A History of Canadian External Relations: Volume 1 The Formative Years 1914 9780773595101

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H IS T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

VOLUME I

The Formative Years to 1914

G. P. deT . G L A Z E B R O O K

A HISTORY OF

Canadian External Relations REVISED

EDITION

VOLUME THE

FORMATIVE TO

I YEARS

1914

Carleton Library No. 27 McClelland and Stewart Limited Toronto / Montreal

Copyright © Canada, 1966 by McClelland and Stewart Limited

Chapters 1-11 of A History o f Canadian External Relations were first published in 1942 by the Oxford University Press, Toronto, under the title Canadian External Relations: A n Historical Study to 1914. The whole work, comprising nineteen chapters, was published by Oxford under the present title in 1950. Both volumes were spon­ sored by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

T h e C a n a d ia n P u b lis h e r s

McClelland and Stewart Limited 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 374

P R IN T E D AND B O U N D IN CANADA BY T . H . B E S T P R IN T IN G C O M P A N Y L IM IT E D

THE

CARLETON

LIBRARY

A series o f C anadian reprints and new collections of source m aterial relating to C anada, issued under the editorial supervision of the Institute o f Canadian Studies of C arleton U niversity, O ttawa. DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE

P auline Jew ett GENERAL EDITOR

R obert L. M cD ougall

EDITORIAL BOARD

Carm an Bickerton ( H is to r y ) M ichael S. W hittington ( P o litic a l S c ie n c e ) H . Edw ard English ( E c o n o m i c s ) B ruce A . M cFarlane ( S o c io lo g y ) G ordon C. M errill ( G e o g r a p h y ) W ilfrid E ggleston ( J o u r n a lis m ) R obin S. Harris ( E d u c a ti o n )

Contents

IN T R O D U C T IO N T O T H E C A R L ET O N LIBRA RY E D IT IO N , fct

v o lu m e

i: The Formative Years to 1914

1: Origins o f the Canadian Society, 1 2: Diplomacy and War, 23 3: Transition from Mercantilism, 47 4: The Path to Confederation, 64 5: The Outlook o f the Dominion, 82 6: A Venture in Diplomacy, 96 7: Trade, Fisheries, and Diplomacy, 120 8: Canada, the Empire, and the United States, 145 9: Effects of External Forces on the Canadian Community, 170 10: The Conduct o f High Policy: Subjects and Methods, 199 11: Defence, 224 N otes, 255

Introduction to The Carleton Library Edition T h e first eleven chapters of this history w ere originally pub­ lished by the O xford U niversity Press in T o ro n to under the title Canadian E xternal Relations: A n Historical S tudy to 1914. W ith the addition o f another eight chapters to cover the subsequent years the book was brought o ut by the sam e publisher, under the present title, in 1950. Both volumes w ere sponsored by the C anadian Institute o f International Affairs. T he present publi­ cation is with the kind perm ission of the O xford U niversity Press and the C anadian Institute of International Affairs. T h e first fourteen chapters have been revised and chapters fifteen to eighteen have been expanded and largely rew ritten. Instead of a final chapter com parable to th at in the edition of 1950 there is provided in an appendix an outline of the subjects of principal interest in the years after the outbreak of the Second W orld W ar, together with a selective bibliography. T he com ­ plexity o f the foreign relations o f C anada in this last period is such that it is impossible to p o rtray them w ithout distortion on the sam e scale as is possible for the preceding century and a half. A volume, it is hoped, will one day be w ritten by some interested scholar on the years in which C anada had com e to play a m ore active p art in w orld affairs. M eanw hile the bibliog­ raphy may be of som e assistance as a guide to the study o f the m odern period. T h e new m aterial contained in this reprinting of A H istory o f Canadian External R elations has m ade it necessary to re-issue the w ork in tw o volumes. V olum e I, containing the first eleven chapters of the original edition, covers the period up to the outbreak of w ar in 1914; volum e II, containing chapters twelve to eighteen and the bibliographical essay m entioned above, covers th e years from 1914 until the entrance of C anada into the second w orld w ar. T he index will be found a t the end o f the second volume. G. P. deT. G lazebrook University o f Toronto N ovem ber, 1965.

CHAPTER 1

Origins of the Canadian Society

T h e history o f C anada, as of all the A m ericas, begins w ith its discovery by E uropeans as an incident in the expansion of trade; and continues as a result of the allied am bitions of com m erce, missions, im perial designs, and pure adventure. Six states of E urope planted their flags in the new w orld; Spain, Portugal, F rance, E ngland, Russia, and H olland. By chance o r by plan the original expeditions landed a t different parts of the long coast. Claim s to territory w ere modified by the rivalries o f the powers, so th at the influence o f each cam e to be exerted in a particu lar area, th e whole character o f w hich was coloured by the im ported culture of that nation. It was the peculiar fate of C an ad a to receive the stam p o f two o f the E uropean great powers; while by the fortunes o f international politics the in­ w ard drives of Spain and Russia were arrested. T hus, if the shadow y story o f the early m igration o f eastern and northern peoples be left aside, the history o f the external relations of C anada has a beginning th at is definite both in tim e and nature. Before the com ing of th e E uropeans there were in the lands th at now com prise C anada no organized states: only Indian tribes living under conditions of barbarism o r sem i-barbarism , know ing little of their neighbours and nothing of a world beyond the limited expanse over which each group ranged. T o this prim itive scene the F rench, and after them the English, brought a culture th at was utterly new and capable o f revolu­ tionizing the w hole life o f the region. T he scientific knowledge o f centuries was suddenly put before a people who knew none o f it: sails to supplem ent the hard labour of the paddle, horses and w heeled vehicles, flint and steel, m uskets for hunting or w ar, steel axes and knives. T o these and other instrum ents were added the m essage o f C hristianity, borne by devoted mission­ aries; and the m eans of education, backed by the learning and culture o f th e m ost advanced society o f E urope. T he F rench brought above all a sym pathetic attitude tow ard the savage, a readiness to teach, an aim not to destroy but to live in am ity. It

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was the tragedy o f the Indian tribes that they lacked the adapt­ ability to take advantage o f their opportunity. It was true that the E uropean brought evil as well as good: diseases that deci­ m ated the tribes; greed th at led the traders to use all m eans, fair o r foul; brandy and rum th at turned the Indians to m adm en; and a stim ulation rath er than a check to the inter-tribal w ars. T o som e extent the natives did m ake use o f European arts; and m uskets, tools, and im proved agriculture eased the life o f the forest. But on balance the red m an gained little and lost much by the com ing of the E uropean, in spite of all the magic gifts spread before him . H e took m uch of the w orst and little of the best; and, failing to assim ilate him self to E uropean culture, gradually saw his hunting-grounds possessed by the invader, his heritage narrow ed to the pitiful reserves saved by tolerance from the broad acres of a once limitless domain. N o rth A m erica was to be the white m an’s heritage. W hile these great continents appeared at first only to block a trade ro u te to the east, experience soon proved that there w ere com ­ pensations, both directly for com m ercial interests and fo r the purposes of church and state. T he fisheries o f the banks of N ew foundland and in the G ulf o f St. L aw rence w ere exploited even before there were settlem ents, and the fu r trade developed from a casual barter by seam en to an industry w orthy o f pursuit. T h e early settlem ents m ade by F rance at P ort Royal and Quebec owed th eir origin to chartered com panies to w hom the obliga­ tion o f bringing colonists was a liability accepted in exchange fo r grants of m onopoly rights in trade. W hen it becam e evident th at the great St. Law rence led not to C hina but to the rapids of Lachine, com m ercial energy found an outlet in the trade with the Indians, just as the search for the north-w est passage by English adventurers was diverted to the trade at the south of H udson Bay. T he configuration o f N orth A m erica encouraged peneration tow ard the centre from widely separated coasts. T he n o rth ern approach was the least hospitable and was used only by the great English trading com pany as an access to factories on the bay, and thence gradually inland for the better conduct o f the fur trade. T he Russian advance from the north-w est was handicapped by m ountain barriers and had no direct effect on C anada. Spaniards, the pioneers in A m erican exploration, drove up from the south-w est, but w ere blocked before they reached th e fu tu re C anadian west. T he English settlem ents on the A tlantic coast grew by degrees until the advance guard crossed

O R I G I N S O F T H E CANADIA N S O C I E T Y - 3

the A lleghanies and pointed tow ard the very area into which the F rench w ere sending traders and soldiers. M oving on con­ verging lines, the nationals of the two E uropean pow ers in­ creasingly found that they com peted for the sam e prizes; and in a series o f w ars each strove to drive the other back to the sea. T h e A nglo-French colonial rivalry thus found local causes in N o rth A m erica as in other parts of the w orld; w hich, com bined w ith m ore purely E uropean issues, forbade a peaceful division o f the still only partially explored continent. F ran ce planted her colonies a t two points accessible by sea: on the A nnapolis Basin o f A cadia and at the natural fortress of Quebec. Both survived in spite o f severity o f clim ate, Indian attacks, and the lukew arm support o f com panies th at were zealous only for trade; and both spread, w ith natural increase and im m igration, into the neighbouring areas. T here was, how ­ ever, a m arked difference in the strength o f the social and cultural groups th at resulted. In both colonies F rench institu­ tions w ere introduced, but the French society in A cadia never developed as far as th at in C anada. T he A tlantic colony, m ore­ over, was early distracted by the successive changes between F rench and English sovereignty; and the process o f w eakening was all but com pleted by the expulsion o f the A cadians in 1755. I t was on the banks of the St. Law rence that the heritage of F ran ce was cherished and preserved. T he form of governm ent was an adaptation o f that o f a French province, closely under the orders of the court, and w ith adm inistrative officers broadly sim ilar to those in France. T he laws w ere based on the Custom of Paris. T he church, while m ore ultram ontane than in France, was the sole one tolerated; and the bishop, like those in France, was appointed by the King. Education was in the hands of the church. T he system of land-holding was also m odelled on that o f F rance, though it lost in the new w orld m ost of w hat re­ m ained of feudalism in the old. By the fortunes o f w ar C anada followed A cadia into the British Em pire in 1763; but if F rance no longer held political sw ay in N orth A m erica the im print w hich she had m ade stood fresh and strong. U nder a tolerant rule, C anadians under­ w ent hardly m ore change than in owing allegiance to another flag. A nd even the old flag continued to w ave symbolically over C an ad a - to w ave long after it had been cut down at home. F or the fleur-de-lys, em blem o f the old regim e, m eant m ore in that once Bourbon province than the tricolore of the revolution and

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o f nineteenth-century F rance. T he speech of the eighteenth century, the church, and the laws w ere at tim es threatened but never seriously endangered. T h e society of the St. Law rence rem ained as it had been before the conquest: prim arily agrarian w ith little instinct for industry, conservative in outlook, attached to the church, introspective and self-sufficient, closely knit, and untouched by the N orth A m erican pressure tow ard worldly progress.This orphaned F rance, cut off from its parent as much by ideas as by conquest, gave to central C anada its first popula­ tio n and an enduring elem ent in the later w hole. T here could be no fu rth er additions to the population by m igration from France; b u t the original stock from the provinces of the north-w est, num bering no m ore than 65,000 at the tim e of the fall of Q uebec, m ultiplied and spread far beyond the bounds o f settle­ m ent a t the height of the old regime. T h e transfer o f British people, ideas, and institutions to the lands th at were to becom e the D om inion o f C anada was both direct and indirect: either straight from the British Isles, o r after passing through a process o f m odification in the other and older British colonies of the A tlantic seaboard. It is only later th at the p attern alters, to show British and A m erican peoples distinct politically, and to allow their influences to be labelled as different. Even in th at stage it is to be taken into account that the A m erican revolution could not rem ove all traces of racial origin. O f the three countries contributing m ain threads to the C anadian fabric before the m ore diversified im m igration o f the nineteenth century, F rance and E ngland had in com m on that they w ere both E uropean, E ngland and the U nited States that they w ere peopled by the sam e stock. T he second relation show ed m ore points o f sim ilarity than the first. N ova Scotia affords grounds for an investigation of British and A m erican influences both before and after those becam e politically two. T h e future of N ova Scotia w as m ade of im m ediate urgency both to Britain and her colonies because of its strategic position in the A nglo-French struggle. W hen Louisburg was returned to France as p art of the settlem ent o f 1748 a new base was begun at H alifax in the following year, and was developed as a naval station and seat of governm ent. T he deportation of the A ca­ dians on the eve of the Seven Y ears’ W ar lessened the threat o f attack from w ithin; but the scanty British population estim ated at 5,000 - offered little security for the peninsula from external aggression. In N ew England there w as apprehension lest N ova Scotia once m ore fall into F rench hands and become

O R I G I N S O F T H E CANADIAN S O C I E T Y - 5

a danger to fisheries and com m erce. W illiam Shirley, governor o f M assachusetts, long urged also the positive im portance of the colony, pointing to its value fo r naval pow er in the A tlantic, and its ability to provide m asts fo r the royal navy. F o r a time opinion in M assachusetts favoured the annexation o f N ova Scotia as a precautionary m easure, but m ore consistently urged a policy of anglicization com bined w ith increased m ilitary strength. T he interests of the governm ents o f both G re at Britain and the A m erican colonies continued to depend on the succes­ sive political situations in the continent. W ith the fall of French pow er both w ere able to feel a sense o f security th at lessened their concern fo r N ova Scotia; b u t when the picture again altered to place an international frontier betw een British colo­ nies and the new U nited States, H alifax took on a new signifi­ cance as a British naval base. M eanw hile N ew England had m ade a m a rk on N ova Scotia. T ow ard the end o f the Seven Y ears’ W ar settlers began to move in fro m N ew E ngland, encouraged by offers of land and prom ises of civil and religious liberty. T he appeals through proclam ations and associations were the m ore readily received since a congestion o f population in parts o f N ew England created an econom ic pressure. W hile settlem ents were m ade or attem pted in several p arts o f N ova Scotia, the ones m ost favoured were the deserted lands of the A cadian farm ers and the valley o f the St. John River. W ith N ew Englanders form ing an increasingly larger proportion o f the population, their influ­ ence began to be show n in all aspects o f the life of the province, from architecture to political institutions. In the latter their aims not infrequently ran counter to those o f the officials and colo­ nists w ho had com e directly from England, and am ongst whom there was a sm all but pow erful conservative elem ent. T he establishm ent o f an elected assembly introduced the province to dem ocratic governm ent; and w hen the assembly m et it proved to be largely com posed of N ew Englanders. A n attem pt was m ade to introduce the N ew England system of local govern­ m ent by the tow n (tow nship) m eeting, but w ithout success; and the legal practice o f E ngland was also preserved against p ro ­ posals fo r A m ericanization.1 Being longer under F rench rule, C anada was later in receiv­ ing English-speaking im m igrants. T he vanguard w ho followed on the heels o f W olfe’s arm y, though few in num ber, soon m ade their presence felt. Q uite frankly they had com e fo r trade, and to the governors w ho looked coldly on these interlopers in an

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E den of orderly French, they pointed to the Royal Proclam ation and the scattered broadsheets which had urged them to take advantage of this new British dom ain. Com ing in the m ain from the neighbouring colonies and Scotland, they were neither able n o r willing to fit themselves to the agrarian econom y and au thoritarian governm ent th at they found in operation: govern­ m ent and laws m ust be re-m oulded to the English pattern, affording an institutional basis for econom ic developm ent and external trade. So long as their num bers rem ained sm all, the local officials were able to check the bustling reform ers, even w hen supported by the sedate periods of the despatches from the board of trade. But if they could lock the door of the house which they had so carefully built, not even the m ost vigorous governors could save it when the very foundations were swept away by the A m erican revolution. Paradoxically enough, it was n ot the appeal of the radical general congress a t Philadelphia that caused the upheaval in Quebec, but the com ing of the defeated tories, themselves fugitives from radicalism. It was at once obvious th at the U nited E m pire Loyalists would m odify the character o f the population. In N ova Scotia, already dom inated by the English-speaking, the change was rath er to reinforce ties with E ngland that had become som ew hat attenuated by early migrations from New England. N ew Bruns­ wick, carved out of N ova Scotia, was a direct result of loyalist additions to the scanty population o f the St. John Valley. In C anada the result was not a modification but a com plete altera­ tion of the balance o f population. Instead of a sm all group of traders as sole representatives o f British stock, there now appeared emigres from persecution, loyal to the crow n - men whose claims could not be disputed, and w hose very presence spelt a new Canada. So m uch was obvious. But that these sam e m en should becom e the allies of the traders in seeking dem o­ cratic institutions w as quite unexpected. “I have great Reason to believe,” w rote the governor, “ these unfortunate people have suffered too M uch by Com m ittees and H ouses of Assembly, to have retained any prepossession in favour of th at M ode of G overnm ent.”2 H aldim and, of course, was w rong - wrong because he saw the basis of division in the thirteen colonies as betw een radicals and tories instead of between those who would o r w ould not take up arm s against the King. A s in the m aritim e provinces, the loyalists in C anada built a strong bulw ark against any break in the British connection; but they w ere determ ined th at the colony should be British in local institutions as well as

O R I G I N S O F T H E CANADIA N S O C I E T Y - 7

in its im perial setting. Just as the m igration from N ew England to N ova Scolia had hurried on the establishm ent o f an elected assembly, so, a generation later, the m ovem ent for elected institutions in C anada received the necessary impetus from the loyalist refugees. Those who followed the loyalists from the U nited States to C anada w ere influenced m ore by econom ic than political motives; and, as it proved, w ere in some cases opposed to the British connection and advocated republicanism . T hough no reliable figures are available, a contem porary, an im m igrant of 1808, estim ated in 1814 th at six-tenths of the population o f U pper C anada either were born in the U nited States o r were children of A m erican im m igrants.3 In all the provinces the W ar o f 1812 brought to an end the first period of im m igration. D uring the period o f hostilities A m ericans could not cross the border, and w hen hostilities were ended there was less desire to em igrate to the lands of a recent enem y. T here was also a policy, arising o u t of disaffection during the war, to restrict im m igrants w ho might fu rth er en­ danger the loyalty o f the populations. N o t only did positive encouragem ent com e to an end, but land-grants to aliens were either refused o r accom panied by conditions. W hat the prov­ inces lost in settlers from the U nited States they hoped to gain by im m igration from the British Isles. T he times w ere propi­ tious. T he years afte r W aterloo brought increasing hardship, particularly to the poorest classes, who w ere led by propaganda and organized aid to tu rn to em igration as an escape. O f the flood of people who found their way from Britain and the con­ tinent to N orth A m erica the British provinces received a share. F o r the m ost p art the new com ers were poor, some of them des­ titute. T here w ere British families with some little capital who brought furniture, books, and even pianos to the virgin forest of U pper C anada; Irish fam ilies w ho faced the miseries o f the voyage and the uncertainty o f a new land in flight from the horrors of fam ine; groups of G erm ans uprooted from their native soil by econom ic o r political motives. A griculture in U pper C anada attracted those w ho had the m eans to secure land and begin pioneer farm ing. F o r others there w ere possibilities of em ploym ent in lum bering, ship-building, o r the construction of canals and railways. Both for the new com ers and the older inhabitants the success o f the venture turned principally on econom ic conditions. W henever em ploym ent was available and m arkets receptive b oth groups w ere satisfied: in leaner years both had cause for

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regret. O pinion in every province oscillated between an anxiety fo r im m igrants and an apprehension lest they should be too num erous or too great a burden on th e com m unity. P auper im m igration was particularly feared in an age w hen no adequate provision was m ade for the poor in the country either of origin o r of settlem ent. In 1842 a fleet o f ships landed im m igrants in N ew Brunswick, w here in principle they w ere w anted but where in practice they had to find em ploym ent o r be a public expense. A St. Andrew s p aper reported th at the poorhouse was already crow ded with the wives and children o f destitute im m igrants, an d in Saint John an editor “ heard that several destitute blind persons, and even unfortunate maniacs, have arrived in this city in som e o f the em igrant vessels this Spring, who of course will at once add to ou r already heavy Parish C harges.”4 T he crisis caused by the sudden com ing o f thousands o f diseased and destitute Irish, driven by the fam ine of 1846, turned to a ghastly tragedy a t Quebec, w here cholera and typhus decim ated their ranks, carried off doctors and priests w ho m inistered to them, and spread fever throughout Canada. In spite of such real draw backs the advantages of securing large num bers o f im m igrants w ere seen as greater than the dis­ advantages, and the governm ents o f the provinces endeavoured to secure a steady flow. In this they found themselves in unsuc­ cessful com petition w ith the U nited States, in spite of low er ocean rates and the efforts o f agents and em igration societies. O ne particularly annoying phenom enon was th at only the poorer im m igrants were landed at H alifax, Saint John, o r Q uebec, while the m ore prosperous ones w ere carried on to A m erican ports. E m igration, either o f those w ho stayed but a few m onths in the British provinces or o f the native-born, was a constant drain on the population, unrecorded but not unnoticed. It was an old story. T h e first chapter tells o f the forcible rem oval of the F rench o f N ova Scotia and P rince E dw ard Island to the colonies along the A tlantic seaboard. L ater em igration was voluntary, and at times, from political motives, such as in the case of A m ericans who returned to their country during the W ar of 1812 or o f the emigres of 1837; but the largest and m ost persist­ ent em igration was owing to econom ic causes. O pportunities, both in agriculture and industry in the U nited States, constantly drew the young m en.5 O n rare occasions they cam e back, and there was also som e com pensating m ovem ent o f A m ericans to the British provinces; but on balance the latter were losing people to their greater neighbour, as they w ere well aware.

O R I G I N S O F T H E CANADIA N S O C I E T Y - 9

Low er C anada was m ost conscious o f its losses, but it was not the only one. “A n exchange paper,” w rote a N ew Brunswick editor, “says there are 4,000 N ova Scotians in Boston and 200,000 Canadians in the U nited States. C an any person inform us how m any N ew -Brunsw ickers are now residing in the neigh­ bouring Republic? T here m ust be a goodly num ber there. We are rapidly annexing ourselves by em igration.”6 N o answ er to the editor’s query could be found in provincial records, but the census of the U nited States for 1850 show ed 100,000 persons born in the British provinces, and th at fo r 1860 a quarter o f a million. A study of the flow of people to and from the provinces reveals th at by the m iddle o f the nineteenth century no m ajor changes in the character o f the population had resulted. Prince E dw ard Island, blocked in its developm ent by absentee land­ lords, had had virtually no im m igrants. T he population of N ew Brunswick rem ained small and hom ogeneous except for French settlem ents in the northern p art o f the province. N ova Scotia and L ow er C anada had undergone no basic ethnological changes; and only in U pper C anada can a com paratively rapid grow th in population be attributed largely to im m igration. British Colum bia had a startling inrush o f prospectors when gold was discovered, but the m iners m ade but a shifting popula­ tion which drifted in or out according to th e prosperity of the gold fields. A ssiniboia had a m ixed population of Indians, halfbreeds, active o r retired servants of the H udson’s Bay Com pany, a few British and Canadians, and A m ericans whose increasing num bers and influence were the significant aspects of the col­ ony’s population. All in all, im m igration before confederation wove no pattern o f population as varied as th at caused by the com ing of E uropeans and A siatics in later years. But if there was less m ixture of nations and races, the effects o f the steady flow o f people from all parts o f the British Isles, and of the exchange o f population betw een the U nited States and British N o rth A m erica, m ay be judged to have had results as great, if n o t greater.

II T h e origins o f the people and the continuing intercourse with oth er countries were from the first strongly reflected in the cul­ tural life o f the provinces. T he schools of N ew F rance, the first

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o f which w ere established before the m iddle o f the seventeenth century, w ere in conscious im itation o f those o f F rance itself. T o the extent th at they differed it was because the conditions of the colony did not allow for an exact duplication of the schools o f the older society. W hen a college was founded by the Jesuits at Q uebec the course was m ade as sim ilar as possible to th at in the Jesuit colleges of F rance. T he text-books used in both p ri­ m ary and secondary education were brought from F rance, as indeed they had to be, since no printing was done in Canada under the F rench regim e. T he change from French to British rule threatened for a tim e to bring w ith it the abolition of the F rench system o f education in favour o f th at o f England. T he w hole staff of the Jesuit College returned to France, and restric­ tions on the religious orders seriously reduced the num bers of school teachers. U ndoubtedly it was an aim o f British policy to introduce protestant education into the new ly-acquired colony, b ut it was an aim th at was before long abandoned. W hile p ro ­ vision was m ade fo r protestant schools for the m inority, the education of the F rench m ajority returned to a parochial basis. E ducation becam e an essential elem ent in the cem ent of FrenchC anadian nationalism . One other danger from abroad was seen in the practice, said to be com m on, by w hich F rench Canadians sent their sons to the U nited States to learn English and study com m erce and industry. Objections were raised both on religious grounds and because it was said that the boys cam e to com pare C anada unfavourably to the U nited States.7 T h e early educational institutions o f N ova Scotia showed their E uropean origin as did those of N ew F rance. T he legisla­ tu re of the colony followed the contem porary rule th at only protestants might teach, and for some years a struggle w ent on between those who sought to keep a restricted and denom ina­ tional system and those who urged the com m on schools. Simi­ larly in N ew Brunsw ick different, and som etim es conflicting, points of view on education w ere brought by the various groups o f settlers. In the early gram m ar schools all teachers were m em ­ bers of the C hurch of E ngland, w hether in orders or not; and the Society for the Propagation of the G ospel sent teachers a t a tim e when they w ere badly needed. In 1820 the M adras system o f schools, under w hich the older pupils taught the younger, was im ported from England. It was not until 1871 th at a system o f free and non-sectarian schools was set up by a provincial statute. In U pper C anada the school system was influenced by E urope and the U nited States. A few private schools were

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opened from tim e to tim e, following the English public school tradition; but m ore characteristic w ere the com m on schools provided fo r under the legislation of the 1840’s. These undenom inational and free schools w ere w orked out mainly from A m erican models, w ith certain elem ents draw n from G erm any and Ireland. In V ancouver Island a system of district schools was inaugurated while the colony was still under the H u d so n ’s Bay C om pany, and in 1865 all com m on schools were m ade undenom inational and free. T he R om an Catholic Church, how ever, established schools in 1858-9 and the C hurch of England one for boys and one for girls a t about the sam e time. M any external influences m ay likewise be seen in the univer­ sities founded in the eastern and central provinces. As in Eng­ land, opinion was divided as to w hether higher education should be for the few o r the m any, and w hether it should be denom ina­ tional and exclusive or non-sectarian. K ing’s College in N ova Scotia was founded in t..e form er tradition, while Dalhousie U niversity was explicitly to have no political o r religious tests. Sim ilarly in U pper C anada cam e a tug-of-w ar over K ing’s Col­ lege at T oronto, in which the forces opposed to denom inationalism proved to be the stronger. Those w ho would have the doors o f the universities opened only to the few were impressed, per­ haps, by the fear th at such broadening o f opportunities would lead tow ard A m erican republicanism ; but while A m erican ideas encouraged those w ho wished to extend higher education to the m any, there was no indication of an accom panim ent o f political philosophy. M odels for organization and curricula were found in the British Isles and, to a lesser extent, in the U nited States and G erm any. Bishop’s College at Lennoxville consciously follow ed O xford and Cam bridge. F o r Q ueen’s U niversity in K ingston, Edinburgh was taken as a model. K ing’s College in T o ro n to drew on the experience of English, Scottish, Irish, and G erm an universities. A cadia U niversity alone, because of im­ m igration from N ew England, was largely affected by A m erican patterns. T he universities o f all the provinces had this in com ­ m on, that they recruited their teaching staffs largely from the British Isles, by which m eans a constant contact was m aintained with British scholarship and pedagogy.8 Beyond the form al education in schools and universities was the less organized reading by the public. In this, as in the text­ books, the direct influence o f the culture o f o ther countries may readily be seen. T o N ew F rance, where the absence of printing forbade the com petition o f any local productions, books o f all

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kinds w ere im ported from F rance, and apparently w idely read. In the libraries o f the citizens o f Q uebec and M ontreal w orks on religion and the L atin classics rubbed shoulders with contem ­ p o rary literature and the critical w ritings o f the philosophes.9 A fter N ew F rance was politically separated from its m otherland the cultural tie rem ained, and F rench influence was felt both directly through im ported books and indirectly in the writings o f F rench Canadians. T he w ritings o f the eighteenth-century F rench radicals m ade little im pact on N ew F rance, since the situations which they criticized did not exist there. T he French Revolution of 1789, however, had a m ore com plicated recep­ tion. T he clergy, seigneurs, and bourgeoisie w ere opposed to the ideas th at developed, but it m ade som e appeal to the general public. G enerally speaking, F rench C anada was conservative in religion and social ideas, b u t F rench-C anadian nationalism w as an im portant force from early days. T he com m ent of an observer from F ran ce is valid fo r the Q uebec o f m any genera­ tions. L es Canadiens ayant garde les qualites intellectuelles qui caracterisent notre race, on voit pour ainsi dire a chaque page dans leurs ceuvres, la m anifestation de cette clarte, de cette m ethode et de cette logique qui sont si frangaises. L eu r litterature se rattache done a la notre, non pas seulem ent parce q u ’elle a ete ecrite dans la m em e langue, m ais aussi parce que toutes les d eux procedent d ’un tem peram ent identique et d ’une form ation intellectuelle d ont les elem ents essentiels sont les m im e s. Elle est forcem ent, en outre d’inspiration frangaise, e ’est-a-dire que les auteurs, d ’une fagon generate, y developpent les m im e s idees et les m em es sentim ents que Von trouve dans la notre. M ais, bien entendu, cela ne signife pas q u ’ils adoptent toutes nos opinions. Certaines tendances de notre esprit leur repugnent absolum ent, et e ’est pourquoi ni le realisme, ni le scepticism e, ni nos idees revolutionnaires n’apparaissent dans leurs ouvrages. . . . Les ecrivains canadiens frangais, idealistes conservateurs, profondem en t croyants, ne ressem blent, par consequent, q u ’a certains des notres.10 English C anada too leant heavily on its m other country for the provision of books. F rom the com fortable houses of H alifax m erchants to the isolated huts o f H udson’s Bay traders English classics and contem porary books w ere to be found. A dvertise­ ments by booksellers show a range o f im ported works, and some favourite authors, such as D ickens, w ere reprinted in th e local

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newspapers. W hile the w riters of English C anada w ere not influenced by an aim of racial survival, they w ere none the less followers of English models. A n occasional case may be found o f o th er sources, such as the effect o f M azzini’s philosophy on F . G . C am eron; but m ore com m on was the rule o f looking to standard V ictorian w riters for ideas and form .11 Canadian w riters in both languages sought to depict C anada and Canadian scenes, but their w orks had no m ore natural a ring than the diaries and com m entaries of English im m igrants or travellers. It was n o t until the end o f the nineteenth century that a native ch aracter could be seen in C anadian literature, and even th en it developed slowly and with hesitation. In other arts there was even m ore borrow ing from abroad. M usic know s no national boundaries, and the culture o f any land would be p o o r indeed w ithout acceptance of the great E uropean com posers, whose w orks w ere perform ed in the British A m erican provinces as elsewhere. T he folk music o f the Province o f Q uebec was alm ost the only instance o f native grow th. T he d ram a in C anada was, at least until the tw entieth century, derivative in origin and largely so in perform ance. Painting, too, was chiefly the w ork o f foreign artists w ho had m igrated to C anada. O f the artists o f the confederation era B erthon was born and trained in France; Jacobi was a Prussian by origin and a recognized p ainter w hen he cam e to C anada; D aniel F ow ler was an English artist w ho m igrated to Canada fo r the sake o f his health; and Krieghoff cam e from R otter­ dam .12 A rchitecture in Q uebec show ed interesting adaptations to local clim atic conditions, b u t elsewhere developed no new characteristics. F ro m earliest days the colonists in N o rth A m erica had brought their churches w ith them , and links w ith the countries o f origin were m aintained n o t only by subsequent im m igration, b u t also by integral connections in organization, relationship to governm ents, o r the w ork o f the m issionary societies. C anada in the old regim e was uncom prom isingly R om an Catholic, and, aided by Jesuit influence, had becom e distinctly ultram ontane. Severed from F rance before the revolution, C anada h ad never to endure the religious vicissitudes th at afflicted the church in th e m o th er country, and looked askance a t th e anti-clericalism th a t m arked revolutionary F rance. In other provinces were found R om an Catholics, m ainly Irish and Scottish, w ho shared w ith those o f Low er C anada the organization and doctrines of th e church, w ith a com m on centre in Rome. T he C hurch of

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England was carried to British A m erica as naturally as the R om an C hurch to French A m erica. In all provinces it was in a m inority position, but as the church of the m ajority o f the influ­ ential groups in governm ent and business it held a place higher than the m ere num bers of its m em bers w ould have given, and in N ova Scotia and N ew Brunsw ick it was for a tim e legally established. W ith the support of the H udson’s Bay C om pany the church was extended into the prairies and across the Rockies. T h e P resbyterian churches in the British provinces reflected the divisions that had com e in the C hurch of Scotland. Presbyterianism also cam e from Ireland and the U nited States. T he M ethodist churches have special interest as an external influ­ ence, since they brought to N o rth A m erica the evangelicalism of the English m iddle class and of the U nited States. A lthough their double source strengthened the C anadian M ethodists both in num bers and ideas, it led in tim e to the necessity of a choice between A m erican and English connections. W hile the C hurch o f E ngland in C anada was one of the bulw arks of oligarchy and conservatism , the M ethodists stood for nineteenth-century English liberalism com bined with the frontier spirit of N orth A m erica. T he M ethodist circuit rider fitted into a landscape of prim itive roads and pioneer farm s as did the A nglican bishop into the m ore esoteric atm osphere of T oronto toryism or o f the H alifax Banking Com pany. O ther and sm aller denom inations appeared in the provinces as groups of im m igrants from the U nited States, the British Isles, o r continental E urope planted their churches in the new soil, som etim es greatly modified under new conditions, som etim es little changed from the parent stock. T ogether they added richness and colour and variety to the culture o f British N orth A m erica.13 I ll T he relations o f the provinces w ith the outside world w ere affected by the geography o f N o rth A m erica as well as by national origin. H ad there been a block o f population advancing steadily from the seaboard inland the story m ight have been a very different one. But conditions forbade such a developm ent. T he A tlantic colonies of Prince E dw ard Island, N ova Scotia, and N ew Brunswick looked eastw ard on the ocean and m ain­ tained connections by sea w ith the U nited K ingdom , the W est Indies, and the neighbouring N ew England states. Between them

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and C anada was a long stretch of largely unsettled country over which com m unication by m eans other than rail was difficult and at best seasonal. T hough C anadians owed a heavy debt to the St. Law rence, their route to E urope was past rather than through the m aritim e provinces; and in its low er reaches the river was only a link, for, unlike the people of the m aritim es, the eyes of C anadians w ere turned tow ard the west. A nother and a longer break in settlem ent, caused by the wild stretches to the' north of Lake Superior, separated C anada from the little colony of Assiniboia, which, isolated on the w est as it was on the east, felt an increasing pull to the A m erican settlem ents on the upper Red River. F a r to the west the colonies of V ancouver Island and British Colum bia fronted on the Pacific, and the stern ranges of m ountains set up behind them a barrier m ore form idable than the w ide prairie. T hey also were m aritim e provinces, m aintain­ ing contact with the A m erican states nearby; b u t the distance to England was longer by thousands of miles than from the prov­ inces on the A tlantic coast o f N orth A m erica. Spaced across the wide continent were these foundations on w hich a single British dom inion was later to be built; all fo r a tim e having as close relations w ith other countries as they had with each other. A nd thus the external influences on th e various colonies oper­ ated concurrently, and w ere accentuated by the com parative isolation of each colony from the other. T h e political philosophy and institutions o f the provinces cam e from beyond their own boundaries, though modified in response to local conditions and progressive stages of develop­ m ent. T he oldest colonies, N ova Scotia and C anada, un d er the successive F rench and English adm inistrations, w ere long gov­ erned by appointed officials; b u t the perm anent gift o f England to the political life o f her n orthern as to her southern colonies was the elective representative system. It was this w hich re­ placed both the centralized French bureaucracy and the conciliar system of early British rule. It was applied both to local and central governm ents. In the form er the m unicipal councils were set up to take over the functions of appointed officers, and in the provincial capitals parliam ents w ere called to follow the ancient traditions of the m other of parliam ents. M ore than one governor called his little parliam ent w ith all the pom p th at he could com m and; and, even in the forests of U pper C anada, the representatives legislated for the peace, w elfare, and good gov­ ernm ent o f their fellow colonists as their forefathers had done in the stately surroundings o f W estm inster. C rim inal and civil

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law, the form o f the courts, and, m ore im portant, the spirit of English justice, w ere faithfully reproduced in the new world. O nly in F rench C anada was there an exception, for there the F rench civil law, so long in practice, was allow ed to remain. Political ideas, as distinct from political form s, cam e through individuals rather than by official action. P erhaps now here else could have been foiind as great a variety o f political views as in the British provinces, for there they were held not only by those o f conservative o r liberal o r radical tem peram ents, but were borne by every ship th at docked, over every road th at led from th e south. T he sources of ideas corresponded to the origins of the m ain elements in population, with one outstanding excep­ tio n: the political philosophy o f F rench C anada show ed little reflection o f th at o f contem porary F rance. T he policies adopted by individuals o r groups in th e provinces carried at times touches o f continental E urope, but the m ajor program m es may be traced in m ost cases to either the U nited K ingdom o r the U nited States, o r to both. Such im ported ideas were seldom untouched by local conditions and traditions, but only an elab­ orate study w ould disclose the degree of transm utation. Som e of the p arty leaders w ere native-born, others w ere recent im m i­ grants; and each group had adherents o f the rig h t o r the left. R obert G ourlay, Jo h n Beverley Robinson, and R obert Baldwin had all drunk deep o f English political thought. Such diverse figures as T hom as H aliburton, W illiam L yon M ackenzie, and L ouis Joseph P apineau drew both on England and the U nited States. Ju st as the countries o f origin sent their rich and their poor, so they sent their conservatives and their liberals. Letters, new spapers, books, and travellers kept the links intact and added the m ost recent developments. I t was no accident th at in the British provinces could be seen in the years afte r W aterloo the sam e fundam ental cleavage between the forces o f conservatism and the forces of change that was so evident in Britain, in E urope, and in the U nited States. In each the struggle took its particular form . Jacksonian dem ocracy trium phed at W ashington, the liberals of continental E urope fought fo r their cause on a hundred fields, and the English parliam ent w as invaded by victorious reform . T he provinces too h ad their “reform ers,” seeking in the nam e of liberalism to dispossess entrenched oligarchies. T he right o f m ajorities, rights o f the people, the pow er of the purse, elected institutions, cabinet governm ent - these cries were not first heard in British N o rth A m erica. T he grievances attacked were

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local, b ut the line o f attack and the cures proposed w ere col­ oured strongly by the thought o f other lands. T he provinces had their revolutionaries and their m oderates. A M ackenzie o r a Papineau m anned the barricades like any Parisian o f 1830 and 1848; a Baldwin or a How e w ould have fitted readily into the left wing of the English whig party. N ew spapers w ere full o f political news. N o doubt their readers w ere interested in foreign events as such, but they con­ sciously or unconsciously looked a t them through the eyes of dom estic politics. T he F rench revolution o f 1848 was a case in point. Local new spapers, following it w ith great attention, tried to draw from it argum ents for their respective policies. A t first La M inerve saw in the revolution the trium ph o f the liberal principles which it entertained itself, and began to coin phrases about the m other country. P uissent les nobles enfants de la France que nous pouvons aim er co m m e des freres, sans m anquer a. nos devoirs envers la couronne d ’A ngleterre, rem plir avec calme, avec dignite, cet acte de souverainte nationale.1* A few weeks later the editor felt it necessary to explain why he gave so m uch space to the revolution. E n publiant une revue des evenem ents gigantesques qui se deroulent chaque jour en E urope, nous avons cru faire plaisir a nos lecteurs, tout en servant les interets du pays. Pouvons-nous rester etrangeres au reveils des peuples, des nationalites? Pouvons-nous rester froids en presence du spectacle grandiose qui nous est ofjert sur tous les points du continent a la fois? N e devons-nous pas, au contraire, en les suivant, d’un ceil attentif; y puiser d'utiles legons de sages avertissem ents, pour travailler avec perseverance, avec energie, avec prudence, a assurer les droits et les libertes de notre bien aim ee patrie.15 A s the revolution progressed, and socialism becam e a leading issue, L a M inerve becam e w orried, and was obliged to make pointed rem arks about the difference between liberty and licence, lest the growing extrem es of old F rance be followed in the new world. M ore conservative F rench papers, as well as the English papers, w ere even less tolerant and m ore suspicious. T h e Second Republic gave way to the Second Em pire, and while the conservatives m ay have been soothed, the radicals were not. L e Pays could not adm ire N apoleon III because it held that

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individual liberty was m ore im portant than m ilitary glory. Some o f its contem poraries differed. “L a Patrie, bleu d’habitude, est devenu indigo de colere parce que certains m em bres Canadiensfran?ais ont cru que l’occasion de la naissance de Louis N ap o ­ leon B onaparte n’interessait pas assez le peuple C anadien pour authoriser la legislature a se donner un conge sur un pareil pretexte. . . .” 1C Tw o years later L e Pays saw possible trouble in E urope, and told its readers th at they could not be disinterested, since A m erica was bound by m any ties to E urope.17 Such an idea, however, was not characteristic. T he English C anadians, and to some extent the French Canadians, had tangible interests in their connection with G reat Britain: governm ent, trade, de­ fence, im m igration. T he F rench C anadians had nothing so solid on w hich to base a connection with F rance. They therefore looked fo r com m on ideas o r for new ideas in the sam e way, and only in a greater degree, that C anadians studied Italy, Russia, H ungary, or any other continental power. In the realm of political ideas the provinces were closely attached to the w ider world. But a link m ore tangible bound them in the practice o f governm ent to a pow er beyond their shores; fo r colonial institutions operated w ithin the fram ew ork o f an im perial structure. T he degree o f control actually exer­ cised in the colonies by the m etropolitan governm ent differed from decade to decade. T he direction of change was tow ard greater provincial autonom y, and by the m iddle of the nine­ teenth century responsible governm ent was recognized as in practice in all the eastern colonies. Responsible governm ent, how ever, was intended to be limited to dom estic affairs, and indeed no dem and for its extension beyond th at existed until a m uch later date. T here rem ained the definition of “dom estic.” T o L ord D urham it seemed feasible to draw the line by an explicit division o f powers, but the list of reserved subjects w hich he suggested would never have been generally acceptable in the colonies. T o rem ove im m igration and crown lands, which he rightly saw to have im perial phases, altogether from the control o f the provinces was politically impossible. N o definite division was m ade, and legal flexibility allowed the interpreta­ tion o f dom estic to be widened. Sometimes this was for the benefit and a t the insistence o f the provinces, notably in regula­ tio n o f tariffs; som etim es it was against the will of the provinces, p articularly in the case of defence. T here w as no doubt th at the relations o f the provinces w ith foreign states were to be con­ ducted by the im perial governm ent; and the only ground for

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variation was in the decisions on policy. Tariff and trade ques­ tions generally cam e increasingly within the control of the pro­ vincial legislatures, but the determ ination o f “high policy” was indisputably in the im perial orbit. If the imperial connection, in the sense o f control, slackened in the nineteenth century, their position w ithin the British E m ­ pire was still a real and ever-present factor fo r the people of the British provinces in N orth A m erica; and they would have been dull o f wit indeed if they had never stopped to exam ine the assets and the liabilities, the best form and the possible future o f that connection. In the early years o f the provinces, during and after the A m erican revolution, there were elements in the provinces which were secretly o r openly disloyal. R ecent A m erican im m i­ grants to N ova Scotia would, had they been able, have joined the revolutionary cause; and in the W ar o f 1812 sim ilar groups in U pper C anada gave cause for apprehension, and from them individuals returned to the U nited States w hen the w ar broke out. A fter 1815, how ever, there is no evidence of sim ilar dis­ affection except to a limited extent in U pper C anada during the period o f rebellion; and there is little evidence o f any direct relation between the origins of the people and views as to the future position o f the provinces. N o r did the differences of opinion follow provincial boundaries: rath er they cut across racial groups, in any one o f which great diversity of attitude m ight be found. T hree possible courses m ay be distinguished as considered in the second qu arter of the nineteenth century: independence, annexation to the U nited States, o r continuance o f the im perial connection. T h e first was m entioned from tim e to tim e but w as never widely supported. N o t a few observers concluded that it was quite im practicable and would only lead to annexation. W illiam L yon M ackenzie expressed this m ost pithily when he concluded that, “on Britain we m ust depend, o r w ith A m erica we m ust unite, fo r national purposes. T here is no third course.” 18 A nnexation as a direct policy was m ore seriously advocated. T h e econom ic progress o f the U nited States was an obvious argum ent for annexation, o r at least for closer relations. One com prom ise proposal cam e from the Q uebec board o f trade, that the provinces should have in the U nited States a representa­ tive to look after their com m ercial interests, but the British goverm ent’s reply was that they were better left in the hands of its m inisters and consuls.10 A part from those with G re at Britain, the closest relations of the British provinces w ere w ith the

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U nited States. In every aspect o f their lives the colonists were influenced by their neighbours; and perhaps it was partly be­ cause o f the strength of that influence that the m ajority of the people of the provinces resisted the A m erican pressure. Perhaps, too, it was because they felt themselves being draw n tow ard a greater political and econom ic unit that they looked about for m eans of defence, and rath er self-consciously sought reasons to persuade themselves that there were fundam ental evils in the republic. C ertain it is that they did not hesitate to point to flaws in A m erican society. T he C anadian rouges w ere accused of favouring A m erican institutions in preference to their ow n,20 and perhaps they did at tim es. They w ere m ore sym pathetic than other groups, but on the whole opinion in the provinces was highly critical o f certain aspects o f A m erican institutions and policy. Slavery m et with universal condem nation, and from sources as different as M ackenzie’s W eekly Message and the British Colonist. Slavery in British N orth A m erica had not offi­ cially been abolished until 1834, but had long before that ceased to have any significance, and indeed had had little place in the econom y of the provinces at any time. T he Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 caused m igration o f negroes from the N orth to the w estern part o f C anada, and created, w ithin that area, both an econom ic and a racial problem . Early in 1851 the A nti-Slavery Society of C anada was organized, having as objects not only opposition to slavery on principle but also aid to the “victims of slavery flying to our shores.” Slavery, perhaps m ore than any other one thing, checked enthusiasm for the U nited States. But there were m any other criticisms. From both right and left came protests against financial conditions in the U nited States. It is quite clear to us that free institutions are not very likely to m ake honest m en out o f the A m ericans. T hey sham efully abuse the greatest privileges they enjoy. W e consider the recent bankruptcy o f 1,500 banks and 1,000 traders, an artful, fraudu­ lent, political m ove, to cheat Europe. England alone holds 450 m illions o f dollars value in A m erican securities.21 A tory paper, the British Colonist of T oronto, expressed the sam e views, pointed to the large English loans, and painted a gloom y picture o f conditions in the country.22 Lynching and im­ proper adm inistration of justice, corrupt governm ent, religious persecution, and harsh treatm ent of the Indians were other charges levelled against the A m ericans, w ith the m oral con­ stantly draw n th at British rule in C anada was superior in all

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these respects. In th e m aritim e provinces the com petition of A m erican fisherm en, “our tricky neighbours,” was a constant them e fo r com plaint; and in all agreem ents on fisheries, trade, o r boundaries the A m ericans w ere represented as driving hard bargains. T he vigour w ith w hich annexation was advocated varied according to the apparent advantages to be gained; and those in tu rn w ere relative to the varying advantages o f the imperial connection. T he shock to the econom y of the provinces resulting fro m the free trade policy o f England led to protests th at G reat Britain, having w ithdraw n h er preference, should leave the colonies alone. “Si lA n g leterre ne laisse plus a ses colonies aucun privilege com m ercial, qui peut attacher celles-ci longtem ps a leur m ere-patrie?” 23 A m em ber o f the N ew Brunswick assem bly suggested that parliam ent was no longer legislating for the w hole em pire but only fo r certain classes.24 In answer to such criticisms other w riters pointed to the positive advantages o f the connection, such as capital fo r public works, and provi­ sion o f m ilitary defence. O thers p u t their argum ents on different grounds, praising the liberty and the institutions w hich came fro m th e em pire. T he Novascotian w ould not “forfeit o u r con­ nection with the d ear old m other country,” even if it m eant sacrificing trade w ith the U nited States.25 A C anadian editor m ocked the grim earnestness w ith which his contem poraries w rote on trade and the em pire, and pointed to w ider considera­ tions. It is very gratifying that, w hile in Canada our public bodies, w hether they be Civic Corporations or Boards o f Trade, devote their pow ers either to m atters o f sectional im portance, or to finding o ut w hether a bale o f cotton goods or a barrel o f flour cannot be im ported with m ore advantage or carried fo r ship­ m en t at less cost through the U nited States than by the St. Lawrence, the attention o f our neighbours in N o v a Scotia and N e w B runsw ick, w hether in newspapers or a t public m eetings is turned alm ost exclusively to the advantages that will be per­ m anently gained by knitting together the w hole British E m pire as one family', and by w orking o u t the prosperity o f that fam ily through its ow n internal relations independent o f foreign interference,26 T h e closer integration o f the em pire, w hether by inform al understanding o r constitutional change, w ould m ore readily be secured if E ngland knew the colonies better. Pained feelings

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w ere n ot infrequently expressed at the lack of interest show n by Englishm en in the affairs o f British N orth A m erica. T he editor of a tory p aper in T oronto was shocked to read a speech by L ord Stanley on the state o f the world in w hich he com pletely ignored Canada. W e do not wish to m isunderstand our position. W e are Pro­ vincials. We are taught it daily; but still with all this sense o f our shortcom ings, judged by a cosm opolitan standard, we do not think that justice is done to us. Pained are we to think that we rank fa r higher at W ashington than at St. James. . . . W ould a m inister o f the Crown in Canada, in L o ndon be looked upon in any other light, than a person to w hom som ething civil has to be said, and to be got rid o f, so soon as official business is dis­ patched? Contrast his reception with som e F u rst o f Schw arzburg R a d o lsta d t.. . .27 T o rem ove this ignorance or indifference w riters in the m ari­ tim e provinces set themselves to explain the colonies to the m o th er country. O thers pleaded for closer integration. “W e wish England to give up addressing her colonies as a separate o r third party,” w rote a T oronto editor, “W e wish Colonial to be adopted as British interests, and we desire to argue fo r them only to the extent th at they are British. L et British o r foreign then be our sim ple question. Let England view C anada as part of herself, and let C anada never forget her duty as a p art of the Em pire.”28 As positive m achinery for closer co-operation two suggestions w ere m ade from tim e to tim e - a perm anent representative of C anada in London, and colonial representatives in the H ouse of Com m ons. But these were n o t pressed, and those w ho m ost actively supported the continuance o f the im perial connection devoted their efforts either to m ore general argum ents o r to proving that the provinces profited by their position w ithin the em pire. N either they nor those who took a m ore critical view could fo r long neglect two subjects m ost concretely apparent as colonial interests - defence and external trade.

CHAPTER 2

Diplomacy and War

International rivalries and w ar were carried by E uropeans to N o rth A m erica together w ith political institutions, econom ic structure, and culture. N o t that w arfare of a kind was strange to the aborigines: on the contrary, the tribes fought each other frequently and w ith a ferocity th at m ade the nam e of Indian a by-word for cruelty and a te rro r to the settlers. T hanks in p art to their own inept handling o f the natives the white men were from the first subject to Indian attacks; but they did not stop at defence, or even at calculated intervention in inter-tribal q u ar­ rels. T o the w arfare which they found and could scarcely have ended they added th at w hich sprang from the com petition of distant states, fought with weapons vastly m ore destructive than the tom ahaw k. It was in the course of w orld wars th at the north of the continent passed wholly under British sovereignty; and the process o f delim itation o f political boundaries continued with far-reaching diplom acy as its m eans and w ar as the final arbiter. F o r the colonies which w ere to form the nucleus o f the C anadian D om inion the causes, the course, and the results of w ar w ere placed in a m ixed setting o f local disputes and the colonial and foreign policies o f E uropean great powers. The very fact that they were colonies implied th at the determ ination and conduct o f policy were beyond their orbit, and th at term s of peace were reached at negotiations in which they took no part. It equally followed that a responsibility for the results o f policy rested on the imperial authorities. T he royal arm y and navy were intended to bear the brunt o f fighting, supported by such colonial forces as were from tim e to tim e available. T he posi­ tion, then, in respect of the w ars fought on C anadian soil was that the colonials had no voice in their origination o r conclusion but did have a subordinate place in the cam paigns. T he advan­ tages and disadvantages of that position m ight be - and indeed long have been - debated. On the one hand the colonies enjoyed the prestige and experience of the British governm ent, and on the other hand were m ade to suffer for its m istakes o r the results

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o f policies unrelated to their im m ediate interests. If they could have been regarded as unexposed to attack except as a result of im perial diplom acy the defence provided from E ngland would have been unnecessary. It is, how ever, safe to conclude that w hen defence was needed - w hatever the cause - the British arm ed forces w ere essential. H ow far those forces could effec­ tively operate in o r for the colonies depended in p art on the dem ands o f cam paigns in o th er parts o f the w orld and in part on th e geography o f N o rth A m erica. T h e h alf century from the end o f the Seven Y ears’ W ar to the end of the N apoleonic w ars is an unrivalled quarry for the study of diplom acy and w ar in relation to the British provinces. In the British E m pire and in F rance, the two countries from w hich cam e the people o f C anada and N ova Scotia, m ajor revolutions broke out, leading to issues w hich m ight be expected to divide the people o f the colonies, and to international com ­ plications o f the m ost far-reaching character. T he response of th e populations o f N ova Scotia and C anada to the appeals of revolutionary and anti-revolutionary parties throw s not a little light on the character and points o f view o f the groups which successively cam e to the provinces. T he two w ars o f the period dem onstrate the changing degree and the nature of co-operation between im perial and colonial forces; while the E uropean align­ m ents illustrate the effect o f the international balance on the m aking o f w ar and peace in N o rth A m erica. T he role o f the people o f N ova Scotia and C anada in the A m erican revolution was alm ost entirely negative, but the provinces as such w ere not u n im p o rtant in its outbreak, in the strategy o f the w ar, and in the settlem ent th at follow ed. T h a t the transfer o f Q uebec from th e F rench to the British E m pire would influence the attitude in th e other colonies h ad long been predicted. T he rem oval of F rench pressure from the n o rth gave to the thirteen colonies g reater freedom to press their claim s against the m other country. B ut while the fall o f N ew F ran ce thus eased the situation o f the thirteen colonies it did not by any m eans preclude the possibility o f a w ar on two fronts. Sir G uy C arleton, early discerning that he m ight inherit th e m ilitary pow er o f his F rench predecessors and use the fortress o f Q uebec and the trained m ilitia o f the colony if force should be needed, bent his efforts tow ard secur­ ing the loyalty and active aid of the F rench Canadians. T h at the Q uebec A ct o f 1774 was the practical m eans to th at end was hard ly disguised by its supporters, and was recognized by its opponents, both in E ngland and the thirteen colonies. It was

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bitterly denounced in both places as an instrum ent of oppres­ sion, designed not only to destroy liberty in the St. Law rence Valley but in the A tlantic colonies as well. O n the eve of hostilities the party of revolt in the colonies had, perforce, to find w hat m ethods they could of scotching a danger which they clearly saw to exist, for if C arleton’s schemes should succeed they would be in a m ost perilous position: threatened by a British fleet based on H alifax, by land forces of F rench C anadians and im perial regulars from Quebec, and by the hostile Indians of the west. Obviously the first move was to attem pt to secure the adhesion o f the people o f the two prov­ inces to the revolutionary cause. O pinion was divided every­ w here - in England, in the thirteen colonies themselves, and in N ova Scotia and C anada - and there appeared to be no inherent reason why two should not be added to the thirteen already being bound together to resist British policy. As a field for p ropaganda N ova Scotia w ould at first appear to be m ost hope­ ful, dotted as it was w ith N ew England fam ilies and in tune with the doctrines of self-governm ent. Yet w hatever w ere the feelings o f the inhabitants (and they were undoubtedly divided), they could hardly be translated into action, for the small British garrison at H alifax was in easy touch with the British fleet. It was literally impossible fo r the revolutionaries to effect a junc­ tion with their supporters in the province, o r even to prevent H alifax from being used as a base of naval operations against them . In all probability, therefore, the people of N ova Scotia w ould be unable to support them . T he aspect of C anada was very different. I f a com bination o f regulars, militia, and Indians could be gathered they m ight advance into the heart of New Y o rk and play havoc with the em bryonic arm ies of the colonies. But could th at offensive not be stopped at source? W as the population o f C anada ready to follow its governor? W as it even loyal in a negative sense? A m ongst the sm all English-speaking group in the province individuals and com m ittees had shown unm istakable sym pathy with the revolutionary cause, while the F rench were a recently-conquered people who might well be persuaded to throw off the foreign yoke. H ence the strategy was clear: to persuade the people of C anada to throw in their lot w ith the revolutionaries, and to enable them to do so by sending arm ed forces to their relief. T he troops a t the disposal o f the governor w ould be overw helm ed, the loyalists suppressed, and the tories in the thirteen colonies given a practical lesson. C anada could be reached by land, and w ith its interm ittent

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com m unication with E ngland be brought into the fold in a way that N ova Scotia never could be.1 Some m onths before the w ar began printed leaflets and agents w ere hurried to C anada to encourage the faithful, convert the uncertain, and intim idate opponents. T he m erchants o f M ont­ real, disgusted with the F rench institutions of the supposedly British province, received both literature and delegates with m ore than interest. Some o f them went over to the revolutionary side and others w ere suspected of passive disloyalty. O n the whole, however, they were unready to join in a fight fo r inde­ pendence of the Britain with which their business connections w ere vital, and chose to bear the known evils of the Q uebec Act rath er than abandon their com m ercial structure. French C an a­ dians were invited to escape from the tyranny of British rule, with a strong hint th at any other course would incur the enm ity of the sons of liberty. F o r m onths the bulk of the French Canadians w ere undecided as to the course they should take. T he A m erican prom ises of self-governm ent m ade little im ­ pression in themselves, but the Q uebec A ct had failed to con­ ciliate the habitants. By the seigneurs and the clergy loyalty to the crow n was unquestioned, and the influence o f the latter especially helped to turn the tide. But if the habitant was unim pressed by assemblies and juries, he found the new act oppressive after the relaxation of the strict rule of the French regime. T he F ranco-A m erican alliance of 1778 m ight have been used as another lever to move the French C anadians against their new governm ent, but neither signatory w anted to see the fieur-de-lys restored at Quebec, and the suggestion o f a com ­ bined attack by a French fleet and an A m erican arm y - which m ight have had a m arked effect - was never adopted. A com ­ bination o f factors - C arleton’s firm adm inistration, the influ­ ence of the church, resentm ent against incidents of oppression by the invaders, and finally the failure o f the invasion — drew m ost o f the F rench at least into passive obedience. W ith a population so uncertain the m ilitary problem o f de­ fending C anada, far m ore o f attem pting an offensive from it, was no light one. T he fact th at N ova Scotia was never seriously threatened illustrates the im portance o f British sea-power, as does, obversely, the vulnerability o f C anada. T he m ain route through the A lleghanies was form ed by the Richelieu R iv erL ake C ham plain-H udson R iver system, and, since it m ight be traversed by either belligerent, an A m erican raiding party wisely secured the fortified posts a t T iconderoga and C row n Point in

D I P L O M A C Y A ND WAR - 27

the spring o f 1775. T he real invasion o f C anada was in the autum n o f the sam e year, w hen one arm y, following that route, captured M ontreal and joined w ith a second arm y that had com e by the valley o f the K ennebec to besiege Quebec. H ere was the one strong defensive position in C anada. T he garrison, it is true, was sm all, and m ore than a half consisted of untrained C anadians; but the A m erican force was likewise small and was handicapped by long lines of com m unication and bad weather. In the spring the strong arm o f the royal navy had at last a chance; and w hen three m en-of-w ar sailed up to the rock the siege was raised - never to be resum ed. Some few hundreds of C anadians had taken p art in its defence (and others had fought on the side o f the enem y), but the w ar was essentially one betw een British and A m erican forces, the form er handicapped by the E uropean alliance against them . It was no national spirit th at saved the British provinces from absorption in the new union, and kept them the basis o f a second British em pire in A m erica: a national spirit was yet to be born. If the British provinces during the w ar w ere paw ns in the great international chess game, it was even m ore true th at they were so in the peace settlem ent.2 It did not, how ever, follow that the m inor role assigned to them was altogether a disadvantage, fo r to some degree they w ere protected by the moves and counter-m oves o f the m ajor pieces. W hile the U nited States had leant on F rench assistance in the w ar and was prepared to follow the F rench lead in the negotiations for peace, the aims of the two countries conflicted on im portant points. W ashington had frow ned on L afayette’s proposal for a joint invasion of Canada, fearing that it might restore Bourbon rule at Q uebec; and, though the A m ericans hoped at one tim e to secure the cession of both N o v a Scotia and C anada, they sacrificed even the hope of widened dom ains for the sake of the balance of power. The F rench governm ent seems to have had no am bition to regain its A m erican possessions, neither did it wish to strengthen the U nited States by such a broad acquisition. Its general plan was fo r a division between British, A m erican, and Spanish pow er on the continent; and its apparent support o f Spain’s claims to the east branch of the Mississippi so alarm ed the A m erican pleni­ potentiaries th at they hastily swung to support Britain in C anada and F lorida as a counter-w eight against the threatened Spanish encroachm ent on the west. It has been said, and with some justice, that G reat Britain m ade an inadequate diplom atic defence of her colonies in the negotiations, but it is evident that

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she had no thought o f abandoning them , and that the fault lay in p art in her insufficient appreciation of the im portance o f the boundaries, and in p art on the continued tension in Europe. F o r w hatever reason, the British let go the O hio Valley and the trad ­ ing posts on the south and west of the great lakes - a result w hich was viewed w ith horror by the M ontreal m erchants w ho knew every inch o f the terrain. On the A tlantic end of the boundary the selection o f the line from the St. Croix River to the highlands, threatened land com m unications by an A m erican wedge between N ew B runsw ick and Canada. T he treaty o f Paris left British colonies along the north of the continent. T h at they w ould rem ain British was to m any A m ericans no certainty: that they would be confined by the term s o f 1783 was not yet accepted in L ondon o r in M ontreal. M ore than a generation was to pass before the issues raised by the A m erican revolution were resolved. D uring th at time there was a spell o f peace, and in it intervals when the tension relaxed, but there could be little expectation o f perm anent peace until after a fu rth er resort to arm s. D anger to the prov­ inces cam e both from N orth A m erican and E uropean politics. In Britain and the U nited States it was believed that the boun­ dary o f 1783 was subject to change. T he British governm ent retained hold o f several im portant posts on the then A m erican side fo r m ore than ten years after the peace, and cherished some hope that centrifugal forces in the new federation - as exem pli­ fied by the secessionist m ovem ent in V e rm o n t-w o u ld lead to its collapse. T he U nited States, for their part, had not altogether abandoned earlier am bitions o f bringing the whole continent within their control. T o the general idea o f political expansion w ere added suspicion of a British alliance w ith the western Indians, land hunger, and designs on the fu r trade of the no rth ­ west. It is possible, however, that such local differences would not have led to w ar had it not been for the recurrence of E u ro ­ pean com plications. A t the very tim e w hen agreem ent over the posts was being negotiated the intrigues o f F rench agents in the U nited States w ere causing alarm in the C anadas; and even w hen the Jay T reaty had been signed the prom ise of peace was darkened by the repercussions of the A nglo-French war. T h e parallel with 1775 was all too apparent: would the U nited States again secure F rench assistance in A m erica? T he event proved that they did not; but nevertheless the E uropean w ar strongly influenced the situation in A m erica. T he British block­ ade seriously im paired A m erican shipping and foreign trade,

D I P L O M A C Y A N D WAR - 29

adding a new source of antagonism to those already existing; while the exigencies o f the struggle against N apoleon limited the ability o f G re at Britain to defend her colonies. T h e m ilitia system o f the British provinces, as it appeared in the first half o f the nineteenth century, was modelled on those o f both F rance and E ngland and had already a history on the continent o f N orth A m erica. In N ova Scotia there w as no break in continuity, and p a rt o f the provincial m ilitia was called up for garrison duty in the period o f the A m erican revolution. In C anada, how ever, the cession and the years of adjustm ent had necessitated a suspension o f the m ilitia system , and such inhabi­ tants as served in 1775 w ere volunteers enrolled as the authori­ ties could secure them . A year after the siege of Q uebec was raised the m ilitia system w as again restored by a series of ordinances, which, w ith the acts of the various provincial legis­ latures, m ade up a coherent system of w hich the principles were com m on to all provinces.3 C ertain central ideas run through the laws from the F rench regim e in C anada and early British ru le in N ova Scotia to the organization in the provinces as it was just p rio r to the W ar o f 1812. L iability to service, w ith specified exem ptions, was universal and com pulsory. A ll men o f m ilitary age were registered by districts and records were periodically sent to headquarters. M usters w ere held on two to four days in the sum m er, and at times som e slight provision was m ade for training. All o r p art o f the m ilitia m ight be em bodied fo r a lim ited period in tim e o f civil disturbance o r war, and when only detachm ents were required they were chosen by ballot. N o pay was provided, and in m ost cases the m en w ere obliged to provide their own w eapons and am m unition. M odifications were m ade during the tense years of the N apoleonic w ars by provin­ cial votes for training and by the introduction o f volunteering. “F lan k com panies” w ere form ed in each regim ent from volun­ teers who still received no pay but were obligated to drill for six days a m onth, and to find their own uniform s and muskets. T aken by itself the m ilitia w ould be judged as of little avail for w ar. B ut it was at no tim e intended to operate alone, only as an adjunct to regular troops. Led by trained officers and stiffened by regular regim ents it could, and did, give a good account of itself. In spite o f requirem ents in Europe, the British govern­ m ent increased its garrison in British N o rth A m erica from some 3,500 in 1804 to nearly 9,000 in 1808 and 1809. O f the total ab o u t one qu arter was m ade up o f regular fencible regim ents raised in the provinces; and while these w ere carried on the

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British budget they eased the problem o f m an-pow er. Such were the land forces on the eve of the W ar o f 1812. T he royal navy, the provincial m arine, and natural and artificial obstruc­ tions, com plete the tale of the means available for offensive or defensive w arfare.

