A History of Greek Philosophy: The Later Plato and the Academy [5]

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A HISTORY OF

GREEK PHILOSOPHY VOLUME V

c

A HISTORY OF

GREEK PHILOSOPHY BY W.

K. C.

GUTHRIE

VOLUME V THE LATER PLATO AND THE ACADEMY

u

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE

LONDON

•

NEW YORK

•

MELBOURNE

Published by the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press

The

Pitt Building,

Trumpington

Street,

Cambridge CB2 irp

London nwi 2DB New York, ny 10022, USA

Bentley House, 200 Euston Road,

32 East 57th Street, 296 Beaconsfield Parade, Middle Park, Melbourne 3206, Australia

©

Cambridge University Press 1978 First published 1978

Printed in Great Britain at the

University Press, Cambridge

Library of Congress Cataloguing

Data

in Publication

Guthrie, William Keith Chambers, 1906-

A

history of Greek philosophy.

Includes bibliographies

CONTENTS: tradition

v.

1.

The

from Parmenides 1.

earlier Presocratics

to Democritus.

—

Philosophy, Ancient - History.

and Pythagoreans.

v. 3.

I.

The

Title.

B171.G83

isbn o 521 20003 2

—

v.

2.

The

Presocratic

fifth-century enlightenment

182

62-52735

[etc.]

I

CONTENTS page

Preface List I

xiii

xv

of Abbreviations

Cratylus Date; dramatic date; characters

I

The

5

dialogue

Comment

16

general; conversation with Hermogenes; a fallacy division?

form;

Hermogenes and Protagoras;

the etymologies;

names and names

reality;

essence

of and

the right relation between

what

meant by

is

correctness

of

Additional note: an ideal language? II

31

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus Introduction (1)

32

Parmenides

33

Introduction (theistic interpretations); date; dramatic date; setting

Part

and characters

One (i26a~35d)

36

Zenos argument countered by the doctrine ofForms; Parmenides* s questions and objections; (i) of what things are there Forms? (ii) what shares in a Form must contain

either the whole

of it

or a part;

first regress argument: the largeness

of the

(iii)

Large;

(iv) can the Forms be thoughts? (y) second regress argument: Forms as patterns or paradigms; (yi) the

Forms unknowable

to us

Conclusion on Part Transition to Part

and we

One

78

6 9 5

God 50

Two

52

v

*

to

ui '

Contents Part

Two

(1370-660)

54

Conclusion

57

(2) Theaetetus

61

date; dramatic date; characters; prefatory conversation; introduction

what

main dialogue;

to

the question^

knowledge? additional note on exemplification and definition; plan of the enquiry; introductory is

conversation (1)

Knowledge

what

is

as perception (151

d-86e)

included in aisthesis? Protagoras

73

and

his

'secret doctrine'; the cleverer theory

status

of the

sensible

of sensation; world; dreams and hallucina-

examination of the theory that knowledge is perception: (i) return to Protagoras; (ii) foreign tions;

languages and unlearned

letters; (Hi)

memory;

(iv)

'knowing and not knowing' dilemma; (v) back again to Protagoras: the defence; (yi) criticism of the defence; (vii) final refutation of Protagoras the

Digression: the philosopher and the practical

man

(172C-77C)

summary;

89

the lesson

Excursus: evil and (i) evil

of the Digression

its

sources

as a negative conception;

or soul? (Hi) are there Platonic

Return to

(ii) evil

due to body

Forms of evils? 100

(1)

final attack

on

disproof of the knowledge (2)

92

Knowledge

the

theory

of total flux; final of sensation with

identification

as true

judgement (doxa) (187 b-

201 c) but

is

103 false judgement possible? (i) false judgement

as mistaking one thing for another;

ment as thinking what

is

(ii)

false judge-

not; (Hi) false judgement as vi

Contents 'other-judgement'; misfitting

wax

false judgement

(iv)

ofa perception

to

a memory:

the

as

the

mind as a

knowledge potential and actual: the

tablet; (y)

aviary

Knowledge

(3)

judgement with a logos

as true

(20ic-iob)

114

theory dreamed by

the

Socrates;

three possible

meanings 0/logos

Conclusion

120 122

(3) Sophist

introductory remarks; definitions: the angler

and the

comment on definitions 1-6; diairesisy and final definition: the Sophist as illusion-

Sophist;

seventh

maker

The status of what being (237 a-48e) '

is

not

and the

criterion of

135

(a) the Sophist's reply; (b) real; (c) materialists

'

and

from

the unreal to the

idealists: the criterion

of

being;

motion has a place in the real world; problem of

motion and reality; interrelationship of Forms; five of the greatest Forms; Parmenides refuted; speech

and

thought: the nature

of falsehood;

return to

dichotomy: the Sophist finally captured; the Sophist

and

the

Forms

Additional notes (/)

'

the

Logos has

161 its birth

of Forms with each and the Sophist

through the interweaving

other' (25$d);

(ii)

Republic 5 163

(4) Politicus

Introduction, outline and general remarks (1)

Logic and method

(a) collection

and

measurement;

(c) the use

(2)

163

Forms

166

division;

(b)

the two types

of

ofparadigm

in the Politicus vii

175

Contents (3)

The myth

180

(4) Political theory

(a)

183

and Republic; (b) rule by of law in government;

Politicus

consent; (c) the role

of

isolation

the

statesman;

(e)

the

force or

(d) final

of

essence

statesmanship (5) Ethics

III

and psychology

191

Conclusion

192

Appendix: Elements of the myth

193

Philebus date

197

and

characters; the concepts

of pleasure and

good; subject and scope; the argument; the one-andmany problem; dialectical solution; fourfold analysis

of everything;

teleological

and

the cause: cosmological

and

arguments; psychology ofpleasure^ pain

desire; false pleasures;

are

there

any

true

pleasures? pleasure-pain compounds; pu^les; true

and means; analysis ofknowledge; composition ofthe mixed life; pleasure

pleasures; pleasure as process loses

second pri^e; the five possessions; the philo-

sophy of the Philebusy conclusion

IV

TlMAEUS AND CRITIAS

24

Introduction influence; date

241

and

characters

Framework and purpose Atlantis {Tim.

2od-25d,

244 Crit.

io8e-2ic)

The 'probable account'

247

250

Maker, Model and Material maker; model; relation of maker

253 to

model; material

What

exactly enters and leaves the Receptacle?

What

is

the cause of pre-cosmic motion?

269 271

272

Necessity viii

Contents Creation of cosmos (29 d~34b)

275

why it was created; uniqueness of the cosmos; body of the cosmos Construction of the primary bodies (53 c~57d)

280

geometrical basis of matter; transformation of the bodies; fifth figure and fifth body; the

primary

remoter principles: geometry

and physics;

particles

perpetual motion and warfare of the primary bodies; motion demands both mover and

vary in

si\e;

moved; five worlds? Soul of the cosmos (34b~36d)

292

Time and

299

creation

Creation of living creatures: nature and fate of the

human

soul (39 e-42c)

305

making and destiny of human and the cause of error

souls; the infant soul

Additional notes (z) the

status

3

of erosy

{it)

extra-terrestrial life?

Necessity and design in the natures of

men

(61 c-

9od)

313 physiology

explanation;

teleological

physics; sensible qualities; body

and pain;

diseases

and

based

on

soul; pleasure

of body and soul

Appendix: the narrative order

V

1

319

Laws

321

Introduction authenticity

and

321 date; characters

and

setting;

plan

if chapter (1) Introductory conversation (bks 1-3)

and methods of education, with special of drink; unity and multiplicity of virtue; the lessons of history; need for a mixed

aims

reference to the use

constitution ix

325

Contents

The

(2)

was

Laws

city of the

332

intended to be realised in practice? status and

it

function oflaws: the lawgiver as educator; the role of punishment; theory and reality (3) Life in Plato's city

population; public

property;

before

four

the

341 private

education; slavery; daily

life

weal; private

trade

classes;

in

and

labour;

Magnesia; contact

with the rest of the Greek world; women; sexual and procreation; conclusion: the ideal

morality citizen

(4) Religion

and theology

state religion

and ethics; personal beliefs;

357 theology

Additional note: Is soul something created? (5) Preservation

of the

laws:

the

Nocturnal

Council

The Laws

(6)

368 in Plato's philosophy

general; the attitude

of

the

law

to

375 the

Socratic

dictum that no one does wrong voluntarily; the

and (7)

VI

the theory

366

Laws

of Forms

Conclusion

381

Doubtful and Spurious Dialogues

383

Introduction; Epinomis; Second Alcibiades; Clitophon; Hipparchus; Minos; Rivals; Theages; Axiochus; Eryxias; Demodocus and Sisyphus; On

Justice

VII

VIII

and On Virtue

Letters

399

The

402

philosophical section of the Seventh Letter

Plato's

'

Unwritten Metaphysics

Introduction: the

A

'

modern

thesis

glance at the evidence

Content of the unwritten doctrine

418 418 423

426

Contents

of the Forms: Indefinite Dyad and OneGood; the Forms as numbers; Forms and numbers the same, or numbers the archai ofForms? did Plato limit the numbers to ten? the generation of numbers; general scheme; were Plato s metaphysics monistic the archai

or dualistic?

IX

Postscript

X

To Plato

443

Plato's Associates

446

Eudoxus life;

and

447

mathematics; astronomy; ontology; Eudoxus the

Forms; geography and ethnology

Speusippus life;

457

ontology;

and

method

theology;

biology;

epistemology;

philosophical

psychology;

ethics:

Speusippus on pleasure

Xenocrates life

and

469

and knowledge;

character; writings; being

the chain

of being; the

Forms; theology: gods and

daemons; cosmology and physics;

indivisible lines,

atomic bodies, parts and wholes; method and logic; psychology; ethics Heraclides Ponticus life;

writings; astronomy

483

and cosmology; physics;

theology; the soul; pleasure; additional note: the

nature of sound

Others

490

ibliography

493

vucXCo I

II

III

Index ofpassages quoted or referred

to

5M

General index

528

Index of Greek words

539

The device on the front cover is the head of Plato from a herm in the Staatliche Museen, Berlin XI

PREFACE There

is

no break

in subject-matter

immediate predecessor, and

between

their division

is

this

volume and

its

purely a matter of physical

convenience. Perhaps therefore they might better have been called 1

Volume

iv parts

i

and 2 ', but since they are

in fact

bulky volumes that did not sound right

fairly

however

what was

that

approach adopted

study of Plato,

its

mean

does

about the general

said in the previous preface

in this

two separate and

either. It

aims and methods, applies

equally to this second half and need not be repeated.

No

interpreter of

Plato can feel fully satisfied with his work, if only because of the inevitable choice,

whether to make the main part of the exposition an

and appreciation of separate dialogues or a synthetic or

analysis

systematic treatment I

gave reasons

by

subjects.

do not regret the decision

I

backs in either method. In the present volume (ch. vin)

do

modern school of interpreters who

justice to the

his early

only glimpse

I

have

tried to

from

see Plato as

it

even secretly, expounded, which, though

through the

comment, must be assumed his written

work.

On

veil

of Aristotelian and

as the unwritten

these premises

back the esoteric teaching I

which

days a systematic thinker with a settled doctrine of

principles, orally,

of

for

my last preface, but as I also admitted, there are draw-

in

later criticism

background

it is

first

we can now and

to every stage

of course wrong to hold

until after the dialogues,

but as will appear,

cannot regard the thesis as established beyond question, whereas on

the other lines

hand

I

do perceive, and hope

selves. (It is this

from appearing,

development which

as

it

did to one

critic,

than parts of a continuous history.) also I

my

I

have brought out, a number of

of genuinely philosophical development in the dialogues them-

my

like to express

my thanks

chapters on the dialogues and I

On the question of arrangement see

'Postscript' (ch. ix).

should

which

I hoped would save volume iv more like a series of monographs

to friends

made

who have

read

valuable suggestions,

some of

many of

have adopted to the great improvement of the chapters con-

cerned. Vol. iv ch. vii {Republic)

was read by xiii

Sir

Desmond

Lee, and in

Preface the present

volume

hi (Philebus)

ch.

by Professor Sandbach and

Dr G. E. R. Lloyd. Dr Lloyd also read ch. iv (Timaeus) and Dr T. J. Saunders ch. v (Laws), To Dr Saunders in particular I owe a number of useful references ters,

however,

which had escaped me. For these

as for

remain solely responsible, especially as

I

every suggestion offered.

To

Miss B. M. Gorse

I

am

I

all

other chap-

did not adopt

indebted for three

things: her impeccable typing, her classical education, and a friendship

extending over

many

years.

Unattributed references to 'vol.

i' etc.

refer as before to the earlier

volumes of this work. I

the I

should like to correct a somewhat elusive misprint in the preface to first

impression of vol.

iv.

On p.

also apologize for the blank space

xv,

on

1.

10, for 'effect' read 'defect*.

p. 4, n. 1.

The

reference should

be to pages 63 f.

W.

CAMBRIDGE DECEMBER I976

XIV

K. C. G.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Most works

cited in abbreviated

form

nizable under the author's or editor's

be however helpful to

list

in the text will

name

be easily recog-

in the bibliography. It

the following:

PERIODICALS

AG Ph.

Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic

AJP

APQ

American Journal of Philology American Philosophical Quarterly

BICS

Bulletin

BJPS

British Journal for the Philosophy

CJ

Classical Journal

of the

Institute

CP CQ CR

Classical Quarterly

G and R

Greece

GGA HSCP IPQ JHI JHP

JHS JP PAS PC PS PR

of Classical Studies (London) of Science

Classical Philology

Classical

Review

and Rome

Gottingische Gelehrte

Harvard

Antigen

Studies in Classical Philology

International Philosophical Quarterly

Journal of the History of Ideas Journal of the History of Philosophy Journal of Hellenic Studies Journal of Philosophy Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society Philosophical Review

Phron.

Phronesis

PQ

Philosophical Quarterly

RCSF

Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia

REG TAPA

Revue des Etudes Grecques Transactions of the American Philological Association

xv

may

Abbrevations

OTHER WORKS (Full particulars are in the bibliography)

CGF

Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta,

DK

ed.

Meineke

Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker

D.L.

Diogenes Laertius

KR

G.

LSJ

Liddell-Scott-Jones,

OCD OP

S.

Kirk and

J.

E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers

A

Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed.

Oxford Classical Dictionary Oxyrhynchns Papyri

Posidonius,

EK

The fragments of Posidonius,

PS

ed. Edelstein

and Kidd.

G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies

RE

Realencyclopddie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed.

Wissowa, Kroll

SPM

et al.

Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen

SVF TGF

Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. von

Arnim

Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, ed. Nauck

known

Note:

The

some

countries called Politeia and Statesman (in the language of the

dialogues

in

England

as Republic

and

Politicus are in

country) respectively. Non-English readers should be warned that the abbreviation Pol. indicates the latter work.

xvi

CRATYLUS' If

you

are

on your guard against taking names too seriously, you wisdom as you grow old. Plato, Pol. 261 e

will

be richer in

Date.

