minds.

development the Government declared him a National Hero after he died and buried him at Heroes’ Acre in Harare. 50 Mason, Year of Decision, 178.

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Furthermore, the siting of the Federal capital in Southern Rhodesia had strengthened the belief among Africans in the Northern Territories that the Federation meant white domination and its location in Salisbury, had enhanced their fears that Southern Rhodesia would extend its racial laws to their Territories. In brief, the unrelenting opposition to the Federation among Africans in the Northern Territories had gathered further strength by their disappointment in the manner in which it was introduced; partnership, in their view, was a sham. This opposition to the Federation had become so strong among Africans in the Northern Territories that however radical might be the changes made in its form and outlook, the retention of the name ‘Federation’ which had become a hated word and was associated in their minds with a policy of white domination, would cause opposition to persist. They further reported that although Africans in Southern Rhodesia appreciated the economic benefits which had come from the Federation since much of the development had taken place in their Territory, this did not mean that they were satisfied with the status quo; like their neighbours in Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland many complained that the Federation had failed to implement the policy of partnership to the degree they had been led to expect and felt that the Federal Government should implement it at once and demanded a larger role in public life. In particular, they demanded representation in the Southern Rhodesia Legislature in which up to that time there were no African representatives. Thirdly, since the maintenance of the colour bar and the prevalence of racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia had turned Africans in the Northern Territories and many in Southern Rhodesia itself, against the Europeans, under the circumstances, no new form of association was likely to succeed unless Southern Rhodesia was willing to make drastic changes in its racial policies. Fourthly, the pass laws in Southern Rhodesia not only hampered an African in travel, but obliged him to carry the appropriate pass whenever he was in town and particularly when he went out at night; they recommended the abolition of passes. Fifthly, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction among Africans in the Federation because opportunities for their advancement in the public services were very limited; while special facilities for training in certain branches of the Federal civil service were provided for Europeans, they were not provided for Africans; no Africans had yet been promoted to commissioned rank in the police forces of the three Territories or in the Federal Defence Forces.

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Finally, racial discrimination was prevalent in several industries in the Federation where Africans received much lower pay than the Europeans even when they had the same qualifications; they were still often not admitted to apprenticeships nor were they trained in sufficient numbers for skilled posts in industry and commerce; this applied not only to private companies but also to industries which were directly or indirectly controlled by the four Governments. The Commission recommended an equal distribution of seats between Europeans and Africans in the Federal Assembly; the extension of the Federal franchise to provide for a Federal Assembly representative of the broad mass of European and African opinion; the setting up of a Franchise Committee to recommend new voting qualifications to ensure that Africans were fully represented; since the maintenance of the colour bar and the prevalence of racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia had turned Africans in the Northern Territories and many in Southern Rhodesia itself, against the Europeans, the four Governments should introduce legislation making discriminatory practices illegal. The Federal capital should remain in Salisbury for the time being but in the future the Federal Legislature should meet in each of the Territories in turn. If in two or three years the removal of racial discrimination had made Salisbury acceptable as the Federal capital, this arrangement should be reconsidered.51 The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, described the Monckton Commission’s Report as ‘a disaster’. In a letter to the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, on 21 September, 1960 he argued firstly that the recommendation allowing each Territory to secede from the Federation, was outside the Commission’s terms of reference; secondly, the Commission had approached its task not from the point of view of what was right or best for all the peoples of the Federation but to ‘appease’ African nationalism. He said for these reasons he and his colleagues in the Federal Government had no option but to reject out of hand the recommendation on secession. In a letter to the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys, on 29 September, 1960 Sir Roy Welensky returned to the issue of secession and argued that when the British Government and the Federal Government agreed on the Commission’s terms of reference, the subject of secession by any Territory was excluded. In response in a letter dated 1 October, 1960 Mr. Sandys stated that even if secession was outside the Commission’s terms of reference, it was bound to be raised at

51 Cmnd. 1148, Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (October, 1960).

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the Federal Constitutional Review Conference and once raised, it would be impossible to stifle discussion on it .52 In light of the report of the Monckton Commission, Mr. Duncan Sandys told the House of Commons on 3 November, 1960 that the basic problem confronting the Federation was how to reconcile the interests and aspirations of peoples of different races with entirely different backgrounds living together in the same country; the issues were partly economic, partly social and partly political. Economically, the European minority enjoyed a standard of living comparatively higher than that of the African majority. The social barriers between the Europeans and Africans included racial discrimination which had caused a great deal of resentment and bitterness among Africans. Politically, Africans were no longer prepared to accept European rule in light of the achievement of full independence by other African peoples elsewhere on the African Continent; they regarded the Federation as a device to keep the white man permanently on top and to prevent them from ever gaining full control of their own affairs. On the other hand, the Europeans were worried by African demands for immediate universal suffrage and the dissolution of the Federation; at the root of the problem was the absence of confidence between the Africans and the Europeans. He said in order to dispel some of the mutual anxieties and suspicions, to create a belief in the good faith of both races and of their genuine desire to work together on honourable terms, would be the main task and a very difficult one, of the Federal Constitutional Review Conference.53

Major Developments, 1958-1960 Meanwhile, in Northern Rhodesia a split had taken place in the African National Congress (ANC) over Mr. Nkumbula’s proclivity for authoritarian rule in the party. In his autobiography, the then Secretary General of the ANC, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, claims that as Mr. Nkumbula’s popularity in the party plummeted, he began to brand anyone who was opposed to his leadership as either a Communist or a sell-out; he went round the provinces suspending and expelling all those provincial officials who he believed had lost confidence in him.54

52

Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days, 272-283. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 629, 1960-61, 3 November, 1960, cols. 372-375. 54 Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free, 93, 95-96. 53

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At a meeting in Broken Hill on 24 October, 1958 those members of the ANC who were dissatisfied with Mr. Nkumbula’s leadership, broke away and formed the Zambia African Congress (ZAC) with Mr. Kenneth Kaunda as President, Mr. M. Sipalo as Secretary General and Mr. Simon Kapwepwe as Treasurer. On 11 March, 1959 the ZAC was banned and Mr. Kaunda and leading members of the ZAC were arrested, detained and rusticated to remote parts of the country from whence they were flown to various prisons in Southern Rhodesia. The Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Arthur Benson, justified the banning of the ZAC on the ground that it had been organizing disobedience to lawful authority and had in particular been preparing to prevent by violence and intimidation those Africans who wanted to cast their ballots at the elections scheduled for 20 March, 1959. On 9 January, 1960 Mr. Kaunda was released from a Southern Rhodesia prison and on 31 January, 1960 was elected President of a new political party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) to replace the banned Zambia African Congress. Meanwhile in Nyasaland, Mr. Aleke Banda and Mr. Orton Chirwa who had been released from prison and several prominent nationalists and professional and business people, formed the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in August, 1959 to replace the banned Nyasaland African National Congress. The MCP achieved prominence almost overnight. Within two days of its formation, more than one thousand Africans had joined its ranks. By July, 1960 Mr. Orton Chirwa and Mr. Aleke Banda had organized the people of Nyasaland solidly behind the MCP. Meanwhile, on 1 April, 1960 Dr. Banda was released from Gwelo prison in Southern Rhodesia and the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Ian Macleod, invited him to London for talks.55 The London Conference held in July, 1960 between Dr. Banda and his colleagues on the one hand and Mr. Macleod on the other, agreed on a new constitution for Nyasaland which provided for a majority of Africans in the Legislative Council five of whom would hold ministerial positions; control of the Executive Council, however, would remain with the Governor.56 It was against this background that the Federal Constitutional Review Conference opened in London on 5 December, 1960.

55 56

Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism, 308-309 P. E. N. Tindall, A History of Central Africa, (New York, Praeger, 1967), 320.

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The Federal Constitutional Review Conference, 1960-1961 At the Federal Constitutional Review Conference in London, Dr. Banda representing the MCP, Mr. Kaunda representing UNIP and Mr. Joshua Nkomo representing the National Democratic Party (NDP) of Southern Rhodesia, demanded the immediate and total dissolution of the Federation while Sir Roy Welensky stoutly argued for its preservation. He categorically denied that the Federal Government was committed to white domination and went on to argue firstly that no one had made a convincing case whatever for dissolving the Federation; secondly, there had been no serious criticism of the use the Federal Government had made of its constitutional powers and that therefore there was nothing wrong with the existing division of responsibility between the Territorial Governments and the Federal Government; he said in order to allay fears that the Federal Government would take away African land, the Federal Government was prepared to insert in the existing Constitution additional guarantees which would be more effective and far-reaching than a Bill of Rights.57 Because the opposing views were irreconcilable, the conference was adjourned and in the event, was not reconvened.

Major Developments, 1961-1963 In the August, 1961 elections in Nyasaland the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) won 22 out of 30 seats in the Legislative Council and shortly afterwards the Governor granted five and later seven of the ten seats on the Protectorate’s Executive Council to the MCP.58 Meanwhile in February, 1961 Mr. Macleod introduced a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia which provided for a Legislative Council of 36 members. In the elections held in November, 1962 the ruling United Federal Party (UFP) won 16 seats; UNIP won 13 seats; the African National Congress (ANC) won 7 seats and thereby held the balance of power between the two major parties. In spite of the bitter rivalry of yesteryear, UNIP and the ANC agreed to form a coalition government. On 1 April, 1963 the Secretary of State for Central African Affairs, Mr. R. A. Butler, told the House of Commons that in light of the election results in Nyasaland and in Northern Rhodesia, the British Government had accepted the view that the two Northern Territories should not be 57 58

Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days, 286-289. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism, 312-313.

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forced to remain in the Federation against their will and had therefore accepted the principle that if they so wished, they should be allowed to secede from the Federation.59 Accordingly, in the first week of July, 1963 he chaired the Victoria Falls Conference to work out the modalities of ending the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The conference agreed to split up the Federal defence forces; the Federal defence forces from Northern Rhodesia would return to Northern Rhodesia; the battalion recruited from Nyasaland would return to Nyasaland and the rest of the defence forces would accrue to Southern Rhodesia; at the dissolution of the Federation, Federal citizens who were British subjects should be allowed to retain their status; the Federal Supreme Court and the rest of the Judiciary would come to an end with the dissolution of the Federation.60 On 17 December, 1963 the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Duncan Sandys, asked the House of Commons to approve the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Dissolution) Order in Council which provided for the temporary continuance of certain Federal courts until they had disposed of the proceedings already in train; all Federal officials for whom there was no prospect of further employment would, in the first instance, be invited to stay on in their existing jobs for a transitional period up to the end of May, 1964 to enable the three Territorial Governments to carry on without interruption the duties which had devolved on them by the dissolution of the Federation; those officials who would become redundant as a result of the dissolution of the Federation, would be compensated for the abolition of their posts. In order to provide security for the terminal benefits of the pensions of Federal civil servants, all the five Governments agreed to maintain the Federal Pension Fund under independent trustees and administered by a new Pension Agency. The three Territorial Governments would share in making good any deficit in the Pension Fund to the extent necessary to ensure the payment of those benefits. The Kariba Hydro-Electric Scheme would continue to be operated under the joint ownership and control of the Northern and Southern Rhodesia Governments; the Central African Airways Corporation would continue to provide a common service for the whole area under the overall authority of the three Territorial Governments. The Governments of Southern and Northern Rhodesia agreed to continue to operate the Rhodesia Railways as a single unit under their joint ownership and control and to share the financial responsibility equally. 59 60

Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 675, 1962-63, 1 April, 1963, col. 32. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 680, 1962-63, 11 July, 1963, cols. 1433-1435.

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Each Territory would, in due course, introduce its own currency; meanwhile, the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland would continue for the time being to manage the Federal currency until the three Territories had set up separate banks of their own not later than 31 December, 1965. Finally, the Territorial Governments accepted in full their respective shares of the Federal debt each in proportion to its inheritance of the Federal assets.61 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formally dissolved on 31 December, 1963.

Summary and Conclusions This Chapter has examined the rise and fall of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) and in particular the origins of the Federation (1938 -1953); the launching of the Federation; the major political developments (1953-1960) and in particular the Federal Constitution and Franchise; the opposition in Northern Rhodesia to the Federation; the Federal Constitution Amendment Act of February, 1958; the Federal Electoral Amendment Act of February, 1958; the return of Dr. Banda to Nyasaland on 6 July, 1958; the major developments in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and in particular the split in the African National Congress (ANC) in Northern Rhodesia leading to the formation of the Zambia African Congress (ZAC) in 1958 with Mr. Kenneth Kaunda as President, Mr. M. Sipalo as Secretary General and Mr. Simon Kapwepwe as Treasurer; the unrest in Nyasaland which led to the declaration of the State of Emergency in February, 1959; the arrest and imprisonment of Dr. Banda and leading members of the Nyasaland African National Congress in various prisons in Southern Rhodesia; the banning of the ZAC and the arrest, detention and rustication of Mr. Kaunda and leading members of the ZAC to remote parts of Northern Rhodesia from whence they were flown to various prisons in Southern Rhodesia; the founding of the Malawi Congress (MCP) in August, 1959 to replace the banned Nyasaland African National Congress; the conclusion of the Devlin Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances in Nyasaland; the release of Mr. Kaunda from prison on 9 January, 1960 and his election as President of a new political party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) on 31 January, 1960; the release of Dr. Banda from prison on 1 April, 1960 and his discussions in London in July, 1960 with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Ian Macleod, on a new constitution for Nyasaland; the policy of partnership 61 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 686, 1963-64, 17 December, 1963, cols. 10641073.

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(1953 -1960) and in particular racial discrimination against Africans in general and in industry, in employment in the Federal civil service; in travel; in education and at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; the Monckton Commission’s Report and its recommendations on the future of the Federation; the Federal Constitutional Review Conference (1960-1961); the major developments from 1961 to 1963 and in particular the August, 1961 elections in Nyasaland and in Northern Rhodesia in November, 1962 which not only granted self-government to both Territories but also allowed them to secede from the Federation; the Federal Conference at Victoria Falls in July, 1963 to work out the modalities of ending the Federation and the last Victoria Falls Conference which formally ended the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 31 December, 1963. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland failed to achieve its major objective of partnership between Europeans and Africans in the main because the Europeans particularly in Southern Rhodesia were by temperament and self-interest incapable of accepting Africans as equals; as a result, they continued to practise racial discrimination against Africans in industry, in travel, in education, in the Federal civil service and initially at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In Southern Rhodesia the European minority practised racial discrimination not only against Africans in general but also against some of the country’s most distinguished African citizens. In spite of the Monckton Commission’s Report, Sir Roy Welensky still believed that the Federation could somehow be saved; in the event, it was not for reasons already explained. He failed to appreciate the strength of ‘the wind of change’ blowing across Africa: the independence of Ghana in 1957, of Guinea in 1958, of Nigeria in 1960, of former French African colonies in 1960, of Tanganyika in 1961, of Uganda in 1962 and of Kenya on 12 December, 1963. In continuing to champion a lost cause, Sir Roy Welensky was unable to adjust to the new situation; in short, he was an anachronism from another age.

CHAPTER FIVE SOUTHERN RHODESIA: FROM THE LAUNCHING OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND TO THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (UDI), 1953-1965

Introduction This Chapter examines the major developments in Southern Rhodesia from the launching of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to UDI (1953-1965) and in particular the premiership of Mr. (later Sir) Garfield Todd (1953-1958); the rise and vicissitudes of African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia (1957-1965) and the major developments which led the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, to announce a unilateral declaration of Rhodesia’s independence from Britain on 11 November, 1965.

The Premiership of Mr. Garfield Todd, 1953-1958 The appointment of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins, as Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 7 September, 1953 left a vacancy in Southern Rhodesia’s premiership. In order to contest for the premiership, Mr. Garfield Todd, (see photo) a former missionary of the Church of Christ and former Principal of Dadaya Mission in the Midlands Province of Zimbabwe, formed the United Rhodesia Party (URP). In the election held early in 1954 the URP with 56.6 per cent of the popular vote won 26 seats for the House of Assembly of 30 white members.1

1

Robert Blake, A History of Rhodesia, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 286.

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A liberal, Mr. Todd will long be remembered for his efforts to improve African education and to broaden the franchise to enable more educated Africans to vote. On becoming Prime Minister, he created the Ministry of Native Education initially with himself as Minister of Native Education. Stressing the need to invest in African education and training, he argued that without knowledge there could be no progress and there could be no knowledge without education.2 In March, 1955 Mr. Todd introduced a ǧ12 million five-year development plan to expand African education and doubled the poll tax which had stood at £1 per annum since 1904 in order to contribute to the scheme.3 The plan aimed to provide five years of lower primary education for all African children in order to achieve universal literacy, to gradually expand upper primary schools to enable more pupils to complete a full eight-year primary course, to open Government teacher training schools and to build eight new Government secondary schools annually. Accordingly, in 1956 the Government opened a teacher training school in Umtali and in 1957 it opened Fletcher High School.4 During Mr. Todd’s premiership, Government expenditure on African education rose from ǧ1, 385,370 in the 1954/1955 fiscal year to ǧ1,626,459 in 1955/1956 to ǧ1,761,788 in 1956/1957. 5 As Africans acquired skills and professions under the plan, it increased white fears that Africans were advancing too rapidly.6 The most controversial issue concerned the franchise which in 1953 required a voter to have an income of ǧ240 per annum or property worth ǧ500.7 As a result of these voting requirements only 429 Africans were on the electoral roll in 1953.8 In December, 1956 Mr. Todd appointed a commission under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Tredgold, Chief Justice of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and a scion of a famous missionary family, to 2

Ruth Weiss, Sir Garfield Todd and the Making of Zimbabwe, (London and New York, British Academic Press, 1999), 83-84. 3 Philip Mason, Year of Decision: Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960, (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), 188. 4 Sybille Kuster, Neither Cultural Imperialism Nor Precious Gift of Civilization: African Education in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1962, (Hamburg, Lit Verlag, 1984), 206. 5 W. V. Breslford, (ed.), Handbook of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1960), 497. 6 Weiss, Sir Garfield Todd, 125. 7 Mason, Year of Decision, 257. 8 Blake, A History of Rhodesia, 296.

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review the franchise in Southern Rhodesia. The Commission was asked ‘to consider and report on a system for the just representation of the people of the Colony in its Legislative Assembly, under which the Government is placed, and remains in the hands of civilized and responsible persons’. It rejected adult franchise on the ground that ‘introduced to the Colony at this stage the effect would be to place the European minority entirely in the hands of the African majority’ and ‘to place political control of the Government in the hands of people sadly unequipped to exercise it’ and recommended the introduction of two voting rolls: a general or higher roll which required a voter to have an income of £720 per annum or property worth £1,500 plus literacy; or income of £480 per annum or ownership of property worth ǧ1,000 plus completion of eight years of primary education; or an income of ǧ300 per annum or ownership of property worth ǧ500 plus four years of secondary education and a new special voting qualification of ǧ180 per annum to cater for African voters.9 It was estimated that the special voting qualification would enfranchise some 6,000 educated Africans. Mr. Todd argued that to continue to keep off the voting rolls 6,000 Africans who had had ten years of education and had worked as teachers, agricultural demonstrators, orderlies and in kindred professions, was unreasonable; his proposal to broaden the franchise, however, met with such opposition in the Cabinet that he threatened to resign if the Bill did not go through. The Cabinet accepted the special qualifications reluctantly and the Bill was promulgated on 18 October, 1957.10 Fearful that the Party would lose the next election, four Ministers who were critical of Mr. Todd’s leadership, announced their intention to resign. On 11 January, 1958 Mr. Todd accepted their letters of resignation and three days later he announced a new Cabinet. At the party congress held on 8 February, 1958 the Government’s representative in Washington, Sir Edgar Whitehead, announced his intention to contest for the premiership. On the first ballot in the three-way race, Mr. Todd won 129 votes; the former Minister for Native Affairs, Sir Patrick Fletcher, 73 votes and Sir Edgar Whitehead, 122 votes. On the second ballot, Mr. Todd held all his votes but Sir Patrick Fletcher’s supporters transferred all their votes to Sir Edgar Whitehead; the final figures were 193 for Sir Edgar Whitehead and

9

Report of the Franchise Commission, 1957, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1957), 5-6, 12. 10 Blake, A History of Rhodesia, 303-304.

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129 for Mr. Todd; accordingly, the premiership passed to Sir Edgar Whitehead.11 Most extant accounts agree that it was the broadening of the franchise to enable more Africans to vote which led to Mr. Todd’s downfall. Dr. David Chanaiwa has argued that Mr. Todd fell from power largely because he was unable to reconcile the need to liberalize the franchise to enable more Africans to vote and the demands of the white electorate to maintain the status quo.12 In a similar vein, Miss Judith Todd has argued that her father was ousted from power in the main because he liberalized the franchise to enable educated Africans to vote.13 In her biography of Mr. Todd, Ruth Weiss has argued that Mr. Todd fell from power because he tried to work outside the parameters of a conservative white society representing narrow group interests and to pursue the humanist targets which his philosophy and religious understanding demanded.14

The Major Political Developments, 1957-1965 Introduction The major political developments in Southern Rhodesia from 1957 to 1965 centred round the rise of African nationalism and the developments which led the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, to unilaterally declare Rhodesia’s independence from Britain. In his popular book, African Nationalism, first published in 1959 the late Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole said the average white man in Africa equated his existence with white domination; he felt he could not possibly live in Africa as an ordinary citizen like everyone else; he could only live as a ruler; hence his opposition to African nationalism. Reverend Sithole defined African nationalism as ‘a political feeling’ among Africans ‘manifesting itself in favour of African rule’; it was not directed against the white man qua white man but against white domination over Africans.15

11

Mason, Year of Decision, 195. David Chanaiwa, ‘The Premiership of Garfield Todd in Rhodesia: Racial Partnership Versus Colonial Interests, 1953-1958’, in Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol. 1, October, 1976). 13 Judith Todd, The Right To Say No, (New York, The Third Press, 1972), 92. 14 Weiss, Sir Garfield Todd, 125. 15 Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism, (London, Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 1968), 57, 54; my emphasis. 12

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The rise of African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia must be understood in the broader context of the independence of Asian countries after the Second World War; the Pan-African movement and the achievement of independence by Ghana in March 1957. The achievement of independence by Asian countries after the Second World War, for example, by India in 1947, served as a shining example not only to African nationalists everywhere on the African Continent but also to African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia that independence could be won through a protracted struggle. The Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England, in October, 1945 had a tremendous impact on the rise of African nationalism not only in Africa generally but also in Southern Rhodesia. In its declaration to the colonial powers, the Congress demanded autonomy and independence for Black Africa and called upon the colonial and subject peoples of the world including workers, farmers, intellectuals and professional classes to fight for their freedom by all means at their disposal.16 Most importantly, it was the Independence of Ghana on 6 March, 1957 which galvanized African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia as elsewhere on the African Continent to fight for their freedom. In his speech celebrating Ghana’s Independence on 6 March, 1957 the Prime Minister, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, said he had never regarded the struggle for the Independence of Ghana as an isolated objective but always as a part of a general world historical pattern and pledged his Government as the vanguard force of liberation to assist those people of Africa who were engaged in the battles for their freedom which he and his people had fought for and won. ‘Our task’, he said, ‘is not done and our safety is not assured until the last vestiges of colonialism have been swept from Africa’.17 It is in this broader context that African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia must be understood.

The African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia, 1957-1959 On 12 September, 1957 the African National Congress (ANC) of Southern Rhodesia was formed with Mr. Joshua Nkomo as President, Mr. James 16 The Declaration was reproduced in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1962), Appendix V, 137. 17 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, (London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957), 290.

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Chikerema as Vice President and Mr. George Nyandoro as Secretary General. In a Statement of Principles, Policy and Programme the ANC said its aim was ‘the national unity of all the inhabitants of the country in true partnership regardless of race, colour or creed’; it stood for ‘a completely integrated society, equality of opportunity in every sphere and the social, economic and political advancement of all’; it regarded these objectives as ‘the essential foundation’ of that partnership between people of all races without which there could be no peaceful progress in the country; it was opposed to tribalism and racialism and welcomed as members people of all races who sympathized with its aims and were prepared to fulfill the conditions of membership; it believed that the country could only advance through non-racial thinking and acting and that an integrated society would provide the only alternative to tribalism and racialism; it regarded as both uneconomic and socially undesirable to apportion land on a racial basis and called for the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act; it demanded the freedom of movement for all people on their lawful business throughout the country without regard to race and called for the abolition of the Pass laws and the introduction of adult suffrage in order to bring about a government responsible to all the inhabitants of the country; it totally rejected the concept and practice of racial discrimination or segregation based on race or colour and demanded not only the elimination of racial discrimination in all public institutions but also the repeal of all discriminatory clauses in the Constitution.18 The ANC soon gained nation-wide support especially in the rural areas where the Land Husbandry Act was extremely unpopular. The cases ANC leaders took to court defending the African farmers’ rights against the loss of their land and cattle under the Land Husbandry Act, brought political consciousness to the rural areas. On 26 February, 1959 Sir Edgar Whitehead declared a State of Emergency and banned the ANC and arrested about 500 of its officials on the ground that there was a growing tendency in the movement to incite people in the rural as well as in the urban areas to defy the law.19 As already noted, Mr. Todd was ousted from power because he was too liberal in so far as he broadened the franchise to enable educated

18

‘Southern Rhodesia, African National Congress, Statement of Principles, Policy and Programme, September, 1957’, printed as Appendix in T. R. M. Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership, (London, Faber and Faber, 1960), 235-244. 19 Nathan Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1965), 49-50.

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Africans to vote. Sir Edgar Whitehead (see photo) was tougher in his attitude towards Africans than his predecessor.20 In a follow-up to the banning of the ANC, Sir Edgar Whitehead enacted a plethora of draconian pieces of legislation including the Public Order Amendment Act, the Preventive Detention Act and the Unlawful Organizations Act to enable the Government to prosecute, convict and punish any Africans who either resisted the orders of lawful authority or refused to comply with the law. The Public Order Amendment Act provided for five years’ imprisonment on anyone who published ‘a false statement’ which was likely ‘to encourage any person to do any act which was likely to endanger the public safety, disturb or interfere with public order or interfere with the maintenance of essential services’. The Preventive Detention Act empowered the Governor to detain indefinitely any person who had been involved in any of the activities which had led to the declaration of a State of Emergency or in any activities which might lead to another; it provided for the establishment of a Review Tribunal consisting of a judge or a retired judge of the High Court and two other persons to consider the cases of detained persons and might make recommendations to the Governor for their release or further detention. The Governor might thereupon accept or reject the recommendations of the Tribunal and his decision was final and not subject to appeal in any court. Furthermore, a detention order was not subject to any appeal, review or other proceeding in any court of law nor would any action, suit or legal proceeding or remedy be available to any detained person.21 The Unlawful Organizations Act empowered the Governor to declare any organization unlawful if it appeared to him that it was likely to endanger public safety, to disturb or interfere with public order or to prejudice the tranquility or security of the Colony.22 Under the Act, any person who continued to be a member of an unlawful organization or was in any way associated with an unlawful organization or had in any way taken part in any activity of an unlawful organization, would be liable to a fine not exceeding ǧ1,000 or to imprisonment for five years or both. 20

For details, see Chengetai J. M. Zvobgo, ‘Southern Rhodesia under Sir Edgar Whitehead, 1958-1962’, in Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol. II, Number 4, October, 1977, 481-492. Unless otherwise stated, most of the material on Sir Edgar Whitehead is drawn from this article. 21 Mason, Year of Decision, 218-222. 22 E. J. M. Zvobgo, The Role of Law as an Instrument of Oppression, (Eltham, Australia, Alternative Rhodesia Information Centre, 1973), 27-31.

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Finally, any person who attended a meeting of an unlawful organization would be presumed to be a member of that organization until and unless the contrary was proved.

The National Democratic Party (NDP), 1960-1961 On 1 January, 1960 the NDP was formed with Mr. Michael Mawema as President, Mr. Morton Malianga as Vice President, Mr. George Silundika as Secretary General, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole as National Chairman and Mr. Robert Mugabe as Publicity Secretary; in October, Mr. Joshua Nkomo (see photo) was elected President. The NDP’s Statement of Principles pledged the party to serve as ‘a vigorous political vanguard’ for removing all forms of oppression and the establishment of a democratic government in Southern Rhodesia; to work for a speedy constitutional reconstruction in Southern Rhodesia in order to establish a government elected on the principle of ‘One Man, One Vote’; to work for the educational, political and economic emancipation of the people especially the underprivileged; to work with other democratic movements in Africa and in the rest of the world in order to abolish colonialism, racialism, tribalism and all forms of national or racial oppression and economic inequalities among nations, races and peoples.23 The NDP began to organize branches in various parts of the country particularly in the urban areas. Sir Edgar Whitehead took steps to counter this development. The arrest of Mr. Michael Mawema (former President), Mr. Sketchley Samkange (Treasurer) and Mr. Leopold Takawira (Chairman of the Harare Branch) on 19 July, 1960 under the Unlawful Organizations Act, sparked off large-scale anti-regime demonstrations in Salisbury (19-20 July) and in Bulawayo (24-26 July). In the wake of the disturbances Parliament passed the Emergency Powers Act which empowered the Governor to declare a State of Emergency if it appeared to him that action was being taken or was immediately threatened by any person or body of persons of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be likely to endanger the public safety, to disturb or interfere with the maintenance of any essential services. The most comprehensive security legislation was the Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill of 27 October, 1960 which was subsequently passed by Parliament as the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. The Bill conferred on any police officer power to forbid any person from addressing any gathering and empowered him to enter and remain on any premises, or 23

Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, 60.

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attend at any place where three or more persons were gathered whenever he had reasonable grounds to believe that a breach of peace might occur or that a seditious or subversive statement might be made; if the Minister of Justice was of the opinion that the printing, publication, dissemination or possession of any publication or series of publications might be contrary to the public interest, he might, by order published in the Government Gazette, declare that the publication or series of publications or all publications published by any person or association of persons, to be prohibited publications. The Bill made it an offence to wear prohibited political uniforms or ‘to display any banner, placard or notice bearing any slogan or words or emblem’ which might lead to public disorder or to any strike or to sing ‘any song or utter any slogan’ which might lead to public disorder. Under the Bill any person who, without lawful excuse, made any statement likely to lead to the destruction of any property, or to do any act or acts which had the effect of defeating the purpose or intention of any law, would be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years; any person who induced another person unlawfully to cease work or to leave any piece of work unfinished or unlawfully to refrain from returning to work, would be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years; any person who did anything which was likely to expose to contempt or ridicule or to incite hatred against or to impair the authority of any officer of the Government of the Colony or of the Federation, or any police officer in carrying out his duties, would be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years. In a stinging critique, the Chief Justice of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Robert Tredgold, (see photo) described the Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill as ‘an anthology of horrors’ and observed that the Bill was not intended as an emergency legislation to be invoked in times of national peril; it was to become part of the ordinary law of the land. He said the Bill severely circumscribed the right of public assembly; it gave the Minister of Justice complete control of public meetings and processions, and these could, at his discretion, be prohibited for a specified period; an individual could, by order be prohibited from attending public gatherings and a lawful meeting could, by order of a police officer, be made unlawful and dispersed and a Police officer could forbid any person, however eminent, from addressing such a meeting. The Minister of Justice could ban any publication or a series of publications and his order could not be varied or set aside by a court of law. Furthermore, the Bill created numerous offences for which minimum sentences were prescribed and

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which the courts were compelled to impose regardless of the circumstances of the case. The cumulative effect of the security laws was to turn Rhodesia into a police state. When the Bill became law, Sir Robert Tredgold decided to resign his post as Federal Chief Justice rather than preside over its enforcement.24 In response to these draconian legislative measures the NDP put forward proposals for a new and revised constitution for Southern Rhodesia under which all citizens would be equal before the law without regard to race, religious beliefs or affiliations or colour. According to the proposals, no person would be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of the law nor would any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; the Legislature would make no laws abridging the right to freedom of speech or of the Press or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for the redress of grievances; the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, would be guaranteed; no person would be deprived of his property compulsorily except according to the law or for just and reasonable compensation; no person would be denied employment on the grounds of race, colour or religious belief; the right to acquire, lease, occupy or use land would not be restricted on grounds of race, creed or colour; every person would have the right to form and join trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests; all children without regard to race, colour or religion would be entitled to such free education as the state would provide.25 At the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Review Conference which was first held in London in December, 1960 and reconvened in Salisbury in January, 1961 NDP leaders demanded parity of representation in the Legislative Assembly, that is to say, 30 African and 30 European seats and adult franchise. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Duncan Sandys, rejected the demand for parity of representation in the Legislative Assembly and for adult franchise and instead proposed a new constitution providing for 15 African and 50 European seats in an expanded Legislative Assembly of 65 members and a franchise which

24

Sir Robert Tredgold, The Rhodesia That Was My Life, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1968), 229-231; 234. 25 Document 5: ‘National Democratic Party: Proposals for a new and revised constitution for Southern Rhodesia, 1960’, in Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, (eds.), Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Select Documents, (New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1979), 34-35.

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provided for two voting rolls: a higher or ‘A’ Roll (largely European) and a lower or ‘B’ Roll (largely African). To qualify for both Rolls, a voter was required to be a citizen of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to be 21 years of age or over, to have had two years of continuous residence in the Federation and three months’ residence in the constituency and electoral district concerned immediately preceding the application for enrolment and to have an adequate knowledge of the English language and the ability to complete and sign the voters’ registration form. The qualifications for the ‘A’ roll required a voter to have an income of not less than ǧ792 per annum during each of the two years preceding the date of claim for enrolment or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ1,650; or an income of not less than ǧ528 per annum during each of the two years preceding the date of claim for enrolment or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ1,100 and completion of a course of primary education; or an income of not less than ǧ330 per annum during each of the two years preceding the date of claim for enrolment, or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ550 and four years of secondary education or appointment to the office of Chief or Headman. To qualify for the lower or ‘B’ roll a voter was required to have an income of not less than ǧ264 per annum during the six months preceding the date of claim for enrolment or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ495 or an income of not less than ǧ132 per annum during the six months preceding the date of claim for enrolment or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ275 and two years of secondary education; or persons over 30 years of age with an income of not less than ǧ132 per annum during the six months preceding the date of claim for enrolment or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ275 and completion of a course of primary education of a prescribed standard or persons of over 30 years of age with an income of not less than ǧ198 per annum during the six months preceding the date of claim for enrolment or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ385 or all Village Heads with a following of 20 or more heads of families; or ordained Ministers of Religion with a university degree or five years of full-time training or two years of training and three years of service.26

26

Reproduced in James Barber, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion, (London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1967), Appendix III, 316-317.

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The new Constitution contained a Bill of Rights which guaranteed the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual including the right to life, liberty, security of person, the enjoyment of property and the protection of the law; freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association and respect for his private and family life. The new constitutional proposals were to be submitted for acceptance or rejection by all the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia in a referendum. Since the major white opposition party, the Dominion Party, had rejected the new constitutional proposals from the beginning, it campaigned for their rejection. The NDP leaders urged their followers to boycott the Government referendum and instead planned to hold a separate referendum on 23 July, 1961 three days ahead of the Government referendum scheduled for 26 July. In a predominantly African vote, 372, 546 votes were cast against and only 471 in favour of the new constitutional and franchise proposals. Sir Edgar Whitehead had little difficulty in carrying the majority of European voters in support of the new constitutional and franchise proposals. When the referendum results were announced on 27 July, 1961 they were a triumph for Sir Edgar Whitehead: 41, 949 Europeans voted for while 21, 846 voted against the new constitutional and franchise proposals. Although both the NDP and the Dominion Party had rejected the new constitutional and franchise proposals, the results of the Government referendum convinced Sir Edgar that partnership between the races was still the right policy. At a United Federal Party (UFP) congress held in October, 1961 at which between one-third and one-half of the delegates were non-Europeans the majority of whom were Africans from the emerging middle class, the abolition of racial discrimination in public places and the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act were both accepted as future party policy. Sir Edgar Whitehead banned the NDP on 9 December, 1961 under the Unlawful Organizations Act. With the banning of the NDP, the possibility of dialogue between the Africans and the Government evaporated; this was disastrous for the policy of partnership.

The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), 1961-1962 On 19 December, 1961 the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) with Mr. Joshua Nkomo as President and with virtually the same leadership as the NDP, was formed. Dr. Samuel Tichafa Parirenyatwa, a medical practitioner who subsequently died in an accident, was appointed Vice President. The new party committed itself, among other things, to:

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introduce adult franchise as the basis of government in Southern Rhodesia; unite the African people to enable them to liberate themselves from all forms of imperialism and colonialism; instill and maintain the spirit of Pan-Africanism in Zimbabwe; work co-operatively with other movements in Africa and elsewhere which fostered the spirit of Pan-Africanism and to observe, respect and promote Human Rights contained in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.27 Sir Edgar Whitehead banned ZAPU on 20 September, 1962 on the ground that it was conducting a widespread campaign of intimidation and terrorism and restricted its leaders to specified rural areas for three months. He hoped that by banning ZAPU and restricting its leaders to their rural homes, he would win wavering white voters and simultaneously muster enough African votes in the coming election. 28 According to the then Chairman of the Highfield Branch of ZAPU, the late Mr. Davis Mugabe, a few days before the banning of ZAPU, instead of marshalling the forces of resistance, Mr. Joshua Nkomo left for Zambia, proceeded to London and returned home after six weeks. On his return, he was arrested and taken to his rural home to serve the last six weeks of a three-month detention order which his lieutenants were then serving.29 In spite of the re-detention of Mr. Nkomo, Sir Edgar Whitehead was still committed to the policy of partnership. This policy was repudiated at the elections held on 14 December, 1962. Since ZAPU leaders had urged their followers to boycott the election, the election campaign was fought between the two white political parties, the ruling United Federal Party (UFP) and the Rhodesia Front (RF) which had been formed in March, 1962 by disparate groups which had comprised the Dominion Party. The campaign centred on the pace at which Africans should be allowed to advance politically. The UFP argued that change must be accepted, reconciliation between the races was essential, Africans must be given rights to avoid frustration and revolt against European rule; the RF argued that the pace of change must be slow and appeasement and revolution must be halted in order to preserve the existing structure of society.30

27

Mimeographed, Constitution of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, (Lusaka, Zambia, 1968). 28 Leonard T. Kapungu, Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom, (New York, Orbis Books, 1974), 47-48. 29 Davis Mugabe, ‘The Nationalist Movement of Dzimbabwe’, in George M. Daniels, (ed.), Drums of War: The Continuing Crisis in Rhodesia, (New York, The Third Press, 1974), 41-42. 30 Barber, Rhodesia, 168.

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The UFP Congress held in November, 1962 at which a third of the delegates were Africans, supported the abolition of all racial discrimination and a repeal of the Land Apportionment Act; the RF was determined to retain the Land Apportionment Act at all costs. In response, ZAPU leaders persuaded those of their followers who were registered voters to boycott the election. The campaign was extremely effective; most registered African voters stayed at home on the day of the election. The election results were a clear repudiation of the policy of partnership. Of the 65 seats being contested, the RF won 35, the UFP 29; one seat went to an independent candidate. According to one critic, Africans rejected the policy of partnership by boycotting the election; the Government was offering them too little, too late; they wanted political power.31 It was clear that they were not going to win political power by participating in the election; they concluded that whites ‘would never voluntarily make more than nominal concessions and that only by overthrowing the whole system of government would African aspirations be achieved’.32 The RF rejected racial partnership by winning the December, 1962 elections on a platform to retain white supremacy in Southern Rhodesia for all time. As soon as the results of the election were announced, the British High Commissioner in Salisbury, Lord Alport, in a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, described the election results as ‘a major, perhaps mortal setback to the British policy’; it had made the chances of any constructive solution to the race problem almost impossible: ‘It meant a swing away from Britain towards South Africa’; it was a triumph of black nationalism since ZAPU’s campaign to persuade the majority of Africans to boycott the election had been remarkably successful.33 In Southern Rhodesia itself the results of the election pointed to a gloomy picture for the future of the country: ‘At the election both races in rejecting a compromise solution thereby implied that the struggle for political power which lay ahead was a racial struggle’.34

31 B. Vulindela Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict, (New York, Hawthorn Books, 1967), 123. 32 Frank Clements, Rhodesia: A Study of The Deterioration of A White Society, (New York, Praeger, 1969), 166. 33 Lord Alport, The Sudden Assignment, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), 223. 34 Barber, Rhodesia, 168.

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The ZAPU-ZANU Split and its aftermath, 1963-1965 In his account of the split of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) from ZAPU, Mr. Nathan Shamuyarira, a prominent journalist who joined ZANU at the time the split took place, tells us that in early April, 1963 Mr. Joshua Nkomo managed to persuade the entire National Executive to leave the country and proceed to Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanganyika. He told them that it was the wish of President Julius Nyerere in particular and of the other Pan-African leaders as well that the Executive should be outside the country at that time. In spite of nursing a disquieting feeling that going to Dar es Salaam was a wrong decision, Mr. Robert Mugabe decided to break his bail conditions of reporting daily to the police and after he had slipped away, the Government issued a warrant for his arrest. Mr. Leopold Takawira who was also on bail pending an appeal against a court sentence, decided against his better judgment to proceed to Dar es Salaam. When the entire Executive assembled in Dar es Salaam on 12 April, 1963 President Nyerere summoned them and told them bluntly that he was surprised that they had arrived in his capital. The Executive was astounded that he had not sanctioned the move; they were greatly disappointed that Mr. Nkomo had misled them. Furthermore they began to see Mr. Nkomo’s behaviour in a sinister perspective and noted that except for the three months he had spent in restriction following the banning of ZAPU, Mr. Nkomo had devoted most of his time travelling the world to organize international support against the Southern Rhodesia regime. They recognized that this was an extremely useful work but many of his followers began to feel that he had done enough outside the country and should now concentrate on confronting the settlers at home. There was thus a fundamental difference of approach to the struggle for independence: Mr. Nkomo wanted to circumvent the situation at home and mobilize international support in the hope of bringing effective pressure to bear on the Government. To Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Mr. Robert Mugabe the thing most needful was more organization at home to crystallize the situation there. Instead, Mr. Nkomo managed to persuade Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Mr. Robert Mugabe, Mr. J. Z. Moyo, Mr. Leopold Takawira and Mr. Washington Malianga to accompany him on visits to several African countries before the Addis Ababa conference which was to set up the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May, 1963. Mr. Nkomo, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Mr. Robert Mugabe, Mr. J. Z. Moyo, Mr. Leopold Takawira, and Mr. Washington Malianga attended the Addis Ababa conference. They lobbied hard for financial and

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moral support for the party and for a government-in-exile; several PanAfrican leaders, however, told them to go home and fight the struggle there. Ghana and Algeria were particularly critical of the exodus. The OAU promised them financial support provided they returned home to wage the liberation struggle inside the country. The Executive had a brief and inconclusive meeting while at Addis Ababa on the question of leadership and decided to discuss the matter fully at a meeting after returning to Dar es Salaam. On reaching Dar es Salaam, however, President Nyerere called Mr. Nkomo and told him it was time to return home. 35 In his autobiography, Mr. Nkomo confirms that President Nyerere told him that his efforts to organize the armed struggle from Dar es Salaam were not practical and ordered him to go back home. 36 In his account of the split, Mr. Shamuyarira further states that to frustrate the plan to depose him at an executive meeting, Mr. Nkomo told the executive that he was leaving for Salisbury. By now the opposition to Mr. Nkomo had crystallized on four points. Those who opposed him wanted ‘a policy of confrontation’ with the European settlers; they wanted a new political party to be formed; they were disappointed at his lack of decisive leadership and were concerned about the lack of confidence in Mr. Nkomo which many Pan-African leaders had expressed to them at the Addis Ababa conference. Mr. Joshua Nkomo precipitated the split after a mass rally in Salisbury on 6 July, 1963 when Mr. Eddison J. M. Zvobgo who had recently returned from studying in the United States, brought from Dar es Salaam for various people around Salisbury confidential letters which stated that the Executive had lost confidence in Mr. Nkomo and that people should prepare themselves for new leadership and an entirely new movement. At a Press Conference after the rally, Mr. Nkomo announced the suspension of Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (National Chairman), Mr. Leopold Takawira (Secretary for External Affairs), Mr. Robert Mugabe (Publicity Secretary), and Mr. Morton Malianga (Secretary General) and sent a cable to Dar es Salaam to this effect. In Dar es Salaam the following day at a meeting of seven members of the Executive, the four leaders who had been suspended, voted to depose Mr. Nkomo while Mr. J. Z. Moyo, Mr. Clement Muchache and Mr. Joseph Musika disagreed and walked out; the split was complete.37

35

Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, 176-179. Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life, (London, Methuen, 1984), 115. 37 Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, 180-182. 36

Southern Rhodesia: From the Launching of the Federation of Rhodesia 117 and Nyasaland to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence

On 8 August, 1963 those nationalist leaders who were disenchanted with Mr. Nkomo’s leadership, formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). ZAPU re-named itself the People’s Caretaker Council (PCC) with the following as members of the executive: Mr. Joshua Nkomo (President); Mr. J. R. D. Chikerema (Vice President); Mr. George B. Nyandoro (Secretary General); Mr. Edward Ndlovu (Deputy Secretary General); Mr. J. Z. Moyo (Treasurer General); Mr. Joseph Musika (Foreign and PanAfrican Affairs); Mr. Josiah Chinamano (Secretary for Education); Mr. T. G. Silundika (Secretary for Publicity and Information); Mr. J. Wingiri (Deputy Secretary for Publicity and Information); Mr. L. Nkala (Organizing Secretary); Mr. Clement Muchache (Secretary for Youth); Miss Jane Ngwenya (Secretary for Women); Mr. Willie Musarurwa (Secretary for Public Relations); Mr. Samuel Munodawafa (National Chairman); Mr. Enoch Dumbutshena (Legal Affairs); Mr. George Maranke (Financial Secretary) and Mr. M. Gumbo (Deputy Secretary for Youth Affairs). At the National People’s Conference on 10 August, 1963 Mr. Joshua Nkomo claimed that the Addis Ababa conference went very well: ‘Our case was well received by the Foreign Ministers and by the Heads of State. To suggest that there was any form of reluctance by any of the independent countries because of one reason or another, is the biggest lie ever told about our political and diplomatic relations with African countries’.38 ZANU’s Policy Statement of 21 August, 1963 committed the party to establish ‘a nationalist, democratic, socialist and Pan-Africanist republic’ in Zimbabwe based on adult franchise; to adhere strictly to the principles of the rule of law; to establish a unitary and indivisible republic based on the principle of non-racialism; to entrench a Bill of rights guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of every citizen; to repeal the Land Apportionment Act and the Land Husbandry Act and to replace them with a new Land Distribution Law; to create a National Land Board to effect an equitable re-distribution of land and to abolish the de-stocking of cattle; to declare unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners and to repeal the Unlawful Organizations Act, the Preventive Detention Act and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act.39 38

Document 13, Joshua Nkomo: ‘Statement to the National People’s Conference, Salisbury, 10 August, 1963’, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, (eds.) Zimbabwe Independence Movements, 60. 39 Document 14, ‘Zimbabwe African National Union: Policy Statement, Salisbury, 21 August, 1963’, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, (eds.) Zimbabwe Independence Movements, 65-66.

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At the ZANU general election meeting in Gwelo in May, 1964 the following were elected as members of the National Executive: the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (President); Mr. Leopold Takawira (Vice President); Mr. Robert Mugabe (Secretary General); Mr. Eddison J. M. Zvobgo (Deputy Secretary General); Mr. Enos Nkala (Treasurer General); Mr. Nathan Shamuyarira (Deputy Treasurer General); Mr. Herbert Chitepo (National Chairman); Dr. Edson Sithole (Publicity Secretary); Mr. Stanlake Samkange (Deputy Publicity Secretary); Mr. Noel Mukono (Secretary for Public Affairs); Mr. Simon Muzenda (Deputy Secretary for Public Affairs); Mr. Simpson Mutambanengwe (Secretary for Foreign Affairs); Mr. Henry Hamadziripi (Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs); Dr. Elisha Mutasa (Secretary for Welfare and Legal Affairs) and Mr. Morton Malianga (Secretary for Youth). In his Presidential address at the ZANU inaugural congress in Gwelo in May, 1964 the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, (see photo) while acknowledging the tremendous moral support the United Nations in general and the Afro-Asian bloc countries in particular had given to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, stated: ‘Those who believe that the AfroAsian bloc will bring us independence are greatly mistaken. Only the PCC believes that. These countries can only help us up to a point, but independence can only be brought to this country by us. No one can liberate another. Only the PCC believes that. There is no such thing as being liberated by others. Others can only help us to liberate ourselves…We are our own liberators’.40 By contrast, the PCC leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, called on Britain to intervene to bring about immediate majority rule in Zimbabwe on the ground that under the Responsible Government Constitution of 1923 Britain had reserved powers to legislate for Southern Rhodesia.41 It is clear that there was a fundamental difference of approach to the achievement of majority rule in Zimbabwe: Reverend Sithole called for a policy of confrontation with the European settlers while Mr. Nkomo believed that British intervention was a sine qua non for the achievement of majority rule in Zimbabwe. When the British Government refused to intervene, Mr. Nkomo and the PCC found themselves in a cul de sac. To implement the policy of confrontation with the white settlers, early in 1964 40

Document 15, ‘Zimbabwe African National Union: Presidential Address at the ZANU Inaugural Congress by Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, Gwelo, 12-13 May, 1964’, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, (eds.) Zimbabwe Independence Movements,79-80. 41 Document 18, Joshua Nkomo: ‘The Case for majority rule in Rhodesia’, Gonakudzingwa Camp, 1964, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, (eds.) Zimbabwe Independence Movements, 106-107.

Southern Rhodesia: From the Launching of the Federation of Rhodesia 119 and Nyasaland to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence

ZANU began to recruit young men and women for military training abroad. The Government responded by arresting the leaders of both ZANU and ZAPU. In June, 1964 Reverend Sithole was arrested in Fort Victoria under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act for urging Africans to prepare to oppose a unilateral declaration of independence. The Magistrate dismissed twelve of the thirteen charges against him since he had urged people to oppose an illegal act. However, he was found guilty of calling on his followers to be ready to oppose a unilateral declaration of independence with axes, bows and arrows. The Magistrate said this was tantamount to fostering a private army and not only sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour with six months suspended for three years but also refused him bail while appealing to the High Court. Mr. Leopold Takawira was arrested and sentenced to six months in prison for making a subversive statement in Umtali in 1962. Mr. Eddison J. M. Zvobgo was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for having served as an official of a banned organization outside the country and served his sentence. On 16 April, 1964 Mr. Nkomo, Mr. Josiah Chinamano and his wife, Ruth, and Mr. Joseph Musika were arrested and restricted at Gonakudzingwa and were immediately followed by 141 PCC supporters.42 The fierce and bloody battles between ZAPU and ZANU to gain mass support made life unpleasant for many people especially in the Salisbury area where several people were killed. The Government suppressed the lawlessness when it banned both parties on 26 August, 1964. Furthermore, an amendment to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act passed by Parliament on 7 December, 1964 made the possession of a bomb an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to twenty years while the possession of an offensive weapon other than a bomb became an offence punishable by a maximum of twenty years in prison; another amendment to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act passed by Parliament on 19 March, 1965 extended the maximum period of restriction from one year to five years. In addition, in May, 1965 nine founding members of ZANUMr. Michael Mawema, Mr. Edgar Tekere, Mr. Eddison J. M. Zvobgo, Mr. Enos Nkala, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Mr. Robert Mugabe, Mr. Leopold Takawira, Mr. Simon Muzenda and Mr. Morton Malianga-were detained at Sikombela Restriction Camp in Gokwe District in northwestern Zimbabwe; in November, 1965 they were transferred to Salisbury Maximum Security Prison. 42 Eshmael Mlambo, Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright, (London, C. Hurst and Company, 1972), 199-203.

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Developments leading to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1963-1965 On assuming office in 1963 the first objective of the leader of the Rhodesia Front (RF), Mr. Winston Field, was to secure independence for Southern Rhodesia as soon as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved. His talks in London with the Conservative British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home on 24 January, 1964 gave him hope that if the Conservatives won the coming election, they would definitely meet Rhodesia’s request for independence. But there were two serious drawbacks: the Conservatives might lose the election and Sir Alec was not prepared to commit himself in writing. Within a matter of a few weeks Rhodesia’s hopes for independence were dashed.43 The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Duncan Sandys, rejected Mr. Field’s request for independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution on the ground that this would be unacceptable to the rest of the Commonwealth. Mr. Field returned home with nothing to show for his visit. In a message to Mr. Winston Field on 22 February, 1964, Mr. Sandys stated that the British Government could not grant independence to Southern Rhodesia under the 1961 Constitution because the franchise was incomparably more restricted than that of any British territory which had achieved independence in the previous fifty years. He said the Press in London had been reporting from different sources that Southern Rhodesia might be contemplating a unilateral declaration of independence; he sincerely hoped that these reports were without foundation for he could not believe that those who might be thinking along these lines had fully weighed the likely consequences. International reaction would be sharp and immediate; the issue would be raised at the United Nations; the Commonwealth would be deeply divided and the attitude of the newer members would be extremely antagonistic. Commonwealth and foreign governments with one or two exceptions would almost certainly refuse to recognize Southern Rhodesia’s independence or to establish diplomatic relations with her. African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia would probably set up a government in exile which many countries would probably recognize. Thus isolated, Southern Rhodesia would increasingly become a target for subversion, trade boycotts, air transport bans and other hostile activities organized by independent African States. In particular the relations between Southern and Northern Rhodesia which had made such a 43

Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith, (London, Blake Publishing Limited, 1997), 61.

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promising start with agreements on the Kariba Dam, the Rhodesia Railways and the Central African Airways could be seriously disrupted. A unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia would not make the country independent and to take such action would violate the Constitution which Southern Rhodesia Ministers had pledged to uphold. The British Government would be bound to take the view that this had no legal or constitutional validity.44 In light of this warning, Mr. Field came to the conclusion that a unilateral declaration of independence would be a mistake and hoped that further negotiations might yet prove fruitful. His failure to gain independence was his undoing; the Rhodesia Front caucus and his Cabinet demanded his resignation; on 13 April, 1964 he resigned both from the premiership and leadership of the Rhodesia Front and was replaced by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Douglas Smith, who, the party believed, was prepared to take independence unilaterally. In a message to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Mr. Ian Smith (see photo) reiterated Rhodesia’s claim to independence under the 1961 Constitution on the ground that the Southern Rhodesia delegation had attended the Victoria Falls Conference which had worked out the modalities of ending the Federation on condition that the British Government accepted the principle of Southern Rhodesia’s independence. In his memoirs Mr. Smith says his talks in London on 7 September, 1964 with Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Duncan Sandys were inconclusive; Sir Alec and Mr. Sandys insisted that the British Government could not grant independence to Southern Rhodesia on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, spoke strongly against a unilateral declaration of independence and warned him of the serious consequences of taking such a step. The talks which were resumed the following morning were no more than a rehash of the previous day’s discussions. A communiqué issued after the final meeting stated that Southern Rhodesia claimed independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution; the British Government stated that it would need to be satisfied that any proposals for independence were acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.45 In a message to Mr. Smith on 16 September, 1964 Sir Alec DouglasHome denied that the British Government had in 1961 given an undertaking to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia on the basis of the 1961 Constitution in the event of the dissolution of the Federation of 44

Elaine Windrich, (ed.), The Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary Record, 19231973, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 202. 45 Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal, 75-77.

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Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He stated emphatically that the British Government had neither given any undertaking explicit or implicit to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia in the event of the dissolution of the Federation nor had the Southern Rhodesia Government asked for any such undertaking.46 In response, Mr. Smith proposed an indaba (conference) with African chiefs and stated that if at the indaba the chiefs approved the Government’s request for independence, it would demonstrate conclusively that the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole wanted independence. Sir Alec was of the view that an indaba would not suffice by itself; it must be replaced or at least supplemented by a referendum or something equivalent to a referendum. On taking office, the new Labour Government under Mr. Harold Wilson (see photo) immediately confirmed that like its Conservative predecessor, it would not accept an indaba as an accurate reflection of majority African opinion. Undaunted, Mr. Smith went ahead with his indaba on 26 October, 1964 at which the chiefs gave their unanimous support for immediate independence under the 1961 Constitution; the British Government, however, refused to recognize the indaba as representative of African opinion.47 Mr. Smith’s quest for Rhodesia’s independence must be understood in the broader context of the advent of independence in Nyasaland and in Northern Rhodesia. As noted in Chapter 4 in the August, 1961 elections in Nyasaland, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) won 22 out of 30 seats in the Legislative Assembly and shortly afterwards the Governor granted five and later seven of the ten seats on the Protectorate’s Legislative Council to the MCP; this made Dr. Banda Prime Minister of a self-governing Nyasaland and on 6 July, 1964 Nyasaland became the independent Republic of Malawi. Meanwhile, in the wake of inconclusive elections in Northern Rhodesia in November, 1962 for the Legislative Council of 36 seats in which the then ruling United Federal Party (UFP) won 16 seats, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) won 13 seats, the African National Congress (ANC), won 7 seats, UNIP and the ANC contracted ‘a marriage of convenience’ when they agreed to form a coalition government. The coalition held together until a new constitution and the elections of early 1964 gave UNIP 55 out of 65 seats in a Legislative Council of 75 members ten of which had been reserved for whites. Like Dr. Banda, Mr. 46 47

Windrich, The Rhodesian Problem, 203. Barber, Rhodesia, 258, 263-264.

Southern Rhodesia: From the Launching of the Federation of Rhodesia 123 and Nyasaland to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence

(later Dr.) Kaunda (see photo) became Prime Minister of a self-governing Northern Rhodesia and on 24 October, 1964 Northern Rhodesia became the independent Republic of Zambia.48 In a statement on 27 October, 1964 –three days after Zambia’s independence-the British Labour Government warned Mr. Smith that a declaration of independence would have no constitutional effect and would be an open act of defiance and rebellion and it would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to it; no Commonwealth Government would recognize a unilateral declaration of independence; Commonwealth membership would be out of the question with all the related economic consequences; the British Government would be bound to sever relations with those responsible for such a declaration; the economic effects would be disastrous to the prosperity and prospects of the people of Southern Rhodesia; all financial and trade relations between Britain and Southern Rhodesia would be jeopardized; any further aid or any further access to the London money market would be out of the question; in short, an illegal declaration of independence would bring to an end relationships between her and Britain, would cut Rhodesia off from the rest of the Commonwealth, from most foreign Governments and international organizations, would inflict disastrous economic damage upon her and would leave her isolated and virtually friendless in a largely- hostile continent. 49 In order to avert a unilateral declaration of independence, the new Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, invited Mr. Smith for further talks in London in February, 1965. In the event, the talks were inconclusive. Mr. Bottomley subsequently outlined to Mr. Smith the Five Principles on which the British Government would need to be satisfied before contemplating the grant of independence: (i) the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed; (ii) there would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution; (iii) there would have to be an immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; (iv) there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination and (v) the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis 48

Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965), 316-317. 49 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971), 25.

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proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. In response Mr. Smith said the Rhodesian Government was unable to accept the principle of unimpeded progress towards majority rule enshrined in the 1961 Constitution; it could not accept any form of constitutional safeguard which would prevent the Europeans in Rhodesia from amending the Constitution if they deemed it necessary to prevent the emergence of an African government; it was not prepared to take any specific steps to end racial discrimination, to amend or repeal the Land Apportionment Act or to contemplate any process of consultation with African opinion within Rhodesia which might result in the rejection of the proposals for independence reached in the negotiations between the British and the Rhodesian Governments.50 To strengthen his bargaining position Mr. Smith held a general election on 7 May, 1965; the Rhodesia Front swept the board by winning all the 50 ‘A’ Roll seats; of the ‘B’ Roll seats, 13 went to the United Federal Party black candidates, one to an Asian and one to an independent white candidate, Dr. Ahrn Palley.51 In a message to Mr. Wilson on 20 October, 1965 Mr. Smith argued that the 1961 Constitution covered all the Five Principles. In a rebuttal the following day, Mr. Wilson said he could not accept that granting independence under the 1961 Constitution would satisfy the Five Principles without further changes and that progress under the 1961 Constitution had not resulted in sufficiently- representative institutions to satisfy the British Government that the granting of independence would be justified.52 Mr. Wilson stated that at a meeting at 10 Downing Street on 7 October, 1965 Mr. Smith again pressed for independence under the 1961 Constitution. Mr. Wilson insisted on the implementation of the Five Principles and pointed out that in every country to which Britain had granted independence, democratic suffrage, one man, one vote, had been achieved before sovereignty was conceded. The talks which were resumed the following day were inconclusive. Mr. Wilson said no basis had been found on which the British Government could grant independence to Rhodesia and warned Mr. Smith of the dire consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence not only economically but also in terms of world opinion, together with the dangers for southern Africa as a whole. 50

Windrich, The Rhodesian Problem, 205-207. Smith, The Great Betrayal, 90. 52 Windrich, The Rhodesian Problem, 207-208. 51

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Mr. Smith rejected any constitutional conference; it was independence on his terms or nothing; he returned to Rhodesia on 12 October, 1965. In a desperate effort to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence, Mr. Wilson flew to Salisbury with the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, to resume the talks; he arrived in Salisbury in the evening on 25 October. The following day he held inconclusive talks with Mr. Smith and in the morning on 27 October held talks with the ZAPU leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, who with his colleagues had been flown from Gonakudzingwa and other detention camps in Rhodesia. In the talks Mr. Nkomo made it clear that he had no intention whatsoever of accepting any settlement before majority rule and rejected the 1961 Constitution, however amended, as a basis for independence. In his talks in the afternoon with the ZANU leader, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole who, with his colleagues had also been flown from various detention camps in Rhodesia, Mr. Wilson said whatever their personal antipathies, Reverend Sithole and his colleagues took the same position as Mr. Nkomo: ‘one man, one vote’. Mr. Wilson also held talks with the Council of Chiefs; he said after questioning the chiefs on their knowledge of the provisions of the 1961 Constitution, it was clear they had little comprehension of the provisions of the 1961 Constitution and that their claims to be a representative consultative group capable of expressing African opinions, were totally false. He proposed a commission appointed by the two Governments to recommend the constitutional arrangements on which Rhodesia could proceed to legal independence. To avert UDI, Mr. Wilson telephoned Mr. Smith in the morning of 11 November, 1965 while the UDI machinery was moving inexorably forward. 53 These last-ditch efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, however, were abortive. On 11 November, 1965, Mr. Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia’s independence from Britain. In his address to the nation announcing UDI, he stated, among other things: ‘In the lives of most nations, there comes a time when a stand has to be taken for principle, whatever the consequences. This moment has come to Rhodesia’.54

Summary and Conclusions This Chapter has examined the major developments in Southern Rhodesia from the launching of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the 53 54

Wilson, The Labour Government, 165, 169-170. Smith, The Great Betrayal, 104-106; The Rhodesia Herald, November 12, 1965.

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Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1953-1965) and in particular, the premiership of Mr. Garfield Todd (1953-1958); the rise and vicissitudes of African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia in the broader context of the independence of Asian countries after the Second World War, the impact of the Pan-African Congress of October, 1945 and the independence of Ghana on 6 March, 1957; the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) of Southern Rhodesia (12 September, 1957); the aims and objectives of the ANC and the banning of the party by the Government on 26 February, 1959; the founding of the National Democratic Party (NDP) on 1 January, 1960; the aims and objectives of the NDP and the banning of the party on 9 December, 1961 under the Unlawful Organizations Act; the formation of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) on 19 December, 1961; the aims and objectives of the party and the causes of the split in ZAPU which led to the launching of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) on 8 August, 1963; the aims and objectives of the party and the banning of both parties by the Rhodesian Government on 26 August, 1964; the developments which led to the unilateral declaration of independence and in particular the fall of Mr. Winston Field and his replacement by Mr. Ian Douglas Smith as Prime Minister on 13 April, 1963; Mr. Smith’s search for independence for Rhodesia in the wake of the independence of Malawi on 6 July, 1964 and of Zambia on 24 October, 1964; the protracted negotiations between the British Government and the Rhodesian Government over Rhodesia’s demand for independence; the failure of these negotiations and Mr. Smith’s unilateral declaration of Rhodesia’s independence from Britain on 11 November, 1965. The nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia laboured under five major constraints. First, the unprecedented repressive legislative measures including the Public Order Amendment Act, the Preventive Detention Act, the Unlawful Organizations Act and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act emasculated the movement. Second, the split in ZAPU which led to the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) fragmented the movement. Third, the bloody battles waged by the two parties against each other in an effort to gain mass support, weakened the movement even further. The Government suppressed the lawlessness resulting from intraparty strife with a mailed fist by banning both parties on 26 August, 1964. Fourth, it tightened security through two amendments to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act on 7 December, 1964 and on 19 March, 1965. Fifth, it arrested and detained ZAPU leaders at Gonakudzingwa Restriction Camp in April, 1964; arrested and detained ZANU leaders at Sikombela Restriction Camp in the Gokwe District in north-western Zimbabwe in May, 1965 from whence they were transferred to Salisbury

Southern Rhodesia: From the Launching of the Federation of Rhodesia 127 and Nyasaland to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence

Maximum Security Prison in November, 1965. Finally, the declaration of the State of Emergency by the Rhodesia Front Government on 5 November, 1965 and the rounding up of those nationalist leaders still at large left the nationalist movement leaderless. The negotiations between the British and the Rhodesian Governments over Rhodesia’s demand for independence were in a sense conducted in a vacuum; at no stage in the negotiations were the African leaders consulted. True, Mr. Wilson held talks with ZAPU and ZANU leaders in Salisbury on 27 October, 1965 but this was in a belated effort to avert a unilateral declaration of independence. In the short term, the Rhodesia Front Government managed to contain African opposition but it could not suppress African aspirations for majority rule. It remained to be seen whether Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence would survive the nationalist challenge in the long run in the broader context of the liberation struggles taking place in the Portuguese territories of GuineaBissau, Angola and most importantly, in neighbouring Mozambique.

CHAPTER SIX FROM THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (UDI) TO THE PEARCE COMMISSION, 1965-1972

Introduction As explained in the previous chapter, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, warned Rhodesia’s Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, of the consequences of a UDI. When, in spite of this warning Mr. Smith announced a unilateral declaration of Rhodesia’s independence from Britain on 11 November, 1965 Mr. Wilson instead of using force to quell the settler rebellion, imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia. This Chapter focuses on the major developments in Rhodesia from UDI to the Pearce Commission (1965-1972) and in particular British economic sanctions against Rhodesia; the discussions on Rhodesia at the conference of the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government held in London (September, 1966); Mr. Wilson’s new proposals for a settlement of Rhodesia’s constitutional problems negotiated aboard the British warship, the Tiger (2-4 December, 1966); the United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia (16 December, 1966 and 29 May, 1968) ; Mr. Wilson’s new proposals for a settlement of Rhodesia’s problems conducted aboard the British warship, the Fearless (October, 1968); the Rhodesian Government’s Proposals For A New Constitution For Rhodesia (1969) and the response of Rhodesian Church leaders to these Proposals; Rhodesia’s Land Tenure Act (1969) and the response of Rhodesian Church leaders to the major provisions of this Act; the AngloRhodesian Proposals For A Settlement of the Rhodesian problem; the launching of the African National Council (ANC) in 1971; the appointment of the Pearce Commission (1971), its Report (1972) and aftermath.