II T h e testing o f the system of defence was neither unexpected n o r long delayed. In m any respects the W ar o f 1812 was strik­ ingly like th at o f 1775, both in its origins and its course. Both form ed p art o f larger international struggles; both involved invasions of C anada; and both illustrate the im portance of British sea and land forccs as the basis of the defence of the British provinces. But, while in neither case did the provincial governm ents have any voice in the diplom acy leading to the outbreak, the C anadian m ilitia and the civil population in general supported those governm ents in action in contrast to the slight response or even hostility of the earlier war. W hether the w ar was prim arily caused by m aritim e disputes incidental to the use o f British sea-power against N apoleon o r to the am bitions of A m erican im perialism ,4 it took the form not o f a dispute over colonial autonom y but of a contest between national states.T he A m erican invasion of the colonies w hich had rem ained British was a blow against the nearest territory of the enem y, and if successful m ust have resulted in conquest and perhaps their annexation. Colonial opinion on th at issue could n o t be represented as unanim ous, for there w ere groups of recent A m erican im m igrants whose allegiance was to the coun­ try o f their birth, and w ho either returned as the w ar cam e or created disloyal elem ents in the provinces. T he assembly of U pper C anada blocked em ergency m easures w hich the adm inis­ trato r considered to be necessary, and on some occasions units o f the m ilitia showed signs of disaffection. T he dom inant ele­ m ent in the population, how ever, w ith the U nited E m pire L oyal­ ists as its core, gave unquestioning obedience and support. In Low er C anada too, w here once both English and F rench C ana­ dians had w avered in their loyalty, the position had changed, but n o t in this case because o f an alteration in the character o f the population. It was tru e th at once again an attem pt at a return to F ren ch sovereignty m ight be feared; but F rance played only a rem ote p art in the A m erican W ar, and a F rance still coloured

D I P L O M A C Y A ND WAR - 31

with the red of revolution. Les Canadiens w ere finding their destiny. It was to be neither in a reversal of the decision of 1763 nor yet in unconditional absorption w ithin the world-wide operations o f British foreign policy. As yet the positive lines were hardly draw n, but the W ar o f 1812 dem onstrated that the F rench of Q uebec would defend their province against an invader. W ar and revolution on two continents had ham m ered o u t a pattern in which the provinces o f British N o rth A m erica saw themselves as at bay against the aggression o f a far m ore pow er­ ful neighbour. T he odds, how ever, were not as uneven as might at first appear. W hile the m orale o f the colonials was relatively high, the U nited States were as much, if not m ore, divided than they had been in 1775. N ew England was cold, if not actually opposed, to the w ar; and the British were careful to nurse this advantage by attacking only on the central and southern coasts, and by allowing the trade o f N ew England to be carried on. T he colonies were dependent on sea-com m unication across the w idth o f the A tlantic, but since the A m erican and French navies were unable to break th at com m unication, it was only the ele­ m ent o f time that was a handicap. T he long land frontier with the U nited States, from A tlantic to Pacific, was guarded by few troops, scanty forces on the lakes, and few fortified positions, but the section that was actually vulnerable was only the central portion of that great stretch. O n the east the m aritim e provinces, with th eir ice-free ports, were easily held by small garrisons in touch with the British fleet, while on the other extrem ity A m erican pow er was so negative that the fur-trading post of A storia was handed over to the N orth W est Com pany. F o r the British the A m erican w ar was not unlike that waged with N apoleon in that they m ade the fullest possible use o f su­ perior sea-power and w ere com paratively w eak in land forces.5 W hile A m erican m en-of-w ar w ere victorious in several separate engagem ents, the British fleet was able not only to m aintain com m unications, but to blockade the A m erican coast and make com bined naval and land attacks on A m erican cities. O n the other hand, the U nited States was able to take the offensive against the central British provinces o f U pper and Lower C anada, which could not be defended by the British fleet since the rapids o f the St. Law rence prevented navigation beyond M ontreal. T he im portance of naval force on the great lakes was fu rth er accentuated by the difficult transport over the crude C anadian roads. H onours on the lakes were not unevenly

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divided. W hen the U nited States secured control of L ake Erie in 1813 the British land forces w ere obliged to retire eastw ard; and, on the other side of the ledger, British ships on L ake O n­ tario held up the A m erican advance on the N iagara peninsula. O n p ap er the arm ies w ere fa r from equal. T he British regu­ lars (including those regim ents raised in the N o rth A m erican provinces) were few in num ber, particularly in the early p art of the w ar when they could w ith difficulty be spared from E urope; but they w ere highly trained, and the A m erican arm y on active service was only a portion o f its nom inal roll. T he C anadian m ilitia included only a handful of com panies w ith any serious training, but - w ith some exceptions - it was m ore successfully em ployed than the A m erican both as an auxiliary to the regulars and as a separate force. T he A m erican weaknesses in training and organization w ere hardly m ore serious than w ere those in strategy. T he chief objective of the A m erican staff should have been to cut the thin line o f British com m unications a t M ontreal o r K ingston, and thus isolate all forces, both on land and water, to the west. Instead o f this, how ever, they began by attacking on th eir left flank w ith the hope o f neutralizing o r securing as allies the pow erful Indian tribes to the west. T hough, after some reverses, they w ere able to invade and occupy the west of U pper C anada, the result o f the w ar was no m ore affected in th a t way than by their offensive in the centre over the N iagara peninsula. T h ree years o f cam paigns ended w ith no decisive victories by either side, and with each ready to m ake peace. F o r the U nited States the first abdication of N apoleon spelt m ore British forces in N o rth A m erica and on the A tlantic, b u t the British had no desire to continue a struggle which they had never w anted, w hich was purely defensive, and w hich dragged on at a time w hen they m ost w anted peace after the exhausting and p ro ­ tracted w ars w ith F rance, and freedom to face th e m ore im p o rtan t settlem ent in Europe. T h e settlem ent in A m erica w as m ade up of several instru­ m ents, o f which the T reaty o f G hent w as only one.6 In the negotiations both sides, according to custom , presented m axi­ m u m term s, the final result having the appearance o f a return to the status quo. T he British plenipotentiaries at first pressed fo r m easures designed to bring m ore security to their colonies: revision o f the N ew Brunsw ick-M aine boundary, an Indian buffer state, m inor adjustm ents elsewhere, and A m erican dis­ arm am ent on the lakes. T he territorial dem ands w ere eventually dropped, and the boundary rem ained as in the treaty o f 1783,

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subject to later settlem ent of certain sections. In 1818 the whole line from the L ake o f the W oods to the Rockies was, by agree­ m ent, established at the forty-ninth parallel of latitude. T he b oundary of N ew Brunswick was destined to rem ain longer a subject o f dispute. U nilateral w as changed to bilateral disarm a­ m ent in the Rush-Bagot agreem ent of 1817, under which arm ed vessels of both sides on the lakes were reduced to the size of police forces. A British attem pt to include an article explicitly nullifying A m erican fishing rights in British N o rth A m erican w aters was successfully resisted, and replaced by a convention of 1818 under which limited rights were allow ed.7 In C anada there was som e dissatisfaction th at better term s had not been secured. T he fur-traders had hoped th at the m istake of 1783 would be corrected, but their protests w ere o f little consequence in view of the im m inent transfer of the trade from M ontreal to H udson Bay. A m ore significant note was struck by John S trachan, later Bishop of T oronto. T hough a staunch tory and im perialist, he hinted th at British control o f diplom acy had its draw backs - an idea th at later was to be m ore com m only and m ore vigorously voiced. . . . W e have just heard that the conditions o f peace have been signed at G hent & ratified by the Prince Regent. O ur E nvoys were not I fear endow ed with m uch sagacity & firmness. I dread to see the articles. This country has certainly derived m any advantages fro m the war and if a proper line o f policy be adopted it will becom e a m ost valuable appendage to the British Em pire. In regard to the vast expence o f the war it is m ost true that m uch m ore m oney has been spent in the country than the soil is worth but this is not the proper way o f stating the question. These colonies are the relique o f happier tim es the m em orial o f the pow er and success o f the British E m pire under the m ost brilliant o f her adm inistrations and could not be given up w ithout disgrace. T h ey have also been a receptacle fo r the Loyalists during the A m erican rebellion and have claim s on the protection o f the M o th er country which to a m agnanim ous nation are irresistible. B ut the Inhabitants o f the Canadas had nothing to do about the Origin o f the W ar they were to becom e its victim s but the causes were national questions o f vital im portance to the welfare & prosperity o f the British E m pire. The great expence o f conduct­ ing the war ought not therefore to be charged upon the Canadas.8

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Seen in a perspective w ider than was possible for contem ­ poraries, the settlem ent of 1814-18 becomes a milestone in the history of British N o rth A m erica. T hough modified in detail and even threatened in its entirety, that settlem ent proved to be the end of a series of wars which covered m ore than a century. F rance, Spain, England, and the U nited States had, in various com binations, struggled for the control of N orth A m erica. The treaties of 1763 and 1783, in spite of the hopeful language in which they w ere couched, were tem porary, and were known even by contem poraries to be tem porary. W hile the peace­ m akers at V ienna - kings, m inisters, and generals - conscious o f the prime im portance o f their task, w ere able to legislate for but a generation, those who were appointed to the m ore humble task of m aking pcace in the new world w ere able to establish the lines on which two powers w ere to live peacefully in that great continent. N ot, indeed, that the peoples o f the provinces were able to discern the final outcom e o f the settlem ent, for there w ere to be m any m ore rum ours o f w ar in the next fifty years, and the problem of security was by no means seen as solved. But if the peace could not be taken as perm am ent, the w ar had brought a new consciousness of nationality, a m ore assured sense o f orientation. Canadians, both French and Eng­ lish, had been ready to fight for their lands, with not a little success; and if defects in the system o f defence had becom e m ore apparent, they were not beyond rem edy. Disloyal groups had been m ore clearly revealed, and steps were taken to remove such danger for the future by barriers against A m erican and encouragem ent o f British imm igrants. Ill Peace on alm ost any basis would have induced, as it custo­ m arily does, a relaxation of concern for m ilitary effort and reorganization; and, while the settlem ent of 1814-18 left much to be desired both in term s and prom ise of perm anence, it was obviously much m ore than a truce, and gave ground for hopes of peace at least for a time. T he peoples and the legislatures of the provinces turned to the problem s of imm igration and m ate­ rial progress, and revived political disputes which only later proved to be w ider than dom estic quarrels. But if the public thought m ore of pcace than of war, the sky of N orth A m erica was not so clear that the responsible authorities could neglect altogether questions of defence. F o r the next quarter-century

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the strategy o f the defence of the British provinces as seen by the British was consistent in principles and not materially changed by the threats to peace that occurred from time to time. All plans were based on the dual assum ption that, while offensive w arfare against the U nited States was not practicable, the provinces were defensible. It was believed that the W ar of 1812 had dem onstrated both the feasibility of successful defence, even against the larger neighbour, and also th at the organization o f land forces was fundam entally sound. T he im provem ents th at w ere considered to be necessary were to m eet weaknesses which were em phasized m ore than revealed by the war. In this last phase of the old colonial system it was taken for granted th at responsibility for defence both in thought and action, rested on the im perial governm ent. It followed, then, that the weight o f attack w ould fall upon the royal navy and the British regulars; but these two professional arm s, it was believed, could afford adequate protection if - and only if - the provinces continued to provide the additional m an-pow er o f the militia. T h e successful operation o f the three branches o f the defence force depended on a fortified naval base on the A tlantic, im­ proved com m unication w ithin the continent, and strengthened or additional fortifications at vulnerable points. Such was the attitude o f the British governm ent tow ard the problem of defending N orth A m erica from the sea to the head o f the great lakes. T h e w ar had am ply proved the ability of the royal navy to m aintain uninterrupted com m unications across the A tlantic, and not even a com bination of powers could challenge the sea-power that dated from the battle o f T rafalgar. T he fleet m ust, however, have a base th a t was safe against land attack o r raids from the sea, and for that reason Sir Jam es Carm ichaelSm yth, the head o f the com m ission sent to inspect the defences o f the provinces in 1825, advised a new citadel for H alifax.9 M inor works w ere recom m ended, for storing am m unition and as “alarm posts and rallying points” at A nnapolis and W indsor. N ew Brunswick was “ the connecting link between C anada and N ova Scotia,” and the com mission pointed to the military im portance o f a satisfactory boundary of N ew Brunswick with M aine. F o r p art of the year troops and supplies could be sent by way o f the St. Lawrence, but in the w inter the overland route through N ew Brunswick was the only one, and it w ould be endangered by the jutting north o f Maine. T he Tem iscouata P ortage road was not only close to the border but could only by

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politeness be called a road a t all. In order to provide a com ­ m unication safer in tim e o f w ar the K em pt road, fu rth er from the boundary, was projected, and was open over som e sections in the thirties. Since C anada was the only province th at was considered likely to be attacked it was essential to provide com m unications through as well as up to it. R apids on the upper St. Law rence barring navigation, the British governm ent, at its own expense, built the Rideau C anal, which had the additional advantage of being well back from the frontier. A t first the imperial experts frow ned on the im provem ent o f the St. L aw rence, as opening it to A m erican attack; b u t later encouraged canals on th at river as a necessary alternative to the R ideau route. T he seizure of control o f Lake Erie in the W ar of 1812 underlined the problem of reinforcing the defences of the western part o f the province, and gave a m ilitary im portance to the W elland Canal. W hile the inland waterways, like the low er St. Law rence, w ere frozen in the w inter, by a happy coincidence the roads of C anada w ere com paratively fit for use w hen the bottom less m ud was decently covered w ith snow. T h e sam e lakes which afforded a m eans o f com m unication for H is M ajesty’s forces w ould be useless fo r that purpose if com m anded by enem y ships, and becom e instead a highw ay for an invader. T he Rush-Bagot agreem ent o f 1817 was intended to cancel out all arm ed vessels save a few patrol boats, but, like m any another disarm am ent agreem ent, its im plem entation followed slowly. Being only required n o t'to keep arm ed ships in com mission, both sides w ere slow to scrap them altogether; and there w ere m any stories o f w arships being secretly built. A fu rth er com plication was th at com m ercial vessels could be converted into w arships w ithout great difficulty, and as the A m erican m erchant vessels w ere far m ore num erous, particu­ larly on Lake E rie, and had m ore ports, the British authorities had cause for w orry. In 1838, at a time o f strained relations, the British governm ent m aintained arm ed vessels in com mission over the m axim um , by consent o f the A m erican governm ent; an d the president was em pow ered, in case of danger, to take sim ilar action. In the m idst of the excitem ent caused by the M cLeod case congress appropriated $100,000 for w arships. In 1843 the British governm ent decided it could safely reduce tonnage to the figure of the agreem ent, only to reconsider its decision at the tim e of the O regon dispute. T he adm iralty sent a shipw right officer to C anada to direct the construction of m erch an t vessels capable o f conversion into arm ed vessels, but

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the w ork was not carried out because o f the m ore pacific attitude of congress.10 Study o f the W ar o f 1812 and o f the topography o f C anada satisfied Carm ichael-Sm yth’s com m ission th at invasion need be anticipated at only a lim ited num ber of places, all of which were in C anada. T he stronghold o f Q uebec had never been captured, b ut its fortifications were neglected. M ontreal had always been an object o f attack by way o f L ake C ham plain, and, in C ar­ m ichael-Sm yth’s view there should be a fortress on the island itself together w ith lesser w orks on the south side of the river. T h e next strategic point, K ingston, was not only a port, naval station, and dockyard, but controlled the entrance to the St. Law rence and the projected R ideau Canal. K ingston, too, m ust then be fortified. Y o rk was not regarded as of im m ediate im portance, b u t a fo rt was recom m ended fo r the N iagara frontier. Finally, som e m inor w orks w ere advised fo r the south-w est extrem ity of U pper C anada. T he proposals o f 1825 w ere m oderate and logical, but little was done to carry them into effect. O f the land forces, British regulars continued to be stationed in all the provinces, the num bers varying from tim e to tim e. In 1835 they were reduced to few er than five thousand, but five years later had again been raised to over fifteen thousand. T he im portance o f th e m ilitia was constantly stressed by the im perial governm ent, w ith suggestions th at im provem ents in the system w ere needed. W riting on the problem o f defence in the shadow o f the O regon dispute, the colonial secretary quoted Sir G eorge M urray as being o f the opinion th at there m u st be “a num erous, well-organized, and well-disposed local M ilitary Force, to co-operate with the R egular A rm y.” The D uk e of W ellington, he added, had stated th at “w ith p roper N aval and O rdnance preparations, C anada m ay be effectually defended by a force o f 10,000 British T roops, if supported by a loyal and w ell-organized M ilitia to the extent o f 35,000 m en.” T he m ini­ m um requirem ents, according to W ellington, were th at the m ilitia should be em bodied and organized, and perhaps given som e training.11 W hile the provinces accepted the principle th at the m ilitia m ust be m aintained, they did little to im prove its efficiency. T he Province of C anada adopted the legislation o f U pper and Low er C anada w ith little alteration except fo r a significant move in 1846 tow ard m ore em phasis on volunteer corps w ith som e training. Such were the plans and the forces fo r the defence o f the

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provinces. In all discussions on the subject, w hether official or unofficial, defensive w arfare was visualized. W as there, in reality, a prospect of attack by the U nited States? As a possibi­ lity it could not be, and was not, dismissed. T he m em ories of 1775 and 1812 were still too distinct, and there was no ground fo r certainty that British and A m ericans could am icably divide a continent. In addition to such general impressions held in varying degrees, were periodic crises whose m enace could not be ignored. T he first arose from a curious tangle of dom estic and foreign affairs that in itself illustrates the effects o f interchange o f populations and ideas. T he doctrines o f the rebellions of 1837 were in p art inspired directly by im m igrants from the U nited States o r indirectly by adm iration of A m erican institu­ tions and conditions. T he m ilitary problem of 1837 and the years imm ediately following was not the suppression of local and ill-organized revolts, but the prospect th at international war might result from sym pathy, from border incidents, or from aggression finding on opportunity. T he escape of the leader of the U pper C anada revolt, W illiam Lyon M ackenzie, to the U nited States raised the possibility of an invasion on behalf of his cause; but w hether the support he received, and the meetings in A m erican tow ns which passed resolutions of sym pathy and raised funds and even volunteers - w hether these were inspired wholly by devotion to dem ocracy o r in p art by anti-British sentim ent is not easy to decide. But w hatever the motives, the preparations on N avy Island created a m ilitary problem in C anada. T he reckless capture of the Caroline at an A m erican w h arf led to the arrest of A lexander M cLeod, a C anadian, and to his trial for the m urder of an A m erican killed in the scuffle. O f m any aw kw ard situations arising from border incidents the M cLeod case was the m ost serious. T he British m inister in W ashington w rote to Palm erston that the conviction of McLeod m ust m ean w ar,12 and Stanley inform ed Sydenham th at he m ight need to retain regim ents in H alifax.13 M eanwhile the Canadian border was disturbed by plans for invading C anada draw n up by A m erican secret societies - plans which bore fruit in actual crossing of the frontier by arm ed forces. L ate in 1838 the H unters sent a force across the St. Law rence, and a battle was fought at W indm ill Point, near Prescott.14 H appily for the peace of A m erica M cLeod was acquitted, the British governm ent expressed regret for the Caroline affair, and the H unters’ Lodges gradually subsided into threats. In response to the tenseness o f five years, there was reorganization and

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increase o f the m ilitary force, but no changes o f principle were m ade in the C anadian militia. T he 1837 affairs had not yet been sm oothed out w hen the first o f two m ajor boundary disputes arose. T he line between M aine and N ew Brunswick involved, as everyone knew, a m ilitary problem in th at an unfavourable settlem ent would seriously endanger com m unications between G reat Britain, the m aritim e provinces, and C anada.T he “ A roos­ took W ar” of 1838 hardly m erited the nam e; but there were actual m ovem ents of troops by both sides, and fighting was narrow ly avoided. In this, as in the Caroline affair, international negotiations rested entirely with the British governm ent. Its conclusion in the W ebster-A shburton T reaty o f 1842 cam e to be traditionally regarded as an exam ple o f British willingness to sacrifice C anadian interests, but later exam ination has re­ vealed the treaty as a reasonable diplom atic com prom ise. W hat­ ever a legal judgm ent of the evidence m ay show - and there is reason to believe that the British case was not a strong one - the settlem ent ended a long dispute at a tim e w hen relations w ere badly strained. Finally the Pacific coast was added to the sum of A nglo-A m erican controversies by the dispute over the bound­ ary o f O regon, held jointly since 1818. T he gravity of the situation may be seen from the fact that the successful candidate fo r the presidency had used the slogan o f “ F ifty-four forty or fight” as an election cry, while Peel told the H ouse o f Lords in m ore m easured but no less certain term s that, while the govern­ m ent would attem pt an am icable settlem ent, it was ready to m aintain British rights in O regon. A lthough the U nited States failed to realize its full am bition in the settlem ent, Britain too accepted a com prom ise. O nce again it was charged that the British governm ent had been weak, but once again the peace had not been broken. T he accum ulation o f crises on the borders o f British N orth A m erica, serious enough in itself, was over­ taken by another group of A nglo-Am erican disputes ranging over an even w ider area. IV T h e position of the British provinces was governed not only by bilateral relations with their im m ediate neighbour but by the w orld politics o f the era. T he nation o f shopkeepers, who had so long and so effectively wielded the sw ord, were struggling to re-build a world in which they could carry on business profitably and at peace. One m ajor object was to keep in the

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A m ericas an open door, through w hich to buy essential raw m aterials and to sell m anufactured goods. O ne attem pt a t out­ side interference by the E uropean powers was blocked by calling in th e new w orld; and if the M onroe D octrine was not the co-operative action that Canning had intended, it served the im m ediate purpose. It was, how ever, far from the wish of the British governm ent that the continents thus insulated from E u ropean, should be the object o f A m erican im perialism . N ot thus would the door be kept open. T he first area w hich th reat­ ened to be absorbed by the U nited States w as Texas, which sought to break aw ay from M exico and join the nation. Both E ngland and F ran ce w ere opposed to such a change, which w ould p u t w ithin a custom s area w hat otherw ise w ould be an excellent field fo r free trade, and - from the English poin t of view - w ould unduly strengthen the U nited States and expose th e rest of M exico to annexation. In p art a t least those fears w ere justified, fo r shortly afte r Texas was absorbed in 1845, N ew M exico and C alifornia w ere added to the rapidly expand­ ing republic. Soon afterw ards the U nited States sought to buy C uba from Spain, and again the British and F rench governm ents m ade clear their objections.15 H ow ever differently these events m ay be interpreted by historians, m any contem poraries saw them in the w orst light. A m erican opinion accused E ngland o f selfish interference in the affairs o f continents closed by the M onroe D octrine to E uropeans; while Britain, anxious to m aintain independent states, accused the U nited States o f aggressive im perialism . F or the British provinces the whole issue had a double significance: the disputes threatened w ar w ith the U nited States, and A m eri­ can expansionism m ight at any tim e be turned northw ard. T hro u g h o ut the provinces Texas, California, and C uba were held up as horrible examples o f the operation of a m anifest destiny w hich had been before, and m ight be again, directed against British N o rth A m erica. A n editorial in the Q uebec G azette is characteristic o f a view th at constantly found expres­ sion. The am bition o f acquiring territory, w ithout being very scrupulous as to the means, seem s to be inherent in the people o f the U nited States. T hey are living on land m ostly wrested fro m the aboriginal inhabitants, who have been exterm inated or driven back to countries now claim ed by the U nited States, and to w hich they profess to have an "unquestionable title." They

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acquired Louisiana and Florida rather as troublesom e neigh­ bours than by fair negotiation. Their citizens overran Texas, declared it independent, and it is now to be added to the U nited States. T hey have tw ice failed in their attem pts to conquer Canada, and subsequently, in an underhanded way, have en­ deavoured to favour attem pts to withdraw it fro m the authority o f the British governm ent. It would Seem that in the view o f m any o f them “m ight is right". . . . W hat m ay be the result o f the existing state o f things it is im possible to foresee; but it is evident that no country can be safe in the vicinity o f the U nited States, but by m eans o f power sufficient fo r its protection, and if needful, the punishm ent o f the aggressor.1G T h e people of the provinces saw boundary disputes on their own borders and A m erican expansion beyond them all as signs o f the onw ard m arch of a republic whose orators h ad not hesitated to announce that it was the destiny o f their country to spread on every side to the ocean. A s if A m erican affairs w ere not bad enough, British N o rth A m erica found itself draw n into the results of a dispute in the N e a r East. O n the Pacific coast there w as talk o f a Russian naval attack. In C anada a story circulated th at R ussian agents in the U nited States were looking fo r recruits to m an a vessel purchased by the T sar, and th at N ew B runsw ick o r C anada was to be attacked.17 But - except for British Colum bia - it was im probable th at the provinces them ­ selves would be attacked, and their m ore constant interest in the w ar w as in the aid they could give to Britain. T h e existence o f threats to the peace of British N o rth A m er­ ica was an old story, as was the need of provision against war resulting from them . T here w ere, however, in the forties and fifties, new factors in the situation w hich changed both the character of the forces and the purposes for w hich they m ight be used. T he prim e m ilitary interest for the people o f N orth A m erica was still the defence of their own soil, but the estab­ lishm ent o f colonies on the Pacific coast and the expectation o f settlem ent on the intervening prairies m eant th at British N o rth A m erica offered a greatly enlarged target. A second and fresh object o f m ilitary effort was support o f Britain in wars outside N o rth A m erica. W hile interest was show n in such wars as those against C hina in 1840 and A fghanistan in 1842, Britain was not, afte r the defeat o f N apoleon, engaged in a w ar w ith a great pow er until 1854. N ew s o f the C rim ean

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W ar brought in the British provinces a w idespread anxiety to aid the m other country in any way feasible, not that the British E m pire was felt to be in danger, or that th e colonies had any definable responsibility, but sim ply as a spontaneous wish to lend assistance. In M ontreal a public meeting was called by the m ayor and addressed by English- and French-speaking citizens, all o f whom laid stress on the A nglo-French alliance. A pplause greeted all references to the fight against the tyrannical T sar and proposals th at C anadians should help. A n address to the king was draw n up, expressing the sym pathy of the C anadian people and the determ ination to resist all aggression against C an ad a.18 N um erous offers o f volunteers were made, and legis­ latures and societies voted sum s for the patriotic fund. The Indian M utiny provoked fu rth er offers of men and money, and in that case the form er was accepted as well as the latter, for the im perial governm ent raised at its own expense, the 100th Royal C anadian Regim ent of Foot. W hile in both w ars the C anadian governm ent placed no obstacle in the way of British recruiting in Canada, the actual offers o f troops w ere m ade by volunteer corps rather than by the governm ent. T he latter was, indeed, w ary of sending from C anada the existing organized forces in view of continued apprehension of A m erican aggression. In case of an invasion British troops, needed elsewhere, m ight not be available for C anada; and in any event the British governm ent was already engaged in the gradual w ithdraw al of the imperial regiments. T his was another and a m ost im portant new factor in the m ilitary situation, for it m eant that the old principle of defence by British regulars aided by provincial m ilitia was being dis­ carded. A num ber of influences com bined tow ard m aking the decision to w ithdraw the garrisons. An im m ediate and practical difficulty was the size of the British arm y. In 1845 it totalled 118.000 men, of whom 53,000 w ere w ithin the British Isles, 26.000 in India, and but 39,000 available for all the colonies betw een 11,000 and 12,000 of the last being in British N orth A m erica.19 T he weakness o f such a distribution o f forces in time o f w ar was pointedly shown in the C rim ean W ar and the Indian M utiny. F urtherm ore, the cost o f the garrisons was increasingly unwelcome. F o r 1846-7 m ilitary expenditure was £ 4 7 4 ,7 8 9 fo r the Province o f C anada and £.170,464 fo r the m aritim e provinces and N ew foundland. T o a generation which was fast losing im perial enthusiasm , and tended to interpret the growth of autonom y as steps tow ard independence, such a burden was

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n o t only irksom e b ut illogical. In 1846 - the year o f the abolition o f the corn laws, and o f the British Possessions A ct - the first w ithdraw als were m ade. F u rth e r w ithdraw als in 1851 reduced the forces in C anada to 4,960 men and in N ova Scotia to 2,026 - the latter being chiefly the garrison at H alifax. By 1855, with the C rim ean W ar in progress, there were only 1,887 imperial troops in C anada, a t a cost o f £ .150,000, and in the m aritim e provinces but 1,086 m en. T here w ere none a t all in Prince Edw ard Island. W hatever m ay have been said at the tim e, there can be little doubt th at the people o f the provinces regretted the decision to call back the imperial troops. Som e com m ents, however, are interesting. W hile it was adm itted th at they had been sent solely fo r the defence of British N orth A m erica, it was often pointed o ut th at any w ar w ould arise out o f A nglo-A m erican disputes and n ot from local differences. O n the other hand, it was also argued that the colonials had not been bearing their share of defence, and had been too ready to let it all fall on the English tax-payers. L ord Elgin, the governor general w ho was attem p t­ ing to w ork out a new type o f im perial structure th at would allow for autonom y w ithout independence, saw the w ithdraw al of troops as p art o f a larger issue. H e constantly urged caution, pointing out that the argum ent that the colonies should assume a larger p art o f the cost of defence would encrease, I fear, the uneasy feeling which the Free Trade policy o f the M other C ountry and the language respecting the D e­ pendencies o f the E m pire in w hich British Statesm en have o f late years indulged both in and out o f Parliam ent have tended to produce in the Colonial m ind. —It would confirm the opinion, which already obtains too widely, that Great Britain begins to feel her colonies a burden and a nuisance — that she desires to sever one by one the bonds that unite her to them - that the connexion therefore will be o f but uncertain duration — and that annexation to the States m ust perforce be looked to as the inevitable goal, the only practicable m ode o f term inating a provisional and entering upon a definitive national existence.-0 T h e opinion began to gain weight that the vacuum caused by the rem oval of British regim ents m ust be filled by a reorganized militia. In the forties and early fifties the m ilitia in every prov­ ince was little different from w hat it had been at the beginning o f the century. Its p aper strength had little meaning. Such

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volunteer corps as existed w ere starved, and even those that struggled tow ard efficiency w ere too often objects of public scorn. T o avoid ridicule one T oronto u nit used to drill in the woods, the m en going to the rendezvous by separate paths.21 In N ova Scotia an act was passed in 1844 cancelling all musters, drills, and training unless specifically ordered, and the militia rem ained entirely passive until 1859. Joseph How e described the m ilitia o f N ova Scotia in his usual pungent style. B y the returns o f 1855, the m ilitia o f N o v a Scotia, on paper, includes 57,855 m en, o f w hom 1435 are com m issioned officers. H ow m any o f these can “set a squadron in the field,” it were vain to conjecture. N o n e o f these has had a squadron to set fo r 20 years. Som e o f them are “old fogies,” fighting the battle o f life with rheum atism , gout, asthm a, dropsy, and other such like enem ies, they are worse than Sepoys or Caffirs, or Zouaves, or Y a n kee riflem en a good deal. . . . These old gentlem en, if they ever knew anything did not kn o w m uch, and we fear that the little they were taught fo u r and tw enty years ago w ould hardly q ualify them to counteract the deviltries o f a Canrobert or a N ana Sahib, w ho have been m ade “wondrous wise” in the m odern schools o f m ilitary science. T hese elderly gentlem en, m ay, then fo r all purposes o f active warfare, be m arked “unserviceable," and set aside like old stores. T h en there are, am ongst the other 1435 “braves” who carry H er M ajesty’s com m ission in their pockets, we should suppose, at least a third w ho kn o w nothing o f the science they have bound themselves, by the acceptance o f their com m issions, to stu d y, and which the honour o f the C row n m ay require them a t any m om ent to teach. . . . There m ay be half a dozen good drills am ong the w hole 1435; but this we believe to be a very liberal calculation. . . . T he tw o Volunteer A rtillery C om panies o f H alifa x and P ictou . . . including perhaps 100 m en in all, are the only really efficient corps in the P rovince, and they, we opine, m ight be m uch im proved. In m aterial the m ilitia is sadly deficient. The w hole o f the arm s in their possession are reported “totally unserviceable and inefficient”. . . . T here is no organization, no science, no esprit de corps, no discipline. T he m ilitia o f N ew foundland, N ew Brunsw ick, Prince E dw ard Island, are, no doubt, in m uch the sam e condi­ tion. There ought to be in these provinces 80,000 m en capable

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o f bearing arm s - available at least fo r self-defence - a n d that m ig h t w ith a little care and forethought, and w ithout m uch waste o f labour, be brought to a condition m ore in accordance w ith the general interests and policy o f the E m pire than they are n ow .22 R eform cam e first in the P rovince o f C anada. Following the recom m endations of a com mission, the legislature passed an act in 1855 (18 V iet., c. 77) w hich, while it introduced no p rin ­ ciples wholly new, did in effect fundam entally alter the organiza­ tion o f th e militia. T he old rule that all m en of m ilitary age w ere liable for service was retained, but this “sedentary m ilitia,” as it was not unfittingly called, was still not to be trained, and gradually becam e little m ore than a m em ory. T he point o f the act was in its provisions for the “active” or “volunteer” militia. A few such units had existed in som e form for m any years, but h ad received neither public nor official encouragem ent. N ow the volunteer units w ere to be both trained and paid, and atten­ tion w as given to the need for m odern w eapons. A m axim um of 5,000 m en was set in the act, but in a few years it had been allowed to go beyond that un d er authority o f an am endm ent of 1856, providing for unpaid as well as paid units. M uch the sam e developm ents followed in the other provinces; though in N ova S cotia the plan was som ew hat different. T here the old m ilitia was retained as well as, and in preference to, the volunteers. T he effect was to drill a far larger num ber of m en, though for shorter periods. But everyw here there w as a new zeal fo r m ilitary preparedness. T he local legislatures voted substantial sum s of m oney, and the British governm ent sent large num bers of firearms to replace the ancient and condem ned veterans. A lthough the new life breathed into the m ilitia w as due to the g reater responsibility it w ould have to bear, it was not the only source o f the defence o f the provinces. T he British regulars w ere to be recalled only by degrees, and fo r the tim e being were in sufficient num bers to stiffen the militia, especially in the period o f reorganization. A s a m ore perm anent source o f aid it was taken fo r granted th at im perial troops w ould be sen t if actual need arose. “T he facilities of steam com m unication,” w rote the colonial secretary, “have greatly dim inished the necessity for a m ilitary force, as a m ere precautionary defence against a rem ote danger, and it m ust be borne in m ind th at, if the security o f C anada should ever-be threatened, troops could be forw arded fo r its assistance w ith the utm ost speed.”23 G iven the suprem acy o f the royal navy, no difficulty w ould exist in the

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tran sfer of such troops. T he navy, too, continued to act as a guard to both coasts of British N orth A m erica. H alifax had long been a naval base, and experience had show n that the m aritim e provinces w ere rendered safe from attack by the near presence o f the British warships. T he younger colonies on the Pacific coast saw their first need of defence during the C rim ean W ar. T he governor, Jam es D ouglas, advocated arm ing all the able-bodied w hites in the colony, along w ith an auxiliary force of Indians, but the council decided that the w hites would be less a protec­ tion than arm ed Indians were a m enace, and preferred to leave the defence of the colony to G reat B ritain.-4 D ouglas's appeals fo r a naval force perm anently stationed in the colony w ere at first received coldly in London, but in 1855 a naval base was established a t E squim ault, thus affording security to the Pacific as well as to the A tlantic coast. In the m iddle o f the century, then, the defences of British N o rth A m erica consisted o f the royal navy for the colonics on both extrem ities, a m ilitia in process o f reorganization, and the residue of im perial troops. A few fortifications had been added after the W ar o f 1812, but on too modest a scale to be a m ajor factor. Because of the disarm am ent agreem ent of 1817 neither C anada nor the U nited States had available naval forces on the lakes, which thus rem ained open to the passage of troops. T rans­ po rtatio n was greatly facilitated by the com pletion of the St. L aw rence canals at the end o f the forties, w hich, together with the W elland C anal, allowed for uninterrupted navigation as far as Sault Ste. M arie. Railways, too, w ere fast being built, and had an im portant place in w arfare both for the greater speed of transportation and because they could be used in w inter. But if C anada was fast building railways, the U nited States was build­ ing even faster. A m erican railways ran tow ards the Canadian border, making possible concentration of troops on a scale and at a speed heretofore impossible. Behind this new stategic factor lay the m ilitary m enace o f a population that was rapidly growing out o f all proportion to th at of British N orth A m erica. It was questionable w hether it could still be said th at the provinces w ere defensible. If hopes still lingered, they w ere soon to be all b ut shattered by the advent of the first great m odern armies, born o f the Civil W ar.

CHAPTER 3

Transition from Mercantilism

M ercantilism was the accepted dogm a and practice of all im perial states in the age w hen N o rth A m erica was opened to E uropean expansion. In conform ity w ith the prevailing prin­ ciples F rance and Britain w ere intent on obtaining from A m erica raw m aterials to supplem ent those available at home, and on securing at the sam e tim e m arkets for their m anufactured products. T rade and the flag w ere inseparable, for unsupported individuals had little chance of conducting com m erce beyond the seas while rival governm ents were closing preserves for the benefit o f their subjects alone. Econom ic m otives account for the exploration that revealed the new lands, the foundation of colonies, and readiness to expend blood and treasure upon defence and developm ent. But if the m otive was econom ic, it does not follow th at no other elem ents entered into colonization, o r th at colonies necessarily suffered because of that prim e purpose. In infant years a colony habitually required and ob­ tained m ost paternal care; but even in adolescence the balance of aid and restriction was not wholly uneven, as witness the zeal with w hich both parties looked to retaining advantages and dropping liabilities. Political institutions, protection, and culture should n ot be forgotten as assets gained by a colony; but even in the econom ic field, which will here be treated as a separate them e, an attem pt m ust be m ade to see the situation as a whole, and not only from the point of view of particular or tem porary interests. F o r m ore than two centuries the older provinces o f the dom inion were econom ically dom inated by the related factors of local conditions and im perial policy; and to the extent that the two could be dovetailed friction was avoided and profit accrued to those in the new and the old worlds. In so far as these provinces were concerned the principles o f m ercantilism , under the F rench or the English regim es, were sim ple enough. P ro ­ duction was to be concentrated on those goods which were not to be found in the parent state, and consum ption was to be of m anufactured articles bought in exchange. T hus an external

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trade for the colonies w as autom atically called into being, as p art o f the very reason fo r their existence. T h e second principle was th at the com m erce so created was to be carried in the ships o f the m etropolitan state (o r its colonies), so adding a profit and m aking possible an expansion in the volum e o f shipping, factors essential to a w orld pow er. E m ploym ent and m arkets w ere thus assured w ithin lim its, as was a supply of articles w hich, at least in the early stages, could n o t be produced in a new and undeveloped country. If the colonies w ere not free to buy in the open m arket they w ere able to sell in a closed one. T h ey need have no concern fo r the provision o r protection of the ships w hich w ere to carry their trade, although they were lim ited in th e choice of carriers m ore strictly than in the choice o f custom ers. T h e particular regulations by w hich im perial econom ic policy was defined and the rigour w ith w hich it was carried out varied from tim e to time. In the F rench regim e little difficulty was experienced in imposing the principles. Such initiative as existed for the foundation o f native industries cam e from F rance itself, as a self-im posed breach in th e m ercantilist system. C olbert’s encouragem ent o f industries o r the aid given to the iron w orks o f St. M aurice in the eighteenth century were not typical and w ere frownfed on by F rench producers; but the very slight effect th at they had in C anada shows how little opposition there w as to the rule of buying from F rance. A griculture, while engaging perhaps three-quarters o f the population of Canada, did little m ore than supply the local m arket. T he com m ercial instincts of the colonists w ere concentrated alm ost wholly on the fu r trade, an adm irable choice from the point of view o f the m other country since it created an export o f goods not produced in F ran ce and an im port of m anufactured articles for the trade w ith the Indians. U n d er British rule the position was never again so com para­ tively sim ple: partly because o f the m ore diversified econom ic am bitions of the colonists, partly because British policy itself was undergoing m odifications. T he n orthern colonies cam e u nder British rule before the revolt o f the southern thirteen, and thus into the old colonial system. In th at system the control o f shipping w as the m ain governing factor. “It w as clearly understood by contem poraries,” w rote M rs. K now les, “ th at the colonial system and the N avigation A cts w ere p art and parcel o f the sam e thing. Colonies w ere regarded as estates to be m anaged for the benefit o f the m other country, and the econo­

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m ic instrum ent o f their control was transport, and to regulate shipping to and from the colonies was to regulate the colonial trad e.” 1 T rade between the m other country and the colonies or between two colonies was to be in British (including colonial) ships only. Shortly after they becam e independent the U nited States w ere perm itted to deal directly w ith the British W est Indies and C anada. F rom 1822 on fu rth er relaxations in the navigation acts were m ade, allowing a lim ited trade between the colonies and foreign states. T he second instrum ent of con­ trol was the tariff. By the m iddle o f the nineteenth century the colonies had secured a m easure o f independence in setting tariffs against foreign states, but it rem ained to establish the principle o f placing tariffs against British goods. Related to the control of colonial tariffs w as the system under which Britain, by conceding preferential rates to certain colonial goods, could encourage certain industries and so indirectly discourage others. But it was also possible to use direct discouragem ent o f enter­ prises that threatened com petition with English industries. W hen a governor of N ova S cotia reported a project for a local colliery in 1752 he was w arned that “it w ould be contrary to those Rules of Policy, which this N ation has wisely observed in relation to its colonies, to bring coals into use in A m erica, as the use of them w ould naturally lead them into the D iscovery of a variety o f M anufactures, the raw m aterials of w hich we now receive from them , and afterw ards retu rn in M anufactures. . . .”2 A few years later another adm inistrator o f N ova Scotia could not “om it observing to your Lordship, that this G overnm ent have a t all times been extrem ely carefull not to give encouragem ent to any kind of m anufactures w hich m ight interfere w ith those o f G reat Britain.” 3 Such instances occurred, but they w ere not frequent. T here was a growing desire in the colonies to diversify their economies, b ut it is w orthy o f note that protests against British restraints becam e vigorous only when changing policy in Britain itself altered the balance o f advantages and disadvantages for the colonies. M eanw hile both parties w ere not ill satisfied with the exchange o f raw m aterials from British N o rth A m erica for m anufactured goods from E ngland, w hich form ed the mainstay o f the com m ercial activity of the form er. T he products which the colonies were able readily to export w ere fish, furs, forest products, and w heat.4 T here w ere natural products which could be provided in apparently unlim ited quantities in some o r all of the colonies; but the governing factor w as not the extent o f the

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supply but the conditions of sale, w hich, in turn, depended on the com m ercial policy and local dem and in Britain, and on the international situation. T he fisheries of the A tlantic coast, which first created a E uropean com m ercial interest in N o rth A m erica, w ere o f particular concern to N ova Scotia; and that province was enabled greatly to extend her p art in the industry in the period during w hich her rivals in N ew E ngland and France were handicapped by the w ars o f the end of the eighteenth and the beginning o f the nineteenth centuries. T he colony on the St. Law rence concentrated on the fur trade, after the conquest as before it. G oods and capital required for the trade were obtained from London firms associated with those in M ontreal, and ocean transport was conducted by English ships. T he busi­ ness was carried on in active com petition w ith concerns in New Y o rk and w ith the H udson’s Bay C om pany. T he boundaries as settled in 1783 and confirm ed in 1794 took from the M ontreal trad ers main posts and routes; they w ere gradually edged out o f the south-w est trade by the A stor interests and A m erican restrictions; and the m ore econom ical transportation secured to the English com pany by its possession of H udson Bay finally led to the collapse o f the C anadian trade in 1821. O ther changes in the international picture brought alternative opportunities to both the m aritim e provinces and C anada. If the fisheries were encouraged by E ngland as a nursery for seam en, the forest resources o f the colonies were also needed fo r the spars and hulls o f the w ooden ships of the royal navy and the m erchant m arine. In the early eighteenth century bounties on the tim ber industry o f the A m erican colonies were begun, and extended to N ova Scotia w hen th at colony finally becam e British. A fter the A m erican revolution an alternative source of supply o f m asts was successfully sought in New Brunswick, N ova Scotia having by th at tim e been denuded of suitable trees. Small exports o f oak, w ooden staves, and potash w ere also m ade from C anada in the second half of the eighteenth century, but any large increase was blocked by the grip on the English m arket held by Baltic tim ber. Som e increases of p re­ ference in the early years of the N apoleonic w ars helped to com pensate fo r the longer voyage, but m ade no m arked change in the volume o f im ports from the British colonies. It was only w hen N apoleon’s continental system closed the Baltic ports th at the British governm ent took rapid action. H eavy duties were placed against foreign lum ber, contracts to cut tim ber were aw arded, and British m erchants persuaded to turn tow ard

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the colonies. M easures designed as a guard against a dangerous shortage in lum ber were continued for a generation, introducing and continuing the tim ber industry as a m ain factor in the econom ic life o f N ew Brunswick and Canada. A griculture em ­ ployed a large p art of the population o f all the colonies but export of its products was slower in developing than that o f fish, furs o r tim ber. T he U nited K ingdom still grew a large portion o f the food for her own population and her landowners were averse to com petition. T he early years of the wars with F rance stim ulated some im ports of grains from British A m erica, but the volume dwindled to alm ost nothing in the later stages of the N apoleonic cam paigns. A fter the close o f the wars small pre­ ferences drew some C anadian grain to the British m arket, but it was n ot until the forties that- m ore generous encouragem ent swelled the grain trade into a m ajor export. In changing proportions and com binations these w ere the staple products on which the export trade of the colonies was built, and for which they exchanged m anufactured articles and such raw m aterials as were not found w ithin British N orth A m erica. Given a situation created by the resources of their lands and the im perial econom ic structure in which they found themselves, the colonials attem pted to m ake the best o f it. The direct approach was by seeking larger preferences and greater purchases in the U nited K ingdom , and this the m erchants of the provinces were not backw ard in doing. In both N ova Scotia and C anada, how ever, there were also devised plans for a wider external trade which should supplem ent the bilateral one with Britain, and arising from the position o f the provinces within the British Em pire. F o r the N ova Scotians the aim was to create an entrepot trade with C anada and the U nited States on the one h and and the British W est Indies on the other. W est Indian products would be forw arded to C anada, for example, and C anadian products sent on in return to the W est Indies. A t the sam e tim e there would be built up a trade with the other neighbouring colonies which w ere also w ithin the protected em pire.5 Tw o obstacles stood in the way - lack of shipping, and A m erican com petition in the W est Indies. T he first the N ova Scotians attem pted to surm ount by the encouragem ent of steam ship services, but success was slight. T he second was beyond their pow er to overcom e, for it depended on British restrictions on A m erican ships. These restrictions varied in a m ost alarm ing m anner, and it was all too apparent that the new gospel o f free trade was m aking converts in E ngland. The

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design o f the Canadians was sim ilar: to develop trade w ith the W est Indies, and to siphon the com m erce o f the nearby A m eri­ can states, especially those of the growing middle west, through the St. Law rence valley. T he belief th a t this plan could be realized arose from two assum ptions: th at the St. L aw rence was the “n atural” approach to the interior o f N o rth A m erica, and th a t A m erican goods could be fathered by C anada to enter British m arkets under the preference. A s in N ova Scotia, C ana­ dians w ere helpless to direct the course o f British tariff policy, b u t they could m ake them selves responsible for adequate transportation, first by canalization o f the w aterw ay and later by the construction o f railways. So im bued were the m erchants w ith the im portance of the plan for a great external trade that they staked everything on com m unications. W hether or not these cherished projects for the exploitation o f the m ercantile system could ever have been realized, they w ere in fact doom ed to failure, fo r the m ercantile system itself was dying. Free trade began to have solid support in England from about 1820, and H uskisson’s tariff reform s m ade breaches in the old citadel. In 1839 the A nti-C orn Law League was form ed and rapidly found a w ide response to a program m e w hich prom ised cheaper bread for the masses. T he w riting on the wall was visible across the broad stretch of the A tlantic. B ut if the old econom ic em pire was dying, it died slowly, and in a blaze o f glory and profit for the colonies. T he C anada Corn A ct o f 1843 adm itted C anadian w heat a t a fixed duty o f one shilling a quarter, and w heat milled in C anada at a proportion­ ate rate. T here were misgivings in England as to the w isdom of such an arrangem ent, especially when it allowed A m erican w heat to be entered as C anadian flour; and such objections were only partially m et by the C anadian action in placing a duty on A m erican w heat im ported into the province. T he tim ber trade, which was relatively m ore im portant in N ew Brunswick than in C anada, also continued to enjoy substantial preferences until th e early forties. In 1846 the blow fell w ith the news that the corn laws were to be abolished by successive reductions over a period of three years. A lready the duty on tim ber had been cut down and fu rth e r reductions had the effect o f cancelling the preference on that staple as well. In British N orth A m erica it seemed as if the bottom had fallen out of the whole econom ic structure, and th e outcry was loud and prolonged. Bitter things were said about the hollowness of im perial unity, and the tories o f M ontreal voted in disgust fo r peaceful annexation to the

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U nited States. T he British parliam ent, satisfied w ith the virtues o f free trade and faced w ith an im m ediate dem and fo r cheap food, w as im m ovable. It did, how ever, take steps to free the colonies from the restrictions o f the old system. T he British Possessions A ct o f 1846 enabled legislatures to rem ove the preferences on British goods, and the navigation laws ceased to op erate in 1849, allow ing foreign ships to trade w ith th e colo­ nies. So perished th e old im perial econom ic system.

II T o m any people in the British colonies it seemed as if the old em pire itself was to go as well. T he year 1846, in w hich the preferences began to be rem oved, saw also the first stage o f the w ithdraw al o f the British garrisons. T he two im perial props w ere pulled away a t the sam e tim e: would the structure rem ain, and if so in w hat form ? T here was pressing need th at the colonies tak e stock o f their ow n positions; o f the relationships w ith each o ther, w ith the U nited K ingdom , and w ith foreign states. T he fu tu re o f their external trad e w as a forem ost question fo r the colonists to consider, but it was im possible to conceive o f tariffs in a vacuum , fo r they were both cause and effect o f a m aze of political and social factors. So, while the thought on tariff veered wildly in this direction and that, it w ent deep into the basic econom ic aims o f the provinces them selves and deep into th e problem s o f external relationships. British colonies in an age of im perial disillusionm ent, A m erican provinces next to a restless giant, fellow colonists who hardly knew each other well m ight they ask themselves w here they stood and w hat path they should take. A fter the first revolt against the change in British policy had subsided, cooler second thoughts w ould reveal both th a t the provinces had attained a n o t unenviable position econom ically and th at the links w ith the m other country had by no means been severed. T he flow of capital, essential fo r the developm ent o f th e new w orld, h ad com e and continued to com e from L ondon. In the new west, becom ing of interest to the Province o f C anada, the H udson’s Bay C om pany had financed explora­ tio n , agriculture, and governm ent. In 1843 the British govern­ m en t enabled C anada to secure capital by guaranteeing the interest on bonds up to £.1,500,000, negotiated by the treasury. W ith such support the bonds sold at favourable prices, m ounting

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to £ .1 1 2 :1 0 . T he proceeds were used for public w orks, princi­ pally canals, and provided w ork both for old residents and newcomers. Railway construction in the fifties was also m ade possible by English capital. T he intervention o f the Brassey firm in the C anadian railway field gave the prestige o f the fam ous contractors to the G rand T ru n k , and fu rth er support was added by the banking firms of Barings and of G lyn, Mills. In days w hen railways alm ost anyw here w ere thought to be a profitable investm ent such encouragem ent was hardly needed to induce individuals to buy stock in C anadian com panies. Besides capital the provinces drew on G re at Britain for experience in determ in­ ing the lines on which their banks should be organized. From the first the general principles of Scottish banking w ere followed, allowing for branch-banking conducted by com paratively large concerns. T he heresy o f “free banking,” as practised in the U nited States, for a time had some support, with the idea that m ore banks would create m ore credit, and that local banks would be m ore sym pathetic to com m unity needs than large ones with distant head offices. In 1850 a concession was m ade to that opinion in C anada by the A ct to Establish F ree Banking in this Province, but little advantage was taken of it, and the “aberra­ tion from sound principles” was not m ore than a threat.6 Early life insurance policies were issued by the agencies of British com panies, and caused an estim ated export of £ 1 0 ,0 0 0 £ 1 5 ,0 0 0 in prem ium s. T he first com pany to be established in British N orth A m erica was the C anada Life A ssurance C om ­ pany, organized in 1847.7 British capital, British engineers, and British contractors played essential roles in the construction of the canals and railways of British N orth A m erica. Both m ethods of tran sp o rta­ tion w ere designed fo r foreign as well as local traffic by improving the St. Law rence entry to the great lakes o r by running steel up to the A m erican frontier. T he m aritim e prov­ inces and C anada laid plans for lines of transportation that would at once prom ote their own external trade and carry traffic between their own ports and eastern and central A m erica. The nam e o f the European and N o rth A m erican Railway proclaim ed that purpose to the world, and if the G reat W estern and G rand T ru n k railways had less descriptive nam es their objects w ere no less exalted. T hough in the fifties an impressive am ount of construction was com pleted in the Province of C anada, totalling some 2,000 miles, and providing rail transport from Riviere du Loup to W indsor, it was soon apparent th at A m erican traffic

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cam e now here n ear to expectations. M ontreal had been con­ nected w ith the w estern p art o f the province, and a line of railway to Portland, M aine, gave access to an ice-free port. T hus C anada was assured of a channel for her external trade through­ out-the year, provided that no.obstacles w ere placed in the way of com m unication through foreign territory. T he projects for connecting the all-year ports of the m aritim e provinces with the interior o f the continent still lagged, so th at no through route on British soil existed, and no links were forged to connect the province on the St. Law rence with those on the sea. O f the w estern colonies Assiniboia was m ore accessible from the U nited States than from Canada. F o r years goods w ere carried by the creaking Red River carts between F o rt G arry and St. Paul, and when steam ships began to operate on the Red River in 1857 transportation was m arkedly easier. Both British C olum ­ bia and V ancouver Island could be reached only by sea, except fo r the laborious and specialized land transport which the H u d ­ son’s Bay Com pany had built up for its own purposes. T he sea voyage from England took four to five m onths, though it could be shortened by proceeding to N ew Y ork and over the Isthm us o f P anam a. T he efficiency of the postal system depended very largely on the state o f facilities for transportation; and to some extent the reverse was also true, since the post office provided revenue for railways and steam ships, and encouraged the construction of roads. From 1851 C anada, N ova Scotia, and N ew Brunswick were all in charge o f the post office within their boundaries, but the carriage of mails between the m aritim e provinces and C anada, especially in w inter, was slow. F o r mail from E urope to C anada resort was had to A m erican railways. T he people of A ssiniboia also m ade use o f the A m erican postal system, and an attem pt to rem ove this cause o f A m ericanization of the colony by a mail service from C anada started in 1858 was soon aban­ doned. By the m iddle o f the century three o f the provinces had telegraph lines connecting w ith the A m erican systems. In C anada the M ontreal T elegraph C om pany ran from Q uebec to Buffalo, and the M ontreal and T roy C om pany built south to the border. N ew Brunsw ick had lines from Calais, M aine, to Saint John, and thence to A m herst, a t which point it m et the N ova Scotian governm ent’s telegraph to H alifax.8 These facilities m ade possible rapid com m unication with the U nited States, and constituted the fastest avenue o f news from Europe. D irect cable connection w ith Britain w as not established until 1866, though

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there was a local cable betw een N ew Brunsw ick and Prince E dw ard Island from 1852. In the fifties th e British colonies in N o rth A m erica had obtained better com m unication w ith the outside w orld than they had w ith each other. T o the advocates o f a political union the position was unsatisfactory; but from the point o f view of external trade there was less to regret, fo r m ore em phasis was laid on trade w ith Britain o r the U nited States than betw een the colonies themselves. T here are no m eans o f obtaining even an estim ate o f the relation betw een the external trade of the colo­ nies and their total national incomes, but it is clear th a t it form ed a large part. T hough C anada was m aking som e advance in that direction, none o f the provinces was industrialized, and all depended on the sale o f staple products abroad as a m eans of securing m anufactured goods o r other articles w hich they lacked. External trade created the greater p art o f their money incom e, leaving m aintenance agriculture o r fishing, and small industries - such as mills of various kinds - producing fo r local consum ption. A n exam ination o f the external trade o f the various provinces in the period between the adoption of free trad e by G reat Britain and the signature o f the reciprocity treaty indicates the extent, nature, and direction o f the trade. In 1852 the principal export o f N ova Scotia was, as before, fish, sent to the W est Indies, the U nited States, and elsewhere. L um ber cam e second in value, and was sold in the W est Indies and the U nited States. Coal was a poor third, and was bought in the U nited States and the o th er provinces. O f total exports valued a t £ 9 7 0 ,7 8 0 the largest buyers w ere the other British provinces ( £ 3 5 2 ,1 8 5 ) , the U nited States ( £ 2 5 7 ,8 4 9 ) , with the W est Indies not fa r behind. G reat B ritain bought goods to the extent o f only £ 6 2 ,6 7 5 . Im ports w ere som ew hat higher th an exports, am ounting to £ 1 ,1 9 4 ,1 7 5 . T he largest portion cam e from G re at Britain, the second from the U nited States, and the third from the other provinces. T he largest single item was cotton goods, com ing principally from Britain. W heat flour from the U nited States and C anada was close in value. O ther item s o f im portance, though considerably less than these two, were tea from the U nited States and the U nited K ingdom , sugar and molasses, fishing-tackle, iron, and leather.0 F o r the same year the exports o f N ew Brunsw ick w ere valued at £ 7 9 6 ,3 3 5 , this excluding ships sold abroad. T he order o f im portance of exports was the reverse o f th at o f N ova Scotia, forest p ro d ­ ucts m aking up m uch the largest item, and fish com ing second.

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T he first w ere sold principally to the U nited States, and fish sales were widely distributed. O f total im ports o f £.1,110,601 rath er m ore than a half cam e from the U nited K ingdom , the leading articles being haberdashery, cordage and rope, hardw are and iron, tea, and leather. W heat cam e alm ost altogether from the U nited States; flour from the U nited States and C anada; fruit, vegetables, and livestock from the other provinces.10 C anada’s exports of £ 3 ,5 1 3 ,9 9 3 were m ade up of w heat and flour to the U nited States, G reat Britain, and the other prov­ inces; tim ber, potash, and pearlash to Britain; and dried fish in lim ited quantities to foreign countries. H er im ports, show n as £ 5 ,0 7 1 ,6 2 3 , cam e chiefly from G reat B ritain and the U nited States, the principal items being as follow s: from G reat Britain - oil, cottons, woollens, silks, linen, haberdashery, fancy goods, iron and hardw are, coal, railway rails, earthenw are and glass­ w are; from the U nited States - sugar, tea, tobacco, salt, leather, oil, cotton, iron and hardw are, m achinery, hides, tallow, and books.11 E xternal trade had by no m eans been destroyed by the aban­ donm ent o f the old imperial system : if it had been the whole econom y of the provinces w ould have been shattered. But while the extrem e pessimism of the late forties had been exaggerated, it by no means followed th at the provinces w ere satisfied with the new order. They continued to believe in preferential m arkets as an objective, and w ere determ ined to find them w herever they could. Tariffs against im ports m ust be retained in some degree fo r revenue purposes, and there was a growing belief in tariffs fo r protection, especially in the m ore industrialized Province of Canada. T here had thus com e to be a conflict between the fiscal policies of G reat Britain and her N o rth A m erican colonies; the latter clinging to a regim e under which they had grown up, and seeking to build anew, on any available design, the structure which had in such a disconcerting fashion been blown down. T h e colonists did not cease to petition for a return, at least in p art, to the old protective system; but even thinly-veiled threats th at the new policy would bring the em pire to an end did not shock English opinion. T he em pire, was the reply, was based not only on trade, but in any case free trade was better for the colonies. N othing could shake this new belief in free trade, to w hich-the British governm ent now clung w ith all the passionate zeal of converts. Som e echoes o f the doctrine were heard in the provinces, w here it began to be argued that, since free trade was so advantageous, it should be adopted there as well. T he M ont­

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real E conom ist devoted itself to this cause and a free trade party was form ed in M ontreal. T h e Free T rade Association, however, adm itted the necessity of tariffs for revenue purposes, as was m ade clear in its m anifesto o f 1846. O n the w hole, however, there was little support for this position, it being pointed out th at England, with her m anufactures and shipping established, was in an altogether different position. T o the editor of the H alifax Tim es it appeared that such m easure of free trade as already existed had already displaced the m anufactures of G reat Britain and m ade the people of the province into “hew ers of wood and draw ers of w ater.” T he fu rth er extension of free trade, perhaps, could not m ake things any w orse.12 F ree trade in itself was not a popular policy; though reduc­ tion of tariffs through reciprocal agreem ents was generally thought to be hopeful. O n the other hand, opinion in favour of protection was significantly growing in C anada, but not as yet in the m aritim e provinces in which m anufacturing had hardly begun. Discussions inevitably arose as to w hether a protective system was suited to the econom y of C anada. T he argum ent on one side was that C anada m ust rem ain agricultural, could not com pete in m anufacturing, and therefore should have a low tariff. A fu rth er objection was th at protection was a tax on consum ers for the benefit of a small m inority.13 O thers held that the clim ate was too cold for extensive agriculture, while the existence of w ater-pow er was prom ising for m anufacturing. So far the picture of m anufacturing was n ot impressive. T here were cotton mills at Sherbrooke and Cham bly; woollen mills at S herbrooke and C obourg; three m anufacturers of rope at M ontreal; paper mills at P ortneuf, C ham bly, Stanstead, and in U pper C anada; iron at Long Point, T hree Rivers, and St. M aurice; glass at St. Jean; tanneries in M ontreal; and axes and nails were also m anufactured.14 It was all on a small scale, though it was to increase rapidly in the fifties. T h e C anadian tariff of 1847 was regarded by English ex­ porters as protective, and a group in Glasgow petitioned that it be disallowed. G rey brought this to Elgin’s attention, and, while adm itting the right o f the provincial legislature to adjust its own tariff for revenue purposes, he pointed out th at the effect might be a decreased purchase o f C anadian grain if the colonial m ar­ ket was closed against British exports in exchange. T he British governm ent refused to be persuaded of the virtues of another assault on the sacred citadel of free trade, and sternly resisted protective m easures in N ew Brunsw ick w hich began w ith a

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bounty on hem p, accom panying the refusal with a lecture on the new econom ics. If the colonies, as the colonial secretary m ore than once pointed out, could not see the advantages o f free trade over protection, they should a t least steer clear of differential duties.15 R. B. Sullivan m ade a protectionist speech in H am ilton, urging the prom otion of m anufacturing in the province as a m eans of increasing capital and population. H e disavowed any hostility to British m anufacturers, but suggested that they and A m ericans should establish plants in C anada.10 T here were m ore converts to protection in the next few years, and in 1852 and 1853 definitely protectionist m otions w ere debated in the assembly. T he m ovem ent gathered strength, and was im ple­ m ented in the Cayley tariff of 1858 and the G alt tariff of 1859. G enerally speaking the free trade m ovem ent was defended by pointing to the success o f that policy in England, and the protectionist m ovem ent by the exam ple of the U nited States. W hen the latter policy gained the ascendancy in C anada English opinion was not only shocked by the unw isdom of the C an a­ dians, b u t alarm ed as to the effect on British trade. F urth er protests against the G alt tariff w ere forw arded to H ead by N ew ­ castle, w ho pointed sorrow fully to the inability of C anada to follow the best fiscal tradition. It was in reply to this and the enclosed m em orial of the Sheffield C ham ber of C om m erce that G alt m ade his fam ous pronouncem ent.17 H e argued th at his was a revenue tariff, m ade necessary by the conditions o f C anadian public finance, and was unlikely to encourage any serious am ount o f m anufacturing. But the m ost im portant p art o f G alt’s rep o rt was the claim that the C anadian legislature had unlim ited control of its tariff. “I t is . . . the duty of the present G overn­ m ent distinctly to affirm the right of the C anadian legislature to adjust the taxation of the people in the w ay they deem best even if it should unfortunately happen to m eet the disapproval o f the Im perial M inistry. H er M ajesty cannot be advised to dis­ allow such acts, unless H er advisers are prepared to assum e the adm inistration o f the affairs o f the Colony, irrespective o f the views o f its inhabitants.” N othing could have been m ore definite. I t was a claim , and as it proved a successful claim , to the fiscal independence o f a colony. T he old im perial system was indeed passing. V ancouver Island deliberately followed a policy o f free trade, and proposals fo r a revenue tariff o f 5 per cent on all im ports, m ade from 1852 on, w ere rejected by the legislature. T he high tariff o f the U nited States bore heavily on the colony, and when

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the attem pts to have the reciprocity treaty o f 1854 extended to cover V ancouver Island failed, V ictoria was m ade a free p o rt in 1860, w ith the object of m aking the island a centre of trade on the coast.38 T he m ainland, on the other hand, im posed 10 per cen t duties on a large list of im ports fo r purposes of revenue; and in the united colony o f British Colum bia tariffs were retained. T h e m ovem ent fo r protection was severely lim ited in scope by the parallel attem pts to secure reciprocal trade agreem ents b oth as between the provinces them selves and with the U nited States. T h at an agreem ent betw een the provinces m et w ith less than enthusiastic and general support illustrates the lack o f ties betw een them . In 1847 N ova Scotia, and in 1848 Canada, passed perm issive acts allow ing the executive at any tim e to adm it, by proclam ation, th e products of any other province. T h e C anadian act, how ever, was never im plem ented. A n agree­ m ent was reached between N ova Scotia and N ew Brunswick, w hich was actually carried into effect; but P rince E dw ard Island abstained altogether, seeing no advantage to herself in the plan. In 1859, after it had accepted confederation in principle, and afte r G alt had conducted his tariff argum ent w ith the British governm ent, the C anadian governm ent initiated a m ovem ent for closer trade relations betw een the provinces. Tw o alternative suggestions w ere offered: that existing arrangem ents for the exchange o f produce or m anufactures o f the provinces should be extended; o r that there should be com plete freedom of trade betw een the provinces - a colonial zollverein. G alt’s m em o­ ran d u m w ent to the board o f trade, w hich returned a lengthy answer. In general the opinion was, as it had been before, that the plan was undesirable. Since the colonies used the tariff as a m eans of revenue, and since their products w ere highly varied, it seem ed impossible to have a w idespread agreem ent am ongst all British colonies. T he econom ies of the N o rth A m erican colonies, how ever, w ere sufficiently alike to allow o f limited arrangements,* but only u nder the condition th at any exem ption from im port duty, applied to the produce and m anufactures of these provinces respectively, shall be equally extended to all sim ilar produce and m anufactures of all countries.” T o do otherw ise w ould be to m agnify the C anadian sin against free trade, the ark of the covenant. A zollverein w ould probably be based on the high C anadian tariff, and was, therefore, ipso facto, objectionable.10 T he British governm ent was evidently prepared to disallow any acts intended to carry out such a plan, as it had

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already disallowed acts o f N ew Brunsw ick and P rince E dw ard Island which would have raised differential duties against the U nited States. W ith this cold reception the plan fo r econom ic federation fell to the ground. T h ere also follow ed on the abolition o f the im perial prefer­ ence system various attem pts to obtain access to the m arkets of the U nited States, particularly fo r the grain and lum ber which had form erly enjoyed a protected position in G reat Britain. T here were two ways o f doing this: by political union, o r by trade treaties. T he form er was an extrem e m easure, but the com m ercial class, particularly o f C anada and N ew Brunswick, saw ruin staring them in the face as a result o f British free trade. Inclined to think in term s o f black an d white, their finan­ cial discom fort was added to a w eakening im perial sentim ent on both sides of the A tlantic. If the m other country ignored their interests they m ust find salvation elsewhere. Few people could think o f Canada, o r even of British N o rth A m erica, as an eco­ nom ic u n it in itself: it m ust be attached to one o r other great pow er. A nd then there was the tradition th a t the U nited States prospered in contrast to the struggling colonies. T o m any people it seemed that the old am bition o f developing the St. Law rence valley as an econom ic avenue between N o rth A m erica and E urope had failed of realization. F ate was against it, and fate now pointed another way. In C anada the annexation m ovem ent was brought to a head by the test of responsible governm ent in the Rebellion Losses A ct. T ories shed loyalty w hen the world they had knowij and governed was turned upside down, and the M ontreal m anifesto o f 1849, calling fo r annexation to the U nited States, was an outburst o f econom ic and political griev­ ances. T h e chief force o f the m ovem ent was in M ontreal, the centre of the com m ercial interests. In U pper C anada there was little sym pathy and considerable resistance. In N ova Scotia and N ew B runsw ick the sam e com bination of political and econom ic events produced cries for annexation, particularly in H alifax and Saint John, and in the lum ber districts o f n orthern New Brunswick; also to som e extent in Prince E dw ard Island.20 It is doubtful w hether this annexation m ovem ent need be taken seriously as a political force. M uch o f it cam e from an angry opposition, and was o f an em otional type that tended to fade with time. A revival of prosperity helped to cure the ills of which the annexationists com plained, and the persistent efforts of E lgin’s governm ent to secure reciprocal tariff arrangem ents with the U nited States gave prom ise o f a cure th at was not so

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excitingly naughty but a t least m ore palatable. T he reciprocity treaty, long under discussion, was finally passed in 1854.21 It provided for the free exchange o f grains and flour, animals and meats, vegetables, dairy products, fish, coal, and lumber. L im ited reciprocal rights were given to coastal fisheries, and A m erican vessels were adm itted to equal rights w ith C anadian on the St. Law rence. T he treaty did not covcr any m anufactured goods, since it was believed that the “budding efforts” o f the provinces in that field w ould not stand against equal com peti­ tion. “Open the floodgates o f the U nited States to-day, and our thriving m anufactures would be assuredly sw am ped.” 22 The treaty included all the British provinces except those on the Pacific coast. T he governm ent of V ancouver Island attem pted to arrange for the inclusion o f that province, but w ithout success. T h e effects of the treaty on the provinces concerned, as show n by the statistics o f the years just before the A m erican Civil W ar created abnorm al conditions, were less than the optim ists had expected but still im portant. In N ova Scotia both im ports and exports increased m aterially, and the U nited States becam e the largest seller and buyer. Sales to the U nited K ing­ dom were sm aller absolutely as well as relatively.23 A sim ilar change occurred in N ew Brunswick. W hereas in 1852 that province exported goods valued at £.603,295 to the United K ingdom and only £ 8 3 ,7 9 2 to the U nited States, in 1859 the figures were £ 7 1 6 ,4 3 6 and £ 2 3 6 ,0 1 4 respectively; and in im ports the U nited States passed G re a t Britain.24 In the same year (1859) Prince E dw ard Island bought from N ova Scotia, the U nited K ingdom , and the U nited States, in th at order, and sold fish and farm products in the U nited States.25 In Canada too the volum e o f trade had increased. Types of goods im ported had changed little under the treaty, but while G reat Britain had been slightly ahead in 1852, by 1859 the U nited States had taken a decisive lead. In exports the change was even more m arked.2'1W hile a m arked increase of external trade had taken place - during, and perhaps because of, the reciprocity treaty the m illenium once pictured had not arrived. T he fisheries of the m aritim e provinces, w hich had been at a low ebb before the treaty, w ere now subjected to even greater com petition from A m ericans, who continued to receive a bounty. T he imposition of higher tarilfs, especially by C anada, antagonized A m erican m anufacturers. Intercolonial reciprocity, frow ned on in 1860, was accepted in principle in 1861. T he desire to retain the treaty

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w aned appreciably in the provinces and began to disappear altogether in the U nited States. T o facilitate trade relations with C anada a num ber o f foreign countries appointed residents o f M ontreal as consuls, these receiving exequaturs from the British governm ent. In 1850 Belgium, Portugal, and D enm ark all took this action, and in 1851 the H ansa towns and H anover followed suit. In 1856 the executive council recom m ended that F rance should appoint a consul-gencral in place of its consular agencies a t Q uebec and M ontreal. T he British governm ent was willing for the change and approached the F rench am bassador, who, how ever, re­ ported that his governm ent could not at the tim e take such action.27 But at the very tim e that the reply was m ade a F rench mission under M . Belveze, com m ander of a French m an-of-war, was touring C anada with the object of establishing com m ercial relations. G reat enthusiasm greeted the F rench party, and an elaborate survey of the conditions of the province was m ade.28 As a result of the trip the F rench tariff was modified so as to adm it C anadian w ood and ships, and a consul-general was appointed in 1859 w ho came to live in Q uebec.23 T h e external trade o f the provinces o f British N orth A m erica not only survived the radical fiscal changes undertaken in Eng­ land, b ut continued to grow. In tariff policy and arrangem ents significant alterations were m ade in the provinces, but on the whole they w ere alterations intended to preserve by other m eans the essential characteristics of the old regime. Budding industries com plicated the situation by causing the introduction o f protection for hom e products; but essentially the provinces looked to external trade, and to finding their m ain econom ic strength from the sale of the staples w ith w hich they had been richly endowed.

CHAPTER 4

The Path to Confederation

H ardly had British N o rth A m erica begun to settle dow n to plan a new order to take the place o f th e Gld w hen the shock of the A m erican Civil W ar threw out all calculations and forced a reconsideration o f plans. It was not so m uch th at the elements in the situation w ere new, fo r the provinces h ad long been accustom ed to A m erican influence in varying form and degree. N o r even was it th at entirely fresh ideas w ere evolved to fit the changed circum stances. T he m oves open to the provinces in constructing their external policies w ere strictly lim ited in nu m b er: it was only in em phasis, com bination, and speed that there was room fo r choice. T h e Civil W ar caught the provinces in a stage o f transition in every im portant aspect o f their external relations. T he old m er­ cantilist em pire had com e to an end am idst cries of despair and bitterness. T he im perial defence system, as it had been known, was doom ed; and so faint was the im perial faith in Britain that m any contem poraries on both sides o f the A tlantic believed that the em pire w ould not long outlast its traditional m anifestations. T h e older colonies w ere a t once seeking to repair the lines of trad e and to adjust them selves to an age o f iro n and steam . Bold steps in the construction o f railways had brought heavy com ­ m itm ents and uncertain results. T he people o f C anada were casting anxious looks tow ards Assiniboia, w ondering how they could arrest its growing attachm ent to the neighbouring states of the union. F a r to the w est the colony o f British Colum bia was in gloom y convalescence after the hectic fever o f the gold rush, looking for a sign as to th e w ay it should take tow ard renewed strength. T he problem s o f the sixties w ere, indeed, such as m ight challenge the wisest statesm anship. Civil W ar in the U nited States, w ith m ilitary operations m ounting in scale and tem pers fraying, could not but affect in som e degree those provinces bordering on the scene of action, accustom ed to constant interchange of people and goods, hardly know ing w hether they w ere m ore draw n by com m unity of in­ terests o r repelled by fear o f aggression.1 T he frequent crossing

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o f the border, w hich had becom e an accepted condition, was curtailed even before the outbreak o f hostilities by threatening conditions in the U nited States. F o r two periods, also, legal barriers w ere set up by the A m erican governm ent. In 1861 passports were required of C anadians em barking at A m erican ports, a rule w hich seriously im peded w inter travel between C an ad a and E urope. A few m onths later the regulation was w ithdraw n, but at the end o f 1864 again passports had to be carried by all foreigners entering the U nited States. In spite of the inconveniences resulting from general and particular restric­ tions to travel, the people o f the provinces m ight well have wished that the boundary could have been com pletely sealed, as the lesser evil com pared w ith the danger of being involved in the war. O n the issues o f the w ar there was no single opinion. H ad the N orth been fighting against slavery, as it first appeared to be, its cause would have m et w ith wide approval, for slavery was generally condem ned in all the provinces. But on the issue o f states’ rights there was no such settled conviction. T he coer­ cion o f the southern states received some adverse com m ent, and was som etim es related to the disturbing process by which the U nited States had been absorbing its neighbours. Judged in term s of practical aid it w ould seem th at the cause o f the N o rth was the m ore p opular one. In spite of the efforts of the authorities to enforce the F oreign Enlistm ent A ct, C ana­ dians enlisted in the federal arm ies, and offers w ere even m ade to raise regim ents in C anada. By far the largest num ber cam e from F rench C anada - perhaps three-quarters o f a total esti­ m ated by a contem porary a t 40,000, o f w hom , it was said, 14,000 were killed.2 W hile a portion o f these enlisted because of conviction, and others fo r adventure o r em ploym ent, m any w ere persuaded by the recruiting agents sent to C anadian towns, o r deluded into crossing the boundary on som e pretext. T he b ounty offered to recruits no doubt was often the inducem ent to enlist, and w hen th at failed attem pts w ere m ade to fill up the ranks by crim ping. T here are few indications o f enlistm ent by C anadians in the southern arm ies, but th a t can, at least in part, be explained by the wide barrier th at separated the provinces from the confederacy. T o international com plications arising o ut of C anadian enlistm ent - voluntary or forced - were added those created by th e desertion o f U nited States citizens from the federal arm ies to C anada. T he presence o f such deserters was unw elcom e both because they added to unem ploym ent, and m ore particularly because o f the friction caused on the border.