The

placing of this dialogue immediately after the Republic

intended as a pronouncement on

its

date, which, like

been a matter of lively debate. Earlier table,

PTI 3)

thought

it

its

is

not

purpose, has

critics (e.g. all five in

Ross's

an early dialogue, before Phaedo, Symposium,

Phaedrus and Republic, and von Arnim's

stylistic studies

made him

date

around 390, before Plato's first Sicilian visit, though otheis (see Ross, ib. 4-5) had seen affinities with later dialogues. Ross himself argued in it

1955 for an early date, and Taylor thought

earlier

it

than any of the

'great dramatic group', even the Protagoras. But since the fifties the

argument from apparent

affinities in

content with the so-called

more favour, though

'critical

won much

group' (Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman) has

without unanimity. Runciman (1962) places

still

'with reasonable confidence' before that group on grounds both of

it

style

and

less sophisticated

(1965) takes puts

still

Meridier.

it

it

as preceding

treatment and thinks Phaedrus

is later,

Luce

Phaedo and Republic and Brentlinger (1972)

before Symposium, Phaedo and Republic, as in 193 1 did

On

the other

Owen

hand

(1953) thinks the argument at

439 d 8-9 'alone would vindicate

its

(195 1) and Allan (1954) put

contemporary with Theaetetus, and

it

place in the critical group', Kirk

Schadewaldt (1971) also argues for a fairly late date, as an immediate preliminary to the critical group. In 1953 Jowett's editors disputed his comparatively early dating of the Cratylus and emphasized

with the

A

1

later dialogues.

descriptive bibliography of

works on the Cratylus

1

804-1 972 will be found in Derbolav,

Sprachphil. 1972, 234-308. Reff. not supplied in the text are: Ross,

1

PLE 2 and n. 3

;

Kirk,

AGPh

R.

Int. de Phil. 1955;

129; Luce, Phron. 1965, 21 and 36; Meridier in his

Taylor,

Bude

PMW

ed., 46;

'75

1.

For

;

Owen,

AJP 195 1, 226; Allan, AJP 1954, 272; Schadewaldt, Essays Merlan 3-1

1972, 116 n. 1; Jowett, Dial* in, 10 n.

Leisegang,

its affinities

2

1 ;

Runciman,

SPM 323

Brentlinger,

a conspectus of views before 1941 see

RE 40. Halbb. 2428. He himself, like Meridier and Wilamowitz, found

it

impossible to

Cratylus Lest

it

appear that the arguments for an early or

late date

giving chief weight to style or content respectively, that an important

argument for the

earlier date

has been reached in the doctrine of Forms.

depend on

should be added

it

concerns the stage which

Thus

Meridier, Ross

(PTI

18-20) and Luce (Phron. 1965, 36) have maintained that they are not yet fully transcendent or separated (Aristotle's word) from particulars, '

'

which would of course put the Cratylus before the Phaedo. The above selection of opinions will suffice to justify Crombie's

a view

assessment of the Cratylus as 'a dialogue whose date must be certain'

(EPD

323).

11,

More even than most,

it is

left

un-

a unique and self-

contained whole.

Dramatic

date. It

is

usually thought (see e.g. Meridier 46) that the

dialogue contains no indication of when the conversation was supposed to

have taken place, but Allan has argued

during the

last

year of Socrates's

Characters. Apart

from

this dialogue,

Aristotle's statements that Plato

(AJP

we know of

that everything

some time he held in a more extreme form than ill,

it

was

Cratylus only from

was acquainted with him

and learned from him the doctrine himself. (See vol.

1954, 272-4) that

life.

was

that taught

201.) Plato too speaks of

him

in his youth,

in flux,

which

at

by Heraclitus

as a Heraclitean

(437a 1, 440 d-e) and even attacks Heracliteanism in the extreme form in

which Cratylus himself (according

to Aristotle) held

it: if all

things

are in flux, they cannot even be spoken of (439 d). Scholars have found

with all the beliefs ascribed to him in the some have sought to avoid it by assuming that Plato is only using his name to make a veiled attack on someone else. Antisthenes was a favourite guess in the past, but is less popular now. Though in

difficulty in reconciling this

dialogue, and

1

separate Crat.

from

from Euthyd. Nakhnikian has argued persuasively

for the priority of Crat. to Tht.

of Protagorean and Heraclitean views (R. of Metaph. 1955-6, {Exegesis 154) in 1973 agrees with Ross in placing it near the beginning

their respective treatments

308 f.). Latest of all, Kahn of the middle group.

1 'In fact the Antisthenes-theory is almost dead' (Kirk, AJP 1951, 238). A useful list of reff. is given by Levinson in R. oj Metaph. 1957-8, and a summary of those in favour by Meridier (44f.), whose sensible conclusions should be noted. Since Levinson mentions Derbolav as supporting it, it is fair to say that in his later book {Sprachphil. 1972, 30 f.) he concludes that all attempts at

identification rest

than knowledge.

on such scanty evidence

that to decide

between them

is

to act

on

faith rather

Cratylus general highly suspicious of such conjectural identifications, 1 tried to

show

Cratylus, that

in vol. in (p. 215) that the central theory

names have

upheld by Antisthenes, speaking.

by

certainly,

The importance which he

pronouncement

his

was

a natural affinity with their objects,

as,

have

I

of Plato's

was the impossibility of

attached to language

is

also false

indicated

was the study of

that the basis of education

names. 2 Since the nature and use of words was a favourite topic of discussion

among

the Sophists (vol. in, 205

f.),

there were probably

more than one champion of each of the opposing views. Another suggestion

is

that the etymological theories

against Plato's

own

of 'Cratylus' are directed

gifted pupil Heraclides Ponticus. This

forward by Warburg in 1929, but as Meridier says, base des plus fragiles

'.

3

it

was put

'repose sur une

Protagoras has also had his turn, 4 and

is

men-

tioned in the dialogue itself as an expert on 'the correctness of names', whose central doctrine identifying appearance with reality is rejected by Hermogenes (391c, 385e-86c). It was a leading theme of vol. Ill that the Sophists shared a common scepticism resting on a plausible interpretation of Heraclitus's flux-doctrine.5 At the same time they were fascinated by the compulsion of Eleatic logic, as is plain from Gorgias's use of purely Eleatic arguments to maintain the equally paradoxical thesis that

nothing

exists (vol.

in,

193

ff.);

and

impossibility of falsehood seems to have rested both

their thesis

of the

on the Heraclitean and on the

assertion of the identity of opposites (vol. in, 166, 182 n. 2)

Parmenidean dictum that 'what

is

not' cannot be uttered. For their

purposes Heraclitean and Eleatic doctrine were criterion' for 1

1

at

one

in

'

abolishing the

any comparative assessment of judgements about the

See vol. in, xiv, 3iof., 323, 347. Vol. in, 209-1 1, cf. Crat. 383 et

al.

(natural Tightness of names), 429c! (impossibility of

falsehood). 3

Bude

ed. 41,

where

reff.

and its critics will be found. It is an odd coincidence have been called Euthyphro (Heraclides fr. 3 Wehrli, where

for the thesis

that the father of Heraclides should

W.'s note). See also Skemp, TMPLD, 2f. First argued by Stallbaum. See Derbolav, Sprachphil. 30 and 297. 5 Though H. himself would not have drawn the same epistemological conclusions, for n-dvrra fcl was not the whole of his teaching. Cf. frr. 1 and 2 (the common logos and the folly of acting 'as if each had his own private wisdom'), fr. 107 (the senses bad witnesses if not checked by the psyche), fr. 114 (the need for voos; the one divine voyos which feeds human vopoi). See for these vol. 1, 425, 415, and cf. vol. in, 185. Jackson (Praelections 17-19) has some judicious remarks on the question whether the theory of the natural Tightness of names goes back to see

4

Heraclitus himself.

3

2-2

Cratylus sensible

world and human

affairs.

1

It is

a reasonable conclusion that

Plato found Cratylus the Heraclitean a suitable character through which to criticize prevailing beliefs of the Sophists about the relationship

between words and linguistic doctrines

reality.

How far the historical

we cannot be

Cratylus shared their

sure, but at least

it is

unjustified to say

with Warburg and Heinimann that because the Sophists were not pure Heracliteans, Heracliteanism and

Plato himself

combined them

etymology were unconnected

in the

until

person of Cratylus.

ADDITIONAL NOTE: CRATYLUS, HERACLITUS AND THE CORRECTNESS OF NAMES For the view just mentioned see Heinimann, N. u. Ph. 54. In the exchange of views between Kirk and Allan in AJP 195 1 and 1954, I do not find either is difficult to believe with K. (p. 244; cf. Allan 281 f.) accounts of C.'s Heracliteanism (Metaph. 989329 and

entirely convincing. It that Aristotle's 1

078 b 9) are taken from Plato (though

lav, Sprachphil. 283),

precarious. K.'s

it

was suggested

and A.'s hypothesis of two stages

view

is

influenced

by

in 1829; see

in his

Derbo-

development

is

his belief that Plato regularly mis-

represented Heraclitus, on which see vol.

1,

488-92. His argument that in the

dialogue C. only welcomes Heracliteanism because

it

supports his belief in

weakened by the fact that C. was a historical person known to be a Heraclitean. In his book on Heraclitus (HCF n8f.) K. actually argues that H. himself did believe that names give some indication of the nature of their objects and bear an essential relation to it. The crucial passage is fr. 48 ((3ios-pios). (Others quoted by Heinimann and Kirk offer less compelling evidence.) Contrary to what Heinimann says (o.c. 55), this does not deny the view of names attributed to C, which was not that names commonly in use are correct, but that they are attached to things by convention (383 a), being either the name of something else or mere noises. Heraclitus with his example of the bow may have meant the natural correctness of names, not vice versa,

the same, but

more probably he used

identity of opposites:

life

it

is

to illustrate his doctrine

and death are the same

(fr.

88; vol.

I,

445

of the

f.).

Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus and brother of Callias the wealthy patron of Sophists (vol. in, 31 and Socrates last

who

hours

iv, 216),

was

according to Plato was one of those present during his

in prison.

Xenophon

says he had also been at the

had previously tried to persuade Socrates to give 1

On

a close associate of

'abolition of the criterion' as a

mark of the

trial,

some thought

Sophists, see Gorg.

fr. 3

DK (vol.

and

to his

Ill,

195

f.).

The dialogue defence.

He

appears again as a participant in Xenophon's Symposium.

him a follower of Parmenides, but and perhaps an inference from his appearance here

Diogenes Laertius doubtful,

called

this is

as the

known of his views apart him by Plato, who represents him as a

opponent of Cratylus. 1 Otherwise nothing

from what is here attributed to young man with no great aptitude the respondents are depicted as

but Cratylus shows

much more

is

for philosophical discussion.

Both

younger than Socrates (429b, 440 d), and tenacity

self-assurance

in

main-

taining his opinions.

The dialogue 1 {Direct dramatic form)

Hermogenes and Cratylus have been arguing about the status of names^ in terms

of the current nomos-physis antithesis, 4 and agree to refer the

dispute to Socrates. tional labels at will,

Hermogenes holds

that they are merely

conven-

imposed by agreement or custom (nomos) and changeable

whereas Cratylus, he says, claims that everything has a naturally

same for Greeks and foreigners, irrespective of those Hermogenes cannot understand what he means, and he to explain himself. Socrates as usual disclaims knowledge but is to go into the matter with them and starts his questions. The

correct name, the in current use.

refuses

willing rest

of the dialogue

falls

into

two

parts, carried

on with Hermogenes

and Cratylus respectively. Phaedo 59b, Xen. Apol. 2 and 3, Mem. 4.8.4, D.L. 3.6. That the last is an inference from was suggested by Natorp, RE vm, 865. 1 A brief indication of the contents has been given in vol. ill, 206-10. 3 I shall in general keep 'name' for the Greek ovonct, even though 'word' would sometimes be a more natural translation. As Robinson said (Essays 100), there is no exact English equivalent. Examples in Crat. include proper names, nouns, adjectives and even adverbs (427 c), and in Soph. (262a) (though not always) they are distinguished from verbs. Thus P.'s use approximates 1

Crat.

more

to Mill's than to present usage. (Mill, Logic

an unpublished 4

Illinois dissertation

In vol. in, 206 n.

Qioti.

2, 1

on the

bk

1

ch. 2.)

M. Roth has

a

good

discussion, in

Crat. (1969), 33-6.

followed Fehling in saying that the contrast

(So also Robinson, Essays noff.) This

is

literally true,

is

not between

-c). Defeated again, Socrates

44

Parmenides is

driven to try the anti-Platonic solution of Antisthenes (vol.

Ill,

a

Form

nowhere

can retain

unity because

its

but in our minds. Parmenides

own poem:

his

1

a

a thought, occurring

it is

meets

first

214):

with an argument from

this

thought must have an object, and that object must

When therefore we think of a group of things as having a certain common character, there must be not only a universal concept in our own minds but a single reality corresponding to it, the character or Form

exist.

By

(idea, eidos) itself.

argument Parmenides answers not only

this

Antisthenes but also, in advance, the long line of interpreters

supposed the Platonic

God

Forms

to be thoughts in the

who have

mind of God. 2 Even

can only think of the Forms because they are there. This

unambiguously

stated in the Timaeus.

was adopted by Plato

or not?' 'Something that

non-existent?

'

It is

far,

is

the Parmenidean position

from Rep. 476c: 'Does a Something. Something that

himself, as appears

knower know something or nothing? exists,

So

therefore to

'

exists.

him

'

'

How

'

could he

know

anything

a legitimate proof that the

Forms

are not mere concepts, but exist independently of our thought of them.

His modification of it, as particulars as a class

by

we have seen

(vol. iv,

487 ff.), was to allow for

between existence and non-existence and cognized

knowledge and ignorance. On Forms exist, each with the proper-

a faculty (belief or opinion) between

the view taken ties

of his

by Parmenides

own One

here,

(eternal, changeless, single, indivisible, isolated,

grasped by thought alone), but nothing else enter into

no

exists,

and

if

it

did

it

could

relation with such an intelligible unit.

Parmenides also produces a second objection. 'the other things' partake of the

Forms, either each

as Socrates says,

If,

will

be composed of

thoughts, and everything thinks, or else they are unthinking thoughts.

One's immediate reaction thinks, but the

is

to say that

mind which forms

it.

it is

If

I

not a thought (concept) that think of something existing

outside me, there are three factors involved: a thinking mind, the

concept which

it

forms, and the reality of which

it

is

the concept.

Parmenides has used the Greek word noema, in form a passive noun

from the verb noein

(to

wards commonly used 1

2

apprehend by thought), but from in

Homer on-

an active sense, to signify an act of thought

Frr. 3 and 8, 34-6 DK. On these see vol. 11, 14, 39-41. See Audrey Rich, 'The Platonic Ideas as Thoughts of God',

45

Mnem.

1954.

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus

As Grote

or even the thinking mind. 1

easy to follow.

could seem a

it

truly said, the

argument

is

not

can hardly be reproduced in English, but to a Greek

It

fair

objection to the view (which Plato had no wish to

defend) that the Forms are no more than concepts in the mind. 2 (v) Second regress argument:

33 d).