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129

Major Developments, 1965-1968 British Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia In the wake of UDI, the British Labour Government imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Accordingly, Rhodesia was expelled from the Sterling area; Commonwealth preferences on Rhodesian goods were withdrawn; selective exchange controls were imposed and Rhodesia was excluded from the London money market. Furthermore, early in December, 1965 the British Government seized Rhodesia’s Reserve Bank assets in London. 1 On 17 December, 1965 it banned oil and petroleum products destined for Rhodesia and prohibited the importation of Rhodesian tobacco and sugar. 2 The Beira-Umtali oil pipeline was closed because British air reconnaissance and frigate patrols and British warships operating off the Mozambican port of Beira, prevented any ships attempting to provide oil to Rhodesia.3 However, Rhodesia continued to receive the bulk of its oil supplies by rail and by road from South Africa and obtained additional supplies from the large oil refinery at Lorenzo Marques in Mozambique.4 British economic sanctions failed to inflict radical injury on the Rhodesian economy inter alia because the Rhodesian business community which had previously opposed UDI, decided out of self-interest, to support the rebel regime and worked skillfully to circumvent sanctions; in 1966 the regime stabilized the foreign exchange situation by reducing imports by about one third. Rhodesia had a strong and broadly-based economy which was not wholly dependent on one product and was almost selfsufficient in both food and manufactured products. South Africa became the major conduit for Rhodesia’s imports and exports, the major source of credit and supplier of petrol. Furthermore, Rhodesia’s mineral exports to Japan, the United States, West Germany and other industrialized nations remained strong.5

1 Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith, (London, Blake Publishing, 1997), 112. 2 Ken Flower, Serving Secretly, (London, John Murray Publishers Ltd, 1987), 62. 3 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970, (London, Weindefeld, Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971), 222-223. 4 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 116. 5 Larry W. Bowman, ‘Rhodesia Since UDI’, Africa Report, (February, 1967), 8.

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The London Commonwealth Conference and Rhodesia, 6-15 September, 1966 At the conference of the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government held in London (6 -15 September, 1966) the assembled leaders asked Mr. Wilson to state categorically that the British Government would not grant independence to Rhodesia before majority rule. In a communiqué issued on 14 September, 1966 Mr. Wilson confirmed that the British Government would not recommend to the British Parliament any constitutional settlement which did not conform with the Five Principles and in particular the Fifth Principle which stated that any settlement must be, and seen to be, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole and assured the conference that: (a) after the illegal regime was ended, the Governor would appoint a broad-based representative administration and that during the interim period the armed forces and police would be responsible to the Governor; individuals who were detained or restricted on political grounds would be released and normal political activities would be permitted on condition that they were conducted peacefully. (b) The British Government would negotiate with the interim administration a constitutional settlement aimed at achieving majority rule on the basis of the Five Principles. (c) This constitutional settlement would be submitted to the people of Rhodesia as a whole by appropriate democratic means. (d) The British Government would need to be satisfied that the test of Rhodesian opinion was free and fair and would be acceptable to the world community. Under pressure, Mr. Wilson assured the Heads of State and Government that the British Government would immediately communicate its intentions to the illegal regime that if it was not prepared to take the initial and indispensable steps to end the rebellion, the British Government would withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement and given the full support of Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations, the British Government would be prepared to join in sponsoring in the Security Council before the end of the year a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. An analysis of the working of economic sanctions prepared by the Sanctions Committee set up in Lagos and presented at the conference showed that although sanctions had undoubtedly depressed the Rhodesian economy, they were unlikely at their existing level to achieve the desired political objectives within an acceptable period of time.6 6 The Communiqué on Rhodesia of September 14, 1966, reproduced in Brian Lapping, ‘The Commonwealth and Rhodesia’, Africa Report, (October, 1966), 13.

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The Tiger Proposals, 2-4 December, 1966 In light of the failure of economic sanctions to topple Rhodesia’s errant regime, Mr. Wilson invited Mr. Smith for talks aboard the British warship, the Tiger, to explore whether the two Governments could reach ‘an honourable constitutional settlement’ which could form the basis for independence. The Working Document unveiled aboard the Tiger consisting of 21 paragraphs, provided for a Legislative Assembly of 67 members comprising of 33 Europeans (to be elected on the ‘A’ Roll), 17 Europeans (to be elected for European Reserved seats) and 17 Africans (to be elected on the ‘B’ Roll); a Senate of 26 members consisting of 12 Europeans (to be elected by Europeans on the ‘A’ Roll of whom 6 would represent Mashonaland and 6 would represent Matabeleland); 8 Africans (to be elected by Africans on the ‘A’ and ‘B’ Rolls) of whom 4 would represent Mashonaland and 4 would represent Matabeleland and 6 Chiefs to be elected by the Council of Chiefs. The ‘B’ Roll would be extended to include all Africans over 30 years of age who satisfied the citizenship and residence qualifications. Under the Working Document, ordinary amendments of the Constitution would require a vote of two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly; the amendment of any of the specially-entrenched provisions in the Constitution would require a vote of at least threequarters of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly and the Senate voting together.7 As noted in the previous chapter, the British Labour Government insisted that it would only grant independence to Rhodesia on the basis of Five Principles: (1) The Principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed. (2) There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution. (3) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population. (4) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination. (5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.8 On 25 January, 1966 Mr. Wilson added the Sixth Principle: the

7

The Working Document Aboard H. M. S. Tiger, reproduced in Bowman, ‘Rhodesia Since UDI’, Africa Report, (February, 1967), 10-11. 8 Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970, 143.

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need to ensure that regardless of race there should be no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority. To give effect to the Fourth Principle, the Working Document provided for the appointment of a commission as soon as possible to study and make recommendations to the Rhodesian Government on ways and means of ending racial discrimination. On the question of the return to legality and the Fifth Principle, the British Government undertook under paragraph 10, to issue an Order in Council as soon as possible to permit the appointment by the Governor of a Prime Minister and other Ministers in Rhodesia. The existing Legislature would be dissolved; the Governor would be invested with legislative powers to be used on the advice of Ministers except in those cases where the Constitution empowered him to act in his own discretion; no later than four months from the date of the dissolution of the Legislature, new elections would be held. If the test of Rhodesian opinion had shown that the new constitution was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, on the basis of that constitution, elections would be held as soon as possible before independence. As soon as the British Government issued the Order in Council referred to in paragraph 10, the Governor, in the full exercise of his constitutional powers, would invite Mr. Smith to form a broad-based Government; the restored constitutional Government would be based on the 1961 Constitution, modified (by Order in Council to be issued as soon as possible) to provide that during the interim period before holding the first election, Rhodesian Ministers would be appointed by and responsible to the Governor who would normally act on their advice on all administrative matters but as regards his ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and the protection of human rights, he would be advised, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, by a Defence and Security Council, comprising of the responsible Ministers, together with the heads of the Defence Forces, the Chief of Police, and a representative of the British Government. During the interim period and before any testing of Rhodesian opinion under the Fifth Principle, censorship would be removed and normal political activities would be permitted provided they were conducted peacefully and democratically. An impartial Judicial Tribunal, appointed by the Rhodesian Government but including one British representative, would be set up to consider the detention and restriction of persons on security grounds; such detention and restriction would be forbidden unless members of the Tribunal were satisfied that the persons concerned had committed, or incited the commission of, acts of violence and intimidation.

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As soon as possible after the return to legality, the British Government would negotiate with the legal Government the details of the constitutional settlement for an independent Rhodesia. The agreed settlement would be submitted to the people of Rhodesia as a whole by a Royal Commission whose composition and terms of reference would be agreed to by the British Government with the legal interim administration. If the settlement was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, the British Government would at the earliest possible date introduce the necessary legislation to grant independence to Rhodesia on this basis and would commend this legislation to Parliament. If, however, the settlement was unacceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, the two Governments would immediately confer together to devise alternative proposals for an independence constitution. On the restoration of a legal Government, the British Government would take all action in its power to bring about the immediate termination of existing economic and other sanctions.9 Mr. Wilson said the major stumbling block was the return to constitutional rule; no agreement could be signed except with a constitutional Government; the test of Rhodesian opinion could not take place against a background of illegality. Under the new proposals, the 1961 Constitution would continue to operate pending the Royal Commission’s determination about the acceptability of the proposals to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; if the constitutional proposals were found to be acceptable, the British Government would proceed to put them before Parliament and proceed to unwind economic sanctions; Mr. Smith would form a broad-based Government during the interim period; to prevent the possibility of a breakdown of law and order, a Governor’s Defence Council consisting of five Rhodesians and one British officer, would be established to advise the Governor in the interim period; the Governor would act on the advice of the constitutional Rhodesian Government.10 In his account of the events leading to the Tiger talks, Mr. Smith said on 19 September, 1966 that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Herbert Bowden, accompanied by the Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones, arrived in Salisbury to explore the possibilities of reaching a new settlement. At the talks they insisted on the return to legality and that the Rhodesian Parliament would have to be dissolved, the Governor would assume control and would appoint Ministers to act until a new Parliament was elected under the new constitution. In addition the British 9

‘The Working Document Prepared Aboard H. M. S. Tiger’, 10-11. Wilson, The Labour Government, 309-321.

10

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Government reserved the right to bring in troops if necessary to assist in maintaining law and order. Mr. Smith said the suggestion to bring in British troops to assist in maintaining law and order, was ‘repugnant’ and to add fuel to the fire the British message ended with a threat that if the Rhodesian Government rejected the new proposals, ‘the consequences for Rhodesia and the whole of central and southern Africa would be incalculable’. He made it clear that Rhodesia would not surrender its independence; it was growing in strength with the passage of time; the economy was positively moving forward and most important, South Africa continued to reiterate publicly its opposition to sanctions. The main stumbling block to a settlement was the return to legality which Mr. Smith said was ‘absolutely unacceptable’ because firstly it meant that Rhodesia would have to dissolve its Government and Parliament and hand over total control to the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, who would then ask him to form a more broad-based Government. Secondly, Sir Humphrey Gibbs as the appointee of the British Government would take his orders directly from London and the Rhodesian Government would be powerless to do anything about it; Mr. Wilson would be in total control. When asked what would happen if the terms of the proposed constitution were rejected, Mr. Wilson said it would be necessary for Rhodesia to return to legality before carrying out the test of acceptability; he made it absolutely clear to Mr. Wilson that the British terms for a return to legality were unacceptable.11 He rejected the return to legality on the ground that Mr. Wilson was asking Rhodesians to give up their de facto independence; this they would not lightly do; he added that even if the two sides reached an agreement, he would have to refer back to his colleagues in Salisbury for their approval.12 After consulting his colleagues upon his return to Salisbury on 5 December, 1966 Mr. Smith rejected the Tiger proposals. In light of this development, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, travelled to the United Nations and moved a resolution requesting the Security Council to impose economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

11

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 129-131. Rhodesia: Documents Relating to Proposals for a Settlement, 1966, (Cmnd. 3171, December, 1966), The Tiger Proposals, in Elaine Windrich, (ed.), The Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary Record, 1923-1973, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 214-217.

12

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The United Nations Security Council and Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia In a resolution on 16 December, 1966 the Security Council, convinced that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security, called upon member states of the United Nations to prevent: (a) The importation into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution. (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promoted or were calculated to promote the export of these commodities from Southern Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals in their territories in any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of such activities or dealings. (c) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration of any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution. (d) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promoted or were calculated to promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia. (e) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promoted or were calculated to promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia, the shipment in vessels and aircraft of their registration of any such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promoted or were calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia. (f) The participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this resolution. 13 In the event, the economic sanctions imposed against Rhodesia by this resolution proved ineffective partly because South Africa was opposed to such sanctions.

13

U. N. Doc. S/RES/232(1966), Dec. 16, 1966.

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Accordingly, on 29 May, 1968 the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. In addition to the sanctions imposed against Rhodesia by the resolution of 16 December, 1966 this resolution: (a) called upon all member states or of their specialized agencies to take all possible measures to prevent the activities by their nationals and persons in their territories from promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia with a view to stopping such emigration; (b) requested member states, their specialized agencies and other international organizations in the United Nations system to extend assistance to Zambia as a matter of priority to enable her to withstand the economic problems arising from carrying out these decisions of the Security Council; (c) called upon all member states or of their specialized agencies to report to the Secretary General by 1 August, 1968 on measures taken to implement this resolution; (d) requested the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be made not later than 1 September, 1968.14

The Fearless Proposals and their aftermath, October-December, 1968 In spite of the United Nations mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia the Rhodesian economy survived. Under the circumstances, Mr. Wilson invited Mr. Smith for new talks aboard the British warship, the Fearless. The talks which began on 10 October, ended on 13 October, 1968. The Fearless proposals were the same as the Tiger proposals with respect to the composition of the Legislative Assembly and the Senate. As in the Tiger proposals, a Bill to amend one of the specially-entrenched provisions of the Constitution would require a vote of at least threequarters of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly and the Senate voting together. Mr. Wilson stated that after thirty hours of talks, it became clear that it would not be possible to reach an agreement.15 At the end of the talks Mr. Smith suggested that a visit by the Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Relations, Mr. George Thomson, might be helpful. Mr. Thomson duly arrived in Salisbury for further discussions which lasted from 2 to 9 November, 1968.

14 15

United Nations Security Council Resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May, 1968. Wilson, The Labour Government, 568-569.

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On 18 November, 1968 Mr. Thomson told the House of Commons that throughout the talks he stood firmly by the Fearless Proposals and made it clear to Mr. Smith that any settlement must be fully consistent with the Six Principles and that there could be no independence before majority rule; he said Mr. Smith and his colleagues were not prepared to accept majority rule except in an impossibly remote and indefinite future.16

Proposals For A New Constitution For Rhodesia (1969) Mr. Smith and his Rhodesia Front party felt so confident that they had weathered the storm over the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and economic sanctions that they proceeded to publish Proposals For A New Constitution For Rhodesia in 1969. The Proposals provided for a Head of State and a Parliament comprising of a Senate and a House of Assembly. Under the Proposals, the Senate would consist of 23 members of whom (a) 10 would be European members elected by an electoral college consisting of the European members of the House of Assembly from candidates elected on the European voters’ roll; (b) 10 would be African chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs 5 of whom would be from Matabeleland and 5 from Mashonaland and 3 would be persons of any race appointed by the Head of State. The House of Assembly would consist of 66 members of whom (a) 50 would be European members elected by Europeans registered on the voters’ roll for 50 European constituencies and 16 would be African members of whom (i) 8 would be elected by Africans registered on the voters’ roll for four constituencies in Matabeleland and four constituencies in Mashonaland and (ii) 8 would be elected by four tribal electoral colleges in Matabeleland and four tribal electoral colleges in Mashonaland. Under the Proposals, European voters would be required to have: (a) an income of not less than ǧ900 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ1,800; or (b) an income of not less than ǧ600 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ1,200 and completion of four years of secondary education while African voters would be required to have: (a) an income of not less than

16 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 773, 1968-1969, 18 November, 1968, cols. 897, 906.

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ǧ200 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than ǧ400 and completion of two years of secondary education.17 The Proposals contained a Declaration of Rights including the protection of the right to life, to personal liberty, protection from slavery and forced labour, from inhuman treatment, from deprivation of property, from search and entry, protection of the law, freedom of conscience, of expression, of assembly and association and protection from discrimination. The exercise of these rights, however, was effectively nullified by Section 84 of the Proposals which stated that no court ‘shall inquire into nor pronounce upon the validity of any law on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights’. The Proposals sanctioned racial discrimination. Sub-section 10 of Section 92 of the Declaration of Rights stated that a law ‘shall not be construed to discriminate unjustly to the extent that it permits different treatment of persons or communities if such treatment is fair and will promote harmonious relations between such persons or communities by making due allowance for economic, social or cultural differences between them’.18 The Proposals were approved by Parliament and became law.

The Response of the Rhodesian Church Leaders to the Constitutional Proposals At its Annual conference of April/May, 1969 the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia condemned the proposed constitution on the grounds firstly, that it was based on the principles of racial division and minority privilege; secondly, fixed racial representation in Parliament would entrench the privileges and power of the European minority. The conference stated that the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia could not approve of a constitution which divided people on the basis of race and privilege.19 In a Pastoral Message, A Call to Christians, on 5 June, 1969 the Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia condemned the Proposals on the grounds, firstly, that they failed to provide adequate elected representation for all sections of the community; secondly, African representation in Parliament according to tribal origins militated against the possibility of ever building 17

Proposals For A New Constitution For Rhodesia, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1969), 3-5, 15. 18 Statute Laws of Rhodesia, 1969, Constitution of Rhodesia Act, Number 54, 1969, Sub-section 10 of Section 92 of the Declaration of Rights. 19 Official Journal of the Second Session of the Rhodesia Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 29 April-5 May, 1969, 74-76.

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a single Rhodesian nation; thirdly, the Proposals were calculated to destroy any possibility of achieving the common good and that if they were implemented, they would find it extremely difficult effectively to counsel moderation to the African people who had been so patient for so long under discriminatory laws and were now presented with such extreme provocation.20 In a letter to The Rhodesia Herald on 16 June, 1969 the Reverend Canaan Banana of the Methodist Church in Rhodesia who subsequently became the first President of an independent Zimbabwe, (see photo) denounced the RF’ s constitutional Proposals on the ground that they were a calculated insult to the dignity of the African population and that the destiny of the country should not be decided by one political party representing a minority group; he said the insulting document would not solve Rhodesia’s problems.21

The Land Tenure Act, 1969 Perhaps no single piece of legislation passed by the Rhodesian Parliament during this period aroused greater passions in Rhodesia than the Land Tenure Act of 1969. Rhodesia’s Land Tenure Act, a latter- day version of South Africa’s apartheid system, divided all land in Rhodesia into two rigidly-defined racial divisions: the European Area and the African Area; a summary of the major provisions of this Act, is called for. Section 11 defined the European Area as an area in which the interests of Europeans were paramount. Under this Section, an African would not be permitted to own, lease or occupy land in the European Area; the owner or person occupying or in control of land in the European Area or his agent would not be permitted to dispose of any such land to an African or to lease any such land to an African; to permit, suffer or allow an African to occupy any such land. If an African was occupying land in the European Area, the owner or person occupying or in control of such land or his agent would be deemed to have permitted, suffered or allowed such an African to occupy such land unless the contrary was proved. Section 16 (2) permitted an African to occupy urban land in the European Area for the purpose of his employment while he was actually engaged in that employment or for the purpose of occupying residential accommodation at the place of his employment.

20 21

A Call to Christians, 5 June, 1969, 3-4. The Rhodesia Herald, June 16, 1969.

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Under Section 17(1) the owner or person occupying or in control of urban land in the European Area or his agent who wished to permit an African to occupy such land, was required to apply in writing on the prescribed form to the issuing authority for a permit authorizing such occupation. What applied to urban land in the European Area applied mutatis mutandis to rural land in the European Area. According to Section 19 an African could occupy and be permitted to occupy rural land in the European Area as an employee while he was actually engaged in that employment or when occupying accommodation provided on the land where he was employed or as a pupil at an educational institution or as a patient at a medical institution. Under Section 20 the owner or person occupying or in control of rural land in the European Area who wished to permit an African to occupy such land was required to apply in writing to the issuing authority for a permit authorizing such occupation. Section 24 defined the African Area as an area in which the interests of the Africans were paramount. Under this Section, a European was not allowed to own, lease or occupy land in the African Area; the owner or person occupying or in control of land in the African Area or his agent was not allowed to dispose of or attempt to dispose of any such land to a European or to lease any such land to a European or to permit, suffer or allow a European to occupy any such land. If a European was occupying land in the African Area, the owner or person occupying or in control of such land or his agent would be deemed to have permitted, suffered or allowed such European to occupy such land unless the contrary was proved. According to Section 33(5) any person who wished to establish an educational or medical institution on rural land in the African Area for occupation by Europeans or to permit Europeans to occupy an educational or medical institution which had been established on rural land in the African Area, was required to apply in writing in the prescribed manner to the issuing authority for a permit authorizing the establishment thereof or such occupation as the case might be. Finally, under Section 34 (2) the owner or person occupying or in control of rural land in the African Area or his agent who wished to permit a European to occupy such land, was required to apply in writing to the issuing authority for a permit authorizing such occupation.22 22

Statute Law of Rhodesia, 1969, Land Tenure Act, No. 55, 1969, (Salisbury, Government Printer, 1969), Sections 11, 16 (2), 17(1), 19, 20 (1) and (2), 24 (1) (2) (3), 33 (5), 34 (2).

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The Response of Rhodesian Church Leaders to the Land Tenure Act, 1969-1970 The leaders of various Rhodesian churches, both Catholic and Protestant, were outraged by the provisions of the Land Tenure Act. On 6 November, 1969 the Secretary of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference, Fr. Richard Randolph, at a Press Conference on behalf of the various Christian denominations, said Church leaders totally disagreed with the principle of dividing Rhodesia into two distinct racial areas none of which could be occupied by members of either race without a special permit from the Government.23 Because of their strong opposition to racial segregation on moral grounds, the Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia warned Mr. Smith on 1 August, 1970 that they would be compelled to close all their institutions in Rhodesia if the Government proceeded to implement the Land Tenure Act.24 The institutions in question included a vast system of primary day schools, 12 upper primary boarding schools, 11 secondary schools, 5 teacher training schools, 8 hospitals and clinics.25 Due to mounting pressure from Church leaders over the issue of permits, Mr. Smith told Parliament on 26 August, 1970 that in order to eliminate the need for permits, the Government would propose an amendment whereby permits would be deemed to have been issued to various Church authorities to enable them to continue their work.26 On 3 September, 1970 the Acting Minister of Lands, Mr. Lance Smith, urged Parliament to pass the Land Tenure Amendment Bill in order to permit Churches to continue their existing work on former mission land and to allow them to continue to own or lease their existing land in either the European or the African Area irrespective of the race of their members. He said the amendment would assist in resolving the problem of confidence between Church and State which was so necessary to the peace and tranquility of Rhodesia. 27 The amendment which was subsequently passed by Parliament, set aside the controversial issue of permits; in light

23

The Rhodesia Herald, November 7, 1969. Race and Morality: A Summary of the Catholic Church’s stand with regard to new legislation in Rhodesia, (Gwelo, Mambo Press, 1 August, 1970), 9. 25 The Land Tenure Act and the Church, (Gwelo, Mambo Press, 1970), 26-27. 26 Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 78, 1970-1971, 26 August, 1970, cols. 98-99. 27 Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 78, 1970-1971, 3 September, 1970, cols. 441-442. 24

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of this development, the Catholic Bishops withdrew their threat to close all their institutions in Rhodesia.

The Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals For A Settlement, 1971 As stated earlier, Mr. Wilson’s Labour Government refused to grant legal independence to Rhodesia until it was satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The British Conservative Government which took office in June, 1970 and inherited the Rhodesian problem, began a new round of talks with Mr. Smith based on the Six Principles. On 21 November, 1971 the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home, and Mr. Smith after several months of negotiations, reached an agreement on Proposals For A Settlement which, if ‘acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole’, would lead to legal independence. The Conservative Government appointed a commission under the chairmanship of a distinguished British judge, Lord Pearce, to ‘ascertain directly from all sections of the Rhodesian population’ whether the Proposals were acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole as a basis for legal independence. Sir Maurice Dorman, the former GovernorGeneral of Malta; Sir Glyn Jones, the former Governor of Nyasaland and Lord Harlech, the former British Ambassador to Washington, were appointed Deputy Commissioners. The Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals provided for three voters’ rolls: a European Roll, an African Higher Roll and an African Lower Roll. The African Higher Roll had the same voting qualifications as the European Roll. The Proposals stipulated the following European and African Higher Roll voting qualifications: an income of not less than $1,800 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than $3,600 or an income of not less than $1,200 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than $2,400 and four years of secondary education. The African Lower Roll required voters to have an income of not less than $600 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than $1,100 or an income of not less than $300 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than $600 and two years of secondary education or persons over 30 years of age with an income of not less than $300 per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at not less than $800 or all Village Heads with 20 or more heads of families.

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The Proposals provided for the appointment of an independent Review Commission to examine the question of racial discrimination and in particular to consider existing legislation and to make recommendations to the Rhodesian Government on ways of making progress towards ending racial discrimination. Under the Proposals, the Declaration of Rights in the 1969 Constitution would be replaced by a new Declaration of Rights affording protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual and conferring the right of access to the High Court for the purpose of obtaining redress for any person who alleged that its provisions had been contravened in relation to him.28

The Response to the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals For A Settlement, 1971-1972 On 30 December, 1971 the Christian Council of Rhodesia held an emergency meeting at the University of Rhodesia to consider the AngloRhodesian Proposals. In a resolution after a full and frank discussion, it rejected the Proposals on the grounds, firstly that the majority in the House of Assembly would for all time be elected by race instead of by a common voters’ roll; secondly, the voting qualifications for the African Higher Roll were so high that they excluded school teachers and other people who occupied positions of considerable responsibility in the community; thirdly there was no provision for examining existing legislation in light of the Declaration of Rights; fourthly, the Proposals lacked iron-clad safeguards against the amendment of the Constitution. Finally, there was no guarantee that the Land Tenure Act would be repealed or adequately amended. The resolution which was passed by 25 votes to 9 stated: ‘In The Light Of The Serious Defects In The Proposals For A Settlement, It Is Our Considered Judgment That They Should Be Rejected’. 29 The Christian Council of Rhodesia was the first national multi-racial organization in Rhodesia to recommend a rejection of the Proposals.30

28

Rhodesia, Proposals For A Settlement, Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, November, 1971, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office), 18, 19, 4-5, 15, 14. 29 National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), Christian Council of Rhodesia, Minutes of the Emergency Council Meeting held at the University of Rhodesia on 30 December, 1971, 2-3; capitals in the original. 30 A.T. Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk: An Autobiography, (London, Evans Brothers, 1978), 96.

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In his memoirs, Mr. Smith claims that reports from all corners of Rhodesia indicated ‘a general satisfaction and relief’ over the agreement reached between the British Conservative Government and the Rhodesian Government which had led to the Proposals. He claimed that not only were the white people happy, but of significance was a report that in Highfield, just outside Salisbury, which had always been the centre of black political activity, the people were openly rejoicing.31 As events were to prove, this was an inaccurate assessment of the true feelings of the African majority. In a Pastoral Message on 19 January, 1972 the Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia condemned the Proposals on the ground that instead of promoting the common good, they preserved at least for the foreseeable future, the privileged position of the white minority in the political, social and cultural affairs of the country.32 The Catholic monthly publication, The Shield, in an editorial in February, 1972 also rejected the Settlement Proposals as a whole and in particular the voting qualifications for the African Higher Roll on the ground that very few Africans earned $1,800 per annum or owned immovable property valued at not less than $3,600 or earned not less than $1,200 per annum or owned immovable property valued at not less than $2,400 and four years of secondary education.33 In an assessment of the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals, the Secretary of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference, Fr. Richard Randolph, argued firstly, that the Proposals failed to remove ‘the racialistic innovations of the 1969 Constitution and its ancillary legislation’; secondly, although African primary school teachers had four years of secondary education, most of them earned less than $100 per month required to qualify for the African Higher Roll; thirdly, the Declaration of Rights did not repeal existing discriminatory legislation; fourthly, the Proposals excluded from their purview any new discriminatory legislation; finally, the Commission on Racial Discrimination would have no power to change the existing discriminatory legislation.34 In a strongly-worded statement at its Annual Conference in January, 1972 the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia deplored and rejected the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals on the grounds firstly that they represented a 31

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 153. Pastoral Message of the Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia, (Gwelo, Mambo Press), 19 January, 1972. 33 The Shield, (February, 1972), 2. 34 Fr. Richard Randolph, ‘An Assessment of the Proposals’, The Shield, (January, 1972), 5-6. 32

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deal between white people by white people for white people; they did not remove racialism which bedeviled every aspect of Rhodesian life; secondly, they left the white section of the community in a highlyprivileged position and undisputed masters of the destiny of five and half million Africans; thirdly, they encouraged division and disunity among Africans by establishing three separate voting Rolls: the African Higher Roll, the African Lower Roll and the tribal Electoral Colleges and urged its members to reject the Proposals on the ground that they were a device to legalize UDI and to perpetuate white minority rule in Rhodesia.35 Meanwhile, a new political organization, the African National Council (ANC), formed in December, 1971 in reaction to the announcement of the terms of the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals, chose Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia as its Chairman. Four members of the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and four members of the banned Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) who formed the ANC included Mr. Eddison J. M. Zvobgo, Dr. Edson Sithole, Mr. Josiah Chinamano, Mr. Michael Mawema, Mr. Cephas Msipa, Mr. Willie Musarurwa and Mr. C. E. Ngcebetsha. The other members of the ANC National Executive were the Reverend Canaan Banana of the Methodist Church in Rhodesia who was appointed Vice Chairman and the Reverend Henry Kachidza of the Methodist Church in Rhodesia who was appointed General Treasurer. Bishop Muzorewa stated that the objective of the organization was to explain and expose ‘the dangerous implications’ that would result if the majority of Africans accepted the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals.36 In his Statement of evidence to the Pearce Commission on 28 January, 1972 Bishop Muzorewa on behalf of the ANC, rejected the AngloRhodesian Proposals on the grounds firstly, that they were intended to legalize UDI; secondly, they did not amount to any significant amendment of the 1969 Constitution; thirdly, the proposed Commission on Racial Discrimination would not be appointed until the test of acceptability was completed; it would therefore not be able to report until long after the British Parliament had granted legal independence to Rhodesia.37 35

Official Journal of the Sixth Session of the Rhodesia Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 4-9 January, 1972, 74-75. 36 Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk, 95. 37 Rhodesia, Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Lord Pearce, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, May, 1972. Statement of Evidence read to the Commission by Bishop A. T. Muzorewa, National Chairman of the African National Council on 28 January, 1972, 121-124.

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In a separate statement in January, 1972 the ANC called upon all Africans in Rhodesia to reject ‘the harmful and treacherous Proposals’ on the grounds, firstly that they were intended to give independence to the white minority instead of the African majority. Secondly, the franchise qualifications and in particular the qualifications for the African Higher Roll were beyond the reach of the overwhelming majority of Africans. Thirdly, the Bill of Rights was worthless because it did not affect existing discriminatory, oppressive and unjust legislation. Fourthly, the Proposals lacked external guarantees against the tearing up of the Constitution; it said the African people were being invited to entrust their future and destiny into the hands of a minority clique which had in the past shown a complete disregard for the law and the Constitution. Finally, the Proposals preserved the Land Tenure Act with its unjust division of land; the 228,000 whites would continue to hold approximately half of the land; the commission on racial discrimination would be barred by its terms of reference from examining the Land Tenure Act with a view to recommending its repeal. The statement said the ANC could not be party to the perpetuation of injustice and greed; for these reasons, it rejected the Proposals.38 Addressing the British public at a mass rally in London organized by the Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee in April, 1972 Bishop Muzorewa warned that the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals which had been arrived at without the participation of African leaders were a prescription for increased racial bitterness, a nursery for an inevitable bloodbath and an insult to the dignity of every African in Rhodesia.39 The former Prime Minister, Mr. Garfield Todd, in rejecting the Proposals, stated that the only acceptable document would be one between the Rhodesian Government and representatives of the African people and then ratified by the British Government.40

38

University of Zimbabwe Library, Godlonton Collection, African National Council (Zimbabwe), Speeches, Press Statements and Miscellaneous Pamphlets, ‘Why the ANC says no to Settlement Proposals’, January, 1972, 1-3. 39 University of Zimbabwe Library, Godlonton Collection, African National Council, (Zimbabwe), Speeches, Press Statements and Miscellaneous Pamphlets, Abel T. Muzorewa, ‘We Reject Injustice and Demand Our Freedom’, April, 1972, 1. 40 Judith Todd, The Right to Say No, (New York, The Third Press, 1973), 96.

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The Pearce Commission’ s Report and its aftermath The Pearce Commission which arrived in Rhodesia on 11 January, 1972 and started canvassing Rhodesian opinion on the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals, completed their task in March, 1972. In their Report published in May, 1972 they stated that while the great majority of the Europeans, Coloureds and Asians accepted the Proposals, the majority of the Africans rejected them. In their analysis of the reasons given by the Africans for rejecting the Proposals, they considered the wider issues as well as the specific objections to the Proposals. The wider issues included mistrust of the motives and intentions of the Rhodesian Government and the lack of consultations between the British and Rhodesian Governments on the one hand and the African leaders on the other. They stated firstly that African mistrust of the intentions and motives of the Rhodesian Government transcended all other considerations. One summed it up by saying ‘We do not reject the Proposals, we reject the Government’; this was the dominant motivation of African rejection at all levels and in all areas. Few Africans could bring themselves to believe that the regime had changed its policies or that the European electorate on whom it depended, was prepared to change its attitudes or its way of life. Many Africans believed that as soon as the British Government had granted legal independence to Rhodesia and had revoked sanctions, a regime which had torn up previous constitutions could do so again; secondly, they were convinced that the Rhodesia Front Government was committed to the perpetuation of white supremacy in Rhodesia; thirdly, no Africans had been involved in the negotiations; they were therefore not a party to them; they insisted that they had a right to be consulted and that neither Government appreciated their aspirations. The specific objections to the Proposals included the franchise qualifications and the Declaration of Rights. Many Africans criticized the franchise qualifications on the grounds, inter alia, that the African Higher Roll was too high and progress to parity consequently too slow; a graduate teacher might take 20 years to qualify and most teachers would never qualify; Ministers of Religion certainly could not; the immovable property qualification was impossible for all but a very few. They stated firstly that the African Lower Roll was meaningless because regardless of how many Africans might qualify to vote on this Roll, they could only elect eight Africans and the elected African representatives would have little influence in Parliament; they argued that the Declaration of Rights was irrelevant and inadequate to solve the

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immediate problems on the grounds that it did not cover existing laws; moreover, it could be nullified through a declaration of a state of emergency which, from past experience the regime would not hesitate to use; in the absence of legal aid, it would be too expensive for Africans to bring cases before the courts. Secondly, Africans had little faith that the proposed Special Review Tribunal would review impartially the cases of those in detention; the British representative would not be able to play an effective role in such a review because he would merely be an observer; the Tribunal which would conduct this review was the same Tribunal which had already recommended the continued detention of those concerned. Thirdly, the powers of the Commission on Racial Discrimination were inadequate because they were not binding on the Rhodesian Government; the regime would be able to find plenty of excuses for rejecting those recommendations it did not like; the prospects for change in the Land Tenure Act through the proposed Commission seemed slight. For these reasons the Pearce Commission stated: ‘We are satisfied on our evidence that the Proposals are acceptable to the great majority of Europeans. We are equally satisfied, after considering all our evidence including that on intimidation, that the majority of Africans rejected the Proposals. In our opinion the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the Proposals as a basis for independence’.41 Mr. Smith was greatly disappointed that the majority of Africans had rejected the Proposals because he believed that Rhodesian Africans were the happiest in the world.42 Mr. Smith’s misplaced confidence that the majority of the Africans would accept the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals was a serious miscalculation of the true feelings of the Africans; a post mortem of the Commission’s Report is called for. Instead of facing up to the unpalatable fact that the rejection of the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals by the majority of Africans was ipso facto a referendum on his regime, Mr. Smith cast aspersions on the integrity of the Commission when in his broadcast to the nation on 23 May, 1972 he stated: ‘We have had many different inquiries and reports during our history; I believe this one will go down as the most irresponsible of them all’.43 He argued that the Commission had seen only 6% of the African 41

Report on Rhodesian Opinion, 80-84, 112. Rhodesia, The Prime Minister, the Hon. I. D. Smith replies to the debate on the Pearce Commission, 8 June, 1972, 4-5. 43 Rhodesia, The Pearce Commission Report: Broadcast Statement by the Prime Minister, the Hon. I. D. Smith, 23 May, 1972, 4. 42

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adult population and then extrapolated the results obtained from a 6% sample as representative of the African population as a whole; to make matters worse, they had carried out the test of African opinion ‘on the basis of one man, one vote, as if they were counting sheep’. In the debate in Parliament on 6 June, 1972 Mr. Smith claimed firstly, that before the Commission arrived, the majority of Africans who subsequently rejected the Proposals, had succumbed to intimidation by a small minority; as a result when the Commission began to test African opinion, very few Africans had the courage to seek private interviews with the Commissioners. 44 Secondly, African nationalists were given a free hand to campaign against the Proposals: ‘Once the Commission started its work of holding meetings with Africans to ascertain their views on the settlement, it was clear that African nationalists had established their cells in all the Districts. Leading agitators travelled ahead of the Commission, from meeting to meeting, orchestrating the opposition’. 45 That African nationalists ‘orchestrated’ opposition to the Proposals, was true enough; having spent many years in prison or in detention among other things for opposing UDI, they seized every opportunity to campaign against the Proposals. In the debate in Parliament on the Commission’s Report on 8 June, 1972 Mr. Smith argued that the Commission’s verdict was wrong because, firstly, an overwhelming majority of three of the four racial groups in Rhodesia had supported the Proposals; secondly, once the Commission started carrying out the test of Rhodesian opinion, intimidation made it impossible for them to make a fair assessment of African opinion; thirdly, the majority of Africans who rejected the Proposals either had no knowledge or understanding of the implications of the Proposals themselves or else rejected them for irrelevant reasons, such as their dislike of the Rhodesia Front Government; fourthly, the Commission had arrived at their conclusion on a purely quantitative basis instead of a qualitative basis which they themselves had conceded would have been ‘in the best interests of Rhodesia’.46 The Pearce Commission had conceded many of the points raised by Mr. Smith. They had admitted that they had seen only 6 per cent of the total African population in the Tribal Trust Lands and in the African Purchase 44 Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 81, 1972, 6 June, 1972, cols. 27-28, 33, 23-24. 45 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 155. 46 Rhodesia, The Prime Minister, the Hon. I. D. Smith replies to the debate on the Pearce Commission, 8 June, 1972, 10.

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Areas. However, they were satisfied that they had met a fair cross-section of the total adult African population in these areas. They had travelled widely and covered all parts of the country. In these circumstances even the more remote villages were normally able to send at least one representative to the nearest meeting place; they were satisfied that almost everyone had an opportunity to express their views if they wished to do so; they said the rejection of the Proposals by a large majority of Africans whom they saw, was broadly representative of the whole population in the Tribal Trust Lands and in the African Purchase Areas. As against Mr. Smith’s claim that before the Commission arrived, the majority of Africans had succumbed to intimidation by a small minority and as a result when the Commission began to canvass African opinion, very few Africans had the courage to seek individual interviews with the Commissioners, the Commission had argued that from the evidence, it was clear that even if the views expressed at public meetings were excluded, those Africans who rejected the Proposals in private meetings, outnumbered those in favour of them by more than four to one. On intimidation, the Commission had conceded that in certain areas there were real incidents of intimidation but they rejected the suggestion that but for intimidation, the majority of Africans who rejected the Proposals, would have supported them. They did not regard the incidents of alleged intimidation, some without substance, some true, some probably true, some possibly true, as part of an overall political design; they found it improbable if not impossible that with the tight security system which prevailed in Rhodesia for several years, a minority could have dominated a majority by intimidation within a few weeks. They added: ‘We ourselves have no doubt from all the facts and circumstances and our own observations that in spite of the incidents of intimidation, the Africans’ rejection by a substantial majority was a genuine expression of opinion’. As against Mr. Smith’s claim that the majority of Africans who rejected the Proposals ‘either had no knowledge of the Proposals themselves or else rejected them for irrelevant reasons’ such as their dislike of the Rhodesia Front Government, the Commission had conceded that it had been difficult to assess the level of comprehension among those attending the large gatherings in the rural areas but all Commissioners were agreed that a majority of the Africans whom they met, sufficiently understood the basic principles and implications of the Proposals to pass a valid judgment on them. That many Africans disliked the Rhodesia Front Government was not irrelevant to their rejection of the Proposals; it was the heart of the problem. The Commission had conceded that many of those who rejected

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the Proposals were either expressing disapproval of the Government’s policies or a distrust of the Government’s intentions rather than disapproval of the Proposals themselves. ‘But’, they added, ‘it seemed to us that this was a valid element in considering whether to accept’. Finally, the Commission had wrestled with the problem of whether to make their assessment of Rhodesian opinion qualitative or quantitative; in the end they decided to make it quantitative on the ground that the Proposals were a package deal with some acceptable things and some unacceptable things or less acceptable things according to the individual views and prognostications of the person to whom the package was offered; his own life would be affected by the decision and he was entitled to make a personal choice; in such circumstances the test had to be basically quantitative. 47 They nowhere suggested that a qualitative assessment of Rhodesian opinion would have been ‘in the best interests of Rhodesia’. It is clear from the Commission’s Report that Mr. Smith’s allegations were completely unfounded. On receiving the Pearce Commission’s Report, the Executive Committee of the Christian Council of Rhodesia agreed at its meeting on 6 June, 1972 that the Report was an accurate assessment of the views of both the Europeans and the Africans and urged the two communities to work together for reconciliation.48

Summary and Conclusion This Chapter has focused on the major developments in Rhodesia from the Unilateral Declaration of Independence to the Pearce Commission (19651972) and in particular British economic sanctions against Rhodesia; the discussions on Rhodesia at the conference of Commonwealth Heads of State and Government held in London in September, 1966; Mr. Wilson’s proposals for a new settlement of Rhodesia’s constitutional problems negotiated aboard the British warship, the Tiger (2 -4 December, 1966); the major provisions of the Tiger proposals; the United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia (16 December, 1966 and 29 May, 1968); Mr. Wilson’s proposals for a new constitutional settlement conducted aboard the British warship, the Fearless in October, 1968; the Rhodesian Government’s Proposals For A New Constitution For Rhodesia in 1969 and the response of the Church leaders to these Proposals; Rhodesia’s 47

Report on Rhodesian Opinion, 63-63, 59, 109, 110-111, 55, 56, 40-41. NAZ, MS109/1/1, Christian Council of Rhodesia, Minutes, 6 January, 1972-20 May, 1974, Council Meeting, 6 June, 1972. 48

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Land Tenure Act of 1969 and the response of Rhodesia’s Church leaders to the major provisions of this Act; the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals For A Settlement of Rhodesia’s constitutional problem; the formation of the African National Council (1971); the Pearce Commission, its Report (1972) and aftermath. For reasons already explained, the British Government’s economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965 and the United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia (16 December, 1966 and 29 May, 1968) failed to cripple the Rhodesian economy. Also for reasons already explained, Mr. Smith rejected the constitutional proposals negotiated aboard the British warship, the Tiger and aboard the British warship, the Fearless. Mr. Smith and the Rhodesia Front felt so confident that they had weathered the storm over UDI and economic sanctions that they proceeded to publish Proposals For A New Constitution For Rhodesia in 1969. Because the income and property qualifications for the franchise under these Proposals were beyond the reach of the majority of the Africans, the leaders of the various churches, both Catholic and Protestant, rejected them. For reasons already explained, they also rejected the provisions of the Land Tenure Act. In its Report published in May, 1972, the Pearce Commission concluded for reasons already stated, that while the great majority of Europeans, Coloureds and Asians accepted the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals For A Settlement of Rhodesia’s constitutional problems, the majority of Africans rejected them and that therefore the people of Rhodesia as a whole did not regard the Proposals as a basis for independence. On receiving the Pearce Commission’s Report, the Executive Committee of the Christian Council of Rhodesia agreed at its meeting on 6 June, 1972 that the Report was an accurate assessment of the views of the Europeans and the Africans and urged the two communities to work together for reconciliation. It remained to be seen whether the racial reconciliation which the Executive Committee of the Christian Council of Rhodesia spoke of, was still possible under the circumstances.

CHAPTER SEVEN FROM THE PEARCE COMMISSION TO THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, 1972-1978

Introduction While the majority of Africans in Rhodesia rejected the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals For A Settlement of Rhodesia’s constitutional problems through the Pearce Commission, majority rule eluded them. This Chapter discusses the major developments in Rhodesia from the Pearce Commission to the internal settlement (1972-1978) and in particular the struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia (1966-1972); the major developments in Mozambique and their impact on Rhodesia (1972-1976); the shuttle diplomacy of the American Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, in southern Africa (1976); the Geneva conference on Rhodesia and its aftermath (1976-1977); the road to the internal settlement (1977-1978) and the major provisions of the internal settlement of 3 March, 1978.

The Struggle for Majority Rule in Rhodesia, 1966-1972 The struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia has been the subject of several studies among others by Maxey Kees, 1 Martin and Johnson2, and by Gann and Henriksen3. It will suffice to say that beginning in 1966 the liberation war waged by the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in response to UDI, was

1

Maxey Kees, The Fight For Zimbabwe, (London, Rex Collings, 1975). David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War, (New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1981). 3 Lewis H. Gann and Thomas H. Henriksen, The Struggle For Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1981), Chapter 5. 2

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unsuccessful 4 in the main because the two political parties had not adequately prepared the people for the armed struggle. ZANLA resumed the liberation war in earnest in December, 1972 in the north-east of the country near the border with Mozambique because of the fraternal co-operation it had received from the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). In its campaign for mobilization and recruitment of cadres for guerrilla warfare in the north-east, ZANLA turned to the teachings of Mao Tse Tung who, from his experience of guerrilla war in China, said guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses of the people and that without the cooperation and support of the masses, it cannot succeed. 5 It is significant that the ZANLA Chief of Defence, Mr. (later General) Josiah Tongogara, trained at the Nanking Military Academy in China. In addition to Mr. Tongogara, other revolutionary leaders who featured prominently in the campaign for mobilization and recruitment included Mr. Rex Nhongo (later ZANLA Deputy Chief of Defence), Mr. Mayor Urimbo (ZANLA’s first Provincial Commander) and Mr. Josiah Tungamirai (later ZANLA’s Chief Political Commissar). The campaign laid special emphasis on political education; the people’s National Grievances such as loss of their land to the white settlers, the limitations on the number of cattle a family could keep because of the Land Husbandry Act, the restrictions on education and job opportunities, were the cornerstone of political education.6 Furthermore, unlike in the earlier period when it had forcibly recruited cadres for the armed struggle, ZANLA began to recruit only volunteers in line with the teachings of Mao Tse Tung who stated that guerrillas ‘ought to operate on the principle that only volunteers are acceptable for service. It is a mistake to impress people into service’.7 It was only after thoroughly politicizing the local people on the aims of the war that a small group of ZANLA guerrillas attacked Altena farmhouse owned by Mr. Marc Borchgrave, a tobacco farmer in the Centenary District, 65 kilometres from the border with Mozambique and 240 kilometres from Salisbury on 21 December, 1972. In one account, in thirty seconds of gunfire, an eight-year old girl was wounded in the foot; three other children sleeping in the house and their grandmother who had arrived from England on holiday five days before, escaped unhurt. Mr. de Borchgrave had to run more than two miles in the dark to the next farm to raise help. The Borchgrave family moved from 4

For details, see Kees, The Fight for Zimbabwe, Chapter 5. Mao Tse Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1962), 44. 6 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 81. 7 Mao Tse Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 86. 5

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their farm for safety to the adjoining Whistlefield farm run by Mr. Marc Dalgleish. Two days later another guerrilla group launched a rocket and grenade attack on Whistlefield farm. Mr. de Borchgrave and his daughter were wounded by shrapnel; despite his leg injuries he limped to the telephone and called the nearest police post, thirteen miles away. In the morning an army vehicle coming down an approach road hit an anti-tank landmine and in the ensuing explosion a white corporal was mortally wounded and three other soldiers were injured.8 In a letter to The Rhodesia Herald on 14 January, 1973 the Catholic Bishop of Umtali, the Reverend Donal Lamont, said it was widespread injustice in Rhodesian society based on racial discrimination which had led to the advent of ‘terrorism’ in Rhodesia and that unless the Government immediately took action to establish true justice for all, there would be no peace in Rhodesia.9 In the first week of February, 1973 the Government closed all schools, churches and businesses in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land adjoining the Centenary District 10 and St. Albert Mission’s primary and secondary schools in Centenary District in the wake of a petition by about 100 white farmers to close the Mission on the ground that a ‘terrorist base’ had been discovered in the vicinity of the Mission; the Mission Superior, Fr. E. Rojek, denied that there had been a guerrilla base in the vicinity of the Mission.11 Because of the seriousness of the security situation in the North-East, the Minister of Justice, Law and Order, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, told Parliament on 29 March, 1973 that the Government had speeded up the administration of justice in order to deal with people who supported the ‘terrorists’; it increased the penalties for people who supported the ‘terrorists’ or failed to report their presence to the Police to a maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment and extended the jurisdiction of senior or provincial magistrates to enable them to impose sentences of imprisonment not exceeding ten years on people found guilty of supporting ‘terrorists’; it not only authorized regional magistrates to impose on the offenders sentences of imprisonment not exceeding fifteen

8

Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1979), 110. 9 The Rhodesia Herald, January 14, 1973. 10 The Rhodesia Herald, February 8, 1973. 11 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia (hereafter CCJP), Documents Concerning the Prosecution of the Members of the Executive, 1977/78, Vol. 1, 1973, 3.

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years but also found it necessary to introduce a system of collective fines for people suspected of habouring ‘terrorists’.12

The Developments in Mozambique and their impact on Rhodesia, 1972-1976 From 1966 to 1972 the guerrilla prospects of winning a protracted war in Rhodesia seemed remote. But the victories scored by FRELIMO in the Tete Province in 1972 followed by the collapse of Portuguese rule over most of Mozambique, radically changed the character of the war; by making good use of FRELIMO’s infiltration tracks and supply routes, ZANU effectively widened the war.13 In his memoirs, Mr. Ian Smith states that the presence of FRELIMO along Rhodesia’s long north-eastern frontier with Mozambique meant that ZANLA had safe havens in Mozambique from which to penetrate the adjacent tribal areas and the white farming areas of Centenary and Mount Darwin. ZANLA’s attack on the Altena farmhouse on 21 December, 1972 inaugurated a pattern of incidents which, because of the use of landmines in the roads, meant that Rhodesia had to deploy more troops and commit more resources to defeat the ‘terrorists’. For the moment Rhodesia managed to contain the threat to the North-East and then began to get on top of it when suddenly a new dramatic development entered the scene: the revolutionary change of Government in Portugal in the wake of a military coup on 25 April, 1974.14 The major factor which led to the coup in Lisbon was the pressure of the nationalist guerrillas in Portugal’s African colonies particularly in Mozambique. On 25 July, 1972 FRELIMO guerrillas launched a new offensive in the Manica Province sabotaging road and railway links from Rhodesia and Malawi to the port of Beira and taking the war into white settler farming areas for the first time. 15 Early in 1973 using sophisticated weapons provided primarily by the People’s Republic of China and by the Soviet Union and enjoying increased popular support, FRELIMO expanded the liberated zones in the north, consolidated its gains in the Tete Province and for the first time was 12

Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 83, 1972-73, 29 March, 1973, cols.1072, 1076-1077. 13 Gann and Henriksen, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 105. 14 Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith, (London, Blake Publishing, 1997), 159. 15 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 125.

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operating in the southern half of the country. By the end of the year FRELIMO guerrillas had mined the railway line from Beira to Rhodesia; raided settler-owned sugar, cotton and sisal plantations; attacked inland towns; disrupted traffic from Beira to Tete and to Cahora Bassa Dam; continuing their advance, they opened a new front in Zambezia Province in July, 1974.16 (See map below):

Source: Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique. 16

Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983), 105-106.

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In light of the unfolding developments in Portugal following the military coup and their likely impact on Mozambique, the South African Prime Minister, Mr. John Vorster, (see photo) inaugurated a new policy of détente or accommodation with Black-ruled states to the north. Accordingly, early in August, 1974 he ordered the withdrawal from Rhodesia of South African Police who, for several years, had been assisting Rhodesians in the campaign against the ‘terrorists’. When Mr. Smith asked for an explanation, Mr. Vorster replied that it was part of the detente exercise.17 In the wake of the military coup in Portugal there was a strong likelihood that the new regime would reach an early settlement with FRELIMO; if this happened, Rhodesia would have an additional 1,100 kilometres of frontier to guard against guerrilla infiltration. Except for the 200 kilometre frontier with South Africa along the Limpopo River, Rhodesia’s 3,000 kilometres of border would adjoin hostile independent states. Furthermore, there was the probability that a FRELIMO regime in Mozambique would impose United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia thereby cutting off Rhodesia’s trade routes through Beira and Lorenzo Marques. Mr. Smith’s immediate concern was Rhodesia’s trade links which were increasingly threatened by FRELIMO guerrillas. Rail traffic to Beira and Lorenzo Marques (now Maputo) had been suspended as a result of a strike by African workers and in the case of the Beira link, because of guerrilla attacks. In light of these immediate problems and the uncertainty over the future of Mozambique, Mr. Smith needed a new and more dependable route connecting Rutenga in south-east Rhodesia with Beitbridge and from there to Johannesburg; work began on the new rail link in June, 1974 and the 145 kilometres of railway were completed on 10 September, 1974.18 On 20 September, 1974 a transitional Government in Mozambique consisting of six FRELIMO and four Portuguese officials and led by Mr. Joaquin Chissano, was installed and served as a caretaker government pending independence.19 The advent of the Transitional Government in Mozambique made it easier for the ZANLA guerrillas to cross the Zambezi River even in broad daylight and added urgency to Rhodesia’s desire to neutralize the guerrillas before they acquired a more secure rear base that offered another 1,100 kilometres of infiltration routes. The interim period preceding Mozambique’s independence on 25 June, 1975 meant that Mr. Smith had a new hostile neighbour to the East which had given the bulk of the support 17

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 176. Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 119-120. 19 Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique, 106. 18

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to ZANLA guerrillas; not only was his Beira communications link threatened but also his trade route through Lorenzo Marques which carried almost all his oil supplies. Moreover, when on 3 March, 1976 President Machel announced the closure of Mozambique’s border with Rhodesia, Mr. Smith was forced to depend completely on South Africa for his trade routes, his ammunition and small arms, his oil and spare parts for mining and other vital areas. Rhodesia’s private sector was receiving between ǧ16,000,000 and ǧ20,000,000 a year in credit loans from South African banks while the South African Government loaned helicopters and armoured vehicles to Rhodesia. 20 Mr. Vorster’s policy of détente with Black-ruled states to the north did not deter Rhodesia from conducting cross-border raids on ‘terrorist bases’ in Mozambique. In his memoirs Mr. Smith states that during one particular raid the Rhodesian security forces eliminated one hundred ‘terrorists’ in return for two security forces killed. Mr. Vorster made it clear that he was opposed to Rhodesian raids into Mozambique.21 In spite of South Africa’s opposition, Rhodesia continued its cross-border raids into Mozambique. On 9 August, 1976 the Selous Scouts, a unit of the Rhodesian army, carried out a daring raid on Nyadzonia, a ZANU refugee camp inside Mozambique and massacred 675 Zimbabweans, mostly women and children. 22 The following day Mr. Vorster summoned the Rhodesian representative in South Africa, Mr. Harold Hawkins, and told him in no uncertain terms of his disapproval of the raid and on 26 August, 1976 ordered the withdrawal of South African helicopter crews from Rhodesia. In light of Mr. Vorster’s increasing opposition, the Rhodesian raids into Mozambique ceased for the time being because of Rhodesia’s extreme dependence on South Africa for arms, ammunition and trade.

Dr. Henry Kissinger’s Shuttle Diplomacy in southern Africa, 1976 The urgent need to reach a negotiated settlement leading to majority rule in Rhodesia should be understood in the broader context of the struggle for world hegemony between the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other during the Cold War. 20

Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 146, 238. Smith, The Great Betrayal, 184. 22 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 241-242. 21

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From March until independence on 11 November, 1975 a civil war broke out in Angola between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), a Marxist party supported by the Soviet Union on the one hand and the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) supported by the United States and South Africa on the other. Dr. Kissinger was determined to prevent the MPLA from coming to power in Angola. To this end, the Central Intelligence Agency pumped millions of dollars in covert funds to the rival FNLA and UNITA. 23 In support of the FNLA and UNITA, South African forces with the encouragement of the United States, invaded Angola from their bases in South-West Africa. In spite of South African support for the FNLA and UNITA, the MPLA triumphed over its rivals in the Angolan civil war with Soviet arms and Cuban troops. On 10 December, 1975 while giving assurances that South Africa had no territorial ambitions in Angola, Mr. Vorster said he was deeply concerned about the ‘blatant’ Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola as their aim was not only to create a Marxist state there, but also to establish a string of Marxist states across Africa from Angola to Dar es Salaam.24 It was his bruised ego in the Angolan debacle which brought the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to southern Africa. To prevent the radicalization of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement through an armed struggle and to prevent Rhodesia from becoming another cockpit for rival powers, Dr. Kissinger was determined to remove the causes of the war by forcing Mr. Smith to concede majority rule. The Rhodesian leader was not only expendable but had become a liability; by his obduracy he was inviting the spread of communist influence rather than containing it, for the longer the war lasted, the more the guerrillas would be forced to turn to communist countries for aid and the more radical they would become.25 In a major address in Lusaka at a luncheon hosted by President Kaunda on 27 April, 1976 Dr. Kissinger stated, inter alia, that the Salisbury regime must understand that it could not expect the support of the United States either diplomatically or in material help at any stage in its conflict with African states or African liberation movements; on the contrary, it 23 ‘Extracts from the Presidentially-Censored House Report on the CIA, January, 1976’, Appendix A, in Mohamed A. El-Khawas and BARRY COHEN (EDS.), THE KISSINGER STUDY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, (WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT, L AWRENCE HILL AND COMPANY), 1976), 183-185. 24 ‘South Africa’s Stand: South African Prime Minister on Angola: December 11, 1975’, in Africa Report, (January-February, 1976), 11. 25 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 236.

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would face the unrelenting opposition of the United States until a negotiated settlement was achieved; the United States would take steps to fulfill its obligation under international law to mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia; he would urge the United States Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment which authorized the importation of Rhodesian chrome into the United States, an act inconsistent with the United Nations sanctions; in parallel with this effort, the United States would approach other industrialized nations to ensure the strictest and broadest international compliance with sanctions; the international community should take steps to assist Mozambique whose closing of its border with Rhodesia to enforce sanctions, had imposed upon it enormous economic hardship; the United States was willing to provide $12.5 million of assistance; the United States was ready-together with other members of the United Nations-to help alleviate the economic hardships suffered by those countries neighbouring Rhodesia which had decided to enforce sanctions by closing their frontiers; the international community should make provision for the thousands of refugees who had fled in distress from Rhodesia to neighbouring countries; the United States would consider sympathetically requests for assistance for these refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or other appropriate international organizations; the world community should lend its support to the people of Rhodesia to enable them to make a peaceful transition to majority rule and independence. To this end the United States was ready to join other interested nations in a programme of economic, technical and educational assistance to enable an independent Zimbabwe to achieve progress and take its place in the community of nations to which its resources and the talents of all its people entitled it; in carrying out this programme, the United States Government would consult closely with the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.26 The key to Mr. Smith’s acceptance of majority rule in Rhodesia was Mr. Vorster whose country, for reasons already explained, was in a unique position to deliver Mr. Smith. Accordingly, in the first week of September, 1976 Mr. Vorster asked Mr. Smith to come down to Pretoria with a couple of his ministers to hear a plan which he and Dr. Kissinger had worked out and which he believed was reasonable. On 13 September, 1976 accompanied by the Minister of Finance, Mr. David Smith, and the Minister of Transport, Mr. Roger Hawkins, Mr. Smith travelled to Pretoria to meet Mr. Vorster. At the meeting, Mr. 26 Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, (New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Third Edition, 1977), 371-372.

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Vorster admitted that the plan he had worked out with Dr. Kissinger did not measure up to the kind of thing Rhodesia was looking for but that it was necessary for Rhodesia to face up to the facts of life and warned Mr. Smith that if he was not prepared to accept this offer of the hand of friendship from the United States, then Rhodesia would be on its own with sanctions tightening, terrorism increasing and finally the Russians coming in. He then went on to explain the kind of plan Dr. Kissinger would bring. The first step would be to set up a council of state consisting of three whites and three blacks and a white chairman. The Council of State would be given two years to draft a new constitution which had to lead to majority rule; because the plan had the backing of President Kaunda and President Nyerere, this guaranteed its acceptance. The free world would provide a trust fund of two billion dollars to guarantee pensions and foreign exchange for whites who wished to leave the country.27 Unknown to anyone, Mr. Vorster had forced Mr. Smith to accept the principle of majority rule in Rhodesia within two years. Mr. Smith went back to his Rhodesia Front Congress and without telling them the details of what he had agreed with Mr. Vorster, they gave him a mandate to negotiate with Dr. Kissinger.28 At a summit with Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster at the residence of the American Ambassador in Pretoria on Sunday, 19 September, 1976 Mr. Smith said Dr. Kissinger admitted that the package he was offering was unattractive but it was the best he could extract from the British and the front-line leaders who had to be taken along; he said he did not see the free world lifting a finger to help Rhodesia and with the passage of time, Rhodesia’s position would deteriorate. In his assessment, Dr. Kissinger said Mr. Smith and his colleagues should accept this offer, unattractive as it was because any future offer could only be worse. If they rejected this offer, there would be understanding and sympathy, never recrimination from him; it was up to them to make the decision. When Mr. Smith suggested the convening of a conference of blacks and whites in Rhodesia to hammer out a new constitution, Dr. Kissinger was sympathetic but said his proposals were a package deal tied up by the British, Americans and South Africans on the one side and President Kaunda of Zambia and President Nyerere of Tanzania on the other and that there could be no going back over that ground again. Mr. Smith’s option was to accept or reject. In response to Mr. Smith’s suggestion to convene a conference of black and white Rhodesians with the backing of .

27 28

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 199. Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 250.

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the free world, Dr. Kissinger said the free world did not have the stomach to stand up to the black Presidents; so Rhodesia would be left on its own. If Mr. Smith rejected this package deal, he would understand and sympathise and would never be party to any action which would be detrimental to Rhodesia. If they accepted the package deal that day, he would fly off immediately to reconfirm the plan with President Kaunda and President Nyerere; Mr. Smith clearly understood the import of Dr. Kissinger’s message: Rhodesia would be on its own.29 After these initial remarks, the plan for majority rule in Rhodesia which Dr. Kissinger presented to Mr. Smith and his colleagues included progression to majority rule within two years; the formation of an interim government consisting of a council of state with equal numbers of black and white members and a white chairman and a council of ministers with a black majority and a black prime minister. When Mr. Smith insisted that it was necessary for whites to control the Ministries of Defence and of Law and Order and to retain the commanders of the security forces in their posts during the transitional period, Dr. Kissinger said he would have to get the reaction of the front-line Presidents.30 After talking for four hours, the conferees decided to adjourn for lunch after which they would reconvene at Mr. Vorster’s official residence. As the Rhodesians rose to leave for lunch Dr. Kissinger complimented them for the manner in which they had conducted themselves and expressed his anguish for the tragedy which was unfolding and said he wished he could do more to help. In their discussion over lunch, Mr. Smith and his colleagues reached a consensus that Dr. Kissinger’s offer seemed to be the least of the various evils facing them; while Rhodesia could get along without the British and the front-line Presidents, without South African assistance there would be serious problems and it had been made clear to them that there were several areas in which South Africa could turn the screws on Rhodesia. When the conference reconvened in the afternoon, Mr. Smith said it was important to realize that the changes envisaged under Dr. Kissinger’s plan would necessitate constitutional amendments requiring a two-thirds majority in Parliament. When Dr. Kissinger repeated his concern about the need for urgency and asked how soon he could give a reply, Mr. Smith said his Cabinet would meet in a couple of days after which his Rhodesia Front caucus would finalize the matter.

29 30

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 201-203. Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 250.

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After a short break to enable all parties to consult, Mr. Vorster informed Mr. Smith and his delegation during a private meeting that the South African Government had come to the conclusion that they were no longer able to go on supporting Rhodesia financially or militarily; it was not only imposing an intolerable strain on South Africa’s resources, it was also attracting growing criticism from their friends in the outside world who were accusing them of assisting Rhodesia in its efforts to obstruct an agreement with the black nationalists; he went on to emphasize the need for urgency; urged them to accept Dr. Kissinger’s proposals and told Mr. Smith to announce to the Rhodesian public that night his acceptance of Dr. Kissinger’s proposals. Mr. Smith said he was surprised at this suggestion in light of what he had earlier explained to Dr. Kissinger-the need to take his Cabinet and caucus with him and the requirement of a two-thirds majority in Parliament without which the whole exercise would be abortive. He reminded Mr. Vorster of the dramatic and far-reaching proposals which he and his colleagues were being asked to accept and asked him whether he would take it upon himself to give an answer without consulting his Cabinet and caucus and indeed the congress of his party if he was facing such a decision for his own country. During the final session Dr. Kissinger told Mr. Smith that while he fully appreciated the problems which confronted him, the Rhodesians had no option other than to go through the process; he hoped they would expedite the plan because, as he had previously said, there were people including the British who were playing a leading role in trying to undermine the plan which had been mutually agreed upon. He said this was incredible considering that it was a British plan; he was simply being used as a middle-man. Mr. Smith assured Dr. Kissinger that there was no need to remind him of the urgency; he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that he had no option but to accept. On Tuesday, 21 September, 1976 the Rhodesian Cabinet sat both morning and afternoon with a break for lunch; the discussion was intensive and constructive with some members finding it difficult to credit the story which Mr. Smith and his colleagues told them. When the Cabinet reconvened the following day there was not much discussion; it was ‘a solemn, sombre occasion and the decision most painful but not difficult’. On 23 September, 1976 Mr. Smith arrived at Parliament for a Rhodesia Front caucus meeting. The news of what had transpired at the meeting in Pretoria was met with incredulity. There was a great deal of anguish and soul-searching and seeking a way out of the predicament; there was no sensible, practical way out. The caucus supported him and the Cabinet decision. Regarding South Africa they accepted that Rhodesia was

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confronted by the one country in the world which controlled its lifeline and which had now issued an ultimatum leaving Rhodesia no alternative.31 Under the Pretoria agreement Rhodesia accepted majority rule within two years; representatives of the Rhodesian Government would meet immediately at a mutually-agreed place with African leaders to establish an interim government pending majority rule and independence. The Interim Government would consist of a council of state, half of whose members would be black and half white with a white chairman and a council of ministers with an African majority and an African first minister. The function of the Interim Government would be to draft an independence constitution. The Rhodesian Government and African leaders would nominate their representatives to the interim Government; during the transitional period whites would retain control of the key Ministries of Defence and of Law and Order; the British Government would enact enabling legislation to bring about majority rule. Upon the establishment of the interim government, sanctions would be lifted and all acts of war, including guerrilla warfare, would cease. The international community would make available substantial economic support to provide assurance to Rhodesians about the economic future of the country. A trust fund would be established outside Rhodesia to finance a major international effort to respond to the economic opportunities which Rhodesia offered. The fund would provide development assistance, guarantees and investment incentives for various projects; the aim would be to expand the industrial and mineral production of the country, to enhance its agricultural potential through suitable land utilization and development programmes and to provide the necessary training and educational facilities for the essential flow of skills.32 Explaining the reasons for accepting Dr. Kissinger’s proposals in an address to the nation on 24 September, 1976 Mr. Smith stated that it had been made abundantly clear to him and the colleagues who accompanied him to Pretoria that Rhodesia could not expect any help or support of any kind from the free world; on the contrary the pressures on Rhodesia from the free world would continue to mount. The alternative to acceptance of the proposals was explained to him and his colleagues in the clearest terms which left no room for misunderstanding. Dr. Kissinger had given him a categorical assurance that as soon as the Interim Government was established, sanctions would be lifted and there would be a cessation of 31 32

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 203, 205-210. Africa Report, (November-December, 1976), 25.