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T h ere were cases of their p ursuit on C anadian soil by A m erican forces, cases w hich could n o t be ignored by th e C anadian authorities. A ny gratitude that might have been felt in the N orth toward the colonials serving in their armies was m ore than offset by a belief that the provinces, like the m other country, really favoured the South, both in thought and in deed. British recog­ nition o f the confederacy as a belligerent, the activities o f the English-built privateer A labam a, and expressed sym pathy for the South in Britain once m ore fanned into a flame old em bers stirred by the seizure of confederate agents from the British ship Trent. T o the A nglo-A m erican disputes w ere added those that arose out o f the plots of confederates, w ho sw arm ed in the provinces as did federal recruiting officers and federal detec­ tives. C anada in particular was dangerously exposed to being forced into the position of territory added to the general conflict. In 1863 L ord M onck w arned the British m inister in W ashington of an intended raid from C anada, and so enabled the federal authorities to guard against it. As the w ar w ent against it, the confederate governm ent m ade desperate attem pts to create a diversion by opening up a new front. In the spring of 1864 three com m issioners w ere sent to represent the “C onfederate D ep artm ent in C anada,” and - apparently supplied w ith am ple funds —the unw elcom e visitors assumed extra-territorial status. T h e largest design, for a northw estern confederacy within the U nited States, cam e to nothing. Tw o or three abortive raids involved violations of C anadian neutrality. T he m ost futile of the plots was the one that caused the greatest repercussions. In O ctober, 1864, a raid from C anada w as organized against the tow n of St. A lbans, in V erm ont. Banks w ere robbed, a cashier was shot, and attem pts w ere m ade to burn the town. T he affair was condem ned in C anada, but when the returning raiders, though arrested prom ptly, w ere at first discharged on the ground th at the court possessed no jurisdiction, there was a bitter outcry in N o rthern papers. T he num ber o f actual arm ed outbreaks as a result of confederate plots was small, but there w ere fre­ q u en t alarm s w hich were alm ost as effective in m aintaining international tension. T hreats to neutrality im plicit in m aritim e disputes and border incidents were accom panied by a revival o f the old issue of annexation. A m ongst the A m erican public and press were men, o f w hom the m ost vociferous w as the editor of the N ew Y ork Herald, w ho urged annexation o f the provinces. W ith the close

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o f the w ar the A m erican governm ent was left w ith a great arm y, and m em ories o f quarrels with both G reat Britain and C anada. T h e old opposition from the South, based on resistance to the addition of fu rth e r free soil, was gone; no r was the South more friendly to either Britain o r her colonies. W ithin the republican adm inistration that took office in 1861 there w ere both anglophobes and expansionists, and the assassination of L incoln left Seward a freer hand under A ndrew Johnson, his imperialist zeal being curbed only by a Congress hostile to Johnson and cautious about expenditure. T he secretary of state’s roving eye fell on the C aribbean, A laska, the H aw aiian Islands, and C anada. He had visions o f extending A m erican pow er to the far east, to South A m erica, and to the A rctic Ocean. N o r was Seward the only p rophet o f m anifest destiny, for m any a w riter saw the blessings of A m erican governm ent extended to m ore than a continent.3 T he Fenian raids on N ew Brunswick and C anada in 1866 were greeted with scarcely concealed approval by the expansionists in the republican party; and a bill was introduced into the H ouse o f Representatives “for the adm ission o f the states o f N ova Scotia, N ew Brunswick, C anada East, and C anada W est, and fo r the organization o f the T erritories of Selkirk, Saskatchew an, and C olum bia.” If the provinces exaggerated their own im portance to a people preoccupied w ith w ar and post-w ar problem s they were at least not w ithout evidence of hostility o r even o f aggressive tendencies. T hey endeavoured to justify their claims to neu­ trality by enforcem ent o f its obligations, but there was no escape from the conclusion that m easures for m ilitary defence must accom pany legal correctness. F o r the defence o f the colonies three elem ents w ere to be considered: the militia, fortifications, and aid from England. A t the outbreak of the Civil W ar there were slightly m ore than 4,000 im perial troops in all British N o rth A m erica; about 5,000 equipped and partly drilled volun­ teers in C anada; and the sam e in the m aritim e provinces to­ gether.4 Steps w ere taken by the British governm ent to send im m ediate reinforcem ents to the extent of three regim ents and a field battery, and after the Trent affair, larger reinforcem ents still. These m easures were designed to m eet a tem porary em er­ gency, and did not alter the policy th at the governm ent had adopted in the forties: th at perm anent garrisons would gradu­ ally be w ithdraw n and im perial troops sent only to m eet specific dangers; and th at the defence of the provinces m ust prim arily depend on an adequate num ber of trained volunteers. Two

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exam inations o f the situation, m ade on the eve o f the Civil W ar, served to strengthen the adherence to th at policy. R eporting in 1859, the m ajority o f the three com m issioners appointed to consider the expense of m ilitary defences in the colonies found th at “ a system o f defence, based upon the presence o f Im perial garrisons in every p art o f the em pire, is as inefficient as it is burdensom e; and th at the right system w ould be one based on local efforts and local resources.” T o this they added that C an ad a was subject to attack only by the U nited States, and th a t the tim e required for th at country to prepare an invading force would be m ore than enough to allow for British troops to be transported to the colony. A select com m ittee o f the H ouse of Com m ons on colonial m ilitary expenditure reported in 1861 that, while some discretion should be left to the governm ent in judging individual cases, “ the responsibility and cost o f the defence of such dependencies [the colonies] from perils not arising from the results of Im perial policy ought m ainly to devolve upon themselves.” 5 T h at the willingness of the colonies to undertake m ilitary obligations should vary in direct ratio w ith the apparent danger o f w ar was to be expected. T he T rent affair produced a quick response. In C anada the existing volunteers drilled enthusiasti­ cally and offers o f fu rth er corps were m ade. Joseph How e offered every able-bodied m an in N ova Scotia for m ilitary service.6 A public m eeting in S aint John drew a large and en­ thusiastic crow d. Enthusiasm soon cooled. A t a second meeting in Saint John speakers expressed surprise th at attendance was slim .7 H ow e ceased to see danger from the U nited States. C an ad a was, as it always had been, the m ost vulnerable o f the colonies, and the apprehension o f w ar led th e governm ent to appoint in 1862 a com mission to consider m ilitary affairs. T he report, presented to parliam ent in M ay in the form of an enabling bill, was an am bitious one, providing for an active force of 50,000 m en w ith a reserve of the sam e size. C onscrip­ tion by ballot m ight be resorted to if necessary. T he annual cost was to be $1,100,000. T he bill was bitterly attacked by m em bers from both U pper and Low er C anada; was defeated; and the governm ent, already w eak, resigned. T h e succeeding m inistry, th at o f Sandfield M acdonald and L. V. Sicotte, returned to a v ariant o f the old system, at a cost of rath er less th a n half of w hat had been proposed in J. A. M acdonald’s bill. T h e failure o f the m ilitia bill served to bring out a variety of opinions both in E ngland and C anada. N ew argum ents w ere

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offered to those in England who felt th at C anada did not bear a fair share of h er own defence. In the press and in parliam ent criticism , some o f it bitter, was expressed. W riting to the gov­ ern o r general shortly after the session of parliam ent had closed, N ew castle hoped th at “the general spirit o f those debates will n ot have been m isinterpreted,” but adm itted th at “the rejection o f the M ilitia Bill has produced a disadvantageous im pression on the minds o f the English people.” C om ing to the practical problem of how to provide for defence he stated he had “the opinions o f the best m ilitary authorities, th a t no body o f troops w hich E ngland could send, would be able to m ake C anada safe w ithout the efficient aid o f the C anadian people. N o t only is it impossible to send sufficient troops but if these were fo u r times the num ber which we are m aintaining in British N orth A m erica, they could not secure the whole of the frontier. T he m ain de­ pendence of such a country m ust be upon its own people.” T he least n um ber o f m en which the provincial governm ent should look forw ard to drilling would be 50,000.8 In the provinces public opinion was divided on the fairness of the attitude o f the British governm ent. T he case was never fully presented, for colonials seized almost entirely on the allocation of costs, concluding th at they should o r should not bear a larger share. U ndoubtedly th at argum ent was also the one m ost obvi­ ously influential in England; but there was also the strategic factor, brought out both in the com m ission o f 1859 and the com m ittee o f 1861, th at assistance could be given m ore effec­ tively by an adequate force to be sent as occasion required than by perm anent and necessarily sm all garrisons. T he public in B ritish N o rth A m erica did not, however, miss the point that the need fo r defence m ight result from im perial rath er than local policy, and m ight be an im perial as well as a local interest. “It is som ething new,” w rote a Saint John editor, “to see the statesm en o f E ngland look forw ard to sham e and dishonour w ith such philosophical calm ness, such cold, calculating indifference. . . . W hile we form p a rt o f the E m pire E ngland m ust and will do all she can to p ro tec t our soil — not indeed for our sake but her ow n.”9 T he sam e them e was elaborated by a rival p ap e r in the sam e city. T h e C olonies should undoubtedly provide fo r their ow n in­ ternal security and peace, and they have already m anifested a disposition to do this; but that they should provide m eans to defen d their territories fro m enem ies externally, w hen m ade so

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by Im perial policy in which the colonies have no voice, we un­ equivocally and decidedly dispute. W hen Great Britain sent her trained and trusted warriors to these Provinces, after the per­ petration o f the outrage on board the T rent, it was n ot to defend Provincial interests, fo r none were jeopardized by any provin­ cial policy or likely to be so, but to m aintain im perial interests, if an attem pt had at that tim e been m ade to seriously imperil them , against all opposing forces.10 In C anada East the radical L e Pays burst o u t at the sugges­ tion th a t E ngland would n ot defend C anada. Situation singuliere! R ester colons, pour le plaisir de s’appeler sujets britanniques, pour les beaux ye u x de I’Angleterre, et cependant dem eurer obliges de nous defendre contre les ennem is de la m etropole com m e si nous etions independants! . . . C om m ent! S ’il plait a ux A nglais et aux A m ericains de se quereller a propos de bottes, pour des questions qui ne nous interessent pas plus que les affaires de C hine ou du Japon, nous serons tenus de verser notre sang et de nous ruiner parce que le Canada est une colonie Britannique . . -11 O ther papers of C anada East took a less decided line, arguing th at C anada and E ngland should share the burden. In both parts o f the province there w ere expressions o f opinion m ore sym pa­ thetic to England, and the attitude of L e Pays could be set off against that of the right-wing tories who urged large expenditure for defence, and placed unlim ited confidence in the British governm ent. E ach accused the other of sinister m otives: the left holding that peace could be m aintained w ere it not for the im perial connection and the misguided im perialism of the tories, and the right constantly hurling the epithet “annexationist.” T h e third factor to be considered in relation to the defence of the provinces was fortifications. In 1863 and 1864 LieutenantColonel W . F. D . Jervois was sent by the w ar office to Canada. In his first report he assum ed that, failing naval superiority on the lakes, the whole province w est of M ontreal was indefensible. T h e second report, how ever, included w orks a t K ingston, T o ­ ronto, and H am ilton, w ith an estim ated total cost of £ 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 . N aval force sufficient to m aintain com m unications would also be required. Q uebec and M ontreal, seaports and m ore readily defensible, w ere to be fortified at a cost o f £ .7 4 3 ,000.12 M ost of the plans were never im plem ented, though they did not cease to be discussed. Jervois’s first opinion, unpopular as it was, that

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C anada W est could not be defended, at least not w ithout con­ siderable naval pow er, was perhaps not far from the truth. A huge A m erican arm y, once freed from the Civil W ar, and with railways a t its disposal, was form idable out of all proportion to the arm y of 1812. F o r the m aritim e provinces the royal navy would always be a protection, but not even troops could reach C anada in w inter except by the arduous land route followed by the im perial reinforcem ents in 1861. T he problem of defence was clearly different in the several colonies both in the danger anticipated and the m eans of repelling it. T hey had in com m on, however, a continuing apprehension o f A m erican aggression and a realization th at the m ilitary em pire, as they had known it, was gone. T he econom ic problem s of the provinces were partly accen­ tuated, partly caused, by the Civil W ar. Factors beyond their control had been causing disturbing changes in the econom y of the British N o rth A m erican provinces. Industrialism and free trade had together upset the old regim e under which the natural products of the provinces had been carried to a protected m ar­ ket in ships built of N orth A m erican lum ber. T he new age of steam , iron, and free trade had called for m ajor adjustm ents. Coal and iron had now to be im ported, and m oney borrow ed fo r the railways that had becom e a necessity. F or a brief period all seemed to be well: capital and equipm ent flowed from E ng­ land, and the reciprocity treaty prom ised a new avenue of pro­ tected trade. But it was a delicate balance, all too easily upset by events abroad. Financial stringency in the U nited States and E ngland autom atically affected the provinces, and on the eve of the Civil W ar the provinces faced a partially-com pleted network of railways and a heavy debt. T he w ar had a disturbing effect in m any ways. A n observer in C anada W est found business de­ pressed, prices low, the value o f land down, the influx of British capital stopped, and money leaving the country. “ We are as a people,” he w rote, “affected m ost acutely by the abnorm al con­ ditions o f ou r great neighbour. . . . O ur currency is deranged, ou r exchanges affected, and, generally, the whole course of com m ercial transactions so governed and diverted that recipro­ cal trade has alm ost becom e an affair of gam bling.” 13 Even if difficult, the trade with the U nited States m ade up m ore than half o f the total external trade of the British provinces, and during the period o f the operation of the treaty the value of that trade had m ore than doubled. T h at this increase was only in part caused by the treaty itself was not fully realized at the tim e, and

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w hen abrogation becam e a possibility it seemed th at a m ajor catastrophe was im pending. T o som e extent, no doubt, the political friction o f the w ar years at least hurried on the A m eri­ can decision to term inate the arrangem ent. But only about 6 per cent of the total foreign trade o f the U nited States was w ith the British provinces, and the decision was not fo r them one of overw helm ing m om ent. T here had been growing resentm ent by A m erican m anufacturers against the increasing tariff protection adopted in Canada, and it w as argued th at the provinces had not lived up to the spirit o f the agreem ent. By taking the southern free traders out of Congress the Civil W ar opened the w ay fo r a policy o f protection. W hile intercolonial trade cam e to be thought o f as an alterna­ tive to th at w ith the U nited States (w hich w as expected greatly to diminish), it had also been investigated for its own m erits. In 1861 the governm ent o f N ew Brunswick proposed a plan fo r free trade between the m aritim e provinces; and the British gov­ ernm ent not only w ithdrew its opposition, but gave its blessing to the inclusion o f C anada as well. A difficulty which had stood in the w ay had always been the higher tariff o f C anada, but by the end of the w ar reductions in C anada had brought the tariffs o f the provinces sufficiently close to allow fo r a custom s u nion of som e type to be seriously considered. A collective effort was also m ade by the provinces to extend their trade w ith M exico, the W est Indies, and South A m erica. In Septem ber, 1865, “T he C onfederate C ouncil fo r T ra d e” m et at Q uebec “in reference to the Reciprocity T reaty with the U nited States and com m ercial m atters generally,” and agreed to recom m end the opening of negotiations for m ore extensive trade. T o this the colonial secre­ tary gave his w arm approval, and a com mission was appointed by the governm ents o f C anada, N ova Scotia, N ew Brunswick, and P rince E dw ard Island. A cting under instructions from their own governm ents, and w ith the necessary good offices o f the British governm ent in relations both w ith other colonies and foreign states, the com m issioners left on their to u r after a m eet­ ing in London. W hen their investigations w ere com pleted the com m issioners m ade a report, w ith som e definite suggestions: im provem ent o f transportation and postal facilities; a reduction o f duties, by reciprocal treaties o r otherw ise, levied in the W est Indies, Brazil, and the Spanish colonies on the staples o f British N o rth A m erica; and an assim ilation o f th e tariffs of the British W est Indies in respect of the sam e staples.14 F o u r years later plans w ere being considered fo r the extension o f trad e w ith

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Portugal and M editerranean countries. All these, how ever, were no m ore than plans, and no solid alternative had yet been found to replace the security of either the old im perial preference or the reciprocal agreem ent w ith the U nited States. A com bination of circum stances thus brought the people of the provinces consciously to consider their future. One possible course was to rem ain as they w ere, but to do so w ould sim ply be to accept present conditions th at were far from satisfactory and fu tu re ones w hich m ight be a great deal worse. Inevitably there was revived the recourse of peaceful annexation to the U nited States, by which the problem of defence would autom atically cease to exist and the ex-colonials would participate in the eco­ nom ic advantages enjoyed by the U nited States. It was tow ard this end that a t least some o f the cam paign against the reci­ procity treaty had been waged in the U nited States, and there were not lacking individuals in the provinces w ho were willing to join with the larger neighbour. In C anada E ast the conserva­ tive and liberal newspapers accused the radical party o f a dan­ gerous adm iration for A m erican institutions, and a tendency tow ard annexation. L ’Ordre was said to favour annexation openly, Le Pays to be always praising the U nited States, and the W itness and the H erald to follow L e Pays. T h eir adm iration for the republic’s institutions w as not shared by L a M inerve, which saw corruption in its people from the custom s officials up, and lam ented the fate o f those F rench C anadians w ho had em igrated to the U nited States.15 T he conservative Courrier du Canada used harsher w ords: L e Pays, de M ontreal, avec cette pertinacite m aladive qui characterise le m al, ne cesse d’exalter les autres pays mais surtou t les Etats-U nis aux depens du Canada; pour ce faire ils soustraient, m utilent, et com battent la verite a outrance. Les m alheureux lecteurs de ce m alheureux journal n’apprennent pas un m o t de la gangrene m orale qui ronge la societe am ericaine et q ui se traduit heure par heure dans la presse de cette infortunee republique.10 Such language was not unusual in days when editors were accustom ed to express their views with unrestrained vigour, but the accusations o f favouring annexation o r independence were m et w ith a revealing argum ent. 11 est fa u x qu'il y ait ici un parti a nnexationiste.. . . II y a tout sim p lem ent des gens qui voient clair, qui consultent Vavenir et

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q ui se dem andent: si VAngleterre nous abandonne, ou ne prom et pas de nous defendre en cas d ’attaque et n ’en prend pas les m oyens, que faudra-t-il faire? 11 y a deux m odes d ’existence politique possible en dehors des arrangem ents actuels: I inde­ pendence ou I'annexion, lequel choisir?17 T h e idea o f union with the U nited States was, in fact, based not on ideological principles but on specific interests. T here was always a m inority which supported annexation on general geo­ graphical or econom ic argum ents, but it was not that m inority which was influential. T he position in the sixties was not unlike that which gave rise to the annexation m anifesto of 1849, but the earlier m ovem ent had had m ore vitality and w ider support than the later. Belief in the im perial connection was strong throughout all the provinces, but scepticism would inevitably increase if no advantages, o r even positive disadvantages, ap ­ peared to be the only rew ard o f loyalty. T he provinces w ere still faced w ith the problem o f their external relations in the future. D iscouraged by the decline in foreign trade, alarm ed by the im perialism of the U nited States, they w anted to be reassured that British connection.spelt tangible aid and not merely risk of international friction. It was not only in C anada E ast that such ideas were being discussed. A supporter o f the governm ent, a journalist in W oodstock, C anada West, was alarm ed by w hat he heard around him. I t is rum oured, that a desire fo r annexation to the U nited States is widely spread absorbing all other questions. This is not true, but it is true, that there is a strong feeling in favou r o f independence taking possession o f the public m in d created and fo m e n te d chiefly by the leading m erchants, in this section, who are doubtless inspired by a desire to guard their ow n interests. The reasons the\y] adduce fo r the agitation are "that Canada is indefensible” —“that it is absurd to burden the country with an enorm ous debt as a condition o f the Im perial grant fo r the fo rti­ fication o f Q uebec" - “that Canada has no need o f expensive defences under the present friendly feeling which exists between Canada and the U nited States” - . . . it is m y du ty to inform you o f the feeling, that prevails here that if we are left to ourselves or fo rced to incur a burden o f debt fo r our defences the cry fo r independence 1 fear will be irresistible in this western peninsula.1S Peaceful annexation was being seriously discussed, though how m uch solid support it had is impossible to tell. T he other

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positive course w hich the provinces might take was tow ard political union, either by regions or of all the provinces together. L ong advocated by individuals, the idea o f a union of some or all of the colonies had lacked the force to carry it over the objections raised. In the sixties a rem arkable com bination of circum stances occurred: the m aritim e provinces were seriously contem plating a regional union; the Province o f C anada looked fo r a way out of its own ham pering dualism ; the colonies of the w est seemed to be slipping tow ard the U nited States. T h e two countries which exercised m ost influence on British N orth A m erica were, directly o r indirectly, exerting pressure tow ard union. T he U nited States supplied coercive force by the m ilitary and political threats that w ere read into the actions and speeches o f her politicians and publicists. T he British governm ent, lately lukew arm tow ard union, cam e to use every means at its disposal to encourage it.19 Pushed and pulled tow ard a decision, provin­ cial governm ents and legislatures gazed dow n the untracked path that led to a new British N o rth A m erica and a new British Em pire. II Responsible governm ent, which its ardent supporters saw as a deus ex m achina to solve the constitutional riddle of the old im perial system, set in bold relief the very problem s which it was intended to remove. A local m inistry in virtual control of the executive pow er was expected to draw a nice distinction between dom estic and external affairs. It is not surprising th at it sought to draw within its orbit those subjects which it could with advantage control, and to label as external equally controversial ground which could be held only with loss and worry. But the m ovem ent which culm inated in G alt’s assertion o f fiscal inde­ pendence in 1859 was a P yrrhic victory, for a British parliam ent and public could not follow a logic under which its soldiers but n ot its goods m ight be exported to the colonies. O ut of the w elter o f conflicting opinions on both sides of the A tlantic a few them es m ay be isolated. In G re at Britain there was little en­ thusiasm for the colonial connection, but a willingness to carry it on subject to a reasonable degree of com prom ise on the o ut­ standing questions. In the colonies, w hich w ere much m ore vitally affected, large m ajorities were anxious to rem ain within the em pire, but found the existing position am biguous and un­ satisfactory. U nion o f the provinces was welcome to both : to

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the m other country because it prom ised some solution o f the defence question, and to the colonies because they believed that it would give them econom ic, m ilitary, and political strength. It is, however, the paradox o f the confederation m ovem ent that the central issue o f the control o f external relations w as left alm ost untouched. T he idea of a union of some o r all of the provinces was not a new one, but - as in the case of the earlier union of the thirteen colonies - external pressure was required to bring them to ­ gether. T he collapse of the old econom ic em pire in the forties had forced the colonies to reconstruct their schem e of external trade, which they had attem pted to do by tariff agreem ents with each other and with the U nited States. T he latter seemed to fail with the abrogation o f reciprocity, and the form er could be extended only by a joint im provem ent o f transportation. T he Civil W ar forced a m ore serious consideration of the defence question, and the British policy of w ithdraw al of troops at least suggested defence based on political union. Finally, belief in colonies had reached its nadir in the m other country, and the British governm ent was ready to give its pow erful support to the federation m ovem ent, with its eyes open to the possibility th at it m ight be the fo rerunner o f independence. T hreats to territory, both that held by the colonies and th at in the w est to which they had som e aspirations, com bined w ith British coolness tow ard econom ic or political em pire, drove on the union m ovem ent over the obstacles o f provincial consciousness and m inority fears. In the com plexity of issues raised by the federation project no single aim - w hether of internal o r external application - can be said to have had a determ ining effect on any one province. T he public, the press, and the legislatures weighed the argu­ m ents for and against, exam ining the proposed constitutional m achinery, financial settlem ent, the possibilities of increased trade, effect on the im perial tie and on relations w ith foreign pow ers. E xternal factors by no m eans constituted the sole co n ­ siderations, but they did receive great attention at a tim e w hen the econom ic and m ilitary position of the provinces seem ed so uncertain. T ra d e played a leading p art in the debates in all provinces.20 A m inority party in Prince E dw ard Island argued that the re­ m oval o f custom s barriers w ould reduce the price of im ported goods, and that agricultural products could be sold in Saint John and H alifax, w hich was particularly necessary in view o f the com ing abrogation o f reciprocity. T he m ajority opinion, how ­

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ever, denied the validity o f this argum ent, and held th a t C anada w ould furnish no m arket for the Island’s staples in agriculture and fisheries, and th a t profitable m arkets already existed in G reat Britain, the U nited States, and the W est Indies. In N ova Scotia th e proponents of confederation argued th at the geo­ graphical position and the potential m anufactures o f the prov­ ince could be exploited only in union w ith a larger territory, of w hich N ova Scotia w ould becom e the “A tlantic frontage.” To this it was answered th at free trade could be secured w ithout political union, and that there was in any case some doubt as to w hether the infant m anufactures of the province should be exposed to the cold breeze o f free com petition. V ery m uch the sam e argum ents w ere used in N ew Brunswick. N either in N ova Scotia n o r N ew Brunsw ick did the trade issue bulk so large as other aspects o f the project. F o r British C olum bia the prospects o f trade w ith eastern A m erica w ere too visionary to have a p opular appeal, but com m ercial dependence on the Pacific states was objectionable because o f the high tariff against the province, and confederation - given effective transportation - m ight p ro ­ vide an alternative. T here was, how ever, som e fear th at a tariff controlled by the dom inion w ould possibly n o t be calculated in th e interests o f British C olum bian industries and agriculture. N o aspect o f confederation was given m ore attention; and advo­ cates o f confederation were even driven to suggest th at there m ight be a special tariff for the province. It was in C anada that th e com m ercial aspect o f confederation was debated m ost hotly, following a tradition o f signal optim ism o r pessimism tow ard each successive plan fo r the im provem ent o f trade. I f the m ari­ tim e provinces needed a hinterland, C anada, “shut up in prison fo r five m onths o f the year in fields of ice,” needed a sea-coast. T h ere w ere hopes, too, of intercolonial trade, which, as C artier pointed out, had been insignificant, but w hich m ight be consid­ erable. A nother defender o f confederation spoke o f exchanging C anadian grain and flour for fish, oil, and coal; but the opposi­ tio n replied th at there was little C anada could buy from the m aritim e provinces, and if there w ere a prospect o f such trade it could be arranged by tariff agreem ent as readily as by political union. O ther m em bers of the legislature w ere concerned about the possibility o f lowering the C anadian tariff, just as members in the m aritim e provinces w ere concerned about raising theirs. A constant argum ent in favour of confederation w as th at it would m ake possible the im provem ent of transportation. F or N o v a Scotia and N ew Brunsw ick this m eant an intercolonial

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railway connecting their ports with the cities of C anada. To them it was a sine qua non, and alm ost an undisputed advantage. C anada was less certain about the intercolonial rail­ way. It would, it was true, give them access to w inter ports, but it was generally recognized that it could not be profitable. T here was talk of better canals com ing as a result o f confederation but the m ost im portant project after the intercolonial was th at o f a railway to the Pacific coast. In the m aritim e provinces expansion to the west was a distant objective, but at least to an im portant body o f opinion in C anada it was essential, even if not pursued im m ediately. In British Colum bia com m unication with C anada was even m ore the price o f union than it was in the low er prov­ inces, and the adhesion of the Pacific province was m ade con­ tingent on the construction of a railway w ithin a stated period. T he Fenian raids - actual o r threatened - gave a background of realism to all discussions on union, as did the broken trade relations in the econom ic sphere. D efence, equally w ith trade, was dependent on adequate com m unications, though w hether or not the intercolonial railw ay, close as it m ight be at points to the A m erican border, was an effective instrum ent for the m ove­ m ent of troops and supplies was a m oot point. A t least it was m ore hopeful than the toilsome m arch overland which the imperial troops had been obliged to take during the Civil W ar. T here was one point undisputed about defence: the British governm ent was convinced that it could be effectively organized only by a single political unit, and for this reason m ore than any other urged on the confederation. T he executive council of New Brunswick, while adm itting that the wishes of G reat Britain were “entitled to great weight,” retained the right to settle the destiny o f the province, w ithout w hich right it claim ed that the conferring of self-governm ent would have been a m ockery. The Fenian raid of 1866, ineffective as it was, partially rem oved the argum ent that defence was prim arily a C anadian problem . In Prince E dw ard Island objections on other counts overrode the defence argum ent, and indeed the islanders had little conscious­ ness of danger to their own territory. D uring the debate in the assembly of N ova Scotia, T upper, A rchibald, and others agreed that the British view that the defence of the provinces could be effective only after confederation was a sound one. “If we are able to defend ourselves,” said C. J. C am pbell, “w ithout the assistance of G reat Britain, let us say so; but if we are not, let us concede w hat the m other country desires.” A gainst this the opposition expressed a readiness to m ake a joint contribution to

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defence w ithout confederation: and one m em ber, M cLelan, claim ed that N ova Scotia was already “one vast drill-shed,” and th at England w ould certainly aid against “the danger she has brought upon us.” In C anada, the m ost exposed colony, the discussions of the defence question were m ost lengthy, but followed m uch the sam e lines as in other provinces. O n the one hand it was said that the advice o f the British governm ent should be followed, in view of its place in the defence scheme of Canada, and having regard for the m ilitary pow er and possible aggression of the U nited States. M any m em bers spoke on the general them e of unity being strength, but there was apparently little knowledge of w h at this m eant in m ilitary organization. T he strategic im­ portance of N ew foundland was a m ore concrete consideration; but on the w hole the governm ent speakers left themselves open to the criticism that they could not show how added strength w ould be gained. O n the other hand, said m em bers of the opposition, confederation w ould increase territory to defend m ore than men and resources to defend it. T he m aritim e prov­ inces could hardly assist C anada, though C anada m ight be called upon to aid them . O n the whole the best policy was to rem ain neutral and avoid the appearance of possible conflict w ith the U nited States. M ilitary preparations might precipitate a preventive w ar waged by the A m ericans. F o r British Colum bia the relation between confederation and defence seemed remote, and was little discussed. Som e effort was m ade to represent the transcontinental railway as playing for British Colum bia the sam e sort o f role in defence as the intercolonial railway was expected to play for the eastern provinces. In point of fact it seemed difficult to believe that C anada could send o f her scanty m ilitary resources to the Pacific. Britain was thought of as the real source o f aid, and the naval station at Esquim alt bulked even larger than th at a t H alifax. But in any case there was less sense of danger in the west than the east. British Colum bia had had no acute problem s o f neutrality during the Civil W ar, and there was only a threat of a F enian raid. T he m enace of Russia, at one time in the picture, had been rem oved w ith the purchase of A laska in 1867. All discussions of defence in the provinces w ere surprisingly devoid of any real understanding of m ilitary affairs or of the broad strategy involved. W eakness on th at side, however, was m ore th an m ade up by the w ealth o f political controversy which tied defence to the im perial connection o r to union w ith the

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U nited States. A shocked m em ber o f the N ova Scotian assembly stated that no m an w ould openly advocate annexation, but, while there was certainly less talk o f it in the m aritim e provinces than elsewhere, it could not be dismissed. In the assembly of Prince E dw ard Island Coles said that “I look upon this talk about the M other C ountry casting us off from her apron strings, and this shaking o f the stars and stripes in ou r face, as only stories intended to frighten the tim id. L et us rem ain true to the M other C ountry and she will stand by us.” G ray, on the other hand, saw the issue squarely as a choice betw een federation and absorption by the U nited States. A lm ost the sam e w ords w ere used by C artier in the C anadian assembly, w ho added that only by confederation could “the whole strength of the em pire” be concentrated at the needed point in N o rth A m erica. In the opening speech o f the debate T ache had spoken of the inevita­ bility of C anada joining the U nited States, either by force or willingly, unless confederation w ere accepted. M acdonald ham ­ mered on the them e th at the im perial connection m ust be m ain­ tained, and th at w ith th at “alliance” cam e protection. M em ber after m em ber spoke o f A m erican aggression, and accepted the view th at it could only be m et by confederated provinces at­ tached to G reat Britain. T he governm ent supporters claim ed, too, th at confederation w ould not lead to independence; which, in any case, w ould be an untenable status. T here w ere not lack­ ing critics of these argum ents who deduced th a t confederation would both w eaken the bonds of em pire and antagonize the U nited States. T h e tide in C anada, how ever, was running strongly tow ard confederation, and its sponsors refused to adm it that it could be a step tow ard independence. H ad it n o t the blessing o f the British governm ent? In British Colum bia the debate concentrated m ore directly on the three alternatives: to m aintain the existing situation, accept annexation to the U nited States, o r enter the dom inion. In no other province did opinion appear to be so equally divided. T he particularism w hich was strong in the m aritim e provinces was even m ore m arked in British C olum bia, separated as it was by thousands of miles from C anada. T here was an active feeling for the im perial connection, based on tradition and constant, if difficult, intercourse. O ne opponent of union with C anada, speaking in the legislative council, balanced its advantages w ith th at o f em pire m em bership: T he question has always appeared to m e to be this: - C on­

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federation w ith England, w hich we have; confederation in its truest sense; C onfederation with all the security o f protection, and all the pride o f self-governm ent, now or hereafter to be, w hen the colony shall have population and wealth sufficient: or C onfederation — or, as it should be term ed, ‘'Incorporation” — w ith Canada. Incorporation w ith a country to which we are bound by no natural tie o f affection or duty, and rem ote in geographical position, and opposed to us in m aterial interests. O n the whole the m ainland was in favour o f confederation and V ancouver Island opposed. In both places - and especially in the island - there were m inorities actively prom oting an­ nexation. Econom ic connection w ith the U nited States and geographical proxim ity w ere supplem ented by the inrush of A m erican prospectors to the F raser in 1858 and the C ariboo in 1860. F requent signs in the U nited States that British Colum bia would be a welcome addition, and frequent signs in G reat Britain that a break in the im perial tie w ould not be opposed, helped to strengthen the m ovem ent. It was touch and go for a tim e, but in the end the province declared fo r confederation with C anada. W ith the addition of British Colum bia, the prairies, and P rince E dw ard Island the territorial unification o f the British N o rth A m erican provinces was com pleted, and there the deci­ sions on external relationships reached the end of a chapter. T h e old issues o f the previous generation did not at once die; but, once the choice was m ade, provincial independence and annexation to the U nited States were relegated to the class of m inority and unpatriotic opinions. As such they reappear, time after tim e, in new guises and under fresh circum stances, soft­ ened, reduced from the stark superlatives th at m ake o f the pre-confederation decades the frankest forum o f British N orth A m erican opinion on external relations.

CHAPTER 5

The Outlook of the Dominion

T h e federation m ovem ent w hich, ap art from N ew foundland, was com pleted in 1873, brought together as a political entity colonies and territories com prising the northern half o f N orth A m erica, an area o f some three and one half million square miles, o r nearly as m uch as the total area o f E urope. The dom inion reached from the A tlantic stronghold o f H alifax to the Pacific ports of V ancouver and V ictoria, and from the A m erican border into the barren and uncharted waste w ithin the A rctic circle. O n the east the ports o f the St. Law rence and o f the m aritim e provinces w ere established links w ith Europe; the w estern coast looked across the broad Pacific O cean, on the far side o f w hich Jap an was beginning to em erge from its feudal isolation and C hina had recently and reluctantly adm itted w esterners to a footing on its ancient state. O n the north-w est corner o f C anada lay Alaska, just pur­ chased by the U nited States from Russia; and along the whole southern frontier ran the w rit o f the governm ent at W ashington. Such w ere the limits. W ithin the boundaries of the dom inion w ere seven provinces. Prince Edw ard Island* N ova Scotia, and N ew Brunswick on the east occupied their present territory, as did British Colum bia at the other extrem ity. Q uebec and O n­ tario consisted then of only the southern portions of the present provinces, and M anitoba was but a tithe of w hat it was to be­ come. Across the north o f the central provinces and over the prairies ran the N orth-W est T erritories. F o r this spraw ling new country a start had been m ade in the provision of m eans of transportation. Roads did well enough for local travel and canals fo r a lim ited tim e and place. Railways already served the most thickly settled areas, but there w ere still big gaps. In the constitutional structure th at had been designed to bind together provinces and territories the influence of other coun­ tries m ay readily be distinguished. C anada was not a sovereign state b u t in a status th at defied existing term inology. In the w ords o f the British N o rth A m erica A ct it was a “Dom inion u nder the C row n o f the U nited K ingdom o f G reat Britain and

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Ireland, with a constitution sim ilar in principle to th at o f the U nited K ingdom .” T here was no necessity to refer in m ore detail to British parliam entary procedure and cabinet govern­ m ent, which, in varying degrees, had been followed in the prov­ inces since the assembly o f N ova Scotia had sat in 1758 and m iniature parliam ents w ere provided for the C anadas in 1791. By the sixties the process o f developm ent had assured local autonom y, through the cabinet system, over local affairs; and no dem and as yet existed for the extension o f control to foreign affairs. T he constitutional history of the provinces had been so m uch a reflection of that of G re at Britain th at the partial tu rn ­ ing to A m erican institutions, caused by the struggles of the early p art o f the century, had been alm ost forgotten. W hen the federal principle was borrow ed from the U nited States it was not because o f its intrinsic virtues, but because circum stances did n ot allow the unitary state th at some of the fathers of confedera­ tion w ould have preferred. T he expedient o f federalism was little used in the w orld of that day, except in the U nited States, and th at exam ple was not altogether a happy one. T he architects o f the C anadian system never failed to point out that their fed­ eration would escape the dangers that were so m anifest in the days of the Civil W ar. A fter all, there w ere A lexander H am ilton and the other federalists; and if their advice had once been fatally ignored, it was still good for those who would escape the centrifugal effects o f states’ rights. T h e constitution o f Canada, then, was intended to com bine the basic principles of the British parliam entary system with an im proved form o f federalism . A utonom y in local affairs was lim ited in law, if not always in practice, by the powers of the governor general and the right o f disallow ance vested in the British governm ent. T he British N orth A m erica A ct, being a statute, could be am ended only by the imperial parliam ent, and its final interpretation lay w ith the judicial com m ittee of the privy council. F o r external affairs the im perial authority in C anada was m ore than a shadow. Executive governm ent was explicitly vested in the queen, and in foreign o r imperial affairs her representative, the governor general, was subject to instruc­ tions from L ondon. T hrough him all dealings with foreign pow ers m ust be conducted, even between O ttaw a and W ashing­ ton. L ack of control over its own external affairs would have seemed to m ake the dom inion a colony, just as com plete control w ould have m ade it a sovereign state. N either extrem e was p opular on either side of the A tlantic; for, while C anadians w ere

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often critical o f supposed British neglect o f their interests abroad, they shied away from any suggestion of independence. In conform ity w ith the British tradition of com prom ise this situation was m et by progressive and practical changes in the m ethods by which C anada saw to her own affairs both in Lon­ don and foreign capitals. T he m achinery creaked, but on the w hole it served the purpose. Resources w ere there in plenty: land for farm ing, fisheries, tim ber, furs in dim inishing volume, gold and other m ineral deposits hardly as yet touched. T here was m uch to be done in this wide dom ain. W ho were the men who w ould exploit the new state that they had called into existence, and govern its relation to the outside world? F o r this great land the population was absurdly small. T he first census after confederation, th at of 1871, gives the population (including P rince Edw ard Island) as 3,689,257 persons. All but a million lived in O ntario and Quebec, and w est o f the great lakes w ere but a bare hundred thousand. Statistics o f racial origins are available only fo r the fo u r original provinces. T here w ere som e two million persons of British origin, one million of French origin, and small m inori­ ties from elsewhere. Of these latter m uch the largest group was G erm an, and th at was only two hundred thousand, m ost of whom lived in O ntario. T he British and F rench groups together m ade up 92 per cent of the total. T hus the population was not widely diversified, and early im m igration changed it little, for in the first ten years after con­ federation im m igration from all sources varied between 25,000 and 50,000 a year. A nd in any case it is questionable how far an analysis of the origins o r birthplaces of the people throw s any light on their attitudes tow ard the outside world. Those o f F rench origin were o f C anadian birth. T hey retained F rench traits, habits, and m ethods of thought. T hey had a sentim ental tie with F ran ce, but no love for the contem porary F rench state o r its rationalistic outlook. N o people in C anada were politically m ore N o rth A m erican. T he people o f N ova Scotia and N ew Bruns­ wick, native-born like their com patriots in Quebec, had a deep interest in the affairs o f G reat Britain and the U nited States, from one o r the other o f w hich m ost o f their ancestors had com e. T he num ber of recent im m igrants in O ntario from the British Isles gives no ratio of attachm ent to their country of birth. M any o f the Irish looked on the U nited K ingdom with unfriendly eyes, although they did n o t organize for hostile purposes as did som e o f the Irish in the U nited States. T he

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G erm an minorities in O ntario and N ova Scotia m aintained some cultural traits, but on the whole they had little in com m on with the G erm any o f Bismarck, and caused no modification politi­ cally in the foreign relations o f the dom inion. O n the other hand, it does not follow th at old and new com ers alike had at once taken on a single C anadian nationality strong enough to cover the traces o f origin and birth. The fathers o f confederation were politicians, n o t alchemists, and to create a new political unit out o f several sm aller ones was not at once to transm ute the whole. C onfederation, indeed, had opened the way for new divisions w ithout healing all those that already existed. O pposition had been least serious in the province of C anada, b ut in the other provinces - east and w est - it had been strong enough to delay, and alm ost to prevent, the com pletion o f the plan. In all the A tlantic provinces there were bitter p ro ­ tests against being sold to C anada, and th a t feeling did not die with the conversion o f Joseph H ow e. “ M aritim e grievances” be­ cam e a tradition in the history o f the dom inion, and so fam iliar was the them e that its real significance was som etim es unduly discounted. Even a transcontinental railway could not over­ com e the divergencies th at em erged between the outlook of the w estern and th at of the central provinces. T he failure to attain to a full national spirit m ust be p u t dow n to a variety of causes, a variety too com plex to be exam ined seriously here. O ne o r two com m ents, however, m ay be m ade in reference to the connection between regional division and external relations. T he pressure o f a com m on danger had been an im portant facto r in driving the provinces together; but the Fenian raids and threatened raids, w hich had evoked som e national spirit in the im m ediate era o f confederation, becam e only a m em ory. A greeable as was the decreasing tension in C anadian-A m erican relations, it inci­ dentally rem oved one o f the m ost potent centripetal forces. Decision on, and conduct of, all external relations were m ade m ore difficult not only by conflicting opinions and interests in various parts o f the dom inion, but also by the com petition for pow er between federal and provincial governm ents when “provincial rights” appeared as a barrier to the strong central governm ent th at had been envisaged by the fathers o f con­ federation. Provincialism and regionalism w ere not the only enemies of C anadian nationalism . T he racial division w hich D urham had found so far advanced in his day did not disappear with union of the provinces, but continued in two form s. C entred in the

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province of Q uebec was a self-conscious racial unit which found its inspiration not in contem porary F rance but in specially dis­ tilled traditions of the old regim e both in E urope and A m erica. T he other distinctive racialism was th at of groups in all the provinces w ho stressed attachm ent to the Britain o f their own day. In the nineteenth century at least no force of com parable m agnitude arose from the presence of other racial units in the dom inion. It is perhaps fair to add that no large elem ent in the Canadian population could be regarded, far less regarded itself, as hostile to a real C anadian unity; but cross-currents and con­ flicting priorities w ere none the less problem s to the Canadian nationalists. Indeed, the very w ord “nationalist” is difficult to apply to C anada for it m eant different things to different men; m ore especially was it suspect as seeming to imply a break in the im perial tie. T h at it proved possible to build C anadian political parties which em braced all provinces eased the pressure of centrifugal-forces, but the caution with which those parties approached the form ulation of external policy is in itself a reflection of conflicting opinions. T h e confederation of the British N orth A m erican provinces coincided w ith national m ovem ents on three continents. With blood and iron Bism arck and M oltke subdued the proud power of the H absburgs and overthrew a B onaparte at the head of the traditional m ilitary state of Europe. T he N orth G erm an C on­ federation, born in the sam e year as the original dom inion, was broadened into the G erm an E m pire while M anitoba, British Colum bia, and the prairies were being added to C anada. At the sam e time the unification of Italy trium phed dram atically as the arm ies of the king entered the city of the Caesars. In N orth A m crica the U nited States had just survived its civil w ar, with the forces o f separatism defeated. F ar across the Pacific Ocean the E m pire of Jap an was taking the first steps in its startling m arch tow ard the status of a w orld pow er, with an economy, governm ent, and defence forces modelled on those o f European states. It was an age of nationalism , the bitter fruits of which w ere n ot to ripen for two generations. Both in E urope and Asia nationalism w as an expansive, and frequently an aggressive, force. N o t long after her revolution, Jap an set out on the long road leading to dom ination o f the m ainland. T he European states com peted in the Balkans, and far beyond E urope into un­ explored and undeveloped colonial areas. Econom ic imperialism could not be practised w ithout annexation, and annexation by one pow er could n o t be ignored by its rivals. N either in, Europe,

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nor A sia, nor A frica could there be extension o f territory or influence w ithout a th reat to the interests of other am bitious states and to the balance o f pow er. In N o rth A m erica in the sam e period nationalism m anifested itself through the m ore peaceful exploitation of undeveloped territories, happily spacious enough not to arouse international com petition. I t w as on this latter type o f nationalism that C an ­ ada entered in the years im m ediately following political union. T h e decisions to explore the hinterland, control the Indian tribes, build railways from coast to coast, and people the un­ occupied lands, were the counterpart of the western drive o f the U nited States, and were typical o f the N o rth A m erican concep­ tion o f im perialism and national destiny. F o r C anada, w ith its sm all population and limited financial resources, the task of subduing half a continent to an econom ic and political system was form idable indeed. T here w as m ore than enough here to occupy all the energies and m eans available w ithout looking tow ard the distant scene. A nd yet the country’s activity could not stop at its own borders. T ru e, there w as no reason o r desire fo r territorial expansion, beyond that im plied in a series of boundary settlem ents; yet the dom inion was, as the old provinces had been, not w ithout essential external interests. T he spread of agriculture to the w estern prairies and the pursuit of m ining in the precam brian shield w ould but increase the need for foreign trade. N o r could the dom inion do other than inherit such international political issues as had existed for the old provinces. II T h e im m igration policy of the dom inion, at least for some decades, was influenced m ore by the need of peopling and de­ veloping the country than by any plan of selection designed to create a well-knit nationality. In the new spapers and parliam ent freq u en t references were m ade to the need o f m ore people, especially of w orkingm en. T he com petition from the U nited States, in taking m en both from E urope and from C anada, was all too clearly realized; but Canadians com forted themselves w ith the idea th at the U nited States was enjoying tem porary prosperity and an exaggerated reputation. By the general act of 1869 (32 and 33 V iet., c. 10), consequently, few barriers were placed. L unatics o r physically incapacitated persons w ere ex­ cluded lest they becom e a public charge; and the governor was em pow ered to prohibit the landing of paupers. F rom tim e to

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tim e advantage was taken o f this last enabling clause w ith the object o f preventing unem ploym ent. F oreigners com ing to reside in C anada m ight receive naturalization, but by a curious and aw kw ard arrangem ent they rem ained aliens in any other p art of the British Em pire. This situation, although frequently criti­ cized, was not cleared up until 1914.1 E qually anom alous, and m uch m ore inconvenient, was the absence o f com prehensive provision for the extradition o f crim inals. N either im perial nor C anadian legislation fully covered the field, and fo r m any years the effective rules were those laid down in the narrow confines o f the treaty o f 1842 betw een G reat Britain and the United States. A t every step of every case, said Edw ard Blake, quoting the w ords o f a judge, it was necessary “ to decide how m uch of the C anadian law is consistent w ith so m uch o f the imperial law as is consistent with the T reaty .”2 I t was another nine years before a C anadian act, designed to cover all countries not having treaties with E ngland and affecting C anada, received the royal assent. Som e analysis of the nature of education, of local writing, and o f books in circulation in Canada, m ay provide an indica­ tion as to w hether these revealed any national characteristics, and w hether there was any attem pt to influence the public mind tow ard a growing nationalism . If there had been any general purpose of adopting the ancient expedient o f using education fo r political ends it w ould have been alm ost com pletely defeated by the clauses in the British N o rth A m erica A ct which assigned control of education to the provinces. As in the period before confederation, the schools and universities drew heavily on the m ethods and the books in use in other countries, but there were occasional exam ples of attem pts to provide C anadian material. In O ntario the Ryerson Readers were designed to replace the M cG uffey Readers', but “ the R yerson Readers w ere m ore re­ strained in attem pting to cultivate national feeling. T hey did not glorify C anada w ith the exuberance with which the M cG uffey Readers glorified the U nited States. T o have done so in the years afte r 1867 w ould have seemed to m any in O ntario base dis­ loyalty to the Im perial tie.”3 A cleric in the eastern townships, w riting in 1870, was alarm ed by the spread o f A m erican heresy to th e ,C h u rc h of England in Canada. T he latitudinarianism introduced from the U nited States, he said, had extended to extrem e secularism in education, which “ has insinuated itself into a large num ber of our H igh Schools in the Eastern Tow n­ ships, which have been seed-plots for the propagandism o f ex­

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trem e A m erican ideas hereafter to bring forth their fruits.”4 It was a parallel to the efforts of the Rom an Catholic C hurch in the sam e province to protect the schools from French rationalism . P rinting and circulation o f books in C anada were to a con­ siderable extent governed by the eccentricities of the contem ­ porary laws o f copyright; and the objections raised in C anada to the operation o f those laws gave rise to problem s in imperial and foreign relations. T he story is a long and com plicated one, b ut the gist o f the C anadian protests was that, while the lack of copyright restrictions allowed A m erican publishers to reprint English works at will, the sam e freedom was not given to C an a­ dians.5 R eference to the correspondence on the subject reveals both the nature o f the dispute and the sources from which C anadians received books. W riting to the colonial secretary in 1890, the C anadian m inister of justice described the situation as he saw it. T h e reading public o f w hat is now the dom inion o f Canada has been principally supplied w ith British literature by A m eri­ can reprints. T he high prices o f British editions have m ade this unavoidable. In spite o f the pointed and repeated warning to British publishers given by the colonial office fo r 40 years, very little has been done to change this state o f things by providing cheap editions o f British works. E ven to this day the English editions cost fro m fo u r to ten-fold the price o f A m erican re­ prints. The result is that the business o f publishing British litera­ ture fo r the Canadian reading public is done alm ost exclusively in the U nited States. The A m erican publisher, unrestrained by any international copyright law or treaty, is free to reprint any British work and to supply it, not only to the reading public o f the U nited States, but to the reading public o f Canada, while the Canadian publisher is not free to reprint any such w ork on any terms, unless he can obtain the permission o f the holder o f the copyright in G reat Britain. In som e noted instances this has actually led to the transfer o f printing establishm ents from Canada to the U nited States. In other cases, English publishing houses have set up branches in N e w Y o rk or other A m erican cities, w ith the view o f reprinting fo r the U nited States and Canada the copyright w orks which they have issued in London. C anadian publishers, the m inister w ent on to say, cannot com pete in offers to reprint English books, because A m erican firm s have not only th^ir ow n great m arket but that o f C anada as well. “O ver-weighted, as we continually are, by reason o f the

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vast com petition o f the U nited States in every branch o f trade, industry and com m erce, your lordship will not w onder a t our being disposed to com plain w hen, in regard to so im portant a m atter as the furnishing o f literature fo r ou r people, we are hindered by a m onopoly; nom inally in favour o f the L ondon publishers, but really and practically in favour o f the publishers o f the U nited S ta te s .. . .”GT he governm ent claim ed that public opinion was strongly critical o f the arrangem ents as to copy­ right, and com m ents in the new spapers support the claim . T he ed ito r of the T oronto M ail, for exam ple, w rote that “ it is idle to suppose that A m erican reprints can be kept out of C anada, and C anadian publishers be prevented from supplying the void. Costly English editions are unsuited to C anada where everybody reads and every reader owns the books he reads. L othair at £ 1 .1 6 stg. m ay find its w ay into English circulating libraries and the m ansions o f the aristocracy; but a dollar edition is w hat is w anted for C anada.” T here was, he added, an A m erican dollar edition w hich supplied the C anadian m arket.7 T hro u g h ­ o ut the whole copyright controversy there was alm ost no reference to C anadian books o r authors. P erhaps it was partly because of tact and the particular point at issue that the dem and fo r British w orks was so constantly stressed, but it rem ains true th a t C anadian literature was not, apparently, a m ajor considera­ tion. C anadians read the books o f Britain, France, and the U nited States; and the national aspect of literature was in the attem pt to encourage printing and publishing. T he C anadian au th o r’s point o f view was urged on Sir John M acdonald by W illiam K irby, who argued th at the way to “prom ote C anadian L iterature and encourage C anadian A uthors” was “by establish­ ing a Prosperous Publishing business in C anada.”8 T he people of the dom inion, like their ancestors in the old provinces, followed the affairs as well as the literature o f other countries. Some events abroad were, of course, treated simply as news, with no p articular significance to C anadians. By dint of copying from British or A m erican papers, C anadian editors had always m anaged to eke out their own scanty sources o f inform a­ tion. T h e telegraph and the cable brought m ore recent and m ore steady news than the “latest advices from E urope” which had once form ed the basis of the periodic budgets in the newspapers o f the provinces. Som e events were regarded with detachm ent in one p art of C anada and with m ore direct interest in another. F o r exam ple, the Franco-Prussian W ar was to an O ntario editor “a pitched battle betw een sovereigns fo r kingly pow er an d ag­

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grandisem ent,”0 but a t the news o f an early F rench victory a Q uebec paper announced th at “A ujourd’hui, ce n’a ete p ar toute la ville qu’une joie, q u ’un delire.” 10 W hatever sym pathy may have existed in O ntario for either belligerent was purely passive, and probably the G lobe's approval o f British neutrality rep re­ sented general opinion, w hether or not the editor would be fol­ lowed in his desire fo r “the entire abstinence from participation in all E uropean com plications.” W hen an em issary cam e from F ran ce to start a recruiting office in M ontreal, offering free passages to F rance and a bounty on arrival, some Irishm en cam e forw ard, but F rench Canadians w aited to see w hat posi­ tion F rance would take on w ithdraw ing troops from Rom e.11 Positive proofs o f friendship took the form o f subscriptions for the F ren ch w ounded, and a message cam e through the consulgeneral from Jules Favre, thanking the subscribers and adding th a t “if the recollection o f the m other country has rem ained green in their hearts, neither has F rance forgotten them .”12 T he views of English C anada on the third republic w ere m ixed, the only strong opinion being condem nation of the Paris com m une. T o F rench Canadians, how ever, the third republic threatened a radical and secular conquest of a m otherland from w hich they still derived m uch o f their culture. If F rench C anadians hesitated to recruit for service in the F rench arm y because of the projected w ithdraw al from Rome, they had enthusiastically joined the Zouaves o f the pope’s own garrison. In response to an appeal from the pope, and enco u r­ aged by the bishop, a com m ittee was form ed in M ontreal at the end o f 1867 to organize a detachm ent and raise funds for its expenses. In February, a group o f 135 (all that could be accepted) sailed from N ew Y ork, and six other detachm ents followed. W hile som e never got beyond F rance, 328 men reached R om e and took p art in its defence against the arm y of Italy.13 These defenders o f the tem poral pow er symbolized the reality o f the link between the papacy and the church in Canada. A t hom e the clergy were holding the fort against the forces of liberalism. Since the days o f the early Jesuit missionaries Quebec had always been strongly ultram ontane, and had offered strong resistance against any contrary philosophy. T he general u ltra­ m ontane revival o f the sixties led in C anada, as it did in France and G erm any, to threats o f schism and to bitter controversy. T h e syllabus o f 1864 and the dogm a o f papal infallibility were, of course, noted in English-speaking C anada, but had no im por­ tan t repercussions. In T oronto the editor o f the G lobe badly

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misjudged the situation when he decided th at “the w orld will go on as usual.”14 T he editor o f the Leader was hostile tow ard the ultram ontane policy, but did not dismiss it so airily. T he chief p rotestant new spaper of M ontreal, the G azette, favoured resist­ ance to the pope’s actions. T he real effect of the ultram ontane policy, however, fell on the R om an C atholics of Q uebec. F or the church authorities to show displeasure o f liberalism or gallicanism was not new; for m any years they had labelled the Institut Canadien and the rouge party as undesirable. In the late sixties a strengthening o f the ultram ontane party am ongst the Q uebec clergy coincided w ith the corresponding ascendancy of that p arty at Rom e, and was encouraged by it.15 T he Institu t was pursued with increasing vigour, and Joseph G uibord, a m em ber w ho had been one o f the group that appealed to R om e against the condem nation o f the society, was refused burial in conse­ crated ground. T he “old catholics” o f Quebec, like those of G erm any, could m ake no headw ay against th e ultram ontanes, whose “Catholic P rogram m e” o f 1871 launched a new excursion into politics, like th at of the C entre party. N o com prom ise with liberalism was to be tolerated in church, culture, o r the state. W hile the influence of the papacy on C anada was continuous and im portant, th at of F rance was - except in the cultural field - hardly m ore than sentim ental. T he two countries th at m ost directly affected C anada w ere the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States. Even if there had been nothing m ore in com m on with the U nited States than a frontier, the affairs of a pow erful and expanding country m ust have been o f im m ediate interest to the dom inion. A nd the final delim itation of this particular fro n ­ tier was still seen as open to question, not so m uch from legal disputes over boundaries as frpm the rem aining force o f “m ani­ fest destiny.” A nnexation, peaceful or forced, was still discussed, and Canadians noted w ith ill-concealed alarm indications of expansionism in the republic w ith the not always unfavourable response in C anada. F enian threats, the perennial argum ent over fisheries, and incidents in the use of border waterways added p articular problem s to the general one of m aintaining friendly relations. But Canadians were n ot w holly occupied with defensive measures. T here w ere m any ties between the people of the two countries. Im m igration from one to the o ther, sim ilar environm ents, sim ilar ways o f life, and com m on reading brought the two peoples together. Canadians, too, never paused in the endeavour to establish favourable trad e relations w ith the U nited States; and while they never reached the com plete goal,

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they w ere conscious o f the place in the C anadian econom y o f w hatever trade did exist. Relations w ith the U nited Kingdom w ere in one sense m ore rem ote and in others less so. Distance was hardly m ore o f a barrier than the divergence between E uro p ean and N o rth A m erican social structures. O n the other h an d , the effective m ajority in C anada held a belief in the em pire th at was m ade up o f a variety of com ponents. M any C anadians came, o r their parents had com e, from the British Isles; and they, w ith others who had less blood relationship, w ere definitely, and sometim es aggressively, British. T here was a general confidence in British institutions o f governm ent and law - a confidence which was only strengthened by com parison w ith parallel institutions in the U nited States. W hile such ties o f em pire cannot be m easured they were none the less real. T here w ere also aspects of the relationship of the dom inion w ith the m other country which could be, and were, analysed and weighed. In the first years of the dom inion C anadian opinion was evoked by public expressions in England o n im perial affairs, by the im perial policies o f both English parties, and by English diplom acy affecting C anada. T here were then seen to be two m ajor schools of thought on colonial affairs: th e one, generally held by Liberals and particularly by the M an­ chester school, being that the fu tu re o f Britain lay in free trade, th a t the colonies w ere moving tow ard independence, and that it was desirable th at they should do so; the other, o f which Disraeli cam e to be the spokesm an, declared th at the L iberals had all but destroyed the em pire, and that it m ust be rebuilt by the estab­ lishm ent of som e form o f centralized institutions. T o most C anadians neither o f these propositions m ade any appeal, for they w anted to m aintain the em pire w ithout im posing on it centralized governm ent. T o occasional conferences in London little objection was raised, but a perm anent council was not then, and never becam e, popular. T here were minorities which w ere opposed even to the loose unity th at existed, and others w hich advocated definite m achinery of governm ent fo r the whole; b ut the great mass of C anadians took the m iddle position, favouring continuance o f the connection w ithout central gov­ ernm ent. Beyond ties of tradition, blood, and sentim ent, w hat positive advantages w ere seen? In trade the preferential system was gone, but there rem ained a substantial volum e that m ight be jettisoned by a political break. T he garrisons w ere alm ost gone, b u t aid in w ar was still assured. English diplom acy was fre­ quently criticized, but C anadians - in spite o f outbursts at times

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- still wished to retain the support o f the great naval pow er. It was tru e that Britain m ight pursue objectives of no interest to C anada, but in reality there was no obligation to aid in them , and no prospect of E ngland’s strength being threatened. A m ongst m any exam inations of the whole position, as it ap ­ peared in the age o f confederation, th at by the editor o f the M ontreal G azette is as frank and as representative of any in an im p o rtan t English-language newspaper. O ur present relations with the E m pire, if let alone by agita­ tors, either upon this side o f the water or the other, are satisfac­ tory. W hat is required is that an understanding should be arrived a t with the m other country that its policy is settled, and is not to be suddenly or capriciously altered. It is not fo r the sake o f effecting any great legislative or constitutional changes that we think these L ondon m eetings o f colonists are useful, or the pro­ posed colonial conference desirable. It is in order that public opinion, in the m other country as well as in the colonies, m ay be aroused, and definite opinions o f Im perial policy form ed, where now all is confused and uncertain. It is greater security o f tenure, not change, that is desirable. T he danger that we can ever becom e so entangled and in­ volved in the netw ork o f Im perial interests that we cannot free ourselves is a m ere chimera w hich can frighten nobody w ho is conversant w ith the facts. A n d if we should negotiate respecting tariffs or com m ercial intercourse with the m other country we should certainly not do so upon any less favourable term s with them than with our neighbours w hom som e are so eager to treat w ith now. . . . b ut if it can be show n that its [the em pire’s] preservation w ill involve burthens which we cannot bear, or disadvantages which are in no wise balanced by advantages, the tim e will com e to give it up.16 C an ad a was preoccupied w ith problem s of internal growth, b u t by no m eans exclusively; no r w ere even those problem s them selves dissociated from relations with other countries. The new federal governm ent w as developed, as it had originated, in th e light of exam ples elsewhere. O rganization of new dep art­ m ents and civil service reform , fo r exam ple, followed the ex­ perience of other states. T he railway to the Pacific, which bulked so large in C anadian politics for the first decades after confederation, brought experts, equipm ent, and capital from abroad. It required im m igrants fo r its construction, to give it

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business, and to build up the west. It was seen as an imperial road to the east and listed as a contribution to em pire defence. T h e w heat produced in O ntario and then in the prairies had to be carried to tidew ater and sold abroad. T he m en w ho cam e to develop C anadian industries form ed trade unions that either were m odelled on o r affiliated to those of Britain and the U nited States. T he w hole C anadian econom y assum ed foreign trade, and th at in tu rn called fo r diplom atic action. Looking about in the age of confederation C anadians w ere seeking to broaden the scope o f their com m ercial relations. T he entrance o f British C olum bia into the dom inion spelt a way to the trade of the far east. T h e W est Indies, South A m erica, and A ustralia were also new fields th at had hardly been touched. T he older channels to Britain, F rance, and the U nited States - needed to be cleared if the best results were to be obtained. Canadians, therefore, w ere increasingly concerned about their relations with the rest o f the w orld. T h a t C anada also form ed p art of a great im perial system accentuated that tend­ ency m ore than it restricted it. T here was, it is true, friction resulting from the process o f pursuing C anadian aims through British m eans; but the friction was noticed m ore than the m ore rem arkable adaptation of a colonial organization to a constantly changing need. In a generation after confederation a way had been found by w hich C anada could in effect conduct her own diplom acy, w ithout disrupting the em pire, and w ithout sacrific­ ing all the bargaining pow er held by civ is Britannicus. By an unorthodox process, and alm ost by the back door, Canadians entered the field o f diplom acy, there to try a t the lists the fo r­ tunes o f their country. T he first venture is of peculiar interest, since it involved alm ost every possible related issue: the imperial connection, defence, trade, and fisheries. A nd the setting was B ritish-A m erican-C anadian relations, the central avenue of C anadian external relations.

CHAPTER 6

A Venture in Diplomacy

In the years im m ediately succeeding confederation the exter­ nal relationships o f C anada fitted into the triangular pattern which had been, and was for long to be, dom inating. W ith the neighbouring U nited States and the distant centre of the British E m pire the dom inion had its closest connections; and on a satisfactory series o f arrangem ents with these two great powers depended her security and m uch of her strength. W hile m any of the links which C anada had with these countries w ere constant, they varied in strength from tim e to tim e; and there were aspects of their policies at this particular tim e - b o th as directly affecting C anada and tow ard each other - th at were beyond the ability of the dom inion to influence, and yet of im m ediate concern to her. O ne w orrying factor was the lack of im perial enthusiasm in G reat Britain, resulting in w hat was felt to be distressingly mild concern fo r C anadian interests. M acdonald poured out his woes in to the sym pathetic ear o f L ord C arnarvon: . . . W e are glad to know that we have in you a friend. 1 m ay alm ost say a friend in need, fo r we greatly distrust the m en at the helm in England, who cannot, I fear, be considered as appreciating the im portance o f m aintaining the em pire as it is, intact. W e indulge the belief here, however, that M essers Bright, L ow e and G ladstone (shall I say L ord Granville?) are not true exponents o f the people o f England. W e m ay perhaps be obliged to appeal fro m the governm ent to the people o f England.1 I t w as neither the first tim e nor the last th at C anada and the U nited K ingdom saw the im perial relationship differently. E ng­ lish com m erce was flourishing under the sun o f free trade, and there was little inducem ent to m ake com m itm ents for the sake o f a colony w hich had ceased to have the virtues of a “plan ta­ tio n ,” and whose im perial zeal m ust have seemed to rise with h er troubles and fall w ith her progress. I t was a phase of English policy w hich w as to pass w ith the revived im perialism o f the later seventies and eighties, b u t it cam e m ost inopportunely at a

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tim e when C anada needed diplom atic and perhaps even armed assistance in her relationships w ith the U nited States. T here had em erged from the once-doubtful strife of the Civil W ar a united country, freed from the divisions of the slavery issue, and with a large arm y. Incidents o f the w ar period had m ade fo r bad blood with G re at B ritain and - to only a lesser extent - with C anada. T here was talk of a post-w ar settlem ent of disputes: not in this case betw een belligerents, but to discuss issues w hich the w ar had raised. In such a settlem ent the governm ent of C anada wished to take part, having specific points to bring forw ard; but, as neither a strong n o r a sovereign pow er, had to appear in some type o f junior partnership w ith the British governm ent. The m atters of im m ediate concern to the dom inion w ere defence, the fisheries, trade, and an indem nity fo r losses incurred in the Fenian raids. T h e problem of defence was how to ensure protection against official o r unofficial aggression from the U nited States. T h e old fear o f annexation by force was not yet dead, kept alive both by m em ories of the past and by contem porary words and acts that seem ed to spell trouble.2 S enator Sum ner, Senator C handler, President Johnson, P resident G ran t, and H am ilton Fish, the secretary of state, all spoke o f the desirability of the peaceful annexation of C anada. These and sim ilar opinions in portions o f the press found their way to Canada. T he situations in M ani­ to b a and British Colum bia w ere both such as to give anxiety. T h e close connection of the Red River colony with M innesota, the rebellion there, and the fear of A m erican expansion into the new C anadian w est com bined to m ake an aw kw ard position. T he acquisition of A laska by the U nited States and the San Juan b oundary dispute m ade the Pacific C oast another vulnerable area, especially as com m unication w ith it from C anada was slow. T he C anadian governm ent was acutely conscious o f the possibilities. It is o f great im portance [wrote M acdonald to Rose] that a part o f the force [to the R ed River] should be R egular Troops, as it will convince the U nited States G overnm ent and people that H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent have no intention o f abandoning this continent. I t has got to be a fixed idea in W ashington that England wants to get rid o f her colonies, indeed M r. Fish has not hesitated to say so. I m ay m ention to you, in entire confi­ dence, that Fish had the im pudence to ask Thornton to ascertain whether H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent w ould offer any objection

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to a free vote being taken in Canada, or in any portions o f it, w hether the people desire to join the U nited States or not, and stated his conviction that if this vote were taken a large m ajority, nine-tenths he said o f the people, w ould vote fo r annexation. H e went further and stated that the refusal o f reciprocity was a legitim ate m ode o f coercion. . . . C ouncil has m ade an indignant m inute on the subject . . . we w alked into Fish at the rate o f a hunt.3 T h ere was indeed ground for apprehension on the p art of a w eak country faced by a great pow er in w hich even the high officials did not hesitate to talk of annexation. T ru e, they always called it peaceful annexation, but the line between persuasion and force has not infrequently been a narrow one. A dded to w ords w ere deeds - or, to be m ore accurate, the absence of deeds. It was a conviction in C anada th at the failure of the U nited States authorities to restrain o r punish the Fenians dem onstrated a lack o f goodwill that was little short o f hostility. T aking words and deeds together (and the two seemed to spring from the sam e attitude) there was at least prim a facie evidence fo r the belief th at m ilitary and naval forces in C anada m ust be calculated on the basis of a possible invasion. T he degree of that probability was a subject o f dispute, b u t there was at least agreem ent that defence m ust not be neglected. Ju st as C anada - in the eyes of m any C anadians - was in need of adequate defences, the imperial troops were being w ithdraw n. T he decision to reduce the garrisons in British N o rth A m erica had been taken m any years earlier, and had always been regretted by the colonials.4 T he British governm ent was determ ined to reduce all colonial garrisons, partly for the sake o f econom y, and partly because its available forces were too widely distributed. In the case o f C anada there was an additional reason arising out o f the belief that the dom inion should accept the burdens as well as the advantages of greater autonom y, and to som e extent an impression that C anada in any case was moving, if not tow ard com plete independence, at least tow ard a status which could no longer be called colonial. The exigencies of the Civil W ar period caused tem porary reinforce­ m ent o f the im perial troops, and the danger from Fenianism fu rth er delayed reduction. T he cost to the imperial treasury fo r the year 1867-8 was £ 1 ,2 4 3 ,4 2 3 , a figure considerably higher than that for either the Civil W ar years or previously. In C anada it was hoped th at circum stances would induce the British gov­

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ernm ent to delay o r m odify its plan of w ithdraw ing the troops. Both the Fenian m enace and the threatening aspect of affairs in the R ed River district were presented as argum ents in favour o f a t least tem porary delay; but the British governm ent was inexorable, and tow ard the end o f 1871 the last of the British garrisons (except that at the naval station of H alifax) m arched out o f Quebec, w here they had been stationed since they had first storm ed that fortress over a century earlier. It was said and understood th at the w ithdraw al o f the troops did n ot absolve G re at B ritain from rendering assistance to C anada in case o f need. It was obvious, how ever, that only naval forces could be rapidly brought to a N o rth A m erican scene of action; and in any case the British governm ent, both directly and through its governors, had persistently urged the doctrine of colonial responsibility for the first line o f defence. T he fortifica­ tions th at w ere agreed upon in 1865 w ere never created, except fo r additional w orks carried out by the im perial governm ent at Quebec. T he C anadian governm ent provided itself w ith money to proceed with the w orks planned for various cities, but the fortifications were n o t built, and in 1872 the original plan was dropped. Beginning with the last years o f the im perial garrisons a C anadian m ilitary organization was slowly built up. A statute o f 1868 (31 V iet., c. 40 ) retained in principle the obligation to m ilitary service, but in practice provided only for a volunteer militia. U nder the statute 40,000 m en w ere to be paid and drilled, b ut only at first was this num ber actually reached. T here was a departm ent of militia, but at first no headquarters staff and no auxiliary services, such as com m issariat. T he first steps tow ard a regular arm y were taken in 1871 w ith the raising of tw o batteries, one at Q uebec and the other a t K ingston, to take o ver and preserve the works and arsenals at those places. T h e Fenian m ovem ent was, as has been suggested, closely related to the whole m ilitary question; as it was, also, to the C anadian position in regard to the projected diplom atic settle­ m ent with the U nited States. T he Fenian B rotherhood, which w as form ed in 1858, turned after the Civil W ar to a plan fo r putting pressure on the British governm ent (by m eans o f inva­ sions o f C anada) to m ake concessions to the Irish revolutionary party. T h ere was m ore talk o f invasion than actual crossing of the frontier, but actual operations were sufficient to justify apprehension. T he public - especially near the border - was certainly alarm ed, and there were constant rum ours o f furth er attacks. T he danger m ade it necessary to spend m ore on the

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m ilitia than w ould otherw ise have been considered, and there was loss of life in repelling the invaders. W hat m ade the whole F enian question bulk so large was two related considerations: th at the Fenians m ight find reinforcem ents and do extensive harm ; and that the A m erican governm ent, by failure to prevent the raids or adequately to punish the participants, exhibited an unfriendly attitude. T he first apprehension proved to be illfounded. T he second was based on at least som e real evidence. W ithout going into the details of the m otives and acts of indi­ vidual A m ericans o r the governm ent, it is only necessary here to understand the C anadian point o f view. In sum m ary this was: th at the raids had cost C anada m en and m oney, that the United States had not m ade proper efforts to prevent them , th at an in­ dem nity should be paid, and th at the British governm ent should press the dom inion’s claim . W hen C artier and M cD ougall were in England they learnt o f negotiations on the A labam a claims, and suggested to G ranville th at if a tribunal were set up on that subject individuals in C anada and the governm ent should have an opportunity o f presenting their claim s about the Fenians.5 In the spring o f 1870 the C anadian governm ent stated its inten­ tion o f urging that the im perial governm ent dem and reparation, on the ground th at the A m erican governm ent had inform ation w hich would have enabled it to stop the raids. T hey pointed out th at the C anadian governm ent, though not being able to stop the St. A lbans raid o f 1864, because of lack o f fore-know ledge, had m ade pecuniary com pensation. Before this privy council report could reach England, G ranville had w ritten to the governor general, Sir John Y oung, saying that H is M ajesty’s governm ent w ould urge the A m erican governm ent to counteract any such m ovem ent in the future. T he C anadian cabinet was furious, and w rote a bitter m em orandum w hich Y oung refused to sign, but sent to G ranville. In it the council expressed its “ unfeigned regret” th at no dem and fo r reparation was being m ade. They believed that “ there is no precedent in the history of civilized nations for a great pow er such as G reat B ritain subm itting to such outrage on its loyal subjects w ithout m aking a dem and for adequate reparation.” A fter fu rth er pressing, K im berley, the new colonial secretary, suggested that the C anadian governm ent draw up a full statem ent o f facts and claims. T he resultant m em orandum , accepted by the council on January 25, 1871, w ent over the fam iliar argum ents at som e length, seeking to show by reference to particular cases th at the U nited States governm ent was well w arned in advance and could have pre­

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vented the raids.0 As a result o f this correspondence the imperial governm ent agreed to bring the claims before the joint high com mission w hich was to m eet at W ashington. N o t the least im portant o f the issues com ing to a head in the early years after confederation was that of the trade and com ­ m erce o f the dom inion. In no field was the close dependence of C anada on satisfactory relations w ith G re at B ritain and the U nited States better illustrated. O f the total external trade of C anada in 1870 as m uch as 89.5 p er cent o f the exports and 88.5 p er cent o f the im ports were accounted for by those powers together. A lthough G reat Britain bought from C anada consid­ erably less than she sold to her, the firmness with w hich freetrade doctrines w ere held left little prospect of preferential duties. In the case o f the U nited States, however, Canadians continued to cast longing glances at the reciprocity treaty of 1854, a renew al o f which, in some form , w ould be especially advantageous in consideration o f the growing height of the A m erican tariff. T he question was w hether the U nited States could be induced to m ake a new treaty, it being borne in mind th at she had renounced the previous one. It seemed probable that a case m ade solely on the virtues o f tariff agreem ents would be insufficient to carry the day. A s m ake-weights the Canadians had two inducem ents to offer: adm ission to their fisheries, and use of their canals. T he fisheries o f N ew foundland and C anada, plentiful and ac­ cessible to A m erican ships, constituted a real bargaining-point. T he fisheries controversy was an old one, both as to the interpre­ tation o f the treaty rights of A m erican citizens, and as p art of the general negotiations on com m ercial relations. T he conces­ sion in the T reaty of Paris o f 1783 to A m ericans of the right to fish in colonial w aters was considered by the British governm ent as abrogated by the W ar of 1812. A m ericans, how ever, did not accept this interpretation and continued to fish after the w ar as before, until some tw enty o f their boats w ere seized by British cruisers. T he convention o f 1818 defined the position by allow­ ing to A m erican citizens fishing rights in p arts of the shore of N ew foundland and L abrador, and the M agdalen Islands; the U nited States renouncing any claim to enter the three-m ile lim it elsewhere, except to obtain shelter, wood, and w ater, and to m ake repairs. T he Reciprocity T reaty of 1854 greatly enlarged the freedom of A m erican fisherm en by providing for reciprocal and free access to the coastal fisheries, with some exceptions; but w hen that treaty lapsed in 1866, the convention o f 1818 -

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with its limited concessions - once m ore cam e into force. The provincial governm ents assumed that the privileges accorded to A m erican fishermen autom atically cam e to an end, but at the solicitation o f the British governm ent agreed to retain them tem porarily. T he C anadian governm ent professed th at they had “no disposition to use the apprehension of national differences arising out of the fisheries, as a m eans of influencing the U nited States to replace their trade relations with British N o rth A m erica on a satisfactory footing,” 7 but it is probable th a t they believed th at the fisheries could be used as a m eans of pressure tow ard restoration o f reciprocity. T hey suggested that fo r the current year the provinces should allow A m erican ves­ sels to fish on paym ent of a licence fee, the proceeds from which should be used for “ the m aintenance o f a joint m arine police.” T he licence fee was duly instituted, consisting of 50 cents and later of $2 p er ton o f the vessel. In spite of the original intention the system was carried on from year to year - although there were constant com plaints from C anada o f w idespread evasion until 1870, when the dom inion governm ent decided to term inate it. T here followed a period in which the convention of 1818 cam e into operation once m ore, accom panied by disputes as to w hat were C anadian waters. Both before and after 1870 there was a necessity for naval policing, which was perform ed partly by the C anadian and partly by the British governm ent. In each of the first three years after the abrogation o f the Reciprocity T reaty there w ere four o r five vessels of the royal navy protecting fisheries in the G ulf o f St. Law rence, and during the sam e tim e, one o r two p ro ­ vincial boats. In 1870 there was one British vessel and eight Canadian - the latter officered as far as possible by retired naval officers. T he division of responsibility and expense was in dispute between the two governm ents, and constant com plaints were m ade in C anada that protection was insufficient. T he abolition o f the licensing system was received w ith outspoken criticisms in the U nited States, being described as unneighbourly; and a long argum ent w ent on as to exactly from w hat w aters the A m erican vessels were to be excluded.8 In the sum m er of 1870 the dom inion governm ent, after reviewing the whole co n tro ­ versy, urged the British authorities to suggest to the A m erican governm ent a joint high com m ission to settle the dispute.0 In the speech from the throne in 1871 it was stated that the fishery question w ould be subm itted to a joint com mission, which, how ever, would include it as only p art o f a large agenda.

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T h e coasting trade, too, was to be a m atter fo r reciprocal concessions. By a C anadian statute o f 1870 (33 V iet., c. xiv) the coasting trade from one C anadian po rt to another was for­ bidden to foreign ships, w ith the exception th at the governor in council m ight declare that this did not apply to ships o f a country which adm itted British ships to its coasting trade. The explanation of this move was m ade by the m inister o f m arine and fisheries in his annual report for 1868-1869. T h e U nited States, he argued, had not reciprocated in a liberal policy in relation to the coasting trade, the use of canals, or fisheries. I am o f opinion that the true policy o f the Canadian G overn­ m en t at present should be to retain all the privileges which it now possesses, until fresh negotiations take place fo r new trade relations between Canada and the U nited States, w hen the opening o f the coasting trade o f the D om inion to U nited States shipping can be included in any arrangem ents which m ay be m ade, if the Canadian governm ent should then be o f opinion that it would be advisable in the interests o f Canada to do so.10 T he second m ajor C anadian asset suitable for bargaining was a w aterw ay from the m iddle w est to the sea. It was a less certain asset than the control of fisheries, since there w ere alternative transportation routes, while the best fisheries were in C anadian w aters. Indeed, the diversion o f traffic to th e E rie C anal o r to A m erican railways at Buffalo was a constant nightm are to those Canadians who were directly o r indirectly interested. T here w ere, however, certain types o f freight which could be carried m ost econom ically to tidew ater by boat; and it was in the know ledge o f this that C anadians had banked on extensive A m erican use of the canal system which in the forties they had been com pleting a t great expense. T he Reciprocity T reaty for the first tim e adm itted U nited States vessels to navigation o f the St. Law rence and the C anadian canals w ith the sam e tolls as those paid by British subjects. U sed as a m ake-w eight in the negotiation o f that treaty, the navigation privilege autom atically fell w ith its term ination. T he U nited States had a quid pro quo in the coasting trade, to which C anadians had not been adm itted even under the Reciprocity T reaty, and in the bonding system. T h e latter enabled C anadian im ports and exports to be carried to and from A m erican all-year ports w ithout paying duty, and its w ithdraw al was a bogey th at was often displayed. But the U nited States h ad little to offer in w ater transport to set against the C anadian canals. T he treaty o f 1854 adm itted British sub­

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jects to the free navigation of L ake M ichigan. A nd until 1895, w hen a C anadian canal was opened at Sault Ste. M arie, C ana­ dian vessels w ere dependent on the A m erican one fo r entrance to L ake Superior. Fisheries and canals w ere consistently brought forw ard as inducem ents to the U nited States to re-enact a reciprocity agree­ m ent. A dded attractions were indeed needed. T he U nited States was in itself a huge free-trade area, rich in m ost natural re­ sources and well advanced in m anufacturing. C anada, on the oth er hand, was in a com paratively early stage o f m anufactu r­ ing, w ith lim ited m arkets, and dependent on a relatively large volum e o f foreign trade. She was, m oreover, attem pting a t the sam e tim e to build up a m ore m ixed econom y, and to sell her staples fo r im ported goods (w hich must, to a large extent, be m an u factu res). A m erican dissastisfaction w ith the treaty of 1854 was due not only to the political relations o f the Civil W ar period. T he C anadian protectionist tariffs o f the fifties were th ought by m any A m ericans to be striking a t the very roots of any perm anent reciprocity betw een the two countries, and to violate the treaty in spirit if not in letter. T here was never any doubt th at C anada w anted to reach an agreem ent w ith the U nited States, even if individuals tried to bolster national pride by statem ents that the U nited States m ust n ot th in k C anada dependent on her charity, and th at C anada could get on very well w ithout reciprocity. T he plain tru th was th a t all parties, and nearly all groups, were anxious to secure a successor to the treaty of 1854. T he only disagreem ent was on the term s to be accepted. Before the treaty had even ru n out the provincial governm ents w ere struggling to secure its renew al or replacem ent. W ith confederation the aim did n o t change, though at tim es it seemed politic not to press it. D eputations to W ash­ ington and inquiries m ade through the British m inister brought news th at there was little hope a t the tim e. It had not been easy to float the treaty o f 1854 - even on cham pagne - and subse­ q u en t events had m ade W ashington even less receptive. Y o u know [wrote M acdonald] that I have always held that a renewal o f those relations can only be effected by the pressure o f A m erican interests upon Congress. It is obvious that congress m ust look at the question fro m an A m erican point o f view entirely, and until convinced that it is .for the advantage o f the trade o f the U nited States to negotiate a new reciprocity treaty no such treaty can be obtained.

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In the state o f feeling that now exists tow ard England in the m inds o f too m any people in the U nited States, nothing like fa v o r can be expected by her. This feeling has absurdly enough been extended to Canada, although during the whole o f the C ivil W ar we spared no pains to perform our duty as a friendly neighbour. Still, the feeling exists, and therefore any appearance o f undue anxiety on the part o f Canada would only tend to defeat the object in view. Canada is quite ready, through the British Am bassador, to re­ new the negotiations at any tim e, and M r. Fish is fu lly inform ed o f that fact. W e can do no m ore. I t w ould be altogether in­ decorous and im proper fo r the Canadian governm ent to co m ­ m ence a system o f lobbying fo r the purpose o f securing the support o f individual m em bers o f congress. W e have gone to considerable expense already in dissem inat­ ing inform ation on the subject o f trade, and fro m tim e to time, as it m ay be necessary, will continue to do so. T he truth seem s to be that, until y o u r public m en get o ut o f their heads the ridiculous notion that by restricting m utual trade annexation will be secured, no earnest a ttem pt will be m ade to secure reciprocity. M eanw hile Canada w ill not entertain fo r a m o m en t the proposition11 to give the freedom o f the St. L aw ­ rence fo r the sake o f the reduction or abolition o f the im port duties on coal, lum ber and salt.12 It was becom ing increasingly evident th at no progress could be m ade in tariff negotiations except in relation to other subjects o f com m on interest, and probably not until the soreness still existing from the Civil W ar could be alleviated. In full-dress debates in the C anadian parliam ent in the spring of 1870 the opposition followed the obvious tactics of accusing the govern­ m ent of lack o f enthusiasm for, and inefficiency in the pursuit of, a reciprocity agreem ent. T he latter m ay, to some degree, have been true; but there is little doubt th at governm ent and opposition w ere one in their aims. T he wisdom of the new regu­ lations concerning the fisheries might be questioned in view of the need to conciliate A m erican opinion, b u t the governm ent believed that it had tried concession w ithout any good result. A p art from the fisheries altogether, there w ere m any groups represented a t W ashington opposed to tariff reductions on p articular classes o f goods - as there w ere always likely to be surrounding any legislature. T o m eet their attacks nothing was effective beyond a series of com prom ises. It was, however,

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possible to attem pt to rem ove political bones of dissension, w hich acted as a barrier against agreem ent on any subject. The British governm ent had for some tim e been moving tow ard a kind of peace conference w ith the U nited States. W hat form it should take, w hat subjects w ere to be included, and how C anada m ight be represented on it w ere all subjects o f vital concern to the dom inion. O ut o f a successful conference might com e the twin benefits o f better feeling between the British Em pire and the U nited States and accord on the m atters of particular inter­ est to C anada, the discussion of w hich seemed to have reached a stalem ate.