Forms as patterns

tion of the relationship

The

Phaedo.

real

in

their

Parmenides

image.

is3

replies

that

It

follows that

anything

this

relationship

the

same

if

character,

Otherwise a second Form immediately appears, and

else.

is

Form, the Form must

two things resemble each other they do and what is this character but a Form? nothing can resemble a Form, nor a Form resemble

resemble the particular; but

by sharing

in the

Forms are a sort of resemble them and are

that

reciprocal : in so far as a particular resembles the

so

main explana-

which was accepted without question

meaning of 'participation'

patterns fixed in the real world and particulars

made

paradigms (232 c-

or

Baffled again, the youthful Socrates tries the other

if it

resembles anything, then another, and this series will be endless.

This argument depends for

its

force

on

resemblance assumed between particular and

must be

semblance does

it

like is

a

that

in the

same

original,

is

is

both

but not a copy of it. Others

dvonTa

elvai.

Both

v6n,pa

and

f|

...

meaning 'unthinking', not,

Of several interpretations 1

32b 4-5

it

is difficult

is

itself,

much

that of copies to

The it:

an

reflection of a face

the face

is

like the

(e.g. Hardie, Ross, Ryle,

Ik vortpdrcov excco-rov elvoci xai -rrdvTa voelv

f|

Owen, vormorra

commonly used active, as its form suggests, 'unthought'. In many places vonua 'thought'. See Xenoph. fr. 23, Parm. 7.2 and 16.4, Emped.

dvor|Toc are in

105.3, uo-io, Aristoph. Clouds 229. 1

Form

and a copy of

like the face

could as well be translated 'mind' as

of

respect. If the explanation of their re-

not simply one of likeness.

In Greek his alternatives are

dvorp-os

being large,

Taylor and Cornford (following Proclus) said no.

this.

and that

reflection 1

like b in

both resemble the Form of Large or Largeness

relation of sensible particulars to a

in a mirror

ovtcc

is

too resemble them in the same way? There has been

dispute over

The

Form must be symmetri-

resemblances between particulars. If a

cal, as are

b

the question whether the

Peck's in

PR

to agree with

form

passive, but as

1962, 174-7,

him

that S.

is

is

especially interesting,

though

in

view

not temporarily abandoning the trans-

cendence of the Forms. Cf. Johansen, CI. et Med. 1957, 7 n. 14. 3 This disposes of the idea that 'participation' and 'imitation' might be different relationships, upheld by P. at different stages of his thought. Cf. Cherniss in 362-4, and especially Arist.

SPM

Metaph. 991 a 20: 'To say that they are paradigms and talk and poetic metaphor.'

46

that other things share in

them

is

empty

Parmenides Runciman) think

by

reply vitiated

this

of likeness,

it still

I

A

involves likeness.

by resemblance even

if that is

on the words

reliance

its

'simply' and 'merely'. Granted that the relationship

model and

is

not merely one

copies are related

its

an incomplete account of their relation. 1

believe myself that Plato did not admit the objection, and that his

defence would

lie

in the non-sensible nature

of the Forms.

I

have

of the somewhat mystical

to this already in the context

referred

language of the Symposium or Phaedrus, but in the Cratylus he has given more philosophical expression to a

Form and

its

physical manifestations.

this essential difference

Runciman has written

158 f.) that the paradigm-theory reduces a a particular. 'If whiteness are white objects.

the

by resembling

Now in the

'

Forms of

things,

(ousia), before

we

is

it)

Form is

if

one of the

Cratylus Socrates's position

through which they have

SPM

to the logical status

white (which must follow then whiteness

between

(in

is

that

their

of

white objects class

of white

we must know

being or essence

can communicate by applying names to them

(p.

28

above). At 423 c-e he says that the art of naming does not consist in trying to reproduce in

words

actual sounds, shapes

belongs to music and the graphic

arts.

and colours. That

But sound, shape and colour

each have an ousia in contrast to their visible and audible manifestations. 2 Ontologically at least, the

particular. It

austerity,

may

that

be, as the

Form

is

same scholar remarks with Aristotelian

nothing could resolve the

Parmenides because the theory of forms '

Plato at

least,

not reduced to the status of a

the status of an intelligible

difficulties

raised in the

unsound ', but for could never be on a par with

is

logically

that of a sensible.3 1

Taylor,

SPM 105;

PMW 358; Cornford, P. and P. 93

Owen,

f.;

PTI

Hardie, Study 96, Ross,

89; Ryle in

319^; Runciman, ib. 158. 2 It is perhaps useful to remind oneself here of the course of the discussion in Meno. For ousia as a transcendent Form see Parm. 133 c. It was one of Aristotle's objections to the theory of Forms that it made the substance of things exist apart from as well as within them (Metaph. 991 bi). 3 Cf. my review of Wedberg's Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy 1957, 370. 1 hope I have now answered Weingartner when he writes {UPD 192): 'The unacceptability of SP is even more obvious when we consider such forms as that of Noise (listen to it !) and of Visibility (look at it now!).' It should give some support to Peck's view in PR 1962 'that Forms are ontologically superior versions of a quality which should be referred to as, for example, the large (intelligible), while a particular should be referred to as the large (visible) '. I take this summary from Clegg's article in Phron. 1973, 35. His own opinion on p. 37, that 'Participation in a Form guarantees that what does the participating is without class-membership because it is imperfect, seems topsy-turvy. Class-membership is just what participation in the same Form does ib.

'

47

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus

A few more words are needed on transcendent and immanent Forms. When we

first

met them

a part of vol. iv, 354f.)

Phaedo (and

in the

I

intentionally repeat here

took the view that the Largeness in us was the

I

Form itself which also existed beyond, and that there was no need to posit between Forms and

a third ontological level

confirmed by the

fact that

This seemed

particulars.

purely large, never admitting any admix-

it is

would think) no way imperfect. Ross however supposed the immanent qualities to be themselves imperfect copies, and more recently Rist has written that ture of its contrary as concrete individuals do, and so (one

in

the largeness in the particular

He adds it is

not

it is

by

later that itself

'of an ontologically defective kind'.

is is

the cause of white in white particulars;

the whiteness in those particulars.' 1 Yet the Phaedo says

writing the Phaedo, as

clear in his

thought

Whiteness

Form can act as a cause. have said, Plato may not have been

presence in particulars that the

its

When

'

own mind

at that stage

(not visible) Form. combination with

about

I

this,

but the nearest approximation to his

seems to be as follows Whiteness :

When

it

is

an

intelligible

enters a material object (say a face),

body produces

visible whiteness,

its

an imperfect imita-

Form in the only medium in which material The face, which was never perfectly white, may

tion of the transcendent objects can reflect

turn red

by

*

it.

receiving {Phaedo i02d-e) Redness instead of Whiteness, '

but Whiteness, whether 'by itself or in us, will always be Whiteness

and nothing

else.

may be

It

said that this

the quality that

it is,

is

not 'self-predication': the

for invisible, intelligible whiteness

the only acceptable sense of that word, all.

That has

2

Man

'

guarantee.

what

at least the

advantage that

argument.3 Nevertheless, as

right

PTI

it

we have

One might almost say that to explain we group certain individuals together

raison d'etre of the theory of

if

indeed

it

Form is

has not

not white in

means anything

relieves Plato of the

'

at

Third

seen time and again, for

him

class-membership, to answer the question by in a class

and give them the same name,

is

a

Forms.

and 223. Likewise Cornford says (P. and P. 78) exempt from all change'. This directly contradicts what S. says Phaedo. It is its possessor who is not exempt from change. 2 Nor is it simply the concept of whiteness, 'a thought in the mind'. That interpretation, 1

Ross,

30, Rist, Philologus 1964, 221

that the tallness in a person 'is not in

already rejected in this dialogue,

The main

is

not Plato's.

N. Findlay's book Plato, the Written and Unwritten Doctrines is that Plato's ontology is not in fact dualistic. There are not two parallel kinds of being: only the Forms exist. Consequently, he argues, all arguments of the 'Third Man' type must fail. 3

thesis

of

J.

48

Parmenides Beauty was the perfection of what

par

beautiful, Largeness the large

always and in every respect

is

excellence

and so on; and he

is

beginning to see that such a doctrine has certain logical drawbacks. (vi)

The Forms unknowable

to

us

and we

to

God(i33b-34e). Following

up his rejection of any kind of participation of sensible particulars in a Form, Parmenides's next point is that it would be difficult to argue against anyone who claimed that Forms, being what we say they must be ', will be unknowable. If they exist by themselves ', i.e. not in our own world (a genuine tenet of the theory of Forms to which Socrates imme*

'

diately agrees), they

— in

or whatever

we

must be

related only to each other, not to the copies

like to call

them

—

our world. Similarly, things

in

our world which indicate a relationship, though named after the Forms,

can only be related to each other. Asked to explain further, he offers the

The one is not slave of the Form Form of Slave. 1 Each is a man,

of a master and his slave.

illustration

of Master, nor the other master of the

and

his relationship

with a man. But Mastership

is

itself exists in relation

world of Forms.

to Slavery itself, a relationship entirely within the

Now knowledge

(as Aristotle said, Cat.

6b 5)

implies a relationship,

being necessarily knowledge of something. In and by

Knowledge

will

sciences, will

be of Reality

have as

itself,

and

its

branches, the

their objects the varieties

itself,

then,

Forms of the

of Reality. Therefore

we have no part or lot in the Forms, which are not in our world, and every Form is known by the Form of Knowledge, none of the Forms the Beautiful itself, the Good itself and the rest can be known by us. if

—

Worse

still,

no god or gods can have knowledge of us and our world

nor be our master. Knowledge being has

it, it

must be

Forms having no

itself is perfectly accurate,

a god, but

if

any

from what we have agreed about

reference to our world,

the gods' world cannot be

and

it

knowledge of

follows that us,

2

Knowledge

in

nor their Mastership

exercised over us.

This argument 1

is

generally dismissed as fallacious, especially the part

outoO SecnroTou, 6 ecm

avrrf)

r\

SecnroTTis,

Secm-cmia. P. intended

no

elsewhere as synonymous with a

Form

we find the abstract noun, between these expressions. All occur interchangeably

but in the next sentence

distinction

(eI6os).

That God, the ultimate cause of everything in the physical world, had no knowledge of that world, was the serious view of Aristotle. It would detract from his perfection, and the world was sustained in being (not brought into being, for it was eternal) by its own inner drive towards the perfection of form represented by God. 2

5

49

GHG

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus about the gods' knowledge ('unwarranted' Ryle, 'meaningless ... a worthless fantasy' Ritter). Cornford said perfect instance of it.

'

The form

itself.

.

.

it

Form with a know anything. This

confused a

cannot

'

r

reopens the whole question of 'self-predication'. If Plato said that

Beauty was perfectly beautiful, he was bound to say that Knowledge was knowing, and he could only avoid these errors by the dualistic metaphysics of the Phaedo. Such a two-world theory was impossible

whom the only alternatives were

for Parmenides, for

was inconceivable. He

'

It is

'

or

*

It is

not ',

and the

latter

sure

along has been against any sort of connexion between the real

all

world and the

So

now

which

was non-existent.

in his eyes of course

outside our world and ourselves or they are within

One

course.

:

there

soul as the epistemological link between the visible and intel-

faculties

logos or nous

:

Forms'. For Parmenides there are only

which grasps the unity of

reality,

and the

sense-organs whose fantasy of a world of plurality and variety utterly unreal. Plato's suggestion that the senses

steps

is

misses immediately Plato's conception of the

ligible orders, as 'akin to the

two

speaking in character. His pres-

he uses his familiar weapon, the 'either-or' dilemma. Either

Forms are no middle

human

sensible,

is

on

way

the

to

an understanding of the

the idea in the Phaedrus that the

might take us the

intelligible

human mind can

is

first

{Phaedo 74a-b),

grasp the unity in

the plurality, the universal in the particular, and so begin the process of recollection of the

Parmenides,

who

Forms is

—

all this is

foreign to the elementary logic of

arguing from his

own

Conclusion on Part

Why

did Plato write

it?

One

first

place,

equation of the real with the

system, with

its

rooted in the

Eleatic's.

fications,

Because in the

premises. 2

He had however

I

suggest, his

intelligible,

own

was firmly

introduced substantial modi-

not glancing back to Parmenides as he did so, but seized by

the inspiration tive flights

which

fired

him

to the

amazing

of the Phaedo and Phaedrus.

Now

pause and take stock, to clarify once for

intellectual

he

all

and imagina-

feels the necessity to

his position vis-a-vis

1 Ryle in SPM, 105, Rir..er, Essence 124, Cornford, P. and P. 98 f. For an able defence of the argument see Bluck, CQ 1956, 31-3. 2 A different approach to this argument has been made by J. W. Forrester in Phron. 1974.

50

Parmenides Parmenides. Parmenides had oversimplified and his conclusions could

not be the

word. But Plato himself had perhaps ignored

last

simple logic too much, and his

own

doctrine of Forms, and especially

the questions of their relation to particulars and of our

them, needed

a

this

knowledge of

sober reappraisal and overhaul.

Being Plato, he puts the

critical part

of the task in the dramatic form

of a personal encounter with his great predecessor. Chronology de-

manded

the fiction that his mouthpiece Socrates had evolved the full

Platonic theory as a very

young man, but

this

had the advantage of

offering Parmenides only the mildest opposition.

Before

is

it

re-

thought, the theory of Forms must be submitted to the most rigorous

examination compatible with the fundamental assumption (which he shared with Parmenides) of a stable and intelligible reality. Here he points out difficulties.

The

positive side of the process

is left

to the later

dialogues in the group. For instance, in the Sophist (249cff., pp. 142

below) the soul

restored to

is

its

ff.

place in the real world, but in terms

very different from those of the Phaedo.

On the unknowability argument Parmenides chooses his words careHe

fully.

does not say

wrong would need

it is

a long

irrefutable,

but only that to show that

both experienced and gifted: and he concludes by saying that of

and many other

this

it is

and abstruse argument with an opponent

difficulties,

and though

it

may need

in spite

a genius to

would rob thought of all direction and make rational discourse impossible. The bafflement which maintain the existence of Forms, to deny

it

1

1

(CQ

Rist

1970, 227) says that the only

universals. 'Philosophy

demand here

is

for

Forms

operates with general propositions, and

as class-concepts or

cannot be (whether or not the classes are Platonic Forms), then thought is at an end. There is no assertion by Parmenides that philosophy is impossible without separate Platonic Forms, there

classed

is

.

.

.

.

.

if particulars

.

'

'

an assertion that philosophy is impossible without e!5r].' Weingartner makes a similar point 149) as an argument that P. in Parm. abandons the notion of Forms as paradigms. Corn-

{UPD

ford on the other hand (P. and P. ioo) saw Parmenides as accepting the

full

Platonic view. Since

Forms are necessary as 'objects on which to fix our thoughts, and as constant meanings of the words used in all discourse', they 'must not be wholly immersed in the flow of sensible things. Somehow they must have an unchanging and independent existence, however hard it may be to conceive their relation to changing individuals' (my italics). I believe Cornford is right. That 'an essence all by itself (oucria carrf] Ka9' aCrrr)v 135 a) should be nothing more than a 'common factor' in particulars (Rist 229) is utterly at variance with the

way

the phrase has so far been used in the dialogue. (Cf. esp. 133 c 2-6.)