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‘terrorism’; his acceptance of Dr. Kissinger’s proposals was conditional upon the implementation of both of these undertakings. In a volte face, Mr. Smith stated that he had all along supported majority rule in Rhodesia provided it was responsible rule. With the approval of the Cabinet and of the Rhodesia Front caucus, he had sent a message to Dr. Kissinger indicating his acceptance of the proposals subject to their being accepted by the other parties involved. Appealing to the nation as a whole, he said he hoped to play a part in helping to guide the destiny of Rhodesia: ‘I remain dedicated to the ideal of doing all I can to ensure that Rhodesia remains a country in which all of us, whatever race or colour, can live and work and prosper together in peace, harmony and stability’. A statement issued in Lusaka on 26 September, 1976 by the frontline Presidents in response to the agreement accepted and announced by Mr. Smith, hailed and congratulated the people and fighters of Zimbabwe whose hard and heroic armed struggle had forced the rebel regime and the enemy in general to recognize and accept the inevitability of majority rule and the need to establish immediately a transitional government to implement this principle and called upon the British Government to convene at once a conference outside Zimbabwe with the authentic and legitimate representatives of the people of Zimbabwe to: (a) discuss the structure and functions of the Transitional Government; (b) establish the Transitional Government; (c) discuss the modalities for convening a full constitutional conference to work out the independence constitution; (d) establish the basis upon which peace and normalcy could be restored in the territory. 33 Geneva was chosen as the venue for the conference. It has been necessary to dwell on the Pretoria summit and its aftermath to demonstrate the enormous pressures converging on his regime which finally forced Mr. Ian Smith to accept the advent of majority rule in Rhodesia within two years. For a man who had repeatedly said that there would be no African majority rule in Rhodesia in a thousand years, it was a remarkable but understandable conversion.

The Geneva conference on Rhodesia and its aftermath, 1976-1977 Before the Geneva conference, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole had been removed from the ZANU leadership because he had renounced the armed

33

Africa Report, (November-December, 1976), 22, 26, 23.

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struggle and was replaced by the Secretary General of the party, Mr. Robert Mugabe. On 10 October, 1976 Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo announced in Dar es Salaam that they had formed a patriotic front with four basic objectives: ‘to liquidate imperialism and colonialism and thereby overthrow the racist minority regime; to create a national democratic state of the people of Zimbabwe; to eliminate all forms of capitalist exploitation and thus create conditions for a full-scale social revolution and to guarantee national peace, security, equal rights and happiness for all the people in a free Zimbabwe’.34 The immediate objective of the Patriotic Front was to enable Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo to coordinate their negotiating position at the Geneva conference. The Geneva conference which began on 28 October, 1976 and was chaired by the British Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Ivor Richard was attended by the two Patriotic Front delegations, the ANC delegation led by Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC delegation led by Reverend Sithole (ANC-Sithole). There were thus four black delegations at the conference in addition to the Rhodesian Government delegation. Mr. Smith arrived for the Geneva conference with one item on the agenda-the establishment of an interim government-as agreed in Pretoria.35 All the nationalist delegations at Geneva rejected Dr. Kissinger’s proposal of a council of state with a white chairman and the retention of the Ministries of Defence and of Law and Order in white hands during the interim period. Mr. Smith insisted that the purpose of the conference was simply to fill in the details of the Pretoria agreement. The Patriotic Front wanted to control the crucial Ministries of Defence and of Law and Order during the transition. The conference was deadlocked for four weeks inter alia because the conferees could not agree on the date for independence. Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo on behalf of the Patriotic Front wanted independence by 1 September, 1977 while Mr. Smith insisted on two years as specified in the Pretoria agreement. Mr. Richard suggested a compromise date of 1 March, 1978. 36 The conference was adjourned for the Christmas holiday; in the event, it was not reconvened. Addressing a conference sponsored by the Academy of Political Science and the Programme of Continuing Education at Columbia University on 13 June, 1977 Mr. Richard said there were three major 34

Colin Legum, The Battlefronts of Southern Africa, (New York and London, Africana Publishing Company, 1988), 35. 35 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 213. 36 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 260.

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problems at the Geneva conference. Firstly, none of the African leaders trusted Mr. Smith or believed his commitment to majority rule within two years because they had learnt from past experience that he was a slippery customer; on several occasions he had apparently agreed to something and had then gone back on it; they were therefore not prepared to accept a structure of government during the transition which left him with potential power to interfere with the process towards majority rule which they insisted should be irreversible. Secondly, because the four black delegations at the conference were disunited, they said much the same thing but with four different voices; the jockeying for position on the black side made it impossible to negotiate with Mr. Smith’s white delegation. Thirdly, Mr. Smith arrived in Geneva waving what he considered his contract with Dr. Kissinger and was prepared to implement that contract and nothing else; he did not shift one inch from his original position. When the conference adjourned for Christmas, it was clear that each side was demanding contradictory assurances. The blacks wanted reassurance that the process towards independence should be irreversible while the whites wanted an assurance that they would have a share of power in the transitional period and a major role to play in an independent Zimbabwe. In light of the failure to reach an agreement at the Geneva conference, the British Government proposed to assume a direct role in the Transitional Government and to appoint a resident commissioner to serve as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Mr. Richard took this proposal to southern Africa in January, 1977, consulted the frontline Presidents, saw Mr. Vorster, Mr. Smith and all the leaders of the black delegations to the Geneva conference. He believed that the nationalists and the frontline Presidents would have accepted the British proposal as a basic framework for further discussion. While not prepared to accept the British proposal, Mr. Vorster gave at least a qualified blessing to the whole enterprise. Unfortunately, on 25 January, 1977 Mr. Smith flatly turned down the British proposal. He said Mr. Smith’s refusal to entertain further negotiations, was ‘shortsighted in the extreme, dangerous for his people and dangerous for the peace of that part of the world’.37

37 Ivor Richard, ‘Diplomacy in an Interdependent World’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1977, 5-7.

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The Road to the Internal Settlement, 1976-1978 In the wake of the failure of the Geneva conference to implement the Pretoria agreement, Mr. Smith began to search for a negotiated settlement with black leaders inside Rhodesia because of the various pressures converging on his regime: the escalating guerrilla war, the declining morale among white Rhodesians in general and the security forces in particular over the long-term future of the country, the pressure from South Africa, the spiralling costs of the war and the new Anglo-American proposals for a settlement presented to him in Salisbury on 1 September, 1977. Early in January, 1977 the nationalist guerrillas had penetrated Rhodesia’s borders stretching the security forces to the limit. To counter the threat from the guerrillas, the regime announced on 27 January, 1977 that it would call up all able-bodied white males between 38 and 50 years of age for military service and would tighten up draft exemptions. The Defence Minister, Mr. Reginald Cowper, said deferments for men below 38 years of age would be cancelled immediately. The wider call- up hastened the emigration of those white males who felt that their privileged lifestyle was not worth dying for; the emigration decreased the number of white males available for the war prompting longer terms of service for those who remained which in turn persuaded others to emigrate. Statistical breakdowns suggested that the inclination to leave was strongest among those whom the regime needed the most: slightly more than half of the emigrants in 1976 were between 20 and 39 years of age and more than 800 or 5 per cent were from the professional elite whose skills had sustained the economy despite economic sanctions.38 In his memoirs, Mr. Smith states that in the wake of the failure of the Geneva conference to implement the Pretoria agreement, his immediate concern was with the security forces because although Rhodesia was enjoying a most successful phase in the war with a very high kill-rate of the ‘terrorists’, there was a definite indication of declining confidence among the security forces over the long-term future of the country; some were openly talking about making plans to emigrate; if this escalated it would have a serious detrimental effect on Rhodesia’s ability to hold the security situation and thus erode its negotiating base; accordingly, he appealed to South Africa for support.

38

The New York Times, January 9, 1977.

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At a meeting in Cape Town on 9 February, 1977 Mr. Smith told Mr. Vorster of the deteriorating confidence among white Rhodesians in general and the security forces in particular over the future of the country resulting from the failure of the Geneva conference to implement the Pretoria agreement. He said in light of this development, it was his intention to seek a negotiated settlement with black leaders inside Rhodesia in the hope of making progress towards a new settlement. Mr. Vorster promised to convey this message to the British and the Americans. Because of the desperate straits in which he found himself, Mr. Smith flew to Cape Town on 12 February, 1977 to confer with Mr. Vorster. At the meeting Mr. Vorster told him that after serious and deep consideration, the South African Government had reluctantly come to the conclusion that Rhodesia had to accept a majority of black faces not only in Parliament but also in the Cabinet. He said in light of the growing pressure on the South African Government from the rest of the world, it was becoming more and more difficult for South Africa to continue to support Rhodesia. In his memoirs, Mr. Smith states that he was greatly disappointed because he had hoped to get South African assistance. Instead, at the meeting he was confronted with ‘the sickening spectacle of South Africa conniving with the British and the Americans-and the communists-to pressurize Rhodesia to give more ground’. The hopes and morale of white Rhodesians were shattered by what they considered the betrayal of the Pretoria agreement; consequently, the exodus of white Rhodesians was gathering momentum; at the end of the meeting, he came to the conclusion that his salvation lay in trying to reach a negotiated settlement with black leaders inside Rhodesia.39 On 15 February, 1977 the Minister of Defence tabled in the House of Assembly supplementary estimates totaling $14 million to meet the escalating costs of the war; this increased Rhodesia’s Defence budget to a record $498.4 million. The Police Vote rose from $44.1 million to $47.5 million to meet the costs of continuing security operations. The Minister requested Parliament for an additional $29,657,000 bringing the total Government spending for the year ending 30 June, 1977 to $547,700,000.40 On 24 February, 1977 the Minister of Finance, Mr. David Smith, announced in Parliament new tax measures to meet the escalating costs of the war. He imposed a surcharge of 10 per cent to the income payable by individuals for the year of assessment beginning on 1 April, 1977 and raised the sales tax from 10 to 15 per cent beginning on 7 March, 1977. He 39 40

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 230-238. The Rhodesia Herald, February 16, 1977.

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said the combination of budgetary and economic problems arising from the ‘anti-terrorist operations’ meant that short-term sacrifices were unavoidable.41 These measures, however, failed to arrest the decline of the economy resulting from the war. Early in June, 1977 the regime announced that all white males below 38 years of age would serve a minimum of 190 days per year in uniform and those between 38 and 50 years of age, a minimum of 70 days. The estimates of expenditure tabled in Parliament on 30 June, 1977 showed that the costs of the ‘terrorist war’ had risen to more than $400,000 a day; the Defence Vote rose from $98.7 million to $141.8 million while the Defence Procurement Fund increased from $4.37 million to $27.9 million in 1977.42 This increase in military spending, however, failed to stem the tide of the war. In June, 1977 a meeting called to review the security situation, was attended by the Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith; the Minister of Combined Operations, Mr. Roger Hawkins; the Minister of Lands, Water Development and Natural Resources, Mr. Mark Partridge; the Minister of Justice, Mr. Hilary Squires; the Commander of Combined Operations, Lieutenant General Peter Walls and the Director of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), Mr. Ken Flower. Of this meeting, Mr. Ken Flower (see photo) recorded in his diary: ‘Peter Walls outlined the Military/Security situation accurately and with great skill-that we were not winning-not even containing the threat’.43 In spite of the strenuous efforts of the security forces, ZANLA cadres continued to infiltrate the Tribal Trust Lands and used them as launching pads for attacks on Government infrastructure.44 In his memoirs, Mr. Ken Flower says Rhodesia’s security situation began to deteriorate towards the end of 1975 as a result of ‘increased terrorist recruitment’ with thousands of recruits joining the guerrillas. In July, 1976 he addressed selected civil servants in Salisbury and Bulawayo on the security situation in general and in particular the three operational areas into which the commanders of the security forces had divided the country in order to deal with the guerrilla war-Operation Hurricane, Operation Thresher and Operation Repulse. (See map below): -41 Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 95, 1976-77, 24 February, 1977, col. 1221. 42 The Rhodesia Herald, July 1, 1977. 43 Ken Flower, Serving Secretly, (London, John Murray), 187. 44 M. Evans, Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1972-1979, (Salisbury, The Historical Association of Zimbabwe, Local Series, 37, 1981), 6.

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Source: Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe. See the Centrefold for this image in colour.

In his address he stated that during the quarter ending 30 June, 1976, 152 ‘terrorists’ were killed and 33 captured in Operation Hurricane while the security forces lost 16 men killed and 124 captured; in Operation Thresher, 96 ‘terrorists’ were killed and 11 captured while the security forces lost 10 men killed and 72 injured; in Operation Repulse, 24 ‘terrorists’ were killed and 11 captured while the security forces lost 9 members killed and 8 injured. He added: ‘In Malaya it took 350 servicemen to kill one terrorist a year. We are doing infinitely better than that, but unless terrorist casualties exceed their present rate of infiltration, no amount of continuous call-up will, of itself, provide a military solution. Indeed, it is doubtful whether any purely military solution is possible’.45 Furthermore, in August, 1976 in the wake of attacks by ZIPRA guerrillas in Bulawayo and on the main 45

Ken Flower, Serving Secretly, 131.

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road from Bulawayo to Victoria Falls, Western Rhodesia was designated a new operational area codenamed Operation Tangent.46 (See map above). That Rhodesia’s security situation continued to deteriorate, was evident from a War Council meeting on 14 January, 1977 at which the Operations Coordinating Committee told the Council that in its assessment, the country was losing so much ground militarily that even with general mobilization which would have a detrimental effect on the economy and which should be introduced only as a last resort, matters could only be prolonged; a political solution was required very soon as the security forces would be unable to hold the position indefinitely. Mr. Smith informed the Council that he was aware of the fact that there would be no end to the war until a political solution was achieved. A CIO report dated 25 July, 1977 which emphasized the need to find additional manpower to contain the situation, let alone prevent its inevitable deterioration, said no successful result could be attained by purely military means: ‘It is now more vital than ever to arrive at an early political settlement before the point of no return beyond which it will be impossible to achieve any viable political or military solution’.47 The liberation war which had been raging in the rural areas, reached Salisbury on Saturday, 6 August, 1977 when a bomb exploded in Woolworth’s store at the corner of Pioneer and Bank Streets in downtown Salisbury killing eleven people. By the middle of the following day, the walls of the store were still pitted with bomb splinters spattered with blood and badly-cracked in several places; reinforced concrete beams were sagging and the plaster had peeled off from the walls bent by the blast; the pavements outside the store were piled with rubble, charred and twisted shelving and furnishings; on the afternoon of the following day, 64 out of 76 people injured in the blast were released from hospital; of the 12 who remained in hospital, 4 were in a critical condition.48 The explosion in the Woolworth store blew away an entire first floor wall, destroyed almost every window on the ground floor and scattered debris into the streets up to a block away. Although the bomb exploded on the first floor, the effects of the blast swept through the ground floor, overturning shelves, smashing windows and glassware and spraying everything with bomb splinters. Following Saturday’s bomb blast, new security measures were introduced at major stores in Salisbury.

46

Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1979), 230. 47 Ken Flower, Serving Secretly, 128, 177, 189. 48 The Sunday Mail, August 7, 1977.

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At O. K. Bazaars, customers were no longer allowed to walk into the store with parcels and suitcases. Greaterman’s and Checker’s stores placed security guards at all entrances with instructions to examine all parcels and packages. At Macey’s, the staff were instructed to examine the parcels of all shoppers on entry into the store while at Meikle’s, all parcels left at counters were examined; the Managing Director stated that he was employing more security guards and had instructed all staff to keep their eyes open for suspicious-looking parcels. Bon Marché posted large notices telling the public that they could only leave parcels in the shop on condition that the staff would examine them; at Sander’s instead of the usual one doorman, two guards were employed at the entrances to the store. New security measures were also introduced at several hotels in Salisbury. The General Manager of the Ambassador Hotel said the staff were scrutinizing all packages and had closed the luggage-room; if guests wanted to leave their luggage, the hotel staff would want to see what was inside or the staff would not accept it. The Manager of Windsor Hotel said the hotel was not accepting parcels while the General Manager of the Monomotapa Hotel said the hotel would employ more security officers and would not accept parcels.49 In the wake of Saturday’s bomb blast in Woolworth’s store, Salisbury (see map above) was designated a new operational area codenamed Operation Salops.50 The Anglo-American peace proposals for Rhodesia presented to Mr. Smith in Salisbury on 1 September, 1977 by the British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, and the American Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Andrew Young provided for the establishment of an independence constitution for the sovereign Republic of Zimbabwe and a single chamber national assembly to be elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, a Bill of Rights to protect fundamental human rights and a Zimbabwe Development Fund of about ǧ750 million, internationally funded and managed but dependent upon the acceptance of the package as a whole. The proposals for the transition called for Mr. Smith and his regime to surrender power and be replaced by an interim government headed by a British resident commissioner and his deputy who, together with a United Nations representative, would oversee the elections and the transfer of power. Furthermore, a Zimbabwe National Army to be created during the transitional period would be based on the liberation forces but would include ‘acceptable elements’ of the Rhodesian Defence Forces. 51 Mr. 49

The Rhodesia Herald, August 8, 1977. Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country, 302. 51 Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, 268-270. 50

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Smith rejected these peace proposals out of hand and instead began to search for a negotiated settlement with black leaders inside Rhodesia. In a radio and television address to the nation on 24 September, 1977 Mr. Smith announced publicly for the first time that he would seek an internal settlement with ‘moderate and responsible’ black leaders inside Rhodesia. 52 Accordingly, he began negotiations with Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the United African National Council (UANC), Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole of the African National Council (ANC-Sithole) and Chief Jeremiah Chirau of the Zimbabwe United People’s Organization (ZUPO). In the negotiations, the UANC demanded universal adult suffrage not only in principle but in practice. Mr. Smith said he was prepared to accept majority rule provided he received, in return, guarantees for whites in order to encourage them to remain in the country and build up the economy. When asked whether he would be prepared to announce publicly that he would accept the transfer of power on the basis of universal adult franchise, Mr. Smith said he would be prepared to make such an announcement provided the statement also stated that universal adult suffrage was in exchange for safeguards for whites. At the next meeting, Mr. Smith presented eight points the most contentious of which stated that to retain white confidence in regard to the entrenched safeguards in the Constitution, one third of the seats in Parliament should be reserved for direct election by white voters. On 12 December, 1977 in response to Mr. Smith’s eight points, the UANC accepted, among other things, a Bill of Rights, an independent judiciary, the need to guarantee pensions and the principle of dual citizenship but rejected separate rolls for whites and instead demanded a common roll for all voters. On 21 December, 1977 while rejecting Mr. Smith’s demand for a third white representation in Parliament, the UANC conceded the principle of separate rolls for whites but insisted that white representation should be reduced to 20 per cent; eventually, the parties agreed on 28 per cent white representation in Parliament and that the entrenched clauses in the constitution would last for 10 years. Bishop Muzorewa and the UANC had no option but to collaborate with Mr. Smith because firstly, they had no following among the guerrillas. Secondly, on 9 January, 1977 after a two-day meeting in Lusaka, the Presidents of the five frontline states announced that they were throwing 52

The Rhodesia Herald, September 25, 1977.

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their full weight behind the Patriotic Front of Mr. Robert Mugabe and Mr. Joshua Nkomo. A communiqué read by President Nyerere said the five leaders had decided to give their full political, material, and diplomatic support to the Patriotic Front forces to enable them to achieve the objectives of their just struggle. The decision of the frontline Presidents was backed by the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 8 February, 1977 after a six-day meeting in Lusaka. The Committee gave the Patriotic Front a mandate to escalate the guerrilla war against Rhodesia’s white minority Government. The Anglo-American peace plan for Zimbabwe presented to Mr. Smith by Dr. Owen and Mr. Young in Salisbury on 1 September, 1977 and in particular its security provision which stated that the new Zimbabwe army to be created during the interim period would be based on the liberation forces, convinced Reverend Sithole that the internal settlement plan was his only viable alternative; having lost the ZANU leadership to Mr. Robert Mugabe, he was in a political wilderness; it was thus this partnership in adversity which forced Mr. Smith and his black partners to sign the Salisbury agreement. Martin Meredith has argued that Mr. Smith accepted the demand for majority rule in Rhodesia because he was confident that in the negotiations with the three internal black leaders, he would be able to keep the main pillars of Rhodesian society-the administration, the security forces and the economy-under white control. Majority rule to him meant simply a parliamentary re-arrangement; he would give the blacks a majority in Parliament but deprive them of power to interfere with the constitutional provisions safeguarding white interests. In this way, he hoped to soothe white fears about the advent of black rule and encourage the whites to stay. His overriding concern was the welfare of the whites: ‘He did not perceive at the time that to make the internal settlement plan work, the black leaders needed to win terms favourable enough for them to be able to convince the black population that a real transfer of power was taking place which merited their support. Instead, he argued that as the whites had agreed to one man, one vote, it was the turn of the nationalists to make concessions’.53 That the welfare of the whites was Mr. Smith’s overriding concern, was evident from his address to the nation on 31 December, 1977 in which he stated: ‘In exchange for the acceptance of the principle of majority rule, we are negotiating the inclusion of those safeguards necessary to retain the confidence of our white people, so that they will be encouraged to go on 53

Meredith, The Past Is Another Country, 325.

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living and working in Rhodesia and thus continue to make their contribution to the economic progress of the country’.54 The urgent need to reach an internal settlement was prompted, once again, by Rhodesia’s deteriorating security situation. In his brief to Cabinet on 17 January, 1978 the Director of the Central Intelligence Organization, Mr. Ken Flower stated: ‘The overall picture is somber. Our Half Yearly Threat Assessment, just completed, confirms the steadily deteriorating internal security situation, as forecast, and holds out little prospect of improvement other than through the achievement of a political settlement’. 55 It was thus a combination of the failure of the Geneva conference to implement the Pretoria agreement, the declining morale among white Rhodesians in general and the security forces in particular over the long-term future of the country, the pressure from South Africa, the escalating costs of the war, the deteriorating security situation and the Anglo-American peace proposals of 1 September, 1977 which finally forced Mr. Smith to seek an internal settlement. On 3 March, 1978 after three months of negotiations, he signed the Salisbury agreement with Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Sithole and Chief Chirau.

The Major Provisions of the Salisbury Agreement The Salisbury agreement provided for the drafting of a new constitution for majority rule in Rhodesia based on adult franchise with all citizens of 18 years and over being eligible to vote and a Legislative Assembly of 100 members. Of the 100 seats in the Legislative Assembly, 72 would be reserved for blacks and 28 for whites; the reserved seats for whites would be retained for a period of at least ten years. The agreement provided for a justiciable Declaration of Rights to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals including protection from deprivation of property and the pension rights of persons who were members of pension funds. Under the agreement the independence and qualifications of the judiciary would be entrenched and judges would have security of tenure. The agreement provided for the establishment of an independent Public Services Board the members of which would have security of tenure; the Board would be responsible for appointments to, promotions in, and dismissal from, the Public Service.

54 55

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 241-242. Flower, Serving Secretly, 193-194.

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According to the agreement, the Public Service, Police Force, Defence Forces and Prison Service would be free from political interference. Furthermore, pensions which were payable from the consolidated revenue fund would be guaranteed and would be remittable outside the country. The agreement permitted holders of dual citizenship to retain their status. The above provisions would be set out in a new constitution and would be regarded as specially-entrenched clauses which could not be amended except by a Bill which would require the affirmative votes of not less than 78 members of the House of Assembly. Under the agreement, the prime functions of the Transitional Government would be: (a) to bring about a ceasefire and (b) to deal with related matters such as :(i) the composition of the future military forces including those members of the nationalist forces who wished to take up a military career and the rehabilitation of others and (ii) the rehabilitation of people who had been affected by the war. The agreement provided for the establishment of a transitional government consisting of an executive council and a ministerial council. The Executive Council would consist of the Prime Minister and the heads of those delegations which had been engaged in the negotiations; the members would take turns in presiding as chairman in such sequence and for such period as the Council might determine; decisions of the Executive Council would be by consensus. The Ministerial Council would consist of equal numbers of black and white ministers. The black ministers would be nominated in equal proportion by the heads of those delegations which had been engaged in the negotiations. The white ministers would be nominated by the Prime Minister. The chairmanship of the Council of Ministers would alternate between black and white ministers. The Prime Minister would nominate which white minister would take the chair and the heads of those delegations which had been engaged in the negotiations would nominate which of the black ministers would take the chair and for the period determined by the Council of Ministers; decisions of the Council of Ministers would be by majority vote and subject to review by the Executive Council. Under the agreement, Independence Day would be 31 December, 1978.56

56 Rhodesia: Rhodesian Constitutional Agreement, 3rd March, 1978, (Salisbury, Government Printer, March, 1978), 1-6.

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Summary and Conclusions This Chapter has discussed the major developments in Rhodesia from the Pearce Commission to the internal settlement (1972-1978) and in particular the struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia (1966-1972); the developments in Mozambique and their impact on Rhodesia (1972-1976); Dr. Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in southern Africa (1976); the Geneva conference and its aftermath (1976-1977); the road to the internal settlement (1977-1978) and the major provisions of the internal settlement. Beginning in 1966 the struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia waged by ZANLA and ZIPRA in response to UDI, was largely unsuccessful because both political parties had not adequately prepared the people for the armed struggle. It was only after thoroughly politicizing the people on the aims of the war that ZANLA guerrillas resumed the war in earnest in the northeast of the country in December, 1972. Rhodesia managed to contain the threat to the North-East when suddenly a new dramatic development took place: the revolutionary change of Government in Portugal in the wake of a military coup on 25 April, 1974 which led directly to the independence of Mozambique on 25 June, 1975. The triumph of the Marxist MPLA over its rivals in the Angolan civil war brought Dr. Kissinger to southern Africa. At a summit with Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster in Pretoria on 19 September, 1976 Dr. Kissinger forced Mr. Smith to agree to majority rule in Rhodesia within two years. In order to implement the Pretoria agreement, the British Government convened a conference of all parties to the Rhodesian conflict in Geneva in October, 1976. For reasons already explained, the Geneva conference failed to achieve its objective to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia. In the wake of the failure of the Geneva conference to implement the Pretoria agreement, Mr. Smith began to search for a negotiated settlement with ‘moderate and responsible’ black leaders inside Rhodesia because of the various pressures converging on his regime: the escalating guerrilla war, the declining morale among white Rhodesians at large and the security forces in particular over the long-term future of the country, the pressure from South Africa, the haemorrghaging of the economy resulting from the war, the deteriorating security situation and the Anglo-American peace plan for Rhodesia presented to Mr. Smith by Dr. David Owen and Mr. Andrew Young in Salisbury on 1 September, 1977. These developments convinced Mr. Smith of the urgent need to reach a negotiated settlement with black leaders inside Rhodesia.

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In a radio and television address to the nation on 24 September, 1977 Mr. Smith announced publicly for the first time that he would try to reach a political settlement with black leaders inside Rhodesia. Accordingly, he began negotiations with Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Sithole and Chief Chirau. On 3 March, 1978 after three months of negotiations, he signed the Salisbury agreement. It remained to be seen whether this attempt to ambush the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe through an internal settlement, would end the war which was rapidly engulfing the country.

Source: Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free.

Source: Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe.

Source: THE WORLD: AFGHANISTAN TO ZIMBABWE.

Land apportionment in Rhodesia in 1965 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_reform_in_Zimbabwe 8/29/2007.

1. Harare

2. Victoria Falls

3. Lake Kariba

4. Outer Wall Surrounding the Great Enclosure

5. Rt. Hon. Cecil Rhodes

7. Nehanda and Kagubi

6. Dr. Leander Starr Jameson

8. Lieut. Gen. J. C. Smuts - 1917

9. Herbert S. Keigwin

11. Dr. Hastings Banda

10. Mr. Harry Nkumbula

12. Sir Roy Welensky

13. Mr. Herbert Chitepo

14. Sir Garfield Todd

15. Mr. Joshua Nkomo

16. Sir Edgar Whitehead

17. Sir Robert Tredgold

19. Mr. Ian Smith

18. Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole

20. Mr. Harold Wilson

21. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda

23. Mr. Ken Flower

22. Mr. John Vorster

24. The Reverend Canaan Banana

25. Bishop Abel Muzorewa

26. Mr. Byron Hove

27. Dr. Eddison J. M. Zvobgo

28. Burning petrol storage tanks in Salisbury’s Industrial sites, December, 1978.

29. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania 30. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher

31. General Josiah Tongogara

32. Lord Carrington signing the Lancaster House Agreement flanked by Bishop Muzorewa, Sir Ian Gilmour, Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Robert Mugabe.

33. Mr. P. W. Botha

34. Mr. Mugabe and Lord Soames after the election results.

35. The Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Joshua Nkomo

36. Mr. Emmerson Mnangagwa

37. Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa

38. Dr. Bernard Chidzero

39. Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai

40. President Robert Mugabe

CHAPTER EIGHT FROM THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT TO LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE, 1978-1979

Introduction This Chapter discusses the major developments in Rhodesia from the Salisbury agreement to the Lancaster House Conference (1978-1979) and in particular the response to the major provisions of the Salisbury agreement (March-April, 1978); the major developments (March-April, 1978); the dismissal from the Transitional Government of the joint Minister of Justice, Law and Order and of the Public Service, Mr. Byron Hove, and its aftermath (April-May, 1978); the Transitional Government’s call for a ceasefire and the Patriotic Front’s response; the major developments (September-November,1978); the impact of the war on Salisbury (11-20 December, 1978); the major developments (January-July, 1979) and in particular the major provisions of the Draft Constitution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia; Mr. Smith’s campaign for acceptance of the Draft Constitution by the white voters in a referendum held on 30 January, 1979 and the results of the referendum; the debate in Parliament on the Draft Constitution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia (February, 1979); the response abroad to the new Constitution; the ‘majority-rule’ election (April, 1979) and its aftermath; the major developments (May-July, 1979); the Lusaka Commonwealth conference (August, 1979) and the opening of the Lancaster House conference in London on 10 September, 1979.

The Response to the Salisbury agreement Most of the criticisms of the Salisbury agreement centred round the entrenched clauses in the agreement. The former Prime Minister, Mr. Garfield Todd, denounced, inter alia, the clause which guaranteed judges security of tenure: ‘The agreement that judges will have security of tenure means that those judges who collaborated with the Smith regime in the

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illegal Declaration of Independence and who since then have sentenced to death those who have fought against that illegality, are protected in their present positions’.1 Addressing the United Nations Security Council on 9 March, 1978 the ZANU President, Mr. Robert Mugabe, on behalf of the Patriotic Front, denounced the Salisbury agreement on the ground that it failed to address the transfer of power from the white minority to the African majority and for this reason, would not end the war: ‘The agreement does not constitute a settlement because it cannot end the war raging in the country. The reality is that only those locked in combat are capable of bringing about a settlement. Similarly, the composition of the future army of Zimbabwe is a matter for those in control of the fighting. It is only the Patriotic Front liberation forces that can guarantee the irreversibility of majority rule and independence’.2 In a powerful address to the National Affairs Association in Salisbury, ZAPU’s Deputy Secretary General, Mr. Ariston Chambati, lambasted the Salisbury agreement on the grounds, firstly, that it guaranteed security of tenure for white civil servants who were part and parcel of the oppressive machinery which had sustained UDI against the overwhelming opposition of the majority of the African people. Secondly, the Bill of Rights in the constitution which under normal circumstances should protect the rights and freedoms of all citizens, was negated by the entrenchment of special rights for whites. Thirdly, the 28 white members of Parliament would constitute a blocking mechanism which would make it virtually impossible for the majority rule government to operate freely: ‘The Salisbury agreement is designed to perpetuate the present structures and to groom a black government to take over from the RF in the image of the RF’.3 In an interview, Mr. Chambati stated that the Salisbury agreement was a gigantic hoax designed to hoodwink public opinion at home and abroad that it would bring about majority rule: ‘We could never support such a fraudulent agreement’.4 The Reverend Canaan Banana, a Methodist Minister and a former political detainee who subsequently became the first President of an independent Zimbabwe, said one of the fundamental flaws in the Salisbury agreement was that it was made without the participation of the Patriotic 1

National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ), MS 1095/1/2, Todd Papers, 22 January, 1977-5 November, 1979, 14 May, 1978, 2. 2 Robert Mugabe, Our War of Liberation, (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1983), 106-107. 3 Ariston Chambati, ‘The Practical implications of the Salisbury Agreement’, in ZAPU Leaders Speak on Internal Settlement, (Private publication, undated), 15-18. 4 Interview with Mr. Ariston Chambati, Harare, 15 March, 1980.

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Front leaders who were the only ones who could have brought about a cessation of hostilities.5 In an interview on the role of Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole in the developments which led to the internal settlement, he stated: ‘While both might have had a genuine desire to bring about majority rule, joining the internal settlement was a fatal error of judgment fuelled by political ambitions for power; they believed that by joining the internal settlement they would outclass the Patriotic Front; they were blinded by self-interest; they regarded the offer by Mr. Smith to join the internal settlement as an opportunity to climb to power’.6 In an interview, the former Secretary General of the UANC, Professor Gordon Chavunduka, said he resigned from the party because under the Salisbury agreement, the major pillars of state power-the judiciary, the armed forces, the Police and the civil service- would remain under white control during the transition and after independence.7 Although the Salisbury agreement was seriously flawed, it did not deter Bishop Muzorewa (see photo) from defending the agreement. Addressing UANC supporters at a rally in Highfield African Township near Salisbury on 19 March, 1978 he stated: ‘The agreement is a mechanism for the genuine transfer of power from the minority to the majority. It achieved all the UANC objectives; it gives one person, one vote; it gives the power of the vote to all Zimbabweans of 18 years and above. This agreement means that the Government of this country can now be chosen by three and half million voters instead of 80,000 voters as was the case in the past’.8 He was apparently mesmerized by adult suffrage which Mr. Smith, under pressure of war, had conceded in the Salisbury agreement and naively believed that an African majority in Parliament, qua majority, would be sufficient to transform Zimbabwean society after independence. In spite of the major flaws in the Salisbury agreement Reverend Sithole defended, inter alia, the 28 seats reserved for whites in Parliament: ‘This concession was necessary in order to achieve majority rule based on one man, one vote. It was a means to a higher end. The 28 seats helped in the task of sustaining white confidence-necessary to the stability of 5

Canaan Banana, The Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe, (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1996), 239-240. 6 Interview with Reverend Canaan Banana, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 30 January, 2001. 7 Interview with Professor Gordon Chavunduka, Harare, 20 October, 2000. 8 NAZ, MS 770/3, An Address by Bishop A. T. Muzorewa, President, United African National Council held at Zimbabwe Grounds, Highfield, Salisbury, March 19, 1978, 3-6, 8; emphasis in the original.

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Zimbabwe’. 9 In his preoccupation with retaining white confidence, Reverend Sithole demonstrated a callous disregard for the political aspirations of his own people.

Major Developments, 4 March-27 April, 1978 After signing the Salisbury agreement on 3 March, 1978 Bishop Muzorewa flew to London to seek the support of the British Government for the Salisbury agreement. In a long statement at Heathrow Airport the following day, he defended the Salisbury agreement and called upon the British Government to recognize the Transitional Government soon to be set up in Salisbury.10 At a meeting with Bishop Muzorewa on 6 March, 1978 the British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, said he would in close consultation with the United States continue to do everything possible to widen the areas of agreement and to help resolve the major outstanding problems, in particular how to ensure a genuine transfer of power to the majority and stable conditions in which fair and free elections could take place and all the nationalist leaders could take part.11 However, at a Press Conference in Salisbury on 13 March, 1978 the veteran nationalist and UANC first Vice President, Mr. James Chikerema, rejected opening negotiations with the Patriotic Front as suggested the previous week by Britain and the United States. He said the suggestion was ‘completely unacceptable’ to the UANC because it would delay peace and prolong the widespread suffering of the African people; if the Patriotic Front leaders wished to return to take part in the transitional administration and in the subsequent majority rule elections, this would be considered.12 In an interview, Mr. Chikerema said in light of the large number of people who were being killed in the war everyday, he was convinced that the internal settlement would end the war.13 In spite of the criticisms of the Salisbury agreement, Bishop Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole and Chief Chirau were sworn in as members of the 9

Ndabaningi Sithole, In Defence of the Rhodesian Constitutional Agreement: A Power Promise, (Salisbury, Graham Publishing, 1978), 58, 60. 10 NAZ, MS 770/3, United African National Council of Zimbabwe, Statement by Bishop A. T. Muzorewa, President of the United African National Council, Heathrow Airport, 4 March, 1978, 1-3. 11 The Rhodesia Herald, March 7, 1978. 12 The Rhodesia Herald, March 14, 1978. 13 Interview with Mr. James Chikerema at his farm just outside Harare, 1 May, 2000.

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Executive Council on 21 March, 1978. In keeping with the express wishes of the UANC they were sworn in by a black churchman, the late Bishop of the Anglican Church, the Reverend Patrick Murindagomo. Bishop Muzorewa said looking back on the three months of negotiations leading to the Salisbury agreement he could not help feel that a mammoth task had been achieved: ‘We achieved a settlement out of the jaws of tragedy. We created hope where there was despair. It was nothing less than a miracle that we had lasted at the conference table and that we struck success where so many had failed’.14 In reality, as already explained in Chapter 7, the successful conclusion of the negotiations leading to the Salisbury agreement was no miracle at all; it was the pressure of war and the deteriorating security situation which finally forced Mr. Smith to concede majority rule. In Washington, the State Department spokesman, Mr. John Trattner, stated on 21 March, 1978 that although the swearing in of the Executive Council was an important step in the process of political change, the United States would continue to work with all parties both in Salisbury and outside the country on an overall settlement which would guarantee the inevitability and fairness of the process leading to majority rule and independence. 15 Because the internal black leaders were unwilling to negotiate with the Patriotic Front leaders, he stated on 27 March, 1978 that the internal settlement was unlikely to succeed because it lacked guarantees to bring about a lasting and peaceful settlement to the area; there had to be a ceasefire in the war and that could take place only as part of a larger settlement.16 On 11 April, 1978 the Transitional Government named 9 black Ministers including a lawyer, Mr. Byron Hove, to serve on the 18-man Ministerial Council with their white counterparts; they were sworn into office on 14 April, 1978. The internal settlement was not without some redeeming quality; a welcome development was the release of political detainees held in various prisons in Rhodesia. On 13 April, 1978 one hundred political detainees were released from Wha Wha Prison on the orders of the Executive Council of the Transitional Government. According to The Rhodesia Herald, the freed

14

A. T. Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk: An Autobiography, (Nashville, Abingdon, 1978), 240. 15 The Rhodesia Herald, March 22, 1978. 16 The Rhodesia Herald, March 28, 1978.

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men sang, chanted, laughed, cheered, and cried their way out of the gates of Wha Wha prison.17 The following day fifteen political detainees were released from Connemara Prison; on the same day, 30 other political prisoners including 11 in Marandellas Prison were released; hundreds of other political prisoners, however, remained in detention.18

The Dismissal of Minister Byron Hove and its aftermath, 28 April-14 May, 1978 The inherent contradictions in the internal settlement were thrown into sharp relief when on 28 April, 1978 the Executive Council sacked the joint Minister of Justice, Law and Order and of the Public Service, Mr. Byron Hove, (see photo) for advocating changes in the Public Service including the judiciary and the Police Force. Although under the Salisbury agreement the Judiciary, the Police Force and the Public Service would be ‘free from political interference’, Mr. Hove, in a controversial statement the day before he was sworn in as Minister, said it would be necessary to make changes in the composition of the Judiciary, the Police Force and the Public Service to reflect the new political reality: ‘The present judiciary was appointed to implement laws made by the minority Government. We must bring in a situation where the laws reflect the broad interests of all the people in this country; consequently the composition and outlook of the judiciary should reflect this political reality. To retain the judiciary as it stands will not be compatible with the new situation’.19 At a Press Conference after he was sworn in as Minister, Mr. Hove said he would take action against any Police officer who abused his powers; he would not, for instance, tolerate any Police officer who harassed people; if any Police officer did so, he would see to it that he would be prosecuted; the Police would have to adjust themselves to a situation befitting majority rule because they were going to enforce in the future, laws which would reflect the interests of the broad masses of the people. He complained that there was not a single African in the upper echelons of his Ministry not because there were no competent blacks but because of the racism practised in the civil service by the previous minority Government; he promised to review the salaries of all civil 17

The Rhodesia Herald, April 14, 1978. The Rhodesia Herald, April 15, 1978. 19 The Rhodesia Herald, April 14, 1978. 18

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servants: ‘There are about 39,000 civil servants in this country of which 27,000 are black. The whites collectively earn $40 million a year and the 27,000 blacks collectively earn $12 million. One white in 20 is a civil servant and one black in 200 is a civil servant. This situation is also not compatible with the objectives we want to achieve’.20 On 19 April, 1978 the joint Minister of Justice, Law and Order and of the Public Service, Mr. Hilary Squires, indirectly rebuked Mr. Hove for advocating changes in the Judiciary and in the Police Force. Speaking at a British South Africa Police (BSAP) pass-out parade at Morris Depot in Salisbury, he said there would be no political interference in the disciplined forces of Rhodesia including the BSAP as specified in the Salisbury agreement; that agreement provided quite explicitly that there would be no political interference within the disciplined forces of the State; therefore, any talk of restructuring the Police by means of political directives would be in flat contradiction of the agreement; the suggestion was a gross departure from what the agreement sought to achieve and should be dismissed as an irresponsible attempt to query its terms.21 The following day the Executive Council reprimanded Mr. Hove and ordered him to retract his remarks on the need to make changes in the judiciary and the Police Force; a statement issued after the first meeting of the new 18-man Ministerial Council, reminded all Ministers that they must stick to the letter and spirit of the Salisbury agreement.22 On 28 April, 1978 the Executive Council dismissed Mr. Hove for refusing to publicly retract his remarks about the need to make changes in the judiciary and the Police Force. In a defiant letter to the Executive Council, Mr. Hove said African policemen with long experience had for a long time been discriminated against in pay and promotion in favour of white officers; in order to end all injustices within the Police Force, the Transitional Government must promote people on merit; he said there must be positive discrimination in favour of African policemen in order to remove injustice.23 On returning to London to resume his law practice, Mr. Hove said there was a lot of evidence that Mr. Smith was trying to reverse the process towards majority rule.24 A crucial meeting of the UANC National Executive in Salisbury on 7 May, 1978 failed to reach a decision on what action to take regarding the dismissal of Mr. Hove. In a Press Statement after an eight-hour meeting, 20

The Rhodesia Herald, April 15, 1978. The Rhodesia Herald, April 20, 1978. 22 The Rhodesia Herald, April 21, 1978. 23 The Rhodesia Herald, April 29, 1978. 24 The Rhodesia Herald, May 2, 1978. 21

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the party’s Publicity and Information Secretary, Mr. David Mukome, said as a result of the dismissal of Mr. Hove, the credibility of the whole agreement was seriously being called into question.25 On 14 May, 1978 Bishop Muzorewa said in spite of the dismissal of Mr. Hove, the UANC would not withdraw from the Transitional Government. The Publicity and Information Secretary, Mr. David Mukome, said the National Executive took the decision to remain in the interim Government ‘in the interests of the country and the people’.26 In his analysis of the practical implications of the Salisbury agreement, Mr. Chambati said Mr. Hove erroneously believed that the Salisbury agreement had ushered in a new dispensation: ‘What Mr. Hove was proposing was that in order to bring about justice in an unjust situation, those institutions through which injustice has been perpetrated against the African people must of necessity be restructured. Mr. Hove did not appear to appreciate the practical implications of the agreement. The Executive Council finally dismissed him; his crime was to suggest changes to bring about justice in a situation that has been characterized by gross injustice against the African people’.27 The Director of the CIO, Mr. Ken Flower, said Bishop Muzorewa’s failure to support Mr. Hove had damaged him politically: ‘The Bishop had failed his first test. He had failed his colleague and the chances of his recovering his position within the UANC, let alone in the country at large, seemed slim’.28 In an interview, Mr. Hove stated that he had no regrets for what he said because it was true; unfortunately, Bishop Muzorewa failed to back him up.29 The UANC National Executive’s decision to stay in the Transitional Government ‘in the interests of the country and the people’ was to cost the party much of its support among the rank and file.

The Transitional Government’s call for a ceasefire At a Press Conference on 22 March, 1978 the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole in his usual bombastic manner and still clinging to the delusion that ZANLA guerrillas were fighting under his standard, stated that he would soon issue ceasefire orders to the guerrillas as soon as members of the Council of Ministers had been sworn into office; he claimed that the 25

The Rhodesia Herald, May 8, 1978. The Rhodesia Herald, May 15, 1978. 27 Chambati, ‘The Practical Implications of the Salisbury Agreement’, 14. 28 Flower, Serving Secretly, ( London, John Murray, 1987), 203. 29 Interview with Mr. Byron Hove, Harare, 25 January, 1985. 26

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vast majority of the people were no longer interested in the war because they had achieved what they had been fighting for.30 Accordingly, on 2 May, 1978 the four members of the Executive Council of the Transitional Government appealed to the guerrillas to lay down their arms and simultaneously announced the lifting of the ban on ZANU and ZAPU. The announcement stated, inter alia, that the fight for majority rule based on adult franchise, had been achieved and that the time had come to call a halt to the fighting and restore peace to the country; in order to facilitate the objective of the Salisbury agreement to bring about a cessation of hostilities, they had ordered the release of people held in detention to enable free political activity to take place during the period leading up to the first election; they therefore decided to lift forthwith the ban on all proscribed political organizations including ZANU and ZAPU. The ZAPU leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, rejected the Executive Council’s call for a ceasefire and stated that until the Patriotic Front forces were in effective control of Salisbury, there would be no end to the war: ‘Mr. Smith still controls the Army, the Police, the Judiciary and the Civil Service. What we mean by a transfer of power is that real power must be in the hands of the people’.31 In addition to the call for a ceasefire, the interim regime announced a ‘safe return’ policy for the guerrillas. In his address to the National Affairs Association in Salisbury already referred to, Mr. Chambati denounced the interim regime’s ‘safe return’ policy for the guerrillas on the ground that the freedom fighters did not take up arms to wage war merely to install black leaders to occupy Rhodesia Front structures; they took up arms to remove injustice which had been perpetrated against the African people through RF institutions; a ceasefire must of necessity be predicated upon an agreement that removed the RF regime and replacing it with an interim government reflecting majority rule.32 In response to the Executive Council’s call for a ceasefire, ZANU’s Deputy Publicity and Information Secretary, Dr. Eddison J. M. Zvobgo,(see photo) stated: ‘We had known that at some stage, once we began really winning, the enemy would try, as part of his psychological warfare campaign, to launch an amnesty drive. We had included this in our syllabus, teaching the comrades quite clearly that once you hear the enemy asking you to surrender, you should know we are winning. So each and everyone in the ZANLA forces knew that once the enemy starts this business, the enemy has had it, and when it did happen as we had 30

The Rhodesia Herald, March 23, 1978. The Rhodesia Herald, May 3, 1978 32 Chambati, ‘The Practical Implications of the Salisbury Agreement’, 13. 31

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predicted, everyone just laughed. So the amnesty didn’t succeed because we had anticipated it’.33 On 15 June, 1978 in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent, Mr. John Humphreys, Mr. Smith conceded that the Transitional Government was not succeeding as well as it had hoped in its efforts to arrange a ceasefire but added that the Government was confident that ‘a very meaningful de-escalation’ of the war would take place before the end of the year when a majority-rule general election was due to take place; he claimed that in certain areas the ceasefire was succeeding and that the ‘terrorists’ were working together with the security forces. 34 The Director of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), Mr. Ken Flower, disputed Mr. Smith’s claim that the Transitional Government had achieved some successes in negotiating a ceasefire; he said some guerrillas had indicated that they would only lay down their arms once a majorityrule government had been installed and that in many areas, the guerrilla commanders were telling their followers to disassociate themselves from the internal settlement.35 On 7 July, 1978 four UANC officials who were trying to negotiate with the guerrillas loyal to Mr. Mugabe, were shot and killed near the Reformed Church’s Morgenster Mission about 40 kilometers south of Fort Victoria. According to The Rhodesia Herald the men were shot through the head with their hands tied behind their backs. In addition, over 40 of Reverend Sithole’s supporters were gunned down in the company of unarmed envoys sent to Wedza District to negotiate with the guerrillas.36 On 13 July, 1978 Bishop Muzorewa in a broadcast to the nation appealed to the guerrillas to lay down their arms on the ground that the struggle for one man, one vote, had been achieved. 37 The guerrillas, however, rejected the appeal for a ceasefire. In his memoirs, Mr. Smith states that at a meeting on 3 August, 1978 the security chiefs impressed on him their concern over the failure of the ceasefire campaign and stated that the black leaders in the Transitional Government appeared to lack motivation and were not putting in enough effort. At a joint session of the Executive and Ministerial Councils on 7

33

Julie Frederickse, None But Ourselves: Masses Vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe, (Harare, Anvil Press, 1982), 142. 34 The Rhodesia Herald, June 16, 1978. 35 Flower, Serving Secretly, 204. 36 The Rhodesia Herald, July 8, 1978. 37 The Rhodesia Herald, July 14, 1978.

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August, 1978 he berated his black colleagues for failing to deliver the goods on the ceasefire.38 Addressing a joint session of the Executive and Ministerial Councils in late August, 1978 the Commander of Combined Operations, Lieutenant General Peter Walls, said in light of the deteriorating security situation and the failure to arrange a ceasefire, unless the Transitional Government did something within the following two or three weeks, it was the view of the security chiefs that some political solution other than that being pursued, would have to be found.39

Major Developments, September-November, 1978 On 23 September, 1978 in light of the deteriorating security situation the interim regime declared martial law over 7 Tribal Trust Lands and 4 African Purchase Areas. 40 (see Map 1 below). The Proclamation establishing martial law set up special courts martial to try: (a) any person charged before the court in respect of offences relating to ‘terrorism’ or the maintenance of public order committed during the state of martial law within an area subject to martial law; (b) any person who had in an area subject to martial law, committed or engaged in during the state of martial law, any act or conduct which was likely to further the aims and objects of ‘terrorism’ or to impede the suppression of ‘terrorism’ or the maintenance of law and order. 41 In a long statement on 27 September, 1978 the interim regime stated inter alia that the proclamation of martial law was necessary and desirable in order firstly to prevent ‘terrorist sympathizers from assisting the terrorists’ and secondly to eliminate ‘the scourge of terrorism from Rhodesia’.42

38

Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal, (London, Blake Publishing, 1997), 260261. 39 Flower, Serving Secretly, 207-208. 40 The Rhodesia Herald, September 24, 1978. 41 Rhodesia Government Gazette Supplements, 1978, Rhodesia Government Notice No. 733 B of 1978, Martial Law (Establishment of Special Courts Martial), Notice, 1978. 42 The Rhodesia Herald, September 28, 1978.

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On 5 October, 1978 the interim regime extended martial law to 10 Tribal Trust Lands and 5 African Purchase Areas and Beitbridge District. 43 The extension of martial law to these areas, however, failed to contain the war, let alone to defeat the guerrillas. Accordingly, on 31 October, 1978 the interim regime extended martial law to the whole of Matabeleland including Victoria Falls and Wankie and to 15 Tribal Trust Lands and 14 African Purchase Areas and Chipinge District.44 ( See Map 2 below):

43 44

The Rhodesia Herald, October 6, 1978. The Rhodesia Herald, November 1, 1978.

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On 24 November, 1978 the transitional regime extended martial law to 17 Tribal Trust Lands and 3 African Purchase Areas; this put roughly 70 per cent of the country under martial law.45 ( See Map 3). In addition, the interim regime extended curfew hours in various parts of the country. For example, early in 1978 the regime dropped leaflets in Maranke Tribal Trust Land, south of Umtali, imposing a curfew lasting from dusk until twelve noon; anybody found wandering about during the prohibited eighteen hours could be shot on sight and no vehicles were allowed to move within or leave the curfew area.46

45

The Rhodesia Herald, November 25, 1978. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, Rhodesia After the Internal Settlement, (London and Salisbury, 4 November, 1978), 19. 46

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On 29 November, 1978 the joint Ministers of Finance asked Parliament for an additional $18 million to meet the rising costs of the war which they had originally estimated at $254 million for the 1978/1979 financial year. According to supplementary estimates tabled in the House of Assembly, the direct costs of fighting the war had risen by 7 per cent and totalled more than $19 million. The regime was spending about $700,000 a day in fighting the war in addition to the $130 million provided for in the July Budget to bolster the economy in the face of economic sanctions; they requested Parliament for an extra $7.5 million to the $160 million Defence Vote and $10.5 million in Supplementary Vote for the war; the extra $7. 5 million allocated to the Ministry of Defence consisted of $5.3 million for the Army and $2.2 million for the Air Force.47 The following day the interim regime banned ZAPU and the People’s Movement (the internal wing of ZANU loyal to Mr. Robert Mugabe) as part of a programme to ‘liquidate’ the internal opposition. Moving a motion in Parliament on 30 November, 1978 to ban ZAPU and the Peoples’ Movement, the joint Minister of Law and Order, Mr. Francis 47

The Rhodesia Herald, November 30, 1978.

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Zindoga, stated that in accordance with the spirit of the Salisbury agreement, the Government had lifted the ban on ZAPU, ZANU (Sithole) and the People’s Movement to enable all political parties to freely express their views in the campaign for elections for a majority-rule government. It had become evident, however, that ZAPU and the People’s Movement had no intention of seeking public support and achieving their political objectives by constitutional means; instead of assisting the Government in the task of bringing about a ceasefire and thereby saving innocent lives, ZAPU and the People’s Movement had publicly denigrated the efforts made by the Government to resolve the country’s problems and bring about peace under a majority-rule government while clandestinely undertaking subversive activities. 48 His motion was put to a vote and carried; accordingly, the interim regime banned ZAPU and the People’s Movement.

The Impact of the war on Salisbury, 11-20 December, 1978 In response to the proclamation of martial law and the extension of martial law to specified areas of Rhodesia, the nationalist guerrillas brought the war to Salisbury. In the evening on Monday, 11 December, 1978 guerrilla rockets hit the fuel storage tanks in Salisbury’s industrial sites (see photo). In an extensive coverage of the ensuing fire, The Rhodesia Herald reported that the tanks burst into flames shortly after 9 p.m. and muted explosions followed at irregular intervals. Police reservists were at the scene soon afterwards and cordoned off the area. As the flames surged high into the black night sky, hundreds of spectators, many of them drawn from a tennis match between Rhodesia and South Africa at the nearby National Sports Centre, pressed against Police lines to get a better view; it was impossible for firemen to get close to the blaze which threatened to engulf nearby factories and ignite the remaining storage tanks. Salisbury’s Civil Defence volunteers and all available ambulances drove along Birmingham Road and other access roads to the scene. The entire Fire Brigade including off-duty members and the Salisbury District fire station units were called in to come and assist in putting down the blaze. The boiling inferno lit up the night sky, streaking vivid orange on the clouds and billowing up a heavy column of 48 Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 99, 1978-1979, 30 November, 1978, cols. 1450-1453.

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black smoke which drifted south. As people in the city and suburbs watched thunderstruck, one huge ball of flame mushroomed hundreds of meters into the air, searing the sky. An onlooker in nearby Marlborough suburb said the fireball looked like a small atomic explosion. People from as far as 25 kilometers from the city centre said they could see the pale orange glare of the flames reflected from the low cloud, with intermittent lightning flashes behind. Thousands of spectators turned out, many of them in pyjamas, to witness a spectacle unparalleled in the history of the capital; hotel residents watched from upper floors and the road up the Salisbury Kopje was jammed with sightseers seeking the most dramatic view of the inferno below.49 On Tuesday morning of 12 December, 1978 a pall of billowing black smoke hovered over the city from the still flaming fuel storage tanks. Fire fighters called off the battle to save the remaining fuel tanks withdrawing hundreds of firemen, soldiers and volunteer Civil Defence workers who had battled desperately in the rain, smoke and heat. A communiqué issued at mid-morning by Combined Operations Headquarters said the security forces had found ‘evidence’ of ‘terrorist involvement’ in the fire and that follow-up operations were continuing. There was a general exodus from the scene at dusk when three of the ten fuel tanks hitherto untouched, burst into flames in rapid succession; one literally blew its top; the lid flew off, sending scraps of metal high in the air. As fire-fighting teams battled to bring the Salisbury fuel storage blaze under control, security forces carried out sweeps of the industrial sites and nearby African townships in search of the guerrillas responsible for the worst fire in the city’s history.50 At a Press Conference in the afternoon on the following day after a tour of the burnt and twisted remains of the Salisbury’s fuel storage depot, Mr. Smith warned Rhodesians to gear themselves for the tough times they were going through and said the ‘stupid people’ responsible for the fire, would not defeat the national effort or dent the determination of Rhodesians to ‘see things through’; he conceded that the ‘terrorist attack’ on the Salisbury fuel depot was ‘a great disaster’ but said Rhodesians had the capacity to hit back at the ‘terrorists’ and to overcome their problems.51 On 14 December, the fire at the fuel depot complex began to die down although one giant tank was still aflame. Salisbury’s fire chief, Mr. Vin Lowrie, said his men had started mopping-up operations and were 49

The Rhodesia Herald, December 12, 1978. The Rhodesia Herald, December 13, 1978. 51 The Rhodesia Herald, December 14, 1978. 50

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recovering fire-fighting equipment with the help of Civil Defence volunteers and Lytton Road was re-opened to traffic in the afternoon.52 The fire at the Salisbury fuel storage depot was finally extinguished at 7.30 a.m. on 17 December, 1978. Mr. Lowrie said altogether 10 fuel tanks had been destroyed by the fire and that the situation was still dangerous as two tanks which were still intact were still very hot and firemen were spraying water on them to reduce the temperature of the fuel inside; the fuel vaporization had to be reduced to avoid the possibility of vapour being ignited from an outside source; there was an additional danger that the pools of fuel lying around could be easily fired and that mopping-up operations would take time.53 When asked by Mr. Brian Walden on the television programme London Weekend, in Salisbury on 17 December, 1978 whether the attack on the Salisbury fuel storage depot was the beginning of urban warfare in Rhodesia, Mr. Smith replied: ‘I think it could be. The terrorists had warned us that it is their intention to step up the war. This was originally to coincide with the fact that we were going to hold our first general election to bring in majority rule at the end of the month. The terrorists are opposed to our settlement. They don’t want a decision through the ballot box; they want it through the barrel of the gun. They made it clear that it is their intention to disrupt the forthcoming election through industrial sabotage and urban terrorism, and I think this is the beginning’.54 On 18 December, 1978 the Government announced a- dusk-to- dawn curfew over the area of Salisbury’s fuel storage depot starting at 6 p. m. The curfew regulations issued by the Salisbury Protecting Authority, Senior Assistant Commissioner, Mr. A. J. Wright, stated that unless specifically authorized, no person would be allowed to be in any street or public place within the designated area except with the written permission of the Protecting Authority for Salisbury and that all people seeking such authority would be required to identify themselves satisfactorily to the officer in charge and satisfy him of their bona fide intentions in the area and their reason for seeking entry. Four Police checkpoints would be established, one each at the intersections of Dumfries and Lytton roads, Lytton and Paisley roads, Paisley and Birmingham roads and at Birmingham and Auckland roads and no one would be allowed to enter the area at any time other than via these checkpoints; no vehicles would be allowed to use the section of Lytton Road between the intersections of 52

The Rhodesia Herald, December 15,1978. The Rhodesia Herald, December 18,1978. 54 NAZ, MSS 474, London Weekend Television, Brian Walden, Interview with Mr. Ian Smith, Part II, Sunday, December 17, 1978. 53

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Paisley and Dumfries roads, or the section of Birmingham Road between its intersections with Paisley and Auckland roads.55 On 20 December, 1978 the joint Minister of Finance, Mr. David Smith, in a long statement in Parliament on the fire at the Salisbury fuel storage depot, stated, inter alia, that the attack on the fuel storage depot was an act of war which the Government had been fighting for so long; undoubtedly this was a spectacular episode in the ‘terrorist war’. He said as far as the Police were concerned on the night of the attack, armed stand-by squads were available in immediate call within the Salisbury area to react promptly to any sign of trouble. In addition, vehicles were patrolling the heavy industrial sites and two happened to be in the immediate vicinity of the oil installations when the attack took place at 9. 20. p.m. Within seven minutes the occupants of these vehicles set up two road blocks and within ten minutes the Police had cordoned off the entire area and the site from which the attack was launched was identified and follow-up operations began immediately. The security guards at the depot sounded the alarm and activated the water sprinklers. The Fire Brigade arrived within four minutes but the wind speed and direction and the tremendous heat from the burning tanks were all against them and it was impossible to bring the fire under control quickly; he said given unlimited resources of men, money and materials, it might have been possible to prevent or contain the fire. In conclusion, he stated: ‘It is just not possible to cover every eventuality and avoid every risk, or to win every battle. We have suffered a temporary setback, but let it make us even more determined to overcome the evil forces which are ranged against us’.56 It has been necessary to dwell on the fire which engulfed Salisbury’s fuel storage depot because firstly, it demonstrated the capacity of the nationalist guerrillas to bring the war to the capital and secondly, in spite of Reverend Sithole’s much-vaunted influence with the guerrillas, the interim regime was unable to win the war. Mr. Smith admitted this much in an interview with Mr. Brian Walden of the television programme, London Weekend, already referred to. When asked whether the Transitional Government was winning the war, Mr. Smith replied: ‘I don’t think we can honestly say we are winning now, but I believe we can hold the position. I have said for a long time, and I think most thinking Rhodesians would go along with me when I say that the final solution is a political solution. We have never stopped trying to bring peace through a political solution. But of course we must hold the security scene, otherwise 55

The Rhodesia Herald, December 19, 1978. Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 99, 1978-1979, 20 December, 1978, cols. 1834-1841.

56

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the country collapses. We are capable of holding the position but we must never lose sight of the fact that the ultimate answer is a political solution’.57

The Draft Constitution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia, January, 1979 As already stated, the Salisbury agreement failed to achieve one of its major objectives- to end the war. This, however, did not deter the interim regime from unveiling a draft constitution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia on 2 January, 1979. The Draft Constitution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia provided for a ceremonial President as Head of State and Parliament consisting of the House of Assembly and the Senate. The President would appoint a Prime Minister and, in doing so, would appoint a person who, in his discretion, he considered to be the best able to command the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly. The Senate would consist of 30 members 10 of whom would be blacks elected by 72 black members of the House of Assembly; 10 would be whites elected by the 28 white members of the House of Assembly; 10 would be African Chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs, five of whom would be from Mashonaland and five would be from Matabeleland. The House of Assembly of 100 members would comprise of 72 blacks and 28 whites; the reserved seats for 28 white members of the House of Assembly would last for a period of at least ten years. Under the Draft Constitution judicial authority in Zimbabwe Rhodesia would be vested in the High Court consisting of an Appellate Division and a General Division. The Chief Justice and other judges of the High Court would be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission; a person would not qualify for appointment as a judge unless he was or had been a judge in a country in which the common law was Roman-Dutch and English was an official language or he had been qualified to practise as an advocate for not less than 10 years in Rhodesia or in a country in which the common law was Roman-Dutch and English was an official language. The Draft Constitution provided for the establishment of a Judicial Service Commission headed by the Chief Justice and a Public Service Commission consisting of a chairman and not less than two and not more 57 NAZ, MS 474, London Weekend Television, Brian Walden, Interview with Mr. Ian Smith in Rhodesia, Part II, Sunday, December 17, 1978.

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than four other members appointed by the President; the Chairman and at least one other member or if there were more than three members, at least two other members were required to have held the post of Secretary or Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary in the Ministry of the Public Service or a post in the Public Service of a grade equivalent to, or higher than that of Under Secretary for periods which in the aggregate amounted to at least five years. Under the Draft Constitution the Commissioner of Police would be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission; a person would not qualify for appointment as a Commissioner of Police unless he had held the rank of Assistant Commissioner in the Police Force or any more senior rank for periods which in the aggregate amounted to at least five years. According to the Draft Constitution there would be a Police Service Commission consisting of a chairman (who would be the Chairman of the Public Service Commission) and not less than two and not more than four other members appointed by the President; of the members appointed by the President, at least two were required to have held the rank of Assistant Commissioner in the Police Force or any more senior rank for periods which in the aggregate amounted to at least five years. The Draft Constitution provided for the establishment of a Defence Forces Service Commission consisting of a chairman (who would be the Chairman of the Public Service Commission) and not less than two and not more than four other members appointed by the President; of the members appointed by the President, at least two were required to have held the rank of Colonel in the Army or Group Captain in the Air Force or any more senior rank for periods which in the aggregate amounted to at least five years. Under the Draft Constitution, dual citizenship would be permitted; a person holding a foreign passport would not be required to surrender that passport nor would he be denied a passport of Zimbabwe Rhodesia because he held a foreign passport. The Draft Constitution provided for a justiciable Declaration of Rights including protection of the right to life and personal liberty, protection from slavery and forced labour, from inhuman treatment, from deprivation of property, from arbitrary search or entry; protection of the law, freedom of conscience, of expression, of assembly and association, of movement and protection from discrimination.58

58

Rhodesia, Constitution, 1979, (Salisbury, Government Printer. 1979).

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The internal black leaders had capitulated when Mr. Smith insisted that the Draft Constitution must be submitted for approval by white voters in a referendum. He therefore began to campaign for acceptance of the Draft Constitution by white voters.