II T h e holding o f a conference at W ashington was the result o f a com bination of circum stances. T he British governm ent, apprehensive of the state of affairs in E urope, and particularly o f the denunciation by Russia of the Black Sea clauses of the T reaty of Paris, was anxious to avoid any possibility of a war on tw o continents. T he tradition that peace with the U nited States was a sine qua non of foreign policy had not yet been established in L ondon, but for the tim e a t least there was a pressing reason fo r the settlem ent of disputes. T he A m erican governm ent, recently freed from the encroachm ent of N apo­ leon III on N o rth A m erica as well as from its own Civil W ar, felt less necessity fo r im m ediate agreem ent, and there were not a few prom inent A m ericans w ho talked alm ost lightly o f a possible w ar w ith G reat Britain. But w ith the replacem ent of Sum ner by H am ilton Fish as secretary of state, there was m ore willingness to com prom ise. T he position of C anada in this situation has been differently interpreted. T o R ipon’s biographer the C anadian issues were incidental and an em barrassm ent.13 T o Canadians they seemed at the tim e and since as o f m ajor im portance. W hether the British governm ent w ould have been eager fo r settlem ent had there been no E uropean com plication, is purely speculative. As it proved, the situation was advanta­ geous to C anada is so far as it started the wheels of diplom acy; and disadvantageous in so fa r as it reduced the bargaining pow er o f the British governm ent, and m ade it too ready for concessions. Both British and A m erican statesm en were inclined to believe that the status of C anada was a provisional one which could hardly last. T he repeated prophecies in the U nited States th at annexation was a question o f tim e w ere based not, as once,

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on the assum ption o f m ilitary force, but on a doctrine o f in­ evitability tem pered by the peaceful persuasion of econom ic pow er. But while nursing this com fortable expectation o f the eventual acquisition o f m ost o f the rest o f N orth A m erica, A m ericans saw the need for settlem ent o f im m ediate questions, particularly in regard to the fisheries, and, to a lesser extent, the unsettled boundaries w ith M anitoba and British Colum bia. A bsorbed in European affairs, anxious to prom ote w orld com ­ m erce by means of free trade, and unim pressed by the value of quasi-colonies, British statesm en w ere tem pted to agree w ith the A m erican suggestion th at their bilateral differences w ould be m ore easily settled if C anada w ere no longer a p art of the British E m pire. But, while recognizing the possibility - even the proba­ bility - o f peaceful separation in the future, they were for the tim e being ready to sponsor the C anadian case up to the point at w hich it endangered the success of the settlem ent as a whole. T h e form o f the A nglo-A m erican negotiations is explained by the course of the A labam a dispute. A treaty o f arbitration fo r the A labam a claim s had been rejected by the A m erican Senate, and the British governm ent was therefore unw illing to risk indignity by pursuing the m atter through ordinary diplo­ m atic channels. I t was, however, urgently necessary to remove the U nited States as a possibly hostile force in case o f w ar with Russia. In the dilem m a Lord T enterden, the assistant under­ secretary for foreign affairs, m ade the ingenious suggestion o f a joint high com m ission.14 It was to be first proposed for the dis­ cussion of affairs other than that of the Alabam a, but w ith the private understanding that the A m erican governm ent should add the A labam a case, and that this be accepted. In conform ity with the tried diplom atic procedure of private agreem ent before official correspondence, Sir John Rose (then resident in London) was sent in January 1871 to W ashington, there, w here he was persona grata, to discuss plans with the secretary of state. Fish was already looking tow ard a general settlem ent having, in the previous Septem ber, suggested to T hornton (the British minister) th at all issues should be dealt with together. D espite the opposi­ tion of Sum ner - who wildly dem anded the w ithdraw al of Britain from the A m e ric a s-F ish found sufficient support before the m onth was out to accept the proposition brought by Rose.15 T he official correspondence was then solem nly conducted on the agreed lines, and the decision that a joint com m ission was to m eet in W ashington duly recorded.10 T h e negotiations leading to the creation o f the joint com m is­

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sion w ere apparently carried through w ithout consulting the C anadian governm ent and w ithout any decision as to w hat part, if any, C anada was to play in the com mission. I t was, o f course, clear th a t at least some of the subjects directly affecting the dom inion w ould be on the agenda, b u t th at alone w ould not satisfy C anada. W hile in E ngland in 1869 C artier and McD ougall had represented to G ranville th at no steps tow ard reciprocity should be taken w ithout consultation w ith their governm ent;17 sim ilarly they had asked th at the dom inion gov­ ernm ent and individual citizens should be allowed to appear before any tribunal considering claim s for dam age by Fenian raids.18 M acdonald had also told Rose, in w riting on the fisheries question, th at “should the question com e up you m ust press on H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent that no negotiation should be en­ tered upon or treaty concluded w ithout reference to the C ana­ dian governm ent.” 19 But by w hat m eans was C anada to take p art in the W ashington discussion? Obviously not by separate representation. T he proposal th at was hit upon in L ondon was to include a C anadian in the British com mission. Rose was th ought of, as having carried on the prelim inary discussions, but w as unacceptable in C anada as not a C anadian by birth, a resi­ dent in E ngland, and a p artn e r in an A m erican banking house.20 M acdonald him self was suggested, and the governor general p ut th e question before him a t the beginning o f February. I have thought over L o rd K im berley’s proposition [he wrote to Lisgar] that I should'act on the Joint C om m ission with the U nited States on Fishery and other m atters. I am a good deal embarrassed by not being able to com m unicate w ith m y col­ leagues on the subject. M y first im pression was that it w ould be better fo r Canada not to be represented on such a Com m ission. B u t then one m ust consider that if Canada allowed the m atter to go by default, and left its interests to be -adjudicated upon and settled by a C om m ission com posed exclusively o f A m ericans having an adverse interest, and Englishm en having little or no interest in Canada, the G ovt, here w ould be very m uch censured if the result was a sacrifice o f the rights o f the D om inion. Eng­ land w ould at once say that the offer was m ade to Canada to be represented on the C om m ission and that it was declined.21 M acdonald agreed, how ever, that he w ould act, subject to his colleagues’ consent (w hich was readily given), and after secur­ ing from K im berley an adm ission of C anada’s exclusive rights

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to fisheries w ithin the three-m ile limit. T here was indeed no app aren t alternative. It was obvious th a t a single C anadian w ould occupy an unenviable position, since he presum ably m ight fail to sway his fellow-com missioners, yet m ust accept responsibility in C anada for the decisions. O n the other hand, there was a t least a better chance of furthering C anadian inter­ ests by this m eans than by official correspondence over the long ro u te to W ashington by way o f London. D uring his stay in W ashington M acdonald kept in touch with his cabinet by m eans of an exchange o f letters and telegram s; but the course of the conference could by no m eans be plotted in advance, and to som e extent he w as obliged to act as best he could, with no time for consultation, as circum stances arose. T he British com mission was headed by E arl de G rey and R ipon, and the other m em bers w ere Sir Stafford N orthcote, a m em ber o f the opposition in the H ouse o f Com m ons, Sir E dw ard T h ornton, the British m inister to W ashington, M ontague Ber­ nard, professor of international law at O xford, and Sir John M acdonald. M acdonald was appointed a plenipotentiary under the great seal, and received his instructions22 from the foreign office. A t the first session de G rey “announced th at his Com m is­ sion - which he pointed out was not a British but an Im perial body, C anada being represented by Prim e M inister M acdonald - was fully em pow ered to sign a treaty.” 23 But w hen later de G rey explained th at any fishery treaty m ust be approved by the C anadian parliam ent, one of the A m erican com m issioners said “th at they thought they were dealing w ith the British E m pire and not with C anada.”24 It was the beginning o f the long story o f foreign uncertainty on the constitution o f the em pire. It was also a new departure that involved possible difficulties in the relations o f C anada and G reat Britain. E. B. C handler of New Brunsw ick and F rancis H incks of the Province o f C anada had accom panied Elgin to W ashington in 1854, but only in an advisory capacity. T he W ebster-A shburton T reaty of 1842 and the O regon T reaty o f 1846 had been negotiated by British plenipotentiaries. T here were no precedents. T h e high com m ission set to w ork on F eb ru ary 27, 1871, and the treaty was signed on M ay 6.25 T he subjects m ost discussed w ere the A labama claim s and the fisheries. In the form er C anada had no direct interest, and the U nited K ingdom had none in the latter. T o M acdonald the w hole conference was a dual struggle, w ith his fellow-com missioners first and w ith the A m ericans second. T o the British m em bers, on the other hand, the pressure

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o f C anadian dem ands com plicated their task o f securing a settlem ent. T o the A m ericans it was a constant puzzle w hether they w ere dealing w ith one country or two. T h at was the crux of the situation, and one not fully recognized by either M acdonald o r de G rey. T he British E m pire com m issioners com posed a body w hich was neither national nor international. C anadians were h u rt th a t their interests w ere not pursued with m ore zeal, and m ore than once M acdonald talked of w ithdraw ing. T here had been no previous agreem ent between U nited K ingdom and C anadian governm ents on the course to be pursued in respect of particu lar subjects. M acdonald, although appointed to the same status as the other com m issioners, seems to have felt no respon­ sibility in m atters not touching C anada, and to have given little w eight to the general attitude o f the British tow ard a settlem ent w ith the U nited States. “ . . . T he British Com m issioners [he w rote] seem to have only one idea in their minds, th at is, to go hom e to E ngland w ith a treaty in their pockets settling every­ thing, no m atter a t w hat cost to C anada.”26 H ad he not been so harassed by his particular problem s, M acdonald m ight have recognized m ore freely th at the British w ere prepared to make concessions for the sake of peace and their E uropean danger; and th at an established peace w ould a t the sam e tim e remove w hatever m enace there was to the security o f Canada. T o de G rey it seemed th at the C anadians gave too little weight to the need o f com prom ise fo r the sake of peace. “T hey are filled with a belief,” he w rote to the foreign office, “th at they can bully the A m ericans into giving w ay and seem indifferent to the risk they ru n by such a policy.”27 Y et it is not surprising that a prim e m inister responsible to the C anadian parliam ent and electorate should have envisaged w ith apprehension the reception of a treaty that w ould certainly be believed to be unfavourable to C anada. “I have taken strong ground w ith my colleagues [he wrote] th at it would be exceedingly unw ise to agree to any term s which it is not reasonably probable w ould be accepted by C anada as should any T reaty be m ade an d afterw ards rejected by o u r Parliam ent the feeling o f irritation w ould be greatly increased.”28 H e w as also playing the dom inion gam e with another object. Fish inquired w hether a fisheries treaty would have to be ratified by P rince E dw ard Island and N ew foundland, and de G rey was uncertain of the constitutional position. “I did n o t choose to enlighten them upon the p oint as I think it well to keep the case of C anada separate. If we com e to any satisfactory T reaty, I shall endeavour to have it lim ited to the D om inion of

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C anada, so that if Prince E dw ard Island and N ew foundland desire the advantages o f the T reaty they m ust come into C o n ­ federation.”20 In the light o f his own feelings and of the pressure fro m C anada, M acdonald was going far in the direction of sacrifices for the sake o f im perial unity. W hen it was first p ro ­ posed th at a fisheries treaty m ust be approved by the C anadian parliam ent M acdonald was p u t in an exceedingly difficult position. I f a m ajority o f m y colleagues should at any tim e conclude to accept term s w hich I do not approve of, I m ust o f course, either p rotest and withdraw, or remain on the com m ission and trust to 'the . . . ratification o f the Treaty by Canada. I f I take the first course, it will disclose to the A m ericans the fa ct o f a difference o f opinion, a conflict in fact, between Canada and England. This the A m ericans are anxious to estab­ lish, in order to get up a sort o f quarrel between the tw o, and strengthen that party in England who desire to get rid o f the colonies as a burden. I f I continue to act on the C om m ission I will be attacked fo r m aking an unw orthy sacrifice o f Canada’s right and m ay be com pelled to vote in Parliam ent against a Treaty which I had a hand in m aking.30 Anxious as M acdonald was to secure a satisfactory settlem ent of the fisheries, his determ ination m ust not go to the point of incurring a m ajor political disaster. A few days later, w hen de G rey said that M acdonald’s insistence w ould bring the negoti­ ations to an end, the latter felt it necessary to m odify his position previously taken th at parliam ent would not accept the projected treaty. M y reason fo r taking this line was it was evidently L o rd de G rey’s aim to m ake m e and Canada responsible fo r a breach o f the negotiations generally in case things w ent wrong. I was resolved not to let any blam e be attachable to Canada in that respect, and thus strengthen the hands o f the party in England w ho consider Canada a burden to be got rid o f and an obstacle to friendly relations with the U nited States.31 T hus the C anadian governm ent had, like the British, aim s in the negotiations w ider than the actual subjects discussed. M ac­ donald was a skilful negotiator and he fought a good fight, but the final term s w ere far from those w hich he, o r any other C anadian, w anted. T he San Ju a n boundary, being relatively

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unim portant, w as little discussed, and w as finally subm itted to arbitration by the G erm an E m peror (articles x x x i v - x l i i ) . 32 T h e Fenian claim s w ere, on A m erican insistence, ruled to be n ot w ithin the agenda - a result w hich M acdonald regarded as fortunate, since it had been arranged th at England would in­ dem nify C anada if the U nited States refused. T here rem ained reciprocity, com m unications, and fisheries, which the Canadians hoped to link together in the traditional m anner. In spite of M acdonald’s effort, however, no tariff agreem ent could be reached. T he articles on com m unications (xxv i-x x x ) provided fo r the free navigation o f the rivers St. Law rence, Y ukon, Por­ cupine and Stikine, and of L ake M ichigan. T he British agreed to urge the C anadian governm ent to allow to A m ericans the use o f C anadian canals on term s of equality with C anadians; and in retu rn the A m erican governm ent opened to Canadians the St. C lair Flats C anal, and agreed to urge the state governm ents to allow the use o f state canals connected with border waters. Bonding privilege was to be allowed to and from the ports of N ew Y ork, Boston, and P ortland, or other ports designated by the president (art. x x ix ). T he ships of either C anada or the U nited States m ight carry goods from one po rt in the other country to another, provided that p a rt o f the transport was by land carriage in bond (art. x x x ) . T he chief effort o f C anada was tow ard an acceptable solution of the fisheries. It was their chief asset, and M acdonald m ade repeated efforts to put it against at least som e degree o f reciprocal trade. T he A m ericans, however, were adam ant; and the only free trade was to be in fish and fish-oil (art. x x i) . T he inshore fisheries o f each country were throw n open to the citizens of the other (arts, x v m -x x ), and the claim of a superior value of the concession m ade by C anada was to be exam ined by a special com m ission (arts, x x n -x x v ).33 O n M ay 8 the W ashington T reaty w as ready for signature.331 Fish and de G rey w arm ly congratulated each o th e r - a n d it came to M acdonald’s turn to sign. W ith the pen in his hand he turned to F ish and w hispered “W ell, here go the fisheries” ; and, as he rose fro m the table, “T hey are gone.”34 HI M acdonald was not w ithout a sense o f d ram a, and his gesture in signing the treaty, as well as the violent protests he m ade during its negotiation, m ust be discounted. Certainly he had failed to secure the term s w hich governm ent and p opular opin­

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ion sought; b u t th at is not an uncom m on result o f any diplom atic com prom ise. T he original C anadian aims had not been set low, and w hat had actually been attained was not contem ptible. T he fisheries had not brought their price, but there was still a chance o f a dividend being voted by the com m ission to be set up. R eci­ procity had been denied, b ut the door was not closed. C anadians had no real desire to exclude A m erican shipping from their canals, o r to forgo the canal tolls. T he F enian claims had not been considered, but M acdonald considered th at he had a p ro m ­ ise from de G rey o f com pensation from the British governm ent. T h e San Juan boundary was to be arbitrated, and the decision m ight fall one w ay o r the other. It rem ained to m ake out a good case in Canada, both to placate C anadian opinion, and to per­ suade parliam ent to pass a bill im plem enting those p arts of the treaty which required legislative action. A s M acdonald now bent his energies to this task, he had, he found, rath er overplayed his hand in his letters from W ashington to the cabinet, and some o f his own colleagues had to be con­ verted. P arliam ent would not m eet for nearly a year, and in the m eantim e he w ould say as little as possible, while preparing his defences. First, he m ust see w hat could be obtained on the F enian account. A pparently the British governm ent was willing to p ay a m odest com pensation if all the other questions at dis­ pute w ith the U nited States w ere settled - th at is to say, if the C anadian parliam ent passed a fisheries act, o r at least if the C anadian governm ent used every m eans in its pow er to induce parliam ent to pass the act. A lthough M acdonald had talked of n o t supporting the treaty, it is m ost im probable that he ever intended to take such drastic action. A t W ashington he had tried to com pensate fo r the disadvantages o f his m inority position by threats that he w ould not sign, o r would sign only w ith reserva­ tions, or that he w ould not press legislation in parliam ent. And now his caution in com m itting him self was certainly done in p art as a wish to confuse the opposition, and probably in p a rt as a m ethod o f bargaining w ith the British governm ent, as here used. But having extracted this conditional prom ise o f a cash paym ent he and H incks soon turned to the m ore attractive alternative of a guaranteed loan to be used for the building of railways and the im provem ent o f canals. A fter a cabinet m eet­ ing, M acdonald w rote to L isgar th at the governm ent w ould do everything in their pow er to carry the treaty if the guarantee was m ade, and th at the popularity o f the loan w ould “ assure you of the m oral certainty o f their success in P arliam ent.”35 A surpris­

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ing note of optim ism was suddenly struck, w hich m ust have confirm ed the British governm ent in their suspicion th at M ac­ donald could get the treaty through if he so desired. A fter a correspondence covering m onths a cable was received on M arch 18 w hich prom ised to guarantee a loan of £ 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 w hen the C anadian acts to im plem ent the treaty had com e into effect, and subject to C anada’s abandoning all claim s on G reat B ritain for losses from F enians.36 N o one knew better than M acdonald th at there was real and w idespread opposition to the treaty. A s soon as the high com ­ mission was m ooted, suspicions were voiced, in parliam ent and out, th at C anada would be the loser, as, it was said, she always had been. M any C anadians regarded the U nited States as the traditional victor in all international disputes, and expressed the fear, too, th a t B ritain w ould sacrifice C anada to an easy settle­ m ent with the A m erican governm ent. T he im portant debates in parliam ent did not com e until the treaty was discussed in the spring of 1872, but for the intervening period som ething o f the tem per o f the country m ay be seen from the com m ents in news­ papers. T he im portance o f the subject of a settlem ent w ith the U nited States derived not only from the direct pecuniary inter­ ests o f the country, but also from the fact th at it related to the central them es of C anadian foreign relations. N othing so bared the thoughts of C anadians as any issue w hich brought up their relations w ith the U nited K ingdom o r the U nited States: and w hen both were involved (as was usually the case) the country began to take stock of its position. It w as the signal for sweeping statem ents, hazardous prophecies, and verbal battles w ithout quarter. T h e San Juan dispute w as distant to old C anada, and while there were various hopes expressed th at the m atter w ould be settled (and in the right w ay ), it m ade little stir in the east. T he F enian question cam e nearer hom e and invoked the C a n ad a U nited K ingdom -U nited States triangle. T he G lobe refused to be frightened, b u t drew interesting conclusions: the Fenian scare was perhaps being magnified in order to get through the m ilitary estim ates.37 T hen it had the effect o f stim ulating C ana­ dian nationalism . “C anadians have gained m ore in national ch aracter during the last six years than in any previous twenty and if we ask, w hat has caused this, we shall find that the o ut­ rageous proceedings o f the F enians and their abettors have been am ong the chief agencies.” 38 A m onth later the sam e pap er was m ore indignant w ith the A m erican governm ent for its “ tacit

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consent” to the raids, but declared th at C anada would not be driven into annexation by such tactics.39 T he chorus soon began o f calls for an indem nity to cover raids and threats said to have cost C anada $4,000,000. T he D aily N ew s o f M ontreal argued that England should either put sufficient pressure on the U nited States, or else provide troops to protect the border.40 T he coincidence o f Fenian raids and the w ithdraw al o f im­ perial troops was, to Canadians, a m ost u nfortunate one. T he G lobe refused to visualize the possibility o f a w ar w ith the U nited States, and took a firm line against a standing arm y. It was left to a small tow n paper to repeat the thought th at had so o ften been uttered: I f English statesm en im agine that Canada is going to turn her youth into policem en and establish a cordon along the frontier, to keep back the Fenian invaders, they are very m uch m istaken. The Canadians are ready to do their share o f the duty im posed, but they m ust not be expected to perform impossibilities. . . . It should be borne in m ind that Canada is at any tim e liable to be m ade the battleground fo r settling any dispute that m ay arise between Great Britain and the U nited States. . . . W hy then are we asked to defen d the country against these attacks occa­ sioned through quarrels in which we have no concern?41 Reciprocity was very m uch in the public eye from the tim e of the abrogation of the treaty of 1854, and the new spapers reflected the general interest. T here is no doubt that a renewal was desired, but there w ere m any com m ents by the editors (as by m em bers of parliam ent) to the effect th at C anada m ust not be considered as dependent on it, but could stand on her own feet. Even stronger w ere the objections raised against any sug­ gestion that by w ithholding reciprocity C anada could be forced into annexation. T he editor o f the Globe, one of the m ost pow erful organs of opinion, reacted violently to the A m erican suggestion o f a zollverein. Canada, we are always proud to assert, is at present an integ­ ral part o f the British Em pire; and whoever, in the whole history o f the past, heard o f an instance o f part o f a K ingdom or E m pire entering into a com m ercial arrangem ent with its great com m er­ cial and political rivals fo r the purpose, avow edly, o f putting excessive differential taxes on the produce o f the rest o f that K ingdom or Em pire? . . . Yes, the very sam e persons who have trotted o ut their Independence and A nnexation hobbies, and

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fo u n d they w ould never do, now fancy they can gain the same end by this uniform custom s plan. The only recom m endation about it is that it is not so m anly as the proposal fo r annexation, but has m ore o f the sneak about it. . . .42 T h e tory Leader o f T oro nto followed m uch the sam e argum ent. Exclusion from a reciprocity treaty w ould not induce C anada to leave the British Em pire. “N either annexation nor independence had held any place in the C anadian m ind.”43 O n the fisheries the G lobe steadfastly defended the C anadian policy o f abandoning the licence system, and argued for the protection of the gulf fisheries as a m ajor asset. A t the very tim e th at M acdonald was trying, in W ashington, to get some quid pro quo for the adm is­ sion to inshore fisheries, the G lobe w as announcing th a t an exchange of th at privilege for reciprocity would be one-sided. In the interval before parliam ent m et the governm ent did not define its stand on the W ashington T reaty, but M acdonald, as a good strategist, sought to protect him self against a new spaper onslaught. H e w rote to A lexander M orris from W ashington to persuade the friendly new spapers to hold back until the Globe had com m itted itself against the treaty. H e would then be free to criticize it him self w ithout allowing G eorge Brown to occupy the strategic position o f im perial loyalty.44 Brown obligingly attacked the treaty as one th at had “no parallel in British history - with one exception, the A shburton capitulation.”45 D uring the m onth of M ay, too, the G lobe collected com m ents from other new spapers. L e Pays had condem ned the treaty outright, and said th at the only honourable course open to C anada was to reject it. L e N ouveau M o nde rem arked th a t “no doubt we have sacrificed m ore than we have obtained; but there is one im por­ tant interest w hich has been protected — th at of peace.” L e C o n s titu tio n a l and the G azette de H yacinthe were both provi­ sionally opposed. T urning to O ntario, th e G lobe reported the attitude o f a num ber of new spapers there. T he St. T hom as H o m e Journal called it not a treaty but a surrender. T he Perth Courier believed th at with the fisheries C anada lost her only bargaining point. T he Belleville Intelligencer called it “ a one­ sided bargain.” T h e G alt R efo rm er rem arked th a t “we are anxious to have peace and harm ony betw een B rother Jonathan and ourselves, but to secure this, we are not willing to sacrifice great interests and receive therefor com paratively nothing in retu rn .” T he Collingwood B ulletin w rote th at “ . . . if the m other country imagines th at she can arbitrarily dispose of ou r fisheries

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to m eet h er own private needs she is m istaken” ; and the Ingersoll N e w s m ade the deduction th at “ if this treaty, o r that p art of it w hich concerns us, had been negotiated by Canadians we could have obtained better term s.” N o doubt the G lobe was to som e extent choosing its papers, but it also quoted the O ttaw a C itizen s survey o f the field, and its conclusion that “judging fro m the general tone o f the C anadian press, we should think th at the T reaty will not prove acceptable unless it contains some qualifications not yet m ade know n.” T he H alifax M orning Chronicle is quoted as calling it “a disastrous T reaty for this P rovince” ; and the G lobe claim ed th at “there is not a single p ap er o f any note in the M aritim e Provinces th at recom m ends the adoption o f the T reaty by the C anadian Parliam ent.” On the other hand, the W hitby Chronicle, which itself condem ned the treaty, reported the H alifax Express and T im es as in favour, though it stated th at N ew Brunswick was altogether hostile.4*5 T hroughout June and July Brow n continued to attack the treaty, and to quote other hostile com m ents on it. M acdonald was defended by some editors as “doing his duty,” and criticized by others for giving way. T he British governm ent was frequently accused o f ignoring C anadian interests for the sake o f its own selfish success. T he attacks on the treaty, said Brown, were not of a partisan nature —even if he did show a particular pleasure in coining phrases about M acdonald. T h at there was som e opinion on the other side o f the case m ay be seen from the editorial colum ns o f the Leader. “The clauses affecting C anada are conceived in a reasonable spirit of equity and are well calculated to cem ent a lasting union between the U nited States and C anada.”47 T he H alifax R eporter is quoted as saying that “w hat is w anted is a m arket [for fish]. T h at the treaty provides. A s for ‘ruin, etc.’ the fisherm en of the British provinces fished alongside the fisherm en' o f the U nited States for twelve years and w ithout finding themselves ruined by the near neighbourhood of their rivals.” L a M inerve defended the treaty on the ground th at C anada would be the first to suffer from trouble between G reat Britain and the U nited States, and th at it was a protection against annexation.48 A final quotation, suggestive fo r the future, m ay be noted. T he editor o f the K ingston Whig, surveying the W ashington settlem ent, con­ cluded that, “of course we have no wish to see C anada annexed to the U nited States, far on the contrary; but we desire to see C anada so far independent o f the H om e authorities, th at she can m ake com m ercial treaties o f h er own, and so bring about

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th e leading wish of all who desire to see C anada take h er due place am ong the nations o f the earth.” 19 Judging by the early editorial reactions to the treaty - even m aking allow ance fo r exaggerated and unrepresentative state­ m ents - the prospect of carrying the treaty in parliam ent m ust have seemed doubtful. By the tim e th at th e session opened on A pril 11 the cabinet was united in its defence o f the W ashington settlem ent. A reference was m ade to it in the speech from the throne, and in the debate on the address A lexander M ackenzie m ade a brief criticism and F rancis H incks a brief defence.50 T he m ain debate began on M ay 3, when M acdonald introduced a bill to give validity to the treaty, in so far as it affected C anada.51 H is speech covered the w hole question, both in the origin of the com m ission and the term s of the treaty. A fter pointing out that parliam ent was free to accept o r reject the treaty, he argued that it w as im portant for the security of C anada that G re at Britain should have an entente w ith the U nited States, and th a t the circum stances o f the tim e justified taking up C anadian com m er­ cial questions at the sam e tim e as the im perial m atter. H e ex­ plained his own appointm ent to the com m ission and why he had accepted, and then turned to a detailed defence o f the clauses affecting C anada. M ackenzie and E dw ard Blake, leading fo r the opposition, denied both the necessity o f the concessions m ade to th e U nited States and the advantages said to have been gained by C anada. O n M ay 16 a vote was taken on the second reading o f the bill and it was passed w ith a m ajority o f sixty-six. T h e bill returned from com m ittee w ithout am endm ent, and received the royal assent before parliam ent rose. T he act (35 V iet., c. 2) provided fo r the adm ission o f U nited States vessels to the eastern fisheries, fo r the im portation w ithout duty of fish and fish-oil, for the transit of goods through C anada in bond, and the carriage o f goods in A m erican vessels from one p art of C anada to another. T hus ended the dom inion’s first experience of diplom acy. T he governm ent had succeeded in getting support for its policy, and it survived the election of the sum m er of 1872, though with a reduced m ajority. M acdonald declared th a t to win the election he had w orked harder th a n he had ever done before or would ever do again. “H ad the result of the election,” he told Dufferin, “shown th a t the people o f C anada disapproved of the treaty and a new m inistry been form ed on th at basis, the relations between C an ad a and the m other country would have been the reverse of pleasant and one cannot foresee w hat political consequences

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would have flowed from the change.” 52 H e claim ed that he had endangered his own political futu re and sacrificed the interests o f C an ad a fo r the sake of the em pire. T hese lofty sentim ents show only one side o f the m edal, but one th at was prom inent to Canadians. It was a tradition - later to be reinforced by the A laska case - th at British diplom acy too often threw C anada to the wolves. T he high com m ission represented a com prom ise between abstention from , and full participation in, diplom atic negotiations. T he results were palatable neither to those who w ere openly critical n o r to those w ho nom inally supported the treaty. It rem ained to be seen by w hat other means this curious em pire could carry on its affairs w ith foreign states. In the m eantim e there was the settlem ent to be w orked out. T he value of the C anadian fisheries and the use o f C anadian canals by A m ericans had still to be dealt w ith; and then there was the perennial question o f reciprocity. H ope had not died: indeed there w ere signs in the U nited States o f a move fo r low er tariffs, and an agreem ent m ight perhaps be secured even if the fisheries card had already been played. A nd now relations with the U nited States w ere presum ably freed from any th reat o f war. This was indeed a relief and a change: ap a rt from th at the m ain them es in C anadian foreign relations - so fully played in 18691872 - w ere still to be carried on in repetition and variation.

CHAPTER 7

Trade, Fisheries, and Diplomacy

Since the C anadian econom y was so largely dependent on foreign trade it followed th at com m ercial conditions in other countries, and com m ercial relations with other countries, p ro ­ foundly affected C anadian well-being. F o r the first few years after confederation prosperity in England, E urope, and the U nited States brought an increase in the external trade of C anada and a corresponding developm ent in hom e industry, finance, and the construction o f railways. T he public revenue, arising almost entirely from custom s receipts, was com fortably m aintained so long as trade continued at a high level. Canadians could (and som e did) view w ith com parative equanim ity the collapse of their hopes of reciprocity in 1871, and tell themselves that they were not their neighbours’ slaves. But w ith the good they needs m ust accept the bad. L ate in 1873 cam e another swift descent of the business cycle. In E urope and A m erica prosperity suddenly turned into depression, and C anada could no m ore escape the effects o f the latter than welcome the m ore palatable fruits o f the form er. T he effect, it is true, was delayed: for it has been characteristic of C anada’s position th at she has neither soared to the heights nor plum bed the depths know n to som e of her large custom ers. T he total of external trade reached a new m axim um in 1874, faltered badly in 1875, and was materially reduced in 1876. Such was the situation th at forced itself on the Liberal adm inistration w hich cam e into office in 1873. F o r this, and fo r the succeeding governm ent, a prim ary task was to re­ store foreign trade a t least to its previous position; and the weapons which lay to their hands were com m ercial agreem ents w ith foreign states and stim ulation of trade by protection or low tariffs. H ere was am ple scope for decisions on policy and for C anadian diplom acy. A lexander M ackenzie’s governm ent leant tow ard a low tariff and tow ard a restoration of reciprocity w ith the U nited States. If the A m erican governm ent proved to be reluctant it m ight be persuaded by an offer to replace the proposed com pensation for C anadian fisheries with a reciprocity agreem ent. H aving ascer­

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tained that the British governm ent w ould have no objection to the change, the C anadian governm ent sent G eorge Brown to W ashington in F ebruary 1874 as a “confidential agent,” where he “speedily succeeded in ascertaining that a general willingness existed on the p art o f the leading statesm en of the U nited States to enter into a new com m ercial treaty.” 1 W hether Brown was misled by wishful thinking o r by A m erican hospitality, the report that he m ade to O ttaw a was optim istic enough to start arrangem ents fo r a form al negotiation. M ackenzie applied for the appointm ent by the im perial governm ent o f C anadian com ­ m issioners - Brown and a m em ber of the cabinet - to be asso­ ciated with the m inister at W ashington, and to occupy a position n ot inferior to th at of M acdonald in 1871.2 D ufferin at once telegraphed the wishes of his m inisters th at negotiations should be begun, and Sir E dw ard T hornton, the British m inister in W ashington, was prom ptly told to undertake them . A few days later Brown was accepted as a com m issioner (the proposal o f a cabinet m inister to serve with him having apparently been d ro p p ed ), and plenipotentiary pow ers w ere forw arded to him. M ackenzie had urged from the first th at the British minister, w ithout the support o f a C anadian with local knowledge, could not adequately handle negotiations w hich directly affected C anada alone. T he British governm ent fo r its part, m ade it clear that the responsibility for attem pting to change the operation of the T reaty of W ashington m ust rest on Canada. A s to the scope o f the negotiations, M ackenzie was satisfied that the restoration of the free list in the treaty of 1854 (as was proposed by the British governm ent) “could not now m eet the requirem ents o f the trad e o f the country nor be in itself a satis­ factory exchange for the fishery com pensation and other advan­ tages expected from C anada by the U nited States under the im plied term s o f the T reaty of W ashington.” 3 H e proposed to extend the list m aterially by adding m anufactured articles. T o this there were three objections: to the argum ent that it would injuriously affect British exporters he sim ply replied th at they also would receive the advantages of any reduction o f duties. H e satisfied him self by consulting C anadian m anufacturers that they would not m ake any protest. T he third difficulty, and the one w hich w orried him most, was the loss of revenue conse­ quent on partial rem oval of duties; and he was thus torn between a desire for lower tariffs and a fear of increased taxation, already felt to be threatened by the cost o f the Pacific railw ay.4 T he C anadian proposals w ere agreed on in A pril by correspondence

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betw een Brown, w ho was in W ashington as agent or plenipoten­ tiary from F ebruary to June, and M ackenzie, in consultation w ith C artw right (the m inister of finance). T hey finally took the form of a long m em orandum signed by T h ornton and Brown, and w ere read to H am ilton Fish, the secretary of state, on April 27. T h e tone o f the m em orandum 5 is set by the statem ent that “an im partial exam ination o f the com m ercial relations between the U nited States and the British N orth A m erican Provinces for the last fifty years, cannot fail to establish, we venture to think, beyond all doubt, th at the trade betw een them has been exceed­ ingly valuable to both countries, but th at the U nited States have, from first to last, reaped the largest advantage from it.” T he “im partial exam ination” then shows th at the U nited States had suffered m ore than C anada from abrogation of the treaty of 1854, and th at the A m erican tariff prevented enlarged trade with Canada. T he British representatives (Brown and T hornton) had, on M arch 28, proposed to Fish a renewal of the treaty of 1854 as a substitute for the arbitration provision of the W ash­ ington T reaty. Fish then suggested an enlargem ent o f the scope o f the treaty, and, while leaving it to the other side to m ake a proposition, m entioned enlargem ent o f the C anadian canals, and the addition o f some m anufactures to the free list. T h e C anadian proposals in the m em orandum w ere: (1 ) to add to the free list under the treaty o f 1854 m anufactures of iron, steel, o r w ood, agricultural im plem ents, oils, and some item s of lesser im portance; (2 ) th at A m erican fishermen should have access to the C anadian coast fisheries on the sam e term s as under the T reaty o f W ashington; (3 ) th a t the coasting trade of each country should be open to the vessels of the other; (4 ) that the canals o f each country should be open to the vessels of the other, the C anadian canals be enlarged, L ake M ichigan be open during the duration of the treaty to navigation by C anadian vessels, and that vessels o f either country be open to registry in the other; (5 ) th at joint com missions be form ed for the im­ provem ent of the rivers St. C lair and D etroit and Lake St. Clair, for the erection o f lighthouses, and for the preservation of fish in inland w aters; (6 ) that citizens of either country m ight secure patents in the other; and (7 ) th a t a joint study be m ade of the prevention of illicit trade. Fish received the m em orandum w ithout enthusiasm and car­ ried on fu rth er negotiations in a m anner hardly m ore satisfac­ tory to Brow n, w ho m anaged to retain, however, a restrained

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optim ism .6 A d raft treaty was agreed on in the middle of Ju n e,7 and Brown was alm ost frantic lest it be delayed too long fo r the Senate’s consideration. H is fears proved to be well founded, for the Senate declared that the last few days o f the session did not allow time for p roper consideration of the treaty; and w hen it did com e before th at body in the following F ebruary it was rejected. So fell, once m ore, the C anadian hopes o f reciprocity, and the Liberal governm ent w as obliged to tu rn from diplom acy to face the growing dem and for salvation by protective tariffs. In the session o f 1876 both houses of parliam ent devoted long hours o f debate to the causes and cure o f the depression. The m ain thread of the argum ent was the effect on C anada of her com m ercial relations with G reat Britain and the U nited States; and, following on that, w hether the solution o f the problem lay in m ore tariff protection. N o pretence was m ade th at there was not a depression: the difference o f opinion consisted in various views as to how it should be m et. D avid Mills, in moving fo r a select com m ittee to inquire into the causes, said th at he was of opinion “th at we are suffering to a very considerable extent from com m ercial depression in consequence o f o ur intim ate com m er­ cial relations w ith the trade o f the adjoining republic. . . . It is n ot very easy for the m erchant to rem ain prosperous while his custom ers are impoverished, and it is not very easy fo r the people o f this country who are engaged in com m ercial pursuits to be in a highly prosperous condition w hile those with whom they are dealing are suffering from financial depression.”8 The accusation was frequently m ade th at C anada was a “slaughterm ark et,” either fo r G reat Britain, o r the U nited States, o r both. O ne m em ber o f the H ouse o f Com m ons revived the argum ent th at the A m ericans were trying, by econom ic pressure, to drive C anada into annexation.0 A nd so the debate w ent on, for hour after hour, w ith lectures on the balance o f trade, presentation o f tables o f figures, and num erous accounts of the hardships o f this or that industry. The only practical focus o f the discussion could be the tariff. T o the supporters of free trade England stood as the exam ple o f suc­ cess; the advocates o f protection held up the U nited States as the leading case fo r their thesis. All this was ground th a t the legislatures o f the old provinces and o f the federation had gone over, again and again. Y et it seemed ever fresh to each genera­ tion. A nd perhaps the pressure o f econom ic hardship was real

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enough to justify yet another re-exam ination o f the Canadian policy. Certainly no better time could be found for the furth er­ ing o f the protectionist creed. In both houses it found a num ber of convinced advocates as well as m ore cautious m em bers who seemed to be on the verge of conversion. T he ranks of the defenders of “the grand principles o f free trad e” were by no m eans broken, but no count was taken w hen the battle was over. T he H ouse of C om m ons had the m ore specific task o f passing a budget. In his budget speech R. J. C artw right, the m inister of finance, pointed to the decreased trade and the consequently reduced revenue. T he governm ent, he said, had “been im por­ tuned from m any quarters to declare themselves in favour of a high tariff. Som e o f the gentlem en w ho have addressed us have done so as the advocates of protection, pure and simple; others . . . have contended, and not w ithout force, that circum stanced as we are, in connection w ith the people o f the U nited States, it becomes the duty of the A dm inistration to m eet the peculiar policy of that people with a reciprocal policy in the sam e direc­ tion.” C artw right was not prepared to take a free-trade stand, but he argued against the supposed advantages of high protec­ tion, and found that it had brought evils in its train in the U nited States. H igh protection, having failed in the U nited States, w ould not be introduced into C anada w here it w ould increase taxation and enrich the few. So the tariff should rem ain at its existing level.10 Resistance to tariff increases was m aintained with difficulty, and was partly unexpected in view o f increases already m ade. T he d rift tow ard higher protection, which in any case was becom ing m ore m arked, was fu rth er intensified by the continuance o f depression. Evidence taken by select com m ittees o f the H ouse o f C om m ons revealed the pressure by m anufactur­ ing interests tow ards higher protection. T he com m ittee of 1874, for exam ple, on the basis of replies to a questionnaire from 215 m anufacturers, reported a general com plaint against the “unequal com petition” w ith the U nited States, and a claim that higher rates would not necessarily raise prices to the consum er.11 In 1877 the T oronto Board of T rade changed to a policy of protection, and in the following year the M anufacturers’ Asso­ ciation of O ntario, w hich had form erly been divided on the issue, voted unanim ously for a national policy.12 U nder the circum stances the Liberal policy was hard to defend and the continual sniping o f the opposition foreshadow ed their adop­ tion of a program m e of protective duties. T he Conservatives, indeed, w ere not slow in taking advantage of the opportunity of

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offering a cure for an adm itted com plaint. Sir John M acdonald m ade a prolonged defence o f protection in the H ouse of C om ­ m ons. In the upper H ouse S enator Read, a confessed believer in protection, m oved fo r a “ national policy” by w hich reciprocity o f trade with the U nited States was obtained or a reciprocity of tariffs was established by C anada.13 In introducing the budget in 1877 C artw right was obliged to rep o rt a deficit o f nearly two million dollars for the previous year. T here w ere, however, in his opinion, special reasons for this: extraordinary expenditures, shrinkage o f trade, and a bad harvest. D epression was universal, and the U nited States, with its protective system, had suffered m ore than had Canada. But the depth o f the depression had, he believed, been reached; and while some m odifications in the tariff were proposed, there was to be no m aterial change. In the course of the long attack on the governm ent’s policy, T upper concluded th at there had been no im provem ent in econom ic conditions, “nothing to justify the hon. gentlem an in refusing to so readjust the tariff of C an ad a as to p rotect and preserve her credit.” T he governm ent, he said, “have nailed their colours to the free-trade m ast, and that sooner than yield, they will go down w ith the ship, and down they will go.” 14 In the session of 1878 the sam e debate, with m uch the sam e argum ents, was continued, and on M arch 7 Sir John M acdonald m oved: That the H ouse is o f the opinion that the welfare o f Canada requires the adoption o f a N ational Policy, which, by a judicious readjustm ent o f the tariff, will benefit and fo ster the agricultural, the m ining, the m anufacturing and other interests o f the D o­ m inion; that such a policy w ill retain in Canada thousands o f our fellow countrym en now obliged to expatriate them selves in search o f the em ploym ent denied them at hom e, will restore prosperity to our struggling industries, now so sadly depressed, will prevent Canada fro m being m ade a sacrifice m arket, will encourage and develop an active interprovincial trade, and m oving (as it ought to do) in the direction o f a reciprocity o f tariffs with our neighbour, so far as the varied interests o f Canada m ay dem and, will greatly tend to procure fo r this country, eventually, a reciprocity o f trade.15 This guarded but all-em bracing proposition was then defended. By sweeping references to history and to contem porary condi­ tions, M acdonald sought to prove that no country had risen to prosperity on free trade, and that none had survived which was

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entirely agricultural. Exam ples w ere adduced, from A thens to m odern Russia, to strengthen the case, and a sad picture was painted o f the depressed state o f industry in C anada and of the m any C anadians w ho were forced to seek em ploym ent in the U nited States. T h e election cam e in Septem ber, still in the m idst o f hard tim es, and the Conservatives w ere returned to office w ith a m ajority of eighty-six. In M arch 1879 Sir L eonard Tilley, the new m inister o f finance, introduced the budget th at was to give effect to the N ational Policy. T he C onservative party lived up to its pledge of greater protection. T he new tariff, as com pared w ith the previous one (th at of 1874), was m ore com plicated and considerably higher. W here fully m anufactured goods had form erly paid 17]/2 p er cent they w ere now to pay up to 30 per cent, and in som e cases the rate w as as high as 40 per cent. A wide range o f goods was covered, and in general the tariff “represented a decision to prom ote industrialization in term s of a C anadian rath er than a N o rth A m erican m arket.” 16 F o r ten years thereafter fu rth e r modifications in the tariff were all in an upw ard direction, until new circum stances forced reductions once m ore.

II T h e L iberal and Conservative parties differed on the height o f the tariff; and by an em phasis on the protection of hom e industries the latter m ight have seemed to m inim ize the sig­ nificance of external trade. T his, how ever, it was never intended to do. T h ere was a firm belief th a t C anadian industry and agri­ culture could flourish only behind the shelter of a tariff wall, but no C anadian governm ent had ever failed to point to the value o f foreign trade. T he H ansard o f these years is studded with statistics, and the deduction was constantly m ade that the woes o f the dom inion w ere due in large p art to a decline in the volume of trade. T he “N ational Policy” was intended not as a brake but as a stim ulant to trade, and w hether or not it was the cause, the event was w hat had been desired. T he picture began to look m ore cheerful, as the following figures show .17 YEAR

1879 1880 1881

IMPORTS FROM U.K.

$30,967,778 33,764,439 42,885,142

IMPORTS FROM U .S.

TOTAL

$42,170,306 28,193,783 36,338,701

$78,702,519 69,900,542 90,488,329

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M ore interest was centred on the figures for exports, which w ere distinctly encouraging.18 YEAR

EXPORTS TO U.K.

TO U.S.

EXPORTS TOTAL

1879 1880 1881

$29,393,424 35,208,031 42,637,219

$25,491,356 29,566,211 34,038,431

$62,431,025 72,899,697 83,944,701

T he balance of trad e was still unfavourable, which disturbed some of the parliam entary econom ists, but the volum e o f ex­ ports w as a respectable and an increasing one. N early half of C an ad a’s external trade was w ith the U nited K ingdom , som e 40 p er cen t w ith the U nited States, and only about 10 per cent with all o th er countries. T he N ational Policy explicitly left the door open fo r reciprocity, but it was im probable th at the U nited States would accept the invitation. T he free-trade policy o f the U nited K ingdom offered no opportunity fo r extension by gov­ ernm ental action. T here rem ained, how ever, the rest of the wide world w ith w hich to trade; and w hat was a relatively small volum e m ight be increased by m eans o f tariff bargaining as well as o th er means. T he m ost hopeful direction in w hich to look seemed to be the British, French, and Spanish W est Indies, trade with w hich was traditional, but had not grow n as was hoped. A t the sam e tim e w ere added, as possible custom ers, Brazil and M exico; and (arising out of negotiations on colonies) Spain itself. T h e only great pow er w ith w hich direct trad e negotiations w ere considered w as France. F o r the benefit of the H ouse o f C om m ons detailed statistics were prepared on trad e w ith the W est Indies, Brazil, and M exico since 1875.10 T rade w ith M exico proved to be insignificant. In 1874 and 1875 C anada had im ported a large am ount of sugar from Brazil, and in 1880 this was recom m enced. Im ports from British and foreign W est Indian islands w ere scattered over a n um ber o f items, but were only in large volum e in sugar, molasses, and salt. L um ber, fish, and m anufactured articles were exported to Brazil in sm all am ounts. Fish was m uch the largest export to the W est Indies, with sm all quantities o f agricultural and m an u factured products. P arliam ent was distressed by the slow grow th of W est Indian trade; particularly - as some m em ­ bers argued - on the ground th at it was highly profitable, show ­ ing a favourable balance o f trade, and offering opportunities for C anadian shipping. L ong hours of debate w ere spent in attem pts to analyse the reasons fo r the sm all am ount o f trade, and two

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m ain causes w ere put forw ard: th at steam com m unication was inadequate; and th at the C anadian tariff prevented the purchase o f raw sugar, w hich w ould be the natural exchange for C ana­ dian products. T h e second consideration becam e bogged in p arty discussions of the tariff. T he first was met by the com ple­ tion o f an agreem ent w ith the governm ent of Brazil, under which the two countries w ere to subsidize a line of steam ships to Brazil and the W est Indies. T he arrangem ent cam e into opera­ tion in 1882, but later broke down. O ne o f the chief com petitors in W est Indian trad e w as the U nited States, and w hen that co untry negotiated a flag treaty with Spain in 1885, allowing A m erican ships the sam e privileges as Spanish in the Spanish W est Indies, alarm was expressed in C anada. T he only answer could be the conclusion of an equally satisfactory arrangem ent w ith Spain. T he diplom ats were also needed to encourage trade with F rance. T he registry o f C anadian ships in that country was found to be - because of the form o f an A nglo-French treaty on less favourable term s than the registry of British ships. T o secure an equally advantageous position, the C anadian govern­ m ent was prepared to reduce the tariff on French wines, the bargain to be sealed in a com m ercial treaty. It was not enough to talk o f the superior ch aracter of C anadian goods: not enough even to exhibit w ares at international exhibitions, such as those at Sydney, Philadelphia, and Paris. T rading was bargaining; but international bargaining could be conducted only through tradi­ tional and recognized channels. By such logic w ere Canadians driven to study the com plicated structure o f the British Em pire. T h e position had to be exam ined from m ore than one point o f view: the effect on C anada o f existing British treaties, the extent to w hich C anada could conduct h er own foreign rela­ tions, and the m achinery - existing o r to be created - by which C anadian affairs abroad could be conducted. Before confedera­ tion, and in the first decade after it, th e practice was to include the colonies in British treaties o f com m erce. M any of these trea­ ties obligated C anada to give m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent to the countries concerned; and two of them —th at w ith Belgium of 1862, and that w ith the G erm an Zollverein o f 1865 —extended to the relations betw een C anada and G re at Britain, thus com pli­ cating the establishm ent of an im perial preferential tariff. In 1877 the British governm ent proposed th at the self-governing colonies should be notified o f a pending com m ercial treaty, and given the option o f adhering to it or being explicitly excluded. T h e adoption of this principle allowed the C anadian governm ent

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a new freedom o f action o f w hich it took advantage.20 In 1881, for exam ple, the colonial secretary transm itted to the governor general a letter from the foreign office stating that negotiations will probably be opened shortly w ith the E gyp ­ tian governm ent, fo r the conclusion o f a com m ercial treaty with E gypt; and I have to request that you will inform m e, at yo u r earliest convenience, w hether there are any m atters in respect o f which yo u r governm ent desires to m a ke any special proposals. T he colonial article referred to in the enclosed letter is the clause now adopted, exem pting the colony under your govern­ m ent, and others o f the m ore im portant colonies, fro m the operation o f the treaty, but providing that its stipulations m ay be applied to any such colonies on notice to that effect being given within one year fro m the date o f the exchange o f the ratifications o f the treaty. In this case the C anadian governm ent did not wish to be in ­ cluded; but in a convention of com m erce between the U nited K ingdom and M orocco, which had lim ited obligations, the opposite decision was m ade. A third negotiation of the same year was w ith E cuador. T he colonial secretary sent to the gov­ ern o r general a copy o f the treaty, already signed, together with a d raft protocol which was to be signed before ratification o f the treaty was executed. T he draft read as follows: T he undersigned, in proceeding to the exchange o f the ratifi­ cations o f the treaty . . . between H er M ajesty and the R epublic o f the Equator, have agreed to the present Protocol. T h e stipulations o f the aforesaid Treaty shall not be appli­ cable to the Colonies and foreign possessions o f H er Britannic M ajesty hereinafter nam ed, that is to say: T he D om inion o f Canada. . . . P rovided always that the stipulations o f the aforesaid Treaty shall be m ade applicable to any or all o f the above-m entioned colonies or foreign possessions o f H er B ritannic M ajesty, on whose behalf notice to that effect shall be given within one year fro m the date hereof, by H er Britannic M ajesty’s M inister at Q uito to the Ecuadorian M inister fo r Foreign Affairs. T he colonial secretary’s letter was dated July 8, 1881. On O ctober 14, 1882, a request for an early reply followed, and it was not until N ovem ber 16, 1882, th at the governor general was able to reply that the privy council had reported against inclu­

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sion in the treaty. T he wheels of O lym pus ground slow. In 1880 th e C anadian governm ent asked to be excluded from a treaty w ith Roum ania. In the sam e year a treaty was m ade w ith Serbia and, apparently inadvertently, C anada w as included w ithout being consulted. T he colonial office then inquired if this was satisfactory, and on hearing from O ttaw a that it was not, had to request the S erbian governm ent to have C anada excluded by action of the national assembly. A part from such a slip, the technique in respect o f new British treaties seemed to w ork sm oothly; and problem s arising out o f treaties concluded earlier had to be m et as they arose. All such treaties, w hether o r n ot they w ere advantageous to C anada, w ere not initiated w ith the object of m eeting particular C an a­ dian needs. Y et such needs existed, as, fo r exam ple, the im ­ provem ent of trade with the Spanish W est Indies and the sale of wooden ships to F rance. Since C anada had no pow er to con­ clude com m ercial (o r any oth er) treaties by her own authority, it becam e necessary to w ork out a system w ithin the imperial fram ew ork as it then was. Like m ost such imperial problem s, this one was m et by experim ents of practice rather than consti­ tutional definition. F ro m the C anadian point o f view it was essential that Canadians, versed in the m atter a t hand, should play a m ajor role in negotiations, w hatever their legal status m ight be. T here being no C anadian political representative abroad, Sir A lexander G alt was dispatched in the autum n of 1878 on a special mission to M adrid and Paris. F orm al negoti­ ations with the Spanish and French authorities w ere conducted by the British am bassadors at the capitals, it being left to them to consult with G alt and to arrange for him to discuss details w ith the governm ents in question. If a draft convention were concluded it w ould be sent to the British governm ent and would have to be approved both by it and the C anadian governm ent before its signature was authorized. A s it proved, th at stage was never reached, not apparently through the fault of the procedure o r the negotiators, but from the com plications caused by a third party in the F rench scene, and by a change of governm ent in M adrid. G alt’s official reports to the governm ent contain no hints as to the adequacy o f the procedure, being for the m ost p art accounts o f interviews and correspondence w ith British and F rench officials.21 H is private letters to M acdonald, however, describe the early difficulties that arose in Paris. H e arrived there in D ecem ber, arm ed w ith letters from the foreign office;

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but L ord Lyons acted w ith w hat G alt considered to be a dis­ courtesy and deliberation th at stood in the w ay of success.22 A fter bearing it w ith im patience for a short tim e, G alt w rote to the foreign office. H is appeal had “a w onderful effect. N ext day I got an affectionate note from L ord Lyons . . . before I had time to answ er it he called on me in person an d m ade all proper am ends, saying he had arranged an interview fo r to-day with the M inister o f C om m erce - apologized about not having asked us to dine and asked us to com e to-day. . . .”23 G alt then w ent ahead w ith direct negotiations, and considered that he was on the verge o f success when the F rench drew back because of a com plication caused by tariff relations w ith A ustria-H ungary. In sending his report hom e, he again show ed th at he was not w ithout a diplom atic sense, pointing o u t th at, if negotiations failed fo r the tim e being, the C anadian term s should be kept secret against a later renewal o f discussions.24 Passing on to M adrid G alt found his relations w ith the am bassador there w ere sm ooth, and in dealing with the Spanish he adopted the usual bargaining device of m axim um term s: “O ur m em orandum ,” he w rote to M acdonald, “covers concessions th at if granted would go fa r to give C anada the w hole carrying trade between the U nited States and C uba - as well as exceptional advantages fo r o u r own productions. But you m ust not expect us to obtain all this. I shall be quite satisfied if we get a substantial rebate on the duties on our productions, w ith the privilege o f the Spanish Flag - fo r the mail steam ship line. . . .” 25 T h e Spanish, like the French, negotiations failed of success at the tim e, but - as in the case of the A m erican negotiations the advantages o f participation in them o f a m an well-versed in C anadian affairs w ere fully dem onstrated. Exactly w hat the status o f the C anadian in such discussions should be was still an open question, but there was a growing feeling in C anada that it should be in som e w ay diplom atic, and th at the representative fo r the negotiation o f trade treaties m ight well be also the holder of a new office proposed to be set up in L ondon. T he im portance of having a C anadian representative in E ngland had led first to the appointm ent o f one with semi-official standing. Sir John Rose was, from 1869 to 1880, accredited to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent “ as a gentlem an possessing the confidence of the C anadian G overnm ent w ith w hom H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent m ay properly com m unicate on C anadian affairs.”20 T he experi­ m ent was fully justified by results, for Rose was able to handle such questions as the transfer o f the H udson’s Bay territory, the

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negotiations leading up to the joint high com mission at W ash­ ington, and C anadian Pacific Railway finance. T he C anadian governm ent, how ever, was anxious to regularize this ill-defined position, and while in E ngland in 1879 M acdonald, Tilley, and T u p p er w rote a m em orandum on the subject for the colonial secretary. In it they argued that the tim e had com e w hen rela­ tions between the dom inion and the hom e governm ent could no longer be satisfactorily m aintained purely by correspondence through the governor general, and th at an officer should be stationed in L ondon who would discuss directly the various m atters of com m on concern, thus obviating the necessity of periodic visits o f C anadian m inisters. Such officer, they sug­ gested, could be accredited, in association w ith the imperial representative, to a foreign court for particular negotiations. T he suggested title for the new officer was “ resident m inister,” and his status w ould be “quasi-diplom atic.” In N ovem ber the colonial secretary sent a copy of this m em orandum to the gov­ ern o r general, w ith a covering letter. T he British governm ent approved of the general idea, but suggested two m odifications: since C anada was an integral part of the em pire, the C anadian representative could hardly be diplom atic; the foreign secretary would decide w hat p art he m ight play in foreign negotiations. In D ecem ber the C anadian privy council reported that, while they still held th at the position was quasi-diplom atic, they were satisfied with the arrangem ents proposed by the colonial secre­ tary. They suggested, as a title, “High Com m issioner of C anada in L ondon.” A brief cable in F ebruary 1880 contained the recognition of Sir A lexander G alt as high com m issioner, and he sailed in M arch.27 Proposals th at there should be a diplom atic representative of C anada in London had m ore than once been m ade,28 and G alt was impressed by that aspect of his office. Shortly before sailing fo r England he discussed w ith M acdonald the term s of his instructions, and w rote a m em orandum em bodying his ideas.29 T h e proposals are startling in their extent, though G alt pointed o ut th at he w ould not advise putting them all in the official instructions, o r expect them to be carried out at once. The m em orandum reads as follows: N om ination o f R esident M inister m arks a new era in C olo­ nial adm inistration. To be attended w ith greatest probability o f success, it should be done with studied deliberation and fo r­ m ality. T he m inister should not present his credentials until the

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governm ents are prepared effectively to enter upon im portant negotiations, and his arrival should be sim ultaneous with the announcem ent o f such negotiations. In m y opinion it would be a grave error to allow the M ission to assum e the appearance o f having its real duties in the Finan­ cial and E m igration arrangem ents - which m ust inevitably arise if the advent o f the M inister be not m arked by serious ap­ proaches to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent, and if the first im pres­ sion relative to its im portance be fo rm e d by the British public through the announcem ent that the Financial and Em igration duties have been assum ed by the M ission. T o give due prom inence to the concession made by the Im ­ perial G overnm ent in this respect, the arrival o f the M inister should be accom panied with the announcem ent o f im portant international negotiations. Subsequently - w ithin fro m one to three m onths, but not sim ultaneously, the m inister should be instructed to take over the supervision o f finance and em igra­ tion — th u s in the m ost direct m anner, m aking it apparent to the governm ent and people o f E ngland that the real im port o f the mission is to be sought in its political aspect. Certain subjects have already been subm itted to the British G overnm ent and rem ain in abeyance. O f these the m ore im portant are — T he negotiation o f treaties with foreign nations. T he Pacific Railw ay - and developm ent o f N orth West. A review o f com m ercial relations - pointing to an im perial custom s union. In regard to the first subject the object is to secure the thor­ ough support o f the im perial governm ent. T he appointm ent o f a Canadian envoy is valuable and his inform ation indispensable, but success will largely depend on the bona fide support given by the Foreign Office. T his support will only be given w hen the views o f the Im perial G overnm ent on other subjects are brought into accord w ith those o f Canada. T he second subject is so connected w ith the last that they m a y be considered as one, because the principle o f a com m ercial union is that o f vital political identity and will be fo u n d the m ost p o w erfu l agent in arranging the others. C ircum stances peculiarly fa vo u r the present discussion o f all these subjects. The term ination o f all England’s com m ercial treaties perm its a change o f policy.

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A m arked change o f public feeling is growing up respecting free trade. T he agricultural distress is anxiously seeking a rem edy. T he great N o rth W est relieves E ngland fro m dependence on foreign nations fo r fo o d — and opens illim itable field fo r emigration. T he Pacific railway thus becom es as necessary fo r England as fo r Canada. Instead therefore o f asking fo r guarantee, let a larger and m ore com prehensive proposal be subm itted, to wit: Practically a substantial alliance fo r certain specific national objects, based on the principle that produce and m anufactures shall respectively receive m ore favoured nation treatm ent than those o f foreign nations. T hat the Pacific railway be constructed on joint account the cost to be recouped fro m the lands. A system o f aided em igration on joint account to be organ­ ized if desired by the im perial governm ent. T he subm ission o f such a proposal w ould am ply ju stify the urgency o f the governm ent in desiring to appoint a minister. It is in accord with the views o f the governm ent and people o f Canada. I t w ould greatly conciliate public opinion in England —a nd if entertained by the Im perial G overnm ent w ould ensure their cordial support in foreign negotiations. It w ould lead to united policy and action with the other colonies. T here is no record of M acdonald’s reply to this m em oran­ dum . In p art it coincided w ith the governm ent’s policy of m ak­ ing the office diplom atic or quasi-diplom atic, but the picture of an im perial alliance w ent far beyond any recorded policy of the governm ent. Certainly the official instructions were the palest reflection o f G alt’s grandiose scheme. Ill Sir A lexander G alt was appointed under the great seal of C anada, and his instructions cam e to him from the secretary of state. G eneral correspondence was to be carried on w ith the secretary o f state; th at on financial questions w ith the m inister of finance; and on em igration m atters with the m inister o f agri­ culture. G alt was to be chief em igration agent, and the instruc­ tions laid it dow n that the encouragem ent of em igration to the

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west o f C anada was to be his first consideration, fo r only in that way could the financial burden o f the w est on the C anadian taxpayer be reduced. In the near fu tu re th e m anagem ent o f the public debt and financial correspondence w ere to be transferred to the high com m issioner. H e was to carry on negotiations con­ cerning the Esquim alt graving dock; assist the C anadian cattle trade; and sound out the British governm ent o n th e delicate subjects o f assistance to the Pacific Railw ay and a British zollverein. In foreign affairs he was to w atch the fishery questions arising o u t of the W ashington T reaty, rem em bering th at the C anadian governm ent did not wish to take th e initiative in any negotiations on them . C areful instructions w ere given on com m ercial treaties. Treaties had been m ade since 1867 which affected the freedom o f action of the dom inion, and it was desired th at C anada should be relieved from obligations as occasion arose, and not fu rth er com m itted w ithout her approval. W henever special arrangem ents in a treaty w ere desired in the C anadian interest the British governm ent w ould be asked to accredit the high com m issioner to the foreign pow er, to act in concert w ith the im perial representative. In his short tenure o f office (1880-1883) G alt p u t his hand to the m ultifarious tasks outlined both in form al instructions and private letters from the m inisters. M uch of his tim e was spent on securing im m igrants, and - while other causes were a t w ork the num bers w ere m ultiplied during his years in London. A start was m ade tow ard trade treaties, but w ithout tangible progress. T he great plans o f the M ontreal m em orandum foundered on the change o f governm ent in E ngland, the failure o f his hopes of being regarded as a diplom at, and the lack o f m oney to establish a position in L ondon w hich he felt m ight enable him to circum ­ vent the caution o f the colonial office. A fter a year in L ondon he w rote to M acdonald. “I think you should insist now on your Representative being recognized as a m em ber o f the Corps D iplom atique. It is really the only proper definition of his rank, and the only w ay to ensure p roper respect here. A s a Colonial these ‘arro gant insulars’ turn up their noses a t us all.”30 N o such change, how ever, was m ade in the position o f the office; and w hether or not the C anadian governm ent wished to have diplo­ m atic status for the high com m issioner, they w ere able to quote the existing arrangem ent against one type o f parliam entary com plaint. Sir C harles T upper, G alt’s successor, was criticized fo r doubling the roles of high com m issioner and m inister of railways; and w hen he took p art in the election o f 1891, it was

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argued th at a diplom at should keep free from party politics. In reply Sir John T hom pson stated that the high com m issioner “is nothing but the agent o f the governm ent living in London. His Excellency the G overnor G eneral is the m edium o f com m unica­ tion betw een this governm ent and H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent, and no other can be h a d .. . . H e does not occupy, either at home o r abroad, such a position as an am bassador in the diplom atic service of the British G overnm ent holds.”31 A private letter from M acdonald to L ord Stanley, how ever, gives a som ew hat different picture o f the practice, if not of the constitutional position: B y degrees the Colonial M inisters [i.e., secretaries] have be­ gun to treat the colonial representatives as diplom atic agents, rather than as subordinate executive officers and to consult them as such. Canada has fo u n d it advantageous on several occasions to have Sir Charles Tupper dealt with as a quasi m em ber o f the corps diplom atique and I have no doubt the colonial secretary has been assisted by his experience w hich Sir Charles gained during his service as a cabinet m inister in Canada. W e do not desire, however, to give him a "free hand” on any subject in discussion with the Im perial G overnm ent. H e m ust take his instructions fro m the governm ent here, as m uch as Sir Julian Pauncefote fro m L ord Salisbury and cannot travel out o f “the fo u r corners” o f any m inute on which his nam e is m entioned.32 T u p p er, like G alt, had m any duties: rescuing C anadian cattle from being condem ned as diseased; encouraging im m igra­ tion; furthering C anadian loans (especially those of the C an a­ dian Pacific R ailw ay); and generally m aking C anada know n by speeches and a m ultitude o f social activities. In 1885, during the N orth-W est Rebellion, he was kept busy answering inquiries in England, getting inform ation from O ttaw a, and trying to correct the attitude o f the Tim es, w hich obtained its news from a cor­ respondent in Philadelphia. T he conduct o f foreign (as opposed to im perial) affairs was not the least p art of his w ork, and the one which m ost closely relates to this study. In this T upper inherited the negotiations for treaties w ith F rance and Spain, together w ith the constitutional question that had arisen in con­ nection with them , th at is, the status of a C anadian negotiator. F ro m the first T upper w as not satisfied to be appointed as an adviser instead of a plenipotentiary. In his early m onths o f office he had learned th at an international conference was to be held

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at Paris to discuss the protection o f subm arine cables. Believing th at this was a m atter o f interest to C anada, he suggested to M acdonald that he should attend, and the latter asked the gov­ ern o r general to cable a request to that effect to the colonial secretary. T he latter then applied to the foreign office for cre­ dentials, and T u p p er w as duly appointed to represent C anada. H e was pleased w ith the conference, and C anada’s place at it, and on his retu rn to L ondon he w rote to M acdonald that “I feel some pride in the fact that C anada took her place in the in ter­ national conference and on an equal footing with all the other Powers, and I m ay add that nothing could exceed the kindness and courtesy with w hich I was treated by all present.”33 In the following year the foreign secretary agreed to T upper’s request that he be m ade a plenipotentiary jointly w ith the am bassador, should the negotiations w ith Spain be officially renewed. “T his,” he w rote, “ is a very im portant point, and in the light o f G alt’s reports a very im portant one scored for C anada.”34 O n the one hand the Conservative governm ent was pressing fo r plenipotentiary pow ers, and on the o th er was resisting the claim s of the opposition for direct negotiations between C anada and foreign states. T he debate - which reappeared periodicallywas chiefly on two grounds: w hich system o f diplom acy would be m ore advantageous to C anada, and w hether greater inde­ pendence in th at one field would threaten the whole im perial structure. T he Senate w ent over the ground in 1879, the C om ­ m ons in 1882, both H ouses in 1891, and the C om m ons again in 1892. In each case there was a solid basis o f agreem ent that C anadian interests w ere not being adequately supported by the existing system o f treaty-m aking, and in each m ore general discussions of the w hole im perial question resulted. E dw ard Blake in the course o f a long speech, did not m ince his w ords: “T he history o f the diplom atic service of England, as far as C anada is concerned, has been a history o f error, blunder, w rong and concession.” His m otion was th at it would be ex­ pedient fo r C anada to obtain pow ers for direct negotiation of trade treaties, either w ith another British possession or a foreign state. M acdonald replied that it was not the failure o f the m ethod, but the effect o f unfavourable circum stances. If C anada w ere to rem ain a dependency, E ngland could hardly grant the suggested concession.35 T o some extent dem ands for direct relations with foreign states reflected the long-held belief th at English diplom ats had done little good fo r C anada. In p a rt such dem ands were the

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result of the slow speed at w hich negotiations moved. Those w ith Spain dragged on b u t seem ed always on the verge of success. T u p p er’s instructions from O ttaw a were to offer a reduction in the C anadian duty on sugar in exchange fo r a reduction on C anadian exports of fish, lum ber, potatoes, flour, and certain m anufactured goods to the W est Indies. In spite of all efforts no result was attained; though som e advantage did accrue to C anada from a British treaty w ith Spain, providing for m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent. T he local officials in H avana, how ever, proved to be a step ahead of the C anadian nationalists. T h e custom s officials w ere convinced th at Canada, being a nation, did not com e under the British treaty, and w ere only persuaded to the contrary by w ord from M adrid. T h e old system thus had its uses. In return for the concessions by Spain, certain W est Indian sugars, raw hides, coffee, and tea w ere adm itted into C anada free of duty. A futher agreem ent was reached betw een Britain and Spain through an exchange of notes in June 1894 w hereby advantages were conceded to the U nited K ingdom and the British colonies in return fo r the con­ tinuance of m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent to Spanish trade. T hough not negotiated by C anada, this w as not denounced by her, and therefore cam e into operation. T h e long negotiations w ith F rance had a m ore successful ending, though not w ithout m any difficulties. Polite rem arks w ere m ade by both parties on the affinity o f old and new France, b ut the results were due not to sentim ent but to a balancing of national interests. In the late autum n o f 1892 T upper w as sent as a plenipotentiary to Paris fo r w hat proved to be the final round. On arrival he explained to L ord D ufferin, the British am bassador, the C anadian position. This, in brief, w as to secure the adm ission o f C anadian goods under the m inim um F rench tariff and the rem oval of the surtaxe d ’entrepot as reciprocity for the existing favourable treatm ent afforded to F rench goods. T he C anadian governm ent, he explained, was no longer willing to reduce the duty on F rench wines. O n the advice of the British em bassy, T upper’s next call was at the office of the R epublique frangaise to secure favourable publicity. A fter a hurried visit to L ondon to consult w ith Sir Jo h n A bbott, he was introduced by the am bassador to the m inister fo r foreign affairs and officials of the com m erce and custom s departm ents. W ith the F rench com ­ missioners T u p p er discussed the actual figures o f trade and the concessions th at m ight be m ade by either party. H aving failed to im press the F rench representatives w ith his picture o f existing

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privileges and th e attem pts to establish steam com m unication, T u p p er fell back on the proposition to low er the duties on F ren ch wines, books, soaps, and o th er articles. Proposals and counter-proposals w ere exchanged in meetings o r by letter, T u pp er keeping in touch with his governm ent to obtain accept­ ances of each series o f m odification. T he next step was the exchange of d raft treaties. T he final term s took the form o f an “A greem ent regulating the com m ercial relations between C an­ ada and F rance in respect of custom s tariff,”30 between F rance and G re at Britain, signed for the queen by L ord D ufferin and Sir Charles T upper as plenipotentiaries on F ebruary 6, 1893. T h e duties on F rench wines, soaps, nuts, alm onds, prunes, and plum s w ere reduced. N ineteen C anadian products - including canned m eats, fish, fruit, tim ber, and wooden furniture, wooden ships, and boots and shoes - w ere to enter F rance, A lgeria, and F rench colonies un d er the m inim um tariff. In respect to these articles C anada was to enjoy m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent; w hile F ran ce and h er colonies were to have com plete m ost­ favoured-nation concessions from C anada. T he agreem ent was to be approved by the parliam ents of F rance and Canada. A fter w hat he considered to be the successful com pletion of his labours, T u p p er was surprised to find th at his governm ent was hesitant about its acceptance. A telegram instructing him not to sign until the term s had been received in O ttaw a arrived too late. T he principal points at issue were, first, a bounty to ships constructed in France, and, secondly, uncertainty as to w hether the m ost-favoured-nation clause in the treaty applied to the trade between C anada and other British possessions. O n the latter point the British governm ent gave an assurance th at it would not so apply, and the agreem ent was finally ratified in 1895, the C anadian parliam ent having passed an act (57 and 58 V iet., c. 2 ) in 1894 w hich em pow ered the governor general to proclaim assent a t a date to be settled.