I cannot think that P. Parmenides was now abandoning the sense his previous arguments, which depended for their force on its separate and

would suddenly have expected given to

elSos in all

his readers to see that

independent existence.

51

5-2

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus

now feels is simply evidence that he has tried to run before he He cannot expect to seize the truth about Forms like Beautiful, and Good unless, before he is much older, he submits to a tedious

Socrates

can walk. Just

what

training in

is

commonly

dismissed as useless

Transition to Part

What manner of exemplified

exercise

Two (^3^d-jyc)

needed? asks Socrates. The manner

is

by Zeno's arguments which they have

difference. Socrates himself

talk. 1

with one

just heard,

had suggested confining the discussion

to

Forms, objects of reason, and ignoring the objects of sense ('Yes, because

I

don't see any difficulty in sensible things having contrary

properties '), and they should continue to sider the consequences not only of

of its being

false, e.g. in

1

2

Also, one must con-

any hypothesis being

is

not a plurality'.

the consequences in either case for the

rest, birth

so.

'

if

there

is

One must ask what are

many, the one, and

and so also with similarity and

but also

true,

Zeno's case not only the hypothesis

a plurality', but also 'if there

relationships;

do

dissimilarity,

mutual

their

motion and

and destruction, and being and not-being themselves.

In a word, whenever you suppose that anything exists or does not exist or

has any other character, you ought to consider the consequences with reference to itself and to any one of the other things that several of them, or

you may

others with reference both to one another and to any one thing select,

whether you have assumed the thing

are really going to

select,

or

of them together; and again you must study these

all

make out

you may you

to exist or not to exist, if

the truth after a complete course of dis-

cipline.' 3

Socrates, appalled at the

magnitude and

begs for an illustration of the method vailed

upon

to apply

to his

it

own

at

difficulty

of this programme,

work, and Parmenides

postulate about the '

One

is

itself

pre-

and

consider the consequences of the existence or non-existence of its subcharge brought against both Socrates and Plato. See vol. iv, 431 n. 3, 499 n. 4. probably thinking of Isocrates. Cf. his In soph. 8, Antid. 262. 2 Taylor, Cornford and Runciman (SPM 161) speak of not confining discussion to visible things, but the Greek plainly says that they are to be excluded altogether. This would naturally 6t8oXE(Jxia, a

i

P.

is

be approved by Parmenides. 3 136D-C, trans. Cornford.

I

should prefer to render the

last

few words:

'if

you

are going to

carry out a complete course of training preparatory to discerning the truth properly'. participle, as often, carries the

weight of

a

main verb.

52

The

aorist

Parmenides This examination occupies the whole of the

ject.

now on

which from

changes

its

of the dialogue,

rest

character completely.

proceeds by

It

question and answer, but the youngest present (Aristoteles) for respondent as as well

likely to give least trouble

',

expectations should

offered simply as

we approach

one example of a

which Socrates should undergo while or noun, the

word

'

second part?

First,

of dialectical exercises

young

(135 d 5-6).

yvuvaaia)

some have seen

quietly dropped.

is

this

series

still

exercise ' (yuuv&3co,

chosen

is

and the exposition could

have been continuous. The narrative form

With what it is

'

As verb

used five times to

is

coming section a promise of more. It is to be a training through which Socrates must 'drag himself (135 d 3) before he can hope to see the truth. Secondly it is said to be of the same type as Zeno's. His procedure was to assume describe

it,

and

it is

strange that

in the

1

'

two opposed hypotheses are conceivable, and leaving one it indirectly by showing that the other led to absurd conThe flaw in this was that both hypotheses might be unsequences. that only

aside, defend

tenable, being

and

'It is'

they are

wrongly or incompletely formulated not' of Parmenides; see vol.

'It is

now

Parmenidean

11,

73

indeed were the

(as

f.),

and

as

an exercise

to apply the deductive procedure to both sides of the antithesis, the hypothesis

tradictory. It can best

of the

One

as well as

be described as an exercise in

its

Aristotelian sense, useful primarily as mental training, secondly to

opponents on itself

their

own

ground, and

because 'the ability to raise

makes

it

easier to detect truth

that Plato's

finally for progress in

difficulties

and error

Parmenides says exercises

on both

con-

dialectic in the

meet

philosophy

sides of a question

in every case'. 2 It

is

in this sense

like this are necessary if the truth

not to escape Socrates. That he should simply raise the aporiai

is 1

It

may seem presumptuous

in the time

as well as

thus summarily to take one side in a dispute which was raging

of Proclus and has on the other side such names as Hegel, K. F.

many more

the view that Part 2

Robinson), and

it is

recent scholars. (See Friedlander, is

is

PL

Hermann and

in, 5041*., n. 23.)

A

Zeller,

good defence of

more than mental gymnastics is Runciman's in SPM 168-71 (against and P. What seems to me incontrovertible is promise of yvpvaaia and nothing more, not for instance (as Brumbaugh

also Cornford's position in P.

C-36C contain a P. on One 1 89) an indirect proof that the theory of forms is a necessary presupposition of understanding anything at all '. If I understand Zekl's work rightly (his long and complex sentences can be hard going for a non-German) this is his conclusion too, that (as he says at the end of his introduction, Parm. p. 14) properly analysed and assessed, the dialogue 'becomes

that 135

puts

it,

'

decidedly what 2

its second part expressly claims: a lesson and an exercise in thinking'. See Arist. Topics 1 ch. 2.

53

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus

To

appropriate.

them

tackle

is

'more moderate' follower

left to his

{Soph. 2 1 6b) in the Sophist.

Part Two (2370-660)

The

plan of the exercise

is

to take the Eleatic hypothesis of

follow out the consequences of case considering the effects

conclusion

on

Whether One

or

being (a) true and

One itself and

the

(and these are the

is

its

last

Unity and

(b) false, in

each

'the Others'. 1 Its final

words of the dialogue)

and the others,

in relation both to themselves and to each other, are and are not, and appear and do not appear, everything in every way. is

This sentence

is

riddle

it

reminiscent of nothing so

eunuch and the bat

The

not,

is

in the Republic,

was quoted

as

nor

is

much

as the riddle

of the

the resemblance fortuitous.

an illustration of ambiguity, and of the unreal

dilemma brought about by asking the incomplete question

'

Is it

or

is it

not? ', without allowing for a middle status between being and not-being

which

By

is

in fact that of the

that neither

it

sensible world. (See Rep. 479 b-d.)

nor the Others can have any properties, be in any state, or

any relation

in

whole

laying the emphasis on the Unity of the One, Parmenides deduces

from

its

to themselves or

existence

anything

else,

or even exist.

By starting

(which immediately introduces a duality, Unity and

Existence) he deduces that both tude, with both of

any

it

and the Others are an

infinite multi-

pair of contradictory attributes, in both of

pair of contradictory states (e.g. at rest

and in motion), and

any

in contradic-

tory relations (same and other, like and unlike, equal and unequal etc.) to themselves

drawn from

and anything

else.

Equally disconcerting conclusions are

the hypothesis that 'the

One

is

not' and

'it is

not one'. 2

P. 262) writes that 'the discussion is about forms alone, and we are expressly that "the rest" of which he speaks are the things of sense (135c). They are just the other forms.' For Cornford the terms 'One' and 'Others' are 'blank cheques' (P. and P. 113) until a particular hypothesis makes clear the sense in which they are there being 1

Burnet (T.

to

warned against the idea

in the first two hypotheses they are 'sensible appearances', 'physical bodies' (pp. 157, This variety of views emphasizes the studied vagueness of the language which alone makes the contradictory conclusions possible. Similarly some (Ryle, Runciman) have thought that 'the One' is throughout the Platonic Form of Unity, others that it is not. 2 A full summary of the 8 (or 9) arguments will be found in Burnet, T. to P. 264-71. Brief and clear is Hamlyn in PQ 1955, 298 f. Burnet's section on Parm. makes perhaps the best case

used.

203

Thus

f.}.

for regarding part 2 as a polemic against the use of

A

'map' of the arguments

is

also provided

by

Owen 54

Parmenidean postulates by the Megarians. in Ryle,

349-62.

Parmenides '

The key

to the

understanding of the second part must be sought in

the unmistakable ambiguity of the hypothesis, "If there

a

is

One".' So

Cornford, and Crombie emphasizes 'the complete vagueness with

which the topic

to be discussed

essential terms shifts as the

introduced '.

is

'

The meaning of

the

argument develops. Without this ambiguity '

and lack of precise definition the arguments could not proceed to

We may

mutually contradictory conclusions.

note,

first,

their

that this lack

of definition, the incompleteness of the predicate in pronouncements like 'It is',

was a mark of Parmenides

himself. 1 Secondly, as Plato

comedy of Euthydemus, it was adopted by the Sophists by which they confused their oppoand upheld the rhetorical thesis that on every topic there are two

showed

in the

as the basis of the logical trickery

nents

'

arguments contrary

to each other'. 2

'Both and neither', the triumphant

cry of Dionysodorus (Euthyd. 300 d),

the conclusion

is

which Par-

is made to reach in this dialogue.3 Gorgias in On the Nonshowed that by Parmenidean logic one could as easily prove 'It

menides existent is

not' as

that very

'It is'. 4

The

ambiguities were perfectly plain to Plato,? yet

ground Cornford denied

'

these ambiguities to construct a string of sophisms'.

expected to infer

'

the ambiguity, and

ments 'cease to be either valid,

indeed

would deem

this

'The student

is

understanding the argu-

fallacious or meaningless', being in fact a

brilliant, refutation

it

on

on

was consciously playing on

that he

of Eleaticism. As evidence that Plato

beneath him to construct sophisms of this

sort,

Cornford

quotes the expression of contempt for them in the Sophist (259D-C).

The

fact

remains that some of the arguments as presented do play on

11, 73 ff., comments on this and on Plato's criticisms and more advanced position. Vol. in, 50 f., 316. That the thesis owed its origin to Parmenides is none the less true because

Vol.

1

1

he himself would not have approved it. Cornford admits both that Parmenides himself confused the two senses of 'If One is' and that the eristic Sophists used the ambiguity 'to entangle disputants in contradictions or paradoxical nonsense' (pp. 109, 111). 3 Noted by Grote (11, 290 f.), who adds that if the demonstrations in Part 2 had

under the name of Protagoras, Gorgias or Euclides, productions, worthy of

For Gorgias's work

4

by Cornford

(p. 226),

men who made

would probably have

come down

called

them poor

a trade of perverting truth.

see vol. in, 192-200.

who

critics

A close parallel occurs in Parm. at

162a.

noted

It is

thinks of it as 'answering' one of G.'s arguments, but perhaps

it

would

makes use of it. Brumbaugh (P. on One 21 f., 22 n. 4) sees a complicated showing that the joke is on G., not Parmenides. 5 Though there have been sceptics, e.g. Grote (11, 297) and recently Runciman (in 180) 'It seems improbable that Plato saw at all clearly where and why the arguments of the exercise are

be

fairer to say that

it

relationship, a 'double irony'

SPM

fallacious.

55

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus ambiguities and are therefore fallacious and sophistic; and

if Plato was one would assume, were Euthydemus and Dionyso-

aware of

this, so,

dorus.

seems more

does

It

likely that the visitor in the Sophist can speak as

he

because the exercise in such sophistry provided by the

just

Parmenides has already shown up the absurdities to which

it

one dialogue

Readers are

certainly a preparation for the other.

is

intended to detect the

and

Parmenides himself put

as

false beliefs, 'that

Some are in

fallacies,

how

to avoid them,

in introducing his account of

it

men's

no judgement of mortals may outstrip thee\ I

make Parmenides propound arguments which fallacious but, if valid, would undermine his own philo-

object that to

any case

sophy,

but as a training in

The

leads.

is

incompatible with the respect in which Plato held him.

I

have

on

remarked already that this respect was not unqualified; and the point

which the

Eleatic visitor in the Sophist feels

father in philosophy,

one which 'is'

and

what

is

'is

is,

even

at the risk

to contradict his

of being thought

unfilial, is the

so conspicuously lacking in the Parmenides, namely that

not' are not absolute: 'what

in a

bound

way

not' (241 d). Since

is

is all

not in some respect that

Parmenides

and

is,

offers is a

training exercise, one out of several necessary before the positive

search for truth can begin, one might even conjecture that Plato

is

paying him the compliment of himself seeing through the sophistic abuses of his central dictum.

The

dialogue ends abruptly at the conclu-

sion of the exercise, and whatever moral Parmenides might it

draw from

remains unspoken.

A

point remains which has been

treat the

its

arguments. Ross speaks of positive ideas which '

will fructify in his later thought'. Parm.

8.61. I differ

fr.

from Cornford

defence of him against Robinson in

arguments

100), that to

second part as 'gymnastics' does not imply that nothing of

value emerges from

1

made by Ross (PTI

the statement

is

on

p.

PQ

no

2

We have noticed,

reluctantly,

too, in the earlier

and would direct a reader to Allan's

1955, 373 f. Important for his denial of sophistry in the that 'Plato usually indicates clearly enough where he is

passing from one to another sense or aspect of "the

One"

or of "the Others". But contrast

217: the contradictory conclusions of hypotheses 1-4 'can be stated thus only because the different meanings of the supposition [that there is a One] have been disguised'. For a full p.

critique of C. see

Robinson,

PED

268-74. R- adopts the 'gymnastic' view, as does Ross (PTI II, 293 n. h, which also contains an interesting

99-101). Both acknowledge their debt to Grote (PL discussion of still earlier views). 2

PTI

100.

Perhaps even in

can be discerned

at

later centuries. Cf.

1433-443 and 1493-c

(SPM 56

Runciman on 165).

the mathematical proofs that

For Plsto one might instance

1

58c!

Parmenides dialogues, a puckish habit of interspersing serious Socratic or Platonic ideas with otherwise

audience

ad hominem arguments, though

the interlocutor or

unlikely to appreciate them, and they are not followed up.

is

On the negative side,

'

Parmenides enunciates

strations as real logical problems,

his contradictory

demon-

which must exercise the sagacity and

hold back the forward impulse of an eager philosophical aspirant'

(Grote

301).

ii,

Conclusion

To

understand the purport of the Parmenides

Every

possibility has

My own

been put forward and rejected

must be offered with great

interpretation

starts

very

is

from the conviction

difficult

in turn, so that

that if Plato chose to

cause he wanted to clear up the relationship between his thesis

of

be for ever grateful, but it

One

was an achievement

fully real

at the

any

diffidence.

Parmenides the leading figure in a discussion of the Forms,

and the Eleatic

indeed.

it

own

make

was bedoctrine

To

exalt the intelligible as alone

for which,

he believed, philosophy must

same time,

stated in Parmenides's terms,

Being.

would have brought philosophy

to a halt.

Hence

his

own

efforts to

provide a bridge between being and not-being, knowledge and ignorance. I

have

Somewhere the two doctrines had to be brought face to face. show that this is happening here, and it will continue in

tried to

the Sophist. Direct confrontation with the old

man

impasse, but Plato's debt to Eleatic thought appears

by

himself leads to an

when he is

uncompromising representative of the same

a less

replaced

tradition. Par-

menides attributes Socrates's discomfiture to immaturity and lack of training in argument,

and

offers a demonstration.