Mr. Smith’s campaign for acceptance of the Draft Constitution by white voters In his opening salvo in the campaign for acceptance of the Draft Constitution by white voters in a referendum to be held on 30 January, 1979 Mr. Smith told a white audience of about 500 in the Queen’s Hall in Umtali on 11 January, 1979 that he could offer no guarantees for the future but that there was still hope for a peaceful settlement. He warned that if they rejected the Draft Constitution in the forthcoming referendum, any subsequent agreement would be worse, and not better for whites. He reminded them that under the Draft Constitution the existing commanders of the security forces would retain their positions; he believed it would be worth their while to continue living and working in Zimbabwe Rhodesia and that was his intention.59 Addressing about 200 whites in Chiredzi the following day, Mr. Smith said majority rule had to be accepted because without it, Zimbabwe Rhodesia would not achieve international recognition; failure to obtain diplomatic recognition would mean that economic sanctions would continue and the war would go on.60 On 18 January, 1979 Mr. Smith told an audience of about 1,200 whites in Bulawayo that the Draft Constitution guaranteed them a secure future in Zimbabwe Rhodesia; if they turned it down in the referendum, they would never get a better deal: ‘The external terrorist leaders will be delighted at a no vote in the referendum. We will have done their job for them’. He said he honestly believed that there was a good chance that Britain and the United States would recognize the new Government. After explaining the entrenched clauses and the safeguards for whites, he said it augured well for good government in the future. In a blunt warning, he stated: ‘If you vote no, the terrorist alliance will be your next government. The situation is as serious as that’.61

59

The Herald, January 12, 1979. The Herald, January 13, 1979. 61 The Herald, January 19, 1978. 60

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Addressing a crowd of about 500 whites in Gwelo on 24 January, 1979 Mr. Smith stated: ‘This isn’t my idea of an ideal constitution. I had to sell something to Rhodesians which if it was left to me, I wouldn’t accept’.62 Appealing to white voters on the eve of the white referendum, Mr. Smith stated: ‘There is no doubt that the proposed Constitution is the best that could have been devised in this country’s present circumstances’.63 Out of a poll of 68,838 whites who voted in the referendum on 30 January, 1979 a total of 57,269 voted for, while 9,085 voted against, the Draft Constitution; of the 71.5 per cent who voted, 85 per cent voted for the Draft Constitution.64 In a post mortem of the results, Meredith argued that the all-white referendum was ‘not so much a vote in favour of majority rule; nor was it an endorsement of Smith’s campaign, for he was offering little more than a leap into the dark; it was rather that there seemed to be no practical alternative and the whites, weary and resigned, simply wanted to get it over with’.65

The Debate in Parliament on the Draft Constitution, February, 1979 Several African Members of Parliament sharply criticized the entrenched clauses in the Draft Constitution. Mr. J. Z. Maposa, for example, stated that the entry qualifications for the civil service were such that no African would be appointed to the judiciary for the next five or ten years; similarly, no African would reach the top posts in either the Police or the Defence Forces for the next ten years. The joint Minister of Justice, Mr. Chris Andersen, defended the entrenched clauses in the Draft Constitution on the ground that the white minority possessed skills, expertise and capital resources far beyond those possessed by the African majority and that those who claimed that the Draft Constitution was too favourable to the whites, should remember this fact and consider what would happen if the whites were to leave the country; he said the Draft Constitution was a triumph of moderation and would win the support of the vast majority of white and black people in the country.

62

The Herald, January 25, 1979. The Herald, January 30, 1979. 64 The Herald, February 1, 1979. 65 Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1979), 357. 63

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Speaking for the Opposition, Mr. M. M. Bhebe argued that the Draft Constitution gave whites power to veto future constitutional amendments because instead of a simple two-thirds majority, an amendment to the entrenched clauses in the Draft Constitution would require affirmative votes of 78 per cent of the members of the House of Assembly. In response, Mr. Andersen castigated Mr. Bhebe for failing to appreciate that while meeting the aspirations of the black people on the one hand, it was necessary to provide safeguards for whites on the other in order to prevent a breakdown of law and order and chaos and to proceed to peace and prosperity. 66 In spite of the criticisms of the Draft Constitution by African Members of Parliament, the House of Assembly passed the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Constitution Bill on 20 February, 1979.

The Response abroad to the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Constitution Testifying before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 5 March, 1979 the former Secretary of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, Sister Janice McLaughlin, denounced the new Constitution on the grounds firstly, that far from abolishing minority privilege, economic inequality and unjust structures of power and control, it guaranteed that they would be preserved for the next ten years. Secondly, under the new Constitution the minority would continue to control the civil service, the police, the armed forces, the economy, the courts and prisons-all those institutions which it had used to dominate, exploit and oppress the African people.67 On 28 March, 1979 the State Department in a long statement issued by the American Embassy in London, denounced the new Constitution on the grounds, firstly, that the major political movements of Zimbabwe had no hand in framing the constitution which was put for approval only before the white community of about 3% of the population. Secondly, the command of the security forces (the army, the air force and the police) was kept in the hands of white officers through qualification provisions requiring black aspirants to have held the rank of Colonel or Group Captain or Assistant Commissioner or above in the existing defence or 66

Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 99, 1978-1979, 7-20 February, 1979, cols. 2474-2476, 2431, 2556, 2395-2396, 2798-2799. 67 NAZ, MS 489-MS 498/2, Testimony of Sister Janice McLaughlin, M. M., Washington Office on Africa before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Rhodesia, March 5, 1979, 1-14.

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police forces for at least five years. Thirdly, the qualification provisions of the Constitution ensured that the courts and the public service would remain essentially in white hands while the qualifications for senior officers in the judiciary and the public service would effectively exclude blacks for decades rather than years. Fourthly, the constitutional provisions relating to land acquisition would effectively preclude any significant land reform; in short, the constitution entrenched the privileged position of white land owners. Fifthly, despite the outlawing of racial discrimination by a Bill of Rights, the entire statute book of the raciallydiscriminatory regime was preserved indefinitely and legislation designed to redress a legacy of inequality was effectively proscribed. Finally, the entire structure of white minority domination was reinforced by the veto guaranteed to the 3% white minority over an extraordinarily- wide range of constitutional provisions.68 On 16 April, 1979 in a radio address from Maputo, the ZANU President, Mr. Robert Mugabe, denounced the new Constitution on the grounds firstly, that it would perpetuate racism because white Members of Parliament would be elected by whites while African members would be elected by Africans. Secondly, it was undemocratic because there was no justification for giving 28% of the seats in Parliament to white settlers who constituted only 3 % of the population. Thirdly, it provided for a Defence Forces Commission which would be exclusively white; he said no army in an independent and free Zimbabwe would be led by white settlers. Fourthly, it provided for the establishment of a Judicial Service Commission composed of whites only. Fifthly, it created a Police Service Commission which would be run exclusively by racist white commissioners who would ensure that whites would continue to dominate the entire public service sector of the Government; he said this would not be permitted in an African country.69 In spite of these criticisms, it was on the basis of this flawed Constitution that the internal black leaders began to campaign for the forthcoming election. Addressing the nation on 2 March, 1979 Bishop Muzorewa stated: ‘The March 3 agreement aimed at bringing peace to our country torn and ravaged by war. It is an agreement to save lives, to stop bloodshed and the wanton destruction of property’. 70 In his campaign for the forthcoming election, Reverend Sithole offered the guerrillas ‘a Bill of Rights’ 68

NAZ, MS 500/4 American Embassy, London, Text of the State Department’s Statement of 28 March, 1979. 69 Robert Mugabe, Our War of Liberation: Speeches, Articles, Interviews, 19761979, (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1983), 112-114. 70 The Herald, March 3, 1979.

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guaranteeing them the right to return to their homes and families in honour and with a secure future within the economy of the new state. The ‘Bill of Rights’ offered each returning guerrilla assistance to complete his education or other training, jobs in the private sector and loans of up to $1,000 for the purchase of farms, homes or businesses.71

The ‘majority rule’ election and its aftermath Because of long distances and logistical problems, the ‘majority rule’ election was held from 17 to 21 April, 1979. When the results were announced, Bishop Muzorewa emerged with a commanding lead; overall, the UANC won 67 per cent of the valid votes cast and took 51 of the 72 seats reserved for blacks in Parliament; Reverend Sithole’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) trailed behind with 14 per cent and taking 12 seats; Chief Kayisa Ndiweni’s United National Federal Party (UNFP) with a strong following in Matabeleland, won nearly 11 per cent of the votes cast and took 9 seats while Chief Chirau’s Zimbabwe United People’s Organization (ZUPO) failed to win a single seat.72 Unaccustomed to play second fiddle, Reverend Sithole rejected the results of the election on the ground that reports from party parliamentary candidates in all the regions of the country indicated that there had been ‘gross irregularities’ in the election and called for a commission of enquiry to investigate these ‘irregularities’. 73 On 29 April, 1979 he urged his colleagues in the Executive Council to investigate the ‘gross irregularities’ in the recent election and threatened that unless they took action, ZANU would not be party to the new Government. In response to Reverend Sithole’s claim that there had been double voting in the election, a spokesman for the British South Africa Police (BSAP) Forensic Science Laboratory said it would have been very difficult if not impossible for a voter to remove the fluorescent dye used during the election to guard against double voting.74 In spite of this statement, Reverend Sithole and his party continued to be dissatisfied with the results of the election. The following day, ZANU’s Deputy Secretary General delivered to the Executive Council a petition calling for an independent commission of enquiry to investigate immediately the ‘gross irregularities’ in the election and sent copies of the petition to the Election Directorate and the Electoral 71

The Washington Post, March 12, 1979. Meredith, The Past Is Another Country, 363. 73 The Herald, April 24, 1979. 74 The Herald, April 30, 1979. 72

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Supervisory Commission. The petition stated that the ZANU Central Committee had received information from all over the country suggesting that there had been ‘gross irregularities’ in the election and alleged inter alia that some people had voted more than once and that some employers had ordered their workers to vote for certain political parties.75 It was clear that in the wake of their electoral defeat, ZANU leaders were clutching at straws in an attempt to explain the reasons for their party’s disastrous performance in the election. On 1 May, 1979 after a two-hour meeting with his colleagues in the Executive Council, Reverend Sithole told reporters that ZANU would not take up its 12 seats in the new Parliament until an independent commission of enquiry had investigated the allegations. Mr. Smith said after the meeting that machinery already existed to investigate complaints about the election and if anyone was dissatisfied with its verdict, they could go to the High Court. 76 The following day the Electoral Supervisory Commission in its Second Report said the one-man, one vote, election was ‘substantially free and fair’ and was ‘an authentic expression’ of the will of the electorate in relation to the contestants.77 On 7 May, 1979 ZANU’s 12 Members of Parliament (MPs) refused to take their seats in Parliament because of the allegations of ‘gross irregularities’ in the general election.78 The following day they boycotted the swearing-in of the new Members of Parliament.79 On 27 May, 1979 Reverend Sithole rejected Bishop Muzorewa’s offer of two Cabinet posts to which his party was entitled in the wake of the election. While thanking Bishop Muzorewa for the offer he stated that the 12 ZANU MPs including himself were not prepared to participate in the new Government.80 For reasons which can only be guessed at, Reverend Sithole and the ZANU Central Committee did not take up their complaints to the High Court. The following day Mr. Josiah Gumede, a former diplomat and a retired school teacher from Matabeleland who was backed by Bishop Muzorewa, was elected by the House of Assembly as the first President of the new State of Zimbabwe Rhodesia; Reverend Sithole and the ZANU MPs boycotted the proceedings.81 75

The Herald, May 1, 1979. The Herald, May 2, 1979. 77 The Herald, May 3, 1979. 78 The Herald, May 8, 1979. 79 The Herald, May 9, 1979. 80 The Herald, May 28, 1979. 81 The Herald, May 29, 1979. 76

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On 29 May, 1979 Mr. Gumede took the oath of office before Chief Justice Hector Macdonald and the Prime Minister-Elect, Bishop Muzorewa, was sworn into office by Mr. Gumede at a ceremony attended by more than 200 guests and journalists at Government House; Reverend Sithole and the ZANU MPs boycotted the ceremony.82 Announcing his Cabinet on 30 May, 1979 Bishop Muzorewa took over the key portfolios of Combined Operations and Defence while Dr. Silas Mundawarara was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism. Ten Ministers in the 17-member Cabinet belonged to the UANC, five to the Rhodesia Front and two to the United National Federal Party. The former Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, was appointed Minister Without Portfolio while the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. P. K. van der Byl, was appointed Minister of Transport and Posts; Mr. David Smith retained his post as Minister of Finance while Mr. Chris Andersen was appointed Minister of Justice. Mr. Francis Zindoga was appointed Minister of Law and Order and of the Public Service while Mr. Ernest Bulle retained his post as Minister of Commerce and Industry; the veteran nationalist and former detainee, Mr. George Nyandoro, was appointed Minister of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development; the UANC Publicity and Information Secretary, Mr. David Mukome, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief Kayisa Ndiweni of the United National Federal Party, was appointed Minister of Mines and Works.83 On 1 June, 1979 the new state of Zimbabwe Rhodesia was born amid controversy about its legitimacy. In a radio and television address to the nation, the new Prime Minister, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, appealed for unity among all races, black and white.84

Major Developments, May-July, 1979 Opposition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to recognition of Bishop Muzorewa’s regime and the lifting of sanctions, crystallized before the birth of Zimbabwe Rhodesia on 1 June, 1979. On 22 May, 1979 the OAU warned those nations which were tempted to recognize Bishop Muzorewa’s regime that recognition of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government would not end the war; a statement released in Dar

82

The Herald, May 30, 1979. The Herald, May 31, 1978. 84 The Herald, June 2, 1979. 83

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es Salaam said the war would not stop until the black majority achieved real power in Zimbabwe.85 On 29 May, 1979, the OAU warned Britain and the United States in particular against recognition of Bishop Muzorewa’s regime. In a statement, the OAU expressed its concern about moves in London and Washington to lift sanctions on Zimbabwe Rhodesia. On the same day, in ‘a sharp warning’ to Britain and the United States, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (see photo) said recognition of Bishop Muzorewa’s regime and lifting of sanctions would be ‘a very serious matter’ and tantamount to ‘a declaration of war’ on the Patriotic Front and their host countries, Zambia and Mozambique. In a dire foreboding of the long-range consequences, he said lifting sanctions would prolong the war. He described the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government as cosmetics: ‘I still hope the United States and Britain will want to get to the heart of the problem and not settle for cosmetics; it will only polarize the situation’. 86 On 3 June, 1979 the Foreign Ministers of the Frontline States expressed their concern at apparent moves by the British Conservative Government and the United States Senate towards recognition of the new regime and possible lifting of sanctions on Zimbabwe Rhodesia; they said such actions would ‘seriously jeopardize relations between those countries and independent African States’.87 These series of warnings from the OAU, from President Nyerere and from the Foreign Ministers of the Frontline States in addition to his own commitment to human rights, led President Jimmy Carter to announce on 7 June, 1979 that he would not lift sanctions on Zimbabwe Rhodesia. In a statement he personally read to reporters, President Carter stated firstly, that he was absolutely convinced that the best interests of the United States would not be served by lifting sanctions. Secondly, he was equally convinced that the best interests of the people of Zimbabwe Rhodesia would not be served by the lifting of sanctions. Thirdly, although the actual voting in the April elections appeared to have been administered in ‘a reasonably fair way’ under the circumstances, the elections were held under a constitution which was drafted by and then submitted only to the white minority; the black citizens who constituted 96 per cent of the population of Zimbabwe Rhodesia never had a chance to vote for or against the constitution under which the elections were held. Fourthly, the Constitution preserved ‘extraordinary power’ for the 4 per cent white minority; it gave this small minority vastly disproportionate numbers of 85

The Herald, May 23, 1979. The Washington Post, May 30, 1979. 87 The Herald, June 4, 1979. 86

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seats in the country’s parliament; it gave this 4 per cent continued control over the army, the police, the judiciary and the civil service and it also let the 4 per cent minority exercise a veto over any significant constitutional reform. Finally, the internal representatives of the opposing political parties were banned from the elections and were therefore unable to participate in the political process; they were prohibited from holding meetings and political rallies and were also prevented from advertising their views in the news media. For these reasons, he could not conclude that the elections were fair or free. 88 Because the elections were not free or fair, he decided to retain sanctions on Zimbabwe Rhodesia. On the domestic front, Bishop Muzorewa’s former first Vice President, Mr. James Chikerema, announced on 20 June, 1979 that he and seven other Members of Parliament had formed a new political party, the Zimbabwe Democratic Party, because of ‘nepotism, tribalism and dictatorship’ in the UANC leadership.89 The defection of Mr. Chikerema and his associates reduced the UANC seats in Parliament from 51 to 43 making Bishop Muzorewa’s government a minority government which could only rule at the sufferance of Mr. Smith and the Rhodesia Front. On 8 July, 1979 Bishop Muzorewa left for the United States at the invitation of Senator Jesse Helms, a well- known supporter of white Rhodesia. At an unscheduled meeting at Camp David on 11 July, 1979 President Carter told Bishop Muzorewa that the United States would support the British Government in seeking an end to the guerrilla war and expressed his sincere desire to see an end to the bitterness and bloodshed in Zimbabwe Rhodesia; he said he was convinced that peace could be achieved by the establishment of a broad-based government responsive to the legitimate aspirations of all the people of Zimbabwe Rhodesia.90 After the meeting with President Carter and with 30 members of the House of Representatives, Bishop Muzorewa left for London for talks with the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher. After an hour-long meeting with Mrs. Thatcher on 13 July, 1979 Bishop Muzorewa told reporters that the meeting had gone ‘very well’; the Foreign Secretary, Lord Peter Carrington, who also attended the meeting, concurred and said the meeting was part of a continuing process of consultation. 91 On his return home on 15 July, 1979 Bishop Muzorewa told reporters he was confident after his wide-ranging talks with President Carter, with 88 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, June 7, 1979, (U. S. GPO, 1980), 1012-1013. 89 The Herald, June 21, 1979. 90 The Herald, July 12, 1979. 91 The Herald, July 14, 1979.

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members of the United States House of Representatives and with Mrs. Thatcher that Britain and the United States would lift sanctions on Zimbabwe Rhodesia and recognize the new Government within the next three months.92 In the event, this confidence was misplaced.

The search for a ceasefire and an end to the war, March-July, 1979 As stated earlier, in May, 1978 the guerrillas rejected the Executive Council’s call for a ceasefire. In spite of this, Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole, like the proverbial ostrich, continued to bury their heads in the sand by insisting that most of the guerrillas were no longer interested in continuing the war because the Salisbury agreement had achieved what they had been fighting for. They appealed to the guerrillas to lay down their arms and return home in peace and that those who were prepared to take advantage of this offer, would receive a general amnesty; they not only claimed that the guerrilla war had declined but also that there were significant defections from the guerrilla forces. The Director of the CIO, Mr. Ken Flower, disputed the claims by Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole that most of the guerrillas were no longer interested in continuing the war because the internal settlement had achieved what they had been fighting for. On 13 March, 1979 he told a meeting of the Executive Council that on the contrary, the security situation had deteriorated almost beyond repair and that ZANLA had nearly 21,000 trained men at its disposal while ZIPRA had about 20,000 with an additional 18,000 recruits waiting in Botswana to be moved to Zambia for military training. The Commander of Combined Operations, Lieutenant General Peter Walls also disputed the claims by Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole that the ‘terrorist threat’ had declined and that there were significant defections from the ‘terrorist ranks’. On 9 May, 1979 he told a meeting of the Executive Council that the number of ZIPRA and ZANLA ‘terrorists’ entering the country was increasing; there were few defections from the ‘terrorist ranks’ and no response to the amnesty offer. 93 In spite of this bleak assessment of the security situation, Bishop Muzorewa continued to pursue his amnesty offer to the guerrillas. On 7 June, 1979 he established an Amnesty Directorate to

92 93

The Herald, July 16, 1979. Flower, Serving Secretly, 221-223.

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ensure that details of the Government’s offer were made known to the guerrillas.94 In a renewed amnesty offer to the guerrillas in a nation-wide amnesty appeal broadcast in Shona, Ndebele and English on 22 July, 1979 Bishop Muzorewa urged the guerrillas to lay down their arms and return home ‘in safety and true freedom’ and said the Government had designed a rehabilitation programme to integrate returning guerrillas into normal life. 95 In another amnesty campaign on 24 July, 1979 the Government distributed thousands of leaflets in Shona, Ndebele and English urging the guerrillas to lay down their arms and return home in peace. 96 The guerrillas rejected the amnesty offer and continued to gain more territory. In his memoirs Mr. Smith states that on 17 July, 1979 the Security Council Report to Cabinet stressed the ineffectiveness of the Government in dealing with the ‘terrorist threat’. On 2 August, 1979 in a long discussion with Bishop Muzorewa, he stressed the seriousness of the security situation and warned him that the Government was not gaining ground; if anything, the reverse was true. He said it was becoming obvious that the Government was not succeeding in containing ‘terrorism’; the black leaders had not been able to deliver the goods, to fulfill their undertaking that once a black government was installed, the ‘terrorists’ would come to their side. Instead, they were competing for support among the various ‘terrorist groups’ including running down their opponents and creating uncertainty and suspicion in people’s minds; a united front would have averted this: ‘The culmination of these events led to the erosion of confidence among our security forces and placing us in a position where we had lost half of our effective fighting force and thus were unable to cover the ground effectively. Because of this, our security forces gradually became less effective and from a position where they had always been in complete control, with the terrorists constantly on the run, they had to concede that in certain areas, their presence was inadequate, and, although the terrorists beat a hasty retreat as soon as the warning was given, for much of the time, they were in control’.97 A new political solution to end the war was the subject of a heated debate at the Commonwealth conference which opened in Lusaka, Zambia, on 1 August, 1979.

94

The Herald, June 8, 1979. The Herald, July 23, 1979. 96 The Herald, July 25, 1979. 97 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 311-312. 95

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The Lusaka Commonwealth Conference, August, 1979 Arriving in Lusaka on the eve of the conference, Australia’s Prime Minister, Mr. Malcolm Fraser, said the changes which had taken place in Zimbabwe Rhodesia were insufficient to merit recognition of the new regime. When asked what more Zimbabwe Rhodesia should do, he said the capacity of the white minority to block constitutional change had to be removed: this was a feature of no other constitution in the world. When the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, (see photo) arrived for the conference, the Chairman of the Frontline States, President Nyerere held ‘a council of war’ with his colleagues-President Samora Machel of Mozambique, Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, Agostinho Neto of Angola and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia-to plan a strategy to block Mrs. Thatcher’s apparent intention to lift sanctions on Zimbabwe Rhodesia.98 In his opening address on Zimbabwe Rhodesia on 3 August, 1979 President Nyerere conceded that since the last meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government in 1977 there had been a political change in Rhodesia: there was now a majority of black faces in the Salisbury Parliament, there was now a black Prime Minister and a black President but the change, although very visible, was more cosmetic than real; consequently, it did nothing to bring the war to an end. He said a democratic constitution and internationally-supervised elections were essential if the war in Rhodesia was to be brought to an end quickly and by other than military victory. The war would not be brought to an end by lifting sanctions on Rhodesia before a democratically-elected government had been brought into existence; the effect of such action would be to make the war more prolonged, more racialist and more internationalized; if the conference failed to provide a democratic alternative, the war would continue until the nationalists had won a military victory, however long it would take. 99 In reply, Mrs. Thatcher stated firstly that from her consultations with other Commonwealth Governments, it was clear that the Constitution under which Bishop Muzorewa had come to power was defective in certain important respects and in particular the clauses which enabled the white minority to block in Parliament, constitutional changes which would be unwelcome to them; such a blocking mechanism had not appeared in any other independence constitution agreed to by the British Parliament. 98

The Herald, August 1, 1979. For the full text of President Nyerere’s opening address at the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference, see Anthony Verrier, The Road to Zimbabwe, 18901980, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1986), 246-248. 99

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Secondly, although it was important to give some guaranteed representation for minority communities in Zimbabwe Rhodesia during a certain minimum period following the transfer of power on independence to encourage them to remain and continue to play a useful part in the life of the community, it was a very different matter from enabling them to block all change. Thirdly, the criticism relating to the composition and powers of various service commissions was also valid; it was clearly wrong to deprive the Government of adequate control over certain senior appointments.100 In a statement on Zimbabwe Rhodesia on 6 August, 1979 the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government agreed that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict; independence on the basis of majority rule would require the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities; the Government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers; a major objective of the conference was to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement.101 Mrs. Thatcher said the twin aims of the Commonwealth peace plan were to stop the war in Zimbabwe Rhodesia and to achieve an internationallyrecognized settlement; she added that one of the advantages of the Commonwealth peace plan for Zimbabwe Rhodesia drafted by six Commonwealth leaders and later endorsed by a full gathering of the 41nation summit, was that it had the backing of the Frontline States. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Malcolm Fraser, said the Lusaka Accord should enable the parties concerned to carry the matter forward; the Commonwealth conference had established the impetus and the thrust which, if continued, must assuredly advance Zimbabwe to peace. The Jamaican Prime Minister, Mr. Michael Manley, concurred and said it was now up to the parties themselves to work out the details such as the composition of the security forces during the transitional period.102 On 10 August, 1979 in light of the Lusaka Accord, the British Government announced that it would call an all-party conference on 100

For full text of Mrs. Thatcher’s speech at that conference, see Verrier, The Road to Zimbabwe, 315-318. 101 The full text of the Commonwealth Agreement on Rhodesia issued in Lusaka, Zambia on 6 August, 1979, was reproduced in Journal of Southern African Affairs, (JSAA), Vol. IV, No.4, October, 1979, 402. 102 The Herald, August 7, 1979.

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Zimbabwe Rhodesia to be chaired by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, and would soon despatch invitations. The announcement followed a Cabinet meeting in London at which Mrs. Thatcher won approval for her new settlement initiative on Zimbabwe Rhodesia; a spokesman for Mrs. Thatcher’s office said the meeting agreed to call a constitutional conference and to send out invitations to the conference as soon as possible.103 On 14 August, 1979 the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, formally invited Bishop Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front leaders to appoint a delegation of up to 12 members each to attend a constitutional conference to be held at Lancaster House in London. Lord Carrington’s letter of invitation stated firstly, that the purpose of the conference would be to discuss and reach agreement on the terms of an independence constitution. Secondly, the military questions associated with a transition to legal independence would be discussed once the terms of an independence constitution had been agreed upon. Thirdly, the proposals attached to the invitations represented in outline the kind of constitution which the British Government believed should be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia and on the basis of which the British Government would be prepared to grant legal independence. The British Government was ready to consider granting independence on the basis of alternative proposals, put forward by any of the parties on which the parties themselves were able to reach agreement.104 The British proposals stated that for a specified minimum period after independence, the House of Assembly would contain a minority of seats reserved for representatives of the European community; the proportion of these seats to the total number of seats in the House of Assembly would be a matter for discussion between the British Government and the Zimbabwe Rhodesian parties. The constitution would protect the independence of the judiciary and the pension rights of public servants; a jusiticiable Bill of Rights would protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.105 In a joint statement in Dar es Salaam on 20 August, 1979 the leaders of the Patriotic Front, Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Robert Mugabe, while accepting the invitation to attend the Zimbabwe Rhodesia peace conference in London, stated that by accepting the invitation the Patriotic Front must clearly be understood to have done nothing more than indicate 103

The Herald, August 11, 1979. For the full text, see Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 4, October, 1979, 404. 105 The Herald, August 15, 1979. 104

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its willingness to negotiate a solution; they rejected the proposed constitutional framework which had, as its basis the illegal internal settlement constitution. 106 The Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government also accepted the invitation to attend the Lancaster House conference which opened in London on 10 September, 1979.

Summary and Conclusions This Chapter has focused on the major developments in Rhodesia from the Salisbury agreement to the opening of the Lancaster House Conference (1978-1979) and in particular the response to the major provisions of the Salisbury agreement (March-April, 1978); the major developments (March-April, 1978); the dismissal from the Transitional Government of the joint Minister of Justice, Law and Order and of the Public Service, Mr. Byron Hove, and its aftermath (April-May, 1978); the Transitional Government’s call for a ceasefire and the Patriotic Front’s response; the major developments (September-November, 1978); the impact of the war on Salisbury (11-20 November, 1978); the major developments (JanuaryJuly, 1979) and in particular the major provisions of the Draft Constitution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia; Mr. Smith’s campaign for acceptance of the Draft Constitution by white voters in a referendum held on 30 January, 1979 and the results of the referendum; the debate in the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Parliament on the Draft Constitution (February, 1979); the response abroad to the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Constitution; the ‘majorityrule’ election (April, 1979) and its aftermath; the major developments (May-July, 1979); the Lusaka Commonwealth conference (August, 1979) and the opening of the Lancaster House conference in London on 10 September, 1979. Most of the criticisms of the Salisbury agreement centred round the entrenched clauses in the agreement and in particular the provision which guaranteed security of tenure to white civil servants who were part and parcel of the oppressive machinery which had sustained UDI against the overwhelming opposition of the African people and the allocation of 28 per cent of the seats in the House of Assembly to a white minority who comprised 3 per cent of the population. In spite of the criticisms of the Salisbury agreement, on 21 March, 1978 Bishop Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole and Chief Chirau were sworn

106 NAZ, MS 589/6/3, The Patriotic Front at the Lancaster House Conference, A Statement of the Political Position of the Patriotic Front, 20 August, 1979, 1-2.

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into office as members of the four-man Executive Council of the Transitional Government. The inherent contradictions in the internal settlement agreement were thrown into sharp relief when on 28 April, 1978 the Executive Council of the Transitional Government fired the joint Minister of Justice, Law and Order and of the Public Service, Mr. Byron Hove, for advocating changes in the Public Service as a whole and the Judiciary and the Police Force in particular. In spite of the dismissal of Mr. Hove, the UANC National Executive said the party would not withdraw from the Transitional Government. The decision to stay in the Transitional Government ‘in the interests of the country and the people’ was to cost the party much of its support among the rank and file. In order to extirpate ‘the scourge of terrorism from Rhodesia’, the interim regime declared martial law over specified areas of Rhodesia and extended martial law to other specified areas of Rhodesia in September, October and November, 1978. The declaration of martial law and the extension of martial law to specified areas of Rhodesia failed to contain the tide of the war, let alone to defeat the guerrillas. In response to the proclamation and extension of martial law the guerrillas brought the war to Salisbury when their rockets hit the fuel storage tanks in the city’s industrial sites on 11 December, 1978 with devastating results on the economy. The failure to arrange a ceasefire with the guerrillas did not deter the interim regime from unveiling a draft constitution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia in January, 1979. In a referendum held on 30 January, 1979 the white electorate voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Draft Constitution under which whites would continue to control the major pillars of state power after independence. In spite of the criticism of the Draft Constitution by African Members of Parliament, the House of Assembly passed the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Constitution Bill on 20 February, 1979. For reasons already explained, the new Constitution was denounced, among others, by the former Secretary of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, Sister Janice McLaughlin, by the State Department and by Mr. Robert Mugabe. In spite of the criticisms of the new Constitution, it was on the basis of this flawed Constitution that the internal black leaders began to campaign for the April, 1979 elections. The biggest loser in the election, the Reverend Sithole, in an effort to explain his party’s disastrous performance in the election, claimed that there had been ‘gross irregularities’ in the election and appealed to his colleagues in the Executive Council to immediately investigate the ‘gross irregularities’ in the election. When his colleagues refused to do so, he and

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the ZANU MPs refused to take their seats in Parliament; boycotted the swearing in of the new Members of Parliament and of Mr. Josiah Gumede as President and Bishop Muzorewa as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia and planned to take his case to the High Court. In the end, for reasons best known to himself, Reverend Sithole did not take up ZANU’s complaints to the High Court. On 1 June, 1979 Zimbabwe Rhodesia was born amid controversy about its legitimacy. For reasons already explained, President Jimmy Carter announced on 7 June, 1979 that he would retain sanctions on Zimbabwe Rhodesia. In July, 1979 Bishop Muzorewa’s regime made several attempts to arrange a ceasefire by offering amnesty to the guerrillas; the latter not only rejected the calls for a ceasefire and the offer of amnesty but continued to gain more territory; it was clear that a new political solution was needed to end the war which was rapidly engulfing Rhodesia. The Lusaka Commonwealth conference held in August, 1979 in seeking a democratic alternative to the war, agreed that a lasting settlement in Zimbabwe Rhodesia must involve all parties to the conflict; independence on the basis of majority rule would require the adoption of a democratic constitution with appropriate safeguards for minorities; the Government formed under such a constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers. In light of the Lusaka Accord, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, formally invited the Patriotic Front leaders and the representatives of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government to attend a constitutional conference which opened at Lancaster House in London on 10 September, 1979.

CHAPTER NINE FROM LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE TO INDEPENDENCE, 1979-1980

Introduction This Chapter examines the major developments from the Lancaster House conference to Zimbabwe’s Independence (1979-1980) and in particular the opening speeches at the conference; the British constitutional proposals for an independent Zimbabwe; the response of the Patriotic Front and of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia delegations to the British constitutional proposals; the transitional arrangements; the appointment of Lord Christopher Soames as interim Governor of Rhodesia; the British proposals for a ceasefire and the Patriotic Front’s response; the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement and of the Constitutional Agreement; the campaign for the independence election (January-February, 1980); the Independence election and its aftermath (March-April, 1980).

The Opening Speeches at the Conference In his opening address on 10 September, 1979 the Chairman of the conference, Lord Carrington, appealed to the delegates to approach the negotiations in a positive spirit and to seek to build up areas of agreement and said the constitutional proposals he had sent to the delegates before the conference, represented in outline the kind of constitution on the basis of which the British Government would be prepared to grant legal independence. The following day the ZAPU leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, on behalf of the Patriotic Front, stated that the task of the conference was to ensure through an indivisible comprehensive agreement the irreversible transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe through free and fair elections. In his opening address at the conference, Bishop Muzorewa argued firstly that the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government had satisfied the six principles which successive British Governments had insisted must be

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fulfilled before the country could achieve legal independence: (a) unimpeded progress to majority rule must be maintained and guaranteed; (b) there must be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution; (c) there must be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; (d) there must be progress towards ending racial discrimination; (e) the constitutional proposals must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole and (f) there must be no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority. Secondly, Zimbabwe Rhodesia had fulfilled the six principles required for legal independence: universal adult suffrage had been introduced and accepted and could not be reversed; majority rule was enshrined in the new Constitution; racial discrimination had been abolished; the new Constitution had been accepted by the people of Zimbabwe Rhodesia as a whole; there was no longer oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority. He said in light of these developments, the British Government had an obligation to recognize the new Government, lift sanctions and grant legal independence to Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

The British Constitutional Proposals for an independent Zimbabwe Under the British proposals, any person who, immediately before the appointed day, was or was deemed to be a citizen of Zimbabwe Rhodesia by birth, descent or registration would, on and after that day, be a citizen of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, any person who, on the appointed day, was a citizen of Zimbabwe or entitled to be registered as such and was also a citizen of some other country or entitled to be registered as such, would not, on or after that day, solely on the ground that he was or became a citizen of that other country, be: (a) deprived of his Zimbabwe citizenship, (b) refused registration as a citizen of Zimbabwe or (c) required to renounce his citizenship of that country, by or under any law. The proposals contained a Declaration of Rights including protection of the right to life, to personal liberty, protection from slavery and forced labour, from inhuman treatment, from deprivation of property, from arbitrary search or entry, protection of the law, of freedom of conscience, of expression, of assembly and association, of movement and protection from racial discrimination. Of the Declaration of Rights, the most controversial related to protection from deprivation of property which stated that no property of any description or interest or right therein would be compulsorily acquired except under the authority of a law that-(a) required the acquiring

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authority to give reasonable notice of the intention to acquire the property, interest, or right therein to any person owning the property or having any other interest or right therein that would be affected by such acquisition; (b) required that the acquisition was reasonably necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, morality, public health, town and country planning, the utilization of that or any other property for a purpose beneficial to the public generally or to any section thereof or in the case of underutilized land, the settlement of land for agricultural purposes; (c) required the acquiring authority to pay promptly adequate compensation for the acquisition; (d) required the acquiring authority, if the acquisition was contested, to apply to the General Division of the High Court or some other court before, or not later than thirty days after the acquisition and (e) enabled any claimant for compensation to apply to the General Division of the High Court or some other court for the prompt return of the property if the court did not confirm the acquisition. The proposals provided for a ceremonial President as Head of State, an executive Prime Minister and Parliament consisting of the Senate and the House of Assembly. Under the proposals the Senate would consist of 40 members of whom: (a) 10 would be elected by an electoral college composed of white members of the House of Assembly; 14 would be elected by an electoral college composed of African members of the House of Assembly; (c) 10 would be elected by the Council of Chiefs of whom (i) five would represent Mashonaland and (ii) five would represent Matabeleland; 6 members would be nominated by the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. The House of Assembly would consist of 100 members of whom 80 would be elected by voters registered on the common roll for 80 common roll constituencies and 20 would be elected by voters registered on the white roll for 20 white roll constituencies. Under the proposals, there would be a High Court of Zimbabwe headed by the Chief Justice and consisting of the Appellate Division and the General Division. The Chief Justice would be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister; judges of the High Court would be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. A person would not qualify for appointment as a judge of the High Court unless- (a) he was or had been a judge of a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil or criminal matters in a country in which the common law was Roman-Dutch and English was an official language; (b) he was or had been for not less than seven years qualified to practise as an

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advocate-(i) in Zimbabwe or (ii) in a country in which the common law was Roman- Dutch and English was an official language. The proposals provided for the appointment of a Public Service Commission consisting of a chairman and not less than two and not more than four other members appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister; of the members appointed by the President, the chairman and at least one member was required to have held the post of Secretary or Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary in a Ministry or a post in the Public Service of a grade equivalent to, or higher than, that of Under Secretary for periods which in the aggregate amounted to at least five years. Under the proposals there would be a Judicial Service Commission consisting of the Chief Justice, the chairman of the Public Service Commission and two other members appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister; of the members appointed by the President, at least one was required to have been a judge of the High Court or was, or had been for not less than seven years qualified to practise as an advocate or attorney in Zimbabwe. The proposals provided for the establishment of a Police Service Commission consisting of a chairman (who would be chairman of the Public Service Commission) and not less than two and not more than four other members appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister; of the members appointed by the President, at least one was required to have held the rank of Assistant Commissioner or any more senior rank in the Police Force for periods which in the aggregate amounted to at least five years. Under the proposals there would be a Defence Forces Service Commission consisting of a chairman and not less than two, and not more than four, other members appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister; of the members appointed by the President, at least one was required to have held the rank of Colonel in the Army or Group Captain in the Air Force or any more senior rank in the Defence Forces for periods which in the aggregate amounted to at least five years. The proposals permitted any person entitled to receive a pension and was not ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe to have his pension remitted to him outside Zimbabwe.

The Response of the Patriotic Front leaders to the British Constitutional Proposals The Patriotic Front leaders rejected the proposal to grant automatic citizenship to all persons who were granted citizenship between UDI and

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legal independence on the ground that this was an attempt to force a future government to accept as citizens people who came to Rhodesia after UDI in order to support the rebellion by serving in the army, the police force, the prison service and the civil service; this would create a serious security problem for the future government. They rejected the principle of dual citizenship on the ground that a person could not at one and the same time be loyal to Zimbabwe and to a hostile state such as South Africa and proposed that dual citizens should, within one year, elect which citizenship to retain. They argued firstly that the proposal to make the principal provisions in the Declaration of Rights unamendable for 10 years except by a unanimous vote of the House of Assembly, was without precedent in Commonwealth independence constitutions; it would place intolerable restrictions on the sovereignty of the Parliament of Zimbabwe; the Government would be unable to respond to legitimate popular demands; it would effectively grant a veto to the minority and would undermine the very spirit of reconciliation which Britain had repeatedly stressed. Secondly, the basic objective of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was the recovery of the land of which the people were dispossessed; the new Government therefore must have the right to acquire any land in the public interest. Thirdly, the proposal to permit the remittance to any country outside Zimbabwe of compensation paid for land acquired from a citizen or permanent resident would encourage citizens and permanent residents to expatriate their capital with potentially disastrous consequences for the economy. Fourthly, the proposal that the Chairman and one other member of the Public Service Commission must have held a senior rank in the Public Service, was designed to ensure that two members of the Commission consisting of a minimum of three and a maximum of five members, would be drawn from the existing Public Service which had supported UDI. Fifthly, the concept of a Defence Forces Commission was without precedent in Commonwealth independence constitutions. Finally, the principle of separate white representation in Parliament would perpetuate racism and the proposal to make reserved white representation in Parliament unamendable for seven years was excessive.1 In the end they accepted under protest the British constitutional proposals for an independent Zimbabwe. In a Press Statement on 17 December, 1979 they said they were aware of the shortcomings of the British constitutional 1 Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, September-December, 1979.

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proposals but believed that they were a sound basis on which to build a truly democratic society in Zimbabwe.2

The Response of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia delegation to the British proposals In his memoirs, Mr. Smith states that he and three other members of the Rhodesia Front in the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government delegation had pressed for stronger safeguards for minorities in order to create the necessary confidence to encourage them to remain in the country and continue to provide their professionalism, experience and skills. After much discussion, the Zimbabwe Rhodesia delegation voted eleven to one in favour of the British constitutional proposals. Mr. Smith cast the lone vote against the British constitutional proposals; among those who voted for the British proposals was the former Minister of Finance, Mr. David Smith. After the vote, he asked Mr. David Smith to account for what he had done and without hesitation, he replied that for some time he had second thoughts and after giving the question deep consideration, his conscience dictated that he should vote in support of the proposals.3 With the acceptance of the British proposals by both sides, the British Government made transitional arrangements.

The Transitional Arrangements The British transitional arrangements provided for the appointment of a British Governor for Rhodesia under an Order in Council conferring on him executive and legislative authority; the Governor would be assisted by a Military Adviser, a Police Adviser, a Legal Adviser and a Political Adviser and other supporting staff to enable him to discharge his functions effectively. In the day-to- day administration of the country, the Governor would work through the existing Public Service. The Order in Council providing for the establishment of the office of Governor would serve as the interim Constitution of Rhodesia. Once the Governor had arrived in Rhodesia and his authority had been accepted, he would assume responsibility for the Government of Rhodesia. All political parties would be required to commit themselves to campaign peacefully for the election; 2

National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), MS 589/6/3, The Patriotic Front at Lancaster House Conference, Patriotic Front Statement, 17 December, 1979. 3 Ian Douglas Smith, The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith, (London, Blake Publishing, 1997), 319-320.

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Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues would be prohibited from exercising ministerial functions during the transition. The transitional arrangements also provided for the appointment of a British Election Commissioner whose specific responsibilities were to supervise the elections directly or through members of his staff and to receive any complaint concerning the conduct of the election and to investigate and take action on any such complaint. Under the transitional arrangements the British Government would request Commonwealth Governments to send observers to monitor the election to ensure that it was genuinely free and fair; no restrictions would be placed upon their movements and every effort would be made to facilitate their task. According to the transitional arrangements, the Governor would set aside three consecutive days for polling to take place and would be responsible for all aspects of the conduct of the election; he would fix a date on which political parties wishing to contest the election should apply for registration, name each electoral district for which they wished to be registered and provide a list of the candidates whom they wished to nominate for each electoral district. Each party presenting candidates for the election would be entitled to have one representative at each polling station in the district concerned to observe the polling. The Election Commissioner and his staff would be required to make sample checks on polling stations throughout the country; the Governor would be responsible for providing adequate security at polling stations and the security of the ballot boxes. The parties to the negotiations reached agreement on transitional arrangements on 15 November, 1979.

The British Proposals for a Ceasefire The British ceasefire proposals stated that with effect from ten days after the signing of the Constitutional Agreement, all movements by personnel of the Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia and all cross-border military activity by the Rhodesian forces would cease. A ceasefire commission under the chairmanship of the Governor’s Military Adviser and consisting of equal numbers of the representatives of the Military Commanders of both sides would meet as required throughout the ceasefire. The functions of the Ceasefire Commission would include: (a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces and (b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the ceasefire. A monitoring force under the command of the Governor’s Military Adviser would assess and monitor impartially all

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stages of the inception and maintenance of the ceasefire by the forces and assist the Ceasefire Commission in its tasks. The Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces would be required to co-operate fully with the monitoring force. Elements of the monitoring force would be assigned: (a) to maintain contact with the command structures of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces throughout Rhodesia; (b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the ceasefire by the respective forces and (c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points. Members of the monitoring force would carry weapons for their personal protection only and would be provided with vehicles and aircraft carrying a distinctive marking; the force would be equipped with an independent radio communications network and would be deployed to the command structure and bases of the Rhodesian forces and to assembly points and rendezvous positions designated for the Patriotic Front forces. The Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia would be required to report with their arms and equipment to rendezvous positions and would proceed thereafter to assembly points. The process of assembly would take place under the direction of the Commanders of the Patriotic Front forces and under the auspices of the monitoring force. There would be reciprocal disengagement by the Rhodesian forces in relation to the successful accomplishment of the assembly process by the Patriotic Front forces. The primary responsibility for dealing with the breaches of the ceasefire would rest with the Commanders of the forces through the Ceasefire Commission and with the assistance of the monitoring force. An attachment to the above ceasefire proposals dated 22 November, 1979 said the purpose of the ceasefire was to bring an immediate end to hostilities to enable the people of Zimbabwe to choose their future government and to achieve independence on the terms which had been agreed at the conference. The Australian, New Zealand, Kenyan and Fijian Governments agreed to participate in the monitoring force; up to fifteen assembly points would be designated for the purpose. In addition, a larger number of intermediate collection points would be designated to which the Patriotic Front personnel would report with their arms and equipment during the initial phase of the ceasefire and from which they would make their way by agreed safe routes to the assembly points. A Patriotic Front representative and a monitoring team would be present at each intermediate collection point during this phase; the Patriotic Front personnel would be guaranteed safe passage from the collection points to the assembly points. As soon as a ceasefire agreement had been reached, all parties would be required to issue instructions

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forthwith to their forces for its implementation. Elements of the monitoring force would be despatched to Rhodesia and would be deployed to collection points and assembly points of the Patriotic Front forces. The process of assembly of the forces should begin immediately and should take no more than seven days. The commanders on each side would be required to issue clear and precise instructions to all units and personnel under their command to comply with the agreed arrangements to bring the ceasefire into effect.4

The Response of the Patriotic Front to the British ceasefire proposals The Patriotic Front leaders in tabling alternative ceasefire proposals, rejected the surrender of areas they already controlled; called for the disarming of white civilians and the establishment of a civil police force and the withdrawal of South African and other military personnel from the country. The British delegation rejected any attempt to demarcate areas of control dominated by one side or the other; to achieve an effective ceasefire, all the national territory must be under the Governor’s control. At a meeting on 26 November, 1979 the Patriotic Front proposed grounding of the Rhodesian Air Force; the establishment of a Commonwealth peace-keeping force composed of states acceptable to both sides and capable of deterring foreign intervention; a Commonwealth ceasefire supervisory commission in addition to the joint ceasefire supervisory machinery; a two-month period to establish a ceasefire; the disbandment of unacceptable elements in the security forces; a demarcation of the areas controlled by both sides; combined police patrols with a Commonwealth element in the areas controlled by either side. At a meeting on 28 November, 1979 Lord Carrington rejected the allocation of zones to each army and grounding the Rhodesian Air Force. He argued that the proposed two-month period to establish a ceasefire was excessive; a Commonwealth supervisory commission was unnecessary while the establishment of a new combined police force with a Commonwealth element was impracticable. At a meeting on 30 November, 1979 the Patriotic Front leaders called for: the withdrawal of the security forces to their bases followed by the assembling of their own forces and the grounding of the Rhodesian Air Force; the expansion of the 4

Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, September-December, 1979, Attachment to Ceasefire Agreement, 22 November, 1979.

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Commonwealth ceasefire monitoring force to include units from Nigeria, India, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guyana and Jamaica; this force should report to the Commonwealth Secretary General as well as to the Governor. After reiterating the British proposals on the disposition of forces, Lord Carrington asked Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe to reconsider their position. On 5 December, 1979 the two leaders accepted the British ceasefire proposals and discussion began the following day on the practical details of the implementation of the ceasefire.5 Although not entirely happy with the British ceasefire proposals which were heavily stacked against the guerrillas and were virtually impossible to implement within the allotted time-scale, ZANLA’s Chief of Defence, General Josiah Tongogara, (see photo) believed it would be wrong to continue fighting when agreement had been reached on the principles he had gone to war to achieve.6 His intervention paved the way for the ultimate agreement on the British ceasefire proposals of a seven-day assembly period to begin one week after the termination of the conference, a total of two weeks for the ceasefire to take effect-much closer to the initial British proposal of no more than ten days than the Patriotic Front’s demand for two months.7 Even after General Tongogara died in a vehicle accident in Mozambique on 25 December, 1979 and was succeeded by his Deputy, Lieutenant General Rex Nhongo, the Ceasefire Agreement continued to hold.

The appointment of Lord Christopher Soames as interim Governor of Rhodesia On 3 December, 1979 Lord Carrington obtained an Order in Council giving the Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, authority to select an individual to serve as Governor of Rhodesia and obtained another Order in Council giving the British Government the legal authority to promulgate the new Constitution. Mrs. Thatcher nominated Lord Arthur Christopher John Soames 8 as the interim Governor of Rhodesia. 5 Henry Wiseman and Alastair M. Taylor, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition, (New York, Pergamon Press, 1981), 11-13. 6 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War, (New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1981), 319. 7 Jeffrey Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979, (Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1984), 82. 8 A Conservative Member of Parliament for Bedford (1950-1966), Soames was Mr. Harold Macmillan’s Secretary of State for War (1958-1960); served as Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1960-1964) under Mr. Macmillan and his successor, Sir Alec Douglas Home; was the British Ambassador to France (1968-

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On 11 December, 1979 with a 75-strong team, Lord Soames left London for Salisbury to take up his post. On the same day, the Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly gave a unanimous Third Reading endorsement of the handover of the country to Lord Soames; the Constitutional Amendment Bill then went to the Senate and from the Senate to President Gumede who signed it into law before the arrival of Lord Soames. Lord Soames arrived in Salisbury in the afternoon of 12 December, 1979. Addressing the nation in the evening, he announced that the British Government had lifted sanctions on Rhodesia and was now looking to other nations to do the same. On the same day the British Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Anthony Parsons, advised the President of the Security Council that the Rhodesian rebellion had ended with the arrival of Lord Soames in Salisbury. Speaking on radio and television only six hours after assuming full executive and legislative authority over Rhodesia, Lord Soames fixed 31 December, 1979 as the last day on which all political parties wishing to contest the election should register; the deadline for registration was contained in a statement issued by the Governor on his arrival at Salisbury airport.9

The signing of the Constitutional Agreement, 21 December, 1979 The Constitutional Agreement for Zimbabwe was signed at noon on 21 December, 1979 (see photo). In a vivid and detailed report, The Herald said it was a day of champagne and handshakes as the leading opponents in the seven-year war turned to the pen rather than the sword to mark a milestone in history. In the ornate 37-metre Grand Gallery in the historic Lancaster House building, 17 weeks of political wrangling came to an end; the agreement to end the war and establish an independent Zimbabwe ruled by a black government was formally signed. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, witnessed her Government’s diplomatic triumph. The aquamarine-coloured leather-covered copies of the agreement were 1972); Vice President of the European Commission (1973-1976); was created a life peer becoming Baron Soames of Fletching in the county of Essex (1978); was appointed interim Governor of Rhodesia (December, 1979-April, 1980); served as Conservative Leader in the House of Lords and thus a Minister in Mrs. Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet concurrent with his duties as interim Governor of Rhodesia (1979-1981). For details, see Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia, 14 June, 2007. 9 The Herald, December 13, 1979.

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decorated with gilt illumination and the Royal Crest. The British team was the first to sign with special silver, fiber-tipped pens. The agreement folders were moved down the line of signatories in a clockwise direction by Foreign Office aides. Mrs. Thatcher sat next to her Defence Minister, Mr. Francis Pym. Senior Foreign Office officials and British ambassadors sat in the same row as Mrs. Thatcher; behind them were Commonwealth High Commissioners, Ambassadors of the European Economic Community and representatives of the Frontline States. The Commander of Combined Operations, Lieutenant General Peter Walls, arrived in plenty of time; with him were the Reverend Sithole, Chief Ndiweni and the Rhodesian Cabinet Secretary, Mr. George Smith. Senior Patriotic Front lieutenants, Mr. Edgar Tekere (ZANU) and Mr. Josiah Chinamano (ZAPU) were among those seated at the left of the main table. Mr. Mugabe shook some hands, including Mr. Sithole’s before mounting the platform and taking his seat. Mr. Nkomo made a point of twice shaking hands with General Walls. Lord Carrington who presided over the proceedings, hailed the agreement as an achievement of vital importance for the whole of southern Africa: ‘If, as a result of a negotiated settlement, wounds so deep can be healed in Rhodesia, then the people of that country will have set an example and given hope to others throughout the world’.10

The campaign for the Independence election On 31 December, 1979 ten political parties lodged notices with the Registrar of Elections, Mr. Eric Pope-Simmonds, of their intention to contest the election. 11 Of these, the major political parties were Bishop Muzorewa’s United African National Council (UANC); Reverend Sithole’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-Sithole), Mr. Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU- PF) and Mr. Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU); a summary of the political platforms of the four major political parties contesting the election, is called for. At a campaign rally at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfield African Township near Salisbury on 6 January, 1980 Bishop Muzorewa said the UANC was the only party with the widest base of support because its membership not only encompassed people of all tribal groups and communities but also represented the various regions of the country: ‘It is the only party capable of bringing about the unification of our nation’. 10 11

The Herald, December 22, 1979. The Herald, January 1, 1980.

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In his address covering a wide range of issues including land, education, health, housing and jobs, Bishop Muzorewa said a UANC government would: introduce and effectively implement a vigorous land reform programme in order to give sufficient and fertile land to the people and to redress the land problem created in the past by successive colonial administrations; provide free primary and secondary education and build more polytechnic and middle level technical institutions to meet the industrial and commercial needs of the nation; expand tertiary education including the University of Zimbabwe through scholarships, grants and loans for students; provide adequate health facilities for all the people including clean water and proper sanitation; make all previously-rented houses available for individual ownership; build low-cost accommodation to ensure that every family would own its own home; create jobs for all the people with equal pay for equal work irrespective of race, tribe, sex, creed or region.12 ZAPU which contested the election under the name ‘Patriotic Front’, put up an elaborate election manifesto covering a wide range of issues including land, jobs, housing, resettlement of displaced persons, education, health, agriculture, rural development, opportunities for young people, wages and salaries of civil servants. The manifesto said a Patriotic Front government would: distribute land fairly to all the people who needed it; through programmes for economic expansion, work towards eliminating unemployment among the people; within the shortest possible time introduce a minimum wage for all workers to enable them to enjoy a good standard of life; ensure that everyone would have a chance of owning or renting a decent home with security of tenure; abolish residential accommodation based on race; assist local government authorities with loans and subsidies for home ownership schemes throughout the country; provide homes for families which had been displaced by the war; assist people who had suffered loss or damage to their property due to their support for the liberation struggle to start a normal life and free and compulsory education for every child up to the age of sixteen; abolish all discrimination in educational institutions and expand the University of Zimbabwe; build more hospitals and clinics in both rural and urban areas within reach of the people; expand ambulance services; establish free milk schemes and/or feeding schemes for children and expectant mothers; establish free nursery centres; provide clean water supplies in the country with piped facilities where possible and develop a 12 The Herald, January 7, 1980. The entire text of Bishop Muzorewa’s speech was subsequently published as an advertisement in The Herald, January 10, 1980.

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more comprehensive national health service; establish agricultural research institutions and colleges; develop People’s Cooperatives and an efficient pricing system; work out a marketing system taking into account the needs of both the producer and the consumer; pursue a vigorous land resettlement, distribution and utilization programme; construct dams and irrigation schemes to improve agriculture and pastoral farming; improve all industrial sectors; build more roads and railways; install postal services within reasonable distance of every home; extend electric power to all rural areas; provide the necessary building materials for the construction of new homes; set up Grain Marketing Depots all over the country and as near as practicable to all grain producers; provide young people with new opportunities for education and apprenticeships; establish a Youth Employment Service to help young people find suitable jobs; provide clubs, sporting facilities, hostels, camp sites, playing fields and swimming pools for young people; ensure that women would enjoy equal rights with men in all respects; raise the wages and salaries of civil servants in line with those of other sectors.13 In his election campaign, Reverend Sithole said ZANU would: bring about reconciliation among all the people of Zimbabwe, economic recovery and prosperity; universalize education; eradicate ignorance, poverty and disease through the combined efforts of Government and the private sector. He said ZANU was the only political party which had made ‘the most critical and the most fundamental contribution’ to the liberation of Zimbabwe; it had demonstrated political maturity and versatility. He added: ‘The ZANU leadership has been thoroughly tested for political vision and dexterity. ZANU is a seasoned Party with wise and principled leadership. Only ZANU can give the black people of Zimbabwe a government sensitive to all their needs’.14 Of the parties contesting the election, ZANU (PF) produced undoubtedly the most comprehensive election manifesto covering a wide range of issues including land and agriculture, industry, education, health, social welfare, housing, social security and Thirteen Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The manifesto said a ZANU (PF) Government would: create a Land and Agricultural Development Fund to facilitate the acquisition of land, land resettlement and agricultural development; acquire as much land from the private sector as would be necessary for the resettlement of the peasants; establish on newly- acquired land collective villages and collective 13

Patriotic Front in Government: Election Manifesto, 1980, 1-24. The entire text of Reverend Sithole’s Election Manifesto was published as an advertisement in The Herald, January 21, 1980. 14

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agriculture; ensure that land for an emergency resettlement and agricultural programme would come from unused or abandoned land, underutilized land and land owned by absentee owners; adopt a uniform policy on agriculture in order to eliminate the distinction and discrimination which had existed between European and African agriculture; combine peasant land holdings to constitute viable collective units on the basis of which State assistance, technical and financial, would be granted; retain but restrict the private sector of agriculture to efficient farmers; promote productivity in the agricultural sector (including African Purchase Areas) in terms of technical aid, loans, grants and subsidies; pay special attention to the needs of both light and heavy industries in terms of investment capital, raw materials and improved technology; maintain a uniform educational system and abolish the distinction between African and European education; provide free and compulsory primary and secondary education for all children regardless of race; abolish sex discrimination in the educational system; strive to ensure that each and every child would have an educational opportunity to develop his or her mental and physical faculties; launch a vast network of technical and vocational schools throughout the country; establish a Zimbabwe Institute of Technology; provide a massive teacher- training programme; expand university education to meet the needs of the nation; run an all- embracing adult education system; abolish the parallel system of hospitals based on race; establish a national health service encompassing the whole country; provide free training for medical and paramedical personnel; run social welfare programmes for destitute, disabled or handicapped people to cater for their physical, intellectual and emotional well-being; pay special attention to the housing of all workers in the urban centres through the Ministry of Housing; work strenuously to improve rural housing by establishing rural housing programmes; establish a state-operated system of social security benefits to cover retirement pensions, sickness and injury on the basis of contribution to schemes for that purpose. ZANU (PF)’s Thirteen Fundamental Rights and Freedoms covered the Right to the Franchise for every citizen; Freedom of Speech, Assembly and Association; Freedom of Religion; The Right to Work and the Right to a Fair Wage; Freedom from Racial Discrimination; Freedom of Person and His Home; The Right to Education; The Right of Women to Equality with Men; The Right to Life; The Right to Rest and Leisure; Freedom from Hunger; The Right to Personal Property and The Right of Recourse to the Courts.15 15

ZANU (PF) Election Manifesto, 1980, 9-15.

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When the ZANU (PF) leader, Mr. Robert Mugabe, accompanied by the Vice President, Mr. Simon Muzenda, and the Deputy Publicity and Information Secretary, Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, arrived at Salisbury airport from Maputo on 27 January, 1980 he pledged that his party would create a truly democratic Zimbabwe in which people of all races would have a place. At an airport news conference he said the last thing ZANU (PF) would want to see would be white Rhodesian refugee camps in South Africa: ‘It would be a failure on our part, a failure of our struggle. We are pledged to the creation of a true democracy based on equality where there won’t be any discrimination on the grounds of race or colour. We have been honest in the struggle, fought gallantly for what we considered to be an honest objective. We will be honest in peace to achieve a society where all will have a place’.16 On 10 February, 1980 Mr. Mugabe survived an attempt on his life-the second in four days- when a heavy explosive charge under a culvert was detonated as the three-car convoy carrying him to Fort Victoria airport, passed over it. The blast occurred at 1.55 p.m. on the airport access road five kilometres from Fort Victoria from where he was returning to Salisbury after addressing a ZANU (PF) rally in Mucheke African Township. Mr. Mugabe who was travelling in the lead car was unscathed but the two back-up cars were damaged and four occupants were treated at Fort Victoria Hospital for minor injuries and shock. 17 Thereafter, his colleagues restricted his election campaign to Salisbury. In an interview, the Deputy Secretary for Publicity and Information and Director of Elections for ZANU (PF), Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, stated: ‘In light of the two attempts on his life, the party leadership decided that it was simply too dangerous for Comrade Mugabe to campaign outside Salisbury; we would campaign on his behalf’.18 On 16 February, 1980 Bishop Muzorewa and his advisers took to the skies in three helicopters for the election campaign.19 It remained to be seen whether in light of his role in the internal settlement, this style of campaigning including sky-shouts and the dropping of leaflets on the target population, would impress ordinary voters in Zimbabwe. On 20 February, 1980 in an open letter to the voters, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole appealed, once again, for reconciliation, unity and peace and stated that unless the diverse human elements in Zimbabwe were

16

The Herald, January 28, 1980. The Herald, February 11, 1980. 18 Interview with Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, 870 Roland Close, Harare, 1 June, 2000. 19 The Sunday Mail, February 17, 1980. 17

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reconciled and committed to national unity and peace, the future of the country would be bleak.20 Addressing supporters on 24 February, 1980 Bishop Muzorewa said the most pressing needs of the nation were reconciliation, peace, unity and reconstruction; the UANC recognized that people needed more land; because there was land in abundance, a UANC government would redistribute land to meet the needs of the people.21 In an open letter to the voters on 29 February, 1980 the ZAPU leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, outlined the role he and ZAPU had played in the liberation of Zimbabwe, of the noble heroes who had died in the war and of ZAPU as the only political party capable of uniting all the people of Zimbabwe: ‘We are the only national, non-tribal party which unites all the sons and daughters of Zimbabwe, irrespective of tribe, race or creed. We have a tried, tested and proved leadership. After the war and all the untold suffering that went with it, we need peace; we need unity; we need reconciliation’.22 It is clear that the four major political parties contesting the election were agreed on the major issues facing the nation: the need for national unity and reconciliation, the need to redistribute land, to improve and expand education, health, housing, to tackle the problem of unemployment; to improve and expand agriculture and industry and to abolish racial discrimination in every facet of life. It was, however, their track record in the liberation of Zimbabwe which in the end mattered most in the minds of the voters. The role played by Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole in the internal settlement was particularly damaging to both leaders in the minds of the voters. As explained in the previous chapter, nothing changed in the lives of ordinary people as a result of the internal settlement. Reverend Sithole’s claims that ZANU was the only political party which had made ‘the most critical and the most fundamental contribution’ to the liberation of Zimbabwe, that its leadership had been ‘thoroughly tested for political vision and dexterity’ and that it was the only political party with ‘wise and principled leadership’, sounded hollow in the minds of many voters. For, if indeed ZANU and its leadership had all these qualities, the party would have shunned the internal settlement; for reasons explained in the previous

20

The Herald, February 20, 1980. The full text of Bishop Muzorewa’s speech was published in The Herald, February 26, 1980. 22 The full text of Mr. Nkomo’s open letter was published in The Herald, February 29, 1980. 21

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chapter, the ZANU leadership saw the internal settlement as an opportunity to climb to power.

The Independence election and its aftermath The voting for the independence election began in the morning on 27 February and ended in the evening on 29 February, 1980. In a prepared statement in response to charges that the election had not been free and fair, the spokesman for Lord Soames, Mr. Nicholas Fenn, stated: ‘Each of us has in our mind an image of an ideal election; no election in the world in any country on earth corresponds precisely to an ideal. The election has been fought in the aftermath of a cruel war, with an imperfect ceasefire and with deep political differences imperfectly resolved. The question to be answered is not whether the election is perfect but whether it constitutes a fair and clear expression of the will of the people of Zimbabwe about the future’.23 Before the vote several observer groups including the Commonwealth Observer Group of 11 members, 20 British Government representatives, 40 unofficial observers from Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands and South Africa, had arrived in Zimbabwe to observe the election. In their terms of reference of 13 December, 1979 the Commonwealth Observer Group had been tasked to observe and report on all relevant aspects of the organization and conduct of the election and to ascertain whether, in their impartial judgment, the election was free and fair; to observe every aspect of the electoral campaign; to consider such issues as freedom of expression, assembly, association and movement with a view to ascertaining whether parties and individuals contesting the election were unfettered in their ability to do so; to observe the conduct of the poll in all its aspects with the right of access to all polling stations and supervising officers and to report their findings to the Commonwealth Heads of Government through the Commonwealth Secretary General.24 In their interim reports on 2 March, 1980 the various observer groups said the election represented ‘an acceptable opportunity’ for Rhodesia’s black electorate to determine the government of their choice; while acknowledging ‘the inherent difficulties’ encountered in the election, they 23

John F. Burns, ‘British Play Down Fraud as Voting in Rhodesia Ends’, The New York Times, February 29, 1980. 24 Henry Wiseman and Alastair M. Taylor, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition, (New York, Pergamon Press), Appendix 1, 150-151.

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concluded that the election had given the country’s estimated 2.8 million voters who cast their votes, a sufficient measure of freedom. In their interim report, the Commonwealth Observer Group said it was their ‘unanimous conclusion’ that the election up to the end of polling, was free and fair. The Commonwealth Secretary General, Sir Shridath Ramphal, in warmly welcoming the report, said it would have great significance for the Commonwealth Governments and the international community as a whole. A statement summarizing the report sent to the British Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, by the 20 British Government observers said all parties had been free to put their case to the people through meetings, canvassing and the use of the public media.25 Before announcing the results of the election, the Government stationed troops in parts of Salisbury as a precautionary measure against the possibility of widespread demonstrations with the potential for violence; amoured vehicles patrolled the streets and air force planes flew low over the city. Three armoured vehicles were parked at one key intersection leading out of the city and dozens of white troops stood guard, their rifles and submachine guns at the ready.26 In the event, no incidents were reported. At midnight on Monday, 3 March, 1980 after the vote, Mr. Nkomo received a telephone call from the Governor’s spokesman, Mr. Nicholas Fenn, informing him that ZAPU had lost the election. Although the vote count was still incomplete, ZANU (PF) had already won more than 50 seats needed for an overall majority in Parliament. Deeply distressed, he telephoned his wife in East Berlin to convey the bad news. At 9 a. m. on March 4, 1980 in a live broadcast, the Registrar of Elections, Mr. Eric Pope-Simmonds, announced that Mr. Mugabe’s ZANU (PF) won 57 of the 80 parliamentary seats reserved for blacks; Mr. Nkomo’s ZAPU won 20 seats; Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC 3 seats while Reverend Sithole’s ZANU failed to win a single seat. Mr. Joshua Nkomo initially accepted but subsequently rejected the results of the election. In a detailed account of the results of the election in his autobiography published in 1984 after he was dismissed from the Government of National Unity, he said the greatest obstacle to the fair conduct of the election came from ZANLA guerrillas in the eastern parts of the country. He claimed that at the ceasefire large numbers of guerrillas loyal to Mr. Mugabe refused to enter the assembly points, stayed on in the 25 26

The Herald, March 3, 1980. The Washington Post, March 4, 1980.