IV In the sam e period as th at o f the protracted negotiations for trad e treaties w ith E uropean states the C anadian governm ent was obliged to re-enter the diplom atic field in N orth A m erica to settle the controversy once m ore raised by the apparently endless fishery dispute. T he rejection by the A m erican Senate o f the treaty of 1874 revived the arbitration provided for under the T reaty o f W ashington. F o r the board o f three, the U nited

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States nom inated E. H . K ellogg; C anada, A. T . G alt; and the neutral arb itrato r was the Belgian m inister a t W ashington, M aurice D elfosse - nam ed by the A ustrian am bassador after the failure of the interested parties to agree on other nam es which one or the other subm itted. T he com m ission finally assembled at H alifax in June 1877, accom panied by legal advisers and oth er assistants appointed by the parties. Elaborate w ritten cases w ere subm itted by the British representatives (on behalf of C an ad a and N ew foundland) and by those o f the U nited States. A fter a brief deliberation the com m issioners, by a m ajority decision, aw arded $5,500,000, payable over twelve years, as the balance due to C anada and N ew foundland for the superior value of their inshore fisheries. Kellogg dissented, and the award was received w ith general disapproval in th e U nited States. In C anada there was mild satisfaction, w hich m eant a good deal in view of the tradition o f A m erican diplom atic cunning and British defeats. Since it was an arbitration, it would hardly be p ro p er to describe G alt’s p art as th at of a successful C anadian advocate; but apparently his course w as m ade easier by a con­ viction of the justice o f the C anadian case.37 A lthough the British brief called for a sum nearly three tim es as large, th at can be put dow n to the usual technique o f bargaining. In effect there seems little doubt that C anada had obtained a generous price - though fo r th at she was to pay in international strain as well as in fish. W hether it was because o f A m erican discontent w ith the decision, o r because the arrangem ents in the treaty of 1871 failed to lay dow n an acceptable o r com plete set of rules, the fishery dispute flared up again before the ink was dry on the aw ard; and the actions and counter-actions, claims and counter­ claim s threatened those friendly relations by m eans o f which alone C anada could com fortably exist on the A m erican conti­ nent. In 1885 the A m erican governm ent announced th a t the fishery clauses of the T reaty of W ashington would be abrogated as from July 1 - th at is, in the m idst o f the season, a result which was only avoided by a tem porary agreem ent to suspend action until the end of the year.38 Following this suspension, the fishery question reverted to the pre-1871 position, and the C ana­ dian governm ent, vigorously enforcing protection of A tlantic fisheries, began to w arn off, detain, o r seize A m erican vessels, to a num ber during 1886 of forty-nine, according to the A m erican secretary o f state.39 T he C anadian parliam ent passed a retalia­ tory act stopping the purchase o f bait by A m erican fisherm en in

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C anadian ports, and perm itting the seizure of any foreign vessel illegally entering C anadian w aters, and Congress replied w ith an act (happily not p u t into effect) em pow ering the president to prevent C anadian vesels from using A m erican ports except in case o f distress. T he H ouse o f R epresentatives would have gone fu rth e r still by the stoppage o f transit by land as well as sea - a m easure o f com plete non-intercourse which it was induced by the Senate to drop. Literally the w aters w ere indeed troubled; and to the m utual seizure o f ships were added other causes of friction: A m erican discontent w ith the H alifax aw ard, com peti­ tion of C anadian fish w ith the interests of N ew E ngland packers, an inveterate taste on the p art o f certain elem ents to tw ist the lio n ’s tail (o r th at of the lion’s c u b ), and a w ell-founded suspi­ cion in the U nited States th a t C anadians were once m ore attem pting to use their fisheries as a lever to secure reciprocity. W illingness to attem pt a settlem ent was not lacking on either side, but by w hat m achinery could it be discussed? T he A m eri­ can governm ent, its m inister in L ondon declared, would not deal w ith Canada. Still less can the United. Slates’ G overnm ent consent to be drawn, at any tim e, into a discussion o f the subject with the Colonial G overnm ent o f Canada. The Treaty in question, and all the international relations arising out o f it, exist only as between the governm ents o f the U nited States and o f Great Britain, and betw een those governm ents only can they be dealt with. I f in entering upon that consideration o f the subject which the U nited States have insisted upon, the argum ents contained in the R eport o f the Canadian M inister should be advanced by H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent, I do not conceive that they will be fo u n d difficult to answ er.40 T h e m inister’s intransigent position seems not to have repre­ sented the views o f Bayard, the secretary of state, w ho had for som e tim e been struggling to m ove tow ard a peaceful settlem ent, an d w ho, in A pril, unofficially invited either M acdonald or T u p p er to discuss m atters personally w ith him .41 T upper called on Bayard in M ay and proposed the holding o f a conference in W ashington. A n exchange o f letters after his retu rn casts some light on the interview . B ayard, it now appeared, regretted the necessity o f the indirect com m unication w ith Canada, m ade necessary by her “im perfectly developed sovereignty,” but recognized th at only the envoys o f G reat B ritain could speak officially. H e w rote w arm ly of the necessity o f good relations

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w ith C anada, and w elcom ed a conference (as he said the presi­ d en t d id ), and presum ed th a t T u p p er w ould be a plenipoten­ tiary. T he British governm ent, having been driven into a dispute in w hich it had no direct interest, readily accepted the proposal; and appointed T upper, Joseph C ham berlain, and Sir Lionel Sackville W est, British m inister in W ashington, as plenipoten­ tiaries. T he official instructions called first for a discussion, and if possible am icable settlem ent, o f the N o rth A tlantic fisheries, b ut allowed w ide latitude on o th er subjects. “ Full liberty is given to you to enter upon the consideration o f any questions which m ay bear upon the issues involved, and to discuss and treat for any equivalents, w hether by m eans o f tariff concessions, or otherw ise, w hich the U nited States’ plenipotentiaries m ay be authorized to consider as a m eans of settlem ent.” T he Bering Sea fisheries m ight also be discussed if th e A m erican repre­ sentatives w ere authorized to do so.42 It was, and long had been, the C anadian aim to include the fisheries in a m ore general agreem ent th at em braced reciprocal tariff concessions, b u t the difficulty w as to get the A m ericans to broaden the agenda. M acdonald had prophesied th a t the w hole procedure was “a snare laid by the U nited States G overnm ent to entrap England into a com m ission to consider the expediency o f relaxing the term s o f the convention o f 1818” ;43 and at the first regular m eeting in W ashington the British representatives spent three hours arguing against the A m erican proposal so to lim it the conference.44 T upper had nothing but praise for C ham berlain in th at battle. O n D ecem ber 3 the British subm itted a proposal th at the fishery privileges should be revived in exchange fo r a tariff agreem ent, b u t this was refused.45 T he m eetings w ere then postponed while T u p p er and C ham berlain w ent to O ttaw a for consultation. N egotiations w ere continued in January, b ut with difficulty. A t one point C ham berlain becam e “wildly indignant” and proposed to retu rn to E ngland,46 but a treaty w as finally signed in the m iddle of F ebruary. T hough this also was rejected by the Senate, a m odus vivendi reached at the sam e tim e, p ro ­ viding for a system o f licences for A m erican fisherm en, came into effect and rem ained in effect for over thirty years. T hus the A tlantic fisheries issue was laid to rest. T upper, who pulled his full weight on the com mission, reported th a t C ham berlain and W est “could not have supported C anada w ith m ore untiring zeal than they have from first to last.”47 T h e Bering Sea question, w hich the A m ericans had kept off the agenda a t W ashington, rem ained unsettled. T he A m erican

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claim was th at it was necessary, in order to preserve the herds of seals, to prevent hunting during a p art o f the year. T he C anadian governm ent, how ever, supporting the interests of British C olum ­ bia fishermen, claim ed th a t this was a subterfuge designed to enable A m erican sealers to have a m onopoly on the coast.48 M eanw hile U nited States cutters were seizing C anadian fishing vessels on the ground th at they w ere poaching.49 Staving off an unfavourable settlem ent betw een the British and A m erican governm ents, the C anadian governm ent sent C. H. T upper, m inister o f m arine and fisheries, to W ashington in February 1890 to m eet the secretary o f state, Blaine. T he younger T upper proved to be less fortunate than his father, both in establishing a w orking arrangem ent w ith the am bassador (Sir Julian Pauncefote) and in negotiations w ith the secretary o f state. T u p p er’s status, it is true, was som ew hat am biguous, and Blaine bluntly said that he had not expected a C anadian representative, though he proved ready enough to talk to him .50 T u p p er believed that the R ussian representative w as “hand in glove w ith M r. Blaine,” and th at Pauncefote was m ore anxious to reach a settlem ent than to push C anadian interests.51 H e protested that no British m inister at W ashington was in a position to take a firm attitude. “If C anadians,” he protested, “cannot act for G reat Britain in the negotiations o f C anadian affairs the m other country should at least send out a strong and fearless m an from hom e who w ould be indifferent as to the im pression he m ight personally m ake upon the U nited States adm inistration.”52 T upper then concentrated his efforts on preventing Pauncefote from drafting a convention unfavourable to the C anadian interests. A ctually no agreem ent o f any kind was reached until 1891, w hen a tem porary stop to hunting was decided on. A t the end of that year the British and A m erican governm ents agreed on an investigation by two com m issioners, the form er appointing G . M . D aw son o f the C anadian G eological Survey and Sir G eorge Baden-Powell. A year later the whole question was referred to an international arbitral tribunal, and the aw ard was favourable to Britain and Canada. Tw o decades o f diplom acy had had diverse effects. A n obvi­ ous one was the experience gained by the C anadian governm ent and parliam ent in the problem s and procedure of negotiation. In dealing with both E uropean and A m erican governm ents C ana­ dians had encountered the advantages and the disadvantages of utilizing im perial m achinery. W hile contem poraries w ere not agreed as to w hether the balance was favourable o r not, there

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was clearly a desire for a t least a greater degree of control over diplom acy on com m ercial subjects. T he progress m ade in that direction in the eighties and early nineties appeared to be halted by the despatch o f the colonial secretary, the M arquess o f Ripon, to the governor general in Ju n e 1895, w hich laid down the principle th at “to give the colonies the pow er o f negotiating treaties fo r them selves w ithout reference to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent, would be to give them an international status as separate and sovereign states.” T h a t principle, how ever, was not pushed to an extrem e in operation; and in 1907, w hen the C anadian governm ent wished to open negotiations w ith F rance, the foreign secretary (Sir E dw ard G rey) ruled that it was the intention to prevent negotiations from being unknow n to the British governm ent; and explained to the am bassador in Paris th at C anadians w ould be the negotiators, th at they w ould doubt­ less keep him inform ed, and that he w ould sign an agreem ent with two C anadian plenipotentiaries.53 C hanges continued to be m ade in constitutional practice in respect o f com m ercial treaties. T o some C anadians th at deve­ lopm ent was alm ost an end in itself, but by others it was m ore properly judged as a m eans o f achieving satisfactory relation­ ships w ith foreign states. T he subject m atter o f the negotiations was in m ost cases com m ercial, and frequently there was no political issue involved. But the line of dem arcation was not exact, and the com m ercial merged into the political w here the m ost fundam ental external interests o f C anada w ere concerned. M ajor changes in tariff arrangem ents with the U nited K ingdom or the U nited States involved decisions on policy in a field w ider than com m erce, a n d - s o it seemed to co ntem poraries-decisio n s w hich w ould define the future relation of C anada w ith the two great pow ers w ith which her fate was bound.54

CH A PTER 8

Canada, the Empire, and the United States

T h e foreign policy of any state is an expression o f the attem pt to m aintain o r establish a series o f relationships w ith other countries, the whole being designed to prom ote security and prosperity. Any com bination of a variety o f factors, such as geography, race, historical connections, and econom ic position, m ay determ ine the nature o f the policy adopted. Being m ade up o f a series of relationships, foreign policy entails the balancing o f one objective against another, and not infrequently the balancing of one state against another. C hanging conditions at hom e o r abroad, changing relations between two foreign states, lead to m odifications o f policy from time to time. Such a general definition m ay be applied to the foreign, or, to be m ore exact, to the external, policy o f C anada. T he alteration o f phrase reveals the one unusual aspect o f the position of the dominion. C an ad a was not a sovereign state but a u nit w ithin an em pire, though grown beyond any know n m eaning o f the w ord colony. T h at im perial connection, in itself a changing one, w as con­ stantly reviewed both by the m other country and its adult child. It brought obligations as well as advantages to both, the relative strengths o f w hich w ere assessed anew by each generation. A s in the forties, C anadians in the last quarter of the nine­ teenth century were earnestly seeking to find an external policy best calculated to further the interests of their country.T heoreti­ cally there w ere, as usual, three simple answers: independence, annexation to the U nited States, o r com plete absorption within the em pire. E ach o f these extrem es had supporters, but m ore characteristic w ere the m any com prom ises. R ather than accept the stark black and w hite offered by the doctrinaires, most C anadians chose a grey, allowing for alm ost endless shades according to the m ixture. T he force o f attraction tow ard each o f the extrem e poles depended on the circum stances o f the time. Independence m ade its appeal w hen fear o f attack was absent, and w hen there was a w eakening of im perial sentim ent caused either by particular dissatisfaction w ith British handling of

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C anadian affairs o r British coolness tow ard “the connection.” T hose w ho favoured annexation to the U nited States could sim ilarly find argum ents when im perial sentim ent was low and some tangible econom ic advantage could be show n. T he picture m ust be seen from two angles to be correctly interpreted. Strengthened relations with either the U nited K ingdom o r the U nited States depended not only on the wishes of Canadians, b ut also on the policies o f those other countries. T h at a bargain requires the action o f two parties was am ply illustrated for C an ad a in her trade relations w ith both great powers. C ircum stances com bined in the eighties to bring to the fore in b oth G reat Britain and C anada serious consideration o f the future o f the em pire. In the m other country the influence of the “ little Englanders” of the m iddle of the century was giving way before a revived im perialism firmly grounded on discern­ ible interests and decorated by touches of em otion. Free trade lost som e of its charm in the face o f foreign tariff barriers and com petitive industrialism in E uropean states. T h e nationalism of the old w orld spread to colonial areas and threatened to shut out the British m erchant. L ivingstone’s discoveries in tropical A frica created a fresh interest am ongst the English, and a new era of expansion set in. H istorians like Sir John Seeley and J. A. F ro u d e p u t the m ovem ent in its setting, while Sir Charles D ilke portrayed the existing em pire o f his G reater Britain. Joseph C ham berlain led a succession of statesm en along the new path, while Cecil Rhodes showed again th at the flag follows trade. Im perialism found its poet in R udyard Kipling, who brought the em pire w ithin the understanding o f every schoolboy.1 T he new im perialism em braced the self-governing colonies as well as the lands fresh to E uropeans. T he search for new fields of investm ent turned British eyes tow ard the m ore advanced colo­ nies, and a t the sam e tim e projects of greater im perial integra­ tion appealed to those w ho had no conscious econom ic motive. F o r the average C anadian the tropical areas, with their ivory and rubber, their problem s of slavery, policing, and railways, w ere rom antic but rem ote. It was in the relations o f the U nited K ingdom and the self-governing colonies that he had a direct interest. Like the Englishm en, he m ight see visions o f a pax Britannica, of a w orld ruled and enlightened by British ideas and institutions; but, also like the Englishm an, he was aw ake to an understanding o f w hat th at m eant for him in the less distant fu tu re and w ith reference to his particular situation. C anada was a country deeply com m itted to external trade, with a great

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area to develop and defend, needing diplom atic m achinery and support to sustain those interests. T he receptive m ood o f the U nited K ingdom caused official and unofficial opinion in Canada to look m ore tow ard a closer alignm ent w ith her, but by no m eans w ithout conditions, w ithout frequent glances in other directions. Probably m ost C anadians who gave thought to the situation at all w ould have chosen, as the ideal, m ore favourable trad e agreem ents with both the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States, w ithout change in the political relation with either. A m inority would have accepted, o r even sought, closer union w ith G reat Britain. A much sm aller m inority w ould have been ready fo r closer union with the U nited States as an accom pani­ m ent to extensive reciprocity. In either case critics could point to the danger o f entangling alliances. T his broad question of external policy was many-sided. The chief aspects w ere political, econom ic, and m ilitary, each affecting the other, but each having tem porarily a leading im portance depending on the circum stances of the day. W hile bearing in m ind the necessary connection between these aspects, the approach in the present chapter will be in the m ain from a p articular side o f the econom ic phase, w hich took concrete form in the choice between two paths: the one leading tow ard im perial preferential trade, w ith o r w ithout political federation; the other tow ard unrestricted reciprocity o r “com m ercial union,” w ith the shadow o f political union behind it. F or the m ajor political parties there was dynam ite either way, and both looked fo r com prom ise form ulas w hich would encourage m ore voters than they alarm ed. O ne group - for it never becam e quite a political party - had struggled to create a national point of view m ore original than the phrasem aking o f the older parties. T he C anada First m ovem ent of the seventies had em phasized C ana­ dian achievem ents, C anadian unity, and a C anadian character not merely a copy o f the m odes o f other lands. A ttacked from all sides the m ovem ent was driven from its brief attem pt to form a political party, and its m em bers w ent in varied directions; but its influence on political thought was lasting. F o r purposes of im plem enting plans for external policy there rem ained the two political parties: the Conservatives, with traditions o f imperial loyalty, and a belief in lim ited reciprocity; and the Liberals, suspected o f less im perialism , historically attached to low tariffs, and laying m ore em phasis on reciprocity. Such prin­ ciples, if they had ever had any reality, proved alm ost m ean­ ingless in the face of events.

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T h e plan fo r com m ercial union w ith the U nited States, throw n into the ring in 1887, precipitated an active controversy and caused alternative plans to be m ore definitely supported. T he general scheme w ith its various form s of com m ercial union, unrestricted reciprocity, or a N orth A m erican zollverein had been suggested for tw enty years o r m ore, both in the U nited States and C anada, but only becam e a real issue for a few years fro m 1887. T he com paratively large support th at it received in C anada at that tim e was due partly to local conditions, partly to the ability of its advocates. C anada was in the m idst of a long depression. T ra d e had fallen off, the large im m igration during the building of the C anadian Pacific Railw ay had ceased, the exodus to the U nited States was alarm ing, prices w ere low, the w est was not filling up as had been hoped, and the U nited States threatened tariff retaliation over the fishery dispute. It was, in the w ords o f Sir Jo h n W illison, “a tim e o f gloom and doubt, o f suspicion and unrest, o f rash opinion and prem ature judg­ m ent.”2 Into the breach cam e Erastus W im an, a N ew Y ork businessm an born in Canada, with experience in journalism , and now president o f the G re at N orth-W estern Telegraph C om pany. W im an collaborated in the U nited States w ith Samuel R itchie, an A m erican with business interests in C anada, and H ezekiah B utterw orth, a m em ber of Congress, who introduced a m easure to provide for com m ercial union. In C anada he found the co-operation o f H . W. D arling, president of the T oro n to B oard of T rade, G oldw in Sm ith, and others. M eetings were addressed during the sum m er o f 1887, pam phlets w ritten, and a com m ercial union league organized, w ith G oldw in Sm ith as president. C ontem porary literature on the subject is alm ost entirely partisan and throw s m ore light on the argum ents m eant fo r p opular consum ption than on the m erits and dem erits o f an econom ic plan. T he plan itself, in fact, needs little elucidation. I t was proposed to rem ove all custom s barriers between the U nited States and C anada, and to establish an identic tariff against third countries. In O ntario com m ercial union received the w hole-hearted support o f the T oro n to M ail, and the condi­ tional support o f the Globe. T he G lobe's condition was that the arrangem ent should be purely econom ic. T h a t a custom s U nion between Canada and the U nited States w ould profit both countries in a pecuniary sense will scarcely be denied by anybody. It does n ot follow that the schem e should be em braced by Canadians. T hey have to enquire w hether their entrance into such a Union w ould involve political consequences

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fro m which they are averse. . . . The Canadian people would m ake the worst o f all trades if they bartered their sentim ents fo r a C ustom s Union. In this m atter we are entirely at variance with the Mail. O ur contem porary believes, as we do, that a C ustom s U nion w ould profit Canada, but it says: - “The only objection to it fro m this side o f the line is that it m ight endanger British connection, but let us seriously ask ourselves if a people situated such as w e are in this controversy can afford to be sw ayed by sentim ent.” To which there can be only one answer - if we cannot afford to be sw ayed by sentim ent we are not w orthy to draw breath as free m en . . . the proposition is m onstrous!3 T h e G lobe continued to hold to this condition, while sup­ porting com m ercial union as an econom ic m easure. It noted th at all its form er correspondents were in favour of the scheme, and “m any of them are willing to go the length o f annexation if they cannot get the benefit o f enlarged trad e with the U nited States in any other m anner.” 4 T here is, in fact, am ple evidence that m any farm ers throughout the country were enthusiastic supporters. T he M anitoba Free Press, representing an agrarian elem ent, rem arked th at “ the cry against C om m ercial U nion is distinctly a ‘vested interest’ cry.” “W hat,” it asked, “are our m anufacturers com pared w ith ou r miners, ou r fishermen, our Lum berm en, o u r farm ers? Shall the millions be kept back for th e benefit o f the score or hundreds?”5 T he M ontreal G azette, on the other hand, opposed com m ercial union on the ground th a t it would harm m anufacturers, and th a t it w ould lead to political absorption. T he C anadian M anufacturers’ A ssociation passed a resolution to the effect th at unrestricted reciprocity w ould be disastrous to m anufacturing, com m erce, and agricul­ ture. In H alifax the M orning H erald m ade alm ost daily attacks on w h at it called the “W im an fad ,” w hich it declared would bring all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of annexation. C anada’s m arkets w ould be open to A m erican m anufactured goods, w ithout any com parable benefit in return. T h e E vening M ail also inveighed against com m ercial union, w hich, it argued, w ould result in a 50 per cent higher duty on British goods. O ther new spapers w ere divided on the issue. The H am ilton Spectator held that com m ercial union m eant annexa­ tion, while the H am ilton T im es thought it w ould enlarge C anadian m arkets. T he M ontreal H erald and the O ttaw a Free Press both argued th at com m ercial union, because it m eant prosperity, would avert annexation. T he T oro n to W orld, O ttaw a

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C itizen, L ondon A dvertiser, and L ondon Free Press w ere all opposed. T h e Com m ercial U nion Club issued a H andbook o f C om ­ mercial Union, a series o f papers supporting the project. In this, as in other publications in favour of the plan, it was denied that annexation, o r even p artial loss of independence, was necessarily a result. G oldw in Sm ith, w ho w rote the introduction to the pam phlet, defended com m ercial union again in his Canada and the Canadian Question. A m ongst the pam phleteers Jam es Y oung (o f G alt) was one o f the m ost active. Com m ercial union, he w rote, w ould threaten the independence o f C anada, ruin her m anufacturers w ithout helping the farm ers, discrim inate against British trade, and rem ove the m ain source of the public revenue.6 P. N . F acktz’s pam phlet, Canada and the U nited States C om ­ pared, is m ore typical o f a type o f argum ent long fam iliar to C anadian readers. C anada, he found, was a country o f great' area and undeveloped natural resources, w ith a happy people and a rosy future. If com m ercial union were adopted annexation would follow, and C anadians find themselves under a corrupt governm ent in a land w here liberty had perished, and where Chicago bankers played poker on steam yachts all Sunday afternoon. E xhorted pro o r con by new spapers, pam phlets, boards of trade, and farm ers’ institutes, the C anadian public also w it­ nessed the passage o f the com m ercial union project across the political arena. T he Liberals, as the low-tariff party, m ight be expected to be the m ore friendly. T he new leader o f the party, W ilfrid L aurier, was anxious to adopt either com m ercial union o r unrestricted reciprocity, but there was som e opposition to the move, and shortly after he had been elected leader he m ade a speech at Som erset, Q uebec (A ugust 1887) in w hich he refused to com m it himself. “ If I am asked a t present fo r my opinion on the subject, I m ay say th at fo r m y p art I am not ready to declare th at com m ercial union should be adopted at the present m om ent. A great deal o f study and reflection are needed to solve this question, fo r and against w hich there is m uch to be said.” 7 Tw o m onths later, C artw right, the form er m inister of finance, becam e the first political leader to support com m ercial union. “I am as averse as any m an can be to annexation, o r to resign our political independence, but I cannot sh u t my eyes to the facts. W e have greatly misused ou r advan­ tages. W e have been m ost foolish and m ost w asteful in our expenditure. W e have no m eans o f satisfying the just dem ands

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o f large portions o f the D om inion except through such an arrangem ent as com m ercial union. T here is a risk, and I cannot overlook it. But it' is a choice of risks, and our present position is anything b ut one o f stable equilibrium .”8 O ther m em bers o f the p arty showed varying degrees o f sym pathy, b u t the L iberal cau­ cus held at the opening o f parliam ent in 1888 decided fo r u n re­ stricted reciprocity rath er than com m ercial union; the difference being th at each country would be free in respect o f tariffs against th ird parties. It was unthinkable th at the C onservative party should risk the cry o f disloyalty o r the disfavour o f the m anufac­ tu rers by adopting com m ercial union; b u t on the other h an d it had never ceased - in spite of the other elem ents o f the N ational Policy — to seek reciprocity, and continued to do so. In 1887 T u p p er w ent to W ashington in another attem pt to bargain for reciprocity in exchange for fishing rights.9 T he difference be­ tw een the two parties on the tariff, then, rem ained one of degree. By the beginning o f 1888 Sir Jo h n M acdonald was confident th a t the com m ercial union cause was lost. T he federal elections, he w rote to T upper, h ad all gone against it. Leading m en of the opposition, like A lexander M ackenzie, Jam es Y oung, and John M acdonald of T oronto, had denounced it. T he rural press of O ntario, he claim ed, opposed it. I t was, in fact, “a dead duck and I th in k L ord Lansdow ne sees now th a t my policy as an ­ nounced to him last spring o f allowing the cry of Com m ercial U nion to blaze, crackle and go out w ith a stink, w ithout giving it u n d u e im portance was a wise one. T he country here now by general consent have connected C. U. w ith annexation and repudiate b oth.”10 It rem ained to be seen w hether parliam ent would ratify this judgm ent. T h e debate in the H ouse o f C om ­ m ons began on M arch 14 w ith a m otion by C artw right to seek free trad e w ith the U nited States in m anufactured goods and n atu ral products.11 Pointing to the em igration o f C anadians and o f recent im m igrants, the slow settlem ent o f the west, and the low figures o f external trade, he argued th at the proper course was reciprocity w ith the rapidly growing U nited States. All classes o f the com m unity w ould benefit; and even if direct tax a­ tion w ere then needed for revenue, the total burden o f taxation would be no greater, and m ore fairly distributed. A s to the effect o f the proposed m easure on im perial relations, C artw right claim ed that, w hile Canadians should not feel any debt to E ng­ lish statesm en, a m ore prosperous C anada w ould buy m ore from E ngland, and, further, w ould “act as a link o f union and am ity betw een the two great English races.” A full-dress debate fol­

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lowed on th e lines laid dow n by C artw right; w hether em igration was such a serious facto r as it had been represented to be, and w hether reciprocity w ould alleviate it; if agriculture and industry would benefit, o r the latter at least be subm erged w ithout pro­ tection; the effect o f rem oving custom s revenue and replacing it by oth er taxes; and the influence of reciprocity on the political relations of C anada w ith the U nited K ingdom . E ach point was taken up at length, and the argum ents were serious and studded with statistics. T he Conservatives w ere careful to point o ut that the opposition h ad had no m onopoly o f a belief in reciprocity, and proposed in am endm ent th at trade relations with the U nited States should be cultivated in so fa r as they did not conflict with the N ational Policy. O n the governm ent side policy and flagwaving were a t tim es brought in to reinforce statistics o f trade, b ut L iberal m em bers urged th at reciprocity was really a defence against annexation, and th at the prospect of im perial preferen­ tial trade as an alternative was utterly unreal in the light of British fiscal policy. A fter three weeks of a debate which on the w hole was m aintained a t a high level, the H ouse divided on A pril 6, and the Conservative am endm ent was carried by 124 to 67 on a p arty vote.

II T h e cam paign fo r com m ercial union gave a new stim ulus to the m ovem ent for a closer integration o f the em pire, a m ove­ m ent which was by no m eans new, b u t had previously lacked w ide support and appeared as som ew hat academ ic. T he interest o f Canadians in the em pire outside the U nited K ingdom was lim ited, but in som e instances surprisingly active. T he affairs of Ireland, and especially the hom e rule m ovem ent, w ere those m ost consistently w atched. A s the G lobe pointed out, there were good reasons for this C anadian interest: there was a large Irish elem ent in the C anadian population; the Irish question was of such concern in the U nited States th at its peaceful settlem ent was necessary for good relations w ith C anada; and a settlem ent was also “necessary to th e peace, the strength, the w elfare, the influence and th e glory o f the E m pire.” 12 T he M anitoba Free Press held th at Ireland was now w ell governed, w hatever had been the case in the past, and condem ned in unm easured terms the “cut-throats” w ho w ere guided by no patriotic interest.18 O ther papers were m ore critical of the British governm ent. T he

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H alifax M orning H erald, for exam ple, frequently described Irish discontent, and labelled the British policy as reactionary. In 1885 a mass m eeting was held in H alifax by Irish sym pa­ thizers. T h e E vening M ail o f H alifax was also critical o f the British governm ent, and stated th at the sooner the Irish obtained self-governm ent, the better it would be fo r the em pire. T he S aint John D aily Telegraph accused the Salisbury governm ent o f engaging in a controversy w ith the T sar as a means of dis­ tracting attention from conditions in Ireland and England. In 1887 the C anadian parliam ent passed a resolution in favour of hom e rule, which, w ith other signs of sym pathy, so encouraged the Irish nationalists th at W illiam O ’Brien sailed for C anada to drive L ord Lansdow ne (an Irish landlord) out o f Canada. N o o th er issue touched the C anadian people as intim ately as the Irish one, but they w ere not oblivious to w hat was going on elsew here in the em pire. T he annexation by F rance and G er­ m any of islands in the w estern Pacific led the editor o f the M o rn in g H erald to draw a parallel between effects o f this on A ustralia and a sim ilar annexation of territory near P rince E dw ard Island.14 T he troubles in the Sudan in 1885 w ere closely followed w ith critical com m ents; in the sam e year the E vening M ail decided that the annexation o f B urm a by G reat Britain w ould rescue the inhabitants from oppression and “m ake a fine addition to ou r possessions.” 15 F oreign affairs had long been extensively reported in C an a­ d ian newspapers, and were, therefore, presum ably considered to be o f interest to readers. But the editors w ent fu rth er than news, for they frequently com m ented on British foreign policy, not hesitating to point to m istakes; w riting w ith such earnestness as to give the im pression that C anadian interests w ere a t stake th at is, th at the strength o f the em pire depended in p art on the success of British foreign policy, and th a t C anada was con­ cerned in the strength o f the em pire. A gain to refer to the editorial page o f the H alifax H era ld : the editor noted w ith satis­ faction th at the British governm ent “have determ ined to act for once with prom ptness and fortitude” in preventing T urkey from sending troops to Egypt. A few m onths later, objecting to w hat he considered to be British w eakness in resisting Russian ad­ vances tow ard India, the editor sweepingly described the cabinet as “ the m ost conspicuously foolish and imbecile m inistry that has ever ruled England for the p ast hundred years.”10 T he exact significance to C anada o f Russian im perialism m ay be seen in the apprehension in 1877-78 of Russian attacks on the west

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coast. A n im m ediate relevance to C anada was deduced from G erm an im perialism in Sam oa in 1887. G reat Britain, the editor o f the H erald suggested, should insist on the neutrality of Sam oa and H aw aii, because of their strategic position with respect to C an ad a’s new ocean route to A ustralia. M any other examples m ight be quoted, from this and other newspapers, to show the C anadian interest in British foreign policy. T he outstanding case, because it m ost directly affected C anada, was policy tow ard the U nited States. H ere C anadians w ere consistently inconsist­ ent, since they dem anded that Britain should be a t once relent­ less in pursuing p articular C anadian interests and conciliatory in o rd er to establish good relations. T hough they never secured anything like a m ajority support in C anada, the im perial federationists alone wove together the m any threads to m ake a logical pattern. In 1884 the Im perial F ederation League was organized in L ondon under the chair­ m anship o f W . E. F orster, a form er under-secretary fo r the colonies, and w ith various representatives of the U nited K ing­ dom and the colonies in attendance. Sir C harles T upper, then high com m issioner, was a speaker at the first conference. T he resolutions adopted indicated in general the purposes o f the league. They w ere: T hat the object o f the league be to secure by Federation the perm anent unity o f the E m pire. T hat no schem e o f federation should interfere w ith the exist­ ing rights o f local parliaments as regards local affairs. T hat any schem e o f Im perial Federation should com bine on an equitable basis the resources o f the E m pire fo r the m ain­ tenance o f com m on interests, and adequately provide fo r an organized defence o f com m on rights. That the league invites the support o f m en o f all political parties. N o attem pt was m ade to define the constitutional m achinery by w hich these ends were to be procured, and the emphasis was laid m ore on unity than on federalism . W hile individuals w orked out plans for a single parliam ent at W estm inster with representatives from all the colonies, the spokesm en o f the league on the whole refused to com m it themselves to any one plan. T hus the league was able to attract the support of men w ho might have found an imperial parliam ent unacceptable. Certainly the general platform of the league had m uch to com ­ m end it: th at there were m atters o f a local nature to be handled

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by the governing body of each unit, and also m atters which affected several o r all of the units. Canadians were, and long had been, very conscious th a t defence, foreign affairs, and trade had w ide ram ifications, which m ade them m ore than local sub­ jects, and th at at least raised the question as to w hether there was any m eans by w hich they could be handled jointly. T he whole project o f closer im perial integration, in its various form s, was one for long and active debate in C anada.17 T h e Im perial F ederation L eague in C anada was founded in M ontreal in 1885, and three branches started - at Ingersoll, Peterborough, and H alifax - in the next two years. Colonel D enison was urged to be the president o f a branch to be form ed in T o ronto, but he did not consider th at the tim e had com e for the country to spend m oney on imperial defence and refused. T he branch did not m aterialize a t that tim e, but only a year later a new factor led D enison to change his m ind. The progress the C om m ercial U nion m ovem ent was m aking [he w rote] and the great danger arising fro m it, led m y brother and m e to discuss it with a num ber o f loyal m en, and on all sides the opinion seem ed to be that active steps should be taken at once to w ork against it . . . and it was decided that the best policy was to advocate a C om m ercial U nion o f the British E m pire as an alternative to the proposition o f a C om m ercial Union with the U nited States, and that a schem e o f Im perial Federation based upon a C om m ercial Union o f the various parts o f the E m pire w ould be the best m ethod o f advocating our view s.18 T ow ard the end of 1887 a branch of the Im perial Federation League was form ed in T oronto, and w rote into its constitution a special clause stating that it looked tow ard im perial preferential trade. D enison m ade a vigorous speech at a public m eeting held by the league, calling on patriots “ to rally round the old flag and fru strate the evil designs of traitors.” Believing that there were traito rs in Canada, in touch with A m ericans who were w orking fo r annexation, D enison and his associates organized a modest system o f counter-espionage w hich produced at least some results. A w ritten statem ent by W im an in Septem ber 1888 directly connected com m ercial union w ith annexation, and this fu rth er confirm ed the suspicions o f the opponents of the first. W hile, therefore, the league in C anada never succeeded in establishing a definite program m e, but rath er contained men with varying views, it served for the tim e being as a focus for

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th e opposition to closer connection with th e U nited States and a generally sym pathetic attitude tow ard im perial co-operation of som e kind. T h e Senate discussed im perial federation on a m otion by C. A. Boulton th a t C anada m ight be accorded rep re­ sentation in the British H ouse o f C om m ons. T he m otion was w ithdraw n w ithout a vote being taken, but the debate gives some im pression o f the argum ents of the day, both on the specific question o f w hether representation w as feasible, and on the general issue o f closer links w ith the U nited K ingdom or the U nited States.19 A m ore direct alternative to unrestricted reciprocity w as a proposal introduced into the H ouse of C om m ons fo r closer trade relations betw een C anada and G reat Britain. D ’A lton M cC arthy, w ho led in the defence of the proposition, denied any hostility tow ard the U nited States, but claim ed th at C anadian trade w ould be m ore feasible w ith G reat Britain, whose products w ere less in com petition w ith those of C anada.20 C ontem porary com m ents in the new spapers give som e indi­ cation o f public opinion o n the im perial federation m ovem ent. T h e G lobe was opposed to any o f the constitutional plans p ut forw ard as unw orkable and undesirable, and could see imperial relations only as static o r less binding. T h e loyalty o f Canadians to-day is a reasonable loyalty. . . . B u t they see that, as all m en acknowledge, a change in the relations o f Canada with the E m pire m ust one day take place. W hether it w ill be fo u n d best fo r Canada to rem ain in the E m pire, as all w ould wish, or to m ake a further advance in the direction in w hich fo r som e tim e it has been proceeding, and to take outside o f the E m pire the place o f a loving child, an attached and devoted friend, is the question. . . .21 F ederation, said the editor tw o years later, w as “a grand jingo dream ,” w ith a danger of draw ing C anada into im perial w ars. T he M ail also held th at federation w as out of the question and had no strong popular support; b u t felt th at defence was m ore neces­ sary to discuss in days w hen “ the belligerent spirit am ong the nations betrays no disposition to subside.”22 T he M anitoba Free Press w as sarcastic about the federation proposals, and con­ cluded that “we are, as a people, well satisfied w ith o u r present relations. W hen there is a change it will be in a direction opposite to th a t sought by the Im perial F ederationists.” C anadians, said the editor, w ould never consent to pay taxes to be spent outside

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th e co untry, n o r did they wish to ru n the risk o f being involved in B ritish w ars.23 T he M ontreal Journal o f C om m erce found th at “the proposition for an organized defence o f com m on rights is entirely too vague to induce the Colonies to com m it themselves to the principle [of im perial federation].”24 T he H alifax H erald was read y to contem plate federation as a fu tu re possibility, b ut n ot as an im m ediate necessity. In contrast to the G lobe, it argued that, w hen a change cam e, it would be in th at direction. T h e H erald w elcom ed the establishm ent o f a branch o f the Im perial F ederation League in M ontreal, rem arking th at “the British E m pire m ust eventually be handled as a whole, o f w hich no p a rt is m aster and no p art dependent.”25 T he E vening M ail o f H alifax was strongly in favour o f an “E m pire com m ercial u nion” as m ore desirable to C anada than one w ith the U nited States.26 Such a plan w ould not be im perial federation, but w ould be a step tow ard it. S uch w ere the issues before the public, but they w ere reflected in only a distorted form in the election o f 1891. T he Liberal p arty held to its project of unrestricted reciprocity, but vigor­ ously denied th at th at im plied annexation o r any breaking o f the im perial bond. O liver M ow at claim ed th at only a fragm ent of either party was opposed to British connection. “A British sub­ ject I have lived fo r three-score years, and som ething m ore - I hope to live m y life a British subject and as a British subject die.” T h e Conservative party, w hile ham m ering a t the “veiled treason” o f unrestricted reciprocity, underm ined the L iberals’ appeal on trade grounds by letting it be know n th at negotiations w ere being initiated a t W ashington fo r a revival, in a modified form , o f the lim ited reciprocity treaty o f 1854. H aving taken th e edge off the L iberal sword, the Conservatives then m ade the m ost o f an appeal to traditional loyalty, both to C anada and the em pire. Sir C harles T upper was brought fro m E ngland to stum p the country, and M acdonald - in w hat proved to be his last election - told the electorate th at “a British subject I was born, a British subject I will die.” W hile M ow at’s sim ilar con­ fession w as lost in the denunciation o f an annexation m enace, the “old m an’s” cry echoed throughout the country. In reality the election o f 1891 settled nothing, save th at the Conservatives were retu rn ed to pow er for five years m ore, and that reciprocity, if obtainable, was to be restricted. Im perial preference, im perial federation, com m ercial and political relations with the U nited States - all rem ained to be defined and settled, and a choice - if choice there m ust be - m ade betw een them.

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III N either the return of the Conservatives in 1891 nor their defeat by the L iberals five years later m aterially changed the ch aracter of the issues before the C anadian people. T he several courses discussed before, centring around relations w ith the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States, continued to be dis­ cussed, and a choice was still to be m ade. In spite o f th e heat engendered, the elections w ere to some extent sham battles, for neither party stood com m itted to a definite policy in these im p o rtant questions. T he L iberal party dropped its aim of un­ restricted reciprocity, while the Conservative adm inistration in its last years of office found th at W ashington was unreceptive to the lim ited reciprocity th at it sought. Both parties then settled dow n to an acceptance of m oderate protection, modified, when possible, by special trade agreem ents. In the last years o f the old century and the early years of the new, how ever, a num ber of factors com bined to give a fresh setting to the C anadian problem o f im perial and continental relationships. T h e progress o f protectionism in the U nited States, under the M cKinley tariff of 1890 and the Dingley tariff of 1897, closed the d o o r to reciprocity negotiations for m ore than fifteen years, until such advanced protection began to be questioned as a cause o f the high cost of living. W hile on th e one hand the road to W ashington was at least tem porarily blocked, the m ovem ent fo r closer im perial ties received a new im petus. T he jubilee of 1897 provided the occasion and the atm osphere fo r a unique gathering o f em pire statesm en in L ondon, at a tim e w hen Joseph C ham berlain’s new im perialism was seeking practical expression. In spite o f the fact th at he held w hat was norm ally considered a m in o r portfolio, th a t of colonial secretary, C ham berlain led his advance guard along new and even alarm ing paths - tow ard continental alliance in place of isolation, tow ard m ilitant empirebuilding in South A frica, tow ard com m ercial union w ith the colonies, and even to a skirm ish against the sacred citadel of free trade. T he note was set by his speech at the C anada Club in the spring o f 1896. The recent isolation o f the U nited K ingdom , the dangers which seem ed to threaten us, have evoked fro m all our colonies, and especially fro m Canada, an outburst o f loyalty and affection w hich has reverberated throughout the w o r ld .. . . is this dem on­

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stration . . . to pass away w ithout a serious effort upon the part both o f colonial and Im perial statesm en to transform these sentim ents into practical results? . . . W e m a y endeavour to establish com m on interest and co m ­ m o n obligations. . . . W hat is the greatest o f our com m on obligations? It is Im perial defence. W hat is the greatest o f our co m m o n interests? I t is Im perial trade. A n d those tw o are very closely connected. I t is very difficult to see how yo u can pretend to deal w ith this great question o f Im perial defence w ithout having first dealt w ith the question o f Im perial trade. . . . M y . . . proposition is that a true Zollverein fo r the Em pire, that a free trade established throughout the Em pire, although it w ould involve the im position o f duties against foreign countries, and w ould be in that respect a derogation fro m the high prin­ ciples o f free trade, and fro m the practice o f the U nited K in g ­ d o m up to the present tim e, w ould still be a proper subject fo r discussion and m ight possibly lead to a satisfactory arrangem ent if the colonies on their part were willing to consider it . . . it would undoubtedly lead to the earliest possible developm ent o f their great natural resources, w ould bring to them population, would open to them the enorm ous m arket o f the U nited K in g d o m . . . .27 D ecisions on any changes in the im perial structure, w hether political, m ilitary, o r econom ic, m ust be m ade in G re at B ritain and C anada (since neither the A ustralian n o r South A frican colonies were as yet united) and in tariff questions m ust over­ com e the accepted policies o f free trade in G re at B ritain and protection in C anada. T h at either country should m ake such a radical departure m ust have seemed im probable, but C ham ­ b erlain’s gesture was followed by some encouragem ent from L aurier too. N o w the statesm en o f G reat Britain have thought [he said in Ju n e 1896] that the colonies have com e to a tim e when a new step m ust be taken in their developm ent. W hat is that? That there shall be a com m ercial agreem ent between England and the colonies. T hat practical statesm an, M r. Joseph Chamberlain, has com e to the conclusion that the tim e has com e when it is possible to have w ithin the bounds o f the E m pire a new step taken, w hich w ill give to the colonies in England, a preference fo r their products over the products o f other nations. . . . The possibilities are im m ense. . . . B u t Sir, if England is going to give

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us that preference, England w ould expect som ething fro m us in return . . . that we w ould com e as closely to her own system o f free trade, such as she has it, as it is possible fo r us to c o m e ... ,28 T h a t nearest point, L aurier w ent on to say, was to adopt a revenue instead of a protective tariff; and such was said to be the L iberal policy, although in reality the difference tended to be little m ore than one of nam e. A year la ter w hen Fielding intro­ duced the first budget of the L iberal governm ent it was found to contain a preferential rate for English goods, 12 Vi per cent at first and then increased to 25 per cent. T his preferential rate was, from one p o in t of view, simply a low er tariff, and as such alarm ing to not a few C anadian m anufacturers. As an imperial move it was greeted with enthusiasm by m em bers of the recently deceased Im perial F ederation League and others who looked tow ard closer im perial relations. G . W . Ross, a m em ber o f the O ntario cabinet, told the British Em pire League th at the prefer­ ence had not only “paved the w ay for the rapid developm ent of C anadian com m erce,” but had “ quieted for the time being, and I hope forever, the restlessness which prevailed in m any q uar­ ters as to the fu tu re of C anada.” Instead of the fluctuating m arkets of the U nited States, C anadians could now tu rn to the m ore certain ones o f England; and at the sam e tim e the C ana­ dian voice would be m ore influential in the councils o f the em pire.29 T here w ere, o f course, not lacking those w ho were equally vocal in condem ning the preference as the thin end of the im perial wedge. I t was with such a background that th e colonial conference m et in L ondon in 1897. In a sense the conference was an inci­ dental result o f the jubilee celebrations, b u t this very connection gave it an im portance, n o t only because o f the atm osphere, but because the jubilee brought the colonial prim e m inisters to E ngland. Both in its personnel and its subject m atter the third colonial conference had a new significance.30 T hat o f 1887 had touched on defence and trade, but had steered away from dis­ cussion o f im perial federation. T he O ttaw a conference o f 1894, called by the C anadian governm ent, dealt in p art w ith trade, b ut Britain was represented only by an observer. T he third conference, in L ondon in 1897, w as described as inform al as to its proceedings, but it was a conference o f governm ents: the U nited K ingdom being represented by the secretary o f state fo r the colonies, and the self-governing colonies by their prim e m inisters. C ham berlain’s opening speech, given prom inence in

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the published reco rd ,31 w as a frank presentation o f the thesis w hich he v/as already know n to hold. T he m ost im p o rtan t and the m ost difficult subject, he said, was the future relation between the U nited K ingdom and the self-governing colonies. H e was not prepared to say w hether the time was ripe fo r change: in E ngland the idea of federation was “ in the air,” and he personally had thought o f “a great council of the E m pire” to w hich the colonies would send plenipotentiaries. But if the tim e should com e w hen the colonies wished “to substitute fo r th e slight relationship w hich at present exists a true partnersh ip ” w ith a share in the m anagem ent o f the em pire, it w ould also have to be realized that “ obligations and responsibility” m ust accom pany control. If a representative body were to be estab­ lished it w ould settle the related problem of im perial defence, the cost of w hich was now borne by the U nited K ingdom , al­ though the arm y and navy w ere n o t even principally m aintained fo r local defence. O n the question of com m ercial relations he referred to the value of a zollverein, but adm itted the difficulties in the way. If the resolutions passed by the conference be taken as a test, its decisions were cautious and lim ited, but not w ithout significance. It was decided (by a m ajority) th a t political rela­ tions between the U nited K ingdom and the self-governing colo­ nies were “generally satisfactory under the existing condition of things.” N o decision was recorded on defence. It was agreed by the prem iers th at they should investigate the possibilities of tariff preferences to the U nited K ingdom . A separate resolution recom m ended the denunciation o f treaties ham pering the com ­ m ercial relations between G re a t Britain and th e colonies. T he reference was to treaties w ith Belgium and G erm any, which contained m ost-favoured-nation clauses standing in the w ay of such a preference. T he case cam e up particularly in relation to the C anadian preference o f 1897, but the British governm ent had long been requested to term inate the treaties, w hich they now did. Finally, a unanim ous resolution called fo r periodic conferences in the future. T hus there em erge from the conference o f 1897 one general issue and three particular ones, all of w hich continued to be discussed, at fu rth e r conferences and betw een them , for m any years. Tw o o f these - the n atu re o f the colonial conference and the defence question - will be exam ined in subsequent chap­ ters.32 T he general problem o f the political relations between the colonies and the U nited K ingdom runs through m ost aspects of the external relations o f C anada. T he particular phase o f it

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which followed the conference o f 1897 is closely linked with com m ercial policy, and m ay be considered here in th at connec­ tion. T h e policy o f the British governm ent in respect of imperial relations was, for the tim e being a t least, the policy of Joseph C ham berlain. W hatever m ay have been the opposition to it, in the governm ent o r outside, it was the policy that was adopted and the one therefore w ith w hich the self-governing colonies w ere concerned. T hose colonies differed in position, needs, and political developm ent, and viewed the im perial question differ­ ently as a result. T h eir attitudes had some, but relatively little, influence on governm ent and public in Canada. On the whole, and except perhaps for trade and the Pacific cable, Canadians w ere ignorant and alm ost oblivious of the other colonies. T heir interest was in the U nited K ingdom - by origin, trade, culture, defence, and governm ent. It happened, how ever, that the man w ho was prim e m inister throughout fifteen years w hen these subjects were to the fore was a French C anadian, the first to hold that office in the history of the dom inion. O n the w hole the F rench C anadians were little affected by the ties that bound th eir English-speaking com patriots to G re at Britain. T heir origin and culture were F rench; they p u t little em phasis on com m erce; minim ized the need for defence, even o f C anadian territory; and had no reason to share in the im perial vision seen by oth er groups of Canadians. C ut aw ay from F rance once and finally, they found their only patrie in C anada, w hich for them should be a p art o f the British E m pire only so long as the established m odus vivendi was retained. W ilfrid L aurier was descended from eight generations o f Canadians, b ut his upbringing was unusual, com bining English P rotestant with F ren ch Catholic schools and associates. N o r did L aurier accept the traditional ultram ontanism of the church in Quebec; indeed, one o f the causes fo r which he stood was the separation of politics and religion, and the freedom to follow liberalism in the one w ithout the accusation of being unorthodox in the other. W hen L aurier w ent to the jubilee in 1897 it was his first crossing of the A tlantic. In London, as the prim e m inister of the only united dom inion, he was given a leading p art in the colourful cerem onies carried out in the atm osphere of royalty and im perialism; and am idst it all he received a knighthood. In spite of the heady air, L aurier was cautious tow ard any com m itm ent, and in fact retu rn ed w ithout m aking any. He accepted C ham berlain’s form ula that responsibility m ust ac­ com pany control, and steered carefully away from both. N ev er­

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theless, L aurier seemed in the eyes o f some o f his countrym en to be caught in the toils of im perialism - a suspicion w hich they thought to be proven by C anadian participation in the w ar in South A frica. H e found him self threatened politically by the early stages o f a nationalist m ovem ent in his own province, a m ovem ent o f which H enri Bourassa was one of the earliest adherents and later the leader.33 T o such m en C ham berlain was an arch-villain, insidiously sapping at the autonom y o f Canada, draw ing her by subtle m eans into the m aelstrom o f imperial w ars, im perial taxes, im perial control. It was not only in French C anada that such views w ere to be found. T he nationalists am ong the English-speaking Canadians found an able pen in G oldw in Sm ith; but Sm ith was a liability as well as an asset, for his nationalism ended in the m anifest destiny of annexation. It was J. S. Ew art, a lawyer of O ttaw a, w ho took up the cause, and hewed to the straight and narrow line o f Canadianism . L aurier had critics to the right as w ell as to the left. If the nationalists later broke w ith him because o f the Boer W ar and the naval defence plans, it was the m ore im perially-m inded Canadians w ho forced him into those lim ited excursions. L aurier, in fact, occupied a m iddle position; and it is a tribute to his political ability that fo r m any years he escaped being crushed between the millstones. O n a policy o f im perial relations generally there is little difference between L aurier on the one hand and M ac­ donald and his successors on the other. T here were, it is true, m any Conservatives who accused L aurier o f being anti-im perial, but they never controlled their own party. L aurier could say w ith as m uch conviction as M acdonald that a British subject he w ould die, but the two w ere, in the practice of governm ent, alm ost equally shy o f com m itm ents. T h at a share in the control o f imperial policy, o r even consultation concerning it, entailed a t least a m oral obligation to bear the consequences becam e a dogm a accepted by w hatever party w as in power. In the decade following the Boer W ar there was active study and discussion of com m ercial policy as a p art of the imperial relationship. Shortly before the colonial conference o f 1902 the president o f the C anadian M anufacturers’ A ssociation an­ nounced that the chief object o f his organization was to bring all British countries into a closer union by means of a preferen ­ tial tariff, and the president o f the British Em pire League in C anada called for an additional duty in all British countries on foreign goods to provide a fund for defence; while the Cassandra voice o f G oldw in Sm ith repeated that no im perial zollverein

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could draw C anada aw ay from the N o rth A m erican continent.34 A t the conference itself the C anadian delegates presented a m em orandum intended to show that the preference had encour­ aged British im ports, though they continued to refrain from using it as a basis fo r bargaining. In his opening speech Joseph C ham berlain recognized that the preference had arrested the decline of British exports to C anada, but the volum e was still n ot great in relation to British im ports from C anada. Even with a preference, he said, a protective tariff m ight effectually exclude British goods; and he looked wistfully tow ard a self-sustaining em pire. T he only resolution adopted by the conference on the subject of tariffs gave a blessing to the principle of preference, and recognized th at a general system o f free trade was not practicable.35 W hile the discussions at the conference w ere not m ade public a t the tim e, it was the general im pression in C anada that L aurier and his colleagues had been w hat their supporters would call cautious and their critics destructive. T he vital issues of th a t conference, however, w ere not tariff levels b u t defence and an im perial constitution. A gainst com m itm ents on either of these latter L aurier set his face like flint. T h e conference had not long adjourned when the tariff ques­ tion once m ore cam e to the fore. T hrough Joseph C ham ber­ lain’s cam paign fo r “ tariff refo rm ,” a direct assault was m ade upon the citadel o f free trade as a m eans of attaining to that self-sustaining em pire of w hich he dream ed. “A sm all rem nant o f L ittle E nglanders o f the M anchester School” clung to the strict application o f free trad e in a w orld in which foreign countries and the colonies as well had adopted protection. Freedom of interchange should be retained as a principle, but the pow er of negotiation and even retaliation be resum ed. In parliam ent a storm o f opposition was raised, not only by the Liberal opposition, b u t also am ongst the lab o u r m em bers and even some of the U nionists. N othing daunted by the traditional cries against a tax on bread, C ham berlain gave blow for blow, and a battle w ent on in new spapers and periodicals and on the public platform . T he “ tariff refo rm ” project continued to be debated from its initiation in the spring of 1903, through 1904 and 1905. In C anada opinion was divided, but on the whole C ham berlain’s policy was supported, though som etim es with reservations. R. L. B orden’s com m ent on the opening speech was th at the Conservative p arty had been fighting for im perial preferential trade for ten years, and the veteran, Sir Charles T upper,. spoke o f C ham berlain’s “manly, straightforw ard and

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plucky stand.” M ost o f the new spapers, especially the Conserva­ tive ones, expressed approval, and various boards of trade passed resolutions in favour of the plan. L aurier was cautious in his com m ents but welcomed the idea o f treaties of com m erce betw een the British countries, each of w hich w ould have its own tariff. T he G lobe was cool about the plan, and in the province of Q uebec som e spokesm en, notably Bourassa, suspected th at trade unity would be a step tow ard political unity.36 T h e C anadian preference to English goods rem ained as the original and solid form o f im perial preference, and while it was often cited as advantageous to both countries, it was not always happily accepted by C anadian m anufacturers.37 W hile modified from tim e to tim e the C anadian preference nevertheless was retained: the rock on w hich the broader scheme was to be wrecked was the English aversion to duties on the necessities of life. C ham berlain had never quite converted the U nionists and Conservatives to tariff reform , but had m ade considerable head­ way. T h e fall o f the governm ent in 1905, and the accession to office o f the Liberals under C am pbell-B annerm an (w ho had denounced the C ham berlain plan) rem oved it, for the tim e at least, as a political possibility. IV In the tw entieth century both independence and annexation to th e U nited States were still talked o f but neither had any considerable m easure o f support. W hat did constitute a live issue was the revival o f projects of reciprocity, a revival m ade possible by a changing attitude in the U nited States w hich in tu rn h ap ­ pened to coincide w ith the British decision to cling to free trade. T he alternatives o f reciprocity and imperial preference for a time played som ew hat the role they had in the eighties, but in a m inor key and w ithout any o f the fighting spirit behind the form er that the advocates o f com m ercial union had show n. John C harlton m ade frequent references, in the H ouse o f C om m ons and the new spapers, to the advantages of reciprocity, which he com ­ pared with the C ham berlain plan, to the detrim ent o f the latter. But until there was some evidence of breaches in the A m erican tariff w all any C anadian thoughts on reciprocity could n o t be m uch m ore than pious hopes. Even while the general belief in high tariffs continued to exist in the U nited States there were scattered indications o f groups who saw advantages in reci­ procity. In 1901 the N ational A ssociation of M anufacturers

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held a N ational Reciprocity Convention at W ashington, and in the next two o r three years the m ovem ent began to gain m om en­ tum w ith the form ation of reciprocity leagues in N ew England and the west, advocacy in the new spapers, by boards o f trade, and delegations to Congress in its favour. T he argum ents were usually that the C anadian m arket could be opened to A m erican goods, and that action was necessary especially in view of the tendency tow ard m ore protection in C anada and the effect that the C ham berlain proposals w ould have on A m erican trade with C anada. T he advantages to A m erican railways of reciprocal trad e w ere often m entioned; and J. J. Hill, whose railways ran at various points to the C anadian border, was an active partisan in w hat was becoming a serious cam paign. In C anada, w here, for thirty years, reciprocity had been en ­ ergetically, at times frantically, sought, enthusiasm had calmed dow n o r was being deliberately suppressed. I t was recognized th at any move m ust com e from the U nited States, and there was a certain unwillingness to play once m ore the p art o f the un­ successful suitor. N o r, indeed, was it certain th at Barkis was now willing. T he tw entieth century had opened a new prosperity fo r C anada, w ith a relatively rapid developm ent o f the w est and growing industrialization in the east. T he C ham berlain tariff refo rm project offered possibilities of an alternative that was attractive to a t least a p art of the population, and might be upset by reciprocity w ith the U nited States. “C anada,” said Colonel D enison in a speech in T oronto in 1903, “should avoid reci­ procity as she w ould the plague.” 38 In the sam e year the C an a­ dian M anufacturers’ A ssociation passed a resolution against a reciprocity treaty affecting the m anufacturing interests of C an­ ada. In 1904 and 1905 m uch the sam e tone seemed to hold; that the U nited States had refused reciprocity w hen C anada wanted it, and that now the dom inion was following other paths. T he strength o f econom ic and political nationalism as a barrier to reciprocity could not as yet be assessed, but there were indica­ tions th at it was becoming a serious element. A further barrier, w hich might be m anned by a quite different group, was the objection that reciprocity w ould endanger the imperial relation. T h ere were, how ever, indications that an agreem ent limited to certain p roducts w ould not be unacceptable; and probably there was m uch m ore desire for such an arrangem ent than public utterances would indicate. T he exact state of C anadian opinion could be tested only when the question was p u t in a specific form .

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In 1909 and the early p art of 1910 the existing high protec­ tion began to be seriously questioned in W ashington, and a variety o f factors led tow ard negotiations with C anada. Im pressed by the dem ands of certain groups, notably the new s­ paper publishers, for lower tariffs with C anada, by using com ­ plaints against the high cost of living, and dissensions w ithin his own p arty, P resident T aft took steps to have the com m ercial relations o f the two countries reconsidered.39 T he subject of im m ediate discussion was the legal necessity of applying to C an ad a the m axim um rates of the Payne-A ldrich tariff due to the fact that the C anadian agreem ent w ith F rance was inter­ preted as a technical discrim ination. W hen the departm ent of state approached the British am bassador, Bryce inform ed the C anadian governm ent o f the departm ent’s desire for a confer­ ence, which the C anadian governm ent suggested should be in O ttaw a. T here the A m erican representatives proposed that C anada should offer her interm ediate rate, but the C anadians denied that there was discrim ination, though they finally agreed to the interm ediate rate on a few articles as a token concession. A series o f discussions, official and unofficial, then took place on the possibility o f considering tariff agreem ents on a broader basis, during w hich the C anadian governm ent expressed its will­ ingness to hold such a conversation at any convenient tim e. A ctual negotiations were conducted from N ovem ber 1910 to Jan u ary 1911. T he C anadian proposals covered a sm all, the A m erican a m uch larger, list o f articles; and by the m iddle of Jan u ary a com prom ise agreem ent was reached, under which m ost n atural products were to be on the free list and the duty on a lim ited num ber o f m anufactured articles to be reduced. T h e agreem ent was to be brought into effect by concurrent legislation. In spite of som e opposition, the necessary legislation was passed by Congress before the end o f July. I t only rem ained fo r C anada to do its part. T h e C anadian parliam ent consisted o f tw o m ajor parties, both of w hich in the past h ad em phatically announced their belief in reciprocity o f some kind. T raditionally the Liberals had been a low-tariff party, but o f recent years had show n little disposition to pay m ore than lip-service to th at faith. But, just as T a ft had experienced pressure for reduced tariffs, so had L aurier. In a to u r through the w estern provinces in the sum m er o f 1910 he was besieged by dem ands for the ending o f protec­ tion, and it seems clear that he was not a little im pressed.40 The caution of his governm ent in meeting the A m erican advances

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was m arked; b u t the L iberals found themselves in a favourable position for bargaining, and might well feel th at the agreem ent was so satisfactory as to be invaluable fo r the com ing election, an d to offer a p lan k especially needed in view of the Quebec revolt over the naval question.41 W hen the m easure was pre­ sented to the H ouse o f Com m ons the Conservative members w ere in a flurry, believing at first th at their constituents would fully support it. I t w as only afte r the lapse o f some tim e th at the opposition settled dow n to resist the passage o f the bill. In thus dividing on party lines parliam ent followed the action already taken by m ost o f the new spapers.42 But even the early exceptions to the rule of p arty allegiance w ere significant, and as tim e went on they becam e m ore so. T he m anufacturing, financial, and transportation interests, through individuals o r boards o f trade, becam e m ore and m ore vociferous in their opposition. In T o ro n to eighteen prom inent citizens, all Liberals, voiced their opposition, and founded the C anadian N ational League under the leadership of Z. A. Lash. Sim ilar defections from the party ranks were conspicuous in other cities. O ne serious blow to the governm ent was the decision of Clifford Sifton, one o f the ablest o f the L iberal strategists, to throw his w hole weight against reciprocity, and give aid to the opposition in the west, w here it w as m ost needed. W hen the Conservatives had blocked early passage of the bill, L au rier decided to go to the country, and thus precipitated an election w hich was fought alm ost entirely on external policies. T h at the reciprocity agreem ent presented advantages to C anada was show n by the favourable reception th at it first received. But the election was fought not on its term s but on its im plications. Tw o argum ents w ere m ainly used by the Con­ servatives and their Liberal allies in English-speaking Canada. T h e first, w hich brought m uch tangible support to the cam paign, was th at Canada, having failed earlier to secure reciprocity, had built up a national econom y with a heavy investm ent in railways and industries; and that both of these, being based on an eastw est pattern, would be endangered by a sudden flow o f north and south com m erce. T he second argum ent, appealing m ore to the general electorate as a whole, could be described by its opponents as pure flag-waving. A ided by indiscreet talk of annexation in the U nited States, orators pictured C anada as losing not only its connection w ith the em pire but its very national being as well. Borden, in his last shot of the cam paign, appealed on this ground: “I believe th at we are, in tru th , stand­

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ing today a t the parting o f the w ays-----W e m ust decide w hether the spirit of Canadianism o r of continentalism shall prevail on the northern half o f this continent.” T he issue, he said, was above party lines; it was for “the m aintenance o f our com m er­ cial and political freedom , fo r the perm anence o f C anada as an autonom ous nation w ithin the British E m pire.” 13 In the province of Q uebec the L aurier governm ent was opposed by the nationalists on another aspect of external rela­ tions. T h e governm ent’s naval bill accentuated the existing fears o f com m itm ent to “im perial w ars” and led to the form ation of a nationalist p arty in the province w here L au rier had hitherto been safe. H enri Bourassa, a t first mildly supporting reciprocity, finally cam e out against it; not th at he loved protection m ore, b ut the naval bill less. T hus was created th at extraordinary alliance o f the opposition in English C anada, w ith its appeal to the im perial tie, and the opposition in F rench C anada, loudly denouncing all signs of im perialism . Before th at com bination the L iberal governm ent, already beyond its prim e, could m ake no effective stand. A nd with the fall o f th e adm inistration was rejected the first - and perhaps the last - A m erican invitation to a reciprocity agreem ent. A decision, w hether wise or foolish, was thus a t last m ade on one im portant aspect o f external policy. T h e im plications of th a t decision could not as yet be assessed. A ll th at was certain was that reciprocity, in its proposed form , was rejected. But the purely com m ercial aspect o f the issue had becom e m ixed w ith wide political considerations - considera­ tions which in themselves w ere confused and even conflicting. H ad Canadians voted for w hat Borden had nam ed “C anadian­ ism” o r fo r closer im perial integration? T he answer lay in the future.

CH A PTER 9

Effects of External Forces on the Canadian Community

T ransportation and com m unications played an im portant part in the foreign relations of C anada as well as in her domestic econom y. Postal and telegraph facilities form ed links with the outside world, and - because o f the geography o f N orth A m erica - were in part dependent on arrangem ents with the U nited States. Railways and waterways involved that and more, fo r they ignored the international boundary and invited traffic to follow the shortest o r easiest lines. Shortly after confederation C anada began to take stock of her internal waterways. A royal com mission was appointed in 1870 to exam ine existing canals and consider the need for fu rth er construction. T he m ajority report,1 issued in the follow­ ing year, showed the strong influence o f the historic belief in the “n atural” role of the St. Law rence as the outlet for the A m erican middle west. “N ature has intended the St. Law rence,” the com m issioners w rote, “ to be the great com m ercial highway o f the west, and if it has not fulfilled its destiny to the extent it should have done, it is because the enterprise o f m an has endeavoured to divert its trade into other and artificial chan­ nels.” T he E rie C anal and the railways of N ew Y ork State had certainly played havoc w ith n ature’s purposes, for only a small proportion o f the possible traffic passed through the Welland C anal. This fact, the com m issioners stoutly m aintained, could be explained by the inadequate size of the W elland and St. Law rence canals. T heir faith still strong in the prospect of prosperous traffic following im provem ent of canals, the com ­ missioners urged that these should be deepened as soon as possible. F o r the W elland C anal, deepening, new locks, and an entirely new w ork for part of the route w ere com pleted in 1887, giving a depth of fourteen feet. Similar plans for the St. Law ­ rence were draw n up, and were carried to com pletion by stages; the whole being finished by 1903. If A m erican traffic was to be encouraged to pass through C anadian canals, it was also true th at Canadians w anted to m ake use of certain waterways in the

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U nited States. E ven the dogm a o f the great river could not disguise the advantage o f the L ake C ham plain-H udson River ro u te to N ew Y ork. In the absence of any C anadian canal until 1895 C anadian entrance to Lake Superior was dependent on the A m erican canal at Sault Ste. M arie. T he joint high commission a t W ashington m ade provision for the m utual use of waterways, b u t the term s o f the treaty w ere in p art only prom ises of recom m endations to the local authorities, being the C anadian governm ent on the one hand and the particular states concerned on the o ther.2 O n the ratification of the T reaty of W ashington the president asked the governm ents o f the interested states to take steps to carry it into effect. T he governor of N ew Y ork, the state m ost concerned, replied that no legal obstacles existed; b ut in 1874 the Canadian privy council declared that C anadian vessels had been prevented from passing through the Cham plain C anal to the H udson River, although A m erican vessels had been perm itted to go to any destination by w ay o f the Cham bly C anal; and the council asked that the British m inister take up the question at W ashington.3 A long diplom atic exchange fol­ lowed between H am ilton Fish, the secretary of state, and Sir E dw ard T hornton, the British minister, the form er using infor­ m ation from the governm ents o f the states and the latter from th at o f C an ad a.1 F o r a time an anti-clim ax was reached when the C anadian governm ent was unable to quote any cases, but in the sum m er o f 1875 it turned out that the C anadian right to use the C ham plain route was virtually negatived by the decision that a vessel m ust discharge her cargo at the first p o rt of entry, and that to proceed fu rth er would be to carry goods from one port in the U nited States to another. A n escape from this dilem m a lay in the pow er placed in the secretary o f the treasury to designate any ports at which vessels laden with the products of C anada might discharge their cargoes; and in 1876 this was p ut into effect, with the result that C anadian vessels were on a parity w ith A m erican in proceeding as far as A lbany, by way of Plattsburg, Oswego, o r Buffalo. T his com prom ise on the navigation o f the H udson R iver by C anadian ships, carrying goods in bond destined for the po rt of N ew Y ork, was regarded as a concession by the A m erican governm ent, w hich took the view that the H udson was an internal w aterw ay, not expressly opened by the T reaty of W ashington. T he St. L aw rence, on the other hand, was in p art an international river, and for the rest of its course was, by article x xvi o f the treaty, to be open for purposes of com m erce

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to the citizens o f the U nited States. In contrast to the A m erican position, which apparently was to m ake such a concession for the benefit of C anadian rath er than A m erican interests, C an a­ dians were anxious to encourage navigation of the St. Law rence in order to swell the volum e of business a t M ontreal, and thus to attract m ore shipping and low er the freight rates. T o this end they w ere m ore than willing to allow A m erican ships equal rights in the canals - except in the W elland to ships whose cargoes were then to be carried by rail o r w ater to N ew Y ork. T he general objective was entirely consistent w ith an old policy, tow ard which the circum stances o f the m om ent w ere to be bent. In 1882 tolls on the Erie C anal w ere abolished, and two years later the C anadian governm ent attem pted at once to m eet this com petition and to stim ulate the through C anadian route by giving a rebate of 90 per cent on all canal tolls on grain cargoes, w hether C anadian o r A m erican, w hich were carried^ as far as M ontreal and were shipped abroad. W as this discrim ina­ tion? T h e C anadian governm ent, in reply to protests, argued th a t it was discrim ination against U nited States ports, and intentionally so; b u t not against A m erican users o f the w ater­ w ay.0 T h e A m erican position was th at it logically involved discrim ination against A m erican citizens. Tw o visits o f C an a­ dian m inisters to W ashington in 1892 failed to produce a settlem ent, though a num ber o f com prom ises w ere suggested, including a C anadian proposal of w ithdraw al o f the discri­ m inatory tolls on the W elland C anal in exchange for navigation as far as N ew Y ork. T he A m erican officials adopted strong language in description o f the C anadian attitude and imposed tolls on the Sault Ste. M arie C anal as direct retaliation. Finally, in F ebruary 1893, the C anadian governm ent capitulated and changed the system of tolls to one acceptable to the U nited States.6 A p art from a general desire to m aintain friendly relations betw een the two countries, the result of the dispute m ay be explained by the superior bargaining position held by the U nited States. Both the S ault Ste. M arie and the C ham plain canals w ere, at th at tim e, m onopolies which could be opened or closed a t will. M oreover, it was not regarded as o f m ajor advantage to the U nited States to secure C anadian traffic. N o doubt it w ould swell the business o f the po rt o f N ew Y ork, but New Y o rk could in any case draw am ple shipping. T he C anadians, on the other hand, felt it necessary to give support to M ontreal, and in general w ere desirous of attracting traffic to Canadian

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routes in com petition w ith those of the U nited States. T he principle extended to railways as well as waterways. T he G rand T ru n k Railway and the G re at W estern Railway were both designed on the assum ption th at they could obtain a generous share o f the traffic between the A m erican m iddle west and the seaboard. By securing a line to Chicago the G rand T ru n k had a connection w ith A m erican railways and, w ith lines to M ontreal and Portland, was in a position to carry goods in either sum m er o r w inter. A fu rth er indication of the belief th at the cheapest ro u te between A tlantic ports and Chicago lay through C anada was seen in the construction o f the C anada Southern, an A m erican-ow ned railway joining the N ew Y ork C entral and M ichigan C entral, and designed to obviate the loop around the south of L ake Erie. T h e exploitation of w hat w ere conceived to be favourable geographical conditions never brought results on the scale that had been anticipated. T he projects for a railway to the C anadian west gave a new tu rn to the issue. T he G rand T ru n k clung to its conviction th at the logical route lay through the U nited States, by w ay o f Chicago; but the governm ental decision in favour of a line wholly on C anadian soil rendered the G rand T ru n k plan impossible, since it could be realized only w ith the aid of public m oney. T he decision to construct a railway to the Pacific coast by way o f the northern shore o f L ake S uperior m eant th at that railway, com pleted in 1885, had to com pete for traffic with A m erican transcontinental lines, and to protect itself against drainage o f business from its m ain line. T he m ost vulnerable points w ere Sault Ste. M arie, the Red R iver V alley, and the Pacific coast. A t these places w here connections w ith A m erican railways were, o r could be, m ade, a variety o f m easures w ere adopted as defence against com petition.7 H eavy investm ent in the C anadian Pacific and the later transcontinental railways - the C anadian N orthern and the N ational T ranscontinental-G rand T ru n k Pacific - represented a com m itm ent to a policy o f east-and-w est traffic in Canada w hich becam e a p art o f C anadian policy and form ed a leading argum ent in the opposition to reciprocity in 1911. W ith the acceptance o f the general strategy of C anadian railways the dream of the St. Law rence V alley as the m ain route to the centre o f N o rth A m erica faded. Y et m uch reality - and increas­ ing reality - rem ained of railway relations w ith the U nited States. Beginning w ith through rail com m unication between M ontreal and Boston in 1851, a netw ork o f connections between

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C anadian and A m erican railways was gradually built up, realized in p art by junctions at the frontier, and in p art by ow nership or operation of lines across the border. By 1933 there w ere fifty-five rail o r car-ferry crossings along the border, all the way from N ew Brunswick to British Colum bia. In the same year C anadian railways had control o r trackage rights over 7,312 miles o f rail in the U nited States, while A m erican railways had a corresponding mileage of 1,556 in C anada.8 T he eco­ nom ic effects of such an interrelationship w ere far-reaching, enabling the com m erce o f one country to have easy access to th at o f the other. Each railway com pany concerned aim ed, of course, to profit from the connection, and each therefore sought to attract traffic to its own lines. Because they were private com panies, the railways conducted, to som e extent, their own international relations, but were not reluctant to appeal to their respective governm ents against “unfair” com petition. Official negotiations resulted on such questions as freight rates and bonding privileges.9 In the m ovem ent for the im provem ent o f transportation by rail and w ater the chief em phasis was laid on satisfactory access to ocean ports in order to m aintain and develop the foreign trade which was a m ajor interest in Canada. W ith the progress of wheat-grow ing in the prairies, added to the staples for export in the east and centre, th at object becam e o f increasing im portance. T h e possible outlets were the sum m er ports of M ontreal and Quebec, the all-year ports o f Saint John and H alifax, the new port o f V ancouver, or the A m erican ports of N ew England and New Y ork. W hile the C anadians had struggled by diplom acy to secure use o f the H udson River route, and C anadian railways continued to obtain connections w ith A m erican railways across the border, the investm ent in C anadian canals and railways dem anded that both should be fed by ocean shipping at C an a­ dian ports. W ithout that, both the C anadian Pacific and the Intercolonial railways would be meaningless, and the expensive canals w ould lead to a blank end. F rom tim e im m em orial the men of the m aritim e provinces and of Q uebec had built and sailed ships, and had sold them abroad. T he gradual replacem ent of w ooden by iron ships, how ever, was fatal to the C anadian industry at that tim e, for local production o f iron was quite inadequate to supply the new need. T h e highest figure for the C anadian production of wooden ships was reached in 1874, and in a dozen years this was reduced by three-fourths. C anadian foreign trade, therefore, had to be

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carried in ships of foreign m anufacture - though not necessarily of foreign ow nership. O ne o f the most im portant o f modern shipping lines was founded by a native o f H alifax, Samuel C unard; but in 1867 the C unarders ceased to call a t H alifax, since the volum e o f traffic on the N ew Y ork route was so m uch g reater.10 T he C unard Com pany, how ever, retained a C anadian connection by its service to the St. L aw rence ports. A nother shipping line w hich originated in C anada was th at controlled by the A llan brothers o f M ontreal. T he com pany continued to use the St. Law rence route in spite o f the hazards of navigation and the com petition w ith N ew Y ork until increasing difficulties led to its sale to the new ly-form ed C anadian Pacific O cean Steam ­ ships. T he D om inion Line, organized in England in 1870, carried on a sum m er service to M ontreal until 1894 w hen financial difficulties caused the sale of its ships, which, however, continued in service to C anada first under the British and N orth A tlantic Steam N avigation C om pany and then under the W hite Star Line. T he im pending com pletion of the C anadian Pacific Railw ay brought prospects o f a com plete C anadian rou te to the orient, w ith the advantages o f through traffic for the railway and o f general trade for C anada. As a first tem porary m easure the railw ay com pany chartered three steam ships. In the m ean­ tim e negotiations w ere being conducted w ith the imperial governm ent on the project o f a Pacific service supported by a m ail subsidy. W ith the conclusion o f an agreem ent, a ten-year contract was aw arded to the C anadian Pacific in 1889 providing fo r a subsidy o f £ 4 5 ,0 0 0 from the im perial governm ent and £ 1 5 ,0 0 0 from the C anadian governm ent for the carriage of m ail to H ong K ong. T he first th ree E m presses were built in E ngland for the C anadian Pacific. A n im portant trade was thus built up, both betw een E urope and the far east, and in oriental goods - particularly silk and tea - im ported into C anada and the U nited States. T h e sea-going shipping entered and cleared at C anadian ports am ounted to 4,319,321 tons in 1868 and 14,175,121 tons in 1900. T his satisfactory increase was due not only to the initiative of individual com panies, but also to governm ental aid by the im provem ent of navigation and by m oney subsidies. T he chan­ nel in the St. Law rence was repeatedly deepened, to tw enty-tw o feet in 1877, and tw enty-seven and a half feet in 1887. A bout 1900 w ork on a thirty-foot channel was begun. C oncurrently with the im provem ent of the channel better harb o u r facilities were provided at Q uebec and M ontreal. T he need for subsidies