For one thing,

Forms could not admit contrary predicates or combine with each other. The demonstration 'proves' that they can do both. In this and other ways Parmenides performs the necessary preSocrates

was

certain that

liminary operation of reducing Socrates to perplexity (aporid) as the

mature Socrates did to people for

it.

Only

we proceed

in the Sophist, to build

like

Meno. And

like

Meno he is

the better

under more sympathetic Eleatic tutelage, do

on the ground thus

cleared,

and

learn, for instance,

Many acquire limit through association with the One. This suggests the Pythagorean notion which according to Aristotle P. adopted in calling his first principles 'the One and the great and small' (or 'indefinite dyad'). See Metaph. 987b! 8 ff. and other passages cited in the unlimited

Ross

ch. 12.

57

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus that

some Forms can combine and others

not.

A

short paragraph from

the Sophist will illustrate the point that in the Parmenides Plato states

dilemmas resulting from the original Eleatic suggests solutions on his

own

We must admit that motion

is

thesis

and

in the Sophist

lines.

same and not the same, and we must not be it is the same and not the same we do not use the word in the same sense. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the Same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the Same we do so on account of its participation in the Other, by which it is separated from the Same and becomes not that but other so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the Same. 1 disturbed thereby; for

the

when we

say

The Parmenidean confusion between identity and attribution is cleared away in terms of the doctrine of Forms, and by the realization that a word may be used in more than one sense.

On

this interpretation the

difference.

The

Parmenides

early dialogues

is

an aporetic dialogue with a

showed Socrates

skilfully

reducing a

respondent (and as he would say, himself as well) to aporia, thereby

exposing the confusions of thought underlying the popular use of language. In the meantime he has become a teacher with elaborate positive doctrines about Forms, soul, the physical world and their

With astonishing artistry as well as flexibility of mind now transforms him again, this time into a young man, keenly

mutual Plato

relations.

intelligent

and eager for truth yet

in

argument no match

for a great

philosopher, in order to subject these positive doctrines to an examination

from the other's point of view.

Prima facie

at least, the first part

makes some

telling criticisms

doctrines in question, and they are never answered. In face of this,

commentators have argued they are

fatal to the

of the

some

that they are not in fact serious, others that

Phaedo doctrine and Plato must have known

alternatively that he failed to realize

how damaging

it

(or

they were), others

1 Soph. 256a-b; see p. 152 below). The translation is M. G. Walker's {PR 1938, 513; I have supplied capital letters for Forms), whose thesis is that P. arrives at his solutions in Parm., and Soph, is only conveying the same lesson. She quotes Morris Cohen to the effect that P. avoids the indecent confusion at which we arrive if we violate the principle of contradiction and try to wipe out the distinctions of the understanding'. I should have said that he intentionally does not avoid it in Parm., but does in Soph. and I claim no originality for this. Cf. Brochard, £ts. de Phil. Anc. et Mod. 167: 'Le Parmenide pose le probleme dans toute sa difficulte, le Sophiste et le '

y

Politique en

donnent

la

solution.

58

Parmenides again that they did not touch the essence of the doctrine but called for a modification which Plato later effected. Most

who

the change as a renunciation of the idea of the

take the last view see

Forms

as transcendent

paradigms in favour of regarding them as no more than universals,

upholding

stable general concepts. 1 Ackrill, that

would be more

it

revising

natural to call

The remark

it.

view, says honestly

jettisoning the theory than

135b, he says,

at

strongly suggests that what he as conceived in the

it

this

is

now sure

of is not that there must be Forms

middle dialogues, Forms as ethical ideals and as the meta-

physical objects of intuitive and perhaps mystical insight; sure of talk,

is

that there

fixed concepts

That

must be

—

what he

is

now

fixed things to guarantee the meaningfulness

of

meanings of general words. 2

the

own criticisms here, gave up the doctrine disproved by many references to it, in

Plato, as a result of his

of transcendent Forms,

is

dialogues universally agreed to be later than the Parmenides, which contrast, in

the terminology of the Phaedo, a world of realities

unchanging, perfect, bodiless

becoming.

true that a

It is

—with

list

—

the visible world of change and

of references only

(like

Runciman's in

SPM 152) needs careful checking, for a die-hard believer in

concepts or

common

eternal,

Forms as some

properties might interpret the language of

of them in that sense. At Laws 965 b-e, for instance, Saunders in the 'Penguin' translation gets on well enough with a vocabulary of 'concept', 'notion',

'common element'

(p.

379

n. 3

below). But one can add

859c, where the language of 'association' and 'sharing'

strongly reminiscent of the Phaedo.

The

is

more

Philebus has several decisive

passages, as have Sophist and Statesman, and of course Timaeus (if one

accepts the traditional dating).

An

It is also explicit in

the Seventh Letter. 3

champion of a change of doctrine after Parm. was Henry Jackson in/, of Philol. on 'Plato's Later Theory of Ideas'. His conception of the nature of the change, however, was different, and based on an interpretation of the Phil, which 1

early and formidable

in his series

of

articles

has not found general favour. For a criticism see Ross,

SPM,

(my

PTI

133

f.

For Rist's view see p. 51 n. 1 above. Abandonment of paradigmatism is also argued by Weingartner {UPD ch. 3), and denied by Cherniss {SPM 361 f.). Ross {PTI 86) thought P.'s doubt concerned the 'Largeness is large' form of expression. That P. did not realize the damaging effect of the criticisms is the view oiRunciman {SPM 15 1-3). Those who think that he neither regarded nor should have regarded them as serious include Taylor {PMJV^o), Grube {PTtf), Cornford {P. and P. 95), Field {Phil, of P. nof.), Crombie 1

Ackrill in

{EPD 3

11,

206

italics).

332 ff.).

Laws 859c

oCTovrrep

av tou

(For the bearing of the Laws on

StKotiou

koivcovtj

ko(t&

this question see also

59

ToaouTOv Kai toO xaAou

Runciman,

PLE

54 f.)

lirnixov

krri.

See also Phil.

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus

Two

passages are especially interesting as explicitly meeting objections

raised in the Parmenides.

49

d, in

place

coming

among

One

has been mentioned already. Soph. 248 c-

to terms with the

'

friends of Forms', restores soul to

the real and explains thereby the possibility of our

ledge of a changeless reality. Phil. a unitary and eternal

1 5

Form can be

its

know-

a-b takes up the question whether

scattered

among an infinite number somehow separated as a

of generated individuals, or alternatively be

whole from and

itself. It

may be added that Aristotle, in his various accounts

criticisms of the doctrine, never suggests that Plato altered

way. Had he done

so, the sting

it

in this

would have been removed from most of

Aristotle's attacks. 1

Having noted of his

you

own

like,

all this

doctrine

—

we may justifiably remind

call it

ourselves

how much

metaphysical, religious, mystical or what

but at any rate genuine Platonic doctrine

—

Plato has omitted

for the purpose of the experiment with Parmenides (pp. 38, 43, 50

we need feel no compulsion to suppose that he has abanSome changes might be needed (e.g. in the language of selfpredication' or the status of a Form when it has 'entered into' a above), and

doned

it. 2

'

particular),

but the cornerstone of the whole, the transcendent, eternal,

ideal character

of the Forms, remained in place. The challenge of

Parmenides was

how

to reconcile this transcendence with a

both with the sensible world

'association' (koivcovioc)

form of

(said in the

Parmenides to be a prerequisite of knowledge) and with each other (declared at Soph. 259e-6oa to be essential if discussion

on

at all).

The

casual allusion to both in the Republic , 3

their serious examination in these dialogues,

come from

is

to

be carried

compared with

shows how

far Plato

has

The

old

the easy, dogmatic assurance of his golden period.

I5a-b, 58a, 59a-c, 6id-e, 62a; Pol. 269c!, 285e-86a; Soph. 248e~49d, 254a; Ep. le "Phedon" se maintient-elle dans

Kucharski's article 'La "theorie des Idees" selon

7,

3423-d.

les derniers

mainly concerned with Philebus. is alone in doubting that Aristotle attributed x"P«^Mos to Plato; and he seems to have misunderstood the attitude adopted in Soph, to the 'friends of Forms'. (See CQ 1944, 101 with n. 3.) It may be helpful to compare vol. iv, iiyf., 118 n. 1, and p. 47 n. 2 above. Ross notes (PT1 99) that Parm. is the one important dialogue to which Aristotle dialogues?', in Rev. Philos. 1969, 1

Chung-Hwan Chen,

never 2

so far as

is

I

know,

refers.

Some have supposed

as recollection.

that the dialectic of the later dialogues replaced the belief in

But see Gulley

in

CQ

knowledge

1954 (esp. pp. 209 ff.) and Rees, Proc. Ar. Soc, suppl. vol.

1963, i72fT. (against Strang).

3 476a. See vol. iv, 498. Similarly at Phaedo i02d it is clearly stated that a Form must be both transcendent and immanent, with no suggestion that this involves any difficulties.

60

Parmenides Greek problem of the One and the Many

was

that Plato

'How',

as the

in this tradition

—and we must never

—was not

Orphic Creator asked,

to

'shall

be so easily conquered.

have

I

forget

things united yet

all

each one separate?' 1 (2)

THEAETETUS 2

Connected with this is the hardest and most urgent of all problems, to which the argument has now brought us. If nothing exists except individuals, and there is an infinite number of them, how can one attain knowledge of the infinite? We know things in so far as they are one and the same and possess some universal attribute. Aristotle, Metaph. 999324-9

The

Date.

introduction

tells

of wounds and dysentery

come

of Theaetetus being carried

home dying

Two

such battles

after a battle at Corinth.

into question, one about 394 or not

Campbell {Tht.

lxif.)

favoured today and

argued for the

much

earlier,

later,

the other in 369.

but the

later is generally

much the more probable. The

Theaetetus

is

a tribute

memory, and probably written not long after his death, i.e. The majority would now on In spite of its close connexion with the Sophist and agree 369/7.3 Politicus (p. 33 above), some are still so impressed with the novelty of the method of collection and division in the Phaedrus that they to his

shortly before Plato's second visit to Sicily.

regard

its

absence from the Theaetetus as sufficient evidence of earlier

composition.

I

have already given

method has been exaggerated

my

opinion that the novelty of the

(see vol. iv,

430 f. and

time of Parmenides and Theaetetus and

is

28 n.

1

above), is lit

by

glow which has faded by

the

and can only record a personal impression the same glow as Phaedo and Symposium, a

p.

that the Phaedrus

not recaptured even in the

Timaeus. Unless the Theaetetus, as a Socratic and aporetic dialogue, to be put in the early I

would 1

2

was

may

all

four

be referred to

edition.

PMlT^io, Field, P. andC.'s 70, Jowett's edd. in, 392 n. The case for the later argued by Eva Sachs, De Th. (19 14), 22-40. (Cf. vol. in, 499 and vol. iv, 52.) disputes about the date see her notes to pp. 18 and 19. Dies remained agnostic (Autour

first

earlier

is

that today),

partly subjective grounds certainly, that

E.g. Taylor,

battle

For

on

Kern, O.F. 165. Cf. vol. 1, 132. For a full discussion of philosophical questions raised by Tht. a reader

McDowell's 3

say,

group (and few would wish to do

de P. 247).

6l

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus dialogues in this chapter were written which include the Phaedrus.

after the great

middle dialogues

1

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON DATING THE THEAETETUS Some would explain the Socratic character of the dialogue by the theory that most of it was written comparatively early and what we have is a revision by Plato of an earlier edition.

It is largely a

matter of internal indications and

personal impressions, and was conjectured even before the discovery of part

of a papyrus commentary published by Diels and Schubart in 1905 which has been thought to furnish some external confirmation. This rests on the fact that the commentator mentions the existence of another, rather frigid proem '

'

beginning 'Boy, are you bringing the dialogue about Theaetetus?'

If this

by Plato (and who would forge it?), the most obvious occasion replacing it by the proem in our manuscripts would be the death of

opening also for

is

Theaetetus, from which it is concluded that the main dialogue, or much of it, was written before he died. (See Cornford, PTK 15.) The best defence of this theory is by Popper (OS 321 f.), who sees signs in the dialogue itself that it was written earlier than the Republic. It may be correct, and should certainly not be passed over even if I am not personally convinced. Popper adduces a number of arguments in its favour, of which I will only point to two that seem to me dubious. (1) He takes two passages of Aristotle, which ascribe to Socrates the

invention of induction, and mention his profession of ignorance, to be allusions to the Theaetetus. But both these historical facts may be illustrated from other dialogues. The profession of ignorance suggests most strongly the Apology, but also Symp. 21 6 d, Charm. 165 b and other places. (2) In the proem Euclides says that Socrates repeated to him the conversation with Theaetetus, that as soon as he got home he made notes of it, and that on subsequent visits to Athens he verified some points with Socrates himself. Popper claims that this contradicts the statement at the end of the dialogue that Socrates's trial was already imminent, which would leave no

time for such

visits,

and suggests that

it is

a relic of the earlier version over-

looked or ignored by Plato in his revision. As to n.

below (written before

1

I

that,

however, see

p.

64

looked at Popper's arguments).

Von Arnim by Cornford, PTK 1. It led Campbell {Tht. Iv) to put Tht. 'between the Phaedrus and Republic', a result which modern admirers of his pioneer work in this field seem content to ignore. On some points the 'infinitae disceptationes' which Apelt noted in 1897 are still with us; e.g. on whether Tht. was completed long before Soph, was composed, contrast Cornford (I.e.) and Ritter (Essence 28). That Tht. itself was composed over a considerable period is of course possible. 1

Of

recent writers,

that Tht.

is

earlier

Robinson {Essays

than Phdr. Stylometry

58)

and

may be

62

De

Vries (Phdr. 11) agree with

a fickle guide, for reasons given

Theaetetus Dramatic

At the very end of the main dialogue Socrates casually he must leave for the King's Stoa in connexion with the

date.

mentions that

indictment of Meletus.

The

date

is

therefore 399, and his

are near. (Cf. vol. iv, 102.) His hearers is

would soon

trial

and death

what

see in reality

described in the dialogue (i73c-75b), the relation of the philosopher

to the practical

world and

his

behaviour in a court of law.

from Megara were intimate friends

Characters. Euclides and Terpsion

of Socrates, present

at his

Of

death (Phaedo 59c).

known. For Euclides and

Terpsion nothing

philosophy see vol. in, 499-507. more is That such an intimate friend of Socrates should be keenly interested in

one of his conversations

mean

that the

as

his

recorded by another

main dialogue contained

is

natural,

and need not

on Megarian doctrine,

reflections

but for internal evidence see Campbell's edition, xxxv-xxxviii. Theaetetus of Athens, a friend of Plato, brilliant

became one of the most

mathematicians of his generation. Only a boy

at the

time of the

dialogue, he receives unstinted praise for his intellectual curiosity and

promise from both Socrates and his master Theodorus. His death of

wounds and

must have struck him

illness

older mathematician Theodorus of Cyrene,

Theaetetus, the dialogue itself

at the

who

us much: his

tells

abandonment of general philosophy

his early

metry, his friendship with Protagoras. 1 Socrates

is

also mentioned,

The

age of 48-50.