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villages they had organized on a war footing and refused anyone else to campaign there. He urged Lord Soames to postpone up to six months the voting in those areas in which it was not possible to hold free and fair elections because of intimidation. Lord Soames agreed but two days later changed his mind and decided to hold the elections on the scheduled dates even in the disturbed eastern districts. Mr. Nkomo believed that as a result of intimidation, ZAPU was cheated of some seats it could have won, given a fair campaign. He said he was aware of this before the votes were counted but decided against bringing his objections to a head because firstly, to do so would have delayed independence. Secondly, ZANU (PF) would undoubtedly have resisted the claim, probably with violence; there was a real risk that the price of fair elections would have been a civil warthis time between Africans. After the counting of the votes, the British Government transported the used ballot papers to London not to store them as historical documents but to burn them; he said it was difficult to believe that the British would have done so if they had nothing to hide. He said after sleeping off the election results he woke up as firmly convinced as ever that ZAPU had been cheated. He said, however, that in light of the fact that the country had gained its independence after years of sacrifice, any bickering now would have inflamed passions, divided the people and encouraged the enemies waiting on the country’s borders to destabilize the country; for these reasons he and his party had to accept what British officials had told them. He said if he and ZAPU had pressed and won their argument, it was possible that the Governor with the authority of the British Government, would have set aside the results of the election but the prospect that Britain would take control of the country for a year or two or three or five years, was something that neither (PF) ZAPU nor the British would possibly want. His senior party colleagues told him that they were deeply disappointed and angry; some candidates had lost in constituencies in which they knew that a large majority of voters had voted for them. The soldiers in particular were distraught; the ZIPRA commanders had to use every ounce of their personal authority to persuade them to remain quietly in their assembly points throughout the election campaign despite many provocations; now they had to go back to those soldiers and tell them that ZAPU had been cheated but must accept the results of the election; there was no alternative but to swallow the results of the election and trust that the alleged victors would use their triumph generously and in good faith.27

27

Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life, (London, Methuen, 1984), 206-211.

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It has been necessary to dwell on Mr. Nkomo’s sanitized version of the election results because firstly, it was at variance with his statement of 4 March, 1980 in which he accepted the results of the election and urged everyone to do the same: ‘Results don’t always please everybody, that’s what democracy is all about. What everyone must do now is accept the results, which give us what we have always wanted, the independence of Zimbabwe’.28 Secondly, he was now suggesting, in effect, a conspiracy between the British Government and Lord Soames on the one hand and ZANU (PF) on the other to ensure a ZANU (PF) victory; this did not tally with the developments which took place at the Lancaster House conference. When Mr. Ian Smith warned that the way things were going at the Lancaster House conference Zimbabwe Rhodesia would be landed with a Mugabe government, Lord Carrington assured him that the whole British strategy had been formulated to ensure that this would not happen. Thirdly, he failed to explain how ZAPU could have won parliamentary seats in the Provinces in which he alleged that ZANU (PF) had intimidated his supporters bearing in mind that it was precisely in those Provinces that ZANU (PF) had its strongest base of support since the beginning of the decisive phase of the liberation war in 1972. He also failed to explain how the ZANU (PF) candidate, Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, a medical practitioner from Mashonaland, won a parliamentary seat in Bulawayo, the capital of Matabeleland, unless, of course, it was all part of the British strategy to ensure a Mugabe electoral victory! For reasons already explained, this was a preposterous suggestion. In light of the results of the election, Lord Soames asked Mr. Mugabe to form a government (see photo). This development sent thousands of blacks into the streets in jubilant celebration. In Salisbury and in black townships around it where far larger crowds gathered to celebrate, thousands vented their feelings by flapping their elbows and imitating the crow of the rooster, Mr. Mugabe’s party symbol in the election. Mr. Mugabe assured whites that no one would victimize them: ‘There is no intention on our part to use the advantage of the majority we have secured to victimize the minority. This will not happen. We will ensure that there is a place for everybody in this country’. In a radio and television broadcast, he appealed to everyone, black or white, to join him in a new pledge to forget the country’s grim past and to join hands in ‘a new amity and together as Zimbabweans trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism and to work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society’. He stated: ‘We recognize that the economic structure is based on 28

The New York Times, March 5, 1980.

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capitalism and that whatever ideas we have must build on that. We are not going to interfere with private property whether it be farms or whether it be the mining sector. The modifications can only take place in a gradual way’. At a Press conference, he said he would try to avoid confrontation with South Africa: ‘South Africa is a geographical reality for us; it’s also a historical reality. The reality is that we have to co-exist with them on the basis of mutual recognition of the differences that exist between us’.29 While some whites were assured, most were skeptical; a number of whites who had been prominent in the old regime did not wait to see whether Mr. Mugabe had indeed abandoned the Marxist policies he had espoused in the past. Chief Justice Hector Macdonald, a judicial hard-liner who often railed against Communism from the bench and confirmed dozens of death sentences on guerrillas convicted in Rhodesian courts, announced that he was taking an immediate pre-retirement leave. In an interview with The Herald immediately after the announcement of the results of the election, Reverend Sithole as in the April, 1979 election cried wolf and rejected the results of the election attributing ZANU (PF)’s victory to countrywide intimidation of his supporters especially in three Provinces: Manicaland, Victoria and Mashonaland East. South Africa’s Prime Minister, Mr. P. W. Botha, (see photo) said he would accept the results of the election but warned Mr. Mugabe that Zimbabwe would suffer if it allowed its territory to become a guerrilla base for opponents of the South African Government. Elsewhere on the continent, President Kenneth Kaunda whose country was the main staging area of Mr. Joshua Nkomo’s forces, welcomed Mr. Mugabe’s victory and said Zambia would accept any government formed by Mr. Mugabe. When asked whether he was disappointed that Mr. Nkomo had come second in the election, he replied: ‘I have kept an open mind about the election. I have made it clear that I would accept the will of the people’. In Maputo there were spontaneous celebrations over Mr. Mugabe’s victory. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who had feared that the British would rig the election in favour of Bishop Muzorewa, warmly welcomed ZANU (PF)’s victory and urged Mr. Mugabe to form a broad-based government including opposition leaders and whites. South African blacks were jubilant over Mr. Mugabe’s electoral victory. Typical was Dr. Nthato Notlana, a prominent civic leader in Soweto, the sprawling black ghetto outside Johannesburg, who stated: ‘I’m on top of the world. If Muzorewa had won, it would have been disastrous. The big lesson to be learned from 29

The New York Times, March 4, 1980.

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this is that anybody in southern Africa who gets white patronage is finished’.30 In an analysis of the election results, The Herald stated that by taking a massive 62.99 per cent of the total poll of 2, 702, 275 votes, Mr. Mugabe left Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Patriotic Front as the closest rival with 20 seats. It was a crushing defeat for Bishop Muzorewa whose UANC managed to win only three seats with the Bishop and his Deputy, Dr. Silas Mundawarara, and Mr. Titus Mukarati, the only candidates to retain their seats. Over the three days of voting 1, 668, 992 people voted for ZANU (PF) out of a total poll of 2, 702 275. ZANU (PF) won all the seats in Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Victoria Provinces; Reverend Sithole’s ZANU attracted a fraction of over 2 per cent of the vote; the Patriotic Front got 24.11 per cent of the poll while the UANC got 8.27 per cent. While Bishop Muzorewa and Dr. Mundawarara were returned in Mashonaland East Province, they conceded the other 12 seats to Mr. Mugabe and his candidates. Mr. Mukarati won his seat in Mashonaland West with the top PF candidate, Mr. Ariston Chambati, the only opposition to the ZANU (PF) candidates who won 6 out of 8 seats. On 5 March, 1980 in an editorial, The Herald which had all along supported the internal settlement, conceded that the election had proved that ZANU (PF) enjoyed massive support: ‘It would be easy, when analyzing the election results, to conclude that intimidation must have been on an even greater scale than was reported in the last few weeks. But the size of Mr. Mugabe’s win suggests that this is far from being the whole truth. Regardless of any other factors, ZANU (PF) unquestionably commands massive support. Yesterday’s scenes of jubilation in Salisbury were proof of it’.31 In spite of what he had said earlier, Reverend Sithole pledged his full support for the new Government to be formed by Mr. Mugabe. At a news conference in Salisbury, he told reporters: ‘The poll has put into power a government whose credentials cannot be doubted by any reasonable person; now that a nationalist government has been established, we feel that the nationalist objective has been achieved. We cannot be seen to be fighting a ZANU (PF) government’. He not only congratulated Mr. Mugabe over his landslide victory but also urged whites to stay in the country and assist the new Government instead of running away. 32 President Jimmy Carter’s Administration congratulated Mr. Mugabe on his ‘resounding victory’ and said it looked forward to working with the 30

The New York Times, March 5, 1980. The Herald, March 5, 1980. 32 The Herald, March 6, 1980. 31

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new Zimbabwe Government. A State Department spokesman, Mr. Hodding Carter, commended all the political parties in Zimbabwe for having participated in the election: ‘The process to independence has not been an easy one; an independent Zimbabwe under majority rule is a goal to which we and other nations have directed our efforts over many years’. The Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, urged all parties to respect the outcome of the election and warned that any attempt to abort the political process would be condemned by the world community. Meanwhile, on 18 January, 1980 in a desperate effort to prevent a ZANU (PF) victory in the election, the former Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, saw Lord Soames about the massive intimidation by Mugabe’s party in Mashonaland East, Manicaland and Victoria Provinces. Lord Soames promised to disqualify Mr. Mugabe’s party in those Provinces but did nothing about it. On 28 January, 1980 Mr. Smith went to see Lord Soames once again to stress his concern over mounting intimidation and reminded him that the Lancaster House agreement clearly stipulated that any political party which indulged in intimidation would be disqualified from the election and asked if he was still determined to disqualify ZANU (PF) in the three Provinces; the Governor now argued that such action would be condemned both internally and abroad. Undaunted, Mr. Smith appealed to the military commanders who had made it clear that they would insist on compliance with the terms of the Lancaster House agreement and that meant the disqualification of ZANU (PF) from the election in those provinces most affected by intimidation. At a meeting on 25 February, 1980, however, the military chiefs said they were now of the view that proscribing any political party from taking part in the election was a non-starter-the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would oppose such action and would probably succeed in persuading the free world to do likewise; they also claimed that South Africa would disapprove of such action. When he suggested postponement of the election, the Commander of Combined Operations, Lieutenant General Peter Walls, stated that in the professional opinion of the military chiefs, this would serve no useful purpose; in any case, they believed it was now too late. When he asked the military chiefs how they would prevent a Mugabe victory, General Walls replied that they would solve the problem by bringing in Mr. Joshua Nkomo whom they estimated would win 20 seats and add them to the 20 parliamentary seats already won by the Rhodesia Front. Mr. Smith said it was difficult to believe that the other political parties together would not win 15 to 20 seats, thus giving the coalition a total of between 55 and 60 seats, a clear majority. Bishop

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Muzorewa who attended the meeting said if he and the UANC failed to win 20 seats, then they were Mickey Mouse. On Saturday, 1 March, 1980 in a message to Mrs. Thatcher, General Walls said there was massive evidence of intimidation in the election including some reported by British monitors and policemen, reminded her of her commitment to oppose Marxism and charged that Lord Soames had proved weak and incompetent, was ignoring the evidence on intimidation and had no intention of complying with the British Government’s commitments. He believed the British should continue with their mission until they had completed it and warned that if they were not prepared to comply with the Lancaster House agreement, he reserved the right to act in a manner he thought best. He claimed that in her reply, Mrs. Thatcher was evasive; consequently, the commanders of the Army and Air Force urged caution. When Mr. Smith asked the military chiefs at a meeting on 2 March, 1980 what would happen if ZANU (PF) won more than 50 seats, General Walls evaded the question and simply reiterated that the military chiefs were satisfied that this could not happen. When he pressed them on whether they had a contingency plan to prevent a Mugabe victory, General Walls, after hesitating for a few moments, eventually stated that in the last resort, the military would not allow Mr. Mugabe to win. Mr. Smith said he believed that if all the commanders of the armed forces confronted Lord Soames with massive evidence of intimidation, they could force him to nullify the results; if he shirked his responsibility, they should inform him that they would be compelled to do the job on his behalf. In the event, the military chiefs balked at the idea of taking unconstitutional action. At a meeting with Lord Soames immediately after the announcement of the results of the election, Mr. Smith argued that the British Government had a special obligation to nullify the results in view of the fact that Mrs. Thatcher and Lord Carrington had assured the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government delegation at the Lancaster House conference that under their plan they could guarantee that there was no possibility of Mr. Mugabe coming to power. Lord Soames said he was unaware of any such undertaking and would not have accepted the job under such circumstances. When Mr. Smith asked him if he was satisfied that the election had been free and fair, Lord Soames, after pausing for a few moments, conceded that there had been some intimidation during the election but believed that it had not significantly affected the results.33 It has been necessary to dwell on the conduct of the election to demonstrate that Mr. Smith and the military chiefs did everything possible 33

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 316,332-345.

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short of a military coup to prevent a Mugabe victory. For reasons already explained, Mr. Joshua Nkomo’s claim that ZAPU was cheated in the election was utterly chimerical. Whites, who had hoped that Bishop Muzorewa would win the election, were stunned by ZANU (PF)’s victory. Explaining ZANU (PF)’s victory in several interviews with the journalist, Ms. Julie Frederickse, the Director of Elections for ZANU (PF), Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, stated: ‘We decided, with the little resources we had, to simply organize a few star rallies. We put most of our resources into the launching rally in Highfield and when Mr. Mugabe finally arrived, it was the largest rally ever seen in the country. Psychologically, that was devastating; the enemy went straight to the drawing boards. In total, Mr. Mugabe addressed three rallies. It was the shortest campaign in history’. Secondly, Mr. Smith’s regime was hoist by its own petard; it had lied to the people over the years, projecting the ‘terrorists’ as having no support, ‘all hated by the people as just a bunch of power-hungry malcontents who could never win a free and fair election’. Thirdly, whites had been so thoroughly brainwashed by radio, TV and the press into believing that the puppets represented the people that they went to bed cosy and comfortable, confident that the pro-Western, promultinational Muzorewa would win: ‘That was to our advantage because when they woke up and found that not only had we won the election but we had walked it, they were stunned; they felt that they had been betrayed’. He said Bishop Muzorewa used helicopters and sky shouts as if he was running for election in Chicago; every tree along the highways had Bishop Muzorewa’s posters. Using a Western media model, Bishop Muzorewa’s South African financial backers poured money into radio and TV advertising. He added: ‘All candidates were allotted several TV appearances; I missed two of them because I knew TV was poor media in Zimbabwe. Who watches it? Unlike the United States, only a small segment of the population here - mainly the enemy-has TV. So why pay to be seen by the enemy?’34 Unlike Mr. Nkomo and Reverend Sithole, Bishop Muzorewa accepted defeat gracefully. On 4 March, 1980 after the announcement of the results, he reiterated his desire for true unity, peace, freedom and prosperity and congratulated Mr. Mugabe on his election victory and pledged ‘in the spirit of democracy’ to support the new Government.

34 Julie Frederickse, None But Ourselves: Masses VS. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe, (London, Heinemann, 1983), 321, 324, 288.

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In his memoirs Mr. Ian Smith said at 7 p.m. on 4 March, 1980 he received a phone call inviting him to meet Mr. Mugabe at his house in the Mount Pleasant suburb of Salisbury. After welcoming him most courteously and ushering him to a seat in his lounge, he told him that the election results now indicated that his party had won a majority of the seats and he was the first person he had called for an exchange of views. Mr. Mugabe said he and his colleagues were sufficiently realistic to accept that the economy was based on the free enterprise system and while there would have to be changes and improvements in the lives of the people this would be done gradually and in a realistic manner. He appreciated the vital need to retain the confidence of the white people to enable them to continue to play their part in building the future of the country. He said the new Government would encourage farmers to continue with their wonderful record of production but he did not believe that vacant land and absentee landlords could be tolerated. He then asked him if he would like to comment. In reply, Mr. Smith told Mr. Mugabe that his main problem was his image in the eyes of the white people and indeed in the free world in general: a Marxist dictator who was dedicated to replacing the free enterprise system with communism and all the undesirable practices associated with it. His principal task would be to correct this and make it clear that his objective was to do what was best for his country; if he would repeat in public what he had just told him, he believed it might start things moving in the right direction. He said Mr. Mugabe’s appreciation seemed genuine and as he escorted him to his car, he expressed the wish that they should keep in contact; Mr. Smith assured him that he would always do whatever he could in the best interest of the country. When Mr. Smith got home, he told his wife, Janet, that he hoped that the meeting with Mr. Mugabe was not a hallucination. Mr. Mugabe behaved like a balanced, civilized Westerner, the antithesis of the communist gangster he had expected. If this were a true picture, then there was still hope instead of despair but he did not want to jump to conclusions because communists were cunning tacticians noted for their skills in psychological warfare.35 In spite of his belated denunciation of the election results, Mr. Nkomo and four senior ZAPU members accepted Cabinet posts in the new Government. When Mr. Mugabe offered him the ceremonial post of President of the new Republic, Mr. Nkomo declined the offer on the ground that as ceremonial Head of State, he would be obliged to sign documents and make public speeches composed by ZANU (PF) and 35

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 341-342.

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embrace policies he disagreed with and had in the past denounced; by pretending to agree with those policies, he would bring himself and the office of President into disrepute: if he expressed his disagreement, he would be accused of abusing his constitutional powers. Mr. Mugabe’s next offer was the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Mr. Nkomo said this was an important post in which he believed he could have done much valuable work; in fact, he had longed to do it and get in touch once again with the ordinary people of the towns and the rural areas whom he knew so well. But there were still more important things to be done; he had visited ZIPRA camps, knew of the mood of distrust among the fighters born of the false election results which he had struggled to persuade them to accept. In the circumstances, it was essential that one of the Ministers responsible for security in the new Government should have their absolute confidence. With the full backing of his party colleagues, he demanded a senior ministry dealing with security matters. When Mr. Mugabe offered him the Ministry of Home Affairs in charge of the Police, he accepted.36 In his memoirs Mr. Smith said at 7 p.m. on Friday, 7 March, 1980, he received a message requesting him to visit Mr. Mugabe for a briefing. Mr. Mugabe said in keeping with the previous discussion, he was planning to appoint some white ministers. Mr. Smith advised him to continue on his path of moderation as, so far, he had created a favourable impression; consistency and honesty on Mr. Mugabe’s part would gain him the confidence and respect of the white people. Mr. Smith promised to continue to be available for discussion if and when required.37 The following day the Commonwealth Observer Group put to rest any lingering doubts about whether the election had been free and fair. In their final report, they said they were not only able to observe the conduct of the election campaign from its early days until its culmination in the announcement of the results, but also to make intensive observations in all parts of the country; their conclusions were therefore based on a thorough study of the totality of the process that allowed the people of Rhodesia to choose the government that would take their country to sovereign independence as Zimbabwe. While conceding that there had been some attempts to limit the freedom of choice of the voters through various forms of intimidation, they argued that the extent of the intimidation was often exaggerated either for political purposes or as a result of incorrect or slanted information. In conclusion, they said they were completely 36 37

Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life, 212-213. Smith, The Great Betrayal, 346-347.

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satisfied with the integrity of the conduct of the poll including the security of ballot boxes and the accuracy of the count. Taken as a whole, it was their considered and unanimous view that the election offered an adequate opportunity to the parties to seek the support of the electorate and sufficient freedom to the voters to exercise their franchise according to their convictions. They reaffirmed the conclusion of their interim report that the election was a valid and democratic expression of the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe.38 After the election Mr. Smith said he was ready to take the hand of friendship which Mr. Mugabe offered to the whites and urged his fellow whites to do the same. But not all whites were so sanguine. Reporting from Salisbury on 9 March, 1980 Mr. John F. Burns of The New York Times stated that a group of young white military reservists in plain clothes gathered angrily around Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, a graduate of Harvard Law School and of Tufts University’s School of Law and Diplomacy, and one of Mr. Mugabe’s chief aides, in the lobby of the Meikles Hotel. Arguing for mutual reconciliation, Dr. Zvobgo said blacks were eager to bury the hatchet, even with Mr. Smith but the reservists wanted none of it. Of Bishop Muzorewa, he was equally forgiving: ‘Muzorewa lost the election not because he was a bad man, but because he had bad advisers. They told him to spend $25 million and fly about the country in helicopters as if this was an American election. We went by foot among the people, and they chose us’.39 In the morning on Friday, 10 March, 1980 the former Minister of Finance, Mr. David Smith, arrived at Mr. Ian Smith’s residence to say that Mr. Mugabe had offered him a cabinet post and that it was his wish to accept. He said Mr. Mugabe was hoping that the two of them would visit him later in the day. At the meeting, Mr. Smith told Mr. Mugabe that the Rhodesia Front and the white community at large had no confidence in Mr. David Smith in light of his performance at the Lancaster House conference and that his appointment would aggravate the situation. In spite of Mr. Smith’s misgivings, Mr. Mugabe decided to appoint Mr. David Smith as Minister of Commerce and Industry. Mr. Smith said in the afternoon on Tuesday, 11 March, 1980 he received the news that Mr. Dennis Norman (who had headed the Rhodesia National Farmers’ Union) had been called to Government House where Lord Soames informed him that Mr. Mugabe would offer him the Ministry of Agriculture. When Mr. Mugabe interviewed him, however, he offered 38

Southern Rhodesia Elections, February, 1980, The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. 39 John F. Burns, ‘Reporter’s Notebook’, The New York Times, March 10, 1980.

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him the Ministry of Mines which he declined on the ground that he knew nothing about mines. Mr. Mugabe then offered him the post of Deputy Minister of Agriculture which he turned down. He went back to Lord Soames who said he would get the matter straightened out. When Mr. Mugabe announced his Cabinet at 7.p.m., Mr. David Smith and Mr. Dennis Norman were among the new Ministers.40 Mr. Mugabe took the additional post of Minister of Defence while the other Ministers included Mr. Simon Muzenda (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs); Mr. Joshua Nkomo (Minister of Home Affairs); Mr. Simbi Mubako (Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs); Mr. Emmerson Mnangagwa (Minister of State for Security); Mr. Kumbirai Kangai (Minister of Labour); Mr. Enos Nkala (Minister of Finance); Dr. Hebert Ushewokunze (Minister of Health); Dr. Dzingai Mutumbuka (Minister of Education and Culture); Mrs. Victoria Chitepo (Deputy Minister of Education and Culture); Mrs. Teurai Ropa Nhongo (Minister of Youth, Sport and Recreation); Dr. Eddison Zvobgo (Minister of Local Government and Housing); Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira (Minister of Information); Mr. Maurice Nyagumbo (Minister of Mines) and Mr. Richard Hove (Minister of the Public Service). The following day the Reverend Canaan Banana, a former political detainee and an ally of Mr. Mugabe, was formally chosen as the first President of Zimbabwe.41 The appointment of two white Ministers and of Mr. Joshua Nkomo and four senior ZAPU members to Cabinet posts in the new Government of National Unity and the retention of Lieutenant General Walls as Commander of the army of the new Republic as part of the policy of reconciliation, not only soothed white fears for the future but also earned Mr. Mugabe the gratitude of the new nation. On 14 March, 1980 Mr. Mugabe requested Lord Soames to stay longer until his new Ministers had had time to settle in their posts. Lord Soames told British correspondents at Government House in Salisbury that he had originally planned to hand over to the new Government at the end of the month and be back in London by Easter but in light of Mr. Mugabe’s pressing request, he agreed to stay on until after independence.42 On 20 March, 1980 in an interview with Ruth Weiss for the London Times, President Kaunda whose country had suffered the most after it broke off trade ties with Rhodesia in compliance with the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia in the wake of UDI, said he rejoiced at the prospect of cooperating with an independent Zimbabwe: ‘We have 40

Smith, The Great Betrayal, 347-349. The Washington Post, April 12, 1980. 42 The Times (London), March 14, 1980. 41

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suffered for the independence of Angola and Mozambique but not to the extent that we have suffered for the independence of Zimbabwe. Now we can look forward to better things, in terms of cooperation between our brothers in Zimbabwe and ourselves’.43 The following day in line with Mr. Mugabe’s pledge not to interfere with private property, the Minister of Mines, Mr. Maurice Nyagumbo, who had spent fifteen years in detention, reassured the Chamber of Mines that the Government believed in a competitive economy and for this reason would not nationalize the mining industry.44 Reporting from Cape Town, South Africa, on 31 March, 1980 Mr. John F. Burns of The New York Times stated that the immediate impact of Mr. Mugabe’s victory was considerably less than seemed likely a few months before. Despite warnings by the South African Prime Minister, Mr. P. W. Botha, and by the Commander of the South African Defence Forces, General Magnus Malan, about the dangers for South Africa of a Marxist Government in Salisbury, the election of Mr. Mugabe had been accepted with relative calm. Crucial to South Africa’s acquiescence in Mr. Mugabe’s victory was a secret meeting between Mr. Mugabe and the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Roelof F. Botha, in Maputo. The meeting which was held as Rhodesia’s three million black voters went to the polls and was arranged through Mozambique’s President, Mr. Samora Machel, took place on the initiative of Mr. Mugabe who feared that a South African-engineered military coup on behalf of the candidate favoured by South Africa, Bishop Muzorewa, would upset the election results. While Mr. Botha refused to discuss the meeting, South African officials familiar with the exchange said they were impressed with Mr. Mugabe’s intelligence and his ‘appreciation of the realities’ facing a black Government in Salisbury. In addition to giving assurances that he would not use Zimbabwe as a springboard for guerrilla attacks against South Africa, Mr. Mugabe used the occasion to outline his moderate policies towards whites and private enterprise which he announced on the day his victory was confirmed. A senior South African official said Mr. Mugabe’s approach at the meeting had made those present wonder whether the defeat of Bishop Muzorewa in the election had been such a setback for South Africa after all: ‘I found him one of the most intelligent black

43

Ruth Weiss, ‘Dr. Kaunda rejoices at prospect of cooperating with Zimbabwe’, The Times (London), March 21, 1980. 44 The Times (London), March 22, 1980.

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leaders I have ever met. It made me think that we might be better off with a strong Mugabe in power in Salisbury than a weak Muzorewa’.45 On 15 April, 1980, the State Department pledged $20 million in economic and humanitarian aid for Zimbabwe. A State Department spokesman, Mr. Hodding Carter, stated: ‘An independent Zimbabwe will be a key element in the future stability and economic development of the entire southern African region. The United States is committed to helping the people of Zimbabwe achieve the peaceful and prosperous future they so richly deserve’. 46 President Jimmy Carter named Mr. Robert V. Keeley,47 a career diplomat and a graduate of Princeton University, as the first American Ambassador to Zimbabwe. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, announced in London that Britain would give Zimbabwe $165 million in economic aid over the next three years to help restructure its Government and economy after independence. He said in addition, the British military would help train the new Zimbabwe army; he announced the aid package shortly before leaving for Salisbury to attend Zimbabwe’s independence ceremony.48 In a very moving article on 16 April, 1980 Mr. Anthony Lewis of The New York Times, reporting from Salisbury, described the changes and ironies which had taken place in Zimbabwe since the election. When Prince Charles came down the steps of the Royal Air Force plane, the Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe, stood with Lieutenant General Peter Walls and the two guerrilla commanders, Lieutenant General Rex Nhongo of ZANLA and Lieutenant General Lookout Masuku of ZIPRA. Mr. Mugabe introduced the Prince to his Cabinet of twenty blacks and two whites. Rhodesian strike aircraft roared overhead. The band played ‘God Save the Queen’. He reported: ‘It was a scene that could hardly have been invented in fantasy a few months ago. And that is the general feeling as this country changes from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: of the events too amazing to believe. Someone who has visited here from time to time over the last 14 years finds himself shaking his head again and again in wonder. Salisbury’s wonderful hotel, Meikles, is now filled with official dignitaries: Indira Ghandi, President Zia of Pakistan and the rest. A year ago there was 45

John F. Burns, ‘South Africa’s Fears About Mugabe Seem to Wane’, The New York Times, March 31, 1980. 46 The New York Times, April 16, 1980. 47 Prior to his new appointment, Mr. Keeley had served, inter alia, as the United States Ambassador to Mali in 1961. For details on the career of Mr. Keeley, see Karen De Witt, ‘U. S. Envoy to New Nation: Robert Vossler Keeley’, The New York Times, April, 19, 1980. 48 The Washington Post, April 16, 1980.

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a pile of guns behind the desk-checked in by white Rhodesians who had come in for a meal or a drink. The ironies are endless. But the greatest change is not a matter for bemused head-shaking. That is that people are no longer being killed in a brutal war. In a way the political solution that is now being celebrated was made possible by the very viciousness of the seven-year war. It did such terrible damage, human and physical, that people were finally willing to compromise in order to end it’. He attributed Mr. Mugabe’s superb performance since the election as largely responsible for the acceptance of change by the white minority: ‘In terms of conveying a prospect of stability, people say he has not put a foot wrong. Most important has been his manner: quiet, calm, amiable. As he jokes with others at a reception for Prince Charles, or responds quickly at a press conference, he makes it all seem easy-as if he had been at it for years. Whether his political wisdom will be equal of his style remains to be seen. But this moment is for celebration. A world with little enough good news can be happy with Zimbabwe’.49 On 16 April, 1980 at a news conference Mr. Mugabe outlined the priorities that would guide his administration: the need to complete the process of building a unified army out of the old Government force and the two guerrilla groups; the resettlement of 200,000 refugees returning to the country from neighbouring black states and others who had poured into squatter camps in Rhodesian towns; the rehabilitation of thousands of schools, clinics and cattle dips closed or destroyed during the war and the need to improve working conditions of blacks in public and private employment many of whom subsisted on wages of less than $50 a month.50 Zimbabwe celebrated its independence in the morning on 18 April, 1980. In a detailed report of the independence celebrations, Mr. John F. Burns of The New York Times stated that with a 21-gun salute booming out at midnight on 17 April, 1980 Rhodesia became the independent nation of Zimbabwe. With millions watching live telecasts of the ceremonies from a Salisbury soccer stadium, Prince Charles handed documents signed by Queen Elizabeth conferring independence to Zimbabwe’s new President, the Reverend Canaan Banana. The 40,000 invited guests, most of them blacks, reacted jubilantly as the Union Jack was lowered at midnight and replaced by the green, yellow, black and red banner of the new nation. But the biggest ovations of the hour-long ceremony were for the Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe, and 49

Anthony Lewis, ‘Land of Hope and Glory’, The New York Times, April 17, 1980. John F. Burns, ‘New Rhodesian Nation’s Goals Emerge’, The New York Times, April 17, 1980.

50

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detachments of the two guerrilla armies that forced the white minority to accede to black rule. Units of the former guerrilla armies of Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Joshua Nkomo, his partner in the Patriotic Front alliance, were flanked by detachments from the Government forces, their bitter enemies until the ceasefire. Rhodesian generals in scarlet-edged uniforms stood at attention as the band played ‘God Bless Africa’, the black nationalist anthem; guerrilla commanders reciprocated by saluting as the Union Jack was hauled down to the strains of ‘God Save the Queen’. On the blue canopied dais, President Banana who was imprisoned for supporting the liberation struggle took the oath of office from one of the most controversial figures of the old white regime, Chief Justice Hector Macdonald, who sent dozens of guerrillas to the gallows. In one of the most moving moments of the ceremony, Mr. Mugabe lit an eternal flame to commemorate victims on both sides in the war. In a remarkable speech, Mr. Mugabe emphasized, once again, the need for reconciliation among all the people of Zimbabwe: ‘If ever we look to the past, let us do so for the lesson the past has taught us, namely that oppression and racism are inequities that must never again find scope in our political and social system. It could never be a correct justification that because the whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, that blacks must oppress them today because they have power. An evil remains an evil whether practised by whites against blacks or by blacks against whites. Our majority rule could easily turn into inhuman rule if we oppressed, persecuted or harassed those who do not look or think like the majority of us. Democracy is never mob rule. It is and should remain a disciplined rule requiring compliance with the law. Our independence must not be construed as an instrument vesting individuals or groups of individuals with the right to harass and intimidate others into acting against their will’.51 The guests who attended the independence ceremony included the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi; the Pakistan President, General Mohammed Zia; the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Malcolm Fraser; the United Nations Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, and several African presidents. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, read a message from Mrs. Margaret Thatcher in which she pledged close cooperation in helping in reconstruction and development of Zimbabwe.52 On 18 April, 1980, the United States became the first country to open an embassy in Salisbury, the capital of the newly-independent Zimbabwe, 51

John F. Burns, ‘Rhodesia Becomes the Nation of Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, April 18, 1980. 52 The Washington Post, April 18, 1980.

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and simultaneously signed an aid agreement with the new Government. In a detailed description of the opening of the American Embassy, Mr. John F. Burns of The New York Times reported that soon after Rhodesia became the nation of Zimbabwe, the dignitaries representing President Jimmy Carter at the midnight independence ceremony gathered in the garden of a suburban home to watch the United States flag being unfurled. The leader of the American delegation, former Governor W. Averell Harriman of New York, led the signing of documents for a $2 million grant for the rehabilitation of Government clinics which had been damaged during the war; several Cabinet Ministers attended the ceremony. The opening of the American Embassy was the highlight of a quiet first day for the new nation. American officials were delighted with the presence of the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, (see photo) who joked and mingled freely with other guests and joined in singing ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’. The Minister of Health, Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, who signed the aid agreement on behalf of the Zimbabwe Government, spoke warmly of the American grant.53

Summary and Conclusion This Chapter has focused on the major developments from the Lancaster House conference to Zimbabwe’s Independence (1979-1980) and in particular the opening speeches at the Conference; the British constitutional and ceasefire proposals for Zimbabwe and the response of the Patriotic Front and of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia delegations to these proposals; the Patriotic Front’s acceptance of the British ceasefire proposals on 5 December, 1979; the appointment, before the conclusion of the constitutional conference, of Lord Soames as the interim Governor of Rhodesia; the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement on 15 December, 1979 and of the Constitutional Agreement on 21 December, 1979; the campaign for the Independence election (January-February, 1980); the Independence election and its aftermath (March-April, 1980). Although the Patriotic Front leaders initially rejected the British ceasefire and constitutional proposals for Zimbabwe for reasons already explained, they eventually accepted them on the ground that their shortcomings notwithstanding, they formed a sound basis on which to build a truly democratic society in Zimbabwe.

53

John F. Burns, ‘U. S. Is First to open Zimbabwe Embassy’, The New York Times, April 18, 1980.

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With the conclusion of the Lancaster House conference, the leaders of the various political parties began to campaign for the independence election. It is clear from their election platforms that the four major parties contesting the election were agreed on the major problems facing the nation: the need for national unity and reconciliation, the need to redistribute land, to improve and expand education, health, housing and to tackle the problem of unemployment; to improve and expand agriculture and industry and to abolish racial discrimination in every facet of life. It was, however, their track record in the liberation of Zimbabwe which mattered most in the minds of the voters. The role played by Reverend Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa in the internal settlement was particularly damaging to both leaders in the minds of the voters; as a result, Reverend Sithole’s ZANU party failed to win a single seat in the election. By winning only three out of the expected twenty parliamentary seats, Bishop Muzorewa and the UANC had indeed proved that they were Mickey Mouse. In addition to his role in the internal settlement, the Western media model used by Bishop Muzorewa in the election campaign including helicopters and sky shouts as if it was an American election, was singularly unsuited to the conditions of Zimbabwe where, as elsewhere in the developing countries, the majority of the voters lived in the rural areas. In spite of the conclusions of the various observer groups that the election was free and fair, Reverend Sithole for reasons already stated, initially rejected but later accepted the results of the election and not only congratulated Mr. Mugabe on his electoral victory but also pledged his support for the new Government. Bishop Muzorewa accepted defeat gracefully and congratulated Mr. Mugabe on his election victory. In the immediate aftermath of the election, the ZAPU leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, accepted the results of the election but subsequently rejected them for reasons already explained. The former Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, for reasons already stated, also rejected the results of the election and appealed to the military chiefs and to Lord Soames to nullify the election. For political reasons, however, those military chiefs who were initially strongly tempted to stage a coup balked at the thought of taking unconstitutional action and eventually reconciled themselves to a Mugabe victory. While conceding that there had been some intimidation during the election, Lord Soames believed it had not significantly affected the results and asked Mr. Mugabe to form a government. The 1980 election was truly a milestone in the checkered history of Zimbabwe; the achievement of Zimbabwe’s independence on 18 April,

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1980 with Mr. Robert Mugabe as executive Prime Minister and the Reverend Canaan Banana of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe as ceremonial President, brought an end to nearly ninety years of British colonial rule. For both ZANU (PF) and ZAPU, the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was a hard road to travel. It remained to be seen whether the Government of National Unity forged between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU would long endure and whether it would adequately address the myriad and urgent problems facing the new nation.

CHAPTER TEN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, 1980-2000

Introduction This Chapter examines the major developments in Zimbabwe from Independence in 1980 to 2000 and in particular the unraveling of the Government of National Unity (1980-1982) and its aftermath; the problem of dissidents in Matabeleland and the Government’s response (1982-1984); the rocky road to the Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU (1985-1987) and its aftermath; the land problem (1980-1998); the developments which led to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (1992-1998); the launching of the Movement for Democratic Change (1999); the June, 2000 general election and its aftermath; women’s rights and human rights in Zimbabwe.

The strains and stresses in the Government of National Unity (1980-1982) A major problem facing the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe was the persistent mutual mistrust between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU and their respective former armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA. On 10 November, 1980 fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA broke out at Entumbane Township three miles from Bulawayo where the Government had imprudently sited ZANLA and ZIPRA camps side by side; 18 people were killed. The fighting ended when Zimbabwe air force jets circled the Township and a detachment from the new National Army separated the rival guerrilla factions. The Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe, stated on television in the evening that he was sending army, police and air force reinforcements to Bulawayo. Earlier in the day the former ZIPRA Chief of Intelligence, Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, accompanied by a white officer, tried unsuccessfully to stop the fighting. A light aircraft equipped with a loudspeaker circled over the battle zone, calling on the guerrillas to lay

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down their arms.1 By the end of the following day, the death toll had risen to 43.2 On 10 January, 1981 Mr. Mugabe without a satisfactory explanation, demoted Mr. Joshua Nkomo from Minister of Home Affairs to Minister Without Portfolio.3 He also announced that the Minister for State Security, Mr. Emmerson Mnangagwa, (see photo) had taken over special duties for military integration and defence and at the same time offered the Ministry of Transport to ZAPU’s Vice President, Mr. Josiah Chinamano.4 The counterfeit peace between the two rival guerilla factions ended on 11 February, 1981 when fighting broke out again at Entumbane. The following day Mr. Mugabe ordered the white-led regular army to smash the mutinous guerrillas. As the regular army prepared an assault on Entumbane to quell the fighting, Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo met for an hour in Salisbury to discuss the situation. Both leaders decided to use force to end the violence. Mr. Nkomo later flew to Bulawayo to assess the situation first hand.5 At a press conference on 13 February, 1981 Mr. Nkomo said an agreement had been reached to end the fighting and to separate the rival factions.6 Altogether, more than 300 people perished in the spasm of the devastating combat which had started the previous week between the former guerrillas. To prevent further fighting, members of ZANLA were escorted in a convoy out of Entumbane in 96 trucks after having been disarmed; the former ZIPRA guerrillas who remained at Entumbane, however, refused to give up their arms until after they had been evacuated.7 On 5 February, 1982 without warning, the Police raided ZAPU-owned farms at Ascot and Woodville near Bulawayo. The following day Mr. Mnangagwa and Mr. Mugabe announced on radio and television that the Government had discovered massive stocks of weapons at the two farms and a large cache of arms at Hampton Ranch near Gweru. Mr. Nkomo said 1

‘18 Die as Zimbabwe Rivals Clash’, The New York Times, November 11, 1980. ‘Zimbabwe Death Toll Rises to 43 In Aftermath of Guerrilla Clashes’, The New York Times, November 12, 1980. 3 Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life, (London, Methuen, 1984), 217-220. 4 ‘Nkomo Is Removed From Key Position’, The New York Times, January 11, 1981. 5 ‘Zimbabwe Army Ordered to Smash Mutiny’, The New York Times, February 13, 1981. 6 ‘Zimbabwe Quells Mutiny; War Fear Eases’, The New York Times, February 14, 1981. 7 ‘In Zimbabwe, 2 Rival Factions Count the Dead’, The New York Times, February 16, 1981. 2

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Ascot and Woodville farms as well as Hampton Ranch were owned by a private company called Nitram which he had helped to set up as the nucleus for resettlement schemes for former ZIPRA guerrillas.8 At a press briefing at Brady Barracks in Bulawayo on 7 February, 1982 a Police spokesman said the Police had found 31 arms caches buried in the Gwaai area and another series of arms caches near Filabusi. Speaking at a rally at Norton, near Salisbury, Mr. Mugabe accused ZAPU of planning to overthrow the Government.9 Mr. Nkomo said he was unaware that arms were hidden at ZAPU farms near Bulawayo.10 On 9 February, 1982 Mr. Mnangagwa announced that the Government had discovered two more arms caches at Ascot Farm. The Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mr. Mike Robinson, confirmed that the Police were holding for questioning all the people working or living at Ascot and Woody Glen farms. Mr. Nkomo said Woody Glen Farm had been bought with money raised among former ZIPRA freedom fighters to provide employment for their comrades and denied any knowledge of the arms hidden on ZAPU properties.11 On the same day, the Police arrived at Mr. Nkomo’s homestead at Makwe Ranch near Kezi and searched the premises but found no weapons.12 In a statement issued after a central committee meeting held in Bulawayo on 14 February, 1982 ZAPU leaders not only denied prior knowledge of the arms caches found on ZAPU properties but also the allegation of a plot to overthrow the Government.13 On 16 February, 1982 the Government outlawed eleven private limited companies owned or associated with ZAPU under the Unlawful Organizations Act. In a proclamation President Banana stated: ‘The activities of the companies, as evidenced by recent disclosures, are, in the opinion of the Government, likely to endanger, disturb or interfere with defence, public safety or public order in Zimbabwe’.14 The following day Mr. Mugabe dismissed from the Cabinet the Minister Without Portfolio, Mr. Joshua Nkomo; the Minister of Transport and ZAPU’s Vice President, Mr. Josiah Chinamano; the Minister of Natural Resources and Water Development, Mr. Joseph Musika and the Deputy Minister of Mines, Mr. Jini Ntuta, on the ground that Mr. Nkomo 8

Nkomo, The Story of My Life, 220-225,228. ‘PF-ZAPU Planned Rebel Action –Mugabe’, The Chronicle, February 8, 1982. 10 ‘We Knew Nothing of Caches-Nkomo’, The Chronicle, February 9, 1982. 11 ‘Two More Arms Caches Revealed’, The Chronicle, February 10, 1982. 12 ‘Police search Nkomo farm for hidden arms’, The Chronicle, February 12, 1982. 13 ‘PF-ZAPU Leaders Answer Charges’, The Chronicle, February 15, 1982 14 ‘Government Declares City Firms Unlawful’, The Chronicle, February 17, 1982. 9

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had on two occasions attempted to harness South African support to overthrow the Government; Mr. Nkomo vehemently denied the accusation. The former ZIPRA Chief of Intelligence, Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, (see photo) said the arms caches should be seen against the background of a breakdown of trust between ZANLA ands ZIPRA. He believed that ZIPRA cadres had buried arms as ‘an insurance policy’ against possible attacks by ZANLA and denied any plot to overthrow the Government. 15 The dismissal of Mr. Nkomo and his associates from the Cabinet effectively brought the Government of National Unity to an end. Mr. Nkomo said this action proved that Mr. Mugabe had abandoned the policy of reconciliation in favour of confrontation.16 On 11 March, 1982 the former ZIPRA Commander and Deputy Commander of the National Army, Lieutenant General Lookout Masuku, and Mr. Dabengwa were arrested by members of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) under the Emergency Powers Regulations. 17 Four former ZIPRA officers were also arrested by the CIO on charges of planning to overthrow the Government. On 7 February, 1983 the trial of the six men on charges of high treason, opened in the High Court in Salisbury.18

The problem of dissidents in Matabeleland and the Government’s Response, 1982- 1984 In the context of Zimbabwe, ‘dissidents’ were those members of ZIPRA who defected from the National Army in the wake of the factional fighting at Entumbane in November, 1980 and in February, 1981 and took their weapons with them. They said they defected from the National Army firstly because of a political bias in favour of ZANLA especially where promotions were concerned; secondly, their comrades in the National Army were increasingly subjected to arrest, detention and harassment by the CIO. They said persecution of their members was their primary motive in taking up arms rather than any political agenda. The Government took the view that the ZAPU leadership was directing dissident activities in

15

‘Mugabe Axes Nkomo: Three ZAPU Ministers also sacked in purge’, The Chronicle, February 18, 1982. 16 Nkomo, The Story of My Life, 218. 17 ‘Masuku and Dumiso Arrested By CIO In Arms Follow-Up’, The Chronicle, March 12, 1982. 18 ‘Masuku, Dabengwa On Treason Trial’, The Chronicle, February 8, 1983.

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Matabeleland.19 ( See map below showing some of the curfew areas and areas where arms caches were discovered).

Source: THE WORLD: AFGHANISTAN TO ZIMBABWE. See the Centrefold for this image in colour.

19

The Catholic Commission For Justice And Peace In Zimbabwe (hereafter CCJPZ), Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988, (Harare, CCJPZ, 1997), 32-33, 40

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On 25 March, 1982 the Police announced that they had discovered a huge arms cache in the dissident-affected area in Filabusi and took four truck loads of modern arms and ammunition –some in mint condition- to Brady Barracks in Bulawayo where a senior police officer and an Army Captain took newsmen to view the arms cache. 20 On the same day, Mr. Mnangagwa announced that the Government had discovered four arms caches at Hampton Ranch near Gweru including 600 rifles and eight SAM 7 missiles; the arms and ammunition were buried in four bunkers, all carefully protected.21 On 4 April, 1982 addressing ZAPU supporters at White City Stadium in Bulawayo, Mr. Joshua Nkomo said the cadres of both wings of the Patriotic Front returning home in 1980 had been led by ‘mutual mistrust’ to cache large quantities of arms and that when he was Minister of Home Affairs he knew that ‘a whole train-load’ of ZANLA arms from Mozambique had disappeared without trace but his efforts to investigate and trace them had been frustrated by ZANLA leaders who refused to cooperate.22 In spite of Mr. Nkomo’s explanation of the origins of the arms caches, on 14 April, 1982 in a Government Gazette Extraordinary, President Banana declared the Zimbabwe Commercial and Industrial Development Company with three top ZAPU officials as its directors, an unlawful organization, on the ground that the activities of the company and its subsidiaries and certain members connected with the companies were likely to endanger, disturb or interfere with defence, public safety or public order; it was the twelfth ZAPU-owned company to be outlawed by the Government.23 On 30 April, 1982 Mr. Mnangagwa announced that the Government had discovered arms caches in the Kezi area of Matabeleland; the arms found were contained in 200-litre drums and several people had been picked up for questioning while others had come forward to assist the Government. He said the police had arrested many dissidents and that many of them and some ZAPU officials would soon appear in court.24 On 2 July, 1982 the Officer Commanding Bulawayo Province Police announced that the Army and Police had discovered various types of arms of war in the western suburbs of Bulawayo and that the operation aimed at 20

‘Huge Arms Cache Found In Filabusi’, The Chronicle, March 26, 1982. ‘More Arms Recovered At Gwelo’, The Chronicle, February 26, 1982. 22 ‘NKOMO HITS AT ZANU-(PF) ONE-PARTY STATE MOVE’, The Chronicle, April 5, 1982. 23 ‘ZAPU-Led Firm Is Banned’, The Chronicle, April 15, 1982. 24 ‘New Arms Caches Found At Kezi’, The Chronicle, May 1, 1982. 21

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apprehending dissidents, had been very successful.25 The announcement was apparently premature because three days later, he proclaimed a 9 p.m. to 4 a.m. curfew in the western suburbs.26 However, the following day the Army withdrew from the western suburbs but the curfew remained in force. 27 On 13 July, 1982 the House of Assembly renewed the State of Emergency for another six months. In winding up the debate on the motion to renew the State of Emergency, the Minister of Home Affairs, Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, disclosed that the Government had found more caches containing large quantities of a variety of weapons of war in Bulawayo and in Kezi during the previous twenty- four hours.28 On 15 July, 1982 a senior police officer in Bulawayo announced that the curfew in the western suburbs of Bulawayo would be extended to cover the eastern suburbs and appealed to the residents in the area to cooperate with the police in their search for weapons which had not been declared to the authorities.29 On 23 July, 1982 in the Nyamandlovu area (see map) 12 dissidents kidnapped six tourists from the United States, Australia and Britain. The kidnapped Americans were Brett Baldwin, 23, of Seattle, Washington and Kevin Ellis, 24, of Bellevue, Washington; the other missing men were Tony Bajzell, 25, and William Butler, 31, of Australia and James Greenwell, 18, and Martyn Hodgson, 35, of Britain. On 25 July, 1982 the Officer Commanding the Matabeleland Police Province signed an order imposing a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Tsholotsho as combined army and police efforts to track down the dissidents who were holding the six tourists hostage, continued. Army helicopters and a spotter plane spent the second day flying over a wide area in a bid to locate the dissidents with their hostages.30 On 27 July, 1982 the Government extended the curfew in the area where the dissidents had abducted the tourists. The search went on all day long in the area west of the Victoria Falls Road 80 kilometres from Bulawayo. The army used spotter planes, helicopters, ground troops and trackers in the operation. The Police set up roadblocks on the main road, 25

‘Weapons discovered In City Dissidents Hunt’, The Chronicle, July 3, 1982. ‘Curfew Imposed In West Of City’, The Chronicle, July 6, 1982. 27 ‘Police on curfew patrol as army pulls out’, The Chronicle, July 8, 1982. 28 ‘Special powers renewed for six months’, The Chronicle, July 14, 1982. 29 ‘Swoops Planned To Seize Arms: Weapons hunt extended to east suburbs’, The Chronicle, July 16, 1982. 30 ‘Tsholotsho Curfew As Hunt Goes On For Abducted Tourists’, The Chronicle, July 26, 1982. 26

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tightened the curfew restrictions in Tsholotsho and imposed a curfew from 2 p. m. to 10 a.m. in the immediate area of the search and extended the curfew to cover the whole of Nyamandlovu and Lupane.31 For four months the Government spared no efforts to locate the tourists and their captors. On 5 December, 1982 a Police spokesman in Bulawayo said the Government was still searching for the tourists. Despite many unconfirmed reports by villagers of sightings in the 5,000 square mile search area, there were no firm clues on the whereabouts of the tourists. The parents of the six men made impassioned appeals for their release on cassette tapes broadcast daily on all four state-owned radio stations but the appeals first broadcast on 11 November, 1982 produced no clues.32 It was in the context of the failure of the regular army and police to find the hostages and the increasing tempo in dissident activities including the killing of white commercial farmers and black civilians suspected of collaborating with the authorities 33 , that the Government deployed in Matabeleland North Province the Fifth Brigade which was trained by the North Koreans in Nyanga in eastern Zimbabwe beginning in the last few months of 1981 and ending on 9 September, 1982. The Fifth Brigade arrived in Matabeleland North Province in January, 1983. In his autobiography Mr. Joshua Nkomo says on arrival in Matabeleland North Province, members of the Fifth Brigade burned villages, slaughtered cattle, raped women and killed hundreds of civilians suspected of harbouring dissidents. In the absence of the Prime Minister who was on business abroad, he approached the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Simon Muzenda, who referred him to the Minister of Home Affairs, Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, who initially agreed to meet him and then failed to keep the appointment. In the circumstances he called a press conference to which he presented twelve eye witnesses to the horrors and appealed to the Government to stop the carnage.34 In their main report, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ) stated that within the space of six weeks after the arrival of the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland North Province, more than 2,000 civilians had been killed, hundreds of homesteads had been burned and thousands of civilians had been beaten; most of the dead were killed in public executions, involving between 1 and 12 people at a time.35 31

‘Curfew extended as hunt goes on’, The Chronicle, July 28, 1982. ‘Zimbabwe Still Pressing Hunt for 6 Tourists’, The New York Times, December 6, 1982. 33 CCJPZ, Breaking the Silence, 38-39. 34 Nkomo, The Story of My Life, 235-236. 35 CCJPZ, Breaking the Silence, 48, 50. 32

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In spite of the reported atrocities, the Minister of Defence, Dr. Sidney Sekeramayi, told Parliament on 11 February, 1983 that the Government was prepared to keep the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland permanently if necessary and that it was up to ZAPU leaders to stop their members and supporters from harbouring the dissidents. 36 At a rally in Manicaland on 17 February, 1983 Mr. Mugabe confirmed that the Fifth Brigade would remain in Matabeleland until every dissident had been routed.37 On 22 March, 1983 a High Court judge, Mr. Hilary Squires, dismissed the treason charges against six former ZIPRA officers including Lieutenant General Lookout Masuku. However, they were not released for they still faced charges along with Mr. Dabengwa in connection with the arms caches found on ZAPU-owned farms. On 24 March, 1983 as he completed three days of testimony in his own defence, Mr. Dabengwa strongly denied that he had been involved in any plot to overthrow the Government.38 At their annual conference on 26 March, 1983 the CCJPZ said it was clear from reports from members of the Hwange, Bulawayo and Gweru Dioceses that human rights were being severely violated in Matabeleland and that men, women and children were being killed and injured without just cause and planned to send a delegation to meet the Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe, on the matter as soon as possible.39 Accordingly, on 28 March, 1983 a delegation from the CCJPZ consisting of Bishop Mutume (President); Bishop Karlen (Bishop of the Diocese of Bulawayo) and Mr. Mike Auret (Chairman) met Mr. Mugabe concerning the military situation in the western areas of the country. Mr. Mugabe assured the delegation that the Government would investigate all reliably- reported cases of abuse of authority by the National Army.40 In spite of the assurance from Mr. Mugabe, the Catholic Bishops of Zimbabwe in a pastoral statement the following day, stated that Government forces continued to commit ‘wanton atrocities and brutalities’ against civilians in their efforts to suppress the dissidents; the campaign led to the maiming and death of hundreds of innocent people who were neither dissidents nor collaborators. They presented to Mr. Mugabe a thick dossier of specific cases culled from reports by priests and mission stations 36

‘Five Brigade Is Here to Stay’, The Chronicle, February 12, 1983. ‘Nkomo and ZAPU warned by P. M’, The Chronicle, February 18, 1983. 38 ‘A Fateful Trial: Witty Ex-Guerrilla vs. Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, March 25, 1983. 39 ‘Catholics To See PM Over Rights’, The Sunday Mail, March 26, 1983. 40 CCJPZ, 31 Selous Avenue, Harare, Press Statement, March 28, 1983. 37

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throughout Matabeleland; they added that they had ‘incontrovertible evidence’ which pointed to ‘a reign of terror caused by wanton killings, woundings, beatings, burnings and rapings’.41 The Minister of Information, Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, denounced the Catholic Bishops for their assertion that the army was continuing to commit atrocities in Matabeleland and claimed that Government forces were bringing ‘peace and relief’ to Matabeleland and described the pastoral statement due to be read in all the Catholic churches in Zimbabwe at Easter, as ‘irresponsible, contrived and propagandistic’.42 That the Government sanctioned the killing of civilians suspected of harbouring dissidents, was tragically illustrated by Mr. Mugabe himself when he told cheering supporters at a rally in Zhombe in north-western Zimbabwe on 8 April, 1983 that the security forces were entitled to kill anyone caught aiding the dissidents: ‘When dissidents are active in an area, that makes it a war zone and in a war zone the price of supporting dissidents is death. People who feed dissidents are starting a war with the Government and they should not complain when their relatives die. When men and women give food to dissidents, our soldiers will come and eradicate them. We cannot select who we fight in this kind of war because we cannot tell who is a dissident and who is not’.43 On 27 April, 1983 Zimbabwe’s first treason trial ended with the acquittal of Mr. Dabengwa and five other former ZIPRA officers on charges of hiding arms on ZAPU farms; however, they were immediately re-arrested inside the High Court.44 ZAPU’s Vice President, Mr. Josiah Chinamano, stated on 13 May, 1983 that the Government had detained two senior ZAPU members including a Member of Parliament the previous week and that violence and intimidation against ZAPU supporters were continuing. He said he had been unable to fathom the reason for the detention of Mrs. Thenjiwe Lesabe, a Member of Parliament for Matabeleland North Province and Mr. Elijah Moyo, a member of ZAPU Central Committee.45 On 8 November, 1983 the High Court ruled that the detention of Mr. Dabengwa was illegal and ordered his release within 24 hours. His lawyers 41

‘Catholics Report Zimbabwe Atrocities’, The New York Times, March 30, 1983. ‘Zimbabwe Assails Bishops for Statement’, The New York Times, March 31, 1983. 43 ‘Mugabe Urges Death for Aiding Dissidents’, The New York Times, April 9, 1983. 44 ‘6 in Zimbabwe Cleared of Treason, Jailed Again’, The New York Times, April 28, 1983. 45 ‘Opposition MP held in Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, May 14, 1983. 42

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had filed an application for his release on the ground that he had been detained for more than 191 days without his case coming before a review tribunal in contravention of a Zimbabwean law which required such cases to be reviewed within 30 days. 46 However, on 25 November, 1983 the Supreme Court upheld the Government’s refusal to release Mr. Dabengwa. Chief Justice Telford Georges ruled in favour of the Government which had appealed against a High Court decision to free Mr. Dabengwa because he had been denied a constitutionally- mandated review of his case within a reasonable time.47 In their main report the CCJPZ stated that beginning in January and ending in May, 1984 in Matabeleland South Province the Government embarked on a deliberate policy to starve into submission civilians suspected of harbouring the dissidents. After three years of severe drought the people came to depend on drought relief deliveries from humanitarian agencies as well as from the Government supplemented by food they bought in local stores. The Government closed all shops and stopped all food deliveries to the area including drought relief and on 4 February, 1984 imposed a blanket curfew operating around the clock, restricting movement into, out of, or around the curfew areas. In an effort to counter the allegations of army atrocities in Matabeleland, a Government Commission of Enquiry headed by a well-known lawyer, Mr. Simplicius Chihambakwe, sat in Bulawayo from 10 to 14 January, 1984 to hear testimonies from witnesses. The CCJPZ gave evidence for one and half days and produced 17 victims who each gave evidence of multiple atrocities, including mass executions, burning to death of people in huts, mass beatings and mass detentions involving various methods of torture.48 The Reverend Habron Wilson, a Catholic priest in Bulawayo and a member of the CCJPZ, said the Army had dug up and burned the bodies of more than a dozen civilians in an effort to cover up evidence of its brutality ahead of the Government-organized tour of Matabeleland South Province by foreign journalists. He said he had received reports of the destruction of the bodies from villagers in the Donkwe Donkwe area southeast of Bulawayo; the soldiers had also thrown grenades into

46

‘Zimbabwe Court Orders Release of Nkomo Aide’, The New York Times, November 9, 1983. 47 ‘Nkomo Backer Loses Appeal in Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, November 26, 1983. 48 CCJPZ, Breaking the Silence, 56, 60- 61.

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abandoned mine shafts where they had dumped the bodies in an effort to destroy evidence of the killings.49 In a belated effort to counter the allegations by church leaders and others that Government troops had committed widespread atrocities in Matabeleland South Province, the Army Commander, Lieutenant General Rex Nhongo, escorted 53 foreign journalists on a two-day trip through the Province. At the Brethren in Christ Church hospital at Mtshabezi mission, 55 miles south of Bulawayo, the American medical missionary, Dr. Devee Boyd, said most of the women admitted into the hospital–at least 100- had been brought with their buttocks so badly beaten that the flesh hung in shreds and that surgery had been necessary to repair muscles and make skin grafts. Although the foreign journalists found no mass graves during the trip, at Kezi, a Catholic priest, Father Gabriel, brought forward local people who led reporters to two graves, each said to contain the bodies of three civilians. Chief Philisi Sithole, with tremendous courage, told the journalists that the soldiers selected victims at random and shot them as an object lesson of what they would do to people who harboured dissidents. Dr. Boyd told reporters that he had written a weekly letter to Mr. Mugabe describing in clinical fashion the patients he was treating and their accounts of how the troops had brutalized them; so far, he had received no reply.50 In another report on army atrocities in Matabeleland, the Catholic Bishops stated that many people taken for interrogation never returned home. A Catholic priest at Minda mission, 65 miles south of Bulawayo, said he had received names of 22 civilians killed by Government troops since 3 February, 1984. The report added: ‘A policy of starvation became clear when the commanders told the people they would first eat their chickens, then their goats, after which they would eat their cattle and then their own children’.51 In an interview with The Herald on 16 April, 1984 Mr. Mugabe cast doubt on the integrity of the Catholic Bishop of Bulawayo and on the ability of his fellow Bishops to make an unbiased assessment of the situation in Matabeleland. In a Press Statement on 19 April, 1984 a spokesman for the CCJPZ, Mr. A. F. Maveneka, made it clear that neither the Catholic Bishops nor the clergy had ever been involved in party politics and that the Bishop and the clergy of the Bulawayo Diocese were not ZAPU supporters. He said the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and the 49

‘Zimbabwe Accused on Army Killings’, The New York Times, May 9, 1984. ‘Doctor Reports Zimbabwe Brutality’, Los Angeles Times, May 12, 1984. 51 ‘Zimbabwe Bishops Describe Details of Atrocity Charges’, The New York Times, April 16, 1984. 50

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CCJPZ were concerned only with protecting innocent people against brutality, the violation of their human rights and starvation.52 On 9 November, 1984 dissidents assassinated the ZANU (PF) Member of Parliament, Senator Moven Ndlovu. The Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Simbi Mubako, said the Senator was gunned down by three dissidents at his home in the southern town of Beitbridge near the border with South Africa. 53 Three days later Mr. Mugabe dismissed the last two ZAPU Ministers from the Cabinet: the Minister of Water Resources, Mr. Cephas Msipa, and the Minister of State in the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office, Mr. John Nkomo. He blamed ZAPU for the murder of Senator Ndlovu and said he dismissed the two ministers because ZAPU continued to support the dissidents.54

The Rocky Road to the Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU, 1985-1987. In a pre-dawn operation on 2 March, 1985 thousands of soldiers and police cordoned off Bulawayo’s western townships in the hunt for arms and dissidents. According to the residents, the security forces encircled the townships putting up roadblocks and carrying out random searches; helicopters and light planes equipped with loudspeakers began patrolling overhead at dawn advising them to stay at home.55 The authorities said the search was a temporary move designed to quell political violence which had claimed two lives in clashes around Bulawayo between the supporters of ZANU (PF) and ZAPU during the previous week. At a news conference in Harare, the ZAPU leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, called the search ‘an election stunt’ designed to demoralize his supporters and force them to vote for the ruling party in the forthcoming general election.56 There were also reports of abductions of ZAPU officials by members of the ruling party in the run-up to the general elections. On 7 March, 1985 a ZAPU spokesman in Bulawayo produced a list of 56 party officials who

52

CCJPZ, Press Statement, 19 April, 1984. ‘Zimbabwe Rebels Slay A State Senator’, The New York Times, November 10, 1984. 54 ‘2 Zimbabwe Opposition Officials Dismissed’, The New York Times, November 13, 1984. 55 ‘Zimbabwe Troops Seal Townships In A Hunt for Arms and Dissidents’, The New York Times, March 3, 1985. 56 ‘Nkomo Accuses Zimbabwe Of an Effort to Rig Election’, The New York Times, March 4, 1985. 53

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had been abducted in Matabeleland since the middle of January. 57 Mr. Nkomo said the principal targets for the abductions were ZAPU local chairmen, organizers and other party officials; the purpose was to destroy the ZAPU organizational structure ahead of the parliamentary elections and thus ensure a larger majority for the ruling party. The ZAPU Administrative Secretary and former Cabinet Minister in Mr. Mugabe’s Government, Mr. John Nkomo, stated: ‘This is not some dark novel, a macabre piece of fiction. It is life and politics in Zimbabwe today’. Friends and relatives of the victims were reluctant to report the abductions for fear of retribution. A nurse from a missionary clinic stated: ‘We have seen people go to the police to complain and then disappear themselves a few days later. If you are a community leader, if you ask ZAPU for help, you get on the hit list and the Land Rovers come and take you away. This terrifies people, simply terrifies them’. The Minister for Political Affairs, Mr. Maurice Nyagumbo, vehemently denied the accusations; instead, he accused ZAPU and the dissidents of abducting and killing more than 10 ZANU (PF) officials who had been trying to win converts in Matabeleland for the ruling party.58 In the general elections held from 1 to 2 July, 1985 ZANU (PF), won 63 out of 80 seats reserved for blacks in the 100-member Parliament while ZAPU won all the 15 seats in Matabeleland.59 On 8 July, 1985 in Harare in the wake of the elections, ZANU (PF) supporters were reported to have ransacked about 600 homes belonging to ZAPU members. In some cases, ZANU (PF) supporters threw ZAPU members out of their houses and piled their belongings in the streets; in other cases women supporters of ZANU (PF) confiscated house keys of ZAPU supporters and locked the residents out.60 Reporting from Harare on 9 July, 1985 Jan Raath of the Times of London stated that uncontrolled violence by members of the ruling party against ZAPU supporters ran into its third day. In the townships of St. Mary’s, Zengeza and Seke in Chitungwiza, south of the city and in Highfield and Mufakose near Harare, mobs of ZANU (PF) youths and women worked systematically through their areas sacking and looting the 57

‘ Zimbabwe Party Reports Attacks’, The New York Times, March 8, 1985. ‘Political Kidnappings Stir Bitter Zimbabwe Struggle’, Los Angeles Times, April 7, 1985. 59 ‘Zimbabwe Vote Gives Mugabe 63 of 79 seats’, The New York Times, July 7, 1985. ZANU (PF) won 63 out of 79 seats instead of out of 80 seats, a ZANU (PF) Member of Parliament having died shortly before the election and was not immediately replaced while Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole’s ZANU won one seat. 60 ‘Zimbabwe Opposition Raided’, The New York Times, July 9, 1985. 58

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homes of non-ZANU (PF) members. Six members of the ZANU (PF) central committee were despatched to Chitungwiza and another to Highfield to try to stem the violence but the destruction continued after the politicians had left. Ululating ZANU (PF) women supporters swarmed around individual homes and flung piles of household goods into the air. At the bottom end of one street flames leaped through the windows of two houses; two women darted into one of them and came out with a few sticks of furniture; a few seconds later an explosion sent ashes showering through the air. A senior ZAPU spokesman said two ZAPU officials were killed in the Dzivaresekwa Township including the party’s candidate who was axed to death when a mob of ZANU (PF) supporters attacked his home at night. Outside Harare, Mr. Kenneth Mano, the ZAPU candidate for the Makonde East constituency was seriously ill in hospital with three stab wounds. The Police announced the death of an unnamed man whose charred body was found the previous day in the Midlands town of Redcliffe.61 On 8 August, 1985 the Police announced that 34 ZAPU members including ZAPU’s chief parliamentary whip, Mr. Sidney Malunga, had been arrested during the previous two weeks and were being held for questioning; the arrests had taken place during four searches of Mr. Nkomo’s houses in Harare and Bulawayo.62 On 17 August, Mr. Joshua Nkomo said six senior members of his party were detained; two officials released later after questioning were the Mayor of Bulawayo, Mr. Enos Mdlongwa, and the Town Clerk, Mr. Michael Ndubiwa; he was not certain what happened to the other four.63 It has been necessary to dwell on the violence which took place in Zimbabwe before and after the 1985 general election to demonstrate that the road to the unity accord was a rocky one. It was in the context of the violence before and after the election that the leaders of the two parties began talks on a merger of the two parties. On 2 October, 1985 Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo met for talks to merge their parties. 64 The following day it was reported that the two

61

Jan Raath, ‘Zimbabwe mobs on rampage as six die’, The Times (London), July 10, 1985. 62 ‘34 Nkomo Followers Are Reported Seized’, The New York Times, August 9, 1985. 63 ‘Zimbabwe Said to Hold Members of Opposition’, The New York Times, August 18, 1985. 64 ‘Zimbabwe political rivals agree to merge their parties’, The Christian Science Monitor, October 4, 1985.