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as an encouragem ent to direct steam ship services to C anadian ports was early seen and constantly acted on. C onsiderable sums were paid to m aintain a line between C anada, the W est Indies, and Brazil; between C anada and F rance; and, in co-operation w ith the British governm ent, to Japan, A ustralia, and South A frica. Subsidies w ere also paid to com panies operating ships between C anadian and British ports, but in this case the steam ­ ship lines were handicapped by A m erican com petition.11 A s a fu rth e r m ethod o f encouraging foreign trade some investigation was m ade in 1910 and the next three years o f the possibility of control of the freight rates o f the ocean steam ship com panies by com m on action of the im perial and dom inion authorities. T here was som e discussion of the question at the im perial conference o f 1911, but w ithout tangible result. In 1913 the C anadian governm ent sent H . L. D rayton, head o f the board o f railway com missioners, to L ondon to discuss the m atter fu rth er, but again no agreem ent was reached.12 T he m ethod o f reaching freight rates by the N orth A tlantic C onference was under some criticism in C anada, and D ray to n ’s report gives the impression th at the charges w ere unduly high. C om m unications, like transportation, played their p art in the external relations o f Canada. T he two are closely connected, for the m ails were dependent on the railway and shipping facilities available. T he com pletion o f the Intercolonial Railw ay and the C anadian Pacific Railw ay m ade it possible fo r the post office to send m ail across C anada, and to connect w ith A tlantic and Pacific ports w ithout being obliged to m ake use of A m erican routes. T h e steady developm ent of ocean shipping at C anadian ports also allowed fo r direct com m unication w ith a growing num ber o f countries, and th at w ith greater speed and regularity. T he com plicated position existing before the establishm ent of the P ostal U nion in 1874 entailed not only high rates o f foreign postage, but varied rates according to the num ber of countries through which a letter passed and w hether o r not bilateral conventions existed. T he situation caused not only expense to concerns engaged in foreign trade b u t also the necessity of arriving at rates fo r alm ost every letter. I t was obviously advantageous, therefore, to secure entrance to th e U nion, but C anada was not adm itted until 1878. U nder the original con­ stitution any one m em ber could veto an application, and it happened th at F ran ce exercised this pow er on account o f a difference w ith G reat Britain over sea rates. T he situation was cleared up by the exertions of the British post office. Reductions

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o f postage rates w ere subsequently m ade both within C anada and fo r foreign letters. T he aspect o f this w hich caused m ost interest was th e project of im perial penny postage. Publicly advocated by an English m em ber o f parliam ent, M r. H enniker H eaton, it was discussed a t the colonial conference of 1887, but n ot adopted. Subsequently the plan was supported by the C ana­ dian governm ent, and cam e into effect in 1898 for the whole em pire w ith the exception o f A ustralia, w hich did not adhere to the arrangem ent until 1911. In 1899 the tw o-cent rate was applied also to letters from C anada to the U nited States.13 C om m unication by telegraph and cable was another subject o f im portance for C anada in its external relations. In respect of telegraphs there is a double interest: the adequacy of the lines fo r the purpose o f com m unication with the U nited States, and indirectly with British and foreign countries; and the connection between C anadian and A m erican com panies. In the years after confederation C anada had a netw ork o f telegraph lines th at joined the m ain cities w ith each other and w ith A m erican lines reaching to the border. T he A m erican com pany, W estern Union, was associated in eastern C anada w ith the M ontreal Telegraph C om pany; and in 1881 W estern U nion acquired lines in N ova Scotia and N ew Brunswick by taking over Jay G ould’s A m eri­ can U nion T elegraph Com pany. T he great N orthw estern T elegraph C om pany, incorporated in 1880, w ith its head office in W innipeg, had E rastus W im an as president. It absorbed the M ontreal C om pany and the D om inion Telegraph C om pany (w hich ow ned the m aritim e provinces’ lines), and thus the A m erican interests o f W estern U nion in C anada were consolidated, although the m ajority stock was held in C anada.14 A cable from N ew foundland to Ireland h ad been successfully laid in the year before confederation by a private com pany, and oth er lines across the A tlantic followed. T o com plete C anada’s cable com m unications w ith the outside w orld it rem ained to establish a Pacific cable. In the discussions of this, as in th at of the im perial penny postage, com m ercial interests were mingled w ith political. T h e initiative in a project fo r an all-British, state-ow ned cable from C anada to A ustralia and New Zealand was taken by S andford Flem ing, and in the score of years from the first proposal to actual construction the pressure for the realization o f the schem e cam e from Canada. W ith the com ing com pletion of the telegraph to the Pacific coast in m ind, F lem ­ ing began to form ulate his plan for the cable, to be the continua­ tion o f th e telegraph line.15 T hrough the early eighties the

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C anadian governm ent, w ith Flem ing’s assistance, collected inform ation w hich they placed before parliam ent. T he Pacific cable was discussed at the colonial conferences o f 1887 and 1897, and by other means in the intervals. N o t a few obstacles w ere raised - the cost, the route, and the claims o f existing com m ercial com panies - but they were all in tim e overcom e, and the Pacific cable was in operation in O ctober 1902. II Before the nineteenth century was out C anada had a system o f transportation th at linked her to the U nited States, Europe, and the far east, and that provided w ater o r rail facilities from one end o f the country to another. T he greater p art o f the railw ay system had been built during days o f depression, b ut in the faith th at better times w ould com e. Private investm ent in the railways, as well as governm ent support by land and money, were a gam ble on the grow th o f the country in the future. W ithout increased population, com m erce, and trade the whole foundation of the structure w ould be gone. T he late eighties and early nineties gave little ground for hope; stagnation was the dom inant feature in C anada as elsewhere. I t was only in the dying days of the century th at confidence and optim ism were rew arded, w hen the business cycle once m ore took an upw ard swing, and Canadians at. least could see the fu tu re w hich they had predicted and on w hich they had staked the present. T he m ines o f British Colum bia and northern O ntario, the forest resources of east and west, the budding m anufactures - all were ready fo r exploitation, and all called for labour. But the chief opening was in agriculture. T he lands o f the prairies w ere ready fo r w orking, but the labourers indeed w ere few. T h e C anadian public and C anadian officials were convinced that they had in the west an asset of incalculable value, not only because of the richness and accessibility o f the land, but because it had a scarcity value now th at the A m erican west was all but fu lly occupied. Im m igrants w ould be welcomed, within limits, in o th er areas and occupations, but the big need was strong farm ers for the virgin soil o f the prairie. In the past C anada had never obtained im m igrants in num bers com parable to her am bitions, and even the addition of such as had com e had been m ore than offset by the drain of people to the U nited States. It has been calculated th at net m igration since confederation showed a loss in every year but one (1873) until 1901.16 The

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inducem ent to m igrate was prim arily econom ic - the hope of people suffering from unsatisfactory conditions o f life in town o r country to better their lot in the new w orld. In som e cases, too, groups in continental E urope w ere led to em igrate because of religious o r political persecution. In the British Isles assist­ ance and encouragem ent had long been given by private persons or organizations to em igrants to C anada and elsewhere. In the early tw entieth century “ about forty societies carried on the w ork o f assisting em igrants, either by providing the passage in whole o r in part, o r in giving advice to intending em igrants, and putting them in touch with friendly societies o r individuals overseas.” 17 T rades unions continued to give some aid to m em ­ bers who wished to em igrate, though to a lesser extent than form erly.18 T he British governm ent in this period took little direct responsibility fo r assisting em igration; but, under various statutes, boards o f guardians, county councils, and borough councils were authorized to render assistance out o f local rates. In general, the efforts of organizations and of the governm ent in the British Isles w ere directed tow ard giving assistance to those w ho were unem ployed or otherw ise suffering from econo­ m ic hardships at hom e. T he C anadian interest in m igration was to secure enough suitable people to help to develop the country, by draw ing them from w herever they could be found. T he Liberal governm ent o f W ilfrid L aurier cam e into office (1896) just as the econom ic horizon brightened. T he vitality of a new governm ent com bined with better conditions to produce a fresh vigour and success in the search for im m igrants. A gents and advertising m atter w ere sent to the U nited K ingdom , the U nited States, and continental E u rope.T he departm ent of im m igration, under the stim ulus of Clifford Sifton, adopted new m ethods and explored new fields.10 T he results o f the cam paign in the U nited States were particularly striking; in 1897 only 9,000 im m igrants cam e from the U nited States, but by 1910 the num ber was over 100,000, and nearly 140,000 in 1913. Since the chief dem and and the. chief opportunity were for farm ers in the prairies, it was open to the governm ent to encourage their settlem ent in two other w ays: by seeing th at an adequate railway system was being provided, and by m aking land available on favourable term s. Even if railway branch lines could never quite keep up to the moving frontier of settlem ent, the C anadian Pacific’s m ain line was rapidly being supplem ented not only by its own branch lines but also by two additional transcontinental railways. In every step o f railway expansion governm ents, both federal and

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provincial, gave aid by w ay of loans, land grants, o r guarantee of bonds.20 A nd because o f its control over the natural resources of the west, the dom inion governm ent was able to organize the system of land grants so as to encourage settlem ent. F rom the first free-hom esteading w as provided for under a series of D om inion L and A cts, w ith conditions th at provided against misuse by speculators, in the attem pt to attract im m igrants. L ands granted to railways in aid o f construction were sold by the com panies, w hich were as anxious to secure the business that would accrue from the presence o f settlers as they w ere to m ake a direct profit out of the land.21 T he railway com panies also played an active p art in the search for im m igrants, carrying on an extensive cam paign abroad with an enthusiasm th at on occasion left them open to accusations o f m isrepresentation. L and com panies and other private organizations also joined in the h u n t for im m igrants, w hether to further their particular interests or in a m ore altruistic spirit of building up the dom inion. T he C anadian Pacific Railw ay followed as active a program m e in securing im m igrants as did the governm ent; and, like the governm ent, encouraged settlem ent by means also of aid to settlers afte r their arrival in the west.22 W hatever the motive might be, the num ber o f im m igrants began to increase in num bers that were pleasing if not all that might be desired. F rom 1884 (during the construction o f the C anadian Pacific Railw ay) the num ber of im m igrants had gone down from a little over 100,000 to a paltry 17,000 in 1896. In 1903 it passed well over the hundred-thousand m ark again; the tw o-hundred thousand m ark was first passed in 1906, and the three-hundred thousand m ark in 1911. T he figure for 1913, o f 400,870, was the all-time high. Even the early tw entieth-century enthusiasm for imm igration did not entirely overshadow the caution o f governm ent and public in the selection of im m igrants. T he balance between quantity and quality was not always easy to adjust, and there were disagreem ents on the desirability of certain types of im m igrants. T he obvious objections were generally entertained tow ard physical disabilities, paupers, and non-white races. T he first choice would be of fam ilies from G re at Britain o r the U nited States w ho w ould go on the land. T hese sources, how­ ever, were too lim ited for C anadian needs, and the governm ent then turned to the continent of Europe. Investigation revealed that few im m igrants could be secured from G erm any, France, Belgium, or th e Scandinavian countries, but th at there were

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possibilities in A ustria-H ungary and Russia of which Sifton had hopes.23 T he several im m igration acts and orders-in-council in the fifteen years before the w ar w ere aimed at encouraging the grow th o f rural, and discouraging th at o f urban, population; this purpose arising in p art from the already existing drift from co untry to town. T he acts also provided regulations intended to keep o ut those w ho w ould becom e a charge on the country, or races w hich could n o t be assim ilated. Between 1902 and 1912 some 60,000 persons were rejected at the ports o r frontier, and 5,629 persons were deported. T he general policy, then, w as to build up the rural popula­ tion, by im m igration, w ithout departing too fa r from the existing ethnic basis o f F rench and English. T he largest group of im m i­ grants was British, consisting o f agriculturists to western C anada and artisans to the cities o f the east. T he latter were em ployed particularly in the heavy industries th at were rapidly developing in the period - for exam ple, in and around M ontreal. A n effect o f this on the province o f Q uebec was to accentuate a difference th at already existed in some degree between the two races - that th e F rench w ere m ore often ru ral dwellers and the British urban. But no great problem of assim ilation to the C an a­ dian population as a whole was created, rath er one of adjustm ent to new conditions.24 A m ong those who w ent to the west w ere to be found agricultural labourers from large English farm s, and th e sons o f yeom an farm ers, of better education and imbued w ith som e spirit of adventure.25 F o r the m ost p art these English farm er-im m igrants were interspersed w ith other farm ers, but one attem pt, m ade in 1903, to form a w holly British colony at Lloydm inster, Saskatchew an, was an interesting but unsuccess­ ful experim ent. T he colony w as not only British in personnel, b ut intended to be so in social structure; the m em bers o f the colony were inexperienced in agriculture, and had little but m isfortune until the population of the district becam e m ore m ixed.26 O ther experim ents in the transplanting o f groups from E urope to settle together in the prairies offered greater problem s o f assimilation, though they som etim es ended in a greater eco­ nom ic success. One o f the m ost interesting examples was th at of the U krainians, who left Russia partly because of political oppression, and partly because o f econom ic hardships and lack o f land. T hey w ere ru ral people, and settled in blocks in all three provinces. “E ach settlem ent,” w rote an observer, “ is a little U kraine in w hich anything o f a foreign n ature rarely intervenes

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to m ar the even tenor of their w ays.”27 W hile the children learnt English, the adult m em bers of the families spoke U krainian. T hey brought w ith them their own culture and their own reli­ gion, the G reek Catholic C hurch. Some o f their art, m usic, and literatu re tended to be overshadow ed by th at w hich already existed in C anada, and a rich heritage w as in danger o f being lost. T o the attem pts m ade in the public schools to plunge their children into the C anadian m elting-pot the U krainians offered resistance, and a wise m easure of toleration allowed a place for the U krainian language. As in the case o f m any settlem ents of im m igrants, the U krainians encountered econom ic difficulties, usually arising out o f unproductive land. T hey w orked on railw ay-construction o r on older farm s, how ever, and w ere able to m aintain them ­ selves, even if on a low standard. F o r C anada such problem as was created by the com ing o f the U krainians was not econom ic but cultural. U p to a point they enriched, by variety, the C an a­ dian culture, b u t som e conform ity was necessary. T h at is to say, if foreign and unassim ilated groups w ere m ultiplied, a time would com e when the p attern would becom e so confused that national entity would be weakened. T h e D oukhobors, w ho settled in southern Saskatchew an, were a m uch sm aller group, but, because of their peculiar beliefs, can be regarded as a foreign influence rem arkable in degree if not in size. T he D oukhobors w ere an unorthodox religious sect w ho w ere persecuted in Russia because of their pacifist beliefs which forbade their doing the com pulsory mili­ tary service. C om ing to C anada, first in 1899, they established a num ber of colonies organized on a com m unal basis. Som e of them , indeed, broke away from com m unism and m aintained private property, but with the m ajority difficulties w ere m et in their first refusal to accept land grants as individuals o r to pay taxes fo r roads. In deference to their beliefs, they w ere accorded exem ption from m ilitary service. T hey proved to be a sober and industrious people, but, in the view of one w ho assisted the first m igration, they got “ drunk on theories and on superstitions.”28 A m inority am ong them was difficult to assimilate. T he m ost rem arkable dem onstration o f their em otional religion w as a pilgrim age across country in 1902, after discarding their pos­ sessions and finally their clothes. Such activities could only be frow ned on by m ajority opinion, and be handled as tactfully as possible by governm ent officials. Such freakish behaviour con­ tributed little to C anada; but it w as foreign only in the sense that

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these families cam e from abroad. T hey created no particularly Russian influence or connection.29 A nother, and a calm er, group of Russians were the M ennonites. T he first m em bers of this reli­ gious group to com e to C anada arrived from Pennsylvania after the A m erican revolution. F rom 1874 on several thousand m ore cam e direct from Russia, settling first in M anitoba and later fu rth er west. A s a m inority o f D utch extraction in Russia they form ed in that country separate colonies as they were to do in C anada after their em igration. T hey were influenced in leaving Russia because o f a policy o f assim ilation there, and it might therefore be supposed th at they w ould seek equally to m aintain themselves as distinct groups in Canada. T heir needs, however, were n ot extrem e: religious freedom , exem ption from m ilitary service, and some use of their own language (w hich was G er­ m a n ).30 O f the com paratively large G erm an and Scandinavian elem ents in the population, a portion cam e from the U nited States, while m any o f the G erm ans in eastern C anada had been there fo r generations. It was generally found that both these racial groups w ere good settlers not only in the sense o f their being industrious, b ut in that they readily fitted in w ith C anadian institutions and custom s. A n exam ination o f the M agyar settlers in Saskatchew an showed th a t by origin they w ere farm la­ bourers, and had naturally taken to the land in C anada. By inquiry from fifty-five fam ilies it appeared th at at least thirty took M agyar periodicals.31 O riental im m igration created a problem quite different from that arising o u t o f the presence in C anada of any other foreign group. T he colour difference in itself was regarded by many Canadians as objectionable, and added to th at were the differ­ ences in standards of living. T he difficulty was greatly accentu­ ated by the fact th at m ost of the orientals settled in one province, British Colum bia. O riental im m igrants cam e from three co u n ­ tries: C hina, Jap an , and India. Each o f these countries had a different relationship politically to Canada. India w as a p art of the British E m pire; with Jap an G reat B ritain had first com m er­ cial and later political treaties; C hina alone was not in a position to w arrant special consideration. The first orientals to arrive in any num ber were Chinese from the U nited States, attracted to British Colum bia by the gold rush of 1858, and am ounting to som e 2,000 in I8 60.32 F u rth e r im m igrants then cam e directly from China, to a num ber sufficient to provoke an inquiry by parliam ent in 1879. C ontractors on the C anadian Pacific Rail­ w ay construction provided w ork for fu rth er Chinese, and as

184 - A H IS T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

m any as 15,000 were estim ated to have entered British Colum bia betw een 1881 and 1884. Because of a ban on em igration from Japan before the revolutionary changes o f 1867 Japanese were later in com ing to Canada. T here were perhaps 1,000 in C anada in 1896. T he census of 1901 shows 4,738 and that o f 1911, 9,067. Im m igrants from India did not start to com e until 1905, and the only large num bers of entries w ere in 1907 (2,124) and 1908 (2 ,6 2 3 ). T he presence of orientals becam e a m ain issue in British Colum bia. T he objections w ere, principally, on two grounds. T he orientals, it was said, could not be assim ilated - nor was it desirable th at they should be. Mixed m arriages w ere held to be o ut of the question, and there were not even ordinary social relations between the races. W hether it was in town o r country, the orientals lived in groups, and lived, it was alleged, under unsanitary conditions th at w ere a m enace to the com m unity. T h e second objection was th at the orientals, w ho w ere virtually all uneducated labourers, deprived white people o f w ork because they were prepared to accept low er wages. This had the effect either of keeping white men unem ployed o r of lowering the whole wage scale. F rom th e m ines the orientals moved to rail­ way construction, and, w hen that w as finished, to fisheries, agriculture, dom estic w ork, and various other callings. In each o f the occupations in turn, it was said, w hite men were dispossessed. T h e provincial legislature and the British Colum bia mem bers o f parliam ent struggled for years to secure exclusion. T he legis­ lature continually attem pted to solve the problem by direct action, but its m easures w ere disallowed by the federal govern­ m ent as beyond provincial powers. T he federal governm ent and parliam ent did, however, take a num ber of steps. M ore than one commission o f inquiry was sent to the coast to investigate, and volum inous reports w ere m ade. V arious m eans were also adopted to restrict im m igration. In 1885 a head tax o f $50 was im posed on every Chinese im m igrant, and in 1900 the tax was doubled. Still the dam was not high enough to stop the flood of entries, and in 1904 the tax was raised as high as $500. T h at too failed in its purpose, and indeed it was interpreted as having the opposite effect by raising wages in a protected labour m arket, and so making it possible for new com ers to earn the tax in a short period.33 Sim ilar action could hardly be taken in respect of the Japanese because of political relations between their country and G reat B ritain. T here was, how ever, the sam e cause for steps o f som e kind to be taken, for the im m igration of Japanese was

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 185

fast increasing, and their rate of natural increase was higher. T h e solution was found not by exclusion, but by a “gentlem an’s agreem ent” o f 1907 with the Japanese governm ent by which passports were to be restricted, and the flow of labourers stopped. In order to discuss Indian im m igration with the British authorities, M r. M ackenzie King was sent to L ondon in 1908. H e found a sym pathetic hearing and a recognition that, on account of clim ate, m anners, and custom s, C anada was not a suitable place in which Indians might live. T he governm ent of In d ia agreed to inform its subjects as to the conditions of C an ­ ada; steam ship com panies w ere warned not to use misleading literature; and the Indian E m igration A ct m ade em igration of contract labour unlaw ful except to those countries which made provisions satisfactory to the governm ent of India. T he C ana­ dian governm ent, on its part, by orders-in-council, imposed as a condition that em igrants should be possessed of $200 and should pass by continuous voyage from their country of origin. Indian im m igration, as a result of these obstacles, dwindled to almost nil.34 T h e fears felt in British Colum bia were, by these various m easures, partly appeased; but the problem o f unassimilable races, threatening econom ic pressure on the w hite population, by no means wholly disappeared. T he population o f C anada, w hich was constantly recruited by im m igration, was equally constantly dim inished by em igra­ tion. T h e door to the U nited States was, in those years, wide open, and thousands of m en and women passed through it every year to seek opportunities o f em ploym ent. A portion of these had only paused in C anada on their way from E urope and can­ not be regarded as C anadians. O thers were native-born or long resident, with C anadian background and ties; and their depar­ ture changed the balance o f races rem aining in Canada, and planted an increasing elem ent in the U nited States. A n agent appointed by the C anadian governm ent to investigate the num ­ ber of Canadians in the U nited States concluded that in 1873 there were 800,000 C anadian-born residents there. A bout half o f these were F rench, and half o f these again were in New E ngland.35 M any o f the Canadians w ent to the expanding Am erican west, especially before the C anadian Pacific Railway opened a route to western Canada. A broad distinction m ay be draw n between the English- and French-speaking C anadian em igrants to the U nited States in that the form er m ixed as individuals with the rest of the popula­

186 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

tion, while the latter tended to form separate colonies and seek to avoid assim ilation. T he em igration o f French C anadians, which had caused alarm as early as the forties, reached larger proportions after the Civil W ar and rem ained considerable until about 1890, w hen it dim inished. It was in large part a m ovem ent o f farm ers to unskilled w ork in the factories o f New England, w here they, and their wives and children, were welcomed as em ployees by the m anagem ents o f expanding industries requir­ ing dependable w orkers at low wages. T he motive of em igration, then, was econom ic, and seems to have been unm ixed with any political or other discontent. T he men w ent simply to seek profitable em ploym ent, w ithout any of the bitterness of the emigre. A ccustom ed to the com m unity life of Quebec, and with little o r no know ledge of English, they early began to form small groups of their own. Separate F rench quarters - outposts of Q uebec - grew up in the factory towns. T he m igrants were not infrequently resented by the English-speaking w orkers, in som ething of the sam e spirit that Canadians resented the coming of Chinese o r other cheap foreign labour. T h eir going was no less regretted at home. Cries o f distress continued to rise in C anada at the loss of thousands after thousands. T he drain of people was regretted because it was held to im pede the econom ic developm ent of C anada, to w eaken the French-C anadian group, and to detach so m any from the church. Efforts at repatriation w ere m ade, and in 1875 the Q uebec legislature voted $50,000 fo r that purpose, p art of which was spent on agents to N ew England. T he results, how ever, were m eagre, and received little support am ongst the spokesm en of the em igres themselves.30 If they could not be induced to return, it rem ained only to encour­ age the m aintenance o f cultural links w ith a people w ho were voluntarily retaining m any of their native traits. T here m ight even result positive advantages. C ette depopulation en masse [wrote H am on] est sans doute une catamite pour le Canada. II eu t etc bien preferable de garder ces h om m es au pays, ou ils auraient fondes des fam ilies de colons attaches au sol. M ais, d'autre part, elle a perm is a la race frangaise et catholique de jeter de profondes racines dans les E tats de I'Est, et qui sait le role q u ’elle peut etre appelee a jouer dans I’avenir?37 H ad not the F rench long since learned the technique of m aintaining their own national characteristics in face of an English governm ent and population in C anada? T he cases were not dissimilar. T he binding forces were, in the m ain, three:

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 187

language, religion, and education; and all three were interde­ pendent. N ew England already had a large R om an Catholic elem ent, but it was Irish. T he im m igrants were handicapped by ignorance of English and fitted with difficulty into the custom s of the Irish parishes. M oreover, to do so would be to lose their entity, and this neither they nor their com patriots in Quebec would willingly see happen. A few F rench priests were estab­ lished in N ew E ngland before 1870, and after that date it becam e the rule. By 1890 eighty-six separate F rench Rom an C atholic parishes had been established, m ost of w hich were served by French priests.:!8 In 1911 there w ere said to be 202 parishes and 101 missions.30 W ith the churches w ent convents and parish schools. T he stress on separate education was the sam e as in Quebec, and w here local conditions m ade it neces­ sary fo r children to attend public schools the defenders of nationalism saw the defeat o f their aims. “L ’ecole publiaue,” w rote one, “est le tom beau de la race frangaise aux EtatsU nis.”40 In 1890 there were fifty convents in N ew England, and these, w ith the parish schools, were educating 30,000 children. T o H am on the education of girls in convents was all-im portant because it was the w om en that m aintained the F rench language. L e convent canadien-frangais sera done avec I’eglise, la citadelle puissante qui gardera a ux em igres leur religion et leur langue. La se form eront les jeunes filles qui devenues plus tard des m eres de fam ille, parleront le frangais au fo y e r dom estique et la fero n t parler a leurs enfants.41 N ew spapers, m any o f them short-lived, w ere founded in various N ew England centres to m aintain the language and corporate feeling of the F rench Canadians in the U nited States. A nother force intended to m aintain their entity lay in the F rench and C atholic societies, united in 1901 under the nam e of 1’Union Saint-Jean B aptiste d ’A m erique. A lready there had been a n um ber o f conventions of the local societies; and in 1874 they were invited to M ontreal to m eet w ith the society there, and sim ilarly in 1880 to Quebec.42 O rganized resistance to assim ilation, and conscious effort to m aintain nationality, were not found am ong the English C ana­ dians w ho m igrated to the U nited States. T he absence of a language difference, and the sim ilarity o f race w ith at least the predom inant part of the A m erican population, m ade it easy for English C anadians to fit into A m erican society. T hey were, m oreover, m ore of the business and professional classes than were the French-C anadian em igrants. In m any cases they

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m aintained links w ith C anada through friends and relations, or in some cases by sending their children back to school. T here w ere m any and frequent expressions o f regret at the constant drain of educated m en from English C anada, but no m issionary effort such as m arked the parallel relations in Quebec. In the early tw entieth century im m igration becam e larger than em igration until the net gain in the peak year (1913) reached 217,914 - slightly m ore than half of the total num ber of im m igrants. T he effects of this shifting of population on the character of the C anadian people cannot be defined w ith any accuracy, but some approach m ay be m ade to a study through the census returns. Since it is impossible to know w hat p ro p o r­ tion of the new com ers passed on shortly to the U nited States, an analysis of im m igrants has a limited value. A m ore fruitful m ethod will be an exam ination o f the population in the country, as show n in the census years. O ne series o f categories is by place o f birth. In 1881 the total population was 4,324,810. O f these approxim ately 86 p er cent were born in C anada, 11 per cent in the British Isles and British possessions, 0.9 per cent in Europe, none in Asia, and 1.7 per cent in the U nited States. T he total population in 1901 was 5,371,315. A large proportion - 86.9 per cent - was C anadian-born; only 7.8 per cent born in the British Isles and possessions; 2.3 per cent in E urope; 0.4 per cent in Asia; and 2.4 per cent in the U nited States. T en years later the population had grow n to 7,206,643. T he C anadianborn w ere proportionately sm aller - 77.9 per cent; 11.5 per cent were born in the British Isles and possessions, 5.6 per cent in Europe, 0.6 per cent in A sia, and 4.2 p er cent in the U nited States. T he population may also be divided by racial origins. (The census o f 1891 did not include this category.) F o r the years covered, im m igrants from the U nited States are not listed separately, as racial origin refers to origin before com ing to this cpntinent. In the lists th at follow only the larger groups are shown, and Indians and Eskim os are om itted.43 RACIAL ORIGIN tiacla

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian Asiatic

1881 4 ,3 2 4 ,8 1 0 2 ,5 4 8 ,5 1 4

1901 5 ,3 7 1 ,3 1 5 3 ,0 6 3 ,1 9 5

1 ,2 9 8 ,9 2 9 2 5 4 ,3 1 9 5 ,2 2 3

1 ,6 4 9 ,3 7 1 3 1 0 ,5 0 1 3 1 ,0 4 2

1911 7 ,2 0 6 ,6 4 3 3 ,9 9 9 ,0 8 1 2 ,0 6 1 ,7 1 9 4 0 3 ,4 1 7 1 1 2 ,6 8 2

4 ,3 8 3

5 ,4 8 5 2 3 ,7 2 1

6 4 ,3 1 5 4 3 ,2 1 3

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 189 RACIAL ORIGIN

P rince E dw ard Isla n d

1881

1 901

1911

1 0 8 ,8 9 1 9 5 ,9 1 6 1 0 ,7 5 1

1 0 3 ,2 5 9 8 7 ,8 8 3 1 3 ,8 6 6

8 8 ,6 1 5 7 9 ,2 6 6 1 3 ,1 2 4

N o v a Scotia

4 4 0 ,5 7 2

British French Germ an

3 4 2 ,2 3 8 4 1 ,2 1 9 4 0 ,0 6 5

4 5 9 ,5 7 4 3 5 9 ,0 6 4 4 5 ,1 6 1 4 1 ,0 2 0

4 9 2 ,3 3 8 3 8 0 ,2 0 5 5 1 ,9 1 9 3 8 ,8 9 4

N e w B ru n sw ick

3 2 1 ,2 3 3 2 4 5 ,9 7 4

3 3 1 ,1 2 0 2 3 7 ,5 2 4

2 3 8 ,1 6 0

5 6 ,6 3 5

7 9 ,9 7 9

9 8 ,7 9 5

1 ,3 5 9 ,0 2 7 2 6 0 ,5 3 8 1 ,0 7 3 ,8 2 0 7

1 ,6 4 8 ,8 9 8 2 9 0 ,1 6 9

2 ,0 0 5 ,7 7 6

1 ,9 2 6 ,9 2 2 1 ,5 4 9 ,1 6 0 1 0 3 ,0 0 4

2 ,1 8 2 ,9 4 7 1 ,6 3 2 ,1 4 4 1 5 8 ,6 7 1

2 ,5 2 7 ,2 9 2 1 ,9 7 0 ,9 8 0 2 0 3 ,6 6 8

1 8 8 ,4 1 4

2 0 3 ,3 1 9

1 9 3 ,6 1 3

6 2 ,2 6 0

2 5 5 ,2 1 1 1 6 4 ,2 3 9 1 6 ,0 2 1

4 6 1 ,3 9 4 2 7 6 ,2 5 9

British French

British French Q uebec

British French Asiatic O ntario

British French German M a n itoba

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian

3 7 ,1 5 5 9 ,6 8 8 8 ,6 3 2 952

Saskatchew an

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian A lb e rta

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian British C olum bia

British French Germ an Scandinavian Asiatic

4 9 ,4 5 9 1 4 ,6 6 0 916 858 236 4 ,3 5 0

1 ,3 2 2 ,1 1 5 1 ,6 0 0

3 5 1 ,8 8 9

3 1 8 ,7 9 9 1 ,6 0 6 ,5 3 5 2 ,3 4 3

2 7 ,2 6 5 1 1 ,9 2 4 3 ,8 9 4

3 1 ,2 9 3 3 4 ,9 7 9 1 7 ,6 4 4 3 1 ,0 5 3

9 1 ,2 7 9 4 0 ,0 9 4 2 ,6 3 4 1 1 ,7 4 3 1,4 5 2 1 ,0 9 4

4 9 2 ,4 3 2 2 6 9 ,5 1 3 2 5 ,4 9 7 7 1 ,0 0 3 3 5 ,1 5 7 2 2 ,2 7 6

7 3 ,0 2 2 3 4 ,9 0 3 4 ,5 1 1 7 ,8 3 6 3 ,9 4 0 634

3 7 4 ,2 9 5 2 1 5 ,1 7 4 2 0 ,6 0 0 4 1 ,6 5 6 2 9 ,5 4 7 1 7 ,5 8 4

1 7 8 ,6 5 7 1 0 6 ,4 0 3 4 ,6 0 0 5 ,7 0 7 4 ,8 8 0 1 9 ,5 2 4

3 9 2 ,4 8 0 2 6 6 ,2 9 5 9 ,3 4 1 1 2 ,7 2 6 1 6 ,0 8 7 3 0 ,8 6 4

190 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

A s in the case o f the racial character of the population im­ m ediately after confederation, the later censuses m ust not be taken at their face value to represent the attachm ents of the population. It is true th at the percentage o f those of British origin dim inished from 60.55 in 1871 to 54.07 in 1911, and that this decrease represented an increasing proportion of Europeans. B ut it is not clear that the change was reflected in changing views on external affairs. M oreover, if the racial com position is exam ined in detail, it will be apparent th at the eastern provinces w ere hardly touched. P rince E dw ard Island retained about the sam e proportion of British and French. N ova Scotia, too, was little affected; and the G erm an elem ent there represented an early im m igration. N ew Brunswick shows a larger percentage of people o f F rench origin who had moved from Q uebec into the n o rth ern p art of the province. T he only notable item in the figures fo r Q uebec is the appearance of Japanese and Chinese, b u t it was not of great significance. O ntario retained its old racial characteristics. In the w est there w ere m ore m ixture and m ore diversity, as was inevitable from its place as the object of im m igration. It can probably be assum ed, too, th at the E uropean groups there were of recent origin. T here m ight, therefore, be a distinction betw een the early G erm an im m igrants o f N ova Scotia and O ntario and the m uch later groups in the prairie provinces. T he m ost controversial issue arose out of the growing num bers of Japanese and Chinese in British Colum bia. In the period between 1871 and 1914 the population of C an ad a was basically British and French, those two together m aking up from 80 to 90 p er cent of the total. T he French, how ever, were F rench C anadian, less influenced by contem ­ porary external influences than any other group of Canadians. T hey had, of course, cultural elem ents w hich grew out o f their original m other country, and w hich to som e extent w ere fed by cu rren t F rench thought. But in respect o f political ideas it m ust be app arent th at they w ere the m ost native of C anadians. T he ranks of the British Canadians, on the other hand, w ere con­ stantly recruited by new com ers from the British Isles and from the U nited States. Those who cam e from the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States brought social and political ideas which they could relate, w ithout undue distortion, to C anadian condi­ tions. T hey readily obtained English o r A m erican periodicals, w hich had always form ed one source of C anadian thinking. T he position of E uropean im m igrants was very different. In some instances they w ere em igres representing a dissatisfied m inority,

E F F E C T S OF E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 191

in others they cam e from purely econom ic motives. T here is no indication o f any serious attem pt to introduce Russian, G erm an, o r Scandinavian institutions, but there was a tendency to cling to an old religion, language, or way of life. Such elements added v ariety - sometim es desirable and sometim es not - but never sufficient to change m aterially the character of C anada. T he British and French basis rem ained the dom inating force, and neither the institutions nor the external policy o f the dom inion appears to have been seriously modified by a growing diversity of peoples. Ill Enthusiasm fo r increased im m igration was vociferous and real, b ut not shared by all classes of the C anadian population. W hile governm ents, railway com panies, land com panies, and em ployers painted a bright picture o f a futu re C anada filled with energetic producers, the w age-earning class looked w ith some distrust on the whole idea. T he im m igrants w ere, and were bound to be, predom inantly o f the w orking class; and it was a question w hether their com ing did not endanger the level of wages and even o f em ploym ent. Led by those of British Colum ­ bia, the C anadian labour organizations repeatedly took a stand against the adm ission o f Chinese, Japanese, or E ast Indian im m igrants, w hose standard o f living enabled them to accept low er wages and thus imperil the position o f the w hite w orker. E ven o f selected im m igration there w as som e doubt, and at tim es opposition to it. D enials were m ade o f the frequent state­ m ents that C anada had alm ost unlim ited openings for immi­ grants. T he annual report to the T rades and L abor Congress of C anada in 1906 expressed a not untypical point of view: “T he few er our people and the g reater ou r w ealth, the m ore ideal will be the existing conditions. W e have no need of cheap peoples, they arc an aspiration of the get-rich-quick m an w ho desires to pile up a few extra thousands o r hundreds o f thousands of dol­ lars at the expense o f the fu tu re of C anada.” 14 T he least opposi­ tion was to agricultural w orkers going to the west, w here there was an evident need of labour. T h e various labour organizations w hich took a continued interest in this aspect of external policy w ere, in their origin and character, m aterially affected by other influences from outside C anada; such influences being carried either by im m igrants or im ported books and periodicals. T he early C anadian trade

192 - A H IS T O R Y O F CA N A D IA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

unions were based principally on English examples, and British influence continued to play a part. A fter confederation, how­ ever, A m erican m ovem ents cam e to be the stronger, and even the predom inant, forces affecting labour organization in Canada. W ith th eir legal status established under an act o f 1872 (35 V iet., c. 3 0 ), w hich was alm ost a verbal copy o f the British act o f the previous year, C anadian unions were m ore free to develop, and indeed show ed a rapid growth in an age o f indus­ trial expansion.45 Individual unions had, even before this, be­ com e affiliated w ith parallel bodies in the U nited States. In the seventies and eighties C anadian labour followed British and A m erican precedents by the linking together o f local unions into larg er bodies o f various sizes and types. T he K nights of Labor, which had a m ushroom grow th in the U nited States, fo r a tim e m et w ith a w elcom e in C anada. T he rival and successor, the A m erican F ederation of L abor, had a m ore lasting connection w ith C anadian organizations. T he Industrial W orkers o f the W orld first obtained adherents in the C anadian w est in 1906, and by 1911 claim ed 10,000 followers. A fter conducting a strike on the G rand T ru n k Pacific Railway in 1912, its num bers w ere cut in half. In 1913 it w as vigorously denounced by the C anadian F ederation of L abour as “attem pting to overthrow the present form s o f society by creating a state o f industrial anarchy,” and its radicalism prevented a wide support in C anada. T he agents o f the I.W .W ., together with delegates of m ore m oderate organizations, foreign groups in the cities, and visiting socialists w ere not infrequently labelled as “foreign agitators.” W hile the m ain trend was tow ard international unions form ed by the junction of C anadian and A m erican units in various trades, there was, am ongst C anadian labour organiza­ tions, a contrary opinion w hich believed in national rath er than international organizations. O ne m ain split began in 1902 with a secession from the T rades and L abor Congress. T he latter continued in the faith of international unions and confined its m em bership to those organizations which had A m erican affilia­ tions. T he seceding groups form ed w hat was first know n as the N ational T rades and L abour Congress, and later renam ed the C anadian F ederation of L abour. T he Federation, always the sm aller body, sought to be national and to include all C anadian unions. T h at position, how ever, it never attained, finding its strength, a t different periods, in Quebec, O ntario, o r the m ari­ tim e provinces. T h e T rades and L abor Congress, while holding

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 193

to the principle o f international affiliation, aimed at being the representative organization of C anadian trade unions. Obstacles were found in Q uebec w ith the rise of the C atholic and anti­ international unions; in British Colum bia, where the unions tended to follow their own course, with or w ithout international connections; and in N ova Scotia. In the last the Provincial W orkm en’s A ssociation shared the views of the F ederation and eventually becam e affiliated with it. T he W orkm en’s Association not only com peted with the Congress, but in 1908 found its field directly invaded by the U nited M ine W orkers, an international, and previously a w estern organization.40 Both the N ova Scotia union and the com pany concerned (T he D om inion Coal C om ­ p an y ) resisted the efforts o f the invaders to enlist the employees in an international union. T he U nited M ine W orkers called a strike in 1909, one which was accom panied by violence, and w hich broadened out into a general issue between national and international unionism . F o r the time being the invaders were repulsed w ith heavy financial losses, though such a decision proved to be the exception rather than the rule for international unionism in C anada as a whole. In the m any argum ents arising out of the dispute in N ova Scotia it was pointed out th at the “international” unions belied their nam e, since they had no affiliations with E uropean trade unions. T here w ere, of course, good reasons for the strong influence o f the U nited States: geographical contiguity and sim ilarity of conditions. T here seems to have been in C anada no im portant body o f opinion which sought affiliation with British labour unions; and there is no indication of m ore than a distant interest in the first and second Internationals in Europe. In 1906 M r. Ram say M acdonald visited C anada, looking for “ an u nder­ standing w ith the labour parties o f the colonies so that there may be harm ony and co-operation between ourselves and them ,” but any co-operation that resulted was only of a general kind.47 T here were, how ever, external forces affecting C anadian labour oth er than those com ing from the U nited States. T he plans and policies o f labour organizations in A ustralia, N ew Zealand, G reat Britain, and Europe w ere studied w ith some care, w ith a view to their lessons for C anada. Two them es were of particular interest: political action and socialist doctrines. M anifestly any labour m ovem ent m ust aim at legislation as one means of achieving its objectives. T he difference of opinion in the C anadian labour organizations was on w hether or not they should intervene directly in politics by creating labour

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parties in the provinces o r the dom inion. British and foreign examples could be cited on either side o f the argum ent. F o r som e years sporadic attem pts w ere m ade to further the desired legislation by running candidates for the various legislatures. In 1873 and 1874 the O ttaw a T rades Council secured the election of labour candidates to the O ntario House. In 1883, 1886, and 1894 the T oronto T rades Council attem pted, unsuc­ cessfully, to elect candidates to either the federal o r the provincial parliam ent. T he Provincial W orkm en’s Association m ade several attem pts in the eighties and nineties to elect candidates to the N ova Scotian Assembly, but w ith little success. T h e British Colum bia labour organizations w ere m ost interested in political action, and in 1902 form ed a Provincial Progressive P arty . T h e question also was frequently discussed by the C anadian organizations as a whole. T he T rades and L abor Congress, at its annual convention in 1894, adopted a general resolution in favour of direct political action, but w ith little result. T h e annual meeting in 1906 was the occasion for serious consideration o f the organization o f a labour party, the sup­ porters o f such a move being encouraged by the success of the L abour party in England and the statem ent o f the president of the A m erican F ederation o f L abor in favour of political action. A gain a general resolution was passed endorsing the sending of representatives o f labour to federal and provincial parliam ents, and again the fruits were small. O n the w hole the C anadian labour organizations steered a middle course between the British em phasis on parliam entary action and the A m erican tendency to m inim ize th at m ethod. T h e various socialist program m es o f G re at Britain, Europe, the U nited States, A ustralia, and N ew Z ealand w ere known in C anada and m et w ith some acceptance. In January 1905 the Socialist P arty of C anada was founded by Scottish and English adherents, together with some m em bers from the U nited States and E uropean countries. Its organization was planned to be provincial with a dom inion executive com m ittee, but its strength continued to be, as it started, in British Colum bia, and the proposed national convention was never held. T he principles of the party were strictly M arxian. T he em phasis was on pro p a­ ganda by lectures and pam phlets, and though the party had m em bers in the provincial legislature, political activity was never its m ain m ethod. T he Social D em ocratic Party, including m em bers who left the Socialist P arty, was founded at T oronto in 1910. Based on British and G erm an models, it continued to

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be centred in T o ro n to as the older body was in the west. A n attem p t to com m it the T rades and L abor Congress to political socialism by a m otion in favour o f “absolute independent politi­ cal action on the p art of the w orking class w ith the collective ow nership of the m eans of life as its ultim ate aim ” was voted down at a m eeting in 1907.48 Socialists from abroad - Britain, the U nited States, and E urope - toured the country from time to tim e. M ay D ay parades - som e o f w hich were prohibited w ere organized in M ontreal, T oronto, and other cities. O n the whole, however, socialism did not find wide support, though it was em braced by various small groups. A m ongst the farm ers of C anada two foreign organizations had fo r a time a considerable success. T he Patrons o f H us­ bandry, o r the G range, was founded in W ashington in 1867, and spread rapidly in the next few years. It was a fraternal society, organized in units, o r granges, and aimed at collective action to cure such farm ers’ ills as high railw ay rates, undue profit by m iddlem en, heavy taxes, and high interest rates on loans. Canadian farm ers w ith sim ilar worries became interested in the idea and granges began to be set up in Q uebec and O ntario from 1872.49 T he order was incorporated in C anada as the “D om inion G range of the Patrons of H usbandry,” and while it had a separate C anadian existence its principles were taken from those o f its A m erican parent. M em bership grew rapidly until it reached its zenith in 1879 with an estim ated 31,000 m em bers. O ntario was the centre of the m ovem ent; it had some success in Q uebec and the m aritim e provinces but alm ost none in the west. T he activities o f the G range included collective purchasing, a co-operative salt m anufacturing com pany, a trust and loan society, and a projected bank. W hile the G range had som e influence on legislation, it did not attem pt to organize a political party. A nother farm ers’ order im ported from the U nited States, the Patrons of Industry of N o rth A m erica, had som ew hat sim ilar organization and objectives, but followed a different course. T he Patrons o f Industry, incorporated in C anada in 1890, found strong support in the west. U nlike the G range, too, it entered the political field, but there m et with disaster in the federal election o f 1896. F o u r m em bers in the H ouse of Com m ons did not constitute a party.

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IV T h e econom ic grow th o f C anada from the late nineties depended partly on the im provem ent in general w orld condi­ tions; and to a large extent on the provision of adequate and costly modes of transportation, together w ith increase o f popu­ lation. T he financing o f all this developm ent, both in the actual expense of railways and the industrial and agricultural advance in w hich the new population was to be em ployed, assured in tu rn a sound internal financial structure w ith a supply of foreign capital. T he political union of the provinces opened the w ay for the utilization of w hat credit was available w ithin the dom inion, and provided a m ore favourable field for the foreign investor. T h e financial institutions of the dom inion, as of the old prov­ inces, were m odelled on those of G reat Britain and the U nited States; and as in the case o f so m any other of its institutions, C anada had to decide on w hether the practice of its m other country or of its neighbour was the m ore satisfactory to follow. T h e banks of all the provinces had, before confederation, dif­ fered little from those o f the U nited K ingdom : there were, however, som e steps taken by the Province of C anada to introduce the “ free banking” adopted by the U nited States. The act o f 1850 (13 and 14 V iet., c. 21) was little used, but there rem ained some body of opinion which preferred the American system o f a large num ber of local banks to the British system of few banks with num erous branches. By the British N orth A m erica Act of 1867 exclusive jurisdiction over banking was given to the federal parliam ent, and in its early sessions there w as discussion over the regulation of banks and currency. T he first decision reached by the governm ent was to organize C ana­ dian banks on the A m erican plan. T he m inister of finance, John Rose, prepared a series of resolutions to this end, and had the extra-parliam entary support o f E. H. King, general m anager of the Bank of M ontreal. R esolutions w ere introduced into the H ouse of C om m ons, but the opposition proved to be so form id­ able that they w ere w ithdraw n. T he two chief sponsors also left the field: M r. K ing died and M r. Rose resigned, to be succeeded by Sir Francis H incks, w ho returned to the orthodox principles of British banking. A cts of 1870 were replaced in the following year by the first general Bank A ct, to apply to all banks, and to rem ain in operation for ten years. T he system of branch-banking w as retained, and the proposal to base bank notes on dom inion securities deposited w ith the receiver-general was rejected. In

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the decennial revisions of the Bank A ct som e signs o f the old A m erican heresy again appeared, but never becam e effective. D ecision on the type o f currency to be used had already been m ade before confederation. In all the provinces the decimal system had been introduced, first as optional and finally as com pulsory. It rem ained only for the dom inion parliam ent to assim ilate the currency o f O ntario, Quebec, and New Brunswick. In spite of some opposition the currency o f N ova Scotia was, In in 1871, m ade uniform with th a t of the rest of C anada contrast to the decision on the type o f banking, no principle, o th er than th at o f convenience, was involved in the retention of the dollar currency, and only sentim ental glances were cast back to the old regim e. I f the currency was N o rth A m erican, the m oney used to build railways and prom ote industry was largely British in origin. G re at Britain was, as she had long been, an exporter o f capital o n a large scale, and the C anadian provinces had in years past been m aterially benefited by this fact. In the early tw entieth century the flow to C anada rapidly increased O f a total foreign investm ent in C anada in 1900 of som e thirty m illions of dollars, a third was British. In subsequent years, as the total investm ent increased, the British proportion was higher. In 1905 the total first passed one hundred million dollars, o f which about 70 per cent was British. T he external investm ent in C anada for the years 1900-1913 has been calculated as follows:

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B ritish: $1,753,118,000 A m erican: 629,794,000 O ther countries: 162,715,000 T otal: $2,545,627,000 A fu rth er stim ulant to C anadian econom ic life was in the establishm ent o f English o r foreign industries in Canada. To some extent this had long been the case: the H udson’s Bay C om pany, fo r exam ple, had played, and continued to play, an im portant p art in Canada, and the G rand T ru n k Railway was largely an English com pany. A m erican interests, too, had pene­ trated to C anada as early as the first half o f the nineteenth century; began to take an im portant place after 1870; and expanded m ore rapidly at the end of the century A voidance o f the tariff was a leading m otive in this m ovem ent; securing of raw m aterial - especially wood products and m etals - was another; transportation costs and adaptability to the m arket also played som e part.

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L abour, capital, and industry from abroad together consti­ tuted a large facto r in C anadian econom ic life. In som e cases there were com plaints that foreign w orkers and foreign indus­ tries dispossessed C anadian w orkers or com panies, but on the w hole they added to a general growth far m ore than they dis­ placed native people and enterprises. If to these there be added foreign trade it is apparent th at the C anadian econom y was largely dependent on external contributions and relationships.

C H A P T E R 10

The Conduct of High Policy: Subjects and Methods

T h e im portance and variety of the external relations o f C ana­ da, increasing from year to year, threw a growing burden on the m achinery o f governm ent, and led to an exam ination of the adequacy of th at m achinery. T hough modelled in general on the British constitution, the C anadian system o f governm ent in ­ cluded two im portant characteristics n o t to be found in th at of the m other country. W hen the union of 1867 was form ed it was decided that a federation rath er than a legislative union was best adapted to the conditions of the country, and subjects having any direct bearing on external affairs w ere assigned to the central authority. N o exception was taken to G eorge Brow n’s statem ent in the debate on the Quebec Resolution th at “for all dealings w ith the Im perial G overnm ent and foreign countries we have clothed the G eneral G overnm ent w ith the m ost am ple pow ers and fo r purposes o f external affairs C anada was virtually a unitary state. T he other leading difference between the constitu­ tions of G reat Britain and C anada - that the latter was n o t a sovereign state —h ad a m ore serious effect on external relations. W ithin the limits o f dom inion powers, the parliam ent at O ttaw a m ight exercise in respect o f external relations the sam e suprem e authority as did the parliam ent at W estm inster. It was a funda­ m ental principle o f the English system that parliam ent should retain, in every branch of public affairs, the right not only to form ulate policy, but also to hold such check as it m ight wish on the m inisters and civil servants concerned. I t has, however, been long recognized that parliam entary control is less easily exercised in foreign than in dom estic affairs: not because the subject is m ore technical, but simply because it is foreign. Except in tim es of crisis, the electors (and therefore the m em bers of parliam ent) are less interested in, and often ill-inform ed on, foreign relations. Inform ation m ay be w ithheld because of the necessity for at least some degree of secrecy in the conduct of diplom acy. U nder the British constitution, and those w hich stem from it, the elected body discusses publicly such aspects of

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foreign policy as treaties and other engagem ents to an extent unknow n under o th er systems o f governm ent, and at tim es to the em barrassm ent o f the diplom ats. On the other hand a study o f the foreign relations o f a dem ocracy will also reveal th at the diplom ats may, and sometim es do, conduct conversations with foreign representatives which, w ithout creating a binding com ­ m itm ent, go fa r tow ard an agreem ent just as real in practice. Exam ples of both types o f cases m ay be taken from recent English history. W hen negotiations for an A nglo-G erm an alliance w ere under w ay at the end of the nineteenth century, the G erm an governm ent saw, as an obstacle to the com pletion o f a treaty, th at it would either be m ade public by discussion in parliam ent, or, if it was not subm itted to parliam ent, would have less value. A n exam ple of lack o f parliam entary sanction is found in the relations built up by the diplom ats of F rance and England between 1904 and 1914, the full im plications of which w ere said not to have been know n even to the whole cabinet. W ith all its draw backs, it has been accepted that parliam en­ tary control of foreign policy is essential to dem ocratic govern­ m ent. T h at principle was autom atically accepted in C anada from the time o f confederation, and in later years becam e a veritable dogm a. In the C anadian, as in the English, parliam ent the subject of foreign relations m ight be introduced by m eans of a statem ent by a m inister o f the crown, by question and answer, by resolution, o r by debate on a convention o r treaty. F rom the very origin o f the C anadian parliam ent the pages of the debates o f the Senate and H ouse o f C om m ons are well larded with discussion o f a t least some aspects of external relations. The largest proportion o f space is taken by com m ercial questions, especially actual o r proposed tariff agreem ents. Reciprocity with the U nited States and the use o f C anadian fisheries would probably come first in length, followed by the various aspects of im perial relations. T he use of C anadian and A m erican inland waterways received the attention o f parliam ent from tim e to tim e, as did the few boundary disputes o f the period. Political relations cam e up m ore often indirectly than directly, as at the tim e o f the joint high com mission at W ashington in 1871 or in relation to im perial defence. Participation in the Boer W ar m ight well be regarded as a direct political question, but it is notew orthy th at the C anadian parliam ent had nothing to do w ith the decisions th at led to the outbreak of th at w ar o r to its conclusion. In political, far m ore than in com m ercial, questions it is ap parent th at the lim itations o f C anadian autonom y re­

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stricted the area and degree not only o f the actual conduct of foreign relations but also o f the policy by which it was governed. T he escape from these lim itations was a many-sided question, w hich will be exam ined later G iven the geographical position, the stress on internal developm ent, and the incom plete autonom y of C anada, it may not be an inaccurate generalization to say that p arliam ent displayed a reasonable know ledge of, and interest in, foreign affairs. W hen the tariff was being considered members w ould present a form idable array of statistics. But they did not stop at factual m aterial. N either H ouse was afraid to exam ine the very fundam entals o f the external relations of C anada: independence, closer or looser political connection w ith the U nited States - all these found advocates, and all were debated with a disarm ing frankness. These were the very bases on which all other external policy o f C anada was predicated, correspond­ ing, fo r example, to the question raised in England as to w hether isolation or alliances w ould be the w iser course. W hile the C anadian parliam ent thus continued on its way, doubts arose as to w hether th at p art o f the civil service w hich dealt with external relations was well designed. T h e old system, untouched for forty years after confedera­ tion, was that external relations were conducted by various m em bers of the cabinet and civil service, according to the subject, w ithout any departm ent or division o f a departm ent having p articular responsibility, and w ithout any recognition o f a need for continuous attention o r expert knowledge. The m ethod o f conducting m atters w ith other British countries or w ith foreign countries falls into two aspects. T he governor general in C anada and the colonial office in E ngland norm ally constituted the sole channel o f com m unication. T h e colonial office might, depending on the subject in question, refer to the adm iralty, w ar office, foreign office, o r other departm ent, and a fu rth er link was added w hen the foreign office referred to an em­ bassy abroad. A reply to a dispatch from O ttaw a might, there­ fore, represent the com pletion o f a process already having passed through several stages. T here w ere, how ever, in practice m odi­ fications to this cum brous m achinery. Com m ercial negotiations w ith foreign states cam e to be direct in all but form , and the C anadians associated in them corresponded directly w ith the prim e minister. O n occasions, as in the proposal for tariff discussions in 1910, the British am bassador in W ashington com m unicated directly w ith the governor general. T he link between the governor general and the C anadian governm ent was

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usually the privy council, and sometimes, on less im portant m atters, an individual minister. A n incom ing dispatch ordinarily w ent from the governor general to the privy council, by \vhi h body it was assigned to the departm ent m ost concerned in the subject. In due course the m inister at the head of the departm ent reported back to the council, the report becam e the basis of a m inute, and the m inute of a reply to the original dispatch. T he sam e process w ould operate fo r a correspondence initiated in Canada. F o r m any years the only criticism was levelled against the portion o f the m achinery first described, th at is o f the com ­ m unication through governor general and colonial office. It seemed at times hardly short of absurd th at correspondence between the C anadian and A m erican governm ents should go by way of London, and objections also w ere m ade to the process of negotiations on trade m atters with E uropean governm ents. But, as modifications were m ade which allowed C anadians virtually to negotiate com m ercial treaties, and as direct com ­ m unications with W ashington becam e m ore com m on, that criticism becam e less noticeable. M oreover, it was fully realized that a radical change in the procedure would m aterially alter the delicate balance o f im perial relations. T he question then was raised - rather late, it is true - as to w hether the purely C an a­ dian p art o f the m achinery was adequate for the purpose. Two facts stared an investigator in the face; now here could there be found com plete files covering even single cases in external affairs - f a r less the full record of the external relations of the dom inion with any particular country, or during any particular period; and secondly, th at there w ere no persons in the civil service specially trained in foreign affairs, o r even enabled to specialize in that field. A practical proposal to end this situation, anom al­ ous in a country which was no longer a colony and which had im portant external relations, was m ade in 1907 to the royal com m ission on the civil service by Joseph Pope, under-secretary o f state. Pope advised that a departm ent, or sub-departm ent, of external affairs be set up, w ith its own staff, and with such files as it could collect from the various places to which they had found their way. W hile the report of the royal com mission m ade only a passing and partial recom m endation following Pope’s m em orandum , the original proposal was adopted by the governm ent some two years later. In 1909 C harles M urphy, secretary of state, moved a resolu­ tion in the H ouse o f C om m ons that a departm ent of external

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affairs be set up, presided over by the secretary o f state, and w ith a deputy head and the necessary clerks In draw ing up the plan the governm ent had the advantage o f the recent precedent in A ustralia, w here a departm ent with a sim ilar nam e had been created. In both cases there was to be not a foreign office, as found in every sovereign state, but an office to handle both intra-im perial and foreign relations. T he reasons for this are obvious: not only was it questionable w hether there w ould be enough business fo r two departm ents; but - the m ore com ­ pelling reason - the two could not be separated, inasm uch as foreign relations w ere conducted through the colonial office. In other w ords, foreign and im perial relations were, to some extent, the same. Early in the debate, and again later, governm ent spokesm en m ade it clear that no change was intended except in the purely C anadian organization, and no contrary opinion was expressed in the H ouse o f Com m ons. T he debate was brief and unimpressive. Speakers on the governm ent side pointed to the growing volum e o f business in external affairs and argued the advantages of a separate organization. O pposition speakers were listless, and had little m ore to say than that things could go on as they were, w ithout additional cost. T he debate was in striking contrast to those on imperial relations o r tariff questions. It is app aren t that parliam ent had no appreciation of the fact that external affairs required expert adm inistration just as did dom es­ tic affairs. A nd in some quarters it was to be long before this fallacy died. T he act and 9 Edw . V II, c. 13) passed with little discussion or change. T he point was m ade, outside parlia­ m ent, that the phrase, “ the secretary of state, as head of the departm ent, shall have conduct of all official com m unications between the governm ent of C anada and the governm ent of any oth er country in connection with the external affairs o f C anada . . . was not an accurate description o f the situation; and that, in view of the continuing role of the governor general, “care” should.be used instead of “conduct.” T he substitution, however, was not m ade, and apparently no practical difficulty arose. T he im po rtan t change in the act was m ade in 1912 when the prim e m inister was m ade secretary o f state for external affairs, an arrangem ent suggested when the original act was drafted, but n o t adopted at th at time. T h e m achinery in force before the W ar o f 1914 was therefore sim ilar to that used in the U nited K ingdom , both on the parliam entary and adm inistrative sides, but lim ited in its powers. T h e parliam ent o f C anada retained a control over external

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affairs in so far as it wished and dom inion autonom y allowed. A portfolio of external affairs, though not held by a separate m inister, carried that subject into the inner councils o f govern­ m ent. O n the adm inistrative side appointm ents w ere m ade but the developm ent of the departm ent in size was slow. Even by the end of the w ar there was only one officer included in the delegation to the peace conference. T he C anadian m achinery fo r the conduct o f foreign affairs differed from the British in th at the form er was not only very sm all, b u t lacked diplom atic missions abroad, w ith all the flow o f inform ation th at they involve. II G enerally speaking, official relations between the C anadian and other governm ents w ere m aintained through British chan­ nels. T here w ere, how ever, m odifications to this rule, im portant enough to justify a separate analysis. T here w ere no perm anent diplom atic agents stationed in O ttaw a, nor w ere there C anadian agents abroad. In several cases C anadians were appointed as ad hoc plenipotentiaries, being, at least in form , representatives o f the British governm ent. In m ost instances appointm ents were m ade for the purpose of negotiation and signature of trade treaties, the relative place of the C anadian plenipotentiaries and their U nited K ingdom associates changing from tim e to time. In one im portant case, how ever, th at o f the W ashington joint com mission o f 1871, the subjects under discussion w ere m ore political than com m ercial. T hough certain disadvantages existed in this indirect diplom acy, they were partly rem oved in practice; and C anada actually negotiated her own trade agreem ents with the aid of the experience and prestige o f the British governm ent. It was through the frequent negotiations with foreign govern­ m ents, chiefly on tariff questions, fisheries, and the use of inland w aters, that C anadians played their m ost active and m ost direct p art in diplom acy. T here w ere also, how ever, a num ber of officials and bodies which w ere m ore perm anent, and were in som e way related to the conduct of diplom acy. Representatives o f C anada abroad w ere alm ost all non-diplom atic. Im m igration agents in various countries were confined to their own subject. A fter confederation m ost o f the provinces continued to appoint agents-general in L ondon, as they had done before; but such officers could not in any way be described as diplom atic, having to do only w ith im m igration and com m erce. T he office o f high

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com m issioner, described in a previous chapter, was in a different category A lthough the C anadian governm ent had originally proposed that its representative in L ondon should be diplom atic o r quasi-diplom atic, constitutional objections had prevented th at status being granted. Even after the departm ent o f external affairs was established the high com m issioner continued to correspond with the under-secretary of state. A large proportion o f the tim e of the high com m issioners was occupied in prom ot­ ing the financial, com m ercial, and im m igration interests of the dom inion, but they could be used for political questions as occasion arose, and w ere usually appointed as C anadian pleni­ potentiaries for the negotiation o f treaties. N o consular appointm ents w ere m ade; Canadians, like other British subjects, being able to avail themselves of the services of the consular representatives o f the im perial governm ent T here w ere, however, a num ber of foreign consuls in C anada, and their position had som e significance as the only representatives o f their countries in the dom inion. T he first rep o rt of the d ep art­ m ent o f external affairs contains a list o f consuls and consular agents in 1910, show ing th at thirty-tw o states had such rep re­ sentatives in C anada. In m ost cases there were several officers, stationed at different C anadian cities T hough the list does not m ake any such distinction, it is probable th at the m ajority of the representatives w ere perm anent residents, and th at only the consuls-general o r senior consuls were de carriere. M ost o f the head offices w ere either at O ttaw a o r M ontreal. T he procedure regulating the appointm ent o f consuls was as follows: a consular officer holding a com mission from the head o f the state required an exequatur, w hich was issued by the British governm ent. In the case o f those resident in C anada, the C anadian governm ent was consulted as to w hether the appointm ent was free from objection. In the case o f those sent specially to C anada, th at is, consuls de carriere, the appointm ent was m ade w ithout consul­ tation. F o r those consular officers appointed by a governm ent o r a superior consular officer a form al recognition, instead of an exequatur, w as granted by the British governm ent, after con­ sultation w ith th at o f C anada. T em porary appointm ents m ight be accepted by the governm ent o f C anada, pending reference to the British governm ent T h e C anadian governm ent was consulted as to the establishm ent of new consulates, and on occasion it took the initiative in suggesting th at approaches should be m ade to th at end. It was, how ever, the status rath er th an the m ethod of appointm ent o f consuls th at entailed ques­

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tions o f principle. A fter confederation, as before it, the general rule o f the British governm ent was that consuls w ere simply foreign residents. Special courtesies m ight well be extended to them, b ut none such as to entail change of status. They w ere not, for exam ple, granted their request to have private entry to the governor general’s D raw ing Room , for this was a privilege conferred on diplom ats. F rom tim e to time one or m ore o f the consuls protested th at they did in fact occupy a position not analogous to that of consuls in sovereign states, but w ere doing diplom atic w ork that would otherw ise be handled by embassies. F o r some years attem pts by the consuls to act as diplom ats were quashed. In 1876, for example, the D anish consul was discouraged from acting as an interm ediary in discussions over m utual rights o f D anish and C anadian ships in the coasting trade. A gain in 1881 Sir John M acdonald gracefully intim ated to the F rench consul that the latter’s views on trade negotiations w ere fo r the ear o f His M ajesty’s governm ent. In later years, however, principles w ere tacitly ignored to allow fo r the convenience o f utilizing a representative o f a foreign pow er resident in the dom inion. In w hat were a t first described as “inform al negotiations,” the C anadian govern­ m ent discussed w ith the G erm an consul-general the tariff quarrel between the two countries, and in 1910 the m inister o f finance and the consul reached an agreem ent for a settle­ m ent In the sam e year the m inister signed an agreem ent w ith th e Italian consul on tariff concessions T he Japanese consul-general took p art in the negotiations arising o u t of the im m igration o f Japanese, the V ancouver riots, and the relation of C anada to the A nglo-Japanese treaty of 1911.10 The contrast between the form al status of consuls and the role they actually played was, therefore, m arked. A nsw ering a question in the H ouse o f C om m ons as to the refusal o f consuls to attend the D raw ing Room , L aurier rem arked th at “ the question . . . is an im p ortant one, not perhaps so m uch on account o f the draw ing room as on account of the duties which consuls general now discharge in Canada. W e have no diplom atic service in C anada, and the consuls general are exercising by tolerance some, I shall not say diplom atic powers, but powers very often cognate to such. T he question is one w hich should be settled, and the m atter is now engaging the attention o f the govern­ m ent In the following session the position of consuls again cam e up in the H ouse, and on that occasion L aurier w ent fu rth er th an he had before. T he position of consuls in C anada, he said,

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like the status o f Canada, could hardly be defined. A lthough L au rier had “often taken the view that we are now a nation,” it was tru e th a t “we cannot have under present conditions diplom atic agents am ongst us other than the consular agents w ho are entrusted by their governm ents w ith com m ercial func­ tions. . . . By the force o f things these consuls general have becom e w ith us sem i-diplom atic agents, and m any of the consuls have really perform ed diplom atic duties.” Citing the cases of G erm an , Italian, and A m erican consuls as exercising diplom atic functions, L aurier adm itted th at “all this has been done w ithout authority, and is contrary to the rules th at apply am ong civilized nations.” T he position, he w ent on, should be regularized. “I th ink we should have an understanding w ith the im perial governm ent th at the consuls should have sem i-diplom atic recog­ nition am ongst us Looking back a t a practice w ith w hich he had been fam iliar, Sir R obert Borden concluded th at it had been “ both convenient and advantageous,” and cited a case during his ow n period of office: th at in 1913, when he had negotiated with the consul-general of Jap an over C anada’s adhesion to the A nglo-Japanese treaty o f 1911.13 L aurier’s suggestion that the practice be regularized was never taken up, probably because the W ar o f 1914 brought C anada nearer to participation in the m ore conventional diplom atic procedure. O ut o f the appointm ent of officers abroad who w ere to prom ote C anadian trade grew the practice o f utilizing these m en fo r functions w hich w ere properly consular. T he first step, in the nineties, was to nom inate businessmen in the British Isles and the W est Indies as “com m ercial agents” under the super­ vision o f the m inister of finance, with the object of receiving inform ation from the localities on the possibilities o f trade, and o f supplying inform ation to com m ercial firms there. W hen the departm ent o f trade and com m erce w as set up in 1892 the agents reported to it, but still gave only part-tim e services. In 1895 the first full-tim e com m ercial agent was appointed at Sydney, A ustralia, and subsequently others were sent to various cities. In 1907 th e nam e was changed to “ C anadian trade com m issioners.” T he prim ary duty o f the com m issioners was to fu rth er the foreign trade of C anada, but as a m atter o f conveni­ ence they cam e to vise docum ents and handle im m igration m atters. But, while they incidentally did consular w ork, they could not be called in any sense diplom atic. In all designs, projected o r adopted, o f m achinery for the conduct of C anadian foreign relations, two im m utable facts of

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C an ad a’s position - her proxim ity to the U nited States and her m em bership in the British E m pire - inevitably played an im­ p o rtan t part. T he form er led to exceptions in procedure and the creation o f a special organization. T he im perial aspect of C an ad a’s position produced a m uch m ore com plicated them e. A s has already been pointed out, the relations of C anada with foreign states w ere carried on to a considerable extent through British officials. A s the dom inion developed in internal strength an d national consciousness, differences o f opinion arose as to th e relative parts th a t should be taken by im perial and C anadian officers, and m odifications w ere m ade from tim e to tim e. But th at sam e grow th o f C anada also brought up an issue, with far w ider im plications and m uch less easily resolved. If this form er group o f detached colonies had becom e a single country with great resources and territory, if dependent status was steadily giving way to increasing autonom y; if C anada was, m o re and m ore, to determ ine and conduct her own foreign policy - was then that policy to be distinct from those o f other parts of the em pire? Such a com plete break w ould generally have been regarded as undesirable and im practicable. But if there was to be a single policy o r an integration of separate policies, by w hat m eans could either be accom plished? In the U nited K ingdom there w ere a com plete m echanism , expert personnel, and a long tradition fo r the carrying out of foreign policy. In C anada and the other dom inions none of the three was to be found. In the U nited K ingdom a realization o f growing foreign pressure on the w idespread em pire and even on the island itself was leading to a desire for support from those parts of the em pire w hich had grown to m anhood. T he dom inions, for their part, saw the problem in the light of their various circum stances. W hile there were as m any approaches to the question as there w ere solutions offered for it, there could hardly be disagreem ent on the leading place taken by defence and foreign policy. The two were, to a considerable extent, interdependent, and any m ajor plan for the one w ould also involve the other. In other respects, how ever, defence was a specialized subject, and will therefore be m ore fully treated in the following chapter. T urning now to foreign policy in general, it is apparent, as M r. D uncan H all points out, that com m on interests can be prom oted only by a single authority o r by co-operation betw een governm ents. In subdivision of the alternatives he finds th at the com m on author­ ity could be th at of the British governm ent o r of an imperial federal parliam ent; and th at co-operation between governm ents

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could be through interm ediaries (corresponding to diplom ats), o r in direct meetings. All fo u r m ethods w ere advocated, can­ vassed, and opposed; and three were in p art adopted T h e idea o f an im perial parliam ent m ade up of representa­ tives from all self-governing p arts of the em pire had the m ost obvious advantages and disadvantages; and m any designs for such a body w ere put forw ard from time to tim e T he general plan would provide fo r a parliam ent meeting in L ondon, having control over m atters o f com m on interest, o f which the m ost obvious w ere foreign policy, defence, and som e am ount of taxation. A n im perial cabinet, responsible to this parliam ent, w ould also be required. It being a federal constitution, each com ponent p art - including the U nited K ingdom —w ould retain its governm ental system for local affairs. T hrough the im perial m achinery a single foreign policy could be evolved and carried out, supported by the whole em pire. T he defence effort could be distributed and integrated, w ith all the advantages o f a single strategy and com m and. H aving a voice in the determ ination of policy, no p art o f the em pire would be com m itted to action - in peace o r w ar - w ithout its wish. T he w hole argum ent was, to some degree, built on the success o f federalism in single countries, particularly in the U n ited States and C anada. T he parallel, how ever, was n o t exact. It would be a union o f parts so divided geographically th at attendance a t a com m on parliam ent would offer difficulties. F urtherm ore, the federated countries would be so unequally represented - because o f the w ide differences in population - th at the U nited K ingdom m ust be the dom inant p artn er. Federalism was not an objective spon­ sored by G reat B ritain and opposed by the colonies. In both it found support, and in both severe criticism. M any people in the U nited K ingdom feared th at their freedom of action w ould be restricted, w ithout com pensating additions o f strength. W hile the dom inions were far from being in agreem ent w ith each other, the effective C anadian opinion was th at federation would spell the loss o f autonom y. A n acute com m on danger m ight conceivably have overridden these objections, but no such overw helm ing factor was felt to be present. D uring the W ar of 1914 th at outside pressure, so effective in the confederation of C an ad a itself, was heavily applied, and an im perial federation was then once m ore discussed. D irect co-operation on m atters o f com m on interest between the governm ents of the em pire was realized in som e degree through the meetings of the colonial (o r later, im perial) con­

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ference. Beginning as conversations betw een the colonial secre­ ta ry and m em bers o f the colonial cabinets, the conferences evolved into m ore organized and m ore authoritative discussions betw een prim e m inisters. W hile personal m eetings and ex­ changes of views w ere undoubtedly helpful, there was a lack of continuity and of provision fo r im plem enting decisions by legislative o r executive action. T he conference rem ained a body w ith no continuous life and its m em bers w ere helpless to do m ore than report back to their respective cabinets and legisla­ tures. T he conference o f 1897 passed a resolution in favour of periodic m eetings and that o f 1902 voted m ore definitely for conferences every four years. N either of these steps involved any essential change in the character o f the conference, but that question cam e up in concrete form at the meetings in 1907. In 1905 A lfred L yttleton, the colonial secretary, suggested in a dispatch to the various British governm ents that the title “colonial conference” should be changed to “ imperial council,” and th at a com mission o r secretariat should be added to give continuity. C anada, alone of the dom inions, objected to the proposals, L au rier’s governm ent seeing the thin end o f the wedge o f an im perial constitution, com m itm ents, and curtail­ m ent o f autonom y. T he proposal was w ithdraw n before the conference o f 1907, but the idea was discussed and it became app aren t that there was no support for any radical change in the conference. In the end a resolution was adopted, nam ing the conference “ im perial,” and m aking it clear th at the discussions w ere betw een governm ents. T he resolution also attem pted to bridge the four-year gap betw een conferences by advocating a secretariat and by allowing for subsidiary conferences on press­ ing o r m inor m atters, to be attended only by those governm ents im m ediately interested. B oth proposals bore fruit. T he secre­ tariat was provided through a reorganization within the colonial office, and the first subsidiary conference was held in 1909 on m ilitary and naval defence. O nce again, in 1911, a proposal for change was m ade, Sir Joseph W ard putting before the conference a plan for an im perial parliam ent, prim arily for defence, and also fo r some aspects of foreign policy and taxation. Even less than the tentative idea of a council did this m eet w ith any support, and the im perial conference rem ained as one between governm ents, w ith no legislative o r executive authority. R eturning now to the fo u r alternatives m entioned above, it is app aren t th at federation was unacceptable, and th at direct co-operation betw een governm ents was realized in som e degree

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through the im perial conference. In direct co-operation of governm ents, by m eans of interm ediaries, m ade little progress before 1914, since the only existing office w hich could have been utilized w ith respect to the relations o f C anada, and the U nited K ingdom was that of high com m issioner, an office which had rem ained non-diplom atic. T here rem ained only the British governm ent as a com m on authority in foreign relations. In certain fields - fiscal policy and relations w ith the U nited States - C anada kept the reins within her own hands. But in spite of adhesion to the doctrine of no com m itm ents - or perhaps because of it - it was left to the British governm ent to shape a foreign policy tow ard E urope that was technically not th at o f the dom inions but in practice charted the course which they were to follow. Relations w ith the U nited States, as with G reat Britain, were o f such prim ary im portance as to suggest special governm ental m achinery. D iplom atic procedure, as has been m entioned, fre­ quently departed from the strictly British channels to becom e m ore direct. In addition to this undefined m ethod was a special body, the International Joint Com m ission, created to deal with b oundary w aters on the long frontier between C anada and the U nited States T he com mission had characteristics which gave it special significance: it was perm anent, had judicial aspects, was purely C anadian and A m erican, and, while devoted to a special aspect o f international relations, capable of extension to other fields. T he origin of the idea o f a body to deal with b oundary w aters is to be found in the International Irrigation Congress, which met a t A lbuquerque, N ew M exico, in 1895. In addition to certain states of the union, C anada and M exico were also represented. A t the instigation of the delegates of the last two countries the congress passed a resolution inviting the U nited States to appoint an international commission to act with the governm ents of C anada and M exico in “ adjudicating the conflicting rights which have arisen.” In 1896 the British am bas­ sador in W ashington conveyed to the secretary of state the desire of the C anadian governm ent to co-operate in the proposed plan, but found no readiness for im m ediate action. It was not until 1902 that the A m erican governm ent appointed its three com missioners, and the C anadian governm ent then further delayed until 1905. T h e International W aterw ays Com mission was an experi­ m ent, and a fruitful one. Division o f w aters for irrigation and, increasingly, for electric pow er inevitably brought controversies