Of the

taught both Plato and

work on square

to concentrate

roots,

on geo-

presence of the Younger

though he remains

silent

—an

additional

indication that Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman are to be read as a

continuous

and is

series, for his

presence

a historical figure, criticized

like

is

again mentioned at Soph. 218 b,

in the Statesman he replaces Theaetetus as chief respondent.

by

He too

Aristotle for treating physical beings

mathematical abstractions, 2 and pretty certainly the Socrates men-

tioned in the Eleventh Letter (358c!) as prevented from travelling 1

For Theaetetus

Halbb., 1351-72, or

JHP

1969, 362 f.

see Sachs's dissertation already mentioned,

more

Brown

von

Fritz in

RE 2.

ill

Reihe, x.

mathematics M. Brown in studies and gives the evidence for T. having written

briefly Taylor,

refers to earlier

PMW 322; and for

by

his

most of Euclid Bk 10. His connexion with the construction of the regular solids is mentioned in vol. I, 268f. For Theodorus, von Fritz, ib. 1811-25. 2 Metaph. 1036b 25 ff. He thought that man could exist without his parts as the circle without the bronze. It sounds as if Y.S. was using a mathematical analogy in support of the full Platonic theory of transcendent Forms. For further details about him see Skemp, P.'s Statesman 25 f. '

'

63

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus health. Socrates

makes much of the

common

thing in

both the boys have some-

fact that

with himself, one being his namesake and the other

resembling him in appearance, but

if this

has symbolic significance

it is

hard to discover. Prefatory conversation. This takes place in Megara, where Euclides

Terpsion

tells

how he met Theaetetus, barely alive, being carried home from

They grieve at the approaching death of a man so talented and in every way admirable, and Euclides recalls how Socrates had prophesied a brilliant future for him when, shortly before his own death, he met and talked with him still a mere boy at Athens. Terpsion would like to hear what they talked about, and this is still possible, for as soon as Euclides got home after hearing it all from Socrates he made notes which he afterwards wrote up at the Corinthian battlefield to Athens.

—

—

checking the

leisure,

details

with Socrates on further

They therefore settle themselves, and a slave reads is

the only dialogue

which

is

visits to

Athens. 1

the manuscript. This

represented as actually read, though in the

introductions to Phaedo, Symposium and Parmenides Plato has been at

some

pains to authenticate the record, at least dramatically. Also of

interest

is

Euclides's remark that he has written

as Socrates told

it,

agreed and so on as tiresome, and casting '

This

is

a

form which,

dialogues, but

from

as

is

we know,

now on

The Parmenides showed form

not in narrative form

it

I

said', 'he

into direct dialogue form.

Plato sometimes used in earlier

he gives up the narrative form altogether.

a transitional stage, in

tacitly dropped half way through, and

has been assumed on other grounds,

as

it

but leaving out the connecting 'and

it is

it

which the narrative a fair inference that,

slightly

preceded the

Theaetetus.

Introduction to main dialogue.

The

Theaetetus

is

a brilliant adaptation of

more critical and maturity. The restora-

the manner and plan of the earlier dialogues to the

probing approach to knowledge of Plato's tion of Socrates to his earlier role, with 1

S.'s trial

late

much of his

original personality,

was already imminent, but the Phaedo (59c!) tells how his friends used to visit him month which intervened between trial and execution. As E. was in Athens farewell, he would certainly have made several previous visits. For the practice

in prison during the

for the final

among

S.'s

admirers of recording his conversations see vol.

64

Ill,

343

f.

Theaetetus

shows Plato

still

anxious to be regarded as the true heir and continuator

of Socratic teaching. 1 In Sophist. Socrates

is

this respect

is

it

a complete contrast to the

not just a thinking-machine like the Eleatic visitor,

but Plato has brought out his character by a number of dramatic touches, e.g. the Socratic

humour of the midwife

ness with which his confession of ignorance

is

analogy, the serious-

followed up in

its

conse-

quences and the positive value of teaching from that position explained.

This accords with the philosophical purpose of the two dialogues, the

one aporetic, setting forth problems, the other

Reminders of the

out the most promising of the

young

didactic, solving them.

many. Socrates

earlier dialogues are

seeking

is still

Charm. 153 d), and is introduced to one whose name he does not know (i44d; Lysis 204 c).

The aim

(143 d;

cf.

to define a given concept, the respondent at

is

Meno, Rep.

instances instead (Laches, Hipp. Maj. y

first offers

1), after

which

suggestions are considered and rejected and the dialogue

several

ostensibly ends in failure.

The

difference lies in the choice of subject. In

the previous dialogues certain moral or aesthetic concepts have been

examined not

— Goodness,

know

As

in the

knowledge of knowledge the distinction between in the latter to

knowledge which

is

is

all

(vol. iv, 160 f., 169

f.).

whether there can be In

Meno and

Republic

drawn and is seen supposition of the changeless Forms:

knowledge and true

belief

is

the philosopher's recovery of the eternal realities with

had direct acquaintance before

simply assumed.

all

raised the question

depend on the

make knowledge purpose

knowledge

knows has been made fun of in the Euthydemus Meno by reference to reincarnation and recollec-

The Charmides even

which we

to

what one does

or what one

and answered tion.

Self-control, Beauty, Justice.

the current puzzle of whether one can learn either

itself,

itself the

Now

for the

first

birth,

and the existence of

time Plato has chosen to

main subject of enquiry,

setting aside for the

preconceived ideas such as appear unchallenged in the

Phaedo- Republic group. Nevertheless he cannot but show

still

has his

own

standpoint,

At one point he even turns aside, in what is formally a pure digression introduced on the flimsiest pretext, to remind his readers that neither the attack on worldly success and

it

itself occasionally.

1 This is perhaps also the purpose of emphasizing, in the preface, the pains taken to ensure the accuracy of the report. Cf. Stoelzel, Erkenntnisprobl. 6-8.

6

65

GHG

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus nor the eschatological

in the Gorgias,

divine

Forms of

that dialogue

superseded. Yet as

beliefs of the Phaedo, nor the and the Republic, are to be regarded as

we saw from

the Parmenides,

new problems have

and in his search for knowledge and its objects he shows more interest than previously in the individuals of the phenomenal world. The enigma of the Theaetetus may be illustrated by two quotations. To Stoelzel it seemed a work that might have been written for his own time (1908) 'as a weapon in its fight against materialism, sensualism, empiricism and positivism'. Richard Robinson on the other arisen for him, far

hand

cites its 'empiricist

and subjectivist tone' as something

unfavourable to the theory of Forms'. Against all

this

the empirical and subjective theories discussed are

'definitely

one may note

shown

to

that

fail,

and

the dialogue could be regarded as a demonstration of their inadequacy. 1

The question: What baffles

me:

'This

is

just the question that

my mind what knowledge is

.

.

man: what do you think it is?' (145c, 146c). Here down the topic of the whole discussion. But what are the

like a

Socrates lays 1

2,

cannot sufficiently grasp in

I

Speak out

Knowledge?

is

See Stoelzel, Erkenntnisprobl. v, Robinson, Essays 42. Although P.'s attitude to the Forms

when he wrote them. Cooper

Tht.

is

much

debated, so far as

I

know no one

believes that he had

abandoned

Phron. 1970 is emphatic that they are not in Tht., but is not there concerned with the wider question. In the past Campbell wrote (Tht. liii) that 'Plato's ideal theory, so far as it is in

allowed to appear in the Theaetetus, deals not with hypostatized

entities,

but rather with necessary

forms of thought, which are as inseparable from perception as from reasoning. But he excepted the digression, and even Robinson, who so vigorously opposed Cornford's thesis in PTK that the Forms are deliberately held back to show that knowledge was impossible without them, grants that there may be allusions to them. (See his Essays, 48. McDowell similarly sits on the fence, p. 174.) Miss Hicken in argues that Plato is genuinely baffled, convinced of the necessity of Forms yet no longer able to distinguish knowledge from belief by their aid. (Cf. Raeder, PPhE, 1905, 283: 'Platon versteht nicht mehr das Band zwischen Idee und Wirklichkeit zu kniipfen. ') Most however would agree with the view put forward long ago by Schmidt in his commentary of 1880: 'Since neither sense-perception nor true belief nor finally determination of the concept (Begriffsbestimmung) prove to be adequate definitions [of knowledge], nothing else can be in Plato's mind, as alone in conformity with his philosophy, but a definition directed to the Idea, i.e. the reality of the concept or the real and true Being on which it is founded. Among more recent scholars one may cite Ross (PTI 101, 103), Fowler (Loeb ed. 4), Solmsen (P.'s Th. 76), Hackforth (CQ 1957, 53 fT., a reply to Robinson), Grube (P.'s Th. 36-8), Cherniss (SPM 7), Llanos (Vie}. Sof. 35), Runciman (PLE 28 f.), Sprute (Phron. 1968, esp. p. 67). For references to Platonic Forms in dialogues believed to be later than Tht., see above, p. 59 with n. 3. 2 An observation of Th. Ebert is worth quoting (Meinung und Wissen 9, n. 15). Scholars '

SPM

'

speak of P.'s 'theory of knowledge' (or epistemology, Erkenntnistheorie), but 'the inapprotitle lies in this, that with it the genetic interest of modern philosophy in the

priateness of the

problem of knowledge

—

question of what

(in

it is'

that

is,

the question of the sources of our

German

its

'

Wesen').

66

knowledge

.

.

.

replaces the

Theaetetus an answer must

criteria that

question:

what

is?

it

down

Unfortunately

criteria

evident

fulfil?

We are up against

how do we know what we

—but

it is

not the

way of

before beginning the discussion just as the

—they

Meno's enquiry into

good and

by which candidates be gleaned

Without

we

beneficial in

for the

dropped

knowledge must be

criteria,

are being judged,

may

of the discussion. 1

Thus

true and infallible (152 c, i6od, 200 e,

object existing (152 c,

its

be

must be something

in the course

cannot be knowledge of the ever-changing, result

it

(87d-e), so certain

suggestions could not be tested and rejected.

criteria the

207c-2oc)b) and

effects

are treated as self-

arete turned out to

name of knowledge

as they are casually

learn that

its

we know

Plato's Socrates to lay

based on the hypothesis that whatever arete was, unfailingly

Meno's pertinent

are looking for before

186c) and stable (there

must be the

e.g. i82e). It

of first-hand experience not hearsay (201 b-c), and

must

it

include

(though the dialogue ends with the admission that these are not sufficient to constitute

ability to give

What

knowledge) true belief (or recognition) plus the

an account (logos) of what one believes or recognizes.

has no logos cannot be

known

(202 d, 205

c).

For comparison, one may quote what has been definition of knowledge' in

terms, if (a)

it

amounts

to this:

he believes/?,

(b)

modern

times.

he has adequate evidence

third of the three definitions is

the classical

Though expressed in various for/?,

'according to the classical definition, knowledge

but there

'

A man knows that/? (p being any proposition)

or true opinion combined with reason'. 2 This

rejects,

called

is

is

(c)p

is

true.

Thus

justified true belief,

closely similar to the

which Plato here discusses and ultimately

a difference in that the

modern

definition speaks

only of knowledge in propositional form (knowledge of facts) whereas

more

knowledge of things, not 'knowledge that' but knowledge with a direct substantival object knowing a syllable, the notes of a scale, a waggon, Theaetetus.3 In fact three kinds of knowledge in Plato

1

his

it is

like

—

Late in the dialogue, at 1960", S. asks permission to do something 'shameless', i.e. disobey rule in Meno (71 b) and claim to state a property of something whose definition is as yet

own

unknown. 1

Hilpinen, Synthese 1970,

1091"., q.v.

known

for

reff.

to various twentieth-century formulations.

between Fr. 'savoir' and 'connaitre', Germ, 'wissen' and 'kennen*. Once English too could mark in words the difference between 'D'ye ken John Peel' and 'He wist not that it was true' (Acts 12:9). Some have thought that P. marked it by his use of eiSevai, iTTio-raaQai and yiyvcboxeiv, but this is not so; e.g. in the short 3

Cf. vol. iv, 493.

It is

well

as the difference

67

6-2

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus are

commonly acknowledged today, the two just mentioned and 'knowknowing a game or knowing one's craft, which involves

ing how', 1 as in

a large element of acquired dexterity, skill or technique, or in morals,

knowledge how

to behave.

Such knowledge however

is

never entirely

divorced from the other two kinds. 2

These

distinctions

have not

come

fully

who

to the surface in Plato,

throughout the Theaetetus tends to speak of knowing in terms of a verb followed by a direct object

—

—

rather than by the equivalent of

For

a fact.3

on which

all

human

'

how to

'

or a proposition expressing

were more reasons than one.

this there

heir of Socrates, the kernel of

thing was.

a concrete individual thing or person

excellence

To know

justice

'

First, he was the whose teaching was that the knowledge depended was knowledge of what some-

',

in the sense of

was the only guarantee of leading

being able to define

a consistently just

life.

it,

now

(Even

Plato preserves the substantival expression so unnatural to us: a

knowledge

definition of

is

desirable because

knowledgeable by knowledge '.4) Here originality of his message, for

the

words

abilities

or

in question

and

this techne

Aristotle saw)

lay

the

from Homer onwards Greeks had used

as for

skills,

rather than intellectual understand-

them, knowledge was the basis of both

and general excellence, but whereas others had thought

technical skill

of

the knowledgeable are

(ETrioraoOai, eTncnTjuri) to denote practical

even bodily

skills,

For Socrates,

ing. 5

(as

'

arete as

simply knowing

how

to act, he believed that

space between 192 c! and 193 a he has used all three for the same sort of knowledge, namely direct The point has been noticed in connexion with Charm, in vol. iv, 169 n. 1. Cf.

acquaintance.

Runciman,

PLE 34

f.;

1

The terminology

2

Cf.

3

A

Runciman,

is

1 1 f.

oti eotov at 186 b.

has already equated aocpia with ETTicrrriiiri, on which see form of expression cf. ib. u8f. (Euthyphro and Phaedo) and 189 (H. Maj.). 450 n. 2, and foil. pp. Examples are collected by John Gould, P.'s Ethics jff.

CT0901 ol ao-b

1),

and

this

did not give the sense of touch any advantage over the others.

appears with them in

fr.

1 1

as

one of the untrustworthy,

'

It

bastard

faculties. 3 1

'The eyeball can be seen by another

eye, the flesh touched, etc.' (Cornford). S. gives

no

examples. 2

Is

Cf.

fr.