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parties had reached a broad agreement to merge at a meeting between the two leaders.65 On 19 August, 1986 the Government freed 10 prominent ZAPU political detainees to promote the unity talks between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU; among those released were four ZAPU Members of Parliament: Mr. Welshman Mabhena, Mr. Edward Ndlovu, Mr. William Kona and Mr. Sidney Malunga.66 In a bid to promote the talks, Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Enos Nkala, held a joint rally in Kezi on 23 March, 1986. The CCJPZ congratulated ZANU (PF) and ZAPU on the efforts made so far towards uniting the nation.67 On 4 December, 1986 the Government released from detention five other top ZAPU leaders including Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa. The release of Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa from detention was seen as clearing a major obstacle to unity. 68 Lieutenant General Masuku had been released from detention on 11 March, 1986 mainly on health grounds and died at Parirenyatwa Hospital in Harare on 6 Aril, 1986 at the age of 46.69 On 22 December, 1987 after protracted negotiations lasting over a year, Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo signed a unity agreement to merge their parties into a single party. Usually taciturn, Mr. Mugabe was uncharacteristically effusive when speaking about the unity agreement: ‘This occasion fills me with emotion. The younger and older brothers who have been separated by circumstance have now come back home and are together. We can now move into the future hand-in-hand, knowing that we leave behind us a united country, instead of going to our graves separately, leaving behind us a divided country’. Mr. Nkomo, much more subdued in praising the merger, appealed to his followers not to look at who had gained or lost by the agreement but instead to take pride in the newlyunified nation: ‘We do not want to leave behind a legacy of division. We want to lay the foundation of a Zimbabwe with one people, one nation’. The two leaders expressed gratitude to President Canaan Banana for having worked tirelessly as mediator to bring the two opposing parties together. President Banana stated: ‘With this national unity we have 65

‘Rival Zimbabwe Parties Agree on a Merger’, The New York Times, October 4, 1985. 66 ‘Mugabe frees 10’, The Washington Post, August 19, 1986. 67 CCJPZ, Press Statement, 30 March, 1986. 68 ‘Zimbabwe frees five detainees in bid for political unity’, The Christian Science Monitor, December 5, 1986. 69 ‘Lookout Masuku Dies at 46; Commanded Nkomo Forces’, The New York Times, April 7, 1986.

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confounded our enemies who sought to inflame our differences. With this unity we have found a new political maturity which will see us working together as one nation against violent discord and destabilization’.70 On 31 December, 1987 Mr. Robert Mugabe was inaugurated Zimbabwe’s first Executive President. In his inaugural address at the National Sports Stadium in Harare he urged ‘all Zimbabweans whatever their tribe, region or religion to stand behind the unity accord and promote it in word and deed’. 71 On 2 January, 1988 in a Cabinet reshuffle, he appointed Mr. Joshua Nkomo, Mr. Maurice Nyagumbo and the Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Dr. Bernard Chidzero, as Senior Ministers with the responsibility for rural development. 72 On 18 April, 1988 the Government announced an amnesty for all dissidents. Under the Clemency Order No. 1 of 1988 signed on 28 April, 1988 by the Acting President, Mr. Simon Muzenda, all dissidents who reported to the Police between 19 April and 31 May, 1988 would be pardoned for all crimes they might have committed; over the next few weeks, 122 dissidents surrendered to the authorities.73

The Land Problem, 1980-1998 Introduction As explained earlier, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the amendments of 1941, 1945 and 1953 left the European settlers in control of the most fertile areas of the country with high rainfall while shunting the African majority to the over-crowded Native Reserves with infertile soil and poor rainfall. The areas assigned to Europeans and Africans (including Native Purchase Areas) remained largely unchanged right through to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 as illustrated in the map below:

70

‘United We Stand’, Africa Report, March-April, 1988, 66-68. ‘Mugabe Now President of a One-Party Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, January 1, 1988. 72 ‘Mr. Mugabe Picks New Cabinet, Giving a Key Post to Nkomo’, The New York Times, January 5, 1988. 73 CCJPZ, Breaking the Silence, 73. For details, see ‘Zimbabwe: An Amnesty for Unity’, Africa Report, (July-August, 1988), 40-42. 71

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Land apportionment in Rhodesia in 1965 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_reform_in_Zimbabwe 8/29/2007. See the Centrefold for this image in colour.

The European area and the African area under the Land Tenure Act of 1969 illustrated in the Table below remained substantially unchanged right up to Independence in 1980.

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At independence in 1980 about 6,000 white commercial farmers owned about 42 per cent of the most productive areas of the country. The basic objective of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was the recovery of the land of which the people had been dispossessed. But as shown in the previous Chapter, the Lancaster House Constitution prohibited the compulsory acquisition of private property including land unless such acquisition was accompanied by ‘prompt and adequate compensation’ in foreign currency; land could only be acquired on a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ basis.

The Land Problem in Zimbabwe, 1980-1998 The problem of land resettlement and reform in Zimbabwe after independence has been the subject of several studies74; a summary of the major developments is called for.

74

See for example, Robin Palmer, ‘Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990’, in African Affairs, Volume 89, Number 355, (April, 1990); Sam Moyo, ‘The Land Question’, in Ibbo Mandaza, (ed.), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986, (London, Codesria, 1987), Chapter 6; Clever Mbengegwi, ‘Continuity and Change in Agricultural Policy’, also in Ibbo Mandaza, (ed.), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, Chapter 7; B.H. Kinsey, ‘Forever Gained: Resettlement and Land Policy in the Context of National Development in Zimbabwe’, in J. D. Y. Peel and T. O. Ranger, (eds.), Past and Present in Zimbabwe, (Manchester University Press, 1983).

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In September, 1980 the Government with financial assistance from Britain, launched an intensive land resettlement programme with the overall objective of resettling some 18,000 families from the overcrowded communal areas (formerly called Tribal Trust Lands) onto 1.1 million hectares of former white commercial farmland over a period of three years; the total cost of the programme was estimated at Z$60 million to be shared equally between Zimbabwe and Britain.75 On 1 November, 1980 the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Mr. Moven Mahachi, said the Government had spent about Z$12.8 million in purchasing 320,000 acres of white farmland. On the same day, the Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe, said the Government had purchased more than 800,000 acres for the resettlement of 15,000 landless families.76 Shortly after presenting a mini-budget in the House of Assembly on 30 January, 1981 the Minister of Finance, Senator Enos Nkala, lambasted the British Government for its niggardly contribution towards Zimbabwe’s land reform programme arguing that the nationalist negotiators at the Lancaster House Conference had accepted the British proposals on land after being assured that financial support for the land reform programme would be readily available in the form of grants. He said the British Government’s offer of ǧ75 million for Zimbabwe’s economic development programme over three years comprising of a grant of ǧ27 million and a loan of ǧ48 million, was unacceptable and demanded greater British contribution.77 At a meeting with officials of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States Agency for International Development and members of Congress in Washington on 9 February, 1981 the Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Dr. Bernard Chidzero, (see photo) said the Government needed financial support to resettle landless black farmers on land to be acquired from white farmers; he stressed that land resettlement was ‘a political as well as an economic necessity’ and a key factor in developing a multi-racial society in Zimbabwe.78 In order to raise the necessary funds for land resettlement, land reform and economic development, the Government invited about 400 delegates representing 45 potential donor nations, 12 international organizations and

75

B. H. Kinsey, ‘Forever Gained’, 95-96. ‘Zimbabwe Treads Delicate Path’, The New York Times, November 2, 1980. 77 ‘Zimbabwe may reject aid package if British insist on terms’, The Times (London), January 31, 1981. 78 ‘Zimbabwe Seeks Aid from U. S.’, The New York Times, February 10, 1981. 76

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16 United Nations agencies to attend the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD). The purpose of the Conference was to raise about ǧ780 million towards the cost of public sector programmes to be carried out during 1981-1984. The total investment envisaged during this period was estimated at ǧ2,575 million of which over half was to be invested in the private sector. The aim of the three-year plan was to channel funds into five main areas: land resettlement and rural development; the repair and reconstruction of the damage caused by the war; the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; the rehabilitation of former ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants and technical cooperation; by far the most important part of the three-year plan was land resettlement which was expected to absorb about two-thirds of the ǧ780 million.79 The conference formally opened in Salisbury on 23 March, 1981. In his opening address, the Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe, told the conference that Zimbabwe needed help in order to recover from the effects of a bitter war, sanctions and the legacy of almost a century of colonialism. The European Economic Community’s Commissioner for Development, Mr. Claude Cheysson, started the till ringing when he announced that the EEC would contribute Z$120 million towards development projects. The Director General of the Kuwait Fund, Mr. Faisal al Khaled, announced that the Fund would provide assistance worth over ǧ25 million for rural development, irrigation, railways and roads projects.80 The following day the head of the British delegation and former interim Governor of Rhodesia, Lord Christopher Soames, said Britain would contribute an additional ǧ25 million including ǧ10 million for land resettlement and purchase of land from white commercial farmers. Canada pledged to provide $50 million over five years; the representative of West Germany said his Government would raise its commitment from ǧ12 million to about ǧ18 million while France offered to double its economic aid programme to ǧ22 million; Japan chipped in with US$3 million.81 In his address Dr. Chidzero stressed that the Government would continue to encourage successful commercial farmers: ‘What we are trying to do here is to transform the peasant sector without adversely affecting 79

‘Zimbabwe seeks ǧ780m aid to revive economy’, The Times (London), February 19, 1981. 80 ‘Mr. Mugabe seeks aid worth ǧ800 m to rebuild Zimbabwe’, The Times, (London), March 24, 1981. 81 ‘Zimbabwe to receive ǧ25m more aid from Britain as part of improved development package’, The Times, (London), March 25, 1981.

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the commercial sector. This is a way of bridging the gap between the two’. At the end of the first day’s session, the pledges of assistance amounted to US$1.3 billion; a substantial portion for the three-year development effort, however, represented commitments made long before the Conference.82 Before the end of the conference, Zimbabwe had received pledges of US$1.5 billion in economic aid. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Mr. Tom Mswaka, said the Government was ‘more than satisfied’ with the international response to its plea for help to rebuild the country’s economy and praised President Ronald Reagan’s Administration for increasing the American commitment from $56 million to $126 million during the conference.83 The conference ended on 27 March, 1981 with a massive sum of ǧ636.73 million having been pledged by aid donors for development projects over three years. When aid commitments already made before the conference were taken into account, it meant that Zimbabwe had attracted ǧ889.58 million in foreign assistance since independence in 1980; of this total, slightly less than half was in the form of grants and the rest in loans.84 In April, 1981 the Government resettled 582 peasant farmers on former white land in Gutu, about 180 miles south of Salisbury; altogether 4, 000 men, women and children were moved to 33 farms totaling about 80,000 acres. The project was the first and largest of six schemes which the Government had initiated around the country as part of its programme to relieve the pressure on land in communal areas by resettling peasant farmers on unused or underutilized white farms. Each family was given half an acre on which to build a house, a plot of 12 acres for farming, a seed pack, a few implements and some fertilizers. The land, however, was of poor quality which explained why most white farmers were only too happy to sell it to the Government. 85 On 31 August, 1981 the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Dr. Sidney Sekeramayi, said white farmers who wanted to sell their land must first offer it to the Government for use in Zimbabwe’s

82

‘Zimbabwe Guests Pledge US $1.3 Billion: Nations and Agencies at Meeting Offer Rural Development Aid’, The New York Times, March 25, 1981. 83 ‘Zimbabwe Reports Getting Offers of $1.5 Billion at Aid Conference’, The New York Times, March 28, 1981. 84 ‘The West hopes to reap rewards from generous aid to Zimbabwe’, The Times, (London), March 28, 1981. 85 ‘Tribal land pressures force Zimbabwe to step up resettlement pace’, The Times, (London), April 7, 1981.

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resettlement scheme; if the Government turned down the offer, the land could be sold privately.86 In a New Year message to the nation on 31 December, 1981 Mr. Mugabe promised to speed up the redistribution of white-owned farmland among the rural blacks. He said despite the Government’s efforts to achieve an equitable distribution of land, the 5,000 commercial farmers still held more than their fair share and that large tracts of that land must be turned over to the peasants in 1982.87 On 9 October, 1983 he threatened to confiscate white-owned land for the resettlement of peasants if the British Government refused to give the promised compensation. 88 Although the resettlement programme was intended to redistribute land to the poorest peasant households and the urban unemployed, most of the land earmarked for redistribution was qualitatively the poorest; the process of land redistribution therefore left white commercial farmers in control of Zimbabwe’s prime land; to this extent, the land question per se remained largely unresolved.89 Initially, abandoned or underutilized land was the prime target for acquisition; hence land resettlement proceeded much faster without serious opposition from white commercial farmers. However, after the first three years as fewer and fewer white farmers were willing to sell their land to the Government, land prices rose by 48 per cent between 1980 and 1985. By 1986 the impact of the programme was marginal, benefiting less than 5 per cent of the estimated 800,000 peasant families in the communal areas and taking up 16 per cent of the commercial farmland. At the same time the increase in the population in the communal areas far outstripped the numbers of those who had been resettled.90 The land problem therefore persisted. After dithering for five years the Government announced a plan to purchase half of the 12 million hectares held by white commercial farmers for redistribution to the black peasants. At a meeting with white commercial farmers and their supporters in Harare in January, 1991 the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Dr. Witness Mangwende, stated: ‘The land question is a time bomb which must be 86

‘Zimbabwe demands first option on land’, The Times, (London), September 1, 1981. 87 ‘Mugabe Will Step Up Land Redistribution’, The New York Times, January 1, 1982. 88 ‘Zimbabwe Threatens To Seize Whites’ land’, The New York Times, October 10, 1983. 89 Sam Moyo, ‘The Land Question’, 191, 198. 90 Clever Mbengegwi, ‘Continuity and Change in Agricultural Policy’, 212.

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solved now. The time for energy-consuming debates on the desirability or otherwise of redistributing land has run out; only tangible action is required’. The President of the Commercial Farmers’ Union, Mr. Alan Burl, while acknowledging that significant land redistribution had to be carried out and conceded that blacks had a bona fide complaint, said white farmers were vital to Zimbabwe’s economy as the country’s largest single employer and that to hurriedly force half of the commercial farmers off their land without adequate compensation, would do Zimbabwe incalculable economic damage and would drastically harm its reputation with international donors. The commercial farmers put forward several suggestions for a moderate land redistribution plan. Dr. Mangwende said he would consider their suggestions and at the same time stated unequivocally that the land resettlement programme was not negotiable; he assured them, however, that the Government intended to carry out land redistribution as fairly as possible.91 In the general election held at the end of March, 1990 Mr. Mugabe and ZANU (PF) won a decisive victory with Mr. Mugabe receiving 78 per cent of the presidential votes cast while ZANU (PF) won 116 of the 120 contested parliamentary seats. Mr. Mugabe who received 2,026,978 votes in the presidential vote defeated his rival, Mr. Edgar Tekere, of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) who polled 413, 840 or 16 per cent of the vote. In the election, ZUM won two parliamentary seats while Reverend Sithole won a seat for the ZANU-Ndonga party. 92 Although only 54 per cent of the 4.8 million eligible voters cast their ballots, Mr. Mugabe interpreted the election results as a vindication of the correctness of the Government’s policies including land resettlement. On 16 March, 1992 the Government announced that it was forging ahead with its plan to forcibly acquire 20 million of the estimated 50 million acres of white-owned farmland. White farmers and Western donors including representatives of the World Bank told Mr. Mugabe that while they agreed with the principle of redressing the inequities of land holdings, they were opposed to the Government’s plan to designate land for acquisition arbitrarily and to pay less than the market rates for it. In a statement at a World Bank meeting in Paris in February, Zimbabwe’s major donors, principally Britain and the United States, cautioned that compulsory land acquisitions would deter foreign investment and severely depress the economy. In response, Mr. Mugabe stated: ‘You cannot run a 91

Andrew Meldrum, ‘The Land Question’, Africa Report, (March-April, 19991, 26-27. 92 ‘Mugabe Wins Decisively in Zimbabwe Voting’, The New York Times, April 2, 1990.

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society of haves and have-nots and hope that society will continue to accept the situation. We have to do justice and give the communal people and other people who want to go into agriculture land to do so’. The President of the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association, Mr. Michael M. Taggart, said there were about 12 million acres of underutilized fertile land which the Government could distribute to black farmers without resorting to compulsory acquisition. 93 Mr. Mugabe, however, brushed aside this argument and proceeded with his programme for compulsory land acquisition. On 19 March, 1992 Parliament approved a Bill which authorized the Government to acquire white-owned farmland in order to settle one million black peasants. White farmers objected to the Bill on the ground that it empowered the Minister of Agriculture to set the value of their land without compensating owners for buildings, barns or other improvements on the farms. In response, Mr. Mugabe warned that if the Government did not step in, the peasants would seize the farms themselves. 94 The following day Parliament passed the Land Acquisition Act. Members of the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) which represented black farmers strongly endorsed the Land Acquisition Act and at the same time urged the Government firstly, to select the best trained and most successful peasant farmers for resettlement as opposed to the previous policy of allocating land to the poorest black farmers and secondly, to sell plots to the resettled black farmers instead of the previous method of allowing them to farm the land through licenses which had to be renewed every five years; they argued that only when a black farmer owned his land and could pass it on to his family would he put in the work and investment needed to develop the land to its full potential.95 The Government’s land resettlement programme was severely damaged morally and politically in the wake of the land scandal which broke out early in 1995 after an independent newspaper, The Daily News, revealed that Bath Farm in central Wedza District which the Government had compulsorily acquired from a white commercial farmer for the resettlement of black peasants, had been leased to Dr. Mangwende, the same Minister who had argued that the Land Acquisition Act would be used to resettle black peasant farmers. The revelation that Dr. Mangwende 93

‘ Zimbabwe Moves to Take Over Whites’ Farmland’, The New York Times, March 17, 1992. 94 ‘Zimbabwe Approves Plan to Seize Farms For Black Peasants’, The New York Times, March 20, 1992. 95 Andrew Meldrum, ‘Righting The Land Wrong’, Africa Report, (July/August, 1992), 19.

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had leased from the State on very favourable terms the first farm forcibly purchased by the state for the resettlement of peasants, raised a furor. Further revelations in the independent press showed that other Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament, top civil servants and high-ranking army officers had also been awarded leases on choice State-owned farms. Confronted with the land scandal, Mr. Mugabe announced in May, 1995 the cancellation of 100 leases of State-owned farms and said a thorough study of the land tenure system in Zimbabwe and the need for land redistribution would be carried out.96 Early in March, 1996 an opposition candidate, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, withdrew from the presidential election and on 15 March, 1996 the last remaining opposition candidate, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, for various reasons also withdrew from the presidential election; this left President Mugabe as the sole candidate in the presidential election. The Registrar General, Mr. Tobaiwa Mudede, said both opposition candidates had withdrawn too late and the nation had spent too much money setting up 3,000 polling stations to cancel the election and that their names would remain on the ballot for the election scheduled for 16 to 17 March, 1996. Mr. Mugabe was apparently so eager for his presidency to be legitimized that he appeared on the Governmentowned television network urging voters to go to the polls. 97 Not surprisingly, he easily won the election with 1,404,501 or 92.7 per cent of the votes cast.98 Buoyed by the election results, Mr. Mugabe proceeded with his land redistribution programme. On 19 November, 1997 the Government gave landowners a list of 1,772 mostly white-owned farms totaling 12 million acres which it planned to seize and turn over to landless black peasants. Mr. Mugabe said the Government would pay only for improvements to the properties, not the land itself.99 On 28 November, 1997 the Government announced that it had identified 1,503 farms it planned to seize and gave the owners 30 days to file their objections. 100 Accordingly, on 28 December, 1997 white commercial farmers submitted final appeals against the designation of 96

‘The Land Scandal’, Africa Report, (January-February, 1995), 31. ‘Zimbabwe’s President’s Last Rival Withdraws From Election’, The New York Times, March, 1996. 98 http://.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Zimbabwe, 8/15/2007. 99 ‘Zimbabwe to Seize White-Owned Farms’, The New York Times, November 20, 1997. 100 ‘Zimbabwe Faces Showdown On Unfinished Issue of Land’, The New York Times, December 21, 1997. 97

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their farms for compulsory purchase by the Government. The President of the CFU, Mr. Nick Swanepoel, said he was confident that the Government which had already admitted anomalies in the original list would spare productive farms; he was optimistic that the process would be open and transparent.101 On 7 January, 1998 in a scathing criticism of the land resettlement programme during his visit to Zimbabwe, Mr. Tony Lloyd of the British Foreign Office, warned President Mugabe that his plan to seize 1, 503 white-owned farms would harm Zimbabwe’s credibility with investors and rejected Mr. Mugabe’s argument that the British Government should compensate white farmers because they were descendants of the British settlers who had seized the land from the black peasants.102 A complicating factor in the land resettlement equation was the problem of squatters. On 20 June, 1998 hundreds of subsistence farmers from 20 villages in Svosve communal area left the stony hills which their families had been pushed into by the white settlers and moved onto three white farms in the Marondera area about 60 kilometers east of Harare. They argued that the Government’s land resettlement programme was proceeding too slowly and decided to move onto the white farms because they were not prepared to die from hunger.103 The Government refused to evict them. In September, 1998 a Land Reform and Resettlement Conference held in Harare involving key domestic stakeholders and international donors, established a set of principles for land reform: transparency, respect for the law, poverty reduction, affordability and consistency with Zimbabwe’s wider economic interests.104

The Developments which led to the formation of the MDC, 1992-1998 Introduction This section examines the developments which led to the launching of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and in particular the economic 101

‘Zimbabweans Appeal on Land’, The New York Times, December 29, 1997. ‘Zimbabwe Is Criticized For Plan to Seize Farms’, The New York Times, January 8, 1998. 103 ‘Zimbabwe Squatters: Land Claims on White Farms’, The New York Times, June 22, 1998. 104 Department for International Development (United Kingdom), Land resettlement in Zimbabwe: Background Briefing, March, 2000, 1. 102

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hardships suffered by the majority of the people especially in the urban areas.

The Developments which led to the formation of the MDC, 1992-1998 The Movement for Democratic Change was largely an urban movement born of the enormous economic hardships suffered by many people especially in the urban areas. By July, 1992 unemployment in Zimbabwe stood at more than 40 per cent, inflation at nearly 40 per cent and interest rates at 36 per cent in addition to critical food shortages caused as much by bad Government policies as by a devastating drought. Malnutrition soared in a country which usually exported food; many children were being turned away from public schools because their parents could not afford the fees. In the face of this grim economic and social picture Mr. Mugabe failed to make decisions or inspire confidence. In this regard, Mr. Ariston Chambati, Zimbabwe’s former Ambassador to West Germany and Chairman of T. A. Holdings, a major business conglomerate, stated: ‘Mr. Mugabe gives the impression of being overwhelmed. The boat is without a captain; two years ago he was very much in charge’. The chief economist at the First Merchant Bank in Harare, Mr. John Robertson, argued that the Government could have avoided half the total food imports with better economic policies. He said for several years, the Government paid a low price to farmers who grew maize, the staple crop. As a result, commercial farmers switched to other crops and the Government had to rely on the small peasant farmers who lived on less fertile land; relying on this uncertain source for maize, the Government, expecting the usual rainfall in January and February, sold its entire maize reserves by December, 1991. But instead of rain, record high temperatures swept across southern Africa, causing the worst drought in the century. 105 The Government apparently learnt nothing from its mistakes and over the next six years continued with its disastrous agricultural policy. On Wednesday, January 21, 1998 after two days of rioting over a steep rise in food prices, the Cabinet met in emergency session and decided to introduce a programme of limited price controls. The Minister of Information, Mr. Chen Chimutengwende, in a statement said the Government was determined to address the situation fully and as a matter 105 ‘Mugabe’s Aura Fades as Drought Sears Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, July 10, 1992.

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of urgency and was taking measures to ensure that no one would be able to raise prices for basic food commodities to ‘unjustifiable and unrealistic levels’. The Government appointed a committee of three Ministers to investigate the price increases and to recommend measures to prevent profiteering. The previous day Mr. Mugabe had ordered troops and armoured cars onto the streets of Harare to help the Police quell the food riots which began on Monday, 19 January, 1998. Although there were no reports of injuries or deaths, looting was widespread. While the Cabinet was meeting in emergency session, the police searched every house in Chitungwiza near Harare confiscating goods apparently looted from ransacked stores; soldiers guarded looted stores south of Harare to prevent reporters from filming the damage wrought by mobs during the previous two days. Mr. Chimutengwende appealed to citizens in the riot-affected areas to return to work and avoid being hoodwinked by hooligans, arsonists and other forces which had their own political agenda. The Government accused whites of fomenting the riots in retaliation for the Government’s plan to seize 1,503 white commercial farms for redistribution to poor blacks. A political analyst at the University of Zimbabwe, Dr. John Makumbe, said the proposed price controls might buy Mr. Mugabe a little time but would not take the pressure off him: ‘The problem is the mismanagement of the economy and that is not going to be addressed by this Government. It will not admit it has mismanaged national affairs and the national economy’.106 Accustomed to luxury, within days of the food riots, all Cabinet Ministers got new Mercedes-Benz cars in addition to the Jeep Cherokees they had got for visiting rural constituencies. 107 It was in these circumstances of economic hardships suffered by many people especially in the urban areas that the MDC was born.

The Launching of the Movement for Democratic Change, (MDC), 1999 Because urban workers were affected the most by economic hardships, the struggle for political, economic and social change of necessity fell on the shoulders of the trade unions. In the absence of a strong political 106

‘To Quell Riots, Zimbabwe Plans Price Controls on Basic Foods’, The New York Times, June 22, 1998. 107 ‘Zimbabweans (Minus the President) Brace for a Crisis’, The New York Times, July 5, 1998.

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opposition to ZANU (PF), the leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) launched the MDC on 11 September, 1999 under the leadership of the Secretary General, Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai (see photo).The MDC held its inaugural Congress at Chitungwiza near Harare on 29 January, 2000; at the Congress Mr. Tsvangirai was elected President of the MDC. Although the MDC was in the main an urban movement, it was also committed to land reform but rejected completely ‘the illegal and destructive manner’ in which the ruling party had carried out the land reform exercise. In its Policy Statement, the MDC committed itself to: initiate ‘a properly- planned and managed land reform process’ in all areas of the country; ensure that the legal rights of land owners would be fully respected and enforced; encourage existing land owners to resume farming as soon as possible and give them all possible assistance to enable them to do so and to assess and pay compensation to white commercial farmers for losses incurred during the ruling party’s land reform programme. The statement said an MDC government would provide security of tenure to black farmers in the communal areas and promised to adopt a marketdriven agricultural policy focusing on enabling commercial farmers to produce at the lowest cost possible on a sustainable and profitable basis and to make special efforts to restore the country’s capacity to feed itself. 108 In short, the MDC’s agrarian reform programme aimed to revitalize agriculture, to stimulate agro-industrial transformation throughout the rural areas and to provide capital to small-scale entrepreneurs in both the rural and urban areas.109 The MDC’s programme of a market-driven economy, respect for land rights and the rule of law, its promise to pay compensation to white commercial farmers for losses they had incurred during the ruling party’s land redistribution exercise, was the sort of sweet music white commercial farmers had been waiting to hear for a long time; not surprisingly, they began to bankroll the new opposition party. On 13 April, 2000 after receiving renewed pledges of financial support from Western donors for the land redistribution programme, the Government temporarily halted its land redistribution programme and

108 MDC: http://www.mdczw.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&, 17/8/2007. 109 MDC: The MDC’s RESTART PROGRAMME, http://www.mdczimbabwe.org, 4-5.

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appealed to black squatters to abandon the white-owned farms they had invaded and occupied during the previous two months. 110 In spite of the promised economic aid, President Mugabe announced on 16 April, 2000 that the Government would not force black squatters to leave the white-owned farms they had occupied; his statement came three days after the Vice President, Mr. Joseph Musika, had called upon the squatters to abandon the white-owned farms they had occupied. The previous week the Supreme Court had ordered the Police to evict the squatters if they would not leave peacefully but Mr. Mugabe, on returning from a meeting of Third World leaders in Havana, vowed to defy the Supreme Court order. Addressing cheering supporters in Harare on 16 April, 2000 Mr. Mugabe described the farm invasions as ‘a problem’ but stated that only the Government and not the courts could correct it. The President of the Commercial Farmers’ Union, Mr. Tim Henwood, said in the altercation which followed the occupation of the Virginia farming area, the invaders abducted Mr. David Stevens from his farm and killed him.111 The following day Mr. Mugabe apparently shifting his tone over the invasions of white-owned farms extended an olive branch to white farmers when he met their leaders behind closed doors. The meeting, however, was fruitless because apart from expressing regrets over the killing of Mr. Stevens, he refused to order the squatters off the land.112 On 19 April, 2000, however, President Mugabe under international pressure to end the violence at white-owned farms, met with the President of the Commercial Farmers’ Union, Mr. Tim Henwood, and the Chairman of the Zimbabwe War Veterans’ Association, Dr. Chenjerai Hunzvi. The first meeting between the two sides yielded a temporary agreement to end the violence. At the end of the meeting, Mr. Henwood and Dr. Hunzvi said they planned further meetings to try to reach an understanding on the future of land reform. Expressing satisfaction at the outcome of the meeting, President Mugabe said: ‘It has created an atmosphere of understanding even though there may not have been the necessary solution on both sides’.113 110

‘ With Foreign Aid Promised, Zimbabwe Calls Off Squatters’, The New York Times, April 14, 2000. 111 ‘Zimbabwe’s Leader Reverses Call for Squatters to Leave’, The New York Times, April 17, 2000. 112 ‘Leader to Meet With Farmers in Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, April 18, 2000. 113 ‘Hostilities Should End, 2 Sides in Zimbabwe’s Land Battle Agree’, The New York Times, April 20, 2000.

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In London on 27 April, 2000 eight hours of tense negotiations on Zimbabwe’s deepening political crisis ended in impasse after the British Government refused to provide extra money for land resettlement until the squatters had ended their occupation of white-owned farms. The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Robin Cook, delivered the message in talks with a delegation of three Zimbabwean Ministers led by the Minister of Local Government, Mr. John Nkomo. British officials said the Zimbabwean negotiators wanted Britain to release $56 million for land resettlement without preconditions. Mr. Cook said Britain was prepared to help pay for land reform and seek further international aid for Zimbabwe but made it clear that the British Government would not take any of these steps against a background of farm occupations and violence. 114 Dr. Makumbe commented: ‘The whole land issue is a classic example of diversion of attention from the real issues facing this country: high levels of unemployment, inflation, and poverty’. Another critic of Mr. Mugabe, the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, the Reverend Desmond Tutu, speaking to European journalists in Durban commented: ‘He is almost a caricature of all the things people think black leaders do. He seems to want to make a cartoon of himself. I am shattered because Mr. Mugabe is one of the most highly qualified and most able leaders. One just wants to weep. It’s very sad’.115

The Parliamentary Elections and their aftermath, June-December, 2000 Opening his party’s election campaign on 3 May, 2000 President Robert Mugabe (see photo) said the occupation of white-owned farms by black squatters would continue until land was available to resettle them. In a contradictory statement, he stated that the takeover of white-owned farms would be carried out in a just way but ‘if there is going to be resistance, then we might go much further. We just want our land and will take it in whatever way is feasible’.116 On 17 May, 2000 with only seven days to go before the parliamentary elections, President Mugabe reminded cheering supporters in Harare that 114

‘Britain Ties Money for Zimbabwe To the End of Land Seizures’, The New York Times, April 28, 2000. 115 ‘Mugabe’s Real Foes Aren’t the Ones He Denounces’, The New York Times, April 30, 2000. 116 ‘Zimbabwe’s Leader Demands Resettlement Lands’, The New York Times, May 4, 2000.

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ZANU-PF had led the country to political independence and promised that it would continue to fight for the people by redistributing white farms to landless blacks and reinstituting price controls on basic foodstuffs. He said he appreciated the hardships they were experiencing and at the same time warned that an MDC government would worsen the situation.117 In spite of the reported violence and intimidation against members of the opposition by members of the ruling party before the election scheduled for 24-25 June, the first day of the balloting apparently opened with relative calm. At a news conference in the evening, the Chairman of Zimbabwe’s Elections Directorate, Dr. Mariyawanda Nzuwah, said the turnout had been ‘tremendous’ with long queues reported in both the urban and rural areas. Reporting for The New York Times, Mr. Henri E. Cauvin said in the urban centre of Marondera about 45 miles east of Harare and in the surrounding rural communities, older and rural voters appeared to be sticking with Mr. Mugabe’s party while the younger and urban voters seemed to be latching onto the new opposition party as their best hope for a change in the country’s miserable economic fortunes.118 On 26 June, 2000 in their first report on Zimbabwe’s parliamentary elections, European election observers condemned the ruling party for supporting a campaign of violence and intimidation before the vote and obstructing the work of thousands of local election monitors. At a news conference several hours after the polls closed on Sunday, 25 June, the head of the European Union observer mission, Mr. Pierre Schori, stated: ‘ZANU-PF leaders seemed to sanction the use of violence and intimidation against political opponents and contributed significantly to the climate of fear so evident during the election campaign. Overall the conduct of the Government has failed to uphold the rule of law and compromised law enforcement agencies’.119 In a stunning performance in the election, the MDC won 57 of the 120 contested parliamentary seats; the ruling party won 62 seats while Reverend Sithole’s ZANU-Ndonga party won one seat. The MDC won its seats in lopsided victories in the urban centres. The casualties included Mr. Tsvangirai himself who lost his race for Parliament; several Cabinet Ministers including the Minister of Justice, Mr. Emmerson Mnangagwa, and the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa, were defeated 117

‘As Vote Nears in Zimbabwe, Mugabe Finds Less Support’, The New York Times, June 18, 2000. 118 Henri E. Cauvin, ‘After Campaign Marked by Intimidation, Zimbabwe Voting Opens With Relative Calm’, The New York Times, June 25, 2000. 119 Henry E. Cauvin, ‘Observers Issue Tough Report on Zimbabwe Vote Climate’, The New York Times, June 26, 2000.

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in the election. In their places voters elected opposition candidates and political novices who had experienced the hardships of ordinary people. Embarrassed by the election results in a speech broadcast on national television in the evening Mr. Mugabe stated: ‘I look forward to working with the new Parliament as together we grapple with the pressing challenges of improving the livelihood of our people and developing our nation. There is a great expectation in our country around the land which is still to come to our people in a big way, and around the economy, which is going through a bad patch and for which lasting answers will have to be found’. In spite of the bitter and divisive campaign, Mr. Tsvangirai urged the people to work together across party lines to improve the economy and added: ‘This election result means that neither ZANU-PF nor President Mugabe can go it alone’.120 The problem was that in spite of the severe rebuke in the parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF and President Mugabe were determined to go it alone in the land redistribution programme; they were able to do so because an amendment to the Constitution allowed the President to appoint 30 Members of Parliament including 8 Provincial Governors and 10 traditional Chiefs; this gave the ruling party 92 seats in Parliament. However, because the ruling party no longer enjoyed a two-thirds majority in Parliament, the MDC MPs could veto any attempt by the ruling party to unilaterally amend the Constitution. On 28 June, 2000 the Minister of Information, Mr. Chen Chimutengwende, said the Government would proceed with the seizure of white-owned farms. He added, however, that the Government was also committed to peace and order.121 Commenting on the tremendous showing of the MDC in the elections, the research economist at the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, Mr. James Jowa, said while in terms of parliamentary debate, the advent of the opposition party was positive, its power to effect change was limited and that things were getting worse and worse.122 On 30 July, 2000 the Government announced that it would acquire 3,000 white-owned farms to resettle thousands of landless people and would use the army to provide transport and other logistical support for the resettlement programme.123 120

‘Success of Zimbabwe’s Opposition Signifies Big Changes’, The New York Times, June 28, 2000. 121 ‘Despite Election, Mugabe Pledges to Seize White-Owned Farms’, The New York Times, June 29, 2000. 122 ‘Zimbabwe’s Woe: It’s the Economy’, The New York Times, July 5, 2000. 123 ‘Mugabe Plans To Confiscate 3,000 farms’, The New York Times, July 31, 2000.

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On 2 August, 2000 the opposition alliance of the ZCTU and white business owners brought the nation to a standstill as thousands of black employees stayed home and white industrialists shut banks and stores to protest the farm invasions. Bowing to pressure, President Mugabe said the squatters would leave most farms within a month after the Government had completed its redistribution plan: ‘We will, in the process remove all war veterans from the rest of the farms that will not be resettled’.124 Three months after President Mugabe bowed to the election results and welcomed the MDC into Parliament with promises of cooperation, the honeymoon between ZANU-PF and the opposition party soon soured. On 9 October, 2000 the Police arrested three opposition Members of Parliament on charges of inciting violence and sprayed tear gas on scores of their supporters who sang and danced outside the courthouse before scattering through clouds of chocking smoke. Mr. Tsvangirai warned that the arrests would cause unnecessary conflict in the country but neither side was willing to back down. Once the euphoria over the parliamentary election results had waned, the MDC Members of Parliament on assuming office, found themselves unable to implement the programmes on which they had been elected; they were outnumbered and outvoted by the ruling party in Parliament. The economic hardships which had propelled most urban electors to vote for the opposition party, continued unabated. The MDC leadership was divided between a small vocal group which was beginning to argue that the party should mobilize the public to take to the streets and force President Mugabe to leave office before the expiration of his term in 2002 and the majority who preferred to oppose the ruling party in Parliament.125 On 10 October, 2000 the Police questioned Mr. Tsvangirai for two hours at their headquarters but delayed a decision on whether to arrest him for making a speech while abroad warning Mr. Mugabe that if he did not resign, the people would remove him by violent means. On the same day they released the three opposition Members of Parliament after declining to prosecute them on charges of inciting violence.126 Reporting from Harare on 13 October, 2000 Rachel L. Swarns of The New York Times stated that the opposition watched helplessly as President Mugabe pardoned the perpetrators of political violence before the 124

‘Protest Against Farm Squatters Stops Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, August 3, 2000. 125 ‘Zimbabwe Authorities Crack down on Political Opposition’, The New York Times, October 10, 2000. 126 ‘Zimbabwe Releases Main Opposition Leader After Questioning’, The New York Times, October 11, 2000.

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parliamentary elections, drafted party militants into a militia and allocated millions of dollars more to the costly war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo while hospitals ran short of syringes. On numerous occasions the MDC legislators found themselves outnumbered and ignored. As the frustration increased, the opposition warned that its supporters might turn to violence if the ruling party continued to block their efforts to make fundamental changes; disillusioned members began to call for mass protests to force President Mugabe to leave office before the presidential election in 2002. A white MDC Member of Parliament, Mr. David Coltart, believed that most opposition members would support a peaceful and meticulously- planned mass action strategy to persuade Mr. Mugabe to resign without damaging the economy or provoking violent clashes with the Government but his constituents in the poor black townships of Bulawayo wanted something more radical such as a general strike. He doubted whether people were prepared to stay away from work for months on end and reminded his constituents that the Government controlled the army and police and was prepared to meet violence with violence.127 With the MDC in disarray, Mr. Mugabe proceeded with his land redistribution programme. On 11 November, 2000 the Government announced that it would press ahead with the land reform programme. The Minister of Lands and Agriculture, Dr. Joseph Made, told the state-run radio: ‘There is no going back on the land redistribution exercise regardless of the Supreme Court ruling that the Government should stop the fast-track programme until all the legal requirements are met’.128 In a race-baiting address to 7,000 cheering supporters at the ZANU (PF) congress in Harare on 14 December, 2000 President Mugabe urged black Zimbabweans to unite against whites on the ground that they were at the centre of the country’s deepening economic crisis: ‘Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, our real enemy. They think because they are white, they have a divine right to our resources. The courts can do what they want, but no judicial decision will stand in our way. My own position is that we should not even be defending our position in the courts. The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans’. Commenting on Mr. Mugabe’s speech, the Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Zimbabwe, Dr. Alfred 127

‘Mugabe’s Foes in Zimbabwe, stymied, talk of Violence’, The New York Times, October 15, 2000. 128 ‘Zimbabwe Presses Its Seizures of Farms’, The New York Times, November 12, 2000.

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Nhema, stated: ‘He is playing to the gallery, but the average Zimbabwean needs practical solutions. The ruling party has to create jobs for Zimbabweans. If the congress cannot address the bread and butter issues, it has failed to tackle the most challenging issue for most people’.129 On 21 December, 2000 the Supreme Court ordered the Government to produce a workable land reform programme. In a 30-page ruling, the Supreme Court gave the Government until 1 July, 2001 to evict the invaders from white-owned farms saying it had a constitutional duty to ensure law and order and to protect the lives of all citizens. In response, a Government spokesman stated: ‘The Government through the President, has already pronounced its attitude to these kinds of decisions. The Court decisions are of no consequence if they are meant to interfere with the current programme’.130 On this sad note the debate on the Government’s controversial land redistribution programme ended, at least for the time being.

Women’s Rights in Zimbabwe, 1980-2000 A comprehensive history of Zimbabwe must of necessity include women’s rights firstly because African women were the most disadvantaged at independence in 1980 and secondly because they were as much a part of liberation struggle as the men. The role played by women in ZANLA during the liberation war has been well studied by Mrs. Josephine Nhongo Simbanegavi.131 The Minister of Community Development and Women’s Affairs, Mrs. Teurai Ropa Nhongo, a former combatant, tells us that during the war, women served as military instructors, commanders, teachers, cooks, carriers of war material to the war front and that about 10 per cent of the forces which served in the rear were women while about 15 per cent were actually engaged in combat.132 Zimbabwe operates under two systems of law: Roman- Dutch law or general law and customary law. Roman-Dutch law imported from Cape Colony in 1891 applies to all Zimbabweans in civil matters. The British

129

‘Leader Urges Zimbabwe Blacks to Menace the White Residents’, The New York Times, December 15, 2000. 130 ‘Workable Land Reform Is Ordered in Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, December 22, 2000. 131 Josephine- Nhongo Simbanegavi, For Better or Worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle, (Harare, Weaver Press, 2000). 132 For details, see her interview with Gayla Cook in Africa Report, (March-April, 1981), 50.

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retained customary law and applied it in all civil matters involving the indigenous people. In Zimbabwean customary law, an African woman was a perpetual minor from the cradle to the grave. She was under the guardianship of her father or some male relative; she had no locus standi to sue or be sued unassisted by some male relative and could not enter into legal contracts. Upon marriage, she immediately passed into the guardianship of her husband and if employed during the marriage, her income was regarded as additional to that of her husband and was taxed more heavily than that of her husband; these disabilities were direct consequences of customary law.133 In Zimbabwe, discrimination against women qua women must be understood in the broader context of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the United Nations on 18 December, 1979. The Convention defined ‘discrimination against women’ to mean ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field’.134 Following independence in 1980 the Government felt that no meaningful development could tale place in Zimbabwe without the total mobilization of all human resources including women. Accordingly, it established the Ministry of Community Development and Women’s Affairs (MCDWA) as the national machinery for the advancement of women in all spheres of life. The Ministry was tasked to mobilize, organize, coordinate and monitor public and private non-governmental organizations geared towards closing disparities between men and women in Zimbabwe.135 The Department of Women’s Affairs in MCDWA was given a mandate to: promote activities aimed at enabling women to participate in and at all political levels and structures; ensure the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in all sectors and all levels of formal employment; assist women to attain economic 133

Eddison Zvobgo, ‘Women in Zimbabwe: Transforming the Law’, in Africa Report, (March-April, 1985), 64. 134 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 1. For details, see http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm , 9/17/2007. 135 The Zimbabwe Report on UN Decade For Women, (Harare, Ministry of Community Development and Women’s Affairs, 1985), 13.

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independence; ensure the availability of adequate social services to women; create a cultural environment which recognized the potential and actual role of women in cultural development and to eliminate all laws that discriminated against women.136 The Ministry of Justice was tasked with the responsibility of transforming the law in so far as it oppressed women. The Minister of Justice, Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, said the Government felt very uncomfortable with the fact that women who constituted more than half of the population of Zimbabwe, were severely disadvantaged at independence and decided to relegate certain aspects of customary law to the dustbin of history by passing the Legal Age of Majority Act (LAMA) which came into force on 11 December, 1982. The new statute fixed the age of majority at 18 years of age for all people, men and women and abrogated African customary law to the extent that it imposed limitations on African women which did not apply to men.137 Under the new statute, an African woman as a major acquired a contractual capacity including the right to enter into a marriage contract without the need for parental consent. However, in spite of the passing of this Act, customary practices continued to militate against the advancement of African women in Zimbabwe. In this regard, Dr. Zvobgo stated: ‘Whatever changes we may bring about in the law of marriages will not alter the fact that for most people in Zimbabwe it will continue to be the practice that a young woman who wants to get married will do so only if her male parent or guardian gives his consent; no law can stop that practice, at least not at the moment. What we can do is to remove the requirement of parental consent from the formalities of marriage’.138 Mrs. Joyce Kazembe, a sociologist and an activist on women’s rights issues, described LAMA as probably ‘the most revolutionary enactment’ concerned with the ideal of equality; its passage was marked by jubilation and ululation by thousands of women at Mbare Stoddard Hall in Harare because of the far reaching and revolutionary implications of the Act. One implication of the Act was that upon reaching majority age, an African woman no longer needed a guardian; she could now sue and be sued in her own right, could own property, sell it or give it away without interference from anyone and as a major she could now enter into any contract without the need for a guardian. Under the Act a woman wishing to enter into a 136

United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Initial Report on Zimbabwe, CEDAW/C/ZWE/1, 20 July, 1996, 8. 137 Eddison Zvobgo, ‘Women in Zimbabwe: Transforming the Law’, Africa Report, (March-April, 1985), 64-65. 138 Eddison Zvobgo, ‘Removing Laws That Oppress Women’, Africa Report, (March-April, 1983), 45-46.

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marriage contract could do so without the consent of her father or other male relative; therefore nobody could legally prevent her from marrying simply because roora/lobola (bride price) had not been paid. Another implication of the Act was that African women could also become guardians of their own children, irrespective of whether these children were born in or out of wedlock.139 In addition to LAMA, Parliament passed several other statutes to outlaw discrimination against women. The Sex Discrimination Removal Act (1983) entitled women to hold public office and to exercise all public functions established by national law on equal terms with men without discrimination. The Labour Relations Act (1985) prohibited employers from discriminating against an employee or prospective employee in relation to employment, on grounds of, among other things, sex. The Act prohibited discrimination in wage determination, provision of training facilities and advancement opportunities and in the provision of other employment facilities. The Matrimonial Causes Act (1985) provided for an equitable distribution of matrimonial property between spouses on divorce in a registered marriage. Under the Act, a woman’s contribution to the well-being of the family was taken into consideration in deciding on the division of the property. Prior to the amendment of the Deeds Registration Act in 1991 a married woman could not deal in immovable property without the assistance of her husband. The Act was amended to remove discrimination against women in the execution of deeds and documents required to be registered with the Deeds Registry. 140 Meanwhile, several women’s organizations were formed to improve the status of women in Zimbabwe. The Women’s Action Group (WAG) was formed on 31 October, 1983. The objectives of the organization were/are to: promote women’s human and legal rights; enhance the ability of women to advocate for their human rights nationally; promote women’s leadership in decision-making processes across the spectrum of society; promote a balanced gender-sensitive portrayal of women in Zimbabwean society and to support any efforts to liberalize the broadcast media in Zimbabwe to allow other non-state players in the sector. 141 WAG developed a Legal Education Programme in 1990 in response to the lack, and in some cases, the absence of knowledge of women’s legal and human rights among women themselves and their inability to access laws or 139

Joyce L. Kazembe, ‘The Women Issue’, in Ibbo Mandaza, (ed.), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986, (London, Codesria, 1987), 390391. 140 CEDAW, Report on Zimbabwe, 13-16. 141 http://www.kubatana.net/wag/html/about_cont.htm 9/23/2007.

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justice. The Programme established an extensive outreach network on legal literacy in order to bridge the gap between the law and society by reforming the framework within which most women lived. The objectives of the Programme were/are to: provide women with tools, education and inspiration to assert their legal and human rights and become leaders in their communities; develop and strengthen networking and outreach activities which advocate women’s rights in communities nationwide; create increased awareness of women’s human rights and to address problems faced by women in the legal system.142 The Musasa Project is a non-governmental organization founded in 1988 in Harare to challenge those cultural values and community attitudes which condoned and justified violence against women in Zimbabwe. Its mission was/is to change social attitudes, behaviour, laws and policies in order to reduce violence against women through networking, public education, counseling and legal advocacy. To raise public awareness, it stages annual media campaigns, conducts radio discussions and participates in local agricultural shows and sponsors many other activities to heighten public awareness of gender-based violence and to change prevailing social attitudes; it offers free counselling and legal advice to women who have been victims of violence. In 1996 it opened a shelter for abused women and children in Harare.143 The struggle for women’s rights in Zimbabwe must be understood in the broader context of the activities of the Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA) Research Trust, an action-oriented research organization in the seven countries of southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. WLSA’s objectives include: developing the research skills of women law researchers in the network countries; conducting research on gender issues in southern Africa, particularly those relating to legal rights; providing information on gender and the law and influencing policy and law reform in each country; networking and exchanging information among the seven countries; conducting training and planning seminars on research and producing materials in the seven countries; exploring and developing new methodologies and new perspectives for the study of gender and law in the seven countries; co-operating and liaising with other organizations in each country, in the region and internationally on issues relevant to women and the law.144 142

http://www.kubatana.net/wag/html/what_cont.htm 9/23,2007. http://www.comminit.com/expriences/pds2005/experiences-3230.html 9/23/2007. 144 http://www.wlsa.org.zm/objectives.htm 9/11/2007. 143

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WLSA traces its roots to a workshop held in 1988 in Nyanga in eastern Zimbabwe which brought scholars and activists from southern African countries to discuss the legal situation of women in the seven countries. Its mission is to contribute to the sustained well-being of women within families and societies in the seven countries through six programmes: Action Research, Information Dissemination and Documentation, Legal Advice and Services, Lobbying and Advocacy for Policy, Legal Reform and Change, Networking, Training and Education on Women’s Rights as Human Rights. It provides consultancy services at national and regional level in the following areas: Gender, Law, Human Rights and Women’s Rights.145 Its activist research is geared to inform and influence action to improve women’s legal position and to incorporate action into research by educating women about their legal rights, providing legal advice and launching campaigns for changes in the law. WILSA research investigates both customary and general law and the interaction between the two and takes the perspective that the official customary law of southern African states is a rigid, skewed and sometimes distorted version of actual customary law.146 The organization has published numerous books on the conditions of women in southern Africa including Zimbabwe.147 Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF) is a Pan-African, non-governmental and non-profit making organization which brings together various organizations and individuals using a variety of tools, including the law, to promote a culture for the exercise of, and respect for, women’s rights in Africa. The network was established at a regional conference held in Harare in February, 1990. Its overall goal is to promote the effective use of a variety of strategies, including the law, by women in Africa for self, community, national, sub-regional and regional development. 148 It has published several books on women’s rights in Africa.149 145

http://www.wlsa.org.zm/profile.htm 9/11/2007. http://www.wlsa.org.zm/program1.htm 9/11/2007. 147 On Zimbabwe, see Maintenance Law in Zimbabwe (1991); Inheritance in Zimbabwe (1994 ); Continuity and Change: The Family in Zimbabwe (1997); Paradigms of Exclusion: Women’s Access to Resources in Zimbabwe (1997); In the Shadow of the Law: Women and Justice Delivery in Zimbabwe (2000). 148 http://www.hri.ca/partners/wildaf/about/about.shtml 9/12, 2007. 149 Including Legal Literacy ( A Tool for Women’s Empowerment, (1992); Strengthening Linkages for Women’s Rights in Africa (1992); The Private is Public (A Study of Violence Against Women in Southern Africa), 1995; The World Conference on Human Rights (The WILDAF Experience), (1995). http://www.hri.ca/partners/wildaf/pubs/pubs.shtml 9/12, 2007. 146

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The Zimbabwe Women Lawyers’ Association (ZWLA) was founded in 1995 to assist women and children to assert their rights by accessing the relevant legal resources; its mission is to uplift the legal status of women and children in Zimbabwe.150 The Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network (ZWRCN), founded in 1997 is a non- governmental organization working on women’s rights and gender issues; its core business is the gathering, interpreting, publishing and disseminating socially-transformative information to enable women to make informed choices about their lives and to influence Government policies through lobbying and advocacy to implement gender-sensitive policies. The objectives of the organization are to: promote gender equality; empower women to influence decision-making at all levels; strengthen inter-organizational networking for the exchange of knowledge and information on gender and to lobby and advocate for change in policies and practices that negatively affect women. It sees its role as a facilitator in empowering women with information. The Documentation and Information Centre holds approximately 5,000 published and unpublished material on gender and development, feminism and women’s human rights. The objectives of the Centre are to: acquire, process and organize published and unpublished material and disseminate the acquired information; provide information on women’s organizations in Zimbabwe; inform, support and strengthen the advocacy and lobbying activities of the organization.151 Although women in Zimbabwe made tremendous strides in their quest for equality with men since the passing of the Legal Age of Majority Act, their right to inheritance was overturned in a dramatic development. In July, 1997 Ms. Venia Magaya, a fifty-two year old seamstress, was evicted from her house in the Mabvuku suburb of Harare by her younger halfbrother after her parents had died. As the eldest daughter of her deceased father’s first wife, a community court had designated her as heiress to the property. Her half-brother appealed the decision to the magistrate’s court and won. Mrs. Rita Makarau, a lawyer and a Member of Parliament, appealed the magistrate’s court decision to the Supreme Court on behalf of Ms. Magaya and in April, 1999, lost. In a unanimous decision (5-0) the Supreme Court ruled that under customary law, only males inherit the estate of a deceased father. Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice Gibson Muchechetere argued that under customary law, the status of African women was basically the same as that of a junior male in the family. 150

http://www.kubatana.net/html/sectors/zim012.asp 2007/09/25. http://www.zwrcn.org.zw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25&I temid=38 9/11/2007.

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Women’s rights organizations both in Zimbabwe and abroad were outraged by the Supreme Court’s decision. In a formal letter of protest to Justice Muchechetere, seven women’s rights organizations in Zimbabwe stated that the decision had set ‘a very retrogressive precedent’ in erasing the progress made in advancing the status and rights of women in an independent Zimbabwe. 152 In spite of the protest, in 2000 the position remained unchanged.

Human Rights in Zimbabwe, 1984-2000 As demonstrated earlier in this Chapter, the Fifth Brigade severely violated the human rights of civilians in Matabeleland in its campaign to suppress the dissidents. This section examines the role played by the Legal Resources Foundation, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZIMRIGHTS), the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum in promoting human rights in Zimbabwe in the broader context of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African (Banjul) Charter on Human Rights and People’s Rights. On 10 December, 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including the right of every person to life, liberty and security of his person; the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law; the right to an effective remedy by competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law; the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state; the right to leave any country including his own and to return to his country; the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution; the right to freedom of thought, of conscience and religion; the right to freedom of opinion and expression, of peaceful assembly and association; the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives; the right of equal access to the public services of his country; the right to social security; the right to work, to free choice of employment and to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment; the right to equal pay for equal work without any discrimination; the right to a just and fair remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity; 152

Sita Ranchod-Nilsson, ‘Zimbabwe: Women’s Rights and African Custom’, in Lynn Walter (ed.), Women’s Rights: A Global View, (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 2001), 199-200.

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the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests; the right to rest and leisure including a reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay; the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services; the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood or old age and the right to education including free and compulsory elementary education.153 Although the United Nations General Assembly adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights during the heydays of colonialism and some of its provisions were clearly unenforceable in light of the poverty prevailing in the colonial territories at that time, it nevertheless had important implications for the future. On 27 June, 1981 the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) adopted the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights under which every individual is entitled to have: the right to liberty and to the security of his person; the right to have his case heard including (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against violations of his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; (c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal; the right to receive information; the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law; the right to assemble freely with others; the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a state provided he abides by the law; the right to leave any country including his own and the right to return to his country; the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with the laws of those countries and international conventions; the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law; the right of equal access to the public services of his country; the right to work under satisfactory conditions and to receive equal pay for equal work and the right to education.154 Although the above provisions of 153

For details, see the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948-1998. http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html 9/14/2007. 154 AFRICAN (BANJUL) CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, (Adopted 27 June, 1981, OAU doc. CAB’LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21,I.L. M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October, 1986), For details, see http://www.1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/resafchar28th.html , 9/14/2007, 1-14.

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the Charter were not always strictly observed by member states because of various constraints including economic constraints, they nevertheless provided a high standard of human rights to aim at. The Zimbabwe Legal Resources Foundation (LRF), a charitable and education trust, was formed in 1984 to meet an expressed need to improve the accessibility to legal information services to all sections of the population. Its vision is to facilitate access to justice through: positive transformation of, and building confidence in, the justice system and campaigning for respect and promotion of the rule of law. Its mission is to achieve its vision by: educating people on their rights and responsibilities and mobilizing them to access their rights; producing legal reference and educational materials; providing training to community leaders and grassroots education through schools; providing legal assistance to marginalized people through well-equipped legal assistance centres; working with authorities and institutions responsible for justice delivery to strengthen the justice delivery system and training officials responsible for the administration and delivery of justice; engaging in test case litigation and pursuing lobbying, advocacy and publicity campaigns for the test case programme; using lobbying and advocacy to raise awareness of human rights and promoting a culture of human rights and observance of the rule of law and developing the human and material resources necessary to accomplish these aims and objectives. It pursues its objectives through the following programmes: Legal Services, Legal Education, Publications; Advocacy and Research.155 The Legal Services Programme operates legal advice centres in urban and rural areas while the Legal Education Programme offers a variety of activities including community education, workshops on human rights issues for secondary school teachers, for local and traditional leaders, for court officials and other judicial officers, radio and other media programmes in the major languages.156 It has published several books and pamphlets written mostly by Professor Geoffrey Feltoe of the Faculty of Law of the University of Zimbabwe.157 The major goals of ZIMRIGHTS, an umbrella organization for several human rights groups which was launched in May, 1992 are to: make human rights a household word and a concern of all Zimbabweans; develop a culture of human rights among individuals and all sectors of 155

http://www.lrf.co.zw/About.php 9/13/2007. http://www.lrf.co.zw/Programs.php 9/14/2007. 157 Including A Guide to Media Law in Zimbabwe, ( 2003); A Guide to Criminal Law in Zimbabwe (2004); Commentary on the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (2004; A Guide to the Administrative and Local Government Law in Zimbabwe, (2006); A Guide to Zimbabwean Law of Delict , (2006). 156

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society in Zimbabwe; promote and defend human rights in Zimbabwe through networking, education programmes, publications, legal aid and lobbying. Its objectives are to: promote (through a deliberate outreach programme) human rights for all people regardless of status; assist the marginalized sectors of the community by providing them with relevant education and information to enable them to assert their rights and to seek improvement in their living conditions; act as a voice of the voiceless, the oppressed and the disadvantaged groups; carry out research into injustices and the underlying causes of these injustices and to find a remedy through documentation and recommendations based on established facts; lobby the Government to commit itself to good governance through ratifying important international human rights instruments and to co-operate with other human rights organizations which strive to advance the cause of human rights locally, regionally and internationally. ZIMRIGHTS strives to achieve its objectives through various programmes and projects. The Human Rights Education Programmes involve workshops to introduce the concepts of human rights, targeting its own members, community leaders, grass-roots organizations, Government officials and schools. The Civic Education Programme uses community theatre to enhance human rights awareness, to stimulate discussion about civic issues and to promote tolerance among citizens, respect for human rights and gender equality. It publishes a newsletter which is widely distributed locally, in the sub-region and among international organizations to promote human rights issues in Zimbabwe and disseminates information through the mainstream media through press releases. On specific issues, ZIMRIGHTS provides information for target audiences. The Economic and Social Rights Outreach Programme uses a holistic approach strategy to enable marginalized, homeless, urban and rural poor identify human rights violations and educate this target group about their rights. Its main thrust is to research, publish economic, social and cultural rights conditions in Zimbabwe, hold workshops and disseminate information on the findings of the Outreach Programme and to promote dialogue between marginalized rural and urban communities with policymakers. ZIMRIGHTS offers legal advice and assistance with special emphasis on human rights test cases and public interest case litigation, that is, using the law to enforce human rights. It takes up the challenge to create capacity for: (a) human rights training and monitoring of strategic lawmaking and enforcement agencies; (b) advocacy for human rights law reform; (c) providing human rights legal services to members, including referral and information. The organization also gathers documentation

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from its field officers on human rights issues they handle at community level, for publication.158 The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), formed in 1996 in Harare, strives to protect, promote, deepen and broaden the human rights provisions in the Constitution of Zimbabwe; it endeavours to find common ground with and to work alongside other Zimbabwean groups, organizations, activists and persons who share a broadly-similar concern for and interest in human rights particularly in southern Africa, and especially those closely linked to the legal profession. To achieve these objectives the ZLHR: monitors proposed legislation which may affect human rights and submits commentaries on such legislation to relevant bodies; issues public statements on important aspects of human rights, when appropriate; arranges meetings, seminars and discussion groups on human rights issues; encourages and supports prospective litigators in cases which involve the protection, promotion, and expansion of the human rights provisions of the Constitution of Zimbabwe and publishes every six months the Zimbabwe Human Rights Bulletin which contains a narrative summary of all major human rights issues in Zimbabwe and an analysis of these developments from a social, political and economic perspective and a survey of legislation which has a bearing on human rights in Zimbabwe.159 The Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, formed in January, 1998, is an umbrella organization representing nine human rights organizations including the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, the Legal Resources Foundation, ZIMRIGHTS, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers’ Association. The objectives of the organization are to: train its personnel in identifying and documenting human rights violations in Zimbabwe, collect information and maintain databases on the observance of human rights in Zimbabwe and on the violations of those rights, undertake legal proceedings on behalf of the victims and to give legal advice to such victims. It produces regular reports on human rights violations in Zimbabwe and documents all human rights violations, particularly politically-motivated violence.160 It provided assistance to detainees and produced a report on the Food Riots of January, 1998 and forwarded it to the President and Parliament in support of the request for an independent commission of inquiry. When the Government took no steps either to establish a commission of inquiry or to compensate the victims, the Forum decided to go ahead and supported the request by 158

http://www.hrforumzim.com/members/zimrights/zimrightstext.htm 9/12/2007. http://www.zhlr.org.zw/about/objectiv.htm 9/21/2007. 160 http://www.hrforumzim.com/front_main.htm 9/20/2007. 159

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the victims for civil claims against the Government. It filed 42 suits in the courts against the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Defence. The Government initially indicated that it would contest all the claims through the Attorney General’s office but later relented and settled the claims either out of court or through judgments handed down by the High Court.161 It is clear that the various organizations working in tandem and with financial assistance from local and international donors, made invaluable contributions in promoting human rights in Zimbabwe.

Summary and Conclusion This Chapter has examined the major developments in Zimbabwe from independence in 1980 to 2000 and in particular the stresses and strains in the Government of National Unity and its aftermath (1980-1982); the problem of dissidents in Matabeleland and the Government’s response (1982-1984); the rocky road to the Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU (1985-1987) and its aftermath; the land problem (1980-1998); the developments which led to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (1992-1998); the launching of the MDC (1999); the June, 2000 general election and its aftermath; women’s rights and human rights in Zimbabwe. An intractable problem facing the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe was the persistent mutual mistrust between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU and their respective former armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA which led to fierce fighting at Entumbane in November, 1980 and in February, 1981 with enormous casualties. The dismissal of Mr. Nkomo and his associates from the Cabinet in February, 1982 for reasons already explained, brought the Government of National Unity to an end. As already explained, several factors led to the rise of the dissident movement in Matabeleland; it will suffice to say that beginning in January, 1983 in its campaign to suppress the movement, the Fifth Brigade unleashed a reign of terror on civilians suspected of habouring the dissidents. The Government denied the allegations of army atrocities against civilians in Matabeleland. It was not until January, 1984 in a belated effort to refute the allegations complained of, that the Government set up a commission of enquiry but declined to publish its report leading to 161 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum: An Analysis of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Legal Cases, 1998-2006.

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suspicion that it must have contained damning evidence of army atrocities in Matabeleland. Enough has been said about the rocky road to the Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU. It will suffice to say that it was the uncontrolled violence before and after the 1985 general election which finally persuaded the leaders of both parties to seek a political solution to the violence. On 22 December, 1987 after protracted negotiations lasting over a year, Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo signed the unity agreement to merge their parties into a single party. To the relief of all Zimbabweans, the Unity Accord finally ended the problem of dissidents which had brought in its wake much sorrow and suffering to the people of Matabeleland. The problem of land resettlement and reform in Zimbabwe after independence was a vexing one. In spite of the enormous amounts of money raised at the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) in March, 1981 the land problem persisted in the main because under the Lancaster House Constitution, as already explained, land could change hands only on the basis of ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ basis. The problem was that many white commercial farmers were unwilling to sell productive portions of their farms to the Government; it was in these circumstances that Parliament passed the Land Acquisition Act in 1992 empowering the Government to compulsorily acquire land from white commercial farmers to resettle landless blacks. Because urban workers were the most affected by economic hardships, the struggle for political, economic and social change of necessity fell on the shoulders of the trade unions. In the absence of a strong political opposition to ZANU (PF) the leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions launched the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under the leadership of the Secretary General, Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai. Although the MDC was largely an urban movement, it was also committed to land reform. Its emphasis on respect for land rights and the rule of law, its commitment to pay compensation to white farmers for losses incurred during the ruling party’s land redistribution programme, led many white farmers to bankroll the new opposition party. In the general election held in June, 2000 the ruling party survived by the slenderest of threads. Putting a brave face on the election results, Mr. Mugabe said he looked forward to working with the new Parliament but three months after bowing to the election results with promises of cooperation, the honeymoon between ZANU (PF) and the MDC soon soured when the Government began to persecute the MDC Members of Parliament and proceeded with its land redistribution programme.