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and the need fo r agreem ent. O ver such rivers as the St. M ary and the Milk, rising in M ontana, and the N iagara the discussion had already begun when the first com mission cam e into being. Its duties w ere to investigate and to m ake reports - with recom m endations if required - to both governm ents. Such lim ited powers proved to be inadequate, and in the course of its reports the com mission proposed that its powers be extended o r a new com m ission established. E xploration and negotiation o f a treaty to im plem ent the suggestion w ent on over the course o f three years. M any m en had a hand in the process. O f the im perial representatives Bryce in W ashington and G rey in O ttaw a encouraged and facilitated the progress of the study. F o r the two governm ents im m ediately concerned, R oot, Laurier, and A ylesw orth w ere the m inisters m ost closely associated with the w ork. T he detailed negotiations, how ever, were shouldered by no one of these but by their appointees - G eorge C. G ibbons and G eorge Clinton, respectively C anadian and A m erican representatives on the old W aterw ays Com mission - who also m ade the first drafts of the treaty, w hich were then ham m ered into shape by G ibbons and C handler A nderson, the chief counsel for the state departm ent. N egotiations occupied a long period and were n ot w ithout difficulties. M r. R oot, with thoughts o f states’ rights and the Senate, at first resisted the C anadian proposal for a treaty which should lay dow n definite principles and give extensive pow ers to the com mission. His alternative plan was for a loose arrangem ent, w ith each problem to be considered afresh as it arose. T o Sir W ilfrid L aurier, on the o th er hand, such a com mission was not w orth creating. W hen R o o t finally gave way some fu rth er trouble developed by the insistence of the Senate in m aking am endm ents, and L aurier seems to have becom e suspicious of their im port and to have lost any enthusiasm he m ay earlier have had. T h e process o f negotiations, so largely direct between C ana­ dians and A m ericans, foreshadow ed an essential characteristic o f the new com mission. T he Boundary W aters T reaty o f 1909 was on its face a treaty betw een G reat Britain and the U nited States, but its purpose was the creation o f the International Jo in t Com m ission on w hich G reat Britain had no representa­ tives. By no one was Britain’s exclusion thought to be oth er than a benefit to her. T he active p art she had earlier played in Canadian-A m erican disputes had been necessary at a tim e when C anada had reason to fear m ilitary aggression, but it visited upon her both additional disputes w ith a great pow er w ith w hich she

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wished to be at peace and the criticism of the Canadians dissatisfied w ith the results obtained. It was hoped now th at purely N o rth A m erican questions w ould be settled m ore readily by the sim pler m ethod of bilateral agreem ent, uncom plicated either by A nglo-A m erican relations as such o r by intra-im perial questions. T he treaty, after defining boundary w aters, and laying dow n rules for com m on use o f them, provided for an Inter­ national Joint Com m ission to consist o f three com missioners on the p art of the U nited States, appointed by the president, and three on the p art o f the U nited K ingdom , appointed by the king on the advice of the governor in council. Equal representation from each country raised the question as to w hether the com ­ mission w ould divide on national lines and the unfortunate parallel of the A laska Boundary Com m ission could be cited as evidence for such a fear. It proved, how ever, to be the case th at m ost o f the decisions were unanim ous; and the only division on national lines was on a point o f procedure. T he pow ers o f the com m ission w ere quasi-judicial, executive, arbitral, and fo r purposes o f investigation and recom m endation Both as de­ fined in the treaty and from the cases considered by it, the w ork o f th e com m ission had to do prim arily w ith boundary w aters. I t was provided, how ever, in article x o f the treaty th at “any questions o r m atters o f difference arising betw een the H igh C ontracting Parties involving the rights, obligations, o r interests o f the U nited States o r o f the D om inion of C anada either in relation to each other o r to their respective inhabitants” m ight be referred to it, w ith the consent o f the A m erican Senate and the governor in council, for investigation and recom m endation. W hile oth er developm ents rendered this article less necessary in later years, it revealed both the tem per of the agreem ent and the wide results th at were expected to follow it. T h e governm ental m achinery for the conduct of C anadian foreign relations was evolved over a period o f years as the dom inion grew in strength and confidence, partly by a process o f trial and error, and as events showed the anachronism s in w hat already existed. It was natural, if u nfortunate, th at organi­ zation followed rath er than preceded the issues w ith w hich it w ould be concerned: natural, because it was only the pressure o f particu lar cases th at proved the need fo r change; unfortunate, because in some cases international disputes m ight have been m ore easily settled if the new m echanism had already existed. T he im portance o f the time-lag varied. T he International W ater­ ways Com m ission and the International Jo in t Com m ission, for

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exam ple, w ere set up soon enough to handle the m ajor cases. T he A laska boundary dispute, on the other hand, was settled by an a d hoc tribunal un d er circum stances which aroused the m axim um o f bitterness in C anada tow ard b oth the U nited States and the U nited K ingdom . Ill T h e determ ination o f foreign policy for C anada depended in the m ain on three factors: geographical position, trade interests, and im perial connection - the three operating singly o r in any com bination. C anadian interest o r activity spread over a w ide area abroad, varying in intensity from one region to another. In the A m ericas the dom inating political entity was the U nited States, w hich tended to overshadow the foreign relations o f C anada as of the other countries o f the w estern hem isphere. But, while they had always to keep in m ind the policies o f the U nited States, C anadians w ere not unm indful of th e lesser pow ers. N earest a t hand, in a position to control the approach to the St. Law rence, was N ew foundland. T h at oldest colony had rejected federation w ith the other provinces in the original discussions, but there was reason to believe that, like Prince E dw ard Island and British Colum bia, it m ight later becom e a p art o f the dom inion. T he atm osphere o f confederation w as not soon dissipated, and the final boundaries o f C anada w ere still uncertain. F o r several years there was talk o f union, both in the island and in C anada. F o r the latter the advantages w ere many. In the defence o f C anada N ew foundland could not be ignored, b u t th a t consideration was given less attention in the days when the suprem acy of the British navy was unquestioned. T he place o f N ew foundland in a shorter sea route to E urope was at times stressed; but the principal argum ents were possibilities o f ex­ tended trade, and - above all - the autom atic settlem ent o f the disputes over fisheries. C onferences betw een the tw o govern­ m ents broke dow n on the refusal o f C anada to take over the island’s debt, but the C anadian governm ent continued to express its general willingness fo r union, and the question was still an open one in 1914. T h e acquisition o f N ew foundland was generally thought to be desirable but not pressing. T he boundaries of th e dom inion in the north w ere fo r a tim e brought into prom inence by the fear th at A m erican zeal fo r the larger A laska w ould be a prelude to general expansion northw ard. F ears w ere expressed, in par­

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liam ent and the press, th at A m erican fishing in H udson Bay might lead to a denial o f com plete sovereignty there. In the Canadian Senate Paschal Poirier advocated a C anadian expedi­ tion to the pole, union with N ew foundland, and the acquisition of G reenland from D enm ark. A. B. A ylesw orth again drew attention to L abrador and G reenland, and the H alifax Chronicle editorially sponsored a C anadian “M onroe doctrine.” T his last was widely discussed by other newspapers, and was intended to em brace the islands o f St. Pierre and M iquelon, should the U nited States attem pt to purchase them from France, as it was feared she m ight d o W ith the rem oval of the danger o f this new stage of A m erican expansionism (if it had ever been a real danger) the idea o f a com petitive M onroe doctrine fell into discard. In the south, as well as in the east and north, was territory that was often spoken of as a possible addition to C anada. T he dom inion carried on a closc trade connection with the British W est Indies, built up in previous decades by N ova Scotia. T rad e between these British colonies was never as great as it was felt it should be between two com plem entary economies, and C an a­ dians had m ade m any attem pts to increase it, but w ithout great success. Both in C anada and the W est Indies it was prim al ily the hope o f extended trade th at led to the suggestions of political union. In 1905 isolated proposals changed to m ore general consideration. C anadian new spapers w ere divided in their views - some cautiously supporting union and others pointing to the problem s th at would arise from the racial com position and political im m aturity of the islands. T he M aritim e Provinces Board o f T rade and the C anadian M anufacturers’ Association both w ent on record in favour of union, and individuals in various parts of C anada were found as advocates O n sober second thought, how ever, C anadians decided th a t it was a step they w ere n ot yet ready to take, either at that tim e, o r even years later in the full glow o f nationalist consciousness. T he C aribbean m arked the southern boundary of the C anadian sphere of active interest in the A m ericas. W ith the republics o f South A m erica even trad e relations w ere slight. Politically the republics were rem ote — even a little m ysterious. Only once did a South A m erican question impinge on C anada, and th at only because o f its effect on A nglo-A m erican relations. R epeated refusals of the governm ent of V enezuela to respect the interests of foreigners led two o f the powers m ainly con­ cerned, G re at Britain and G erm any, to apply pressure by means

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o f a naval blockade in 1902. T here is no reason to believe that C anadians saw that this action had any bearing on the dom inion, but it soon proved to have an im portant indirect one. T he U nited States, sensitive to any E uropean intervention in South A m erica, was particularly disturbed by it w hen taking place close to the proposed canal in the isthm us, and strain developed in the relations of the two E uropean powers with the U nited States. T hough desiring to avoid a fu rth er break with G erm any, already opened by the failure o f the alliance negotiations, the British governm ent was even less willing to depart from its fixed p rin ­ ciple o f A m erican friendship, and in 1903 consented to the A m erican proposal of subm ission o f the V enezuela dispute to the H ague tribunal. It was during the last m onths o f the block­ ade, and when Britain was m aking its decision, that the arrange­ m ents for the submission of the A laska boundary dispute to an international tribunal were finally m ade. T he dispute was an old one. T h e boundary laid down in the treaty o f 1825 between Russia and G reat Britain antedated any accurate geographical know ledge o f the region, and created problem s com m on to all N o rth A m erican boundary questions. By 1867, w hen Alaska w as purchased by the U nited States, the population of British Colum bia was fully conscious o f a northern developm ent based on discoveries of gold, and saw in the southern extension of A laska a barrier against the necessary access from the hinterland to the sea. A fter the entrance o f British Colum bia into the federation its legislature and governm ent constantly called the attention of O ttaw a to the need for defining the boundary, and the C anadian governm ent in turn had negotiations initiated through British diplom atic channels. A ll attem pts to reach agreem ent on the m achinery for handling the dispute had, how ever, failed up to the end o f the century. In a conference between U nited States and C anadian representatives at W ash­ ington in F ebruary 1892 the C anadians proposed th at the dispute be subm itted to “som e im partial authority” ; and that following an aw ard a com m ittee o f experts be asked to report on the best w ay o f delim iting the boundary T h e Joint H igh Com m ission o f 1898-99, am ongst other C anadian-A m erican questions, considered th at o f A laska, and the C anadian proposal for a tribunal o f three narrow ly failed o f acceptance. The counter-proposal, for a tribunal of six - half British and half A m erican - w as unacceptable to C anada, and a British com ­ prom ise plan o f 1902, fo r the com m ission of six to include two neutral m em bers, was rejected in W ashington. Such was the

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position when L aurier w ent to the colonial conference o f 1902, having prom ised his colleagues not to yield to any English p ro ­ position for acccpting the A m erican proposal. O n his return, how ever, he confessed that he had agreed to such a commission, appointed by the two parties to the dispute. “ Pressed for details he refused to go beyond the statem ent that he had no option but to yield the point It rem ained, then, only to set the m achinery in motion. In January 1903 a treaty was signed by the British am bassador and the A m erican secretary of state, providing for a tribunal o f “six im partial jurists o f repute, w ho shall consider judicially the questions subm itted to them ,” which plan was reluctantly ac­ cepted by the C anadian governm ent. In F ebruary the bad news rea d ied O ttaw a th at Roosevelt had appointed Elihu Root, the secretary of state for w ar, Senator Lodge, and Senator T urner. T he Canadian governm ent quite properly objected that none of these was an im partial jurist: the first being a m em ber of the governm ent that was a party to the dispute, and the other two having declared themselves against the C anadian case. It was, they com plained, a violation o f the treaty. O n F ebruary 27 w ord cam e from L ondon that the selection o f A m erican m em ­ bers was as much a surprise there as in O ttaw a; that they felt it practically impossible to press for new appointm ents; were most unwilling to drop the whole negotiation; and could only suggest British m em bers “who will m eet the altered circum stances of the case.” By the tim e the governor general sent a reply to this (M arch ) the treaty had already been ratified (M arch 3 ), and, as the C anadian governm ent pointed out, fu rth er discussion was precluded. T hey would not, how ever, consider the suggestion of m atching the A m erican representatives T he British m em bers, as appointed, w ere L ord Alverstone, chief justice of England, Sir Louis Jette, lieutenant-governor o f Q uebec and form erly a judge of the superior court of Quebec, and A. B. Aylesworth, a C anadian lawyer. W hile the C anadian governm ent then lived up to the letter and spirit of a treaty o f w hich they had never approved, from the first they had good reason to suspect the good faith of the A m erican governm ent. Full study has been m ade of the argum ents adduced by both sides, o f the positions taken by the three governm ents con­ cerned, and in so far as it can be done - of the conversations th at w ent on behind the scenes T here is little disagreem ent on the m ain points, though the authorities differ as to the relative strength o f the C anadian and A m erican cases. O n the whole it

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seems clear that the latter was definitely a stronger one; and, while there was a C anadian case, and it was argued by counsel o f great ability, it would have been surpiising if it had been upheld in any court. U nfortunately the tribunal of 1903 never lived up to the judicial principles laid dow n for it. Theodore Roosevelt as m uch as told the A m erican m em bers th at they could find only one way; and, indeed, they seem to have needed no spur to run as partisans. N o criticism has been m ade of either the appointm ent o r actions o f the C anadian m em bers; yet they do seem to have been infected by the non-judicial atmosphere. Clifford Sifton, the British agent for the settlem ent, com plained after his return th a t “ Lord A lverstone did not stand by the P erhaps this was no m ore than an Canadian com m issioners u nfo rtu nate phrase; yet it is hard to conceive of the C anadian com missioners finding in favour o f the A m erican case. The aw ard, which substantially accepted the A m erican claims, was signed by the three A m ericans and Alverstone. Jette and Aylesw orth refused to sign the aw ard, and each voluntarily w rote an opinion with reasons for that refusal Both differed on several points from the m ajority decision. A ylesw orth finished his statem ent with the rem ark that “ the course the m ajority of this tribunal has decided to take in regard to the islands at the entrance o f P ortland channel is, in my hum ble judgm ent, so opposed to the plain requirem ents o f justice, and so absolutely irreconcilable w ith any disposition of th at branch o f the case upon principles o f a judicial character, th at I respectfully decline to affix my signature to their aw ard.” Jette concluded by saying that he “found it impossible . . . to concur in this arbitrary determ ination of a line w hich, although it does not concede all the territory they claim ed to the U nited States, nevertheless deprives C anada o f the greater p art of that to w hich she was entitled.” U nder no circum stances w ould it have been easy for a tribu­ nal consisting o f three nationals from each party to the dispute to decide entirely on judicial principles. T he charactcr o f the A m erican appointm ents finally rem oved any possibility of such procedure, leaving the only alternatives as a deadlock o r a diplom atic com prom ise. C anadians generally, would have ac­ cepted the form er in a choice of evils, but British opinion favoured the latter. It seems evident that A lverstone, perhaps under pressure from his governm ent, doubled the roles of diplom at and judge in the general interest of A nglo-Am erican understanding. O n their return to C anada the two C anadian

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com m issioners m aintained a dignified restraint in com m ents on the aw ard, refusing to achieve a cheap popularity by capitalizing on w h at was undoubtedly a very general resentm ent. A num ber o f C anadians urged m oderation, or supported the aw ard as an unpleasant but necessary one; but on the whole opinion - espe­ cially in the press - was m ore or less violently critical It was taken fo r granted that the C anadian case was unassailable, and the general com plaint was th at A lverstone had subm itted to the governm ent’s desire for peace at any price: the price being, as usual, the sacrifice of C anada. T he tradition o f the weakness of British diplom acy on behalf o f C anada was already deep-rooted. T hough not w ithout som e reason to support it, the argum ent was less often based on a study of the evidence than on senti­ ment: and a naive assum ption that the C anadian case was always right, and that right w ould always prevail. T hough not a few C anadians had had experience o f diplo­ macy, they had done little to apprise the public of the real character and place o f that art. Since the days of the W ashington com mission o f 1871 Canadians generally had gained little appreciation of diplom acy as a process of bargaining, in which com prom ise and sanctions played a large part. T he A laska “panhandle” was classed with the jutting north o f M aine. N either o f the two cases, as such, was studied seriously; nor could the average C anadian appreciate that firmness in pressing even a good case m ust be tem pered by gauging the resultant friction. In 1903 there was reason to believe that Roosevelt’s chauvinism was not m ere acting, and that it touched a highly responsive chord in the country. T o talk o f w ar was perhaps extrem e; but there was a state short of w ar that would have been as unw elcom e to C anada as to England. G iven the circum ­ stances, the best th at could be hoped from the Alaska tribunal was a deadlock. T o the British governm ent this spelled a set­ back to the entente policy pursued in Venezuela. To C anada it could bring no good; A laska would still be a bone of contention, with a possible (though im probable) later settlem ent m ore in favour of the dom inion. Bad relations between England and the U nited States would bedevil N o rth A m erican politics as well. If, how ever, C anada was dissatisfied w ith the results o f British diplom acy, the only logical course was to conduct her own affairs directly - supplying the m eans and accepting the respon­ sibility. It was a course which had m ore than once been p ro ­ posed in the past, but never with the authority which L aurier now gave to it in the H ouse o f Com m ons.

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I have often regretted . . . that we have not in our ow n hands the treaty-m aking power which would enable us to dispose o f o ur own affairs. B ut in this m atter we are dealing w ith a position that was forced on us - we have not the treaty-m aking power. . . . 1 am sorry not only that we have not the treaty-m aking power, but that we are not in such an independent position that it is in m y pow er to place before parliament the whole o f the correspondence as it passed between the Canadian governm ent and the British governm ent. B ut we shall have that correspond­ ence and it will be placed before parliament at the next session, - the whole o f it, no m atter what protest m ay com e from abroad. . . . But we have no such power. Our hands are tied to a large extent, owing to the fact o f our connection - which has its benefits, but which also has its disadvantages - the fa ct o f our connection with the m other country m aking us not free agents and obliging us to deal with questions, affecting ourselves through the instrum entality o f British ambassadors. . . . The difficulty as I conceive it to be, is that so long as Canada remains a depend­ ency o f the British crown the present pow ers that we have are n o t sufficient fo r the m aintenance o f our rights. It is im portant that we should ask the British parliam ent fo r m ore extensive powers so that if ever we have to deal w ith m atters o f a sim ilar nature again, we shall deal w ith them in our ow n way, in our ow n fashion, according to the best light that we have.23 If this was a statem ent o f policy it was one that was not im­ plem ented. In all probability L aurier, sm arting under a sense of injustice, spoke m ore strongly than he otherw ise would have done. C anada was already on the road to assume in greater degree the conduct of her own affairs, but it needed m ore than the authority of the British parliam ent to m ake the change. A fter the first burst o f indignation was over, it was questionable w hether the public w ould have w elcom ed such a radical depar­ ture in one step. M oreover, while C anadians had in the past show n skill in diplom acy, there were no civil servants trained in, o r even assigned to, that special field; and it is significant that W. Sanford Evans proposed that there should be a departm ent o f external affairs.29 In the establishm ent of th at departm en t in 1909, o f the International Joint Com m ission in the sam e year, the procedure over the F rench treaties in 1907 and 1909, and over the reciprocity agreem ent in 1911 it m ay be argued that the A laska affair played a part; but it is equally probable that these changes w ould have occurred in any case.

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N o one of the three countries derived m uch advantage from the A laska award. T o the U nited States fell a strip of territory barring the way to decaying m ines in an undeveloped wilder­ ness. G reat Britain secured som e degree o f reconciliation with the U nited States a t the cost of tem porary but real discontent in C anada. C anadian fears of A m erican expansionism were once m ore revived. T he whole afFair was a tem pest in a teapot: but of such stuff are international relations som etim es made. T h e political relations of C anada outside the A m erican con­ tinent w ere, in the period before 1914, alm ost entirely indirect: th a t is to say, arising out o f British, rath er than C anadian, foreign policy. But w hat is true o f political policy does not so generally apply to interests. Com m ercial advantages and selec­ tive im m igration depended in p art on satisfactory political rela­ tions w ith foreign states. M ore basic still was the aim to preserve for the em pire as a whole a position in the w orld sufficiently pow erful that its independence could not be seriously end an ­ gered, and - com ing closer to hom e - that C anada could not be invaded. T hus the balance o f pow er affected C anada like other countries. But unlike other countries with a sm all population she was draw n into these larger political issues not only on her own continent, but east and west as well. In the A m ericas there was no balance o f pow er, and presum ably never w ould be one. T he dom inance of the U nited States, however, was softened by a peaceful (if not always conciliatory) outlook. In the far east and in E urope the rivalry of the great powers, as they appeared after 1871, was assum ing a p attern and a severity th at was fast becom ing the leading political fact o f the period. T h e pow er o f Jap an was first dem onstrated in the SinoJapanese w ar o f 1894. F o r the British E m pire the rise o f a new great pow er in the Pacific had great im plications. T he U nited K ingdom had been the pioneer in opening C hina to trade, and was m aking heavy investm ents in railways, financial organiza­ tions, and com m erce. A ustralia and N ew Zealand could not b ut be affected by the expanding pow er o f Japan, and India too was w ithin the Pacific sphere. F o r C anada the im m ediate pressure o f the far east arose from A siatic im m igration, the attem pts to lim it w hich created a delicate political problem Less weight was placed on trad e w ith the countries o f the far east until the early tw entieth century. W hen G reat Britain m ade a com m ercial treaty w ith Japan in 1894 C anada was unwilling to accede to it unless she could retain the right to exclude both labourers and artisans; and even w hen the British am bassador had secured

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agreem ent to such a provision, the C anadian governm ent de­ layed becom ing a party to the treaty until 1906, by w hich time trade had assum ed proportions sufficient to balance anti-Asiatic sentim ent. W hile the policy o f virtual exclusion m aintained by the dom inions did not help neither did it seriously hinder the good relations of Japan and the U nited K ingdom as w ritten into com m ercial and political treaties. O n the other hand the friction th at m ight have resulted from the im m igration difficulty was softened by the satisfaction felt in T okyo over the AngloJapanese alliance. T he first alliance, o f 1902, was sought by Jap an , and served her well in her w ar w ith Russia. T he second treaty, in 1905, carried further obligations for both signatories, and was regarded as m utually advantageous. C anadians had no reason to criticize an alliance which paved the way to the volun­ tary lim itation of Japanese im m igration through the gentlem en’s agreem ent and strengthened the defensive position of the em pire as a whole. T he press or ihe U nited States w elcom ed the alliance o f 1902 as a m eans of m aintaining the open door W hen the treaty of 1905 was announced it could be said that “the C ana­ dian press alm ost universally approves the arrangem ent and con­ gratulates L ord Lansdow ne upon his successful diplom acy D uring the im perial conference of 1911 the dom inion rep re­ sentatives had, fo r the first tim e, an opportunity o f discussing foreign policy - not in the conference itself, but in secret meetings o f the com m ittee of imperial defence. T here Sir E dw ard G rey m ade a long statem ent of different aspects of British policy T he A nglo-Japanese alliance, he said, had been m ost satisfactory and he hoped it w ould be renewed. Before doing so, how ever, it was necessary to reconcile it with British policy tow ard the U nited States. If the U nited States became involved in a w ar with Japan, B ritain w ould be obligated to assist h er ally. T o avoid this he had proposed to the Japanese govern­ m ent that a clause should be included rem oving the obligation o f either signatory from going to w ar w ith a pow er w ith which it h ad a general arbitration treaty. W ritten into the alliance, a clause (iv) to th at effect saved England from difficulties with the U nited States by virtue of the new arbitration treaty. By this ingenious device G rey also rem oved a cause of w orry to C ana­ dian statesm en. G rey was able to w rite to the British em bassy at T okyo that the dom inion representatives had agreed cordially to the alliance T here is every reason to suppose that, as far as C anada was concerned, this was the case. Leaving AngloA m erican relations friendly, and easing the strain on C anadian-

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Japanese m igration arrangem ents, the alliance still strengthened the position of the British E m pire in the far east, and conse­ quently in the w orld as a whole. T h e alliance with Japan not only strengthened the position of G re at Britain in the far east, but also relieved her of the neces­ sity of m aintaining a large naval force there, m aking it possible to divert ships to E uropean w aters. It was in the N o rth Sea that they w ere now urgently needed. W hen the R o u n d Table, a quarterly devoted to the affairs of the British Em pire, was first published in 1910, the opening w ords were these: “T he central fact in the international situation to-day is the antagonism be­ tween England and G erm any.” T he events of the next four years m ore th an justified the assertion. C anada had no p art in foreign policy in E urope in the ten years before 1914: the ententes with F ran ce and Russia, the perm ission to the general staffs to con­ du ct conversations on m ilitary and naval co-operation, and the attem pts to prevent w ar in the Balkans. N o r did the C anadian governm ent give advice in, or share responsibility for, British policy in the last hectic days from the m urder o f the A rchduke F ran z F erdinand to the outbreak o f general hostilities. It was not th at C anada was deliberately excluded from British councils: it is probable that the British governm ent w ould have welcomed consultation. But consultation, as successive C anadian govern­ m ents had seen, involved responsibility; and they preferred to forgo the one in order to avoid the other. T h a t they were none the less com m itted to the results of British policy was the anom aly o f the position and the price they paid. F ro m the tu rn o f the century, w ith the failure of AngloG erm an negotiations fo r an alliance, the generally unfriendly attitude o f E urope tow ard the w ar in South A frica, and the beginning o f G erm an naval construction on a large scale, the urgency and the burden o f defence against a growing danger forced m ilitary and naval planning into the forefront of inter­ national relations. If no scheme was agreed on - though many were su g g e ste d -fo r a foreign policy draw n up and underw ritten by all the self-governing parts o f the em pire, the problem of defence becam e, m ore and m ore, one for the dom inions as well as the U nited K ingdom . Could C anada defend her own terri­ tory? C ould she, and would she, share in a com m on effort to guard against the th reat of G erm an aggression?

C H A P T E R 11

Defence

T h e w ord “defence,” widely enough interpreted in all coun­ tries, has in C anada been stretched beyond all reasonable bounds. It is, perhaps, not w ithout significance that this should be so: that no such term s as “w ar office” o r “adm iralty” should be cu rren t w here frontiers are know n as “boundaries,” where the regular arm y was not called by th at nam e, w here w ar, in fact, has never been visualized except as resistance to aggression. It is healthy th at this should have been so, and, on the w hole, consistent w ith the outlook an d interests o f the C anadian people. Y et C anada is not w ithout m ilitary history and achievem ents; and, as in other states, the threat o f force, even when n o t carried into effect, has played its p art in her foreign relationships. It will be well, therefore, first to discover w h at is m eant o r implied in C anada by the w ord defence. Basically it has stood for the m aintenance o f territory already possessed, and w ith th at purpose few C anadians have disagreed. Less obviously it has m eant the defence o f interests, such as trade, fisheries, o r rights o f citizens abroad. It has had a very real m eaning as the defence of C anada’s general political posi­ tion in the w orld: protection against a serious loss o f pow er or against a hostile alliance. It is tem pting, but misleading, to draw an absolute distinction between defence of C anadian soil and im perial defence, for im perial defence itself had not one but several aspects. In some cases it has touched C anada directly. Even in the period after the w ithdraw al o f the im perial garrisons th e naval bases at H alifax and Esquim alt played a dual role: as p art of the British naval system and as guards on the Canadian coasts. O ther points, such as N ew foundland and the W est Indies, m ight be regarded in p art as indirect o r outpost defences of C anada. T hirdly there has been the defence of the em pire as a political organization o f w hich C anada form ed p art and in w hose strength she had a direct stake. F o r this the leading exam ple w ould be the W ar of 1914. Finally cam e C anada’s place in British w ars whose outcom e was neither a direct nor an indirect th reat to Canada. F o r participation in these a m uch less

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obvious case could be m ade out, b u t events - such as the Sudan expeditions - proved th at there was a case and th at it had supporters. A ccepting the w ord defence, w ith its m anifold m eanings, it rem ains to exam ine in m ore detail the purposes for w hich mili­ tary and naval pow er would be m aintained, the local conditions to w hich they w ere related, their organization, and their use. Peace, consolidation, and econom y in arm am ent w ere naturally the desiderata o f a country whose area was vast, population sm all, and political unity recent. A saturated pow er has no zeal fo r territorial expansion, but even the broad acres o f the do­ m inion left som ething to be desired. T he jutting north of M aine was an old grievance w ith practical disadvantages that were real but not insuperable. C anadians w ould agree that they had been hardly treated, but had no idea o f attem pted revision by a show o r use o f force. N ew foundland w ould be a w elcom e addition to the federation, but th a t was a financial rath er than a m ilitary problem . In the A rctic the claim s of C anada m ight be disputed, but the m ajor territorial dispute was over the boundary of A laska. H ere it w as that C anadians, w ithout fully realizing it, experienced a clear case o f the delicate relation between diplom acy and arm ed force. Some A m ericans (including the president) hardly veiled their determ ination to resist any in ­ fringem ent of their rights, as they saw them . T he success of diplom acy is explained not a little by the skill o f the diplom at; but it is no accident that states capable o f exercising strong m ilitary o r naval force - and willing in the last resort to do so have a card to play in international negotiations that no m ere dexterity will take. T h e connection between foreign policy and m ilitary policy may, u nder the happiest conditions, be m ade rem ote, but in no case can it be abolished. A rm ed forces have no m eaning (leaving aside their police role) except in relation to possible but defined use against other states. It is the business o f soldiers to fight w hen called upon to do so in the pursuance of, o r as a result of, the foreign policy of the civil governm ent. T he first discussion o f foreign policy between the representatives o f the governm ents of the U nited K ingdom and the dom inions was in the com m ittee of im perial defence in 1911. T he foreign secretary, Sir E dw ard G rey, was invited by M r. A squith to give an exposition o f the international situation, and began by talking of the aspect of defence th at was then m ost to the fore. “T he starting point,” he said, . . of th e consultation w hich we are now going to have

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on F oreign Policy, and the foreign situation, is really the cre­ ation of growing strength of separate fleets and forces in the D om inions. . . . It is possible to have separate fleets in a united E m pire, but it is not possible to have separate Fleets in a united E m pire w ithout having a com m on F oreign Policy which shall determ ine the action of the different forces m aintained in dif­ T he nature and extent of feren t p arts of the Em pire. . . arm ed forces are dictated in p art by the capacity of a state to provide them and in p art by the use for which they m ay be required. M ilitary history is, to some extent, a them e in itself: in technical organization and the course of w arfare. F o r the rest it is dependent on political policies and event's. T o say that a country w ants peace m ay be the truth but not the w hole truth T h e real objective is peace on at least reasonably satisfactory term s. “Peace at any price” is alm ost a meaningless phrase, for there com es a point w here national pride and national interest will dem and the use o f arm ed force, perhaps as the answ er to the aggression of another state. M ilitary preparation in C anada in the generation before 1914 was governed by two sets of factors: dom estic interests and external pressure. T he period was one of rapid econom ic devel­ opm ent, with industrial expansion in the central provinces and the peaceful conquest of the western. Financial and hum an resources were alm ost wholly absorbed in great railway schemes to m ake possible the settlem ent of the prairies and the exploita­ tion o f its agricultural land. T o secure im m igrants and retain them in the dom inion, to build and finance transcontinental railways, and to prom ote the foreign trade which was a neces­ sary corollary of the other two - these were the subjects before p arliam ent and public. It is true th at foreign trade in itself w idened C anadians’ outlook beyond their own boundaries, but fo r m any years there was a peaceful w orld whose oceans were reassuringly patrolled by the ships of the British navy. E xternal pressure m ight be applied by another A m erican pow er or from beyond the coasts o f the continent. F rom her im m ediate neighbours C anada had little reason to fear aggres­ sion. R elations w ith N ew foundland were not w ithout friction. T h e fishery dispute trailed on for years', and there was an unsettled boundary between Quebec and L abrador. It would, how ever, have been absurd to think o f a British dom inion as a potential enem y. N ew foundland could be o f m ilitary signifi­ cance to C anada only if it were to com e under the control of a foreign pow er, an eventuality o f which there appeared to be

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no prospect. T he only other land frontier m arched with that of the U nited States, on the south and the north-w est. H ere, in one respect, the position was reversed: C anada being the weak pow er and its neighbour the strong. T here were not lacking grounds for controversy - fisheries again, and boundary dis­ putes - but Canadians were m ore and m ore assum ing that war, o r even serious friction, w ith the U nited States could be left out o f account. It was true that in the U nited States there was loose talk of annexation as late as 1911, but it was not taken as a threat. A fter the settlem ent a t W ashington in 1871, unpopular as that m ay have been at the tim e in C anada, the old fear of A m erican aggression, of m anifest destiny, and o f forced an­ nexation steadily dissipated. W hile relations with the country against which C anada had erected defences for nearly two cen­ turies at last becam e fixed and pacific, clouds cam e up from o th er directions. T o England Russia was the bogey in the nine­ teenth century, and to C anada too in the seventies and eighties. A t tim es attack on either coast was feared from the am orphous state which straddled the continents, and whose m ilitary strength was so consistently overrated. T hanks to her alliance with G reat Britain in 1902 and to the settlem ent of the im m igration ques­ tion, Jap an ’s growing pow er was not in these years regarded as involving any th reat to the Pacific coast of Canada. T he new danger, and the one which m ore and m ore dom inated all plan­ ning fo r defence, lay in G erm any’s frank struggle for world pow er, and the appearance, for the first tim e in a century, of a fleet intended to challenge the suprem acy o f the British navy. In retrospect there can be seen a change, not fully realized at the tim e, of the whole political position on w hich the defence policy of C anada was built. F o r decades before confederation and through the early years of the dom inion defence for C an a­ dians had m eant protection against the U nited Slates. T o aid them in this task they looked to G reat Britain, whose great navy, professional arm y, and am assed wealth m ight redress the bal­ ance of the w eak against the strong. In m om ents of E ngland’s troubles - the C rim ean W ar or the Indian M utiny - there were m any volunteers in British N orth A m erica ready to lend their swords in evidence o f loyalty and com m on feeling. It was not, however, because England was w eak or her national strength at stake th at these men cam e forw ard. In the days of the A m erican Civil W ar and im m ediately following it the w ithdraw al o f the im perial troops from C anada was regretted, even resented. The w eak still appealed to the strong for aid. In less than tw enty

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years came the th reat to the British position in A frica, ominous unpopularity throughout Europe, and the naval policy of T irpitz and the K aiser. N ow C anada, w ith a new sense of security on h er own borders, was forced for the first tim e to consider seriously the defence of the em pire of w hich she was a part. It was no longer a question of gestures by individuals; it was a problem of national policy. T he transition from the old balance to the new occupied some years; and the difficulty in under­ standing a change so close a t hand was magnified by confusion o f issues. To the opponents of im perial federation in all its forms the cry of the em pire in danger sm acked o f a plot to lure the unw ary into a political fram ew ork designed not for co-operation but dom inance. Even to those not persuaded by either faith it was apparent th at projects for im perial defence could never be wholly divorced from som e type of agreem ent on foreign policy w ithout which m ilitary o r naval plans would be either meaningless o r dangerous. If C anadian defence policy be judged to have been anachro­ nistic and its results to have been to some extent inadequate and inefficient, the governm ents im m ediately responsible m ust re­ ceive a m easure o f sym pathy. A gainst w hat danger m ust they guard? H appily against no neighbours. Could they believe the old argum ents o f the federationists? C ould the m ilitary burden on such a w ealthy country as E ngland be taken seriously in com parison to the burden on C anada o f opening a pioneer country? It is n o t wholly surprising th at the governm ents of these years steered by th e star o f im m ediate dom estic needs, avoiding as best they could the rocks of provincial and racial cleavages. D efence policy tended to be based on com prom ise, w ith inevitable technical draw backs - and some surprisingly effective results. C anadian defence forces m ay be divided into m ilitary and naval. In both there w ere im portant links w ith the imperial arm s; but the projects for an im perial defence organization were separate from the uniform ity o f drill, exchange of officers, and other convenient devices w hich were not intended to create a united force. II F ear of A m erican aggression during and after the Civil W ar stim ulated a new interest in the defence forces and was an im­ p o rtan t elem ent in the confederation m ovem ent. But such zeal

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as was tem porarily shown fo r expansion and im provem ent of the forces passed w ith the rem oval of the im m ediate danger. Little was left of the plans and talk of those years. T he fortifica­ tion scheme was dropped altogether and the m oney was spent on the Pacific railway. T he regular arm y - o r “perm anent fo rce” - had been started in 1871, and while it rem ained small, the principle soon becam e firmly established. T he Royal M ilitary College was opened at K ingston in 1876 and provided a m ixed academ ic and m ilitary training of a high standard. Everything, how ever, seemed to com bine against any forw ard m ovem ent in the m ilitia. T he N orth-W est Rebellion o f 1885 had no lasting effects. T he financial depression w hich began in the late seven­ ties, the expenditure on public w orks (especially railw ays), and peaceful relations w ith the U nited States all discouraged m ilitia reform . Even the rem oval of the im perial troops from all points except the naval bases failed to encourage m ilitary preparations. It was w hat an historian of the m ilitia has called “ the dead p eriod E xpenditure was cut alm ost in half; the num bers of the active m ilitia in training fell by a third; and the enthusiasm o f officers and m en waned. T h e V enezuela scare of 1895 and m ore especially the experi­ ence of the South A frican W ar sounded a note o f necessity that brought new life to the m ilitia. A lready there had been some slight signs o f progress. T he perm anent force was reorganized and enlarged; the obsolete Snider rifles w ere partially replaced; governm ent expenditure was m odestly increased; and public interest som ew hat revived It was, how ever, after the South A frican W ar th at the m ain changes occurred. T here w ere not lacking - and never had been lacking - critics of the m ilitia system : officers o f the m ilitia itself, C anadian civilians, and the English officers appointed in com m and in C anada pointed at tim es to weaknesses. T he p ap er strength of the m ilitia was said to be misleading; the period of training too short; equipm ent to be obsolete, incom plete, and insufficient in quantity; the p ay of both perm anent and non-perm anent m ilitia too small. N o one questioned the quality of the personnel, o r their efforts to m ake the best o f the situation, but the handicaps w ere said to be too great. O n the other hand, the opposition to reform was influ­ enced not only by parsim ony but by a disbelief in the necessity of m ilitary preparations on a large scale. A com m ent in the M ontreal H erald in 1902 on L ord D undonald’s proposals for change is not untypical:

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D undonald apparently shares a delusion dear to H utton . H e seem s to think the people of Canada are concerned about being in readiness fo r war, or that if they are not they are to blam e and should be stirred up. A n y m an who thinks that way - and all European soldiers do - fails to grasp the essential distinction between E urope and N o rth A m erica. W ith E urope war is a condition. W ith us it is a theory* T h e point of the Herald's, attack was perhaps sharpened by resentm ent against the prevailing rule under which the officer com m anding the C anadian m ilitia was appointed from the British regular arm y. It w ould be doing less than justice to the individuals w ho held the position not to record th at they made a valuable contribution to the C anadian militia. T hey were able to bring to the w ork training and experience w'ider than a C anadian officer could obtain, and undoubtedly m any o f their criticism s were valid and their recom m endations wise. M any, indeed, of the im provem ents in the m ilitia were due to one or oth er of these officers. It was an arrangem ent, how ever, which was almost bound to lead to trouble sooner o r later. W ith few exceptions, the com m anding officers seem to have established good relations with the C anadian officers, who w elcom ed their experience and w ere as anxious as they for reform . But it was n ot easy for non-C anadians to continue to hold the chief position in the C anadian m ilitia, in a period in which C anadian autonom y and national feeling were growing, w ithout arousing opposition. Especially was this true when the visiting com m anders found it necessary to m ake criticism s publicly. T he practical difficulty th at arose was in the relations between the com m anding officers and the m inisters of militia. T he division of powers was illdefined, and each accused the other of usurping authority. G eneral H utton had a series o f disagreem ents with the m inister o f militia, F. W. (L ater Sir F rederick) Borden. W hen H utton returned to England in 1900 to take p art in the South African W ar the question was bluntly asked in the C anadian H ouse of C om m ons if he had been dismissed because o f friction with the governm ent T o this L aurier replied coldly that the m atter was better not discussed, but nevertheless a debate ensued. M ost of the m em bers who spoke defended H utton, but the point was m ade, by Borden and others, th at it m ight be necessary in the future to appoint Canadians. In the course of his rem arks Borden also denied that there had ever been im proper political influence on the militia. T h at there had been such influence was

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a current charge, and one th at arose in acute form during the period in which L ord D undonald was com m anding officer. D undonald cam e to C anada in 1902 know ing som ething o f the difficulties that had arisen and having been w arned that he might well m eet trouble. H e was a soldier o f considerable experience, both in peace and war, and proved him self to be sincerely anxious for the best interests o f the C anadian militia. O n his m any tours of inspection he found much to criticize in the organization, equipm ent, and training of the militia, and in a num ber of public utterances was not slow in pointing to w eak­ nesses which he believed to exist and changes which he thought should be made. F rom the first he claimed that his efforts were impeded by political interference A p art of his report for 1902 was n ot presented to parliam ent, and in 1904 arose w hat has become know n as “the D undonald incident.” T he rights and wrongs o f the affair m ay still be debated. T o D undonald it was a case o f a m inister insisting on an appointm ent in the arm y for party reasons; to the governm ent it was an attem pt to overrule its suprem e authority D undonald was dismissed; but before he left C anada m ade public his views, w hich, while bringing him some applause and sym pathy, did nothing to ease w hat had become an intolerable situation. O ut of the tenure o f the chief com m and by English officers cam e a paradoxical com bination o f results: the adoption of m any of the reform s w hich they had urged, and the decision against sim ilar appointm ents in the future. Both H utton and D undonald had urged the developm ent o f a self-contained m ilitia in place of w hat the form er described as “a collection o f m ilitary units w ithout cohesion, w ithout staff, and w ithout those m ilitary departm ents by w hich an arm y is moved, fed, or m inistered to in sickness.” T he move tow ard an arm y com plete in all branches began in H u tto n ’s day and continued after it as a principal line o f developm ent Both results were found in the M ilitia A ct of 1904 (4 Edw. V II, c. 2 3 ), the m ost im portant of such acts since confederation. Indeed, as Borden pointed out in introducing the bill into the Com m ons, the existing m ilitia law was practically the sam e as th at before confederation T he new regim e, as defined by the act o r as brought into effect under its permissive clauses, showed traces o f national consciousness. T he form er rule under which imperial officers in the Canadian m ilitia had precedence over Canadians o f equal rank was abolished; and the im perial officer in com m and a t H alifax w a no longer autom atically to take charge of the militia at the

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outbreak of w ar. M ore im portant than either of these was the provision th at any qualified officer in the British Em pire w as to be eligible for the chief com m and, and not only an English officer as form erly. This provision was the answ er to the pre­ vious friction between governm ents and general officers com ­ manding, and was supplem ented by a clause enabling a militia council to be set up. T h e council was said to be follow ing the precedent recently established in E ngland, w here the army council, following the recom m endations of the E sher C om ­ mission, had the secretary o f state for w ar as chairm an, with the m ilitary m em bers as advisers. H enceforw ard the m inister of m ilitia becam e the sole centre o f authority, w ith the chief o f the general staff as the senior officer. T here was no longer any appointm ent com parable to that of the form er com m anders in chief. But the effect in practice, writes Colonel H am ilton, was that “ the m inister saw m ore of the technical men, the soldiers, and heard their case presented; and the influence o f the soldiers, and m ore especially o f the senior soldier, steadily grew. The result o f a step which ostensibly lowered the footing o f the soldier was to increase his influence in th e w orking of the D ep artm ent T he act also provided th at th e perm anent force m ight be raised from one to two thousand; th at the period of annual training for the non-perm anent force m ight be extended to thirty days; and th at the pay o f both branches o f the militia be increased. In the years following 1904 expenditure on the m ilitia was steadily increased from two and a half m illion dollars in 1903-04 to seven and a half in 1911-12. D uring the same period the num ber of m en trained in the active m ilitia rose from thirty-five to fifty thousand. T h e m em oranda of the new m ilitia council in 1905 reflect official views of the new regim e In their m em orandum to the m inister o f m ilitia the m ilitary m em bers of the council pointed o ut that they had not “a clean sheet' on which to draw out their plans, and they have constantly had to com prom ise between w hat was desirable and w hat was attainable.” T heir plans were not am bitious: gradual additions to the cavalry and artillery of the perm anent force, and organization o f the arm y service corps, ordnance corps, and arm y m edical corps. T he finance m em ber o f the council then explained in a m em orandum the estimates fo r 1905-6, showing the increased expenditure in some detail. By 1910 the council was ready with a m ore elaborate rep o rt Som e changes were reported: an inter-departm ental com m ittee fo r co-operation between the departm ents of m ilitia and defence

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and o f naval service; the appointm ent o f staff officers to train candidates for the British staff college; and a m obilization com m ittee at headquarters. But the form al picture draw n by the council looked less im pressive w hen exam ined by soldiers. T he them e o f the rep o rt o f the inspector-general, M ajor-G eneral L ake, was that the reduction of estim ates had seriously im paired the efficiency and developm ent of both perm anent and non­ perm anent m ilitia In the sam e year an outside opinion was given by Sir Jo h n F rench, who, as inspector-general o f the im perial forces, had been invited to inspect the C anadian m ili­ tary forces. His report pays tribute to th e m en and officers available and to som e aspects of their w ork; but the weaknesses he found were m ore conspicuous than the strength. H e took “ability to defend th e land frontiers o f C anada” as the standard by which he form ed his judgm ent, and his conclusions did little to give C anadians any sense of security. T he peace organization he found defective in th at the various arm s of the service were not in correct proportions either in total o r in any one district, n o r did they have opportunities of training together. U nits lacking in integration would have to be throw n together in time of w ar, w hen a fu rth e r difficulty w ould arise from a lack of adequate m obilization plans. F rench m ade som e suggestions for changes in the training o f the perm anent force, but on the w hole w rote w arm ly o f its efficiency. Some alterations, he thought, m ight be m ade in the organization of the staff. W hether the volunteer system w ould m eet C anadian conditions could not, he thought, be decided until it had been given a fair trial, w ith a b etter organization, better knowledge in the higher com m and, and the qualifications for officers and the engagem ents o f the ran k and file in the m ilitia being enforced Asked by the m inister of m ilitia to report on how far and in w hat m anner Sir John F re n ch ’s recom m endations could be im plem ented, M ajorG eneral Lake observed th at on the whole they followed the sam e lines on w hich the m ilitia council had been w orking. “T h ere are,” he w rote, “no proposals contained in Sir John F ren ch ’s report the adoption of w hich would involve any dep ar­ ture in principle from the policy w hich, under your direction, the m ilitia council has pursued since its inception in 1904 . . . the extent to w hich progress in carrying out his recom m enda­ tions can be m ade and the period which m ust elapse before they can becom e effective depends entirely upon how far Parliam ent is prepared to provide for the expenditure necessary Some at least o f the recom m endations m ade by F rench and

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endorsed by L ake were carried into effect. In eastern C anada the militia was organized in peace as it w ould be in war, into divisions each with a com m ander and staff, and each divi­ sional com m ander was to control all the troops within his area. But still the reports of the new inspector-general, a C anadian, G eneral O tter, pointed to continuance o f the old weaknesses: shortage of officers and m en, and inadequate qualifications. The last w ord before 1914 cam e from Sir Ian H am ilton, who inspected the C anadian forces in the sum m er o f 1913. O rganiza­ tion, training, and education he believed had all improved. He found, however, that th e active m ilitia was still short of instructors, and th at units w ere under strength. A bove all he stressed the unreality of the p aper liability for universal military service, and the absence in practice o f any reserve Such, in outline, w ere the m ilitary forces of C anada in the period between the w ithdraw al of the im perial troops and the W ar o f 1914. T hough theoretically based on universal service, the C anadian m ilitia was in reality purely a volunteer force. A part from the sm all perm anent force, the militia suffered from scanty resources and sketchy training - in spite of the zealous efforts of m any of its m em bers. T here was little that was distinctively C anadian about the militia. W hile frequently criticized as following too slowly o r im perfectly the British arm y, it was nevertheless organized and trained on the m ethods of th at arm y. From England cam e its drill, its weapons, and its training. C om m anding officers for m any years cam e from Eng­ land, as did m any of the staff o f the Royal M ilitary College. C anadian officers attended the English staff college. Advice cam e in generous am ounts from English officers in Canada, cither holding positions for a term o r on special inspections. T h e colonial defence com m ittee transm itted its views on C ana­ dian defences to O ttaw a. W hen changes were m ade they consisted in closer approxim ations to British practice: more m odern rifles, organization, m obilization plans, relations be­ tween civil and m ilitary officials concerned in defence. A reading o f either the reports of British experts o r discussions by C ana­ dians gives the impression th at the excellence of the m ilitia was in direct ratio to its likeness to its prototype. In addition to this technical relation o f the m ilitary forces o f the U nited Kingdom and Canada, was another and quite different one, found in the projects fo r concerted plans for im perial defence: organization for co-operative effort tow ard a com m on end.

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III Im perial defence, as has already been suggested, was not a single but a m ultiple problem , involving the defence of C anada, o f near-by British territories, of far-distant colonies, and of im perial pow er as a whole. T he protection of C anada itself was intended, after confederation, to be prim arily a C anadian re­ sponsibility, with the understanding that in case of attack G reat Britain would render assistance as she was able. T he m ajor part o f the imperial troops had been w ithdraw n by 1871, though a garrison was left at H alifax.T he m ilitary history of both H alifax and Esquim alt is o f peculiar interest in that they alone played a dual role: as conveniently-situated ports for the British navy, which happened to be situated in C anada; and as strategic posi­ tions through w hich C anada might be invaded. T he C anadian point o f view, both in the governm ent and am ongst the public, was that the cost of m aintenance should be shared; but the actual division was not so easily reached. W hen the w orld seemed peaceful Canadians tended to take the attitude that these bases were a British concern: when any threat loomed they em pha­ sized the necessity o f British naval and m ilitary forces being represented on both coasts. Because of this shifting atm osphere, and because of the impossibility of defining the relative values received by the U nited K ingdom and the dom inion, the negotia­ tions over the allocation of cost were protracted. Soon after British Colum bia joined the federation her governm ent pressed for the graving dock at Esquim alt, for which the dom inion had prom ised in the term s of union to guarantee the interest on a loan. Correspondence then ensued between the provincial, federal, and im perial governm ents. T he last agreed to contribute £ 3 0 ,0 0 0 on condition that the dock should be suitable in dim ension and character, and that His M ajesty’s ships have preferential treatm ent there fo r fifteen years. T he dom inion governm ent, for its part, offered a grant of £ 5 0 ,0 0 0 in lieu of its guarantee in the term s of union But in spite o f these early offers there rem ained some disagreem ent, and contracts were not aw arded until 1890.18 T he m aintenance of the defensive w orks and a garrison at Esquim alt was a m ore vital question which took even longer to settle. H ere again the pressure cam e from British Columbia, through the provincial governm ent and m em bers of parliam ent, b ut the arrangem ents were to be m ade between the governments o f the U nited K ingdom and Canada. T he Russian scares of

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1877-1885 drew attention to the weak state o f defences on the Pacific coast, and tem porary m easures were taken to strengthen Esquim alt. Several years w ere then passed in correspondence between the C anadian and British governm ents, with proposals and counter-proposals as to how the responsibility for defence m ight be shared. It was not until 1893 th at an agreem ent was reached under w hich the dom inion governm ent was to pay part of the cost o f construction and the m aintenance of the buildings and defence w orks, to pay for a detachm ent of Royal M arine A rtillery, and to supply some troops to supplem ent the garrison. This, with m odifications, continued to be the basis on which E squim alt was m aintained. N o such controversy took place over H alifax, presum ably because the British governm ent regarded it as a m ore im portant naval base. It was suggested, however, that C anadian troops in the neighbourhood would be available in case of need. A step tow ard a share in the defence of H alifax was taken during the South A frican W ar, w hen a battalion was provided to relieve the British troops there fo r service elsewhere. A fuller responsibility for the defence of both ports was first suggested by the C anadian representatives at the colonial con­ ference o f 1902 in an offer to garrison both H alifax and E squim alt and was form ally renewed early in 1905. T he offer was gratefully accepted, w ith the suggestion that the change m ight be m ade gradually, C anada in the m eanw hile defraying the cost o f such im perial troops as tem porarily rem ained T he proposal was accepted substantially as it was m ade, and in 1906 the last o f the im perial troops left H alifax and Esquim alt. A t the beginning of 1907 the C anadian governm ent also took over the H alifax dockyard, though privileges for the royal navy were reserved. T he changed position at the two ports coincided with the adoption o f a new policy by the adm iralty under w hich a local squadron was no longer to be stationed at either, but an equal o r greater degree of security prom ised from the larger units in which the ships w ere thereafter to operate. T o m any C anadians, on the A tlantic and Pacific coasts alike, even one ship that could be seen was a m ore real protection than m any th at were far away. Feelings were mixed over the changes of 1905. Protests against the British abandonm ent of the stations w ere accom panied by expressions of satisfaction that C anada was accepting a greater proportion of the burden of defence T h e buildings and other property at H alifax were form ally transferred to the C anadian governm ent in 1910, and those at E squim alt in 1911, subject to their being m aintained in a state

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of efficiency, to a supply of fuel being kept, and other facilities being provided for the royal navy. Excitem ent over the new policies for H alifax and Esquim alt arose not only from the im portance of these two ports but because the decisions respecting them w ere related to the wider issues of im perial defence, then receiving a growing am oun t of public attention. N o aspect of defence was as obviously a C ana­ dian interest as th a t o f the keys to h er eastern and western coasts, b u t there were other problem s th at had to be faced, and on w hich some decisions had to be made. T he story o f th e plans discussed in tim e of peace fo r co-operative im perial defence m ay be traced through the meetings of the colonial and imperial conferences. R eferring to the program m e of the first session in 1887 the colonial secretary w rote that “in the opinion o f H er M ajesty’s governm ent the question w hich is a t once urgent and capable o f useful consideration is th at of organization fo r m ili­ ta ry defence In the opening speech L ord Salisbury disclaimed any idea that “ this proposal fo r Im perial defence is a m ere contrivance on our p art to lighten ou r burden, o r that it results from any indolence o r selfishness o f ours,” b u t w ent on to say, in an apparent non sequitur, th at “we desire th a t all should take th eir fair and legitim ate p art in a task o f w hich all ought to be p ro u d N early half the w orking tim e o f the conference was devoted to considerations of defence, m ainly on naval problem s o f the Pacific, and the possible action to be taken by the A us­ tralian colonies. T he C anadian p art in the discussions was m eagre and negative. Sir A lexander Cam pbell m ade w hat were to becom e regulation references to the Intercolonial and C an a­ dian Pacific railways as contributions to defence, and virtually denied that the British navy was greater because of any respon­ sibility fo r th e defence o f C anada T en years elapsed before the next general discussion of defence (fo r it w as not taken up at the O ttaw a session o f 1894), and then the pace was soon seen to be quickening. Joseph C ham berlain w ent straight to the point of arguing th at the great m ilitary and naval defences o f G reat Britain w ere necessitated largely by her em pire. W ithout this force behind her Canada w ould be helpless in the face o f disagreem ents w ith Japan, Russia, or the U nited States, and becom e largely a dependent pow er. T h e colonial defence com m ittee, he said, had m ade some im provem ent, but the position in the colonies in regard to defences was still not satisfactory. As positive steps he proposed th at regim ents should tem porarily be exchanged between G reat

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Britain and the colonies, and th at a colonial regim ent thus in E ngland might take part in any m ilitary operations th at occurred. It is evident from the record of the conference that the colonial prem iers m ade no prom ise o f anything m ore than an exam ination o f the proposed interchange. Sir W ilfrid L aurier attended his second colonial conference in 1902 w ithout the South A frican W ar having shaken his inherent nationalism ; in L ondon he faced Joseph C ham berlain, whose im perialism had been fortified by the com m on efforts of that war. From other colonies came representatives w ith no less conflicting policies. In the p rep ara­ tions fo r the agenda, defence, am ongst other subjects, was suggested by the colonial secretary. In reply M into was obliged to report that his m inisters did not consider that “ in the varying conditions o f the Colonies there can be any scheme of defence applicable to all Taxed by the leader o f the opposition with returning a discourteous reply, L aurier denied any such inten­ tion, b ut repeated th at no useful purpose could be served by discussion o f defence. T he governm ent would, he said, be ready to discuss the defence of C anada, but som ething other than that was intended by a school in England and C anada “which wants to bring C anada into the vortex o f m ilitarism which is the curse and the blight of E urope D efence, how ever, appeared on the agenda; and indeed the conference w ould have been entirely unrealistic if th at had been excluded. In his opening speech C ham berlain again pointed to the heavy burden of defence borne by Britain - a burden which was largely due to the existence of the colonies. But the colonies were no longer young and poor: they w ere rich enough to offer tem ptation to aggression and strong enough to assum e a share o f their own defence To introduce the subject o f naval defence the first lord o f th e adm iralty spoke on the position of sea-power and m ade in particular two points: that the task o f the navy was n ot literally defence of certain places, but o f destroying the enem y fleet; and th at the m aritim e spirit of the em pire and the sense of personal interest should be aroused by having m ore colonials in the navy. H e had, he said, consulted the prem iers, all of w hom had offered m oney grants except L aurier, who had said that he was not able to m ake a sim ilar offer, but th at his governm ent was contem plating the establishm ent of a local naval force. Figures were produced showing the per capita naval expenditure (C anada being n il), and a d raft agreem ent on naval plans was m ade between the U nited K ingdom , A ustralia, and N ew Zealand; but the C anadian representatives rem ained aloof.

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On m ilitary policy m ore definite plans w ere p u t forw ard. T he secretary of state fo r w ar advocated a highly trained, if small, force in each colony to be held in readiness for im perial service. T o this the representatives o f both A ustralia and C anada ob­ jected on the ground that it would be a derogation of the principles of self-governm ent. A parallel plan by N ew Zealand for an im perial reserve force appeared w ith the approval of the colonial defence com m ittee; the com m ittee also sponsored a p ap er by L ieutenant-Colonel A ltham , assistant quarterm astergeneral at the w ar office, which proposed that specified troops in each colony (3,000 in C anada) should be ready to supple­ m ent the British arm y in case o f need. T he C anadian policy was sum m ed up in a m em orandum (printed as appendix vi to the rep o rt) draw n up by the C anadian m inisters regretting their inability to assent to suggestions o f either the adm iralty o r the w ar office. T heir objections arose, they said, “ not so m uch from the expense involved, as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposals w ould entail an im portant departure from the p rin ­ ciple o f colonial self-governm ent.” They recognized th at C anada should take over m ore of th e burden o f “self-defence,” and held that while the C anadian m ilitia had defects it was being im proved. On the naval side they contem plated a naval reserve. In any defence schemes they wished to co-operate w ith the im perial authorities, so far as that was com patible with selfgovernm ent. Im plicitly the m em orandum gave the impression th at C anada should be increasingly responsible for her own defence; but it avoided any reference to activities outside Canada. A t the colonial conference of 1907 the C anadian policy in regard to defence was substantially unchanged: no com m it­ m ents, no contributions to British naval o r land forces, and no outside control over any part of the C anadian forces. But w hatever the reason - w hether it was th at the atm osphere was better, o r th at the British governm ent had learned wisdom —the conference proceeded m ore sm oothly tow ard positive results. Progress, how ever, was least m arked in regard to naval defence. L ord T w eedm outh, first lord of the adm iralty, adm itted British responsibility for naval defence. Colonial aid would be wel­ com ed in any one of several form s, so long as consistent with control o f strategy and unity o f com m and T he C anadian reply was m ade by the m inister o f m arine and fisheries, L. P. Brodeur. T he C anadian position, he said, was different from th at of the other colonies and should be treated as such. H e objected to a

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docum ent show ing th at C anada had spent nothing on naval defence, citing the fisheries protection service, the naval militia, wireless stations, the hydrographic survey, and assum ption of the dockyards a t H alifax and Esquim alt. C anada was o f one m ind, he said, on the proposal to contribute directly to the British navy. A resolution m oved by one o f the representatives o f C ape Colony in favour of the principle of colonial contribu­ tions in som e form to the British navy was directly opposed by L aurier and w ithdraw n. It w as on m ilitary defence th at the conference reached positive agreem ent. L ord H aldane, secretary of state for war, explained how the general staff had grow n out of the recom m endations o f the E sher com m ittee of 1904, and suggested that the sam e principle might be applied to the em pire, to m eet w hat he described as “ the desirability o f a certain broad plan o f m ilitary organisation.” Sir Frederick Borden, after ascertaining that there was no idea o f creating a body with authority in C anada, accepted in principle one with advisory functions, and in which there should be interchange of officers with the general staff of C anada. T he proposal was then em bodied in a general resolution and accepted by all the m em bers of the conference. It was on these lines th a t im perial m ilitary defence was to develop from then on. “T he elaborate plans fo r pre-arranged contingents,” concludes Colonel H am ilton, “thus dropped to a proposal for an Im perial general staff. T his m eant m ore than the civilian reader m ight suspect, for it carried the idea of establishing in the E m pire com m on types o f organization, co-ordinated plans fo r action, a com m on way of thinking on m ilitary problem s, a com m on doctrine o f w ar It w as fully understood, and definitely stated over and over again, that no prom ise or guarantee was m ade by the dom inions to provide contingents, and th at there was no suprem e m ilitary authority in C anada save that of its governm ent. O n the other hand, the Canadian governm ent willingly entered into the plan fo r uni­ form ity of education and organization, and for com m on discus­ sion o f m ilitary problem s. Follow ing the general agreem ent at the conference of 1907 a m em orandum w as draw n up by the general staff and circulated to the dom inions at the end of 1908.31 F urth er progress along the sam e lines was m ade at the subsidiary conference o f 1909 (a form o f additional conference provided for under resolution o f the colonial conference of 1907, and called because of the im m ediacy o f the G erm an naval ch allen g e). T he m ilitary experts m et together under the chair­

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m anship o f the chief o f the im perial general staff and exam ined a m em orandum subm itted by him of “Proposals for so organiz­ ing the m ilitary forces of the em pire as to ensure their effective co-operation in the event o f w ar R ecom m endations were m ade by the experts designed to im plem ent the general objectives o f uniform ity of training, equipm ent, and organization, for the relations o f general staff officers in the dom inion and the U nited K ingdom , and fo r the education o f officers. These recom m enda­ tions were then accepted by the full conference and the com m ittee of im perial defence. “T he result,” M r. A squith told the H ouse of C om m ons, “is a plan for so organizing the forces o f the Crow n w herever they are that, while preserving the com plete autonom y of each D om inion, should the D om inions desire to assist in the defence o f the E m pire in a real em ergency, their forces could be rapidly com bined into one homogeneous Im perial A rm y.” W hen the conference again m et in 1911, under its new title o f “ im perial conference,” progress was reported on the plans generally accepted in 19 07.33 T he im perial general staff, al­ though only two years old, was said to have m ade progress, and a C anadian section to be in process of form ation. It was reported th at officers of the C anadian perm anent force w ere undergoing the sam e exam inations for prom otion as those in the British regular arm y. T he arm y council expressed its willingness that the inspector-general should inspect overseas forces a t the request o f a dom inion W hile these and other aspects of reorganization were going forw ard, an attem pt was m ade to change the principles then being followed by a revived plan for central political control over the defence forces of all parts of the em pire. A lthough other aspects of defence were brought before the com m ittee o f im perial defence ra th e r than the im­ perial conference, Sir Joseph W ard’s project for an imperial parliam ent o r council for im perial defence came, as a previous resolution, before the conference F rom the first of the discus­ sion W ard ’s plan evoked little sym pathy from any of the representatives of other p arts o f the em pire, and frank opposi­ tion from most. In the course o f being questioned, W ard adm itted that his parliam ent w ould have authority to com pel the dom inions to m ake contributions to an im perial navy - an idea w hich was s.o far rem oved from practical politics as to be hopeless of achievem ent. W ith this m otion w ithdraw n, the discussions o f defence proceeded in the com m ittee of imperial defence and at the w ar office and adm iralty.

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F ro m 1911 until 1914 the organization o f im perial defence lay, in the main, in two bodies: the im perial general staff and the com m ittee o f imperial defence. Both w ere advisory bodies, and both contained representatives of the dom inions. T he latter had no fixed m em bership, but dom inion representatives might attend, as full m em bers, as the occasion required. T hat the com m ittee was also used in 1911 as the body in which foreign policy was discussed has been seen as having dangerous impli­ cations for dom inion autonom y T he fact was, however, that c o o p e ra tio n in foreign policy was not keeping pace with co-operation in m ilitary policy: in other words, the control over the developm ent o f situations in which the m ilitary plans might be called into play was virtually left by the dominions (so cautious about m ilitary control) to the British foreign office. T he risk this involved was preferred, by C anada at least, to the m ore ap parent risk involved in consultation and responsibility.

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IV In the last qu arter of the nineteenth century wars and rum ours o f w ars gave reality to the m ilitary policy o f C anada in respect of both local and im perial defence. F ear of Russian attack, which had long been dorm ant, revived with the critical inter­ national situation in the near east in the years after 1877. Between the C rim ean and the Japanese wars the strength of Russia was com m only over-estim ated; and when the invasion of T urkey threatened an A nglo-Russian w ar m any Canadians found cause fo r alarm , not merely in the danger to the U nited K ing­ dom but also in threats to their own shipping and coasts. A nd in the sam e period, while fear o f A m erican aggression had m ateri­ ally abated, good relations with the U nited States were not taken fo r granted. O ne T oronto editor conjured up unpleasant visions of difficulties w ith both Russia and the U nited States. . . . we regard as absolutely fallacious the idea entertained in so m e quarters that there is anything in the Treaty o f Paris [of 1856] which will prevent Russia fro m issuing com m issions to vessels intended to prey upon the com m ercial m arine o f England and her colonies in case o f war, and if the Canadian G overnm ent is hugging itself on a contrary notion and so neglecting to provide fo r possible contingencies, we fear they, and all people here who hold them , are destined to a rough awakening . . . any Power can at any tim e issue com m issions to

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any vessel it pleases, and convert it into an addendum to its own belligerent navy. M oreover, it is quite on the cards that co m ­ plications m ay arise between Great Britain and the U nited States in connection with this delicate point, and it will not do fo r us in Canada to be slum bering in a fo o l’s paradise. . . . While Canada in fact has nothing w hatever to gain, as a colony, by war between Russia and England, it has a very great deal to lose, and hostilities are sure to subject us as a colonial depend­ ency to constant alarms and risks. This is a point which we fear is not y e t realized by our people. . .

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A few clays later the M ail pointed to the danger o f hostilities in the N orth Pacific. In fact the governm ent was not slum bering, b ut had already discussed the defenceless condition of the A tlan­ tic coast, and appealed to Britain for a fleet o f fast cruisers W hen the dispatch reached the adm iralty the reply was that the m atter had long been under consideration; that the A m erican Civil W ar had shown w hat dam age could be done by a single fast cruiser; and th at a considerable expenditure w ould be required to afford any adequate protection. “Looking,” the adm iralty reply continued, “at the very large m ercantile m arine possessed by the D om inion, it is only reasonable to assum e that the C anadian governm ent will avail themselves of their resources for the protection o f C anadian ports and shipping,” but sug­ gested aid by the loan of guns A lready the governm ent had authorized the expenditure o f $ “ in view of the precau­ tionary m easures now being taken for defensive purposes but apparently did not respond to the larger suggestion. A ppre­ hension continued for some tim e. In 1879 reports were circulated that a Russian steam er from the Baltic was off the coast of M aine, and was laden with guns and seamen to supply com nierce-raiders. In 1883 the Senate discussed the defenceless condition of the Pacific coast. W. J. M acdonald, who brought up the question, spoke of the com parative nearness of Russian naval bases, the possibility o f an Indian uprising in case of war, and the need for m ore protection by the royal navy In 1885 a sim ilar concern for the A tlantic coast was expressed by the Saint John Telegraph in a suggestion that a Russian w arship m ight quite possibly com e into th at h arb o u r Before the Russian danger had ceased to stir C anadian feel­ ings the affairs of Egypt brought on a new and different type of m ilitary question. W hen W olseley was organizing an expedition in 1884 to relieve G ordon, cut off at K hartoum , he cabled a

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request for voyageurs, like those who had gone w ith him to the R ed River in 1870, as steersm en for the N ile boats. A party num bering 386 all ranks was sent, m ade up in part of Indians and in p art o f lum berm en (fo r the voyageurs had all but disappeared T he expedition reached K hartoum too late, and as the situation in the Sudan becam e increasingly grave, N ew South W ales offered a contingent. Should C anada take sim ilar action? Individual C anadians prom ptly offered to raise regi­ m ents, and there were suggestions that the governm ent should send a contingent. F rom L ondon T upper cabled th at Canada should send and pay for troops. “T he cost,” he w rote later, “would not be m uch and C anada cannot in my judgm ent afford to do less after w hat New South W ales has done. It will be repaid to the country in m any ways and carry out the expectations raised by your speeches h e r e .. . T he W eek o f T oronto rather sur­ prisingly called for sending substantial aid A m ore general attitude, however, was that expressed by the M a il and the Globe o f T oronto and the Saint John D aily Telegraph.**.Britain, the argum ent ran, w as not in danger. Filial loyalty might properly inspire individual offers o f service, but only a m ajor crisis should lead the dom inion to m ake an official effort, at her own expense. A sim ilar but m ore vigorous opinion was expressed in the M anitoba Free Press, which com m ented that “ all the talk we have heard about C anada’s fighting the battles of England is very silly and quite likely to be h u rtfu l In this particular case the m atter was decided by the outbreak o f the N orth-W est Rebellion which required th at all available C anadian troops should rem ain in Canada. It was w orthy o f note that in this, unlike the first Riel rebellion, im perial troops were not needed. T en years later the V enezuela controversy caused m ore than a ripple in C anada, and had an interest in that it again involved the possibility - though perhaps a rem ote one - o f defence against the U nited States. This also m arked the last occasion on which considerable preparations were m ade as defence against the U nited States. But much the m ost im portant m ilitary event fo r C anada between the period of the Civil W ar and Fenian raids and the W ar of 1914 was the South A frican W ar. T he decision to be m ade by the C anadian governm ent was n ot an easy one, since the struggle with the Boers m ight be interpreted either as an episode in British im perial developm ent or as a crisis of dimensions sufficient to threaten the power and prestige o f the em pire o f w hich C anada was part. It was an imperial question m idw ay between the Sudan expeditions and the W ar of

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1914. In C anada, too, it m ight take the appearance o f the repression o f one ethnic group by another, and so touch a delicate nerve. In the sum m er of 1899, as the situation in South A frica becam e m ore acute, several British colonies m ade offers of m ilitary aid in the event of hostilities, and in C anada there were some suggestions th a t their exam ple should be followed. Both p arliam ent and public, how ever, w ere slow in reaching that conclusion. On July 31 the prim e m inister introduced a resolu­ tion into the H ouse o f C om m ons expressing sym pathy with the British governm ent in its attem pt to secure equal rights fo r British subjects in the Transvaal. W hether o r not this could be taken as an endorsem ent of British policy, it was not enough to satisfy the growing dem and fo r m ore tangible aid. J. S. W illison, then editor o f the G lobe, bluntly told L au rier th at he would have to send troops o r go out of office, a conclusion w ith which L aurier was reluctantly forced to agree before long A t the beginning o f O ctober events m oved rapidly. O n the third Joseph C ham berlain, the colonial secretary, who fo r three m onths had been angling for official prom ises o f aid, cabled an acknow ledg­ m ent o f private “offers to serve in South A frica” and described the m eans by w hich they could be carried o u t On the same day L aurier had given an interview in w hich he said that while C anadian forces m ight be sent abroad in defence o f C anada, the South A frican situation did n ot create any such menace. F o r this reason, and because parliam ent (w hich was not sitting) would have to grant the money, no troops had been offered. It has som etim es been said th at L aurier’s hand was forced by C ham ­ b erlain’s cable: it is m ore probable th at it was forced by the pressure of public opinion. C ertainly he was in an uncom fortable position. Personally reluctant to take any action, not believing that the South A frican affair w ould assum e large proportions, and pressed in his own province not to intervene, he found him self obliged either to do so, o r to allow the opposition free play w ith public sentim ent in m ost of English-speaking C anada. O nce the decision was m ade no constitutional difficulty was allowed to stand in the way. A n ingeniously w orded privy council rep o rt o f O ctober 14 show ed the hope o f the cabinet th at it was possible to accept a very lim ited liability. A fter quoting C ham berlain’s dispatch, the rep o rt states that,

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conditions, is o f opinion that the m oderate expenditure which would thus be involved fo r the equipm ent and transportation o f such volunteers m ay readily be undertaken by the governm ent o f Canada without sum m oning parliament, especially as such an expenditure under such circum stances cannot be regarded as a departure fro m the well know n principles o f constitutional governm ent and colonial practice, nor construed as a precedent fo r fu tu re action

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O n O ctober 30, within a day o f the last date set by Cham berlain, a battalion of over a thousand men sailed from Canada. As they had originally proposed, the British governm ent were to bear all expenses other than the differential between Canadian and British rates of pay from the tim e the troops landed, but one change w as m ade in that the C anadians were to be kept as a separate unit. O n N ovem ber 2, after news of reverses, the C anadian governm ent cabled an offer of another contingent, which, however, was not accepted until the situation had grown even worse in D ecem ber. Thus, when parliam ent m et in F ebruary 1900 the C anadian governm ent had, on its own authority, sent two contingents to a w ar th at had already show n itself to be the m ost serious in which G reat Britain had been engaged for half a century. The debates in both H ouses w ere prolonged and at times impressive. W hile the governm ent enjoyed an alm ost unanim ous support on m ain principles, criticism was not lacking. Some there were who held that m ore rapid and m ore generous aid should have been rendered, and in particular that C anada should have borne all expenses. O thers objected to any participation. Even the breezy language of the privy council report could not disguise the fact that the governm ent had acted w ithout sanction of parliam ent, but the great m ajority agreed that, under the cir­ cum stances, this was justifiable. T here w ere long discussions of the causes o f the war, of the im portance o f South A frica to G reat Britain, and o f the interest which C anada had in the struggle. T he general tenor of the debate was that British policy had been neither unreasonable nor aggressive; but a vocal m inority, led by Bourassa, condem ned the policy and the action of C anada in supporting it. T he em phasis constantly laid on the position of Q uebec revealed both the existence of an anti-war party there and the apprehension in the other provinces that that party might be dangerously strong. C onstant protests w ere made that Q uebec was “loyal,” but it was also apparent that the most

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critical speeches cam e from m em bers for Q uebec constituencies. O ne fu rth e r test of the governm ent’s policy cam e in the general election of 1900, an election largely fought on th at policy, and in w hich an elem ent o f bitterness was all too apparent. T he results o f the polling were som ew hat striking: in O ntario the governm ent lost fourteen seats, and in Quebec it gained all but seven. It was easily apparent, therefore, that there had been no serious revolt in Q uebec against L aurier; while the vote in O ntario m ust be explained not by any opposition to the w ar but, in p art, by dissatisfaction at such cautious participation. T h e C anadian contribution to the w ar w as not inconsider­ able. T h e forces sent overseas consisted, first, o f the second (special service) battalion o f the Royal C anadian Regim ent at a strength o f 1,150 officers and m en, under the com m and of a C anadian, L ieutenant-Colonel O tter. T he second contingent, recruited at the end of 1899, included the Royal C anadian D ragoons (tw o sq u ad ro n s), draw n largely from the perm anent force, the C anadian M ounted Rifles (tw o sq uadrons), recruited in p art from the N orth W est M ounted Police, and three batteries of Royal C anadian A rtillery, also recruited in p art from the perm anent force. In addition to the two first C anadian con­ tingents were troops later raised in C anada, but not directly by the C anadian governm ent. These included L ord S lrathcona’s H orse, o f three squadrons, the expenses o f w hich were m et by L ord Strathcona; twelve squadrons o f the South A frican co n ­ stabulary; the 2nd C anadian M ounted Rifles; the 10th C anadian Field H ospital; and the 3rd, 4 th, 5th, and th C anadian M ounted Rifles (these last arriving after the conclusion o f p eace). In all 7,300 m en w ent to South A frica In C anada the 3rd Battalion, R oyal C anadian R egim ent, was raised to relieve the imperial garrison at H alifax. Citizens contributed to the Red Cross and P atriotic F u n d organizations in C anada, and to provide insur­ ance and other funds fo r the troops. Owing to the short term of enlistm ent parts o f the forces returned to C anada before the end o f hostilities, no r w ere the reinforcem ents adequate to keep the units up to strength. A p art from these weaknesses the C anadian troops played an active and efficient p art in the war. T hough lacking in training and experience on arrival in South A frica, they perform ed their duties satisfactorily, and at tim es with conspicuous success W hile C anadians had thus played an active part in the war, th eir governm ent had had no influence on the circum stances w hich led to its outbreak o r on the m ethods by which it was

6

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conducted. It rem ained to be seen w hether the C anadian govern­ m ent would exercise, o r wish to exercise, any control over the term s on w hich peace was to be m ade. O n several occasions the criticism was m ade in parliam ent th at C anada h ad gone into a w ar fo r which she was in no way responsible, and the sim ilar objection was raised against a purely English peace. In 1900 and 1901 Bourassa asked in the H ouse of C om m ons w hether the governm ent had been consulted on the conditions o f peace, or intended to offer any opinion; and on both occasions the prim e m inister explicitly replied in the negative In 1902 John C harlton moved a cautious resolution asking for a m agnanim ous treatm ent o f the Boers. In the debate th at followed m ost o f the speakers agreed with the prim e m inister th at the C anadian parliam ent had a right to express such opinions, b u t th at to intervene w hen peace w as actually un d er discussion might prolong, rather than shorten, the w ar. O ther m em bers said that C anada had already been too free in expressing opinions The m otion was w ithdraw n; and the C anadian participation in the South A frican W ar continued to be confined to its m ilitary aspect.