157b (habit makes us use these words, though wrongly) another reminder of Empedocles? 9.5

(on y£v£a8oci)

fj

9£pis

ou KccAfouai

vopicp 6' e-rricprmi koci aCrrds.

and for a detailed account of D.'s theories of 438-49. The theory of the KopyoTepoi has been attributed in modern times, not very compellingly, to Antisthenes and Aristippus. (For some reff. see Friedlander, PL III, 488 n. 20.) It is also held that P. himself either constructed the theory or at least believed it. So McDowell, Tht. 130, preceded by Friedlander, Cornford, Jackson, Burnet, Stenzel, Ritter, 3

For another view see Campbell, Tht.

perception vol.

xli-lv,

II,

PMW

contra, Taylor, 329^ Runciman (PLE 19) argued that it could not be P.'s because he never held a Berkeleian theory of sensation, which would have conflicted

Nakhnikian and others:

78

Theaetetus

summing up

In

at 157c!: 'Tell

the theory to test Theaetetus's assent, Socrates says

me whether you like the idea the things we have just spoken

nothing

that

but

good or

is

are becoming.

'

beautiful or

all

The sudden

introduction of 'good' and 'beautiful' into what had been

a

all

may sound odd, What he has in mind

of sense-perceived properties like white and hot

list

but for Plato is

of,

the

'many

all

alike

belong to the sensible world.

beautiful things' of Rep.

'lover of sights and sounds in just the

same way

',

as large

and

5,

which are recognized by the no more beautiful than ugly,

in fact are

and small, heavy and

light things (both in

the Republic and here) can appear as their opposites. There too, exactly as here, he says that

not,

what they

none of the many phenomena

are said to be. (See Rep.

A

Status of the sensible world. here. It

is

pressed

home

unceasing change (flux) for the whiteness itself

we

on the theory

or even say that perception

fect

—

at the

the only realities

discourse impossible.

same time can remind us of the changeless '

'

—because they resemble them or '

'

their

natures. But

that Plato accepts for the sensible

the flux-doctrine

What becomes

We

we are naming it rightly,

knowledge any more than non-knowledge.

all

and timebound manner share

many do)

in

Phaedo and Republic Plato teaches that sensibles are

always changing but

Forms

is

cannot even say that a thing 'flows white',

is

In short, the theory makes in the

that everything

flowing and shifting into another colour.

cannot name anything with any assurance that

Now

than are

point vital to Plato's philosophy arises

at i82cff.:

is

are, rather

479 a-b.)

which we have here, then,

if

in

an imper-

we assume

(as

world the extreme form of

as

Gulley writes

(PTKJ4),

of the doctrine that sensible characteristics are 'copies' or

'images' of Forms, that they are recognisable and hence are able to prompt the recollection of

Forms? This doctrine

clearly

assumes that there are

determinate and recognisable sensible characteristics; indeed that sensibles are determinate

and recognisable

it is

in so far as they

'

a doctrine participate

and hence 'resemble' Forms. There is a serious inconsistency, then, between this doctrine and the consequences drawn by Plato from the fact in'

that sensibles are in flux. with the theory of Forms, but Cornford (PTK 50 f.) seems to have thought it not exactly Berkeleian. (For comparison and contrast with the Berkeleian phenomenalist tradition see

McDowell

i43f.) In fact

it

could not be P.'s for the reasons given on the next few pages, and

plainly the neo-Heraclitean doctrine referred to as such at i79dff.

79

is

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus Others have expressed similar views, 1 but the point Plato here describes the sensible world as

suggest, that

is, I

would be if there were no Forms. Neither supporters nor opponents of this explanation have it

appreciated that their existence changes the nature of the sensible world.

This indeed was a main reason for their introduction. Parmenides had denied

all

reality to the sensible

dichotomy

'is

or

not'.

is

world on the ground of

The Forms, and

his exclusive

the admission of 'becoming

an intermediate stage, were designed, not to depress the sensible

as

world but to save

it

from

annihilation.

Somehow

the Heraclitean and

Parmenidean views of reality must be reconciled. The Platonic universe is

an integrated whole consisting of intelligible and sensible spheres. As

the Timaeus teaches

—

that triumphant vindication of order, regularity

and value in the movement and change of the sensible world it

such order and stability as

the Forms. 2

It is

it

possesses

is

the fact that

—what

it is

gives

modelled on

true that for Plato 'sensible things are forever flowing,

and there can be no knowledge of them'; but there can be true opinion because, Aristotle continues, there are also what he called Forms, with reference to which the sensibles can be spoken of because their causes, that

is,

Forms

are

they impart definite characters to the sensibles.3

Contemporary Heracliteans were like their master without his Logos, the universal law governing the continual flux of change, 4 and Plato

had no thought of following them sea of indescribability.

We may

in their fantasy of a recall the

might

he says,

in the dialogue:

talk to maniacs; they are living

theories, always in motion, incapable of staying

to a question or an argument.

They own no

adrift

on

a

outburst against them of

Theodorus, an authoritative and sympathetic voice as well,

world

still

a

you

examples of their

moment

masters or pupils,

to listen

it's

a case

1 Cornford held that the extreme flux-doctrine was P.'s own theory of the sensible world having proved by its means that knowledge cannot be perception, he leaves us to infer that it depends on the Forms. This would certainly make him guilty of the inconsistency which Gulley finds. If Forms existed, yet in no way moderated the utter instability and disorder of our world (an inconceivable situation), knowledge would be as impossible as if they did not. 2 Cf. esp. 52a. On the 'cleverer' theory, of course, one could not speak of a sensible as

coming 3

to be 'in a certain place' (ev tivi tottoj). Cf. also Gorg. 5076-5088.

Arist.

Metaph. 987332^9. The causal aspect of the Forms has been prominent

places in dialogues already discussed. See 4

For

a

followers

by

summary of is

it

in

many

vol. iv, 350-2.

Logos see vol. 1, 434. His distance from his rabid where he makes a point similar to that made later (i86d) the senses are 'bad witnesses' which cannot yield knowledge without a mind H.'s conception of the

also indicated

P. himself, that

on

by

fr.

55,

to interpret them.

80

Theaetetus of spontaneous generation, and each thinks the other an ignoramus (i79e-8oc). Theirs was the position of Cratylus,

by saying

who outdid

one could not step into the same river

that

once,

Heraclitus

and ended by

taking Plato's hint and abandoning speech altogether (Arist. Metaph.

ioioai2-i5).

At the end of the Cratylus (439 b rT.) Socrates demonstrates to Cratylus on his extreme flux-theory, allowing no permanent entities at all, verbal communication and knowledge would be impossible. If not only that

were under constant

beautiful things but the very property of beauty

change, there would be nothing to which one could apply noun or adjective, as

having either identity or

qualities.

Plato 'does accept that the sensible world sense) and so

'

at the

same time he

asserts that

(Gulley goes on to claim)

'is

that

minate"

equally valid whether or not

it

shows

"being

is

Forms

with "being deter-

assumed

to last,

it is

is

habitat of copies of the Gulley,

PTK 83. On

more obvious

p.

Forms

are

is

in

effect

of

assumed

439 d 9, that whereas and water, being mutable and unstable,

fire

'this' or 'that' (touto),

certain qualities (toioutov)

1

Forms exist. '*

said, in contrast to Crat.

physical bodies such as

cannot be called

that

inconsistent with the existence and

the Forms. Finally, in the Timaeus, in which the first

This'

that the

that the neo-Heraclitean theory that everything

incessant flux and change

from

extreme

and denies

acknowledge

in flux" is incompatible it is

exist

characteristics.

in itself implicitly to

argument All

This does not show that in flux' (in the

world has any determinate

that the sensible

is

is

by

Forms. 2 In

72 he admits that

interpretation' of 439c! 4.

they can be said to possess

virtue of the penetration into their

Even

their causal capacity the

this thesis if

(which

Forms

involves rejecting the 'grammatically I

do not

believe) P., never a precise

had been betrayed into giving the impression that the existence of the Forms made no difference to the nature of the sensible world itself, the weight of evidence on the other side would far outweigh it. Runciman saw the point. See his PLE 21 on the argument of the Cratylus. On G.'s views see also vol. iv, 493 n. 1. I believe that what I say here is also relevant to the remarks of Robinson in Essays 48, and Owen in 323. 1 Tim. 49 d, 50 c. This should be read in conjunction with Cherniss's acute arguments in 355-60, though I do not necessarily follow him in all their subtleties. The late dialogue Phil. (59a-b), though it puts the contrast between being and becoming in strong terms, only repeats the point made in Rep. 5 that precise truth cannot be found within the changing sensible world, and therefore So^a is different from i-rnarripr]. I hope the last few pages answer the point raised by McDowell, pp. 180-1, para, (ii), and I believe I am in substantial agreement with the extremely close-knit argument of Cherry in Apeiron 1 967. writer,

SPM

SPM

8l

ParmenideSj Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus rescue the sensible world from the meaningless chaos to which the neo-

would consign it. Truly, as the Parmenides repeats (135 b-c), if you deny the existence of Forms you will have nothing on which to fix your mind and will destroy the possibility of rational Heraclitean maniacs

To

discourse. flux of

suggest that their existence and presence could leave the

becoming unaffected shows

a

fundamental misunderstanding of

Plato's position.

Dreams and hallucinations (1 57e-6od). This theory (continues Socrates) commonly made, that in dreams, madness

can withstand the objection or illness

we have

after

We

all.

moment

false perceptions,

asleep and

objection

so that perception

cannot even give certain proof that

lies in

is

we

not

infallible

are not at this

dreaming our conversation, and the answer to the 1

the theory's assertion that sensation

is

nothing more

than an interaction between two constantly changing things, and exists (or rather

'

becomes ') only

in relation to both.

the Protagorean 'for him', 'for me'. There illusory sensation. If

sour to the same that he has

is

man

is

One must

wine sweet and pleasant to

a healthy

in sickness, the explanation in

become

a different subject,

always add

then no such thing as an

man

tastes

terms of the theory

whjjh together with the

drinking of the wine produces different offspring, namely the sensation

of sourness on his tongue and a moving and changing sourness in the '

wine (159c), which has no

'

qualities 'in itself

but only 'for somebody'.

Thus Protagoras is vindicated, and each man is the sole judge of what is for him; and the name of knowledge cannot be denied to a state of mind impervious to falsehood or error about what

is

or becomes.

This was asserted independently by Descartes {Meditation 1, trans. Haldane and Ross f.). For Moore's and Russell's positions see Newell, Concept of Phil. 56-8. J. L. Austin (S. and S. 49 n. 1) says it is absurd because (for one thing) we describe some waking experiences as 'dream-like', and if Descartes (and P. whom neither mentions) were right, 'if dreams were not "qualitatively" different from waking experience, then every waking experience would be like a dream'. I do not believe P. was right, but I doubt if it is possible to refute him so easily. An experience which we call dreamlike is one which we believe to be real (not imaginary like a dream), but which gives an impression of the unreality which, in our waking hours, we ascribe to 1

pp. 75

we are dreaming, our dream-experiences seem real (witness the way we may wake up laughing, crying or in a state of fear), and it is by no means inconceivable that in a dream we might speak of our experiences as dreamlike though (like the man awake) we believed them to be real. Somewhat similar is Tht.'s point that we can dream we are narrating a dream, a our dreams. While

thing which

(Meno

I

myself have often done. P. too could speak of a waking experience as dreamlike

85 c).

82

Theaetetus Examination ofthe theory that knowledge is perception. Thus Theaetetus's firstborn has been delivered after a difficult labour. The next job is to

examine the baby and see Theaetetus pursues

worth

if it is

on the whole

rearing.

I

have said that the

a systematic course, but

it

preserves

the natural turns of a genuine conversation, with short interludes, a

longer digression, and shifts from one aspect of the subject to another

and back again. This

few

realistic style is particularly

marked

in the next

sections.

(i)

Return

to

Protagoras (i6ib-i62a). If knowledge

is

perception

man has his private and unassailable truth (and on this supposition why confine it to man among sentient creatures?), what and every

had Protagoras to

right

seriously

meant

that

himself up as a teacher?

set

no man

is

Can he have

wiser than another, or even than a pig or

tadpole? Having said this, Socrates immediately turns round and

denounces it,

he

to a

it

insists

new

(ii)

name

as

cheap rhetoric. Without refuting

they must attack the question in a different way, and passes

point.

Foreign languages and unlearned

knowledge

And

is

letters

(163 b-d).

Assuming

sense-perception, what happens in the case of an

Do we

language? it?

in Protagoras's

not hear what

is

said, or

again, before learning to read

that

unknown

do we both hear and know

do we not

see letters, or

do we

see

know them? Theaetetus replies judiciously that we know we see or hear, the sound of the voices and the colour of the letters; but we neither perceive nor hear what an

and therefore just as

much

and shape

as

interpreter or schoolmaster could this piece

tell us.

Socrates congratulates

him on

of clear thinking, which he will not dispute for fear of stunt-

ing his growth. language, besides

He

could of course have replied that to admit that

its

audible or visible symbols, has a meaning which an

interpreter or teacher could convey,

is

to admit that perception

—

is

not

whole of knowledge. But this coup de grace the indispensability of mind and ratiocination in the acquisition of knowledge is not to be

the

administered until

much later (i84b-86d),

—

to allow for further criticism

of both Protagoras and the flux-theory. (iii)

Memory (^d-^b). Knowledge, we 1

say,

is

perception.

Then

1 Gulley (PTK 77) refers to this passage as evidence that in the claim of perception to be knowledge, perception is meant to include memory-images. This, surely, would reduce the

83

7-2

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus he who, for example, sees

Are we then

it.

necessarily forgets it

clearly,

1

sees

something knows that thing

to say that it,

when he goes away

or alternatively that though he

he no longer knows

it

knowledge

still

remembers

because he does not see

alternative strikes Theaetetus as 'monstrous',

limitation of

long as he

as

or shuts his eyes, he

it?

Either

and he admits that the

to sensation apparently leads to impossible

consequences.

The knowing and not-knowing' dilemma (165 b-d). This sounds and Socrates's next move is surprising. Without refuting the last '

(iv) final,

argument, he declares that Protagoras would have put up a better fight

They have been quibbling like contentious Sophists, not true philosophers. He must try to come to the aid of the dead Protagoras.

for his theory.

But

far

from defending the

he has

all

attack

it

along said

is

thesis that

knowledge

is

perception (which

included in Protagoras's), what he does

first is

once more by an ultra-sophistical argument. If you look

something with one eye closed, do you see (and therefore know) not?

Answer yes

or no

it

to at

or

—no nonsense about seeing with one eye but

not with the other. Under such pressure Theaetetus agrees that the

only possible answer makes his thesis self-contradictory.

Many

questions might be asked, continues Socrates: for instance, can

other

know-

ledge be keen or dim (like perception)? Then, throwing this argument aside,

he goes straight on to ask

how

Protagoras would defend his

position.

The argument

is

identical with

some of those used by

brothers in Plato's farcical exposure of

eristic in the

the fighting

Euthydemus.