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The role played by the Government in improving the status of women in Zimbabwe through various statutes, has been explained in detail. It is clear that as a result of these statutes women made a tremendous progress in many aspects of life, the Magaya vs. Magaya decision notwithstanding. The origins and objectives of the various women’s organizations to improve the status of women in Zimbabwe and in particular their legal and human rights, have been explained in detail; it will suffice to say that through various programmes including extensive outreach networks, they raised public awareness of women’s legal and human rights. The role of various human rights organizations in promoting human rights in Zimbabwe in the broader context of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, has been explained in detail. These organizations through various programmes, have heightened public awareness of the need to improve human rights in Zimbabwe. The history of Zimbabwe since independence has been a checkered one with mixed results. The achievement of independence opened a glorious chapter in the nation’s history with tremendous achievements recorded in education and health during the first decade of independence. With its enormous natural resources, Zimbabwe should be doing infinitely better than it is doing today; regrettably, it is the mismanagement of the economy which is at the heart of the nation’s problems. While the nation has achieved the political kingdom, ordinary people are economically worse off today than at independence; a nation which made such a promising start at independence and was expected to serve as the breadbasket of the southern African region because of its sophisticated agricultural industry, can no longer feed itself with little prospects of improvement in the lives of ordinary people in the foreseeable future.

POSTSCRIPT ZIMBABWE, 2001-2008

Introduction In the parliamentary elections held in Zimbabwe on 29 March, 2008, the ruling party, ZANU (PF), lost control of the House of Assembly for the first time since independence in 1980. In the presidential elections, the leader of the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC), Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai, defeated the ZANU (PF) candidate, Mr. Robert Mugabe, by 48 to 43 per cent of the vote; because neither candidate gained 51 per cent of the vote as required by law, this necessitated a run-off. Prior to the second round of voting on 27 June, 2008 President Mugabe through a systematic campaign of terror against members of the opposition, ‘won’ re-election. This extended postscript examines the events leading to these extraordinary developments and in particular the arrests and harassment of leading members of the MDC prior to and after the presidential elections of 9 to10 March, 2002; the presidential elections; reports of four observer groups to the presidential elections; other developments (2002-2004); the 2005 parliamentary elections and their aftermath (March-December, 2007); the food crisis (July, 2001-March, 2008); economic mismanagement (April, 2001-February, 2008); the March, 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections and their aftermath (April- June, 2008); reports of three observer groups to the run-off presidential election and its aftermath; the major developments (June-September, 2008) and in particular the Memorandum of Understanding signed between ZANU (PF) and MDC (21 July, 2008); the 15 September agreement signed between ZANU (PF) and MDC; the food crisis (March-August, 2008); economic mismanagement (March-August, 2008); summary and conclusion. Although these developments took place simultaneously, for clarity, they will be treated separately.

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The arrests and harassment of leading members of the MDC, 2001 In a widening crackdown on 7 February, 2001 the MDC’s Vice President and leader of the MDC in Parliament, Mr. Gibson Sibanda, and the Secretary of the Youth League, Mr. Nelson Chamisa, were arrested on charges of inciting violence during speeches at weekend rallies; both denied the allegations and instead accused the Government of orchestrating violence against members of the opposition.1 On 6 May the Government filed charges of terrorism against Mr. Tsvangirai arising from a speech he had made while abroad in October, 2000 warning President Mugabe that if he did not resign, the people would remove him by violent means. Mr. Tsvangirai said the charges were politically motivated the aim being to prevent him from contesting the forthcoming presidential elections.2 In a landmark ruling on 21 November, 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the charges of terrorism against Mr. Tsvangirai on the ground that Sections 51 and 58 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of 1960 under which the State had brought charges of terrorism against Mr. Tsvangirai, were unconstitutional as they contravened the right to freedom of expression and to protection of the law. 3 Undeterred by the Court ruling the Government continued to hound the leader of the opposition. On 25 February, 2002 Mr. Tsvangirai was interrogated by the Police for two hours at Harare Central Police Station on charges of plotting to assassinate President Mugabe. 4 It was in the context of the arrests and harassment of leading members of the MDC and the terrorism charges against Mr. Tsvangirai that presidential elections were held in Zimbabwe from 9 to 10 March, 2002.

The Zimbabwe Presidential Elections, March, 2002 On Saturday, 9 March, 2002 voters in Zimbabwe turned out in record numbers for the first day of the presidential elections. In Harare, the capital, voters stood in long queues to cast their votes. In the evening the 1

Rachel L. Swarns, ‘Two Opposition Leaders Are Arrested in Zimbabwe Crackdown’, The New York Times, February 8, 2001. 2 http://www.afrol.com/News2001/zim020_tsvangirai_charged.htm 3 http://www.afrol.com/News2001/zim039_tsvangirai_cleared.htm 4 ‘Tsvangirai accused of high treason’, http://www.afrol.com/News2002/zim012_mdc_murder_plot2.htm

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Minister of Justice, Mr. Patrick Chinamasa, said he was prepared to allow voting beyond the stipulated period if it became clear that more time would be needed to accommodate the ‘unprecedented’ turnout. The Registrar General, Mr. Tobaiwa Mudede, in a statement, confirmed that voters already in the queue by 7 p.m. of the following day would be allowed to vote and that polling stations would remain open until voters were cleared. 5 On the second day, the voter turnout was reported to be high both in the rural and urban areas but the voting process in MDC strongholds in the urban areas was extremely slow; in some polling stations in Harare, for example, as few as 60 people an hour were able to vote. 6 On Sunday evening, 10 March, 2002 Justice Ben Hlatshwayo of the High Court ordered the Government to extend voting in the presidential elections nationwide to Monday, 11 March to accommodate thousands of people who were unable to cast ballots before the polls closed. 7 The Minister of Justice, Mr. Patrick Chinamasa, bowed to the High Court order to extend the voting nationwide for a third day.8

Reports of Observer Groups on the presidential elections and other developments, 2002-4 Before the vote, the observer groups invited to monitor the presidential election included the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) representing 35 civic organizations, the Norwegian Observer Mission, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum and the Commonwealth Observer Group; a summary of their findings and conclusions is called for. In a Press Statement on 12 March, 2002 the Chairman of the ZESN, Dr. Reginald Matchaba-Hove, said the presidential elections in Zimbabwe were not free and fair because firstly, there was a deliberate attempt by the Government to increase the number of polling stations in the rural areas, in particular mobile polling stations which were difficult to monitor while polling stations in the urban areas were reduced by as much as 50 per cent in some constituencies. In Harare and Chitungwiza this was particularly 5

Henri E. Cauvin, ‘Voters Brave Long Lines And Threats In Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, March 10, 2002. 6 ‘Zimbabweans flock to elect President’, http://www.afrol.com/News2002/zim019_elections2.htm 7 Henri E. Cauvin, ‘Judge Orders An Extra Day For Balloting In Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, March 11, 2002. 8 http://www.afrol.com/News2002/zim020_elections3.htm

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worrying because the presidential and municipal elections were being held simultaneously; as a result, tens of thousands of Harare and Chitungwiza voters were unable to vote even after the extension of voting by an extra day. Secondly, there were disturbing reports of violence during polling days-opposition polling agents and even the ZESN monitors were harassed and prevented from carrying out their work. Thirdly, there were questionable data on the rural and urban divide which claimed that there was a higher voter turnout in the rural areas than in the urban centres. On behalf of the ZESN Dr. Matchaba-Hove stated: ‘There is no way these elections could be described as substantially free and fair’.9 In a Preliminary Statement on 13 March, 2002 the Norwegian Observer Mission stated firstly that the run-up to the presidential election was marred by intimidation and violence; opposition meetings were disrupted, party representatives were taken in for questioning by the Police during deployment to their polling stations, party offices were raided and opposition officials and supporters were detained on spurious charges. Secondly, in spite of a clear requirement in the Electoral Act to allow all voters in the queue to vote at the close of the polls, the Registrar General decided to close all polling stations around 10 p.m. on the second day and at 7 p.m. on the extended third day. Inexplicably, the polling did not start at 7 a. m. but at 11 a. m. on the third day; the irregular closure of polling stations on the second and third day together with the late opening on the third day, removed the last chance to offer all voters a fair chance to cast their vote within a reasonable time. For these reasons the Mission concluded that the presidential elections in Zimbabwe were not free and fair.10 In a Press Release on 13 March, 2002 the SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer Mission stated firstly that the election campaign was marred by incidents of violence in all provinces; evidence indicated that the majority of people affected were MDC supporters or those perceived to be opponents of the ruling party; the prevalence of violence against members of the opposition was reflected in virtually all reports of their observers in the field including the abduction of some MDC polling agents. Secondly, the voters’ roll was made available to the public three days before the polls, leaving no time for the electorate to verify its accuracy; consequently, thousands of people were unable to vote. Thirdly, the 9

http://www.africaaction.org/does02/zim0203.htm Kare Vollan, Preliminary Statement on presidential elections by the Norwegian Observer Mission, 13 March, 2002, in http://www.afrol.com/Countries/Zimbabwe/documents/norw_election_mission.htm

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reduction in the number of polling stations in urban areas had a major impact on the elections especially in Harare where presidential and municipal elections were being held at the same time resulting in congestion with some voters spending more than 48 hours in the queues in their sheer determination to vote. Fourthly, the opposition was denied access to the public media; the slanted coverage of the election by the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation deprived the electorate of an opportunity to make an informed choice; for these reasons they concluded that the presidential elections in Zimbabwe were not free and fair.11 In a Preliminary Report on 14 March, 2002 the Commonwealth Observer Group stated firstly that while the actual polling and counting processes were peaceful, the run-up to the presidential elections in Zimbabwe was marred by ‘a high level of politically-motivated violence and intimidation’ by members or supporters of the ruling party against members or supporters of the opposition. Members of youth groups organized under a National Youth Training Programme carried out ‘a systematic campaign of intimidation’ against known or suspected supporters of the MDC; violence and intimidation created a climate of fear and suspicion; very often the Police refused to take action to investigate reported cases of violence and intimidation especially against known or suspected supporters of the MDC; they appeared to be high-handed in dealing with the MDC and lenient towards ZANU (PF) supporters; this failure to impartially enforce the law seriously called into question the application of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. Secondly, the limitations on freedom of speech, of movement and of association, prevented the opposition from campaigning freely. Thirdly, restrictions placed on local civic society groups effectively barred this important sector from participation in the democratic process; unnecessary restrictions were placed on the deployment of independent domestic observers. Fourthly, thousands of Zimbabweans were disenfranchised because of lack of transparency in voter registration and the wide discretionary powers of the Registrar General in deciding who was included in, or omitted from, the electoral register. Fifthly, the ruling party used its incumbency to exploit state resources to benefit its electoral campaign; this was compounded by the Government’s near monopoly of the broadcast media.

11 SADC, Parliamentary Forum Observer Mission (Windhoek), Statement on Zimbabwe Elections, March 13, 2002.

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Finally, on polling days many voters in urban areas who wanted to cast their vote were unable to do so because of a significant reduction in the number of polling stations. There was an inexplicable delay in complying with a High Court order to extend voting to 11 March. Voting in Harare and Chitungwiza was especially slow, leading to many voters being turned away at the end of the third day; they concluded that conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for a free expression of will by the electors.12 According to the official results announced on 13 March, 2002 Mr. Mugabe won 1,685,212 votes or 56.2 per cent while Mr. Tsvangirai won 1,258,401 or 42 per cent. 13 Mr. Tsvangirai rejected the results on the ground that prior to the elections, ZANU (PF) had waged a two –year campaign of violence in which opposition supporters were beaten or killed by mobs led by war veterans and young militants recruited by the ruling party; MDC leaders were unable to campaign in some areas because of widespread violence; polling agents were abducted during the three-day election period; the reduction in the number of polling stations in MDC strongholds in the urban areas prevented nearly 360,000 voters from casting ballots before voting ended on Monday evening. 14 On 6 June, 2003 Mr. Tsvangirai was arrested in Harare for organizing mass protests demanding President Mugabe’s resignation; military helicopters swooped over the city while army vehicles ferried troops around the city and police patrol cars cruised the streets. In Bulawayo opposition officials said troops in full combat gear were patrolling the streets; at least 300 people including opposition Members of Parliament were arrested nationwide during the protests.15 In a dramatic development on 20 June, 2003 Justice Susan Mavangira of the High Court ordered the release of Mr. Tsvangirai on the ground that the State had failed to prove that Mr. Tsvangirai posed a serious threat to the nation’s stability. 16

12 Commonwealth Observer Group’s Preliminary Report on Zimbabwe presidential elections, 14 March, 2002, in http://www.afrol.com/Countries /Zimbabwe /documents/commonw_election_group.htm 13 For details, see http://en.wikpedia.org/wiki/Zimbabwean_presidential_election%2C_2002 14 The Washington Post, March 14, 2002. 15 ‘Zimbabwe Arrests Opposition Leader and Fends Off Protests’, The New York Times, June 7, 2003. 16 ‘A Zimbabwe Judge Frees Opposition Leader Jailed by Mugabe’, The New York Times, June 21, 2003.

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On 20 January, 2004 Mr. Tsvangirai taking the stand for the first time in his eleven-month treason trial, denied that he ever plotted to assassinate President Mugabe.17 In a landmark decision on 15 October, 2004 Justice Paddington Garwe of the High Court dismissed the treason charges against Mr. Tsvangirai because of insufficient evidence to convict him on charges of plotting to kill President Mugabe.18

Zimbabwe Parliamentary Elections, 31 March, 2005 and their aftermath On 31 March, 2005 parliamentary elections were held in Zimbabwe. According to official results, of the 120 parliamentary seats being contested, ZANU (PF) won 78 seats with 1,569, 687 votes or 59.6 per cent; the MDC won 41 seats with 1,041, 292 votes or 39.5 per cent of the poll; one seat went to an independent candidate. 19 At a news conference the following day Mr. Tsvangirai rejected the results charging that ZANU (PF) had stolen the election through intimidation and vote rigging.20 In a statement on 3 April, 2005 the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) while conceding that the voting process nationwide had progressed smoothly and speedily amid general peace and tranquility, nevertheless argued firstly that the Report of the Delimitation Commission released in December, 2004 was not well publicized as evidenced by the high numbers of voters who were turned away at polling stations because they were in the wrong constituency. Official figures released by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) indicated that in six provinces the number of voters turned away before the end of polling totaled 130,000 or 10 per cent. For instance, in Makoni East constituency where ZANU (PF) won 9, 201 votes compared with the MDC’s 7,708 a total of 2,223 voters had been turned away while in Mutasa South constituency where ZANU (PF) got 9,715 and the MDC 9,380 votes, a total of 1,460 voters had been turned away; in both cases, the number of voters turned away was higher than ZANU (PF)’s margin of victory. Secondly, the public media, both print and electronic, were biased against the opposition; access to the radio and television was heavily skewed in favour of the ruling party. Thirdly, 17 ‘Zimbabwe: Opposition Leader Denies Treason Plot’, The New York Times, January 20, 2004. 18 ‘Zimbabwe Court Clears Leader of Opposition; Evidence of Attempt to Kill Mugabe Was Wanting’, The Washington Post, October 16, 2004. 19 Wikipedia, Zimbabwean parliamentary elections, 2005. 20 ‘Mugabe’s Party Wins Majority in Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, April 2, 2005.

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the failure by the ZEC to display the results at some polling stations reduced transparency and accountability and undermined the value of counting ballots at each polling station.21 An MDC spokesman, Mr. James Littleton, also rejected the results of the election on the ground that there were wide discrepancies between some vote totals and the election results. At 2 a.m. on 1 April, 2005 the Government announced that 8,579 voters had cast ballots in Murehwa South constituency in Mashonaland East Province but the final results showed that ZANU (PF) had won 19, 200 votes and the MDC 4, 585; in other words there were 15,206 more ballots than the total number of votes reported earlier.22 Similarly, in Nyanga constituency the Government first reported that 13, 896 ballots had been cast but the final results gave the ZANU (PF) candidate 12, 612 votes versus 9,360 for the opposition candidate-a total of 8,000 more votes than originally announced; he said there were also discrepancies in 29 other constituencies. 23 In the wake of its defeat in the controversial March parliamentary elections, the MDC began to splinter over whether to field candidates for the Senate. Mr. Tsvangirai said the party should not take part, arguing that the vote was certain to be rigged in favour of ZANU (PF) and that taking part would add legitimacy to the results but many party leaders including the Secretary General, Professor Welshman Ncube, and the Vice President, Mr. Gibson Sibanda, sharply disagreed arguing that boycotting the election would cede political control to Mr. Mugabe; at a meeting on 24 October, 22 party leaders fielded candidates for election to the Senate. 24 In the Senate elections held on 26 November, 2005 ZANU (PF) won 43 of the 50 contested seats; the MDC managed to win 7 seats.25 Following its defeat in the Senate elections, the MDC split into two factions: one led by Mr. Tsvangirai with the support, among others, of Mr. Tendai Biti, Mr. Nelson Chamisa, Mr. Lovemore Moyo, Mr. Elias Mudzuri, Mr. Eddie Cross and Mr. Roy Bennett and the other led by Professor Arthur Mutambara and supported among others, by Mr. Gibson 21

Dr. R. Matchaba-Hove, Chairperson, Zimbabwe Election Support Network Statement on 2005 Parliamentary Elections, April 3, 2005. 22 ‘Zimbabwe Opposition Promises to Spell Out Election Fraud’, The New York Times, April 5, 2005. 23 ‘Opposition In Zimbabwe Sees Fraud In Vote Data’, The New York Times, April 7, 2005. 24 ‘Zimbabwe’s Opposition Party Splits Over Running in Next Election’, The New York Times, October 25, 2005. 25 ‘Zimbabwe Turnout Hits a Record Low; Mugabe Backers to Dominate Senate’, The Washington Post, November 29, 2005.

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Sibanda, Professor Ncube, Mr. Gift Chimanikire, Mr. Gabriel Chaibva, Mr. Paul Themba Nyati and Mr. David Coltart. The Government took advantage of the split in the MDC to further weaken the opposition. On Sunday morning, 11 March, 2007 the Police cracked down on a major anti-government rally in Highfield Township near Harare killing one protester and arresting several others including Professor Mutambara and the St. Mary’s MP, Mr. Job Sikhala. Mr. Tsvangirai was arrested together with members of his faction including Mr. Biti, Mr. Chamisa, Ms. Sekai Holland and Ms. Grace Kwinjeh. 26 The following day Mr. Tsvangirai and Professor Mutambara stood side by side in court before the Police ejected spectators and sealed off the building. One of Mr. Tsvangirai’s lawyers, Mr. Alec Muchadehama, said Mr. Tsvangirai suffered deep cuts to his head and a badly-battered right eye during his two days in jail.27 On 14 March, 2007 defence lawyers said fifty anti-government protesters who were arrested and beaten by riot police on Sunday, 11 March, were freed after neither the Police nor the prosecutors showed up at a hearing at which the protesters were to be charged; a lawyer for some of the protesters, Ms. Beatrice Mtetwa, said an unknown number including Mr. Tsvangirai, remained in Harare hospitals, some with broken bones and other serious injuries; they were released in the custody of their lawyers.28 On 18 March Mr. Nelson Chamisa was stopped and beaten with iron bars by four assailants as he tried to drive to Harare International Airport to catch a flight for Brussels for a meeting with European Union officials.29 The same day Professor Mutambara was arrested as he tried to leave Harare International Airport to fly to South Africa. In a related incident, two other anti-government activists, Ms. Grace Kwinjeh and Ms. Sekai Holland, who had been seriously injured in the 11 March incident, were stopped by the Police as they tried to catch a flight to South Africa to seek medical treatment.30 26

‘Zimbabwe: Outpost of Tyranny: Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights Information Alert on Arrested Civil Society and Opposition Leaders’, 12 March, 2007. 27 ‘50 Protesters Hospitalized in Zimbabwe After Beatings’, The New York Times, March 14, 2007. 28 ‘Zimbabwe Frees 50 Protesters Without Charges’, The New York Times, March 15, 2007. 29 ‘Zimbabwe Opposition Spokesman Beaten at Airport’, The Washington Post, March 19, 2007. 30 ‘Opposition Official Beaten as Zimbabwe Crackdown Grows’, The New York Times, March 19, 2007.

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Addressing the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington on 23 March, 2007, the Chairman of the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights, Dr. Douglas Gwatidzo, said when Mr. Tsvangirai arrived at the Avenues Clinic in Harare he had a long gash in his scalp and was delirious from loss of blood; Ms. Kwinjeh had deep lacerations and a torn right earlobe while Ms. Holland sustained multiple fractures.31 In spite of the outrage over the 11 March incident, the Government continued to harass members of the opposition. On 28 March the Police raided the MDC headquarters and arrested Mr. Tsvangirai before freeing him a few hours later; riot police cordoned off the party headquarters shortly before Mr. Tsvangirai was scheduled to hold a news conference and arrested 20 people 32 At least 30 people were arrested outside the party headquarters including the MDC Member of Parliament, Mr. Paul Madzore, and the MDC Director of Elections, Mr. Dennis Murira. 33 On 5 May, 2007 the Police arrested two members of the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), Mr. Alec Muchadehama and Mr. Andrew Makoni, who had been part of a team of lawyers who had represented Mr. Tsvangirai and dozens of MDC officials after they were arrested and severely beaten by the Police on 11 March, 2007.34 In an unprecedented development on 27 June, 2007 the Police beat up lawyers who had gathered outside the High Court in Harare to protest the unlawful arrest and detention of Mr. Alec Muchadehama and Mr. Andrew Makoni; among the lawyers who were picked up and beaten by the Police was the President of the Zimbabwe Law Society, (ZLS) Ms. Beatrice Mtetwa. 35 Lawyers marched in protest against what they saw as increasing acts of violence against the legal profession. In a petition to the office of the Minister of Justice, Mr. Patrick Chinamasa, the ZLS said it was concerned at the ‘relentless and unjustified attacks’ on its members for actions taken during the course of their work. Attorneys who had been either attacked or threatened included the Deputy Secretary of the ZLS, Mr. Lawrence Chibwe; Mr. Alec Muchadehama, Mr. Andrew Makoni and Mr. Otto Saki. They stated: ‘In terms of the Legal Practitioners Act, legal practitioners are entitled to represent their clients without fear of being harassed and intimidated by the authorities. This right cannot be fully 31

‘Zimbabwe Doctor, Rights Activist Sees His Nation in a Free Fall’, The Washington Post, March 24, 2007. 32 ‘Zimbabwe Raid Targets Activists; Opposition Leader Arrested Again’, The Washington Post, March 29, 2007. 33 Amnesty International, Public Statement, 28 June, 2007. 34 ‘2 Lawyers arrested in Zimbabwe Sweep’, The New York Times, May 6, 2007. 35 Amnesty International, Public Statement, 28 June, 2007.

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enjoyed in an environment where legal practitioners are vilified, intimidated, harassed, assaulted, arrested, and detained for carrying out mandates given to them by the supreme law of the land’.36 In a report covering the period 24 November to 14 December, 2007 in the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for March, 2008 the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) said ZANU (PF) supporters marched through the streets of Harare on 30 November, 2007 in a ‘million man’ march organized by the war veterans in support of President Mugabe’s candidacy for the forthcoming elections. ZESN observers witnessed cases of misuse of public resources for this event; at least two motor vehicles belonging to the Chitungwiza Town Council were used to ferry ZANU (PF) supporters to the ‘million man’ march. Observers in Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central and Harare reported seeing the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company buses ferrying people to Harare for the march; in Hwange and Bulawayo, the National Railways of Zimbabwe were used for a similar purpose. The observers also reported cases of politicization of state or public functions and programmes for the benefit of the ruling party. In Hwedza and Chiredzi North constituencies, participants at a meeting organized under the Reserve Bank’s Farm Mechanization Programme to donate ox-drawn ploughs to poor villagers were forced to chant ZANU (PF) slogans; at Roger Howmann Hall in Masvingo Central constituency, ploughs were only allocated to people who had ZANU (PF) membership cards and could chant correctly at least three of the party’s slogans. The District Administrator for Gokwe- Nembudziya constituency told people who had been given ploughs that they would not be required to repay their loans if the ruling party won the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. The Masvingo Provincial Governor, Mr. Willard Chiwewe, was alleged to have stated that the ox-drawn ploughs donated to poor peasants would be withdrawn if ZANU (PF) lost the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. In Mutasa North constituency, the Police, soldiers and members of the Central Intelligence organization (CIO) disrupted an MDC rally for thirty minutes; the rally was only able to proceed after the MDC organizers showed them a police clearance letter. The ZESN urged all Zimbabweans to maintain high levels of political tolerance and desist from engaging in political violence.37

36

‘Angry lawyers take to the streets’, The Financial Gazette, (Harare), June 28, 2007. 37 ZESN, Pre-election Update, No. 1, 24 November to 14 December, 2007, 1-6.

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The Food Crisis, July, 2001-March, 2008 The Government’s disastrous land reform programme described in Chapter 10, led to widespread food shortages in Zimbabwe. In July, 2001 the Government admitted for the first time that the country was running out of food and needed foreign aid to help it to buy grain from abroad. 38 In a letter to the United Nations Development Programme, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Simba Makoni, detailed the huge food demands facing the country and asked for more than US$360 million in international aid.39 The ZANU (PF) Member of Parliament for Mberengwa East constituency and Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Rugare Gumbo, told Agence France-Presse on 17 September, 2001 that the food situation in Mberengwa was desperate.40 On 4 October, he said several people had already died of hunger in the southern districts of Mberengwa, a community of 170,000 people. 41 In Masvingo Province thousands of starving villagers abandoned their homes in search of edible wild fruits and roots.42 On 30 April, 2002 the Government declared a state of disaster as food shortages threatened famine; the declaration enabled international relief agencies to set up emergency programmes for an estimated 7.8 million people in need of urgent food aid.43 An FAO/WFP report dated 29 May, 2002 stated that Zimbabwe faced a serious food crisis because cereal production had largely collapsed due to prolonged drought and the disruptive land reform programme. It estimated the production of cereals for consumption in the April, 2002/March, 2003 marketing year at about 670,000 tonnes, a decline of 57 per cent from the previous year and 69 per cent down from production in 1999/2000; maize production was 480,000 tonnes, down by 67 per cent from the previous year and down 77 per cent in 1999/2000; cereal import requirements for the 2002/2003 marketing year were a staggering 1.869 million tonnes of which maize accounted for 1.705 million tonnes or 91

38

‘Zimbabwe Admits Food Crisis’, BBC News, July 5, 2001. ‘U.N. Will Send Food to Zimbabwe’s Hungry’, The New York Times, November 10, 2001. 40 ‘Thousands in rural Zimbabwe facing starvation’, Agence France Presse, September 17, 2001. 41 ‘Plenty of Pain to Share in Zimbabwe Land Reform’, The New York Times, October 5, 2001. 42 Energy Bara, ‘Zimbabwe’s Famished Fields’, BBC News, May 2, 2002. 43 ‘Zimbabwe “disaster” as famine looms’, BBC News, April 30, 2002. 39

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per cent; approximately 6 million people needed emergency food assistance amounting to 750,000 tonnes of cereals.44 On 1 July, 2002, the World Food Programme (WFP) launched an appeal to the international community to provide emergency relief food for six countries in southern Africa for the next nine months and was seeking US$507 million to fund close to one million tonnes of food for 10.2 million people until the next harvest in March, 2003; the needs for Zimbabwe comprised of 45 per cent of the total regional appeal or 452, 955 tonnes of food at a cost of US$229.4 million; as of 30 June, 2002 total cereal imports in the 2002/2003 consumption year were 270,400 Metric Tonnes (MT)- enough to cover less than two months of consumption requirements. The Government said the wheat available was 60,000 70,000 MT tonnes or a two months’ supply and planned to import 35,000 MT to meet the shortfall for the 2001/2002 marketing season; the national annual wheat consumption was 420,000 MT; the shortfall of 324,000 MT was expected to reach the millers in October.45 The United Kingdom donated US$10.6 million for Zimbabwe under the Southern Africa Regional Appeal; because of widespread food shortages, the official food inflation in May, 2002 was estimated at 108 per cent. The value of the expenditure basket for the very poor urban household of four people more than quadrupled in the twelve-month period; that of the very poor households increased by 163 per cent while the upper end of poor households in Harare saw their expenditure basket increase by 198 per cent to about ZW$19,360 per month by May, 2002.46 From 1 April to 31 July, 2002, a total of 336,843 MT of food was imported through the Government and donor humanitarian assistance. In spite of this, the food imports fell short of the national demand; maizemeal and maize grain remained in short supply; total cereal imports were just enough to cover two months of national consumption requirements. The Government-controlled Grain Marketing Board (GMB) contracted to purchase 500,000 MT of white maize from South America while the WFP was still to bring into the country a total of 137,094 MT of food pledged by the donors. 47 44

SPECIAL REPORT, FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO ZIMBABWE, 29 May, 2002. 45 United Nations, Relief and Recovery Unit, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, 8 July, 2002. 46 United Nations Relief and Recovery Unit, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, 22 July, 2002. 47 United Nations Relief and Recovery Unit, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, 6 August, 2002.

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The poor agricultural performance leading to food imports was attributed among other things to land re-distribution and farm invasions. White farm owners, unsure about the Government’s future policy directions planted less land while the new black farm owners uncertain about their occupancy and policy continuity, did not clear enough land for planting and politically-motivated violence on farms undermined farming activity.48 On 6 August, 2002 the Government tabled in Parliament and got an endorsement for a supplementary budget of ZW$52 billion, 16 per cent of which was for financing agricultural inputs for many newly-settled black farmers; fertilizer was in short supply primarily because imported components for the manufacture of fertilizer could not be secured in the desired quantities due to foreign currency shortages and the controlled price of the commodity made it unviable to produce it.49 In spite of widespread food shortages, the Government gave nearly 3,000 white farmers until 8 August, 2002 to vacate their farms for redistribution to blacks; those who defied the eviction order faced fines and up to two years in prison; hundreds of white farmers, however, defied the eviction order and none was arrested; the Police said they were waiting for formal instructions from President Mugabe. 50 In a much-awaited speech, Mr. Mugabe said of the defiant white farmers: ‘The game is up and it is time for them to go. We shall not budge; we shall not be deterred on this question. The land is ours’.51 On 16 August, 2002, 24 white farmers were arrested five of whom appeared in court in Gwanda where they were charged with defying the deadline to vacate their farms; the President of the Commercial Farmers’ Union, Mr. Max Crawford, said the Police were still looking for more farmers and were fanning out throughout Matabeleland and arresting farmers who were defying the eviction order.52 Two days later the Police rounded up 133 white farmers who had failed to meet the 8 August deadline to vacate their farms; 30 were released on bail while the rest 48

‘Zimbabwe-A Crumbling Economy’, Economic Report on Africa, 2002, Chapter 4, 117. 49 United Nations, Relief and Recovery Unit, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, 6 August, 2002. 50 ‘Thousands of Whites Defying Zimbabwe Over Farm Evictions’, The New York Times, August 12, 2002. 51 ‘Mugabe Remains Unyielding On Eviction of White Farmers’, The New York Times, August 13, 2002. 52 ‘Zimbabwe Starts Arresting White Farmers Defying Eviction’, The New York Times, August 17, 2002.

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remained in police custody. The Assistant Police Commissioner, Mr. Wayne Bvudzijena, said the Police would continue to arrest white farmers until they received instructions to cease doing so from the Attorney General’s office; the former Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, said he intended to continue farming at his ranch regardless of the threat of a twoyear jail sentence.53 In January, 2003 about one million people in the urban areas in Zimbabwe were in dire need of food; the United Nations urged donors to provide more food aid for Zimbabwe in order to avert disaster. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) imported a total of 685, 784 MT of food from February to December, 2002; in the Binga District, the Save the Children Fund (U. K.) provided 130,000 people with food aid.54 The FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission Report on Southern Africa dated 19 June, 2003 stated that in different parts of Zimbabwe many farmers lost their crops due to erratic weather and estimated total cereal production for consumption in 2003/2004 at 980,000 tonnes or 41 per cent higher than the previous year but 51 per cent below the 2000/2001 harvest. In addition to erratic rainfall, it attributed the much lower than normal cereal production to limited availability of seed and fertilizer and the inability of the newly-settled black farmers to fully utilize their land due to lack of adequate inputs or capital to procure them. Because of the haphazard implementation of the land reform programme, the large-scale commercial farming sector was now producing only about 10 per cent of its output in the 1990s. The Report estimated cereal import requirements for the 2003/2004 marketing year at 1.287 million tonnes of which maize accounted for 980,000 tonnes and said 4.4 million people in rural areas and 1.1 million in urban areas would need food assistance in 2003/2004.55 People were so desperate for food that at some distribution sites, beneficiaries were opening and eating uncooked rations on the spot and some even lacked the strength to carry their food home; the shortage of maize was driving many people to illegal gold panning and to eating wild fruits.56

53

‘More Arrests Of Farmers Defying Ouster In Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, August 19, 2002. 54 United Nations Relief and Recovery Unit, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, 29 January, 2003. 55 ‘Zimbabwe: significant food gap’, in FAO REGIONAL NEWSLETTER: Response to the Southern Africa crisis, July, 2003. 56 ‘Zimbabwe Orders Relief Agency to Hand Over Food Aid’, Environment News Service, August 20, 2003.

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In order to alleviate widespread food shortages, the WFP provided 1.1 million Zimbabweans with food aid in August, 2003. The Programme reached rural populations in 31 districts, up from 22 districts in May; over 27,000 malnourished children in Harare and Bulawayo received food assistance through the WFP urban feeding programme.57 The cost of the December, 2003 low-income urban household monthly basket monitored by the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (CCZ) increased by 5 per cent on the November basket to reach ZW$678,000.58 In January, 2004 the food situation in Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate. In addition to wild fruits and roots, households in some parts of Zimbabwe were reportedly eating locusts; WFP field reports indicated that scanty and erratic rains had affected the germination of crops in parts of the country; the worst affected was Manicaland Province. GMB supplies in rural depots remained low and supply was either erratic or nonexistent; the WFP was under ever-increasing pressure from entire communities which sought to be registered for food assistance because cereals were unavailable on the open market.59 In a Special Report on Zimbabwe in July, 2004 the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimated the year’s cereal production at just over 950,000 tonnes and said the Government’s agricultural policy had adversely affected the production of maize and wheat; there was little incentive for farmers to produce beyond their subsistence needs, given price controls and the lack of alternative markets; consequently, areas planted with maize in the major grain producing areas of Manicaland and Mashonaland were estimated to have dropped by between 9 and 37 per cent.60 The following month the food security outlook in Zimbabwe for the 2004/2005 marketing year remained uncertain; the WFP estimated that approximately 2.3 million people in the rural areas would be unable to meet their food requirements during the 2004/2005 season. The largest proportion of the population projected to be food insecure was in Matabeleland North Province (39.1 per cent); Matabeleland South Province (33.9 per cent) and Manicaland (31.7 per cent). The annual food inflation stood at 378 per cent in July, 2004; the monthly expenditure 57

United Nations Relief and Recovery Unit, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, 17 September, 2003. 58 United Nations Relief and Recovery Unit, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, January, 2004. 59 World Food Programme Emergency Report, 16 January, 2004. 60 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Special Report, Zimbabwe, 5 July, 2004.

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basket for a low income urban household of six monitored by the CCZ stood at ZW$1,326,980; by the end of July, the cost of meat rose by 96 per cent, that of bread by 17 per cent, tea by 23 per cent and flour by 18 per cent.61 In October, 2004 the Government requested local companies to supply 75,000 MT of maize seeds, 300 MT of groundnuts, 30,000 MT of soya beans and 200 MT of sorghum; the seed houses said they would deliver 32,000 MT of maize seed to the Government. The country was also experiencing shortages of ammonium nitrate fertilizer which was critical to maize production; the fertilizer industry said it would import 30,000 MT of ammonium nitrate fertilizer to complement local stocks. 62 Throughout the year, the availability of basic commodities (maize meal and flour) in Zimbabwe remained difficult and the ability of a significant proportion of the population to access food, considerably worsened; nearly 2.5 million people were food insecure following the 2004 harvest; with limited means to earn cash to procure food, a considerable number of households were left with no option but to depend on food aid. In the lean period before the harvest, the WFP stepped up food distributions funded by the European Commission’s €20 million commitment sanctioned in December, 2003.63 In 2005 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said at least three million people in Zimbabwe needed food assistance.64 In its appeal for Zimbabwe for 2006 the WFP estimated that in the 2005-2006 agricultural season at least three million people would need food assistance as the country had harvested an estimated 600,000 MT of maize, compared to its requirements of 1.8 million MT.65 Due to favourable rainfall the food security situation in Zimbabwe improved somewhat following the April, 2006 harvest; however, production remained inadequate to meet internal needs. The 2006 maize harvest was estimated at 1,100,000 MT against a human consumption requirement of 1.4 million MT; maize grain remained out of the reach of many vulnerable households with price inflation exceeding 1,200 per cent.66 61

The UN Humanitarian Coordinator’s Monthly Report, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, August, 2004, 1. 62 The UN Humanitarian Coordinator’s Monthly Report, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, October, 2004, 1. 63 Joint Annual Report, 2004, European Commission-Zimbabwe, 10. 64 United Nations, OCHA, Annual Report, 2005. 65 United Nations, Consolidated Appeal for Zimbabwe, 2006, 1. 66 United Nations, Zimbabwe, Projected 2007 Needs for WFP Projects and Operations.

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An FAO Mission to Zimbabwe in a Report for 1-31 May, 2007 estimated that around 2.1 million people would face serious food shortages as early as the third quarter of 2007; about 352, 000 tonnes of cereals and 90,000 tonnes of other food assistance would be needed to meet their basic food needs; overall, the Mission estimated the April/May, 2007 harvest at 925, 000 tonnes of cereals including 799, 000 tonnes of maize and 126, 000 tonnes of sorghum and millet-a 44 per cent decline from the previous year’s estimated output; the worst affected provinces were Matabeleland South, Matabeleland North and the Midlands where many families harvested nothing; the Government contracted to purchase 400,000 tonnes of maize from Malawi.67 From April, 2007 the WFP implemented a smallscale food distribution programme for an estimated 300,000 beneficiaries; under this programme, it distributed some 2,700 MT of food.68 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in a report covering the period 1-31 May, 2007 said the Government ordered manufacturers to cut food prices by 50 per cent; as a result, staple foods and other basic commodities for purchase became scarce; this adversely affected the food security of urban households; the total USAID humanitarian assistance for Zimbabwe amounted to $173, 649,094. 69 In spite of this assistance, the availability of maize grain and maize meal and other basic commodities in Zimbabwe continued to be problematic with shortages of bread in the shops and outlets as wheat flour in the country was increasingly in short supply.70 An FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe estimated the national cereal production in 2007 at 44 per cent down from the 2006 Government estimate resulting in a significant national food deficit; maize output was 46 per cent lower than the previous year and 13 per cent lower than the year before. The major factors responsible for the decline in addition to adverse weather were shortages of key inputs, deteriorating infrastructure, especially for irrigation. The newly-resettled black farmers were able to cultivate only about 30 to 50 per cent of their total arable land owing to shortages of tractor/draught power, fuel and fertilizers, under-investment in infrastructure/improvements, and lack of incentive because of price controls; large-scale commercial 67

United Nations, OCHA, Zimbabwe, Humanitarian Situation in Zimbabwe, 1-31 May, 2007 68 United Nations, OCHA, Zimbabwe, Humanitarian Situation in Zimbabwe, 1-31 July, 2007. 69 USAID, Zimbabwe-Drought and Complex Emergency, July 31, 2007. 70 United Nations, OCHA, Zimbabwe, Humanitarian Situation in Zimbabwe, 1-30 September, 2007.

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maize production accounted for less than 5 per cent of the country’s total maize production. Based on its estimates, the availability of cereals locally for consumption in 2007/2008 was about 1.287 million tones; the total utilization of cereals was about 2.339 million tonnes including 1.928 million tonnes for direct human consumption; the resulting cereal import requirement was 1.052 million tonnes of which the maize deficit accounted for 813,000 tonnes. The area planted to grains including maize in the 2006/2007 main season was down by about 6 per cent but the aggregate cereal yield was down by almost 40 per cent resulting in total cereal production drop from the previous year’s Government estimate of 44 per cent; overall, the area planted to maize in the communal areas declined by 8 per cent.71 By the end of October, 2007 many households in Zimbabwe had exhausted their cereal stocks and depended on income from short-term work on farms and/or outside assistance. Local maize seed availability stood at 35,000 MT against a requirement of 50,000 MT; the balance of 15,000 MT was being imported; sorghum seed in stock was 1,442 MT against a requirement of 4,000 MT. In most areas the winter wheat crop was affected by seed shortages as well as frequent power cuts making it very difficult for farmers to irrigate their fields; some shops in the rural areas remained closed due to the unavailability of basic commodities.72 The food security situation in Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate especially in the southern and western areas due to a severe drought; hyperinflation, price controls, fuel shortages and economic collapse underlay the country’s worsening food crisis.73 In January, 2008 availability of and access to food continued to be a problem as supplies especially in rural areas were limited and erratic; prices continued to increase in rural and urban areas. The fertilizer situation remained depressed throughout the 2007/8 season; a total of 51, 568 MT of basal fertilizers was imported as of 25 January, 2008.74 The following month, a total of 7,641 households received food packs countrywide; a large number of people in Hurungwe, Makonde, Chiredzi and parts of Manicaland Province came to the distribution sites in the hope

71

FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe, 5 June, 2007. 72 United Nations, OCHA, Humanitarian Situation in Zimbabwe, 1-31 October, 2007. 73 USAID, Southern Africa Food Security Outlook, October 2007-March, 2008. 74 United Nations, OCHA, Humanitarian Situation in Zimbabwe, 01-31 January, 2008.

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of being assisted or at least registered for food aid; many of them said they had run out of food stocks and desperately needed food handouts.75 Due to widespread food shortages, the United Nations appealed to the international community for more food aid for Zimbabwe. In March, 2008 the Swedish Government through the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) responded positively to the United Nations appeal for food aid for Zimbabwe by contributing SEK 44.5 million (about US$7.2 million). 76 The Australian Government did likewise; the Parliamentary Secretary for International Development Assistance and Member of Parliament for Fraser, Mr. Bob Mcmullan, said Australia would provide US$2 million to the WFP call for food aid to meet an urgent and growing need for humanitarian assistance in Zimbabwe; this latest assistance was in addition to Australia’s contribution of US$43.5 million to the WFP in August, 2007 and US$3.75 million in 2006-2007.77 It has been necessary to dwell on the food crisis engulfing Zimbabwe from July, 2001 to March, 2008 to underscore the Government’s utter failure to provide adequate food for the majority of the people; granted that the drought impacted negatively on food production, the Government’s chaotic fast-track land reform programme was largely responsible for widespread food shortages.

Economic Mismanagement, April, 2001-February, 2008 Agriculture has historically been the mainstay of Zimbabwe’s economy contributing more than 60 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings and between 15 and 19 per cent of GDP. In addition, the agricultural sector had strong links with manufacturing; at least 60 per cent of local agricultural output found its way into local manufacturing while 20 per cent of manufacturing output was absorbed by agriculture.78 The invasions and occupation of white –owned commercial farms by war veterans in 2000 disrupted agricultural production; as a result the agricultural sector declined by 12.9 per cent in 2001; the sector’s performance declined by 21 per cent in 2002. Maize production which 75

United Nations, OCHA, Humanitarian Situation in Zimbabwe, 1-29 February, 2008. 76 Swedish Humanitarian Assistance in response to the 2008 UN Consolidated appeal for Zimbabwe, March 12, 2008. 77 Australian Government, Overseas Aid, MEDIA RELEASE, Australia to Provide More Food Aid to Zimbabwe, 15 March, 2008. 78 ‘Zimbabwe-A Crumbling Economy’, in Economic Report on Africa, 2002, Chapter 4, 113.

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declined by 33 per cent from 2.1 million tonnes in 1999/2000 agricultural season to about 1.4 million tonnes in 2000/2001, declined by 66.2 per cent in the 2001/2002 agricultural season to 490,000 tonnes; winter wheat was forecast to decline by 165 000 tonnes compared to 282,000 tonnes of the previous year.79 Not content with invading and occupying white-owned commercial farms, war veterans also invaded industry; in April, 2001 they descended on factories of about 30 companies mostly in Harare demanding extra compensation for workers who had been laid off for weeks or months; this plunged the country deeper into political and economic turmoil; at least 400 businesses including the steel industry shut down. While the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) advised businesses to reject the demands, several owners acceded to them and others were negotiating. The Minister of Industry and International Trade, Dr. Nkosana Moyo, who had criticized the attacks on industry, resigned without any public explanation.80 In the mining sector which accounted for around 4 per cent of GDP, 5 per cent of formal sector employment and 30 per cent foreign exchange earnings, the threats of mine invasions, the depressed world mineral prices, the high borrowing costs and the foreign exchange shortages pointed to a bleak future.81 Gold production which accounted for about half of the total value of the mining sector declined by 18.2 per cent from 22.07 tonnes in 2000 to 18.04 tonnes in 2001.82 The situation worsened after Falcon Gold Zimbabwe Limited closed one gold mine early in March, 2001 and shut down two others in late March because crucial supplies such as fuel, cyanide, lime and hard currency to pay for them were increasingly harder to come by.83 Because of the shortage of foreign currency the Government was unable to pay for fuel. In May, 2001 the country’s main fuel supplier, Independent Petroleum Group of Kuwait, suspended delivery of fuel to Zimbabwe over non-payment of bills; as a result on 12 June, 2001 the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) announced massive fuel increases with petrol rising by 74 per cent per liter to $1.38; aviation fuel

79

African Economic Outlook: Zimbabwe, AfDB/OECD, 2003, 356-357. ‘Militants in Zimbabwe Now Take Aim at Industry’, The New York Times, May 11, 2001. 81 ‘Zimbabwe-A Crumbling Economy’, 117-118. 82 African Economic Outlook, Zimbabwe, 2003, 358.. 83 ‘A Mining Company Suspends Operations in Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, March 31, 2001. 80

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by 82 per cent to $1.03 per liter and diesel by 67 per cent to $1.20 per liter.84 On 18 June, 2001 riot police fired tear gas in Mabvuku suburb in eastern Harare to disperse residents who were protesting the previous week’s fuel price increases. In southern Harare some bus owners cut their fares while others did not run their buses for fear of violence if they did not reduce their fares.85 On the international front, due to the shortage of foreign currency, Zimbabwe defaulted on its debt payments to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Government first incurred arrears to the IMF in midFebruary, 2001; at the end of August its overdue obligations totaled about US$53 million including about US$24 million to the IMF’s General Department and about US$29 million to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) Trust. On 24 September, 2001 the Executive Board of the IMF after reviewing its overdue financial obligations to the organization, declared Zimbabwe ineligible to use the general resources of the IMF and removed it from the list of countries eligible to borrow resources under the PRGF.86 On 1 November, 2001 the Minister of Finance, Dr. Simba Makoni, told Parliament in his Budget Statement for 2002 that persistent inflationary pressures, continuing uncertainty over the land reform programme, declining business confidence, the withdrawal of support by the international community and shortages of foreign currency had all combined to make the economic decline much more rapid than the Government had projected and estimated that by the end of the year, the economy would contract by 7.3 per cent and by a further 5.3 per cent in 2002.87 On 15 April, 2003 the Minister of Energy and Power Development announced new fuel price increases of ZW$450 per liter for leaded petrol (210 per cent increase) and ZW$200 per liter for diesel (160 per cent increase); the new price increases came into effect the following day. Furthermore, the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) introduced a power-shedding programme. In a statement an official said due to scarcity of foreign currency, the importation of power and energy

84

‘Fuel prices surge in Zimbabwe’, BBC News, 13 June, 2001. ‘Fuel protest in Zimbabwe’, BBC News, 18 June, 2001. 86 International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 01/40, September 25, 2001. 87 ‘Zimbabwe’s economy slumps’, BBC News, 1 November, 2001. 85

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from external sources had been reduced to levels which necessitated loadshedding at times of peak demand.88 In his Budget Statement for 2004 covering a wide range of issues, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Herbert Murerwa, stated among other things that the manufacturing sector was operating below capacity, in most instances below 50 per cent largely due to shortage of foreign currency, transport bottlenecks, loss of skilled labour and unreliable supply of energy; given the heavy reliance of the mining sector on foreign markets, a fixed exchange rate in an environment of rising inflation had seriously undermined its viability and competitiveness. The tourism sector continued to experience constraints associated with negative perceptions arising from adverse publicity and fuel shortages.89 The fuel crisis remained the single biggest threat to the efforts to save the economy from its perilous state as workers either came late to work or went home early because fuel shortages had paralyzed public transport; more than 1,000 bus drivers and crews had been laid off because of inadequate diesel for their vehicles. Education was collapsing partly because teachers either could not get to school due to lack of public transport or they themselves were spending hours of working time in fuel queues. The tourist industry, touted by the Government as a key element in its turnaround economic strategy, failed to meet targets; foreign visitors could not travel to resort areas because of fuel shortages brought about by the fact that the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) owed vast sums to overseas oil companies and the Government had run out of foreign exchange to service the debt. The fuel shortage was worsened by a scam involving the diversion of subsidized fuel from NOCZIM for resale by privately-owned underground companies linked to senior Government officials at 10 times the officially-gazetted price.90 In his National Budget Statement for 2006 covering a wide range of issues including high international oil prices, foreign currency shortages, agriculture and the mining sector, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Herbert Murerwa, stated among other things that the previous agricultural season had impacted negatively on the economy, resulting in an anticipated decline of 3.5 per cent of GDP; the resultant foreign currency shortages had constrained the supply of fuel and importation of critical raw materials 88

United Nations, Relief and Recovery Unit, Zimbabwe Humanitarian Situation Report, 28 April, 2003, 1. 89 THE 2004 NATIONAL BUDGET STATEMENT, November 20, 2003, 1-2, 811. 90 Joseph Chigugu, ‘Fuel Crisis Deepens Zimbabwe’s Troubles’, Environment News Service, March 14, 2006.

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thereby undermining capacity utilization in many sectors of the economy. The high levels of inflation had not only undermined the competitiveness of industry but had also eroded the purchasing power of incomes. The agricultural sector was projected to decline by 12.8 per cent in 2005 mainly due to drought and the non-availability and/or the delayed availability of critical inputs such as fertilizers, chemicals, equipment and fuel; these factors had compromised the productive capacity of the agricultural sector. The mining sector was forecast to decline by 5.7 per cent in 2005 due to deteriorating international prices of minerals. The manufacturing sector slowed down in 2005 and was expected to decline by 3 per cent due to shortages of foreign currency for essential imports of raw materials. Inflationary pressures had intensified since the second quarter of 2005; the annual rate of inflation rose to 411.3 per cent in October, 2005. 91 On 1 December, 2006 in his Budget Statement for 2007 covering the fiscal performance up to October, 2006 the Minister of Finance, Dr. Herbert Murerwa, stated among other things that the deterioration in the welfare of Zimbabweans had seen their capacity to access basic healthcare services, education, housing and other amenities collapse overnight under the prevailing hyper-inflationary environment in which the country continued to experience loss of critical skills and the dominance of the informal sector in the economy. The economy was projected to decline by 2.5 per cent in 2006 compared to 3.8 per cent in 2005 and to grow marginally by between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent in 2007 due to the improved performance in agriculture and mining; the manufacturing sector continued to be negatively affected by low capacity utilization and was expected to decline by about 7 per cent in 2006. The annual inflation which rose from 613 per cent in January, 2006 to reach a peak of 1,204 per cent in August eroded disposable incomes and worsened poverty; savings had been severely affected, with pensioners unable to make ends meet; the competitiveness of exports had been eroded by high levels of inflation which had become increasingly self-sustaining through expectations of even higher levels of inflation; in such an environment producers were adjusting their prices on the basis of their expectations of the high cost of replacing stock; similarly, salaries and wages were being driven up by high inflation; workers demanded more money because the high levels of inflation had eroded the purchasing power of their incomes.

91

THE 2006 NATIONAL BUDGET STATEMENT, December 1, 2006.

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Postscript

At the end of October, 2006 the total external debt amounted to US$4.1 billion and external payment arrears totaled US$2.2 billion. Improved revenue collections had not been translated into improved service delivery and project implementation given the cost escalations which adversely affected the delivery of public services. The relativelylow remuneration levels of civil servants was compromising not only the capacity of civil servants to access basic necessities such as transport, accommodation, food and medical service but also the Government’s ability to retain and attract skilled and experienced personnel. The domestic debt which had remained relatively stable during the first half of the year had been increasing rapidly as expenditure demands on the Government increased to ZW$46.1 billion by the end of June driven largely by the review of wages of civil servants in May; by September, the domestic debt had risen to ZW$119.4 billion. The erosion of incomes in the prevailing high inflationary environment had left the Government with a largely- unmotivated and poorly-paid civil servant and a shortage of personnel in critical areas including health, education and technical fields.92 Writing from Harare on 22 April, 2007 Mr. Angus Shaw of the Associated Press reported that the economic chaos engulfing Zimbabwe had turned even a mundane task such as renting a car into an unachievable dream for the average law- abiding citizen. A car rental company quoted a day rate of ZW$690,000 to hire a basic model, plus a deposit of ZW$25 million; this was the equivalent of ZW$2,760 per day, plus a deposit of ZW$100,000 at the official exchange rate. The Consumer Council of Zimbabwe estimated that regular supermarket goods increased in price by 50 to 200 per cent in March alone; a can of soda cost ZW$10,000 or ZW$40 at the official exchange rate.93 Early in May, 2007 the Government announced 20 hour daily electricity cuts for households across the country as supplies were shifted to irrigate the winter wheat crop; a government notice said ZESA Holdings would give priority to wheat farmers who needed electricity for irrigation while domestic use would be restricted to just four hours a day.94 In addition to daily electricity cuts, inflation continued to menace the economy. Writing from Harare, Jan Raath of The Times (London) reported 92

Minister of Finance 2007 Budget Statement, 1 December, 2006. Angus Shaw, ‘$40 Will Buy A Can of Soda in Zimbabwe; Roaring Inflation Forces Many Into Black Market’, The Associated Press, cited in The Washington Post, April, April 22, 2007. 94 ‘Zimbabwe to Ration Electricity for Homes to Four Hours a Day’, The New York Times, May 10, 2007. 93

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that in April, inflation had risen to 3,700 per cent; a single brick cost what ten years before would have bought a mansion in the capital’s up-market areas; the cost of postage stamps went up by 600 per cent.95 On 28 June, President Mugabe threatened to seize foreign companies which had raised prices and cut production in what he called an economic ‘dirty tricks’ campaign to oust his regime; speaking at the burial of a top military officer in Harare, he charged that some industrialists were deliberately reducing production, raising prices and illegally banking foreign currency abroad.96 On 3 July, 2007 The Associated Press reported that Government inspectors and plainclothes policemen raided shops and supermarkets to enforce price cuts as shoppers grabbed up goods in the growing price chaos across the country; bread and corn meal disappeared from most shelves as stores complied with President Mugabe’s order of the previous week to halve the prices of basic commodities in an attempt to get a grip on rampant inflation which had reached an official rate of 4,500 per cent in May.97 The following day as the Police and a pro-Government youth militia swept into shops and factories threatening owners with arrest and worse unless they rolled back prices, staple foods vanished from store shelves; economists warned that the price roll- backs were unsustainable and that shop owners and manufacturers would soon shut down and lay off workers rather than produce goods at a loss.98 Late in July, 2007 the Government proposed to indigenize the economy through the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Bill. Addressing the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) and representatives of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), the Minister of State for Indigenization and Economic Empowerment, Mr. Paul Mangwana, said the first reading of the Bill which would take place in the first week of August would ensure that at least 51 per cent of the shares in every public company and other businesses would be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. Independent economists warned that the

95

Jan Raath, ‘Zimbabwe’s inflation hits 3,700 %’, The Times, (London), 18 May, 2007. 96 ‘Mugabe Threatens Nationalization; Foreign Assets in Zimbabwe Could be Seized’, The Washington Post, June 28, 2007. 97 The Associated Press, ‘Zimbabwe: Bread Disappears From Shelves’, cited in The New York Times, July 3, 2007. 98 ‘Anti-Inflation Curbs on Prices Create Havoc for Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, July 4, 2007.

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proposed legislation would chase away the little foreign direct investment remaining in the country.99 On 1 August, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe issued a $200,000 note to lighten the burden of beleaguered citizens already so battered by hyperinflation that the common method for carrying currency was not a billfold but a grocery bag. 100 The new note was worth US$13 at the official exchange rate and US$1 on the black market. 101 Six days later 7,660 business owners and managers were arrested on charges of violating President Mugabe’s order to slash by half the prices of basic commodities; 600 were later released after paying fines.102 On 28 September, 2007 in spite of the warning by independent economists of the danger of chasing away the little direct foreign investment available, Parliament passed the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act to gradually transfer majority ownership of all businesses, including mines and banks to indigenous Zimbabweans.103 The Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act defined ‘an indigenous Zimbabwean’ as any person who, before 18 April, 1980 was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of race and any descendant of such person. Under the Act, at least 51 per cent of every public company and any other business would be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. The Act provided among other things that no merger or restructuring of the shareholding of two or more related or associated businesses or acquisition by any person of a controlling interest in a business would be approved unless 51 per cent in the merged or restructured business was held by indigenous Zimbabweans; no unbundling of a business or demerger of two or more businesses would be approved unless 51 per cent in any such resulting business was held by indigenous Zimbabweans; no relinquishment by a person of a controlling interest in a business would be approved unless the controlling interest was relinquished to indigenous Zimbabweans; no projected or proposed investment in a prescribed sector of the economy available for investment by domestic or foreign investors for which an investment license was required, would be approved unless a controlling interest in the investment

99

‘Zimbabwe business grab on the way’, The Zimbabwean, 23 July, 2007. ‘Zimbabwe: New $200,000 Bill’, The New York Times, August 1, 2007. 101 ‘Zimbabwe launches $200,000 note’, BBC News, 31 July, 2007. 102 ‘Zimbabwe: 7,660 Arrests in Price Campaign’, The New York Times, August 7, 2007. 103 ‘Zimbabwe: Foreign Businesses To Locals’, The New York Times, September 28, 2007. 100

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was reserved for indigenous Zimbabweans.104 It was doubtful that direct foreign investment would flow into the country under these onerous restrictions. On 29 November, 2007 in his National Budget Statement for 2008 covering a wide range of issues including agricultural performance, mining, manufacturing, inflation, food imports and external debt, the Minister of Finance, Dr. S. C. Mumbengegwi, stated among other things that agricultural production declined from 1, 485,000 tonnes in 2006 to 953,000 tonnes in 2007. The winter wheat production suffered extensively from power supply interruptions which compromised irrigation operations, thus reducing wheat yields; in the mining sector inadequate foreign exchange and electricity supply interruptions had exacerbated the decline in production levels. The manufacturing sector continued to face several challenges including rising production costs, foreign currency constraints and interruptions of supplies of electricity; as a result most manufacturing companies were operating at capacity levels of below 30 per cent. The hyper-inflationary environment remained a major constraint to sustainable economic growth and export competitiveness; annual inflation rose from 1, 593 per cent in January, 2007 to 7,983 per cent in September due firstly to declining production and supply of goods and services; secondly to depreciating local currency; the high inflation had become self-sustaining because of speculation whereby producers were adjusting prices on the basis of anticipated future inflation and high replacement costs. Food imports were expected to increase from US$178.5 million in 2006 to US$405.1 million in 2007; imports of manufactured goods increased marginally from US$ 262.6 million in 2006 to US$270 million in 2007. The total external debt stood at US$4.1 billion of which total external arrears amounted to US$2.7 billion.105 On 20 December, 2007 the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe announced that he was withdrawing the $200,000 note (the equivalent of US$6.66 at the official exchange rate and US$0.12 at the black market patronized by most Zimbabweans) he had introduced in August and replacing it with $750,000 and $500,000 notes; he claimed that as a result of this measure, cash shortages would be a thing of the past

104

PARLIAMENT OF ZIMBABWE, INDIGENIZATION AND ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT ACT, 2007, 6-7. 105 National Budget Statement, 2008, Presented to the House of Assembly, 29 November, 2007.

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but he did not address the fact that there was virtually nothing to buy in the shops.106 On 28 January, 2008 the Reserve Bank issued $1million, $5million and $10 million bank notes. The new notes, however, did not immediately relieve the country’s cash shortages as long queues persisted at the banks.107 The annual inflation rate accelerated sharply in November, 2007 to a new peak of 26, 470 per cent from 7,892 per cent in September; the increase prompted the Reserve Bank to raise interest rates from 975 to 1,200 per cent.108 In December, 2007 inflation galloped to 66, 000 per cent.109 In February, 2008 it rocketed past the 100,000 per cent mark.110 It is clear that the Government terribly mismanaged the economy with disastrous consequences for the country. It was in the climate of the relentless persecution and harassment of the leaders of the opposition by the Government and the ruling party, the food crisis and economic mismanagement that parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled for Saturday, 29 March, 2008.

Prelude to the parliamentary and presidential elections, February-March, 2008 In a report covering the period 6 February-11 March, 2008 the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) stated among other things that in Chimanimani constituency in Manicaland Province, ZANU (PF) misused Government vehicles to ferry supporters around the constituency; in Mashonaland East Province, MDC officials were denied the use of school premises for their meetings while ZANU (PF) had unrestricted access to the same; in Mashonaland Central Province, farming implements and inputs were allocated only to ZANU (PF) loyalists and card holders. In Mashonaland East Province, chiefs were told to warn their followers that if they voted for the MDC, they would lose the pieces of land they had acquired during the land reform programme. At a rally in Sanyati, ZANU (PF) officials warned the electorate that voting for the MDC would spark a civil war. In Chirimanzu South constituency they warned the electorate that if they voted for the MDC, they would be denied drought relief. In 106 ‘Zimbabwe: Another Day, Another Dollar Change-Over’, The New York Times, December 20, 2007. 107 ‘Zimbabwe: ‘A Fistful of Millions’, The New York Times, January 19, 2008. 108 ‘Zimbabwe: Inflation at New Record’, The New York Times, February 1, 2008. 109 ‘Zimbabwe: Inflation Surges To Official 66,000 %’, The New York Times, February 15, 2008. 110 Noor’s List, ‘Zimbabwe inflation breaks 100,000%’, February 23, 2008.

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Guruve, the District Administrator warned black farmers that if they voted for the opposition, their farms would be repossessed; in Bulawayo, ZANU (PF) officials warned residents of Ward 17 that if they voted for the opposition, they would be denied food handouts. In Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland East, MDC (Tsvangirai) officials were denied police clearance to hold rallies on the spurious ground that there were inadequate police personnel to provide security. In Mashonaland East Province, chiefs urged their people to vote for the ruling party to avoid being evicted from their homes; in Mount Darwin East and North constituencies, ZANU (PF) youth militia forced people to attend ZANU (PF) rallies.111 Mr. Robert Mugabe, Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai, a member of ZANU (PF) and former Finance Minister, Dr. Simba Makoni, and an unknown figure, Mr. Langton Towungana, contested the presidential elections. At a news conference on 5 February, 2008 Dr. Makoni who was running as an independent candidate, said he shared the agony and anguish of all Zimbabwe citizens over the extreme hardships they had endured for nearly ten years and attributed these hardships to the failure of the national leadership.112 On 13 February, 2008 ZANU (PF) formally expelled Dr. Makoni from the ruling party; a party spokesman, Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, said any party officials who supported Dr. Makoni’s renegade candidacy, would be similarly expelled.113

The parliamentary and presidential elections, 29 March, 2008 Voting in the parliamentary and presidential elections began on Saturday, 29 March, 2008 at 7 in the morning and ended at 7 in the evening. In 207 out of 210 House of Assembly seats being contested, MDC officials said their party had not only swept most of the big cities like Harare and Bulawayo where it was previously strong but had also won in Masvingo, Bindura and in dozens of areas it had never won before. The Chairman of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), Mr. Noel Kututwa, said 111

Zimbabwe Election Support Network, Pre-election Update, 6 February-11 March, 2008, 5. 112 ‘Major Figure in Zimbabwe To challenge Mugabe Rule’, The New York Times, February 6, 2008. 113 ‘Zimbabwe: Party Formally Expels Mugabe Challenger’, The New York Times, February 13, 2008.

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the delay in announcing the results had fuelled speculation that something was going on. The MDC Secretary General, Mr. Tendai Biti, said early returns showed that his party was massacring ZANU (PF) parliamentary candidates and that the trend was irreversible; while claiming victory, Mr. Biti worried aloud about a possible reversal of fortune when he said in some areas where the party thought the results were final, some ballot boxes were missing. There were other worrisome signs; prior to the election, the security chiefs had said they would support no one but Mr. Mugabe; in a joint statement, they warned MDC candidates against making victory statements based on unofficial totals ‘thereby fomenting disorder and mayhem’. The following day the MDC claimed that it had won a landslide victory insisting that vote counts posted outside thousands of polling stations indicated that the party had defeated ZANU (PF) and President Robert Mugabe.114 The results of the parliamentary elections released on 2 April, showed that the opposition (MDC-Tsvangirai and MDC-Mutambara) had won a majority in the House of Assembly with 109 out of 210 seats while ZANU (PF) had won 97 seats; an independent Member of Parliament, Professor Jonathan Moyo, retained his seat for Tsholotsho North constituency. The following day the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission confirmed that the ruling party had lost control of the House of Assembly for the first time since independence in 1980; a summary of the results is shown in Table 1 below: Table 1: Parliamentary Election Results for 29 March, 2008: Party Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-Tsvangirai) Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara (MDC-Mutambara) Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU (PF) Independent (Jonathan Moyo) Total

114

Seats 99

% of seats 47.86

10

4. 83

97

46.86

1 207

0.48

‘Zimbabwe Opposition Says It Has Beaten Mugabe, Longtime Autocrat, in Landslide’, The New York Times, March 31, 2008.