It

depends on demanding a simple answer in the terms of a question using an incomplete predicate or in some other

way unanswerable without

argument to nonsense. Cornford (PTK 65) says S. breaks it off because to save the definition of knowledge as perception that term must be stretched to include memory (true enough), and 'there would be no objection to that'. For all P.'s variations on the scope of aiaQnais, I think he would strongly object to calling memory a sensation or emotion (156b), or anything else but an act of the mind. In terms of the modern distinction between potential and actual remembering (for which see Broad, Mind and its Place in Nature 222, Shoemaker in Ency. Phil, v, 271), according to which one can say that a man remembers an event in his childhood even when he happens to be asleep or thinking of something else, P. seems to be considering memory-acts only, not memory-powers. Seeing is of course only one example of perception: P. could equally well have spoken of remembering a tune one has heard. (Cf. vol. iv, 508, n. 5). But in speaking of memory, as most often of knowledge in general, he has in mind acquaintance with an object or person rather than knowledge of a fact. 1

84

Theaetetus qualification. 1

proponent

its

as 'an

perturbable gentleman', 'a targeteer serving for pay in the

Why

words \ 2

who

cannot have been meant seriously by Plato,

It

indeed emphasizes his irony by describing

should he produce

this succession

im-

army of

of arguments which

Socrates either drops abruptly or himself dismisses as contentious?

Because,

suggest, though he enjoys playing with the indefensible

I

thesis that all

knowledge

provided directly by the senses, and takes

is

Protagoras seriously enough to want to examine him from every point

of view, there theories,

which he

go beyond

own

him only one

for

is

is

unassailable refutation of these

saving for the end

the senses to use

:

peculiar

its

the need for mind, which can

power of

reason, drawing

its

conclusions from the data which the senses present but cannot

Only mind can

interpret.

fulfil

the essential condition of

knowledge by

reaching the essence (ousia) and the truth of things (i86c-d); and ousia

and truth are contrasted by

only mean that the sensible world in the light

is

is

to be interpreted

and understood

of the Forms.

Back again

(v)

defence

when

Plato with sense-perceptions, this can

to

delivered

Protagoras: the defence (i65e-68c). Most of the

by Socrates

in direct speech, as

from the mouth of

Protagoras, with plenty of scolding of himself for unfair tactics. 3 1

Protagoras deals '

knowledge with

with the

first

sensation,

last

and then

two arguments

against identifying

length upholds his

at greater

own

(historically genuine) views.

To

(a)

the argument

past experience

is

from memory he

replies that the

man remembering know it: he knows the

This would meet the question whether a

rience.

something that he has seen nevertheless does not

memory-impression but not the object of his sensation. 4 raise the

distinct 1

unmentioned question, what

from

a perception

Examples are the

learn, the

memory of a

something different in kind from the original expe-

familiar

and

all

is

a

(It

could also

memory-impression

knowledge

is

if it is

perception?) at 293 c and 'Who Euthyd., vol. iv, 268 ff., and

Parmenidean Can a thing both be and not be?' '

wise or the ignorant?' (275 d). See also the

summary of the

276 f. 2 This character will ask an aUKTa (Euthyd. 2j6e). .

3

The dramatic and

other significance of S.'s elaborate and entertaining impersonation of

Protagoras has been vividly brought out in E. N. Lee's 4

For

a recent discussion

of

this

article,

argument see E. N. Lee,

85

I.e.

Exegesis, 225-61. 235.

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus (b)

thing

The

know and

question whether someone can

not

know the same

meaningless, for in a world where both subject and object of

is

perception are continually changing, one cannot speak of the same

person or the same thing

at

all.

Socrates might have added here what he

says later (i84d), that this theory treats a

man

as a collection

of separate

On

sense-organs, with no psyche (mind or personality) to unite them. that hypothesis

it

could be legitimate to say thai one eye sees and knows,

the other not, but psyche (c)

'

Protagoras

ment (which tion), 1

now

is

not to be mentioned yet.

own man-the-measure

returns to his

'

clearly does not involve confining

and Socrates's vulgar and unscientific '

preclude any

None can

me

'

man from being

dispute that

'

knowledge

'

state-

to percep-

objection that

it

would

wiser than another, or even than a beast.

my beliefs are true for me, but it may be better for

that other things should

doctor with medicines

both appear and be to

me

alters a patient physically to

true. Just as the

give

him

pleasant

sensations instead of painful (his indubitably sour wine appears and so

becomes

for

him sweet

again), so a Sophist can with persuasive

words

change a man mentally so that he has thoughts which, though not truer than formerly, are more profitable. Even the customs and laws of a state are

may

always right and proper for

in practical terms

political capacity)

(vi)

is

by

replaced

so long as

by

it

so, yet

it.

The

and

of truth or

test

Protagoras continued: criticism of the defence (i7oa~72b). (a)

therefore

number

more

false

than true by as

his

own

true for them, and

it is

false beliefs possible. 3

much

is

as the rest

By

of mankind out-

his single self.

This argument

might suspect

is

perhaps not very serious, but

at first sight,

where

that truth

for his

own

3

them

the pragmatic one of future benefit or harm. 2

doctrine he must concede that their belief

1

thinks

his oratory until useful

are so for

Everyone except Protagoras thinks

2

it

be harmful, and a statesman (or Sophist in his

can work on

valuable practices both appear and

falsehood

it

is

by

it is

not, as

one

Socrates's insistence else-

not to be decided by a counting of heads, and that

part if he

Cf. vol. in, 186 n.

contradicted

at least

were convinced

that

something was true the

fact

2.

For a full account and discussion of this curious doctrine see vol. Ill, 171— 5, 267^ Here S. frankly carries Prot.'s doctrine beyond the field of sensation, using the words

So^djEiv, xpiveiv, oleadai (i7od).

86

Theaetetus

would leave him unmoved. He would simply say that the others were wrong, but Protagoras cannot do so, and as a preliminary dig it is well enough to say that according to him there must be x-thousandfold more truth in the denial of his doctrine no one

that

than in

else believed

1

it

assertion.

its

opponents' contrary belief he i.e.

When

Protagoras refutes himself.

(b)

he admits the truth of his

own

himself agreeing that his

untrue that any man, however ignorant,

is

it

is

is false,

the measure of

is

was neatly summed up by Sextus, who Democritus {Math. 7.389): 'If everything that

truth (171 a-c). This refutation also to

attributes

it

appears

true, the belief that not

is

based on what appears, will thing that appears

The not

all

true will

is

everything that appears

itself

be

become

some

true;

is

some men

beliefs are false'

and strongly suggests that the dictum of Protagoras, of the Liar (vol.

true,

being

false.

simple syllogism: 'Every belief beliefs are true; therefore

is

and so the belief that every-

true,

believe that

sounds cogent,

like the

paradox

499), involves a vicious circle. In the past,

Ill,

com-

mentators have either passed over Socrates's argument in silence

Campbell) or called

it

been drawn to the

(Cornford). Lately, however, attention has

fair

fact

that Socrates has omitted the qualification

hitherto scrupulously inserted, that the contrary belief of others true for them.

Could not Protagoras reply

for him,

though

others

not, like his

is

false for others?

own,

Against

acknowledging to be it is still

them

open

that

to

him

true.3

to say:

my view is

and

is

it is

it is

them, but that

this therefore is

what he

'

Certainly false;

it is

but that

true for is

view

true for me.

'

4

is

that

it is

Gorg. 471

2

See Runciman,

3

The

I

am

true for

have shown to be

I I

am

not committed to

the other hand, while rescuing

him

PLE 16

and Vlastos, introd.

to Prot., xiv n. 27.

question whether Prot.'s dictum can account for second-order judgements (judgements

of the truth or falsehood of other judgements) has been discussed by Tigner in whose view is disputed by E. N. Lee, Exegesis 242-8. 4

that

because they cling to the

true for them,

On

me

it

is

H. Maj. 298 b.

1

eff.,

said that the belief of

false for

old vocabulary of objective falsehood which

saying that

only

Most recently E. N. Lee has maintained

simply

inadmissible. If I say their

is

that his doctrine remains true this

that the doctrine

absolutely, or objectively, false,

is

(e.g.

2

not quoting Lee verbatim.

87

Mnem.

1971,

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus from the tion

toils

of Socrates, Lee concludes that his immunity from refuta-

bought

is

at the price

of showing that he

not really saying any-

is

thing serious that can be significantly discussed or denied. 1 (c)

Grant that the doctrine

is

true in the field of sensation: each

what appears

to

him sweet,

sole judge of

is

cold, hot etc. But even our

defence of it showed that, in the matter of what will bring future benefits,

truth (17238).

As

one adviser

what

a judge of

nor one it

state in

lays

will

man

within himself the healthy', 2 one

what

is

is

as just or unjust,

expedient because

better than another in respect

it

of

be healthy for him, 'knowing

will not

be as good as another,

judging what actions will benefit

down

man

even admitting that

it,

holy or unholy,

so for

is

As

it.

for

such moral and religious concepts, 'men do assert' that these have no but are only a matter of agreement. This line

real, fixed nature,

is

by those who do not accept Protagoras's theory completely. The above is a paraphrase of 171 d 8-72 bj. Unfortunately disagreement about the 'the argument' (logos,

some think only secondly there

I

sentence. First, the subject

is

there

of the defence) to an unnamed 'they', which

sc.

doubt about those

On

believe that

is

changed from

a stylistic variation, others a different reference^

is

theory completely'. vol. in,

last

taken

who

and

'do not accept Protagoras's

the evidence about the Sophists presented in

what Plato has

in

mind

is this.

'things just and unjust, holy and unholy' have (physis or ousia 174 b 4) of their

own but are

The view

that

no nature or essence

only matters of convention

(nomos) or agreement was shared by Protagoras with the other Sophists;

on grounds of simple expediency,

estab-

and customs ought to be upheld, many of them saw

in the

but whereas he argued lished laws

that,

merely conventional basis of law and current morality a reason for a

man 1

to flout

them whenever

L.c. 248. Cf. earlier

cost of any standard 2

by

Runciman,

it

PLE

reference to which

suited him.4 16: it

'He

can, in fact, only advance [his belief] at the

could be demonstrated.

Another instance of a current expression which may be taken

Forms

as

implying the

full

theory of

or not, according to choice. Cf. vol. iv, 222 f.

PTK 81

3

Contrast Cornford,

4

See vol. in, esp. pp. 146, 268.

that in Prot.'s belief sensations,

n. 1,

with Hackforth,

still

less

Mnem.

1957, i32f.

be seen that I do not agree with Cornford moral concepts, existed 'by nature'.

It will

88

{PTK

82)

Theaetetus

At

this

point the argument

is

famous Digression conof the lawyer and man of

interrupted by the

life of the philosopher with that Though Plato is unlikely to have placed

trasting the affairs.

reason*

(vii)

it

may

it

good

there without

be simpler to finish the discussion of Protagoras first.

Final refutation of Protagoras (ijjc-yyb). For this Socrates has

only to elaborate a point already made. The theory that perceptions and experiences are unchallengeably real and true for the experiencing sub-

may

ject

well be valid for the present and past, but

prediction.

Judgements of expediency concern the future

sent behaviour, as to better than others

which there

what

will

no disputing

is

the test of

it fails

that

effect

of pre-

man knows

one

appear and be to them. This applies to ex-

doctors, vintners, musicians, cooks, legislators

—and

Protagoras himself earned large fees in the sincere belief that he

knew

perts in many arts

—

better than others

what would appear and be

who

This leaves the flux-philosophers,

them

to

in the future.

since they confine their belief

in the infallibility of sensations to the present, are not touched

we may

argument. Before finishing with them, Digression: the philosopher

Summary. The pretext that if the after all

natural

is

it is

at the

sole 1

that those

who

when

The

truth

2

to pursue

is,

On

the Digression as taking

it

is

in fact a

by

mark of

we

are

Callicles.

Socrates's

he continues, that compared with those bred

truth. up on

like for as

The lawyer by

a higher,

more

men

to slaves, having

long as they contrast

is

like,

with the

tied to a topic

universal level the theme of the criticisms

238-41, 354^ Schole, 'leisure'. But as used by P. and Aristotle the Greek

associations and

how

spend much time in philosophy should cut

any subject they

aim of reaching the

reflect

they appear and speak in a court, and

Gorgias and the reproach levelled at Socrates

of Prot., see Lee, 2

simply a remark by Theodorus

in the law-courts philosophers are as free

leisure

man (172C-77C)

multiplying and getting more formidable,

like

Plato never tires of insisting that superiority.

up

the practical

slight,

this

turn to the Digression.

they have plenty of time. This prompts Socrates to

ridiculous figures

back

for this

arguments look

and

by

I.e.

names

Greek

more

word

acquires

much

richer

our 'culture'. It is not accidental that it has given birth to 'school' and 'scholar'. Its value and its association with philosophy and learning are especially emphasized by Aristotle. When he says that happiness lies in schole {EN 1 1 77b 4, Pol. 1338 a 1) he does not mean idleness. Nature herself prompts us to use leisure rightly, a typically

ideal,

89

like

Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus imposed by

opponent and to a

a watchful

and

learn the arts of flattery reality twisted

and stunted

The complementary

strict time-limit.

own

deceit, clever in his

He must

estimate but in

mind.

in

of the philosopher suggests a

description

He

Platonic rather than a Socratic ideal.

a stranger not only to the

is

law-courts and Council but to the market-place and dinner-parties.

Only

his

body

nature of all that exists. His interest

him, but in what

man

is,

reversed

if

questions of

is

how

and

man who has

of

affairs

injured

injustice in themselves,

abroad seeking the true

not in the doings of men around

distinguished from other beings.

in practical affairs helpless

the

is

power mean nothing

Since birth, wealth, rank and

both arrogant and is

mind

in the city, while his

is

to him, he appears

and ignorant. The position

can be persuaded to abandon personal

whom

what they

for the question of 'justice

are',

and

and instead of calling rich men

and kings happy, consider the whole nature of kingship and human happiness.

Then

it is

who

he

Theodorus comments

make

will

that if

a fool of himself.

everyone believed

this there

would be

fewer evils in the world, but Socrates replies that evils can neither vanish

must always be something contrary

('there

to good') 1 nor have

any

place in the divine sphere, so they haunt this world 'of necessity'.

Hence one should make all speed to fly from here to there. This is done by becoming as like as possible to God, the perfection of righteousness, making oneself 'just and holy with wisdom' (or knowledge, 9p6vnais). To understand this is true wisdom and excellence {arete), as opposed to the world's conception of them. Those who aim not at being but at seeming wise in the eyes of the world, whether in a profession or craft or in politics, are not squandering

own

it

low and vulgar. 2 Their penalty

in play. Schole

is

the

whole

basis of

life,

is

inescapable.

the goal of

all

Of two '

business, and carries

end in itself, he like of the politician leisureless '. If states do not know how to live at peace, their lawgivers are to blame for not having educated them in the life of schole {Pol. 133439). At Pol. 1 323b 39 'a different schole' means a different branch of learning, and at 1 313 b3 scholai in pi. are its

happiness and pleasure within

P. calls the

it.

In eulogizing

it

in the Ethics as an

'

life

the bane of a tyrant ('societies for cultural purposes' Barker).

(though how seriously seems doubtful) that may have in mind the thought at Pho. 97 d that knowledge of the best involves knowledge of the worse. Similarly at Ep. 7, 344 a-b, virtue and vice must be learned of together. (Cf. Arist.'s oft repeated principle tcov Evavdcov r\ a\ni] 1

This

if evil

is

not explained. At Lys. 221 b-c

disappeared,

good would

lose

its

S. says

value.

Or

P.

ktrwri\\tr\.) 2

The

latter

politician whose wisdom is word commonly expressed an

counterfeit aristocratic

is