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Due to the deaths of three candidates in three House of Assembly constituencies, the ZEC postponed voting in Pelandaba-Mpopoma in Bulawayo, Gwanda South and Redcliff; in the by-elections held on 27 June, 2008 for the three constituencies, ZANU (PF) won Gwanda South and Redcliff while the MDC (Tsvangirai) won Pelandaba-Mpopoma; this gave MDC (Tsvangirai) a total of 100 seats in the House of Assembly (47.62 per cent) and ZANU (PF) 99 seats (47.14 per cent).115 Following the announcement of the parliamentary election results, ZANU (PF) alleged widespread irregularities and demanded a recount of votes in 23 constituencies. In the General Notice 581/2008 (12 April, 2008) the ZEC ordered a recount of the House of Assembly results in 23 constituencies. The recount confirmed the status quo that, for the first time since independence in 1980, ZANU (PF) had lost control of the House of Assembly.116 The Senate elections showed the following results shown in Table 2: Table 2 Party Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-Tsvangirai) Movement for Democratic ChangeMutambara (MDC-Mutambara) Total

Seats 30

% Seats 50

24

40

6

10

60

100

In a detailed report covering the period 30 March to 8 May, 2008, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) stated among other things that the delay in announcing the results of the presidential election exacerbated the reign of terror experienced by members of the opposition in the rural areas. In Mutoko North constituency, ZANU (PF) supporters told the electorate that they were aware of the people who had voted for the MDC and would deal with them accordingly. Mashonaland East and Manicaland became hotspots after the election. On 11 April, the ruling 115

ELECTORAL INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (EISA), Promoting Credible Elections and Democratic Governance in Africa, Zimbabwe: 2008 House of Assembly election results, June, 2008. 116 ‘Zimbabwe: I’ll show you mine if you show me yours’, IRIN NEWS, 29 April, 2008.

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party unleashed a reign of terror on MDC supporters around All Souls Mission in Mutoko; some victims sought refuge in nearby mountains and watched as their goods were being looted and their houses torched; those who failed to escape were physically assaulted; some were denied medical care as some hospitals had been instructed not to admit them. In Zaka Central constituency, ZANU (PF) youth militias said they wanted to eliminate the MDC syndrome among the people before the run-off elections; in Chinhoyi MDC supporters were assaulted when the MDC (Tsvangirai) House of Assembly candidate was declared the winner. While there had been a semblance of sanity in the pre-election period, the activities of the war veterans scaled up in the post-election period; the rhetoric about white people seeking to re-colonize the people began soon after the 29 March, 2008 elections; incidents of fresh farm invasions began in Masvingo, Mashonaland West and Manicaland. In Masvingo Province the deployment of heavily-armed soldiers in rural areas made rural residents anxious and afraid. Chiefs warned people in their jurisdiction that they would be excluded from Government relief programmes if they continued to support the opposition; in Zaka West constituency they warned MDC supporters that they would be denied food aid. In Bikita West constituency Headmen were ordered to write down the names of all people they thought belonged to the MDC; this demonstrated the partisan role played by traditional leaders in the politics of the country.117 On 3 April, 2008 while the nation waited in suspended animation for a fourth day without official results in the race for president, the MDC announced its own final tally, proclaiming Mr. Tsvangirai the winner with 50.3 per cent of the vote to 48.3 per cent for Mr. Mugabe- barely enough to avoid a run-off. 118 The following day the ZANU (PF) Secretary for Administration, Mr. Didymus Mutasa, without conceding defeat, told journalists after an all-day meeting in Harare that a consensus had emerged that Mr. Mugabe should run in a second round of voting. 119 In the event, Mr. Tsvangirai fared much better in the presidential election than his party had projected as shown in Table 3.

117

ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK, Post-Election Update No 1, 30 March to 8 May, 2008. 118 ‘Mugabe Foes Win Majority In Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, April 3, 2008. 119 ‘Party Leaders Say Mugabe Will Fight On’, The New York Times, April 5, 2008.

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Table 3: Presidential Poll Results-29 March, 2008 Harmonized Elections Candidate Makoni, Simba Herbert Stanley Mugabe, Robert Gabriel Towungana, Langton Tsvangirai, Morgan Total Valid Votes Spoilt ballots Total votes cast Percentage Poll

Number of votes 207 470 1 079 730 14 503 1 195 562 2 497 265 39 975 2 537 240

Actual Percent Vote 8.3% 43.2% 0.6% 47.9% 100% 42.7%

SOURCE: ZIMBABWE ELECTION SUPPORT NETWORK, Post-Election Update No. 1, 30 March to 8 May, 2008, 4.

Livid at losing the presidential and parliamentary elections, President Robert Mugabe and the ruling party returned to the policy of repression against members of the opposition. From 29 March to 14 April, the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) treated 157 cases of injury resulting from organized violence and torture by members of the ruling party against members of the opposition.120 The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) reported that from 14 to 16 April, 2008, at least 150 people had been arrested and detained by the military at Harare Central Police Station. The arrests and continuing violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms had been exacerbated by state actors working hand-in-hand with ZANU (PF) militias; the nationwide campaign of terror was being perpetrated against persons suspected to have voted against the ruling party; 9 people from Budiriro high-density suburb near Harare were abducted from a funeral by members of the military dressed in plainclothes. In St. Mary’s near Harare at least 20 people including a former mayor and a recently-elected councillor were abducted from their homes by plainclothes personnel

120

Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR), Statement on upsurge of organized violence and torture, April 15, 2008.

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believed to be members of the military and the Zimbabwe Republic Police.121 In the aftermath of the elections, the number of victims of statesponsored violence against members of the opposition escalated; among the 62 victims treated by the ZADHR were 9 women including an 84-year old woman who had sustained serious facial injuries when she was struck in the face with stones on opening the door of her house to unknown assailants; a 34-year old man was severely beaten and lost consciousness for a few minutes; when he woke up, he found that his right ear had been cut off; a 25-year old man had such a deep laceration on the base of his nose that it appeared to be falling off; however, several days after suturing, the nose was healing well. Of the four cases of burns treated, two involved people who had been trapped inside when their houses were set on fire; a 60- year old man sustained fractures on his left forearm and three bones in the left hand; a 50-year old man with an axe wound to the back of the head had extensive soft tissue injuries especially to the buttocks with haematoma formation and to the soles of his feet due to falanga; the ZADHR called on the Government to stop these ‘grotesque, cruel and shameful acts of violence’.122 In a dramatic increase in violence in May, 2008, 30 victims were treated by ZADHR for limb fractures at Harare hospitals and clinics; supplies of bandages were reported to be exhausted in most health centres. In addition, 53 seriously- injured patients were admitted to wards in three Harare hospitals; the victims alleged that the perpetrators in all cases were war veterans and ZANU (PF) supporters; many victims of violence did not receive medical treatment; numerous incidents of violence were reported from remote rural areas where there was no access to transport; there were widespread reports of the injured being denied medical care at health centres because state agents had warned the staff not to treat them; war veterans were turning away ambulances sent to collect seriouslyinjured victims. The level of brutality and callousness exhibited by the perpetrators of violence was unprecedented and the attacks by war veterans on women, children and the elderly shamed the memory of all true heroes of the liberation struggle. Much of the violence had been specifically directed against members of the opposition, particularly those who had acted as election agents or monitors in the elections. Villagers 121

ZLHR, ‘Violent retributive action against innocent Zimbabweans by state agents on the increase’, April 17, 2008, 1-2. 122 ZADHR, Statement concerning cases of organized violence and torture, and of intimidation of medical personnel, from April 22 to April 24, 2008, April 25, 2008. 1-2.

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and school teachers in districts where the opposition had trounced the ruling party in the elections had also been targeted even though they had no political affiliations; without exception, the victims had identified the perpetrators either as war veterans, members of the security forces or ZANU (PF) youth militias. The ZADHR said it was clear from the widespread and coordinated nature of the violence and the consistent pattern of injuries inflicted, that state agents were organizing and directing the terror campaign against members the opposition to secure victory for President Mugabe in the run-off election.123 In a report for 28 April to 4 May, 2008 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Harare, said politically-motivated violence including physical abuses, displacement of households, burning of houses and killings of members of the opposition, continued to be reported from different parts of the country; 6, 735 individuals were reported to have been displaced as of 2 May, 2008.124 The run-up to the second round of the presidential election led among other things to an up-scaling of violence in the rural areas targeting school teachers involved in the elections especially in the areas where the opposition had routed the ruling party in the recent elections; more targeted attacks on opposition supporters especially those who had played an active role in the first elections; increased incidents of violence, injury and deaths; disruption of the education system as schools were used as polling stations; victims of violence continued to flee from rural to urban areas seeking refuge in churches and other institutions; about 28, 500 persons were confirmed to have been displaced.125 During the period 26 May-1 June, 2008 OCHA officials observed among other things, the continued displacements of people due to politically-motivated violence; the loss of livelihood of many people particularly in the urban areas; increased strain on the health institutions as health personnel were targeted for treating the victims; suspected opposition supporters were randomly selected, beaten and forced to flee from their homes; at least 33, 425 persons were confirmed to have been displaced.126 123

ZADHR, Statement concerning escalating cases of organized violence and torture, and of intimidation of medical personnel, May 8, 2008. 124 OCHA, Zimbabwe Election Period: Weekly Situation Report, 28 April-4 May, 2008, 1. 125 OCHA, Zimbabwe Election Period: Weekly Situation Report, 12-18 May, 2008, 1-2. 126 OCHA, Zimbabwe Election Period: Weekly Situation Report, 26 May-1 June, 2008, 1.

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Although there was no marked increase in politically –motivated violence from 2 to 13 June, 2008 the severity of the attacks was reported to have worsened; the displacement of children was particularly heartbreaking as separations of children from their families continued to be widely reported; a total of 69 children were missing.127 As the run-off election was fast approaching the escalation in the numbers and severity of cases of violent assaults and torture against members of the opposition during May was of a scale which threatened to, and for a brief period did, overwhelm the capacity of doctors to respond; of the 53 deaths reported by ZADHR up to the end of May, 7 occurred in hospital following admission for injuries sustained during violent assaults; clinical fracture cases increased three-fold from April to May, 2008.128 In Washington, President George W. Bush in a statement denouncing the continued use of state- sponsored violence in Zimbabwe including arrests and intimidation of opposition figures ahead of the run-off election, called upon the Zimbabwe Government to immediately halt all attacks against members of the opposition and to permit freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and access to the media.129 On 4 June, 2008 in spite of President Bush’s statement, Mr. Tsvangirai was detained by the police for nine hours; two days later, he was stopped at a roadblock on his way to a rally near Bulawayo and taken to a police station for questioning.130 On 12 June, the MDC Secretary General, Mr. Tendai Biti, was arrested at Harare International Airport on his return from South Africa; a police spokesman said Mr. Biti would be charged with treason for falsely claiming that Mr. Tsvangirai had won the presidential election of 29 March before official results were released. The same day, Mr. Tsvangirai was stopped at a roadblock near Kwekwe, was held at Kwekwe Police Station, released after two hours but later detained again while driving into Gweru, the next stop on his election campaign; he was released a second time without being charged.131 127

OCHA, Zimbabwe Election Period: Weekly Situation Report, 2-13 June, 2008,

1.

128

The weblog of Norman Geras, Health report from Zimbabwe, Cases of Systematic Violent Assault and Torture Overwhelm Health Professionals, Communication sent by ZADHR to Norman Geras, June 17, 2008, 1-2. 129 The White House, Statement by President Bush on the Violence in Zimbabwe, June 2, 2008. 130 ‘Zimbabwe Blocks Opposition Rallies and Again Detains Its Leader’, The New York Times, June 7, 2008. 131 ‘Zimbabwe Detains Opposition Leader Again, and Aide Is Held on Treason Charge’, The New York Times, June 13, 2008.

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In light of the violence sweeping large areas of the country, the MDC in a long statement in Harare on 22 June, 2008 stated among other things that since the parliamentary and presidential elections, President Mugabe and his supporters had been waging war against the people of Zimbabwe; their retributive agenda had seen over 200,000 people internally displaced; over 86 MDC supporters killed; over 20,000 homes destroyed and over 10,000 injured and maimed in an orgy of violence; ZANU (PF) militias dressed in army regalia had been deployed to spearhead a terror campaign in the rural and urban areas; the ruling party had set up over 3,000 militia bases across the country in order to cow MDC supporters into submission; MDC rallies had been banned; with only five days left before the election, the Police still refused the MDC permission to hold its only star rally at the Harare Show Grounds; the unlawful arrests of Mr. Tsvangirai had been going on unabated; there was a complete blackout of MDC activities in the public media in clear contravention of the SADC Guidelines and Standards Governing Free and Fair Elections; the vilification of Mr. Tsvangirai by the public media was unprecedented; by denying the MDC access to the media, the Government had managed to deny the party access to the people; over 2,000 MDC supporters including polling agents were detained; the arrests had targeted the MDC Members of Parliament, Councillors and election agents; the game plan was to cripple the MDC campaign; in these circumstances, the MDC believed that a credible election reflecting the will of the people of Zimbabwe was impossible. For these reasons, Mr. Tsvangirai announced that he would no longer participate in ‘a violent, illegitimate sham of an election’.132 Mr. Tsvangirai’s announcement that he was pulling out of the run-off presidential election was greeted with relief by many grass-roots opposition activists who had borne the brunt of violence at the hands of the ruling party militias.133 In a statement on 23 June, 2008 the United Nations Security Council condemned the campaign of violence in Zimbabwe against the political opposition ahead of the second round of the presidential election and called upon the Government to stop the violence, to cease political intimidation, to end the restrictions on the right of assembly and to release the opposition leaders who had been detained.134 In a statement the same

132 Zimbabwe Scholars Group, MDC Press Statement On The Presidential Run-Off, Sunday, June 22, 2008. 133 ‘Some sighs of relief heard in Zimbabwe’, Los Angeles Times, June 23, 2008. 134 United Nations Security Council, SC/9369, SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS VIOLENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN

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day, the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, deeply regretted that despite the repeated appeals of the international community, the Zimbabwe Government had failed to put in place the conditions necessary for free and fair elections and that the circumstances which had led to the withdrawal of the opposition leader, Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai, from the run-off election, represented a ‘deeply-distressing development’ which did not bode well for the future of democracy in Zimbabwe.135 The Zambian President, Mr. Levy Mwanawasa, who had earlier likened Zimbabwe to the sinking Titanic, also called for a postponement of the run-off election; speaking in his capacity as Chairman of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) he told reporters that the situation in Zimbabwe failed to meet the SADC Principles and Guidelines and African Union regulations on free and fair elections.136 Shortly after pulling out of the run-off election, Mr. Tsvangirai sought temporary refuge at the Dutch Embassy in Harare as the crackdown on members of the opposition continued unabated with 60 opposition activists arrested by riot police during a lunch-time raid at the opposition headquarters. 137 The United States Secretary of State, Ms. Condoleezza Rice, condemned in the strongest terms the Zimbabwe Government’s continuing campaign of violence against members of the opposition.138 In a statement on 24 June, 2008 the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa supported the call for a postponement of the run-off election: ‘The ugly incidents and scenes that have been visited on the people of Zimbabwe persuade us that a run-off presidential election offers no solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis. In a society that is already highly polarized, a run-off election will only serve to widen the divisions. The very legitimacy of the run-off has already been severely compromised by the actions of both the ZANU (PF) militants and those of state officials who do not even conceal their partiality in favour of the governing party’.139 The same day, appalled by the unprecedented levels of violence against members of the opposition, the National Spokesperson for the ZIMBABWE; REGRETS FAILURE TO HOLD FREE, FAIR ELECTION, 23 June, 2008. 135 United Nations Secretary General, SG/SM/11650, AFR/1716, OPPOSITION WITHDRAWAL FROM ZIMBABWE ELECTION ‘DEEPLY DISTRESSING DEVELOPMENT’, 23 June, 2008. 136 Blogflict, ‘Zambia’s Leader Calls For Zimbabwe Election to be Delayed’, June 23, 2008. 137 ‘Mugabe rival takes refuge in embassy’, Los Angeles Times, June 24, 2008. 138 Statement by Secretary Condoleezza Rice, June 23, 2008. 139 ANC Press Statement, June 24, 2008.

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Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), Mr. Patrick Craven, said COSATU fully sympathized with Mr. Tsvangirai’s decision to withdraw from the run-off presidential election.140 The former South African President and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Mr. Nelson Mandela, attributed Zimbabwe’s political crisis to the failure of leadership; another South African Nobel laureate, the former Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, the Reverend Desmond Tutu, commenting on Australian television, said Mr. Mugabe had mutated into something quite unbelievable; he had turned into a kind of Frankenstein for his people.141 On 25 June, 2008 SADC leaders urged the Zimbabwe Government to postpone the run-off election on the ground that if the election were held under the prevailing circumstances, it would compromise the credibility and legitimacy of the results. 142 In spite of the appeals from various quarters to postpone the run-off election, Mr. Mugabe said the election would proceed on schedule on 27 June. In a preliminary statement the SADC Election Observer Mission (SEOM) to the run-off election noted among other things that whenever ZANU (PF) supporters disrupted opposition rallies, law-enforcement agencies did nothing to stop them in spite of a court order authorizing such rallies; there was a one-sided coverage of Mr. Mugabe’s campaign in the state media. In light of these observations the SEOM was of the view that the prevailing environment in Zimbabwe impinged on the credibility of the electoral process; in short, the election did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe.143 In a scathing critique of the presidential run-off election in Zimbabwe, the Botswana Observer Mission in a separate report stated, among other things, that the state media prominently featured ZANU (PF) political advertisements and messages to the exclusion of the MDC; at the Police Stations where most of the postal voting was taking place, the commanders of the security forces denied the Mission access to the polling stations; when asked for an explanation, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission said it was within the discretion of the commanding officers to either grant or refuse permission; meanwhile the observer teams received reports that postal voting was taking place in the presence and

140

‘COSATU demands democracy in Zimbabwe’, 24-06-08. ‘Mandela condemns Mugabe’, Los Angeles Times, June 26, 2008. 142 IRIN News.org : Southern Africa: SADC calls for poll postponement, 25 June, 2008. 143 SADC ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, 27 June, 2008. 141

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under the directions of commanding officers who instructed their juniors to vote for Mr. Mugabe or risk losing their jobs. The Mission observed that while ZANU (PF) was free to hold political rallies, MDC political rallies were systematically disrupted by ZANU (PF) youth militias; people believed to be MDC supporters were subjected to severe beatings, harassment, torture, killings and general threats of violence; ZANU (PF) youth militias mounted illegal roadblocks, forcing people to attend ZANU (PF) rallies; in contrast, ruling party supporters received the full protection of the Police as their rallies were never disrupted. Furthermore, President Mugabe made it clear at most political rallies and meetings he addressed that he would not accept the outcome if Mr. Tsvangirai won the election. The teams observed a high level of intimidation and politicallymotivated violence which escalated with the approach of the run-off election leading to injuries, internal and external displacements of people, abductions, loss of property and lives; in short, the mayhem observed by the teams had the effect of depriving the people of Zimbabwe the opportunity to fully participate in the electoral process. Voters were required to record the serial number on their ballot papers and later submit that information to ZANU (PF) functionaries; this was intended to induce some voters into believing that the information pertaining to the manner in which they voted would be accessible and used against them. In some rural polling stations chiefs/headmen were instructed to record the names of their subjects who were then required, against their will, to go and queue behind their chief/headmen in a predetermined sequence on voting day. In this way voters were made to believe that their voting patterns were capable of being verified as to whether they had voted for ZANU (PF); notwithstanding the apparent orderly conduct that prevailed on voting day, the entire election process was marred by a wave of violence; the observer teams concluded that the presidential run-off election was not free and fair and did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe.144 In an interim statement on 29 June, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) Observer Mission to the run-off election in Zimbabwe concluded that the election was not free, fair or credible among other things because of the prevailing political environment; the restrictions on the fundamental civil and political rights such as freedom of assembly and of movement; the 144

Statement of Botswana election observers, Statement of the Botswana Observer Team on the June 27, 2008 presidential run-off election, The Zimbabwe Times, July 8, 2008.

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lack of access to the public media by the opposition; non- transparency in the postal voting process and the politicization of the security forces. In a detailed critique, the PAP Observer Mission stated that the prevailing political environment throughout Zimbabwe was tense, hostile and volatile; the electoral campaign was marred by high levels of intimidation, violence and displacement of people; several cases of abduction, some of which resulted in deaths, were reported; incitement to violence by ruling party officials and war veterans instilled fear and trepidation amongst voters; while Mr. Mugabe was free to organize star rallies, Mr. Tsvangirai was denied the opportunity to do so; the ruling party used the state-controlled media as a vehicle to discredit Mr. Tsvangirai; postal voting was conducted in a non-transparent manner; the Mission was denied permission to observe and verify the results; the commanders of the security forces maintained their position of overt support for the ruling party; the observers were dismayed to see uniformed police officers on duty wearing the ruling party regalia; the Mission called on SADC working together with the AU to engage the political leadership in Zimbabwe into a negotiated transitional settlement.145 In a preliminary statement on 29 June, 2008 the African Union (AU) Observer Mission to the run-off election in Zimbabwe stated among other things that fear of violence deterred popular participation in the electoral process; there was inequitable access to the state media by the opposition; it was therefore their considered view that the election process fell short of African Union accepted standards. 146 The following day the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, said the run- off election in Zimbabwe did not reflect the true and genuine will of the Zimbabwean people or produce a legitimate result in light of the violence and intimidation which had preceded it.147 The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission nevertheless declared Mr. Mugabe the default winner of the one-candidate election as shown in Table 4:

145 INTERIM STATEMENT, THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF AND PARLIAMENTARY BY-ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 29 June, 2008, 1-3. 146 AFRICAN UNION, OFFICE OF THE OBSERVER MISSION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF ELECTION IN ZIMBABWE, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE AFRICAN UNION OBSERVER MISSION, HARARE, 29 June, 2008. 147 Office of the spokesperson of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Statement Attributed to the Spokesperson for the UN Secretary General on Zimbabwe, Tokyo, Japan, 30 June, 2008.

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Table 4: Run-Off Presidential Results by Province

Bulawayo Mash West Masvingo Mat North Mat South Midlands Manicaland Harare Mash Central Mash East Total

Robert G. Mugabe 21227 256699 321404 84185 92654 302407 323284 156478 276912 315119 2150269

Morgan Tsvangirai

Rejected/Spoilt votes

Total Votes

13291 18459 12804 40099 21687 33555 29561 48307 4066

9166 10821 7940 9907 7353 19438 17525 36547 3409

43584 285979 343948 134191 121694 355400 370370 241232 284387

11171 233000

7675 129781

333965 2514750

Source: Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.

Following the announcement of the results of the run-off election, Mr. Mugabe was sworn in for a sixth term. In his inaugural address referring to a battle rather than an election, he stated: ‘In this new struggle for our country, many of our comrades lost life, limb and property. Those people who have lost their lives in this gallant struggle, rest in peace assured that we remain vigilant to protect Zimbabwe’s heritage’.148

The Major Developments, June-September, 2008 On 30 June, 2008 President Robert Mugabe flew to the Egyptian resort of Sharm El Sheik to attend the African Union summit. The Kenyan Prime Minister, Mr. Raila Odinga, urged the African Union to suspend Mr. Mugabe from the organization until he allowed free elections to take place in his country, arguing that the African Union would be setting a dangerous precedent if it allowed Mr. Mugabe to participate in its meetings; as far as he was concerned, Zimbabwe had no president with legitimacy to run the country.149 Botswana’s Vice President, Mr. Mompati Merafhe, also urged the African Union to exclude Mr. Mugabe from future 148

‘Mugabe’s foes brace for fallout’, Los Angeles Times, June 30, 2008. ‘Kenyan Prime Minister calls for suspension of Mugabe from African Union’, Wikipedia, June 30, 2008. 149

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meetings.150 In sharp contrast in a very tame resolution on Zimbabwe, the summit merely called on President Mugabe and Mr. Tsvangirai to initiate a dialogue with a view to promoting peace, stability, democracy and the reconciliation of the Zimbabwean people.151 Mr. Tsvangirai rejected the call from the African Union to hold talks with President Mugabe citing state-sponsored violence against members of the opposition.152 Nevertheless on 10 July, talks between ZANU (PF) and the MDC began in Pretoria.153 At the talks the opposition was represented by the Secretary General, Mr. Tendai Biti, and the Deputy Treasurer, Mr. Elton Mangoma; ZANU (PF) was represented by the Minister of Justice, Mr. Patrick Chinamasa, and the Minister of Labour, Mr. Nicholas Goche.154

The Memorandum of Understanding signed between ZANU (PF) and the MDC In a Memorandum of Understanding signed between ZANU (PF) and the MDC on 21 July, 2008 the parties agreed among other things to issue a statement condemning violence; to call for peace and to take all measures necessary to ensure that the law was applied fairly and justly to all persons irrespective of political affiliation; to take all necessary measures to eliminate all forms of political violence and to ensure the security of persons and property; to work together to ensure the safety of any displaced persons and their return home; to refrain from using abusive language which might incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or undermine each other.155 In a statement the South African Government congratulated the ZANU (PF) and the MDC leaders for signing the Memorandum of Understanding: ‘We are convinced that the Memorandum of Understanding has laid a firm 150

‘African Union calls for unity government’, csmonitor.com , July 3, 2008. African Union Summit Resolution on Zimbabwe, Adopted at the 11th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly, July 1, 2008, Sharm El Sheik, Egypt. 152 ‘Opposition Rejects Call To Start Talks With Mugabe’, The New York Times, July 3, 2008. 153 South African Government Information, South African Government Statement on the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Zimbabwe, 12 July, 2008. 154 ‘Zimbabwe Rivals Tentatively Begin Talks on Political Crisis’, The New York Times, July 11, 2008. 155 South African Government Information, Memorandum of Understanding between the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) and the two Movements for Democratic Change formations, 21 July, 2008. 151

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foundation for the Zimbabwean people to start on a new road towards political stability and economic recovery’.156 On 13 August, 2008 after three days of intensive negotiations, President Mugabe and Mr. Tsvangirai were deadlocked over which of them should lead a unity government. The talks were adjourned with no date set for a resumption of negotiations. The official mediator in Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises, the South African President, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, left Harare without the power-sharing deal he had hoped for.157 Four days later President Mugabe and Mr. Tsvangirai failed to close a power-sharing deal at the SADC summit held in Johannesburg from 16 to 17 August.158 A communiqué issued at the end of the summit reaffirmed SADC’s commitment to work with the people of Zimbabwe to enable them to overcome the challenges facing them.159 On 11 September, President Mugabe and Tsvangirai finally struck a power-sharing deal. The South African Government congratulated the people and political leadership of Zimbabwe on the power-sharing deal, stating: ‘The agreement has once more underlined our often- stated view that only the people of Zimbabwe, acting with the support of the international community, can author their own destiny out of the current political and economic challenges facing their country. While this is a cause for celebration, we are all too aware that this historic milestone constitutes but the end of the beginning’.160

The 15 September, 2008 agreement Under the agreement signed in Harare on 15 September, 2008 the Executive Authority of the Inclusive Government would vest in, and be shared among the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; the President would exercise executive authority; the Prime Minister would 156

South African Government Information, South African Government congratulates Zimbabwean parties for the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, 21 July, 2008. 157 ‘Talks in Zimbabwe Adjourn Without Any Deal in Sight’, The New York Times, August 14, 2008. 158 ‘Zimbabwe’s Power-Sharing Deal Eludes Mugabe and Rival’, The New York Times, August 18, 2008. 159 Text of SADC Final Communiqué, SADC Heads of State and Government, 18 August, 2008. 160 South African Government Information, Statement on the political agreement reached in Zimbabwe, 11 September, 2008.

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exercise executive authority while the Cabinet would also exercise executive authority. In the exercise of executive authority, the President, Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers would honour the principles and spirit underlying the formation of the Inclusive Government and act in a manner that sought to promote cohesion both inside and outside government. According to the agreement, the President among other things would: chair meetings of the Cabinet and the National Security Council; formally appoint the Vice Presidents and Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers and after consultation with the Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers, would allocate Ministerial portfolios. Under the agreement, the Prime Minister in his capacity as executive authority among other things would: chair meetings of the Council of Ministers; exercise executive authority; oversee the formulation of government policies by the Cabinet; ensure that the policies so formulated would be implemented by the entire government; ensure that Ministers would develop appropriate implementation plans to give effect to the policies decided by the Cabinet; the Prime Minister as a member of the National Security Council, would report regularly to the President and Parliament. According to the agreement, the Council of Ministers consisting of all Cabinet Ministers and chaired by the Prime Minister among other things would: assess the implementation of Cabinet decisions; assist the Prime Minister to attend to matters of coordination in the government; enable the Prime Minister to receive briefings from the Cabinet Committees and to make progress reports to the Cabinet on matters of implementation of Cabinet decisions. Under the agreement Mr. Mugabe would remain as President and Mr. Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister; there would be 2 Vice Presidents nominated by the President, 2 Deputy Prime Ministers, 1 from MDC (Tsvangirai) and 1 from MDC (Mutambara); 31 Ministers 15 of whom would be nominated by ZANU (PF), 13 by MDC (Tsvangirai) and 3 by MDC (Mutambara); 15 Deputy Ministers 8 of whom would be nominated by ZANU (PF), 6 by MDC (Tsvangirai) and 1 by MDC (Mutambara). Finally, the agreement empowered the President to appoint 9 new Senators 3 of whom would be nominated by ZANU (PF), 3 by MDC (Tsvangirai) and 3 by MDC (Mutambara).161 161

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNIONPATRIOTIC FRONT (ZANU-PF) AND THE TWO MOVEMENT DEMOCRATIC CHANGE (MDC) FORMATIONS, ON RESOLVING THE CHALLENGES

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It is clear that the above agreement was inherently unworkable because firstly, to the extent that Mr. Mugabe remained President, the MDC had legitimized his rule in spite of the fraudulent run-off presidential election of 27 June, 2008; secondly, to the extent that both the President and Prime Minister would exercise executive authority over the same Cabinet, the agreement was unlikely to last in the long term.

The Food Crisis, March-August, 2008 Meanwhile, in spite of the support from the international community, the food situation in Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate. In March, the Ministry of Agriculture estimated that only 28 per cent (470,669 MT) of the national food requirement would be met by the 2007/8 harvests leaving a deficit of 1,428,360 MT; poor timing of cropping, a centrally-controlled market system and limited resources were cited as the main causes of crop failure.162 In April, the World Food Programme assisted 300,000 people with food aid.163 A SPECIAL REPORT, FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO ZIMBABWE dated 18 June, 2008 stated among other things that for the second consecutive year, the combined impact of adverse weather, lack of timely availability of inputs and severe economic constraints had caused enormous hardships and food insecurity among both rural and urban populations; maize production was estimated at 575,000 tonnes, 28 per cent lower than in 2007 and 44 per cent below the 2006 Government estimate. The Mission estimated the total domestic cereal availability for 2008/09 marketing year at 848,000 tonnes, about 40 per cent below the previous year’s domestic supply. The primary factors responsible for the decline in addition to adverse weather, were untimely delivery of seeds and shortages of fertilizer, deteriorating infrastructure, and most importantly, unprofitable prices for most of the Grain Marketing Board-controlled crops. The newly-settled black farmers cultivated only about half the prime land allocated to them due to shortages of tractor/draught power, fuel, and investment in infrastructure/improvements; the large-scale commercial sector was producing less than 10 per cent of the maize it produced in the 1990s. With the total utilization of cereals at FACING ZIMBABWE, DONE AT HARARE, ON THIS 15TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2008, 21-25. 162 OCHA, Zimbabwe Election Period: Weekly Situation Report, 28 April-4 May, 2008, 1. 163 OCHA, Zimbabwe Election Period: Weekly Situation Report, 11-18 April, 2008.

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about 2.080 million tonnes including 1.875 million tonnes for direct human consumption, the resulting cereal import requirement was estimated at 1.232 million tonnes, of which the maize deficit accounted for about 1 million tonnes. The annual inflation which stood at 355,000 per cent in March, 2008 dramatically eroded the purchasing power of households on a daily basis and greatly limited their access to the meager food supplies available; given the acute shortage of foreign currency, the dwindling export base and the high prices of maize in the region and internationally, the Mission estimated firstly the total commercial cereal imports at about 850,000 tonnes, leaving an uncovered deficit of about 380,000 tonnes for maize; secondly, about 2 million people in rural and urban areas would be food insecure between July and September, 2008 rising to 3.8 million people between October and peaking to about 5.1 million at the height of the hungry season between January and March, 2009; the food- insecure population would require food assistance amounting to about 395,000 tonnes of cereals in 2008/09; additional foods such as oil and legumes as well as supplementary foods would also be needed to augment the higher needs of most vulnerable groups. In light of the Grain Marketing Board’s limited capacity, the Mission recommended among other things the opening up of trading in cereals to private traders to ensure that cereals could be imported and moved quickly to areas of need; emergency assistance by the Government and the international community to supply timely and quality seed and fertilizer and dipping chemicals in order to control tick-borne livestock diseases; the need to source urgently appropriate varieties of maize and small grain seed for delivery in September, 2008; the need to promote locally-grown openpollinated variety seed and use of manure instead of imported chemical fertilizers. In order to deal with the structural food deficit and chronic shortage the Mission urged the international community and the Zimbabwe Government to enter into a policy dialogue to mobilize the economic and other assistance needed to promote sustainable food production and overall food security by way of development assistance for investment in farm mechanization and infrastructure to enhance productivity and to allow fuller capacity utilization by the newly-settled farmers; it supported reforms of the grain marketing system in line with the economic

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liberalization policy goal announced by the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in April, 2007.164 Because the Government did not take up the above recommendations, the food crisis deepened; as of mid-August, 2008 the country had a stock of 315 MT while the monthly food consumption was 147.75MT; grain was generally unavailable in most areas and where it was available it was priced well beyond the reach of many people.165 As a result of the food crisis, desperately hungry citizens were running out of survival strategies; those with nothing to sell were resorting to eating whatever wild fruits they could get hold of; rural people were selling off their livestock for cash to buy food; in the southern provinces, there were reports of desperate families marrying off their under-age daughters to elderly well-off men in return for food. The coping mechanisms used by some families in high-density suburbs in urban areas included petty trading such as selling vegetables, cigarettes and small items in front of their houses; in rural areas those with some livestock were selling whatever they could to raise the cash needed to buy food, but with retail shops empty of food items, they resorted to the black market for purchases at exorbitant prices; in Mberengwa some people were going for days without food as most of the villagers had harvested very little or nothing during the year.166

Economic Mismanagement, March-August, 2008 Due to economic mismanagement discussed earlier, the annual inflation in Zimbabwe rocketed past the 100,000 per cent mark in February, 2008. In March as already noted, it soared to 355,000 per cent. 167 In June it galloped to 11.25 million per cent.168 The highest bank note issued by the Reserve Bank in July was ZW$50 billion with an exchange rate of ZW$64 billion for US$1; a teacher’s salary was about ZW$66 billion per month, just enough to buy two liters of cooking oil and a bar of soap; an average 164 SPECIAL REPORT, FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO ZIMABWE, 18 June, 2008, 1-2. 165 OCHA, Zimbabwe Election Period: Bi-Weekly Situation Report, 14-26 August, 2008, 1. 166 Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe: The Humanitarian Crisis Report, 15 August, 2008, 1, 5. 167 OCHA, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Mid-Year Review of the Appeal, 2008 for Zimbabwe, 16 July, 2008, 1. 168 ‘Inflation surges to 11.25 million per cent’, The Zimbabwe Times, August 20, 2008.

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worker earned about ZW$25 billion a month while a loaf of bread cost ZW$2 billion.169 On 13 July, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Mr. Gideon Gono, said he could not proffer any way forward in terms of reviving the economy without a national unity government to foster a national consensus that put the interests of the country first. 170 To the ZANU (PF) leaders, however, a government of national unity with the MDC was anathema; furthermore, to the extent that President Mugabe was their meal ticket, it was more important to keep him in office than to save the economy. Early in August, 2008 Mr. Gono called for a freeze on prices and wages in a bid to rein in the spiralling inflation, stating: ‘Zimbabweans must realize that the country is in a practically binding state of socioeconomic emergency. As such, there is need for a universal moratorium on all incomes and prices for a minimum of six months’. 171 Meanwhile, the country’s economic woes were worsened by a shortage of paper on which to print money. The state-owned Fidelity Printers and Refiners which had tirelessly churned out bank notes, was thrown into a crisis early in July after a German company stopped supplying bank note paper because of its concerns over the recent violent run-off election; consequently, the printing operation slowed down drastically; two thirds of the 1,000-strong workforce was ordered to go on leave and two of the three money-printing shifts were cancelled; the result on the streets was an immediate cash crunch; accordingly, the Reserve Bank issued ZW$100 million, ZW$250 million and ZW$500 million notes in rapid succession; by mid-July the highest denomination was ZW$50 billion (worth US$1 on the street). Before the crunch a beer at a bar in Harare cost ZW$15 billion; at 5 p. m on 4 July, it cost ZW$100 billion (US$4 at the time) in the same bar; an hour later, the price had gone up to ZW$150 billion (US$6).172 On Saturday, 19 July, 2008 the Reserve Bank introduced a ZW$100 billion bank note (equivalent to US$1) which was to come into circulation on Monday, 21 July.173

169

Nutmegcollector, ‘Some Interesting Facts About Paper Money: Zimbabwe Inflation Rate Hits Over 9 Million Per cent’, July 3, 2008. 170 ‘Zimbabwe Reserve Bank chief says economy needs political unity’, The Times, (London), July 13, 2008. 171 ‘Zimbabwe inflation rockets higher’, BBC News, 19 August, 2008. 172 ‘Lack of bank note paper threatens Zimbabwe economy’, Los Angeles Times, July 14, 2008. 173 ‘Zimbabwe introduces $100 billion banknotes’, CNN, July 19, 2008.

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Reporting from Harare, on 18 July, 2008 Mr. Chris Mcgreal of The Guardian, stated among other things, that as a result of the raging hyperinflation, many workers could no longer afford transport to go to work; instead they formed ‘walking clubs’ to travel to the city; the numbers had been falling as jobs disappeared under the barrage of hyperinflation and a currency devaluing so fast that banknotes issued just a few months before were not worth enough to buy a single sheet of toilet paper, that is if toilet paper could even be found in the empty supermarkets. The economic crisis had wormed its way into almost every facet of everyday life as people spent days struggling with intermittent power supplies and water shortages or waiting for hours in queues for bread or cash. Zimbabweans used to feel sorry for their war-blighted neighbours in Mozambique who were forced to cross the border to buy basic goods; now queues of Zimbabweans, black and white, lined up at the checkout tills at Chimoio in Mozambique, loaded with bread, flour and tinned foods because the supermarkets at home were all but empty. Zimbabweans used to laugh at Zambia’s currency, the kwacha, as Monopoly money; now at Victoria Falls on their side of the border, they were using the kwacha as hard currency because the Zimbabwe dollar lost half its value every few days. Increasingly people were getting by on one meal a day; retired people across Zimbabwe had seen their pensions wiped out by inflation; even for people with money, shopping was a logistical nightmare. The first problem was to get hold of cash; the Reserve Bank could not print it fast enough to keep up with demand but neither did anyone want to hold onto it for very long when prices were rising by the hour. People queued for hours to draw their allotted ZW$100 billion limit from the bank each day but then spent it as fast as possible before it lost what little value it had. It was possible to write cheques but shop owners demanded that they be made out for twice as much as the bill because cheques lost half their value while clearing. With a fairly advanced electronic banking system in Zimbabwe, it was possible to bypass the cash shortage by using a debit card but the limits on individual transactions meant a basket full of groceries required the card to be swiped dozens of times to pay the bill; some supermarkets had staff standing full- time at the card machines and queues of customers lining up to pay; other supermarkets had no problem because they had nothing to sell. People with hard currency-South African Rand or American dollars –were increasingly drawn to underground supermarkets set up in warehouses; shopping was by appointment; customers were screened to ensure that they wouldn’t blow the whistle.174 174

Chris Mcgreal, ‘What comes after a trillion?’, The Guardian, (U. K.), July 18, 2008.

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To this miserable existence has President Mugabe reduced the people of Zimbabwe. It was in the context of the food crisis and the crumbling economy that President Mugabe signed the 15 September agreement; a government of national unity was his life-line to international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which he had previously denounced as imperialist institutions. For Mr. Tsvangirai the immediate advantage was an end to state-sponsored violence against members of his party; it remains to be seen whether the agreement will work in practice.

Summary and Conclusion This postscript has examined the major developments in Zimbabwe from 2001 to 2008 and in particular the arrests and harassment of leaders of the opposition prior to and after the presidential elections of March, 2002; the March, 2002 presidential elections; reports of four observer groups to the presidential elections; the aftermath of the presidential elections and other developments (2002-2004); the March, 2005 parliamentary elections and their aftermath (March- December, 2007); the food crisis (July, 2001February, 2008); economic mismanagement (April, 2001-February, 2008); the parliamentary and presidential elections of 29 March, 2008 and their aftermath (April-June, 2008); the run-off presidential elections (June 27, 2008); reports of three observer groups to the run-off presidential elections and their aftermath (July-August, 2008); the major developments (June-September, 2008) and in particular the Memorandum of Understanding signed between ZANU (PF) and the MDC (21 July, 2008); the 15 September, 2008 agreement between ZANU (PF) and the MDC; the food crisis (March-August, 2008) and economic mismanagement (MarchAugust, 2008). For reasons already explained, four observer groups unanimously concluded that the 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe were not free and fair. Following defeat in the March, 2005 parliamentary elections, the MDC began to splinter into two factions which subsequently fought the 29 March, 2008 parliamentary elections separately. The Government’s disastrous land reform programme and severe droughts led to widespread food shortages which were exacerbated by economic mismanagement and in particular fuel shortages; the constant interruptions of electricity supplies and the collapse of the education system.

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In the 29 March, 2008 parliamentary elections, ZANU (PF) lost control of the House of Assembly for the first time since independence in 1980. In the presidential elections Mr. Tsvangirai defeated Mr. Mugabe by 48 to 43 per cent of the vote. Following defeat, President Mugabe through a systematic campaign of terror against members of the opposition ‘won’ reelection in the run-off on 27 June, 2008. For reasons already explained, three observer missions were unanimous that the run-off elections in Zimbabwe were not free and fair; nevertheless, Mr. Mugabe was declared the default winner of the one-candidate election and was sworn in for a sixth term. Utterly unable to solve the country’s political and economic crises and under pressure from SADC, the Pan- African Parliament and the African Union Mr. Mugabe agreed to form a national unity government with the MDC but to the extent that the 15 September agreement has left him in control of the country, it is doubtful that the international community will in the near future provide the financial assistance needed to jump-start Zimbabwe’s crumbling economy. President Robert Mugabe has managed to cling to power so far; it remains to be seen whether he will survive the economic meltdown Zimbabwe has experienced since 2000.

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INDEX

African Affairs Board, 75, 78, 83 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 299 African Union (AU) Observer Mission, 347 agriculture, 6, 7, 10, 33, 37, 41, 42, 44, 51, 75, 230, 231, 232, 234, 253, 279, 284, 325 All -African People's Conference, 84 American Congregational Church, 19 American Methodist Episcopal Church, 38, 42, 46 Andersen, Chris, 202, 203,207 Anderson, W. H, 31, 32 Anglo-American proposals, 169 Armitage, Sir Robert, 85 asbestos, 36 Auret, Mike, 263 Banana, Reverend Canaan, 139, 145, 182, 183, 247, 250, 254 Banda, Aleke, 96 Banda, Dr. Hastings, 74, 82, 84, 85, 122 Baxter, G, 74 Beal, Lieutenant Colonel Robert, 25 Bennett, Roy, 313 Benson, Sir Arthur, 96 beryllium, 60 Bhebe, M. M, 203 Biti, Tendai, 336, 342, 349 Bledisloe, Lord, 72 Boers, 9 Borchgrave, Marc, 154 Botha, P. W, 239, 248 Botha, Roelof, 248 Botswana, 1, 12, 161, 210, 212, 294 Bottomley, Arthur, 123, 125

Boyd, Dr. Devee, 266 Boynton, Sir John, 236 Brethren in Christ Church, 38, 39, 266 British South Africa Company, 14, 16, 22, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 48, 49, 52 Brown, George, 134 Bulawayo, 10, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 32, 36, 38, 44, 108, 171, 173, 201, 238, 255, 256, 257, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 269, 290 Bulle, Ernest, 207 Burl, Alan, 278 Burns, John F, 246, 248, 250, 251, 252 Burton, I. B, 31 Bush, President George W, 342 Butler, R. A, 97 Butler, Reverend J, 40 Buxton, Earl, 35, 50, 52 Bvudzijena, Wayne, 320 Carnegie, Reverend David, 37 Carrington, Lord Peter, 209, 214, 217, 218, 226, 227, 229, 238, 242, 249, 251 Carrington, Major General Sir Frederick, 25, 27 Carter, Hodding, 241, 249 Carter, President Jimmy, 208, 217, 249, 252 Carter, Sir Morris, 55 Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia, 138 Catholic Bishops of Zimbabwe, 263 Cauvin,Henri E, 287 CCJPZ, 259, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 270, 271 Centenary District, 154, 155

A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 Chambati, Ariston, 182, 282 Chamisa, Nelson, 307, 314 Chancellor, Sir John, 51 Changamire, 5 Charter of the British South Africa Company, 11, 14, 32 Chavunduka, Professor Gordon, 183 Chavunduka, Sarah, 91 Chibwe, Lawrence, 315 Chidzero, Bernard, 91, 271, 274 Chihambakwe, Simplicius, 265 Chikerema, James, 106, 117, 184, 209 Chikore Mission, 19 Chimanikire, Gift, 314 Chimutengwende, Chen, 282, 288 Chinamano, Josiah, 117, 119, 145, 229, 256, 257, 264 Chinamasa, Patrick, 308, 315 Chipembere, H. B, 84, 85 Chirau, Chief Jeremiah, 175, 177, 215 Chirwa, Orton, 96 Chissano, Joaquin, 158 Chisiza, Dunduza, 84 Chishawasha Mission, 18, 26 Chitepo, Herbert, 89, 118 Chitepo, Mrs. Victoria, 247 Chiume, W. K, 84 Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, 155 Chiwewe, Willard, 316 Christian Council of Rhodesia, 143, 151, 152 chrome, 36, 135, 161 Churchill, Winston, 54 coal, 36, 60 Coghlan, Charles, 51 Colquhoun, Archibald Ross, 15 Coltart, David, 290, 314 Commonwealth Observer Group, 235, 236, 245, 246, 310 Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), 326, 331 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 345

377

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 292 Cook, Robin, 286 copper, 6, 36, 135 Coryndon, R. T, 34 cotton, 6, 7, 10, 79, 157 Cowper, Reginald, 169 Craven, Patrick, 345 Crawford, Max, 268 Cross, Eddie, 313 Dabengwa, Dumiso, 255, 258, 270, 287 Dadaya Mission, 69, 101 Dande, 4 Davidson, Miss Frances, 39, 46 Department of Native Education, 41, 42 Devlin Commission, 86, 99 Devlin, Lord, 86 Domboshawa School, 43, 45, 53 Dominican Sisters, 18 Dominion Party (DP), 112, 113 Dorman, Sir Maurice, 142 Dumbutshena, Enoch, 117 Duncan, Andrew, 25 Dutch Reformed Church, 18, 19, 39, 44, 47 Elliot, Reverend W. A, 31 Emergency Powers Act, 108 Engel, Bishop Jesse, 38 Etheridge, Reverend E. H, 44 Fearless Proposals, 136, 137 Federal Constitutional Review Conference, 97, 100 Fenn, Nicholas, 235, 236 Field, Winston, 120, 126 Fifth Brigade, 262, 263, 298, 304 Fletcher, Sir Patrick, 103 Flower, Ken, 129, 171, 172, 177, 188, 190, 210 Forbes, Major Patrick William, 21, 177, 188, 190, 210 FNLA, 160 Fort Victoria, 19, 119, 190, 233 Foster, John, 81

378 Franchise, 82, 83, 103 Fraser, Malcolm, 212, 213, 251 FRELIMO, 154, 156, 157, 158 Garwe, Justice Paddington, 312 Geneva conference, 153, 166, 167, 168, 169, 179 Ghandi, Indira, 249, 251 Gibbs, Sir Humphrey, 134 Goche, Nicholas, 349 gold, 1, 6, 11, 12, 15, 16, 20, 36, 52 Gono, Gideon, 355 Goromonzi Secondary School, 69 Great Trek, 9 Great Zimbabwe, 4, 6, 7, 18 Grey, Earl, 25, 27 Griffiths, James, 74 Grobler, Pieter Johannes, 12 Gumbo, Rugare, 317 Gumede, Josiah, 206, 207 Gurney, Dr. Samuel, 46 Guruhuswa, 4, 5 Gwaai Reserve, 22 Gwatidzo, Douglas, Dr., 315 Hadfield Commission, 62 Hamadziripi, Henry, 118 Harare, 1, 108, 268, 269,271, 277, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290, 293, 295, 296, 297, 302 Harlech, Lord, 142 Hartzell, Bishop Joseph, 38 Hawkins, Roger, 161, 171 Helm, Dr. John T, 19, 47 Helms, Senator Jesse, 209 Henwood, Tim, 285 Hlatshwayo, Justice Ben, 308 Hole, Hugh Marshall, 22 Holland, Sekai, 314 Home, Lord, 86 Home, Sir Alec Douglas, 120, 142 Hove, Byron, 181, 185, 186, 188, 215, 216 Hove, Mike, 90 Hove, Richard, 247 Howard Institute, 18

Index Huggins, Sir Godfrey, 73, 76, 81, 101 Hunzvi, Chenjerai, 285 Hwange National Park, 2 Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, 332 Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Bill, 331 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 274, 327 Jameson, Leander Starr, 15, 24 Johnson, Frank William Frederick, 15 Jones, Arthur Creech, 73 Jones, Reverend Neville, 45 Jones, Sir Glyn, 142 Jones, Thomas Jesse, 62 Jowa, James, 288 Jowitt, Harold, 63, 65, 66, 70 Judson, Lieutenant D, 26 Kachidza, Reverend Henry, 145 Kagubi, 28, 29 Kangai, Kumbirai, 247 Kapwepwe, Simon, 96, 99 Kariba, Lake, 2 Karlen, Bishop, 263 Kaunda, Kenneth, 87, 95, 96, 97, 99, 212, 239 Kazembe, Joyce, 293 Keigwin, Herbert, 42,43, 44, 45 Kezi, 257, 260, 261, 266, 270 Ki-Moon, Ban, 344 Kissinger, Henry, 153, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 179 Knight-Bruce, G. W. H, 18 Kona, William, 270 Kwinjeh, Grace, 314 Labour Relations Act, 294 Land Acquisition Act, 279, 304 Land Apportionment Act, 106, 114, 117, 271 Land Tenure Act, 128, 139, 140, 141, 143, 146, 148, 152, 272 Lardner-Burke, Desmond, 155 Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, 108, 117, 119, 126

A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill, 108, 109 Lawley, Sir Arthur, 48 Legal Age of Majority Act (LAMA), 293, 294 Lendy, Captain, C. F, 20 Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 86 Lesabe, Thenjiwe, 264 Lewis, Anthony, 249, 250 Limpopo River, 1, 4, 158 lithium, 60 Littleton, James, 313 Llewellin, Lord, 81 Lloyd, Tony, 281 Lobengula, 12, 13, 19 London Commonwealth Conference and Rhodesia, 130 London Missionary Society, 10, 12, 30, 31, 37, 45 Lorenzo Marques, 129, 158, 159 Lowrie, Vin, 196 Macdonald, Chief Justice Hector, 239, 251 Macfarlane, Ronald, Captain, 25 Machel, Samora, 159, 212, 248 Macleod, Ian, 96, 99 Macmillan, Harold, 94 Made, Joseph, 290 Madzore, Paul, 315 Magaya vs. Magaya, 305 Mahachi, Moven, 274 Maguire, Rochfort, 13 Maize Marketing Board, 61 Makarau, Rita, 297 Makoni, Andrew, 315 Makoni, Chief, 28 Makoni, Simba, 317, 327, 329, 335, 339 Makumbe, John, 283, 286 Malan, General Magnus, 248 Malawi Congress Party (MCP), 96, 97, 99, 122 Malianga, Morton, 108, 116, 118, 119 Malianga, Washington, 115 Malunga, Sidney, 269, 270

379

Mandela, Nelson, 345 Mangoma, Elton, 349 Mangwana, Paul, 331 Mangwende, Witness, 277 Manicaland, 11, 16, 18, 19, 32, 37, 239, 240, 241, 263 Manley, Michael, 213 Mao Tse Tung, 154 Maposa, J. Z, 202 Martin, Sir Richard, 25, 27 Mashonaland, 4, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 43, 46, 48, 131, 137, 199, 220, 238, 239, 240, 241 Mashonaland Native Police, 17 Mashonganyika, 29 Masuku, Lt. General Lookout, 258, 263, 270 Matabeleland, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 43, 48, 131, 137, 192, 199, 205, 206, 220, 238, 255, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 268, 298, 303, 304 Matabeleland North Province, 262, 264 Matabeleland Order in Council, 21 Matabeleland South Province, 265, 266 Matchaba-Hove, Dr. Reginald, 308, 309 Matope, 4, 5 Matrimonial Causes Act, 294 Mavangira, Justice Susan, 311 Maveneka, A. F, 266 Mawema, Michael, 108, 119, 145 Mbeki, Thabo, 350 Mbire, 4, 5 Mcgreal, Chris, 356 McLaughlin, Sister Janice, 203, 216 Mcmullan, Bob, 325 Mdlongwa, Enos, 269 Meredith, Martin, 176

380 Memorandum of Understanding, 306, 349 Merafhe, Mompati, 297 Milton, William, 48 mining, 33, 36, 60 Ministry of Community Development and Women’s Affairs (MCDWA), 292 Mizeki, Bernard, 18 Mnangagwa, Emmerson, 247, 256, 257, 260, 287 Moffat Treaty, 11, 12, 13, 32 Moffat, John Smith, 12 Moffat, Reverend Robert, 12 Monckton Commission, 92, 94, 95, 100 Monckton, Lord Walter, 92 Morgenster Mission, 46, 190 Mount Selinda, 19 Movement for Democratic Change, (MDC), 255, 281, 282, 283, 284, 287, 288, 289, 290, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307 Moyo, Elijah, 264 Moyo, J. Z, 115, 116, 117 Moyo, Jonathan, 336 Moyo, Lovemore, 313 Moyo, Nkosana, 326 Mozambique, 1, 36, 52, 127, 129, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 179, 208, 212, 227, 248, 260, 295 MPLA, 160, 179 Msipa, Cephas, 145, 267 Mswaka, Tom, 276 Mtetwa, Beatrice, 314, 315 Mubako, Simbi, 247, 267 Muchache, Clement, 116, 117 Muchadehama, Alec, 315 Muchechetere, Justice Gibson, 298 Mudede, Tobaiwa, 280 Mugabe, Davis, 113 Mugabe, Robert, 108, 115, 116, 118, 119, 167, 176, 182, 190, 194, 204, 214, 216, 227, 229, 233, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242,

Index 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 263, 264, 266, 267, 268, 270, 271, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 304, 305 306 Mukombero Nyahuma, 5 Mukome, David, 188, 207 Mumbengegwi, S. C, 333 Mundawarara, Silas, 207, 240 Munodawafa, Samuel, 117 Murerwa, Herbert, 328, 329 Murira, Dennis, 315 Musarurwa, Willie, 117, 145 Musasa Project, 295 Musika, Joseph, 116, 117, 119, 258, 285 Mutambanengwe, Simpson, 118 Mutambara, Professor Arthur, 313, 314 Mutapa dynasty, 5 Mutapa state, 5, 6 Mutasa, Chief, 16 Mutasa, Didymus, 338 Mutasa, Elisha, 118 Mutumbuka, Dzingai, 247 Mutume, Bishop, 263 Muzenda, Simon, 118, 119, 233, 247, 262, 271 Muzorewa, Bishop Abel, 145, 146, 167, 175, 177, 180, 183, 184, 188, 190, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 224, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 239, 240, 242, 243, 246, 248, 253, 280 Mwanawasa, Levy, 344 Mzilikazi, 7, 8, 9, 12 Napier, William, 25 National Democratic Party (NDP), 97, 108, 110, 112, 126 National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), 328 Native Department, 16, 42 Native Development Act, 42, 44

A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 Native Land Husbandry Act, 106, 117 Ncube, Professor Weshman, 313, 314 Ndebele, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 31, 32, 33 Ndiweni, Chief Kayisa, 205, 207 Ndlovu, Edward, 117, 270 Ndlovu, Senator Moven, 267 Ndubiwa, Michael, 269 Nehanda, 28, 29 Nemakonde, Chief, 19 Neto, Agostinho, 212 Ngcebetsha, C. E, 145 Ngwenya, Jane, 117 Nhema, Alfred, 291 Nhongo, Lt. General Rex, 154, 227, 249, 266 Nhongo, Mrs. Teurai Ropa, 247, 291 Nhongo-Simbanegavi, Josephine, 291 Nkala, Enos, 118, 119, 247, 270, 274 Nkala, L, 117 Nkomo, John, 267, 268, 286 Nkomo, Joshua, 97, 105, 108, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 125, 176, 189, 214, 218, 229, 234, 236, 239, 240, 241, 243, 245, 247, 251, 252, 253, 256, 257, 260, 262, 267, 269, 270, 271 Nkrumah, Kwame, 105 Nkumbula, Harry, 82 Noel-Baker, Philip, 74 Norman, Dennis, 246 Norwegian Observer Mission, 257, 258 Ntuta, Jini, 257 Nyagumbo, Maurice, 247, 248, 268, 271 Nyamandlovu, 261, 262 Nyandoro, George, 106, 207 Nyasaland African National Congress (ANC), 84, 85, 96, 99

381

Nyatsimba Mutota, 4 Nyerere, President Julius, 115, 116, 208, 212, 239 Nzuwah, Mariyawanda, 287 Odinga, Raila, 348 Operation Hurricane, 171, 172 Operation Repulse, 171, 172 Operation Salops, 174 Operation Thresher, 171, 172 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 115, 176, 207, 208, 241, 299, 300 Owen, David, 174, 179, 184 Pan-African Congress, 105 Pan-African Parliament (PAP) Observer Mission, 346, 347 Parirenyatwa, Dr. Samuel Tichafa, 112 Parsons, Dr. L, 46 Partridge, Mark, 171 Patriotic Front, 167, 176, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 189, 208, 214, 215, 217, 218, 221, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 251, 252, 260 Pearce Commission, 128, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 179 Pearce, Lord, 142, 145 Pennefather, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Graham, 15 People’s Caretaker Council (PCC), 117, 118, 119 Perth, Lord, 86 Plumer, Major Herbert, 24, 25 Pope-Simmonds, Eric, 229, 236 Potgieter, Henrik, 9 Prestage, Fr. Peter, 31 Pretoria summit, 166 Preventive Detention Act, 107, 117, 126 Public Order Amendment Act, 107, 126 Raath, Jan, 268 Railways, 36, 52, 98 Ramphal, Sir Shridath, 236 Randolph, Fr. Richard, 141, 144

382 Reagan, President Ronald, 276 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 332, 333, 334, 355 Reyneke, Reverend M, 44 Rhodes, Cecil John, 12, 14, 27 Rhodesia Front (RF), 113, 114, 120, 121, 124, 127, 137, 147, 149, 150, 152, 162, 163, 164, 166, 182, 189, 207, 209, 223, 246 Rice, Condoleezza, 344 Richard, Ivor, 167, 168 Richartz, Fr. Francis, 26, 30 Robertson, John, 282 Robinson, Sir Hercules, 12 Robinson, Virgil, 31 Rozvi kingdom, 5, 7, 10 Rudd Concession, 11, 13, 14, 32 Rudd, Charles Dunnell, 13 SADC Election Observer Mission (SEOM), 294 SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer Mission, 258, 309 Saki, Otto, 315 Salisbury, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 36, 37, 49, 86, 89, 92, 93, 94, 108, 110, 114, 116, 119, 125, 126, 127, 133, 134, 136, 144, 154, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 212, 215, 216, 228, 229, 233, 236, 238, 240, 246, 247, 248, 249, 256, 258, 275, 276 Samkange, Sketchley, 108 Samkange, Stanlake, 13, 89, 118 Sandys, Duncan, 94, 95, 98, 110, 120, 121 Savanhu, Jasper, 88 Schori, Pierre, 287 Sekeremayi, Sidney, 263, 276 Selous, Frederick C, 15 Selous Scouts, 159 Sex Discrimination Removal Act, 294 Shaka, 7, 8

Index Shamuyarira, Nathan, 89, 115, 118, 247, 264, 335 Shangani Reserve, 22 Shaw, Angus, 279 Shimmin, Reverend Isaac, 39 Shippard, Sir Sidney, 12 Shona, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 38, 47, 211 Sibanda, Gibson, 307, 314 Sikhala, Job, 314 Silundika, T. G, 117 Sipalo, M, 96, 99 Sithole, Chief Gambo, 28 Sithole, Chief Philisi, 266 Sithole, Edson, 118, 145 Sithole, Reverend Ndabaningi, 104, 108, 115, 116, 118, 119, 125, 166, 175, 188, 234, 268, 280 Smith, David, 161, 170, 198, 207, 223, 246, 247 Smith, Ian Douglas, 100, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 142, 144. 148, 149, 152, 156, 158, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 179, 190, 196, 197, 198, 201, 202, 206, 207, 209, 211, 223, 241, 242, 244, 245, 246, 253, 223 Smuts, General Jan Christian, 50, 51 Soames, Lord Christopher, 218, 227, 228, 241, 242, 251, 275 South Africa, 1, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 34, 35, 36, 48, 49, 50, 51, 85, 114, 129, 135, 139, 158, 159, 160, 163, 164, 169, 170, 235, 241, 248, 267 South African Republic (see also Transvaal), 11, 12, 14, 15 Southern Rhodesia African National Congress, 105, 106 Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Review Conference, 110

A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference, 44, 63, 67, 68 Squires, Hilary, 171, 187, 263 St. Augustine’s Mission, 18 Stanley, Oliver, 73 Stanley, Sir Herbert, 47 Stark, George, 66, 67, 68 Steyn, Dr. M. H, 19 Swanepoel, Nick, 281 Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 274 Taggart, Michael M, 279 Takawira, Leopold, 108, 115, 116, 118, 119 Tegwani Training Institution, 48 Tekere, Edgar, 119, 229, 278 Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret, 209, 212, 227, 228, 251 Thompson, Francis, 13 Thompson, W. L. Dr., 19 Thomson, George, 136 Tiger Proposals, 131, 134 Tjolotjo Industrial School, 43, 45, 53 Tobacco Marketing Act, 61 Tobacco Marketing Board, 61 Todd, Garfield, 101, 102, 103, 104, 126, 146, 181 Togwa dynasty, 5 Tongogara, General Josiah, 154, 227 Transvaal (see also South African Republic), 9, 11, 24, 37 Tredgold, Sir Robert, 102, 109, 110 Tsholotsho, 261, 262 Tsvangirai, Morgan, 284, 287, 288, 289, 304, 306, 307, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 336, 337, 338, 339, 342, 343, 350, 351 Tungamirai, Josiah, 154 Tutu, Reverend Desmond, 286, 345 UANC, 175, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 190, 205, 207, 209, 216, 229, 230, 234, 236, 240, 242, 253

383

UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 266, 267, 269, 270, 272, 273, 301, 303 UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 271, 272, 273, 274, 290, 291, 301, 303 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), 101, 125, 126, 128, 129, 137, 145, 149, 151, 152, 153, 179, 182, 215, 222 Union for Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), 160 United African National Council (UANC), 175, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 190, 205, 207, 209, 216, 229, 230, 234, 236, 240, 242, 253 United Federal Party (UFP), 97, 112, 113, 114, 122 United Kingdom, 74, 78, 235, 318 United Methodist Church in Rhodesia, 138, 144, 145 United National Independence Party (UNIP), 96, 97, 99, 122 United Nations Security Council, 135, 136, 182, 292, 298 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 298 United Rhodesia Party, 101 United States, 37, 116, 129, 159, 160, 162, 184, 185, 201, 203, 208, 209, 210, 235, 243, 249, 252, 278 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 274, 323 University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 91, 92 Urimbo, Mayor, 154 Ushewokunze, Herbert, 238, 252, 261, 262 Vambe, Lawrence, 29, 30, 89 Vance, Cyrus, 241

384 Victoria Agreement, 20 Victoria Falls, 2, 36, 73, 76, 98, 100, 121, 173, 192, 261 Vintcent, Judge J, 27 Vlok, Reverend M, 45 Vorster, John, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, `164, 168, 170, 179 Walden, Brian, 197, 198, 199 Waldheim, Kurt, 251 Walls, Lt. General Peter, 171, 191, 210, 229, 241, 242, 247, 249 Welensky, Sir Roy, 72, 73, 84, 86, 88, 94, 97, 100 West Germany, 129 Wha Wha Prison, 185 White, Reverend John, 28 Whitehead, Sir Edgar, 103, 106, 107, 108, 112, 113 Wilson, Harold, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136 Wilson, Reverend Habron, 265 Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA), 295, 296 Women in Law and Development in Africa (WLDAF), 296 Women’s Action Group (WAG), 294 World Food Programme (WFP), 266, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 301, 303 Wright, A. J, 197 Young, Andrew, 174, 179 Zambezi River, 1, 2, 4, 13, 158 Zambia, 1, 71, 74, 87, 95, 96, 99, 113, 123, 126, 136, 161, 162, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 239, 295 Zambia African Congress (ZAC), 96, 99 ZANU (PF), 231, 232, 233, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 254, 255, 267, 268, 269, 270, 278, 284, 290, 303, 304, 305, 255, 259, 260, 261, 262, 265, 266, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 292, 293,

Index 294, 295, 298, 300, 304, 306, 307 ZANU (Sithole), 195 Zia, General Mohammed, 251 Zimbabwe, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 28, 33, 39, 45, 101, 102, 110, 112, 115, 180, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 228, 229, 230, 234, 235, 238, 241, 245, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 258, 273, 276, 281, 285,291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307 Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), 153, 154, 156, 158, 171, 179, 188, 189, 210, 236, 249, 255, 256, 258, 260, 275, 291, 303 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (Also known as ZANU (PF)), 115, 117, 118, 119, 125, 126, 127, 145, 153, 156, 159, 166, 176, 182, 189, 194, 204, 205, 206, 207, 217, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 253, 254, 255, 260, 267, 268, 269, 270, 278, 284, 287, 288, 289, 290, 303, 304, 305, 255, 259, 260, 261, 262, 265, 266, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 292, 293, 294, 295, 298, 300, 304, 306, 307 Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 119, 125, 126, 127, 145, 153, 182, 189, 194, 218, 229, 230, 234, 236, 237, 238, 243, 244, 247, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 263, 264, 267, 268, 269, 270, 303, 304 Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR), 264, 288, 289, 290, 291, 339

A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), 275, 304 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), 284, 289, 304 Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), 257, 258, 261, 262, 265, 283, 284, 286, 287, 288, 312, 316, 334, 335, 337 Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), 276, 279 Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZIMRIGHTS), 298, 301, 302 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), 298, 302, 339

385

Zimbabwe Legal Resources Foundation, 300 Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), 288, 331 Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), 153, 173, 179, 210, 237, 245, 249, 255, 256, 257, 258, 263, 264, 275, 303 Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), 278 Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA), 297 Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network, 297 Zindoga, Francis, 195, 207 Zvobgo, Eddison J. M, 116, 118, 119, 145, 189, 233, 243, 246, 247, 292, 293