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V N aval defence was no less im portant to C anada than land defence, afte r confederation as before it; but so long as the British navy m aintained unquestioned suprem acy on the seas C anadians could and did expect th a t their coasts w ould be protected by that great force w ithout their contributing ships themselves. F o r th at reason there was in the dom inion no pres­ sure to form ulate a naval policy until, in the tw entieth century, the dom inant position held since T rafalgar began to be th reat­ ened by G erm any. Even then the C anadian governm ent and parliam ent moved slowly to m eet the new circum stances. T h ro u g h the colonial conference of 1907 the C anadian attitude was alm ost w holly negative, being sim ply a refusal to m ake contributions to the British navy. In the following years, how­ ever, the vague suggestions o f a C anadian navy began to harden into a positive policy. T here had long been differing views in C an ad a on naval defence. O ne school o f thought concurred with the view, presented at earlier colonial conferences, that the English burden of naval defence was m aterially increased by the existence o f the colonies; and th at the latter should consequently take steps to share that burden. A nother held th at British naval

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pow er was designed fo r defence o f world-wide trade and was as large as it was because of a British conviction th at sea-power, fo r an island dependent on sea-com m unication for its prosperity and very life, m ust be unquestioned. T hose who held the form er view suggested either a direct contribution o f money o r ships to the British navy (the plan m ost acceptable to the adm iralty ), o r a C anadian navy acting, when occasion required, in concert with the royal navy. Occasionally, as at the tim e o f the Russian scares, the people o f both coasts at least w ere conscious o f the need of naval protection, but otherw ise the obviously superior pow er o f the British navy prevented any feeling of necessity. It was only in 1909 when the G erm an construction obviously began to threaten British suprem acy that the C anadian people were aroused to a desire for action. T here were, it is true, some w ho claim ed th a t the danger was unduly, and even im properly, m agnified; there were also those who continued to believe that naval defence was a British, and not a C anadian, responsibility. T h e effective m ajority, however, accepted the proposition that the threat was real, and that C anada m ust lend aid to com bat it. In w hat form th at aid was to be rendered rem ained a m atter of disagreem ent. T h e first substantive discussion o f the naval question in parliam ent showed a rem arkable unanim ity o f opinion On M arch 29, 1909, a prom inent Conservative, G. E. Foster, intro­ duced a resolution which, in general term s, expressed the responsibility o f C anada fo r a share in the defence of h er coasts. In an explanatory speech he said th at there were two ways of assuming this responsibility. O ne was by the contribution of m oney to the adm iralty. T o this he saw objec­ tions, and would prefer the creation o f a C anadian naval force. L aurier im m ediately expressed his agreem ent in principle, but suggested that the resolution relate only to the form ation o f a C anadian naval service. Borden intervened to propose that, while this was the proper course, the possibility of a contribu­ tion in case of em ergency should not be excluded. A fter further am endm ents a resolution was passed unanim ously. It recognized “the duty of the people of C anada, as they increase in numbers and w ealth, to assum e in large m easure the responsibilities of national defence,” stated that the paym ent “of regular and periodical contributions” would not be the best course, and approved expenditure for a C anadian naval service, recognizing that “the naval suprem acy o f B ritain is essential to the security

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of com m erce, the safety o f the em pire and the peace o f the w orld.” T h e scene then tem porarily shifted to London. A t about the sam e time as the C anadian resolution the governm ents of New Zealand and A ustralia had offered battleships. T he British gov­ ernm ent, in view of the actions of the three dom inions, and of its understanding that th e C anadian governm ent intended to send its m inister of m ilitia and defence to England fo r consulta­ tions, proposed the holding o f a subsidiary defence conference, as provided for by the colonial conference of 1907.50 W hen the conference duly m et at the end of July the adm iralty subm itied a m em orandum expressing its preference for a single navy, but agreeing that the conditions in some o f the dom inions led them to prefer local naval forces. F or those th at followed this policy it was recom m ended that a distinct fleet unit should be the aim. Such a unit should include one arm oured and three unarm oured cruisers, six destroyers, three subm arines, and the necessary auxiliaries. “T he estim ated first cost o f building and arm ing such a com plete fleet unit would be approxim ately £ 3 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 , and the cost of m aintenance, including upkeep of vessels, pay, and interest and sinking fund, at British rates, approxim ately £ 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 per annum .” T o these sum s should be added the pay o f persons in the auxiliary services, and of those in training, sick, and in reserve. Ship-building and repairing establishm ents would be required, training schools, and sources of stores. W hile a dom inion w ould thus provide its own navy com plete, there should be uniform ity in equipm ent, training, and discipline. It was understood that in time o f w ar the local naval forces should com e under the general direction o f the adm iralty. In the discussions that followed (of w hich only a sum m ary was printed) between the British and C anadian representatives, a m uch less am bitious program m e was considered. G iven C anada’s double seaboard, a fleet u nit was recognized as unsuitable, and the adm iralty, on ascertaining that C anada asked for two plans for naval forces involving a cost o f £ 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 or £ 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 annu­ ally, suggested lo u r cruisers and six destroyers or three cruisers and four destroyers. D uring the period of construction and training the adm iralty was prepared to lend two cruisers, and also volunteers from the royal navy to be paid by the Canadian governm ent. T he address from the throne in N ovem ber 1909 forecast a C anadian navy, and January 1910 L aurier introduced the N aval Service Bill providing for a departm ent o f the naval

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service, a naval reserve force, a naval volunteer force, and a naval college. In case of em ergency all o r p art of the navy could be placed at the service of the royal navy. T he prim e m inister explained that o f the two program m es drafted by the adm iralty at his request the governm ent would choose the larger one, providing eleven ships at a cost of $3 m illion. It soon became apparent, as had been indicated in the previous m onths, that unanim ity was at an end. T he Conservatives, though otherwise disunited, were opposed to the bill. T he official position of the party, as expressed by Borden, was that the electors should be consulted and that the plan was faulty in th at no provision was m ade to m eet the im m ediate em ergency. T he proper m ethod for doing so, he said, was to provide the royal navy w ith two dreadnoughts. F . D. M onk, leader of the Conservative party in Quebec, argued against either a C anadian navy or a contribu­ tion to the British one. T he governm ent’s plan w ould tie Canada to the foreign policy of Britain, in w hich she had no voice, and create a com m itm ent to fight in any British w ar. T here should, he said, be a plebiscite. In a speech outside the H ouse, H enri Bourassa continued to flay the whole policy. T here was no G erm an m enace; there was no threat to C anada; there was no prospect of Britain consulting C anada on foreign policy; there should be a plebiscite. In spite o f these and other criticisms the am endm ents w ere defeated and the bill passed by a com fortable m ajority. T h e first steps to im plem ent the act cam e quickly enough. A minister, deputy-m inister, and director o f naval services were appointed and a naval college established at H alifax. Tw o old cruisers were bought from the U nited K ingdom . T he N iobe was a very large and heavily-arm ed vessel and the R ainbow smaller. It was an encouraging beginning, m arked by flags, salutes, and speeches - and it was also virtually th e end. N io b e struck a rock off Cape Sable and was not repaired until the end of 1912. R ainbow , after som e cruises up and down the west coast, rested in Esquim alt fo r h arb o u r training. T enders were called for con­ struction of fu rth er ships in C anada but no contracts had been aw arded before the fall o f the Liberal governm ent. M eanw hile there w ere discussions of naval policy at the im­ perial conference o f 1911. Representatives of the adm iralty and o f A ustralia and C anada reached an agreem ent set forth in a m em orandum T he naval forces of the two dom inions w ere to be u n d er the control of their respective governm ents, but train­ ing and discipline were to be generally uniform , with those o f the

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fleet of the U nited K ingdom , and officers and m en m ight be interchanged. T he C anadian and A ustralian navies were to have their own naval stations, the limits of w hich were defined. “In time of war, w hen the naval service of a D om inion, o r any part thereof, has been p u t at the disposal of the Im perial governm ent by the D om inion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of the British fleet, and will rem ain under the control of the British A dm iralty during the continuance o f the w ar.” T he election o f 1911 stopped the further progress of the plans of 1910. O utside Quebec the dom inating issue in the elec­ tion was the reciprocity project, but in that province the issue was naval policy. Borden continued, in public statem ents, to describe the L iberals’ navy as expensive and useless, as a “politi­ cal m akeshift.” Significantly for his later policy he added that “responsibility for Em pire defence clearly involves som e voice in Em pire policy. C anada’s perm anent and effective co-operation in naval defence can only be accom plished by proposals which take account of this consideration and any such proposals should be subm itted to the people for their approval.” The nationalist point o f view in Quebec, as expressed by M onk and Bourassa, claim ed th at the Liberal policy would lead C anada into B ritain’s imperialist w ars and was not required for the defence of Canada. A s a result o f the vote the governm ent lost seriously in Q uebec and overwhelmingly in O ntario. W hen the Conservatives cam e into office in 1911 the N aval Service A ct stayed on the statute book but no contracts for additional ships w ere aw arded and the sm all force th at had been built up continued to disintegrate. On being questioned in the H ouse the m inister said th at a new policy w ould be brought forw ard; meanwhile no substantive change would be m ade. In June 1912 Borden w ent to E ngland, accom panied by three other m inisters and expert advisers, and there a series o f con­ versations was held with A squith, other cabinet ministers, offi­ cials of the adm iralty, and the com m ittee of im perial defence. T h ere were discussions of the international situation, the G er­ m an naval program m e, the action which C anada m ight take, and how the dom inions could have a voice in im perial foreign policy. T he first lord of the adm iralty, W inston C hurchill, stressed the need for an em ergency contribution to the royal navy. In D ecem ber 1912 Borden introduced the N aval Aid Bill into the H ouse of Com m ons. Starting from the point of view of developm ents w ithin the em pire, he said th at the problem was to

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reconcile co-operation w ith dom inion autonom y. It was fully understood th at sharing naval defence m ust be accom panied by sharing control o f foreign policy. T he naval suprem acy of the em pire was threatened, and for this reason there should be an im m ediate contribution o f the cost of three dreadnoughts ($35 m illion). C anadians could serve on these ships, which would necessarily be constructed in England; and the ships could later be recalled to form p art o f a C anadian u nit o f the royal navy. T he Conservative policy was to have even less success than the Liberal one. T he opposition argued th at the navy should be a C anadian one, though larger than they themselves had planned in 1910, and L au rier moved an am endm ent in th at sense. It was argued that there was no real em ergency, and that the Conserva­ tive policy endangered dom inion autonom y. R epresentation on the com m ittee of im perial defence (w hich the governm ent had accepted as a first step) w ould not be an effective way o f influ­ encing im perial foreign policy. Britain was richer than Canada. Only a C anadian navy would defend the C anadian coasts. In spite o f the loss o f M onk, who had resigned from the cabinet, the governm ent had am ple votes to pass the bill. T he opposition, how ever, adopted w hat was claim ed to be a policy of obstruc­ tion and the debate w ent on for week after week. F inally the governm ent introduced closure and the bill was passed through the C om m ons in M ay. T he Senate (which still had a Liberal m ajority) took, how ever, the unusual course of defeating the bill afte r advancing argum ents already fam iliar. T he question, said the Senate m ajority, should be “subm itted to the judgm ent o f the country.” A virtual stalem ate had been reached, partly because of sin­ cere differences of opinion and partly from party m anoeuvring. T h e governm ent was unwilling to renew a debate which could only have the sam e ending as before, and equally unwilling to reverse its policy by sponsoring the L iberal plan for a C anadian navy. N ot only was no progress m ade along either o f the two paths proposed by the parties, but even the naval force already acquired was not m aintained in a state o f efficiency. T he person­ nel was allowed to dwindle and the two cruisers were tem pora­ rily o ut of commission. C anada was thus left with no naval policy and alm ost no navy. Y et the danger which had brought the issue to a head was as real as the m ost pessimistic had described it. T he G erm an navy was a fact, and the policy which had brought it into being was soon to be translated into fact in the W ar of 1914.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

Origins o f the C anadian Society (PP. 1-22) 1. F o r the influence o f N ew England o n N o v a Scotia see J. B. B rebner, N ew E n g lan d ’s O utpost: A cad ia B efore the C onquest o f C anada (N ew Y o rk , 1927), and T he N e u tra l Y ankees o f N ova S cotia: A M arg in al C olony during the R evolutionary Years (New Y o rk , 1 9 3 7 )C arleton L ib rary N o. 45; also M . L. H ansen, T he M ingling o f the C anadian a n d A m erican Peoples (N ew H aven a n d T o ro n to , 1940). 2. W . P. M . K ennedy (e d .), S tatu tes, Treaties a n d D ocum ents o f tht C anadian C o nstitution, 1 7 1 3 -1 9 2 9 (T o ro n to , 1930), p. 171. 3. M . Sm ith, A G eographical View o f the B ritish Possessions in N o rth A m erica (B altim ore, 1814), p. 51. 4. S t . Jo h n N ew B runsw icker, Ju ly 15, 1842. 5. F o r a full study o f this subject see H ansen, M ingling o f the C anadian a n d A m erican P eoples, chap. vi. 6. The G leaner (M ira m ic h i), D ec. 30, 1850. 7. La M in e n e (M o n tre a l), F eb . 6, 1853. 8. Sir R obert F alco n er, “ Scottish Influence in the H ig h er E d u cation of C an a d a " ( Proceedings an d T ransactions o f the R oyal Society of C an ad a, 1927), “ E nglish Influence on the H igher E d u catio n of C an a d a ” (ib id ., 1928), “ A m erican Influence o n the H igher E ducation o f C an a d a ” (ib id ., 1930). 9. R . M . Saunders, “ T h e C u ltu ra l D evelopm ent o f N ew F ran c e B efore 1760” (E ssay s in C anadian H isto ry , ed. by R. Flenley, T o ro n to , 1939), p. 329. 10. G eorges V attier, Essai su r la m entality canadienne-fransalse (P aris, 1928), p. 133. 11. L om e Pierce, “ E nglish C an ad ian L iteratu re ” (T h e R oyal Society of C an ad a: Fifty Y ears R etro sp ect, T o ro n to , 1932), p. 57. 12. N ew ton M acTavish, T he F in e A rts in C an a d a (T oronto, 1925), p. 9 fj. 13. O n the P ro testa n t churches see G . W . B row n, “ T he E arly M ethodist C hurch and the C an ad ian P o in t o f View” (R ep o rt o f the C anadian H isto rical A ssociation, 1938), and “ T h e F o rm ativ e P eriod o f the C an ad ian P ro testan t C h u rch es" (E ssays in C anadian H isto ry , cd. by R. F len ley ). 14. L a M inerve, M arch 30, 1848. 15. Ib id ., M ay 18, 1848. 16. L e P ay s (M o n tre a l), A p ril 12, 1856. 17. Ib id ., M arch 23, 1858. 18. M ackenzie’s W eekly M essage (T o ro n to ), O ct. 22, 1859. 19. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, Series G , vol. 148, p. 142. 20. L a M inerve, D ec. 12, 1851. 21. M ackenzie's W eekly M essage, N ov. 20, 1857. 22. B ritish C olonist (T o ro n to ), O ct. 29, 1857.

256 - A H I S T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 23. L a M inerve, Feb. 26, 1846. 24. The G leaner, M ay 6, 1850. 25. The N ovascolian (H a lifa x ), A ug. 5, 1861. 26. The P ilo t, quoted in Q uebec G azette, M arch 18, 1846. 27. B ritish C olonist, A pril 3, 1858. 28. Ib id ., A p ril 14, 1841.

CHAPTER 2

D iplom acy and W ar (pp. 23-46) 1. F o r N o v a S cotia an d C an a d a d uring the A m erican revolution see, in ter a lia , J . B. B rebner, T he N e u tra l Y ankees o f N o v a S cotia: A M arg in al C olony d uring the R evolutionary Y ears (N ew Y o rk , 1937); G . M . W rong, C an ad a a n d the A m erican R evolution: T he D isruption o f the F irs t B ritish Em pire (N ew Y o rk , 1935); Ju stin H . Sm ith, Our Struggle f o r the F o u rteen th Colony: C an a d a during the A m erican R evolution (2 vols., N ew Y o rk , 1907). 2. F u ll acco u n t o f the p eace negotiations will be found in S. F . Bemis, "C a n a d a and th e Peace S ettlem ent o f 1782-3” ( C anadian H istorical Review, X IV , Sept. 1933), an d The D iplom acy o f the A m erican R evolution (N ew Y o rk , 1935); A . L. B u rt, The U nited States, G reat B ritain a n d B ritish N o rth A m erica fro m the R evolution to the Establishm ent o f P eace a fte r the W ar o f 1 8 1 2 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940). 3. Texts o f th e ordinances a re in the R ep o rt o f the W ork o f the Public A rchives fo r the Y ears 1 9 1 4 a n d 1 9 1 5 (O ttaw a, 1916). C orrespond­ ence relating to the ordinances is in A H istory o f the O rganization, D evelopm ent an d S e n ic e s o f the M ilitary an d N a v al F o rce s of C an a d a fro m the Peace o f P a ris in 1 7 6 3 , to th e Present Tim e, edited by the H isto rical Section o f the G eneral Staff (3 vols., n.p ., n .d .). F o r the history o f the m ilitia see C. F . H am ilto n , “ T h e C anadian M ilitia” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V , 1927-8); E. J. C ham bers, T he C an ad ian M ilitia: A H isto ry o f the O rigin an d D evelopm ent of the F o rce (M o n treal, 1907); J . P. E dw ards, “T he M ilitia o f N ova Scotia, 1749-1867” ( C ollections o f the N o v a S co tia H isto rical Society, X V II, 1913); B enjam in Suite, H isto ire d e la M ilice canadienne-franCaise, 1 7 6 0 -1 8 9 7 (M o n treal, 1897). G . F . G . Stanley, C anada's Soldiers (T o ro n to , 1960) is a useful sk etch o f the whole period. 4. O f tw o recent books co n tain in g discussions o f the W ar o f 1812 that by J . W . P ra tt, E xpansionists o f 1 8 1 2 (N ew Y ork, 1925), em phasizes A m erican expansionism ; w hile A . L. B u rt, in The U nited States, G reat B ritain a n d B ritish N o rth A m erica argues th a t th e m aritim e disputes w ere th e chief causes. 5. T here is a considerable lite ra tu re o n th e W ar o f 1812. A good general acco u n t is C. P. Lucas, T he C anadian W ar o f 181 2 (O xford, 1906). A . T. M ah a n ’s classic, Sea P o w er in its R elation to the W ar of 1 8 1 2 (2 vols., B oston, 1905), in terp rets the su b ject widely. 6. F o r the negotiations an d term s o f settlem ent see B urt, T he U nited S tates, G re a t B ritain an d B ritish N o rth A m erica.

N O T E S - 257 7. F o r the la te r history o f the fisheries disputes see below , p p . 139-43. 8. G eorge W . Spragge (e d .) , The Jo h n Strachan L e tte r B ook, 1 8 1 2 -1 8 3 4 (T o ro n to , 1946), S trach an to C olonel H arv ey , F eb ., 1815. 9. T h e rep o rt o f the com m ission, w ith the exception o f a n article (52) on the vulnerable p o in ts o f the U nited States, was lithographed under the title Copy o j a R ep o rt to H is G race the D u k e o f W ellington M aste r G en eral o f H is M ajesty’s O rdnance etc. relative to H is M ajesty’s N o rth A m erican Provinces by a C om m ission o j which M . G eneral S ir Jam es C arm ichael Sm yth w as P resident, Lieut. Colonel S ir G eorge H o ste, C ap tain H a rris m em bers (1 8 2 5 ). A sum m ary o f the conclusions is in S ir Jam es C arm ichael-Sm yth’s Precis o f the W ars in C an ad a, edited by his son, Sir Jam es C arm ichael (L ondon, 1862). 10. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, Series G , vol. 109, p. 458; vol. 116, p. 139; vol. 121, p p . 210, 217, 295; vol. 122, p. 458. See also J . M. C allah an , The N eutrality o f the A m erican L ak es a n d A nglo-A m erican R elations (Jo h n s H opkins Studies in H isto rical a n d P o litical Science, Scries X V I, nos. 1-4, B altim ore, 1898). 11. Series G , vol. 122, p. 99, Stanley to M etcalfe, Sept. 16, 1845. 12. Series G , vol. 108, p. 108, F o x to P alm erston, Jan . 10, 1841. 13. Series G , vol. 110, p. 451, Stanley to Sydenham , Sept. 10, 1841. 14. A full acco u n t o f these events is in A. B. C orey, The Crisis o f 18301 8 4 2 in C anadian-A m erican R elations (N ew H aven an d T o ro n to , 1941). 15. See J . H . Latanfi, A H isto ry o f A m erican Fo reig n Policy (N ew Y ork, 1934). 16. Q uebec G azette, A pril 28, 1845. 17. M ackenzie's W eekly M essage (T o ro n to ), A pril 7, 1854. 18. L a M inerve (M o n tre a l), M ay 6, 1854. 19. Series G , vol. 122, p. 99, Stanley to M etcalfe, Sept. 16, 1845. O n the w ithdraw al o f troops see C. P. Stacey, C an a d a a n d the B ritish A rm y, 1 8 4 6 -1 8 7 1 ; A Study in the P ractice o f R esponsible G overnm ent (L on­ don, 1936; T o ro n to , re p r., 1963), and C. F . H am ilto n , “T h e C anadian M ilitia” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V I, 1928-9). 20. A . G . D oughty (e d .), The E lgin-G rey P a p e rs, 1 8 4 6 -1 8 5 2 (4 vols., O ttaw a, 1937), I, 267. 21. G . T. D enison, Soldiering in C an ad a: R ecollections a n d Experiences (T o ro n to , 1900), p. 30. 22. T he N ovascotian (H a lifa x ), Ju n e 14, 1858. 23. Series G , vol. 143, p. 200, N ew castle to Elgin, M arch 31, 1853. 24. M inutes o f the Council o f V ancouver Isla n d , 1 8 5 1 -1 8 6 1 (A rchives of B ritish C olum bia, M em oir n o.-2 ) , Ju ly 12, 1854.

CHAPTER 3

T ransition from M ercantilism (pp. 47-63) 1. L. C. A . K now les, The In d u stria l a n d C om m ercial R evolutions in G re a t B ritain during the N ineteenth C entury (L o n d o n , 1933), p. 295. 2. H . A . Innis (e d .) , Select D ocum ents in C an ad ian E conom ic H istory, 1 4 9 7 -1 7 8 3 (T o ro n to , 1929), p . 212.

258 - A H IS T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 3. Ibid., p. 210. 4. M ary Q uayle Innis, A n E conom ic H istory o f C an a d a (T oronto, 1935); D . G . C reighton, T he C om m ercial Em pire o f th e S t. Law­ rence, 1 7 6 0 -1 8 5 0 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1937; repr., 1956); H . A. Innis, T he C o d Fisheries: The H istory o f a n In tern atio n al Econom y (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940; rev. ed., 1954); H . A . Innis, The F u r T rad e in C an ad a: A n In tro d u ctio n to C an ad ian E conom ic H istory (N ew H aven, 1930; rev. ed., 1956); A . R. M . Low er, “T h e T ra d e in Square T im ber” ( C ontributions to C anadian Econom ics, V I, 1933); D . A . M acG ibbon, T he C anadian G rain T rad e (T o ro n to , 1932); W . T. E asterb ro o k and H . G . J. A itken, C anadian E conom ic H istory (T o ro n to , 1961). 5. Innis, C od Fisheries, p. 267. 6. B. E. W alk er, A H istory o f B anking in C an a d a (T oronto, 1909), p. 41. 7. H . C. B aker, A L ecture on Life A ssurance (H am ilto n , 1848); P ro ­ spectus, an d F irst a n d Second A n n u al R ep o rts o f the C an a d a Life A ssurance C om pany (H am ilto n , 1849). 8. Jo h n M u rray, Story o f the T elegraph (M o n treal, 1905). 9. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assem bly o f N ova Scotia, 1853. 10. Jo u rn als o f the H o u se o f Assem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, 1853. 11. Tables o f T rad e and N avigation fo r 1 8 5 2 . 12. Sept. 29, 1846, quoted in the Q uebec G azette, O ct. 14. 13. Le Pays (M o n tre a l), Feb. 26, 1856. 14. T he Econom ist, quoted in L a M inerve (M o n tre a l), Sept. 24, 1846. 15. Jo u rn als o f the Legislative A ssem bly o f the Province o f C anada, 1856, appendix 28. 16. E dw ard P o rritt, Sixty Y ears o f P ro tectio n in C an ad a, 1 84 6-19 07 (L ondon, 1908), pp. 198 ff. 17. Province o f C anada, Sessional P apers, 1860, no. 38. 18. M inutes o f the Council o f V ancouver Islan d , 1 8 5 1-1861 (A rchives of British C olum bia, M em oir no. 2 ). 19. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assem bly o f N o v a Scotia, 1860. 20. C. D . A llin and G . M. Jones, A nnexation, P referen tial T rade and R eciprocity (T o ro n to , n .d .). 21. On the negotiation and term s o f the treaty see D . C. M asters, The R eciprocity Treaty of 1 8 5 4 (L ondon, 1937; rep rin ted in the C arleton L ibrary, 1963). 22. B ritish C olonist (T o ro n to ), D ec. 20, 1855. 23. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assem bly o f N ova Scotia, 1860. 24. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f A ssem bly o f N ew B runswick, 1860. 25. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assembly o f P rin ce E dw ard Islan d , 1860. 26. Province o f C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1860, no. 23. 27. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, Series G , vol. 151, pp. 92, 196. 28. Belveze’s rep o rt is prin ted in Le Pays, Sept. 2, 4, 6, 9, 1856. 29. L. P. T u rco tte, Le C an a d a sous I'union, 1 8 4 1 -1 8 6 7 (Q uebec, 1871), pp. 267-9.

N O T E S - 259 CHAPTER 4

T he P ath to C onfederation (p p . 64-81) 1. F o r (lie relations o f B ritish N o rth A m erica w ith the U nited States during the Civil W ar sec J . W . H olm es, “ B o rd er R elations between C an a d a and the U nited S tates during the A m erican Civil W ar” (un­ published m .a. thesis, U niversity o f T o ro n to , 1933); L. B. Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elations, 1 8 4 9 -1 8 7 4 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1939); M . L. H an sen , The M ingling o j the C an ad ian an d A m erican P eoples (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940; R. W . W inks, C an a d a a n d the U nited S tates in the Civil W ar Y ears (B altim ore, 1960). 2. L a M inerve (M o n tre a l), N ov. 16, 1865. 3. F o r contem porary A m erican opinion see J. P. Sm ith, T he R epublican Expansionists o f the E arly R econstruction E ra (privately pianographed, 1933). 4. C. P. Stacey, C an ad a a n d the British A rm y, 18 4 6 -1 8 7 1 : A Study in The P ractice o f R esponsible G overnm ent (L o n d o n , 1936), p. 118. T he m ilitary position during the Civil W ar is analysed in this w ork. 5. B oth re p o rts a re prin ted in Province o f C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1862, no. 17. 6. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, H ow e P ap ers, H ow e to M ulgravc, N ov. 30, 1861. 7. The M orning Freem an (S ain t J o h n ) , Ju ly 3, 1862. 8. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1867-8, n o . 63, N ew castle to M onck, A ugust 21, 1862. 9. The M orning F ree m a n , A ug. 7, 1862. 10. The C o u rier (S ain t J o h n ), A pril 12, 1862. 11. L e Pays (M o n tre a l), O ct. 11, 1864. 12. T h e second re p o rt is in Jo u rn als o f the H o u se o f Assembly o f N ova S co tia, 1865, appendix 35. 13. W hitby C hronicle, M arch 16, 1865. 14. R ep o rt o f the Com m issioners fro m British N o rth A m erica A ppointed to Inquire in to the T rade o f the W est Indies, M exico an d Brazil (O ttaw a, 1866). 15. L a M inerve, Ju n e 22, 1865. 16. Le C o u rrier d u C an a d a , Sept. 4, 1865. 17. Le Pays, M ay 18, 1865. 18. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, M acd o n ald P a p e rs, G eneral L etters, J. M cW hinnie to M acdonald, M ay 1, 1865. 19. C hester M artin , “ B ritish Policy in C anadian C o nfederation” ( C an a­ dian H isto rical Review, X III, M arch , 1932). 20. T he published debates o f the legislatures o f P rin ce E d w ard Island, N ova Scotia, N ew Brunsw ick, C an ad a, an d B ritish C olum bia have been used fo r the following passages. See also P . B. W aite, The Life an d Times o f C onfederation (T o ro n to , 1962).

260 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S CHAPTER 5

T he O utlook of the D om inion (pp. 82-95) 1. M . H an co ck , “N a tu ra liz atio n in C an a d a ” ( Papers a n d Proceedings o l (he C an ad ian Political Science A ssociation, V I, 1934). 2. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1880, p. 873. 3. H . F . A ngus (e d .) , C an a d a and H e r G re a t N eighbour (T oronto, 1938), p. 89. 4. I. C o nstantine, On the Influence o f A m erican Id eas in the Anglican C hurch in the D iocese o f M o n treal (M o n treal, 1870). 5. F o r a b rief acco u n t o f th e developm ent o f th e dispute see A . B. K eith, Responsible G overnm ent in the D om inions (3 vols., O xford, 1912), p. 1216 ff. 6. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1892, no. 81. 7. T he M ail (T o ro n to ), M ay 4, 1872. 8. L o m e Pierce, W illiam K irby: The P o rtra it o f a Tory Loyalist (T o ro n to , 1929), p. 378. 9. W hitby C hronicle, A ugust 4, 1870. 10. L ’EvSnem ent, quoted in G eorges V attier, E ssai s u r la m entality canadienne-frangaise (P aris, 1928), p. 252. 11. The G lobe (T o ro n to ), Ju ly 25 and 27, 1870. 12. Ib id ., Sept. 28, 1870. 13. B. M . C o rrig an , “ C an a d ia n C ru sad ers” (.Queen's Q uarterly, X L V II, spring, 1940). 14. The G lobe, M ay 16, 1870. 15. O. D . S kelton, L ife a n d L etters o f S ir W ilfrid L a u rier (2 vols., L ondon, 1922; rep rin ted in the C arleto n L ibrary, 1965), I , 30£f. 16. M o n tre al G azette, J a n . 5, 1870.

CHAPTER 6

A V enture in D iplom acy (p p . 96-119) 1. P ublic A rchives o f C an ad a, M acdonald P ap ers, L etter B ook 14, Private. A p ril 14, 1870. 2. L. B. Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elations, 18 4 9 -1 8 7 4 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1939), p. 200 ff. 3. M acd o n ald P apers, L e tte r B ook 13, Private. J a n . 26, 1870. 4. See above, pp. 42-43. 5. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1869, n o . 61. C artie r and M cD ougall to G overnor G eneral, M ay 20, 1869. 6. T h e docum ents are p rin ted in C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1872, no. 26. 7. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1871, no. 12. M inutes o f C an ad ian Gov­ ernm ent, M arch 23, 1866. 8. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1871, no. 12. 9. C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1885, n o. 101a. M em o, o f Ju ly 4, 1870, by the M inister o f M arine a n d Fisheries. T h is lengthy m em o sets o u t the

N O T E S - 261 C anadian position, a n d the h isto ry o f the fisheries question from th a t p o in t o f view. 10. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1870, no. 11. 11. A U nited S tates suggestion o f F e b ru a ry , 1870. See Shippee, C anadianA m erican R elatio n s, p. 315. 12. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B o o k 14. T o G . W . B rega, A pril 4, 1870. 13. L ucien W olf, L ife o f the F irst M arq u ess o f R ipon (2 vols., London, 1921), I, 239. 14. Ibid. 15. A llan N evins, H am ilton Fish: T he In n e r H isto ry o f the G ra n t A d­ m inistration (N ew Y ork, 1936), p p . 425, 441. 16. T h e text is in C an a d a , Sessional P ap ers, 1872, no. 18. 17. C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1869, n o. 59. Privy Council R eport, June 11, 1869. 18. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1869, no. 61. C artie r and M cD ougall to G o v ern o r G en eral, M ay 20, 1869. 19. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter Book 14. M arch 11, 1870. 20. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter B ook 15. M acd o n ald to Lisgar, F eb. 4, 1871. 21. Ibid. 2 2 . T h e text is in C an a d a , Sessional P ap ers, 1872, n o. 18, p p . 5, 11. 23. N evins, H am ilto n Fish , p. 470. 24. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter B ook 15. M acd o n ald to T u p p er, M arch 21, 1871. 25. F o r detailed accounts o f th e conference see N evins, H am ilton Fish, c hap. xx; Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elatio n s, chap. xv; G oldw in Sm ith, T he T reaty o f W ashington, 1 8 7 1 : A Study in Im p erial H istory (Ith a c a , 1941); D o n ald C reighton, Jo h n A . M acdonald: T he Old C hieftain (T o ro n to , 1955). 26. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L e tte r B o o k 15. M acd o n ald to T u p p er, A p ril 1, 1871. 27. Q uoted in Sm ith, T reaty o f W ashington, p. 70. 28. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter B ook 15. M acdonald to Tupper, M arch 21, 1871. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ib id . M acdonald to T u p p er, M arch 29, 1871. 32. T h e aw ard, dated O ctober 21, 1872, w as in fav o u r o f the U nited S tates’ claim. 33. T his a rran g em en t led to the H alifax Com m ission. See below , pp. 139-40. 33a. T h e text o f th e tre a ty is in T reaties a n d A greem ents A ffecting C an a d a in F o rc e Between H is M ajesty an d the U nited S tates of A m erica, with Subsidiary D ocu m en ts, 1 8 1 4 -1 9 2 5 (O ttaw a, 1927). 34. N evins, H am ilto n Fish , p. 490. 35. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L e tte r B o o k 17. M acd o n ald to Lisgar, J a n . 22, 1872. 36. Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elations, p . 399. 37. T he G lobe (T o ro n to ), A p ril 18, 1870. 38. Ib id ., A pril 25, 1870. 39. Ib id ., M ay 26, 1870. 40. Q uoted in W hitby C hronicle, Ju n e 9, 1870. 41. B arrie E x am in er, Jan . 21, 1869.

262 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

The G lobe, M arch 25, 1870. L eader (T o ro n to ), Jan . 1, 1870. M acdonald P ap ers, L etter B ook 15. A pril 21, 1871. The G lobe, M ay 19, 1871. W hitby C hronicle, Ju n e 1, 1871. L ead er, M ay 13, 1871. Q uoted in Sm ith, T reaty o f W ashington, p. 140. Q uoted in W hitby C hronicle, Ju n e 8, 1871. C anada, H o u se o j C om m ons D ebates, 1872, pp. 21, 24. Ib id ., pp. 294-345, 346 ff., 431 ff. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B ook 18. Sept. 2, 1872.

CHAPTER 7

T rade, Fisheries, and D iplom acy (pp. 120-144) 1. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1875, no. 51. Privy Council R ep o rt, M arch 26. 2. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, A lexander M ackenzie L e tte r B ooks, III. M ackenzie to D ufferin, F eb . 24, 1874. 3. M ackenzie L etter B ooks, II. M em o, by M ackenzie, M arch 9, 1874. 4. M ackenzie L e tte r B ooks, III. M ackenzie to B row n, M arch 28, 1874. 5. T h e text is printed, together w ith som e official correspondence, in C orrespondence R elating to the N egotiations fo r a R eciprocity Treaty (C m d. 1060, 1874; N o rth A m erica, no. 4 ) . 6. Som e o f his letters fro m W ashington a re in A lexander M ackenzie, The Life an d Speeches o f H o n . G eorge Brow n (T o ro n to , 1882), p. 212 ff. See also D ale C. T hom son, A lex an d er M ackenzie, C lear G rit (T o ro n to , 1960). 7. T h e text is in C orrespondence R elating to N egotiations fo r a Reci­ procity T reaty. 8. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1876, p. 65. 9. Ib id ., p. 129. 10. Ib id ., p. 253. 11. Jo u rn als o f the H o u se o f C om m ons o f the D om inion o f C anada, 1874, appendix 3. 12. S. D . C lark , The C anadian M an u factu rers’ A ssociation: A Study in C ollective B argaining an d P o litical P ressu re (U niversity o f T oronto Studies, H isto ry and E conom ics Series, vol. V II, T o ro n to , 1939), p. 6. 13. C an ad a, D ebates o f the Senate, 1877, p. 248. 14. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1877, p. 165. 15. Ib id ., 1878, p. 854. 16. W . A . M ackintosh, The E conom ic B ackground o f D om inionProvincial R elations (R ep o rt o f the R oyal C om m ission on Dom inionProvincial R elations, 1939, A ppendix 3 ); reprinted in the C arleton Library (1 9 6 4 ), p. 30. 17. C an ad a Y ear B ook, 1939, p. 507. 18. Ib id ., p. 506. 19. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1884, no. 67.

N O T E S - 263 20. F o r th e correspondence concerning treaties w ith Serbia, R oum ania, E cu ad o r, M orocco, E gypt, an d M ontenegro, see C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1883, n o. 89. 21. C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1880, no. 104. 22. Public A rchives o f C anada, M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ Sir A lexander G a lt.” G a lt to M acdonald, D ec. 18, 1878. 23. Ib id ., Dec. 20, 1878. 24. Ib id ., Jan . 1, 1879. 25. Ib id ., Jan . 20, 1879. 26. M. H . Long, “ S ir Jo h n R ose and the In fo rm al Beginnings of the C anadian H igh C om m issioncrship” ( C an ad ian H isto rical Review, X II, M arch , 1931). 27. C anada, Sessional P apers, 1880, no. 105. 28. E .g., by A lexander C am pbell in C an ad a, D ebates o f the Senate, 1874, p. 17. 29. E nclosed in M acd o n ald P a p e rs, “ S ir A lexander G alt.” G a lt to M ac ­ d onald, M arch 11, 1880. Confidential. 30. O . D . Skelton, The L ife an d Times o f S ir A lexander Tilloch G alt (T o ro n to , 1920); rep rin ted in the C arleton Library (1966), p. 271. 31. C an ad a, H ouse o f C om m ons D ebates, 1891, p. 575. 32. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B ook 27. A ug. 15, 1890. W hen m inutes w ere sen t to the colonial secretary, copies w ere forw arded to the high com m issioner. 33.M a c d o n a ld P a p e rs, “ Sir C harles T u p p e r.” T u p p e r to M acdonald, O ct. 31, 1883. 34. Ib id ., T u p p e r to M acdonald, Sept. 11, 1884. 35. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1882, p. 1068 ff. 36. T he text is in B ritish a n d F oreign State P a p e rs, L X X X V , 28. 37. Skelton, S ir A lex an d er Tilloch G alt (1920 e d itio n ), p. 512. 38. F o r the docum ents o n this question see th e B ritish C orrespondence R elative to the N o rth A m erican Fisheries, 1 8 8 4 -1 8 8 6 (U n ited States, n o . 1, 1887); F u rth e r C orrespondence R especting N o rth A m erican Fisheries, 1 8 8 6 -1 8 8 7 (U n ited States, no. 2, 1887); C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1887, no. 16. A full acco u n t o f th e negotiations, from the point o f view o f the A m erican governm ent, is in C. C. T ansill, The Fo reig n Policy o f T hom as F . B ay ard , 1 8 8 5 -1 8 9 7 (N ew Y o rk , 1940). 39. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1888, no. 36C. 40. Ib id ., E. J . Phelps to Salisbury, J a n . 26, 1887. 41. L. B. Shippee, T hom as F ran cis B ayard ( “T h e A m erican Secretaries o f State an d T h eir D iplom acy,” ed. by S. F . Bcm is, V III, N ew Y ork, 1927-8). 42. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1888, no. 36C. 43. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter Book 24. M acd o n ald to L ansdow ne, Sept. 24, 1887. 44. M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ W ashington T reaty , 1888,” vol. V II. T u p p er to M acdonald, N ov. 24, 1887. 45. E . M . Sau n d ers (e d .) , T he Life a n d L e tte rs o f the R t. H o n . S ir C harles T u p p er (2 vols., L o n d o n , 1916), II, 101. 46. Ib id ., p. 109. 47. M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ W ashington T reaty , 1888,” vol. V II. T u p p er to M acdonald, F eb . 10, 1888. 48. M em orandum by G . E . F o ste r, 1888. Q uoted in P. E. C orbett, The

264 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S S ettlem ent o f C anadian-A m erican D isputes: A C ritical Study of M ethods a n d R esults (N ew H av en a n d T o ro n to , 1937), p. 43. 49. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1887, no. 48. 50. M acd o n ald P apers, “ B ering Sea,” vol. I. C. H . T u p p er to M acdonald, F eb . 26, 1890. 51. Ib id ., M arch 3 and 10, 1890. 52. Ib id ., A pril 11, 1890. 53. C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1908, n o . 144. 54. M any aspects o f the relations o f C an a d a an d the U n ited K ingdom a re discussed in D . M . L. F a rr, The C olonial Office a n d C anada, 18 6 7 -1 8 8 7 (T o ro n to , 1955).

CHAPTER 8

C anada, the Em pire, and the U nited States (pp. 145-169) 1. F o r a n analysis o f the n a tu re and the literatu re o f B ritish im perial interests o f this period see \V. L. Langer, D iplom acy o f Im perialism , 1 8 9 0 -1 9 0 2 (2 vols., N ew Y o rk , 1935), I, ch ap . in. 2. J. S. W illison, S ir IVilfrid L au rier a n d the L ib eral P arty : A Political H isto ry (2 vols., T o ro n to , 1903), II, 120. See in general R. C. Brow n, C an a d a ’s N a tio n a l Policy, 1 8 8 3 -1 9 0 0 : A S tudy in C anadian-A m erican R elations (P rin ceto n , 1964). 3. T he G lobe (T o ro n to ), M arch 2, 1887. 4. Ib id ., A pril 5, 1887. 5. M an ito b a F ree P ress, Sept. 5, 1887. 6. Jam es Y oung, O ur N a tio n a l F u tu re (T o ro n to , 1888). 7. W illison, S ir IVilfrid L a u rier, I I , 141. 8. Ib id ., II, 138. 9. See above, pp. 141-42. 10. P ublic A rchives o f C an ad a, M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B o ok 24. M acdonald to T up p er, Jan . 15, 1888. 11. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1888, p . 144 ff. 12. The G lobe, A pril 18, 1887. 13. M an ito b a F re e P ress, O ct. 27, 1887. 14. M orning H e ra ld (H a lifa x ), Jan . 27, 1885. 15. Evening M ail (H a lifa x ), O ct. 22 and N ov. 12, 1885. 16. M orning H e ra ld , J a n . 20 a n d M ay 1, 1885. 17. R epresentative opinions m ay be found as follow s: p r o - G . T . D eni­ son, T he Struggle fo r Im p erial U nity: R ecollections a n d Experiences (L o n d o n , 1909); G . R . P a rk in , Im p erial F ed eratio n (L o n d o n , 1892); G . M . G ra n t, Im p erial Fed eratio n (W innipeg, 1890). c o n t r a - G old­ w in Sm ith, C an ad a an d the C anadian Q uestion (L ondon an d T oronto, 1891); and w ritings o f J . S. E w art a n d H en ri B ourassa. p r o an d CON - S. C. C heng, Schem es fo r th e F ed eratio n o f the B ritish Em pire (N ew Y o rk , 1931). 18. D enison, Struggle fo r Im p erial U nity, p p . 79, 85. 19. C anada, D eb ates o f the S en ate, 1890, p. 256 ff. 20. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1888, p. 1069 ff.

N O T ES - 265 The G lobe, Jan . 23, 1885. T he M ail (T o ro n to ), M arch 15, 22, A pril 6, 1887. M an ito b a F ree P ress, Jan . 16, 23, F eb . 3, 1887. Ib id ., Feb. 3, 1887. M orning H e ra ld , M ay 12, 1885. Evening M ail, Ju n e 11, Sept. 22, 1887. J. L. G arvin, The L ife o j Jo sep h C ham berlain (3 vols., London, 1934), III, 179. 28. W illison, S ir W ilfrid L au rier, I I , 287. 29. G . W . Ross, P referen tial T rade with G re a t B ritain an d R eciprocity with the U nited States (T o ro n to , 1897). 30. F o r a detailed study o f the conferences fro m 1887 to 1907 see R ichard Jeb b , T he Im p erial Conference: A H isto ry an d S tudy (2 vols., L ondon, 1911). 31. Proceedings o f a C onference betw een the Secretary o f S ta te fo r the C olonies a n d the P rem iers o f the Self-governing C olonies a t the C olonial Office, L on d o n , Ju n e an d Ju ly 1 8 9 7 (C d. 8596). 32. See below, ch ap ters 10 and 11. 33. F o r an acco u n t o f this m ovem ent, see H e n ri B ourassa, Q ue devonsnou s cl /’ A ngleterre? (M o n treal, 1915). 34. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1902, pp. 108-9. 35. P ap ers R elating to a C onference betw een the Secretary o f S ta te for the Colonies a n d the P rim e M inisters o f Self-governing C olonies; Ju n e to A ugust, 1 9 0 2 (C d . 1299). 36. F o r fu rth er C an ad ian com m ents see C anadian A n n u a l Review, 1903, p. 306 IJ.-, 1904, p. 390 ff.; 1905, p. 448 ff. 37. E d w ard P o rritt, Sixty Years o f P ro tectio n in C an ad a, 1 8 4 6-190 7 (L o n d o n , 1908). 38. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1903, p. 382. 39. F o r an analysis o f the A m erican position, as well as o th er aspects of the subject, see L. E . E llis, R eciprocity, 1 9 1 1 (N ew H aven and T oro n to , 1939). 40. T h e trip is described w ith docum ents in E d w ard P o rritt, T he R evolt in C an ad a ag ain st the N ew Feudalism : Tariff H istory from the R evi­ sion o f 1 9 0 7 to th e U prising o f the W est in 1 9 1 0 (L o n d o n , 1911), c hap. xii. 41. See below, p. 252. 42. Full analyses o f public opinion and the p arliam en tary debates a rc in the C anadian A n n u a l R eview , 1911, and in E llis, R eciprocity, 1 9 1 1 . 43. H enry B orden (e d .) , R o b ert L a ird B orden: H is M em oirs (2 vol3., T o ro n to , 1938), I, 327.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

CHAPTER 9

Effects o f E xternal Forces on the C anadian C om m unity (pp. 170-198) 1. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1871, n o. 54. 2. See above, p . 112. 3. C an ad a. Sessional P a p e rs, 1876, III.

266 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 4. Ib id ., and C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1879, n o. 64. 5. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1892, no. 99. 6. J. M. C allah an , A m erican Foreign Policy in C an ad ian R elations (N ew Y o rk , 1937), p. 423 ff. 7. G . P. deT. G lazebrook, A H istory o j T ran sp o rtatio n in C an a d a (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1938), and rep rin ted in the C arleton L ib rary in tw o volum es (1 9 64), II, 108 ff. 8. A detailed study o f this developm ent is in W . J. W ilgus, T he Railway In terrelatio n s o j th e U nited S tates a n d C an a d a (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1937). 9. See, fo r exam ple, C allah an , A m erican F oreign Policy, p. 394 ff. 10. F o r the history o f ocean shipping in relatio n to C an a d a see A dam S h o rtt and A . G . D oughty (e d s .), C an a d a an d Its Provinces (23 vols., T o ro n to , 1914), X , 589 ff. 11. N o rm a C laire T ay lo r, “T h e E conom ic D evelopm ent o f C anada’s M erch an t M arine” (u npublished m .a . thesis, U niversity o f T oronto, 1924, p. 25. 12. H . L. D ray to n , O cean F reight R ates (D e p a rtm e n t o f T rad e and C om m erce, O ttaw a, 1913). 13. F o r a n o u tlin e of the history o f the C an ad ian po st office since 1867, see S h o rtt and D oughty (e d s .), C an ad a a n d its Provinces, V II. 14. H . M arshall, F . A . S o u th ard , and K . W . T aylor, C anadian-A m erican In d u stry : A Study in In tern atio n al Investm ent (N ew H av en and T o ro n to , 1936), p. 125. 15. L. J . B urpee, Sand/ord Flem ing, Em pire B uilder (L o n d on and T o ro n to , 1915), p. 154 ff. 16. R oland W ilson, “ M igration M ovem ents in C anada, 1868-1925” ( C anadian H isto rical R eview , X III, Ju n e 1932). C f. A . R. M . Low er, “ T h e G ro w th o f C an a d a ’s P opulation in R ecent Y ears” ( C anadian H isto rical Review , X III, D ecem ber 1932). 17. W . A . C arro th ers, E m ig ratio n fro m the B ritish Isles, w ith Special R eference to the D evelopm ent o j the Overseas D om inions (L ondon, 1929), p. 253. 18. S. C . Jo h n so n , A H isto ry o f E m igration fro m the U nited K ingdom to N o rth A m erica, 1 7 6 3 -1 9 1 2 (L o n d o n , 1913), p. 80 ff. 19. J. W . D afoe, Clifford S ifton in R elation to H is Tim es (T oronto, 1931), p. 137 ff. 20. F o r th e relatio n o f railw ays to settlem ent see W . A . M ackintosh, P rairie Settlem ent: T he G eographical S etting (T o ro n to , 1934), chap. in .

21. F o r the principles an d practice o f land g ran ts see C h ester M artin, "D o m in io n L a n d s" Policy (T o ro n to , 1938). 22. F o r a detailed study see J . B. H edges, B uilding the C anadian West: The L and a n d C olonization Policies o f the C anadian Pacific Railway (N ew Y o rk , 1939). 23. D afoe, Clifford Sifton, p. 141. 24. L. G . R eynolds, T he B ritish Im m igrant: H is Social an d Econom ic A djustm ent in C an ad a (T o ro n to , 1935). 25. A . G . S treet, F a rm e r's G lory (L o n d o n , 1932). 26. C arro th ers, Em igration fro m the B ritish Isles, p. 247. 27. C. H . Y oung, The U krainian C anadians: A S tudy in A ssim ilation (T o ro n to , 1931), p. 76. 28. A . M aude, A Pecu liar People: T he D o u k h o b o rs (N ew Y o rk , 1904), p. 232.

N O T E S - 267 29. A full acco u n t o f the D o u k h o b o rs is in J . F . C. W right, Slava B ohu: T he Story o f the D o u k h o b o rs (N ew Y o rk , 1940). 30. R. E ngland, The C olonization o f W estern C an ad a: A Study o f C on­ tem porary L an d Settlem ent, 1 8 9 6 -1 9 3 4 (L o n d o n , 1936), p. 232 ff. 31. E. H . O liver, “ T he S ettlem ent o f Saskatchew an to 1914” ( Proceed­ ings an d T ransactions o f th e R oyal Society o f C an ad a, 1926). 32. F o r detailed studies o f the whole question o f o rien tal im m igration and its results see Cheng T ien-fang, O riental Im m igration in C anada (S hanghai, 1931), and C. J . W oodsw orth, C an ad a an d the O rient: A Study in In te rn a tio n a l R elations (T o ro n to , 1941). T he Japanese C an ad ian s by C. H . Y oung, H . R. Y. R eid, and W . A . C arrothers (T o ro n to , 1938) is m ore concerned with stan d a rd s o f living. 33. R ep o rt o f R oyal C om m ission A pp o in ted to Investigate th e M ethod by which O riental L abourers H av e Been In tro d u ced into C anada, 1908. Q uoted in Cheng T ien-fang, O rien tal Im m igration in C anada, p. 73. 34. Cheng T ien-fang, O riental Im m igration in C an ad a, p. 142 ff. 35. M . L. H ansen, The M ingling o f the C anadian a n d A m erican Peoples (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940), p. 168. 36. A. R. Foley “ F rench-C anadian C ontacts w ith N ew England” (.Con­ ference on E ducation Problem s in C anadian-A m erican R elations, ed. by R. L. M orrow , O rono, M aine, 1939). 37. E. H am on, Les C anadiens-frangais de la N ouvelle A ngleterre (Q ue­ bec, 1891), p. 11. 38 . G . T. P rio r, “ T he F ren ch C an ad ian s in N ew E n g lan d ” (unpublished m .a . thesis, Brow n U niversity, 1932 ) , p. 67 . Cf. H am o n , Les C anadiens-frangais, p. 89 , w ho gives 120 churches o r chapels. 39. A ddlard D esrosiers and P. A . F o u rn et, L a R ace frangaise en A m iriquc (M o n treal, 1911), p. 23. 40. Ib id ., p. 35. 41. H am on, Les C anadiens-frangais, p. 108. 42. D . M . A . M agnan, H istoire de la race frangaise aux E tats-U nis (P aris, 1912), p. 290 ff. 43. F ro m Seventh Census o f C an a d a , 1931, I, 710. C om plete figures will be found there, divided into ru ral and urban. 44. C anadian A n n u a l Review , 1906, p. 294. 45. F o r the history o f lab o u r organization in C an a d a see R. H . C oats, “ L ab o u r M ovem ent in C an a d a ” (S h o rtt and D oughty [eds.], C an ad a a n d its Provinces, I X ) ; H . A . Logan, The H istory o f TradeV nion O rganization in C an ad a (C hicago, 1928); N orm an J. W are and H . A . Logan, L ab o r in C anadian-A m erican R elations (T o ro n to , 1937); and H . A . Innis, " L a b o u r” (E ncyclopedia o f C an ad a, ed. by W . S. W allace, T o ro n to , 1936). 46. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1909, p. 297 ff. 47. Ib id ., 1906, p. 303. 48. Ib id ., 1907, p. 283. 49. F o r the history o f the G ran g e in C an ad a see L. A . W o od, A H istory of F arm ers' M ovem ents in C an a d a (T o ro n to , 1924). 50. R o b ert C halm ers, A H isto ry o f C urrency in the B ritish Colonies (L o n d o n , 1893). 51. Jac o b V iner, C an ad a's B alance o f In tern atio n al Indebtedness, 190019 1 3 (C am bridge, M ass., 1924), p. 139. 52. F o r a full acco u n t see M arshall, S outhard, and T aylor, C anadianA m erican In d u stry .

268 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S CHAPTER 1 0

T he C onduct of H igh Policy: Subjects and M ethods (pp. 199-223) 1. Parliam en tary D eb ates o n the Subject o f the C onfederation of the B ritish N o rth A m erican Provinces (Q uebec, 1865), p. 108. 2. In Section II o f this ch ap ter. 3. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1909, p. 1978. 4. See above, p. 131#. 5. C an ad ian s paid fees for w o rk done by B ritish consuls w hich a t least equalled th e c o st o f the service. T h e first C an ad ian consuls were app o in ted in 1940. 6. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1910, no. 29B. 7. T his p rocedure was la te r changed, leaving only form al action to the B ritish governm ent. See Sum m ary o f Proceedings, Im p erial C onfer­ ence o f 1926, p. 26. 8. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1910, no. 10G. 9. C anadian A n n u al Review, 1910, p. 619. 10. A. G . Dewey, The D om inions an d D iplom acy: The C anadian C on­ tribution (2 vols., L o n d o n and T o ro n to , 1929), I I , 291. 11. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1909-10, p. 853. 12. Ib id ., 1910-11, p. 953. 13. Sir R o b ert L aird B orden, C anadian C onstitu tio n al Studies (T oronto, 1922), p. 128. 14. H . D . H a ll, T he B ritish C om m onw ealth o f N ations: A Study o f its P a st an d F u tu re D evelopm ent (L o n d o n , 1920), p. 96. 15. O f a considerable literatu re on the subject, S. C. C heng, Schem es for the F e d e ra tio n o f the B ritish Em pire (N ew Y o rk , 1931) contains the m ost com prehensive analysis o f all the schem es, and o f the argum ents fo r an d ag ain st them. 16. M inutes o f P roceedings o f the C olonial C onference, 1 9 0 7 (C d . 3523), p. 24 ff. 17. F o r the history o f the com m ission a n d studies o f its organization and op eratio n see C . J . C h ack o , The In tern atio n al Jo in t C om m ission be­ tw een th e U nited S tates o f A m erica an d the D om inion o f C anada (N ew Y o rk , 1932); P a p e rs R elating to the W o rk o f the In ternational Jo in t C om m ission (O ttaw a, 1929); and J . M . C allah an , A m erican Foreign Policy in C anadian R elations (N ew Y o rk , 1937), p. 499 ff. 18. R. A . M acK ay, “ T h e In tern atio n al J o in t C om m ission betw een the U nited States and C an a d a ” ( P ap ers R elating to the W o rk o f the In tern atio n al J o in t C om m ission, O ttaw a, 1929). 19. C anadian A nnual Review , 1903, pp. 388-89. 20. Ib id ., 1905, p. 487 ff. 21. C an a d a , Sessional P a p e rs, 1892, no. 37. 22. J . W . D afoe, Clifford Sifton in R elatio n to H is Tim es (T oronto, 1931), p. 217. 23. C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1904, no. 46A. 24. See, fo r exam ple, II. L. K eenleyside, C an a d a a n d the U nited States: Som e A spects o f the H istory o f the R epublic a n d the D om inion (N ew Y o rk , 1929), p. 210 ff.\ C allahan, A m erican F oreign Policy in C ana­ d ia n R elations, chap. XIX; L . M . G elber, The Rise o f A nglo-A m erican

N O T E S - 269 Frien d sh ip (L o n d o n and T o ro n to , 1938), chap. vii; D afoe, Clifford Slfton, c h ap . v m ; P. C. Jessu p , E lih u R o o t (2 vols., N ew Y ork, 1938), I I , chap. x ix ; O. D . Skelton, Life a n d L etters o f S ir W ilfrid L a u rier (2 vols., T o ro n to , 1921); rep rin ted in the C arleto n Library (1 9 65), I I , 57 ff. 25. Q uoted in D afo e, Clifford Sifton, p. 236. 26. Printed, w ith th e aw ard, in C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1904, n o. 46A. 27. C an ad ian A n n u a l Review , 1903, p. 365 ff. 28. Q uoted in Skelton, L ife a n d L e tte rs o f L a u rier (C arleto n L ibrary, 1965), I I , 66. 29. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1903, p. 366. 30. See above, p p . 183-85. 31. C .-F. C hang, The A nglo-Japanese A lliance (B altim ore, 1931), p. 86. 32. C an ad ian A n n u a l Review , 1905, p. 421. 33. G . P. G ooch a n d H aro ld Tem perley (e d s .), B ritish D ocum ents on the O rigins o f the W ar, 1 8 9 8 -1 9 1 4 (11 vols., L o n d o n , 1927-1938), V I, 789. 34. Ib id ., V I, 525.

C H A PTE R 11

D efence (pp. 224-253) 1. G . P. G ooch and H aro ld Tem perley (e d s .), B ritish D ocum ents on the O rigins o f the W ar, 1 8 9 8 -1 9 1 4 , V I, 781 2. C. F . H am ilto n , “T h e C an ad ian M ilitia: T h e D e ad P eriod” ( C ana­ dian D efence Q uarterly, V II, 1929-30). 3. H am ilto n , “ T h e C an ad ian M ilitia: T h e Beginning o f R eform ” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V II, 1929-30). 4. Q uoted in C anadian A n n u al Review , 1902, p. 193. 5. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1900, p. 323. 6. T h e E a rl o f D u n donald, M y A rm y Life (L o n d o n , 1926). 7. F o r D u n d o n ald ’s case see M y A rm y L ife, chap. xxvi; fo r the gov­ ernm ent’s see O . D . Skelton Life an d L etters o f S ir W ilfrid L aurier (C arleto n L ibrary, 1965), II, 83. O n this p o in t an d in general see R ich ard A . P reston, C an a d a a n d "Im p eria l D efen ce" (T o ronto, 1967). 8. F o r a sum m ary o f this process see C. P . Stacey, The M ilitary P ro b ­ lem s o f C an ad a: A Survey o f D efence Policies a n d Strategic C ondi­ tio n s P a s t an d Present (T o ro n to , 1940), appendix B. 9. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1904, p. 205 ff. 10. “T h e C an ad ian M ilitia: T h e C hange in O rganization” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V III, 1930-1, p. 97). 11. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1905, n o . 130. 12. Ib id ., 1911, no. 35. 13. Ib id . 15. Ib id ., no. 35B. 14. Ib id ., no. 35A. 16. S ir C harles L ucas, The E m p ire a t W ar (L o n d o n and T o ro n to , 1921), I, 235-39.

270 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 17. C an a d a , Sessional P ap ers, 1875, n o . 64. 18. Ib id ., 1890, no. 59G. 19. N o m ention o f this a p p ea rs in the re p o rt o f the conference, b u t in a Privy C ouncil rep o rt o f J a n . 20, 1905, it is said to h av e been “ stated verbally” (.C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1905, no. 128). 20. Ibid. 21. F o r a sum m ary o f opinion in p arliam en t an d th e press see C anadian A n n u al Review , 1905, p. 461 ff. 22. R ichard Jeb b , T he Im p e rial C onference: A H isto ry a n d Study (2 vols., L ondon, 1911), I, 8. 23. Ib id ., p. 19. 24. Ib id ., p. 55. 25. Proceedings o f a C onference Between the Secretary o f State fo r the C olonies a n d the P rem iers o f the Self-governing C olonies, 1 8 9 7 . (Cd. 8596, 1897). 26. C anadian A n n u al Review, 1902, p. 106. 27. Ib id ., p. 107. 28. Papers R elatin g to a C onference Between the Secretary o f State fo r the C olonies an d the Prim e M inisters o f Self-governing C olonies, 1 9 0 2 . (C d . 1299, 1902). 29. M inutes o f Proceedings o f the. C olonial C onference, 1 9 0 7 . (C d. 3523, 1907). A verbatim reco rd o f th e discussions. 30. “ T he C an ad ian M ilitia: Im p erial O rganization” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V III, 1930-1, p. 2 4 4 ). 31. C orrespondence R elating o t the P roposed Fo rm atio n o f a n Im perial G eneral Staff. (C d. 4475, 1909.) 32. C orrespondence a n d P a p e rs R elating to a C onference w ith R epre­ sentatives o f the Self-governing D om inions on the N av al an d M ilitary D efence o f the E m pire, 1 9 0 9 . (C d . 4948, 1909.) 33. Papers L aid B efore th e Im p erial C onference: N av al a n d M ilitary D efence. (C d. 5746-2, 1911.) 34. Sir Ia n H am ilton inspected the C an ad ian m ilitia in 1913. See above, p. 234. 35. M inutes o f Proceedings o f the Im p erial C onference, 1 9 1 1 . (C d. 5745, 1911.) 36. See, e.g., R ichard Jeb b , T he B ritannic Q uestion: A Survey o f A lter­ natives (L o n d o n , N ew Y o rk , 1913), p. 43 ff.-, A . G . Dewey, The D om inions an d D iplom acy: T he C anadian C ontribution (2 vols., L ondon and T o ro n to , 1929), I, 294 ff. 37. T o ro n to M ail, M ay 7, 1878. 38. P ublic A rchives o f C an a d a , M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ D efence,” vol. II. Privy C ouncil R eport, M ay 4, 1878. 39. Ib id ., A dm iralty to C olonial Office, Ju n e 10, 1878. 40. Ib id ., Privy Council R ep o rt, M ay 22, 1878. 41. C an ad a, D ebates o f th e S en ate, 1883, p. 118 ff. 42. Saint Jo h n T elegraph, M ay 7, 1885. 43. C. P. Stacey, R ecords o f the N ile V oyageurs 1 8 8 4 -1 8 8 5 (T oronto, 1959). 44. M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ S ir C harles T u p p e r.” T u p p er to M acdonald, F eb . 27, 1885. 45. T he W eek (T o ro n to ), F e b . 19, 1885. 46. F eb ru ary and M arch , 1885. 47. M an ito b a F ree P ress, O ct. 24, 1885.

N O T E S - 271 48. S ir Jo h n W illison, R em iniscences, P o litical a n d P erso n al (T o ro n to , 1919), p. 303. 49. C anad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1900, n o. 20. 50. Ib id ., no. 49. 51. H am ilto n , “ T h e C an ad ian M ilitia : T h e S outh A frican W ar” ( C an a­ dian D efence Q uarterly, V II, 1929-30, p p. 537-42). 52. F o r a n acco u n t o f the C an ad ian forces in the w ar see W . S. Evans, T he C anadian C ontingents a n d C an ad ian Im perialism : A S to ry a n d a S tudy (L ondon, 1901). 53. C anad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1900, p . 6625; 1901, p. 1290. 54. Ib id ., 1902, p. 3316. 55. T h e m ost com plete and w ell-docum ented acco u n t o f the naval ques­ tion in the perio d 1909-1914 is in G . N . T u ck er, T he N av al Service of C an a d a (2 vols., O ttaw a, 1952) I, chaps. 6-9. F o r public a n d p a rlia ­ m entary opinion see the C an ad ian A n n u al Review . F o r contem porary com m ent see also the R ound T ab le, vols. 1-4. T h e positions o f the successive prim e m inisters a re outlined in S kelton, Life a n d L etters o f L au rier an d the B orden M em oirs. 56. F o r the correspondence see C orrespondence an d P ap ers R elating to the C onference with R epresentatives o f the Self-governing D om inions on th e N a v al a n d M ilitary D efence o f the E m pire, 1 9 0 9 . (C d . 4948, 1909.) 57. See P ap ers laid B efore the Im p e rial C onference: N a v al an d M ilitary D efence (C d. 5746-2, 1911).

N O TE ON T H E A U TH O R

A distinguished historian and public servant, G . P. deT. G lazebrook was born in London, O ntario, in 1899. E ducated at the U niversity of T oronto and a t O xford, he joined the D epart­ m ent o f H istory a t the U niversity of T oronto in 1924. D uring the Second W orld W ar he served as a Special A ssistant in the D epartm ent of E xternal Affairs, rejoining the U niversity of T o ronto faculty in 1946. A fter three years’ ser­ vice at the U niversity he returned to O ttaw a to re-enter the D epartm ent o f E xternal Affairs. F ro m 1953 to 1956 he was M inister in the C anadian Em bassy a t W ashington and later becam e an A ssistant U nder-Secretary of State for External Affairs. H e retired from the D epart­ m ent in 1963, to resum e lecturing and w riting at the U niversity o f T oronto. M r. G lazebrook has w ritten m any books on C anadian political and econom ic history. They include Sir Charles Bagot in Canada (1 9 2 9 ); A H istory o j Transportation in Canada (1 9 3 8 ); A H istory o f Canadian E xternal R elations (1 9 5 0 ); A Short H istory o f Canada (1 9 5 0 ); A H istory o f Canadian Political T hought (1 9 6 6 ); and L ife in Ontario: a Social H istory (1 9 6 8 ).

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AM ERICAN I n d i a n s , edited and with an Introduction by Mark Nagler 61. l a n g u a g e s i n c o n f l i c t , by Richard J. Joy, with a Preface by Frank G. Vallee 62. T H E LAST FO RTY YEARS: T H E U N IO N O F 1841 TO C O N FED ERA TIO N , by J. C. Dent, abridged and with an Introduction by Donald Swainson 63. LA U RIER AND A LIBERA L Q U E B E C : A STUDY IN PO L ITIC A L M ANAGE­ M E N T , by H. Blair Neatby, edited and with an Introduction by Richard T. Clippindale p e r s p e c t iv e s o n t h e n o r t h

H IS T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

VOLUME I

The Formative Years to 1914

G. P. deT . G L A Z E B R O O K

A HISTORY OF

Canadian External Relations REVISED

EDITION

VOLUME THE

FORMATIVE TO

I YEARS

1914

Carleton Library No. 27 McClelland and Stewart Limited Toronto / Montreal

Copyright © Canada, 1966 by McClelland and Stewart Limited

Chapters 1-11 of A History o f Canadian External Relations were first published in 1942 by the Oxford University Press, Toronto, under the title Canadian External Relations: A n Historical Study to 1914. The whole work, comprising nineteen chapters, was published by Oxford under the present title in 1950. Both volumes were spon­ sored by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

T h e C a n a d ia n P u b lis h e r s

McClelland and Stewart Limited 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 374

P R IN T E D AND B O U N D IN CANADA BY T . H . B E S T P R IN T IN G C O M P A N Y L IM IT E D

THE

CARLETON

LIBRARY

A series o f C anadian reprints and new collections of source m aterial relating to C anada, issued under the editorial supervision of the Institute o f Canadian Studies of C arleton U niversity, O ttawa. DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE

P auline Jew ett GENERAL EDITOR

R obert L. M cD ougall

EDITORIAL BOARD

Carm an Bickerton ( H is to r y ) M ichael S. W hittington ( P o litic a l S c ie n c e ) H . Edw ard English ( E c o n o m i c s ) B ruce A . M cFarlane ( S o c io lo g y ) G ordon C. M errill ( G e o g r a p h y ) W ilfrid E ggleston ( J o u r n a lis m ) R obin S. Harris ( E d u c a ti o n )

Contents

IN T R O D U C T IO N T O T H E C A R L ET O N LIBRA RY E D IT IO N , fct

v o lu m e

i: The Formative Years to 1914

1: Origins o f the Canadian Society, 1 2: Diplomacy and War, 23 3: Transition from Mercantilism, 47 4: The Path to Confederation, 64 5: The Outlook o f the Dominion, 82 6: A Venture in Diplomacy, 96 7: Trade, Fisheries, and Diplomacy, 120 8: Canada, the Empire, and the United States, 145 9: Effects of External Forces on the Canadian Community, 170 10: The Conduct o f High Policy: Subjects and Methods, 199 11: Defence, 224 N otes, 255

Introduction to The Carleton Library Edition T h e first eleven chapters of this history w ere originally pub­ lished by the O xford U niversity Press in T o ro n to under the title Canadian E xternal Relations: A n Historical S tudy to 1914. W ith the addition o f another eight chapters to cover the subsequent years the book was brought o ut by the sam e publisher, under the present title, in 1950. Both volumes w ere sponsored by the C anadian Institute o f International Affairs. T he present publi­ cation is with the kind perm ission of the O xford U niversity Press and the C anadian Institute of International Affairs. T h e first fourteen chapters have been revised and chapters fifteen to eighteen have been expanded and largely rew ritten. Instead of a final chapter com parable to th at in the edition of 1950 there is provided in an appendix an outline of the subjects of principal interest in the years after the outbreak of the Second W orld W ar, together with a selective bibliography. T he com ­ plexity o f the foreign relations o f C anada in this last period is such that it is impossible to p o rtray them w ithout distortion on the sam e scale as is possible for the preceding century and a half. A volume, it is hoped, will one day be w ritten by some interested scholar on the years in which C anada had com e to play a m ore active p art in w orld affairs. M eanw hile the bibliog­ raphy may be of som e assistance as a guide to the study o f the m odern period. T h e new m aterial contained in this reprinting of A H istory o f Canadian External R elations has m ade it necessary to re-issue the w ork in tw o volumes. V olum e I, containing the first eleven chapters of the original edition, covers the period up to the outbreak of w ar in 1914; volum e II, containing chapters twelve to eighteen and the bibliographical essay m entioned above, covers th e years from 1914 until the entrance of C anada into the second w orld w ar. T he index will be found a t the end o f the second volume. G. P. deT. G lazebrook University o f Toronto N ovem ber, 1965.

CHAPTER 1

Origins of the Canadian Society

T h e history o f C anada, as of all the A m ericas, begins w ith its discovery by E uropeans as an incident in the expansion of trade; and continues as a result of the allied am bitions of com m erce, missions, im perial designs, and pure adventure. Six states of E urope planted their flags in the new w orld; Spain, Portugal, F rance, E ngland, Russia, and H olland. By chance o r by plan the original expeditions landed a t different parts of the long coast. Claim s to territory w ere modified by the rivalries o f the powers, so th at the influence o f each cam e to be exerted in a particu lar area, th e whole character o f w hich was coloured by the im ported culture of that nation. It was the peculiar fate of C an ad a to receive the stam p o f two o f the E uropean great powers; while by the fortunes o f international politics the in­ w ard drives of Spain and Russia were arrested. T hus, if the shadow y story o f the early m igration o f eastern and northern peoples be left aside, the history o f the external relations of C anada has a beginning th at is definite both in tim e and nature. Before the com ing of th e E uropeans there were in the lands th at now com prise C anada no organized states: only Indian tribes living under conditions of barbarism o r sem i-barbarism , know ing little of their neighbours and nothing of a world beyond the limited expanse over which each group ranged. T o this prim itive scene the F rench, and after them the English, brought a culture th at was utterly new and capable o f revolu­ tionizing the w hole life o f the region. T he scientific knowledge o f centuries was suddenly put before a people who knew none o f it: sails to supplem ent the hard labour of the paddle, horses and w heeled vehicles, flint and steel, m uskets for hunting or w ar, steel axes and knives. T o these and other instrum ents were added the m essage o f C hristianity, borne by devoted mission­ aries; and the m eans of education, backed by the learning and culture o f th e m ost advanced society o f E urope. T he F rench brought above all a sym pathetic attitude tow ard the savage, a readiness to teach, an aim not to destroy but to live in am ity. It

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was the tragedy o f the Indian tribes that they lacked the adapt­ ability to take advantage o f their opportunity. It was true that the E uropean brought evil as well as good: diseases that deci­ m ated the tribes; greed th at led the traders to use all m eans, fair o r foul; brandy and rum th at turned the Indians to m adm en; and a stim ulation rath er than a check to the inter-tribal w ars. T o som e extent the natives did m ake use o f European arts; and m uskets, tools, and im proved agriculture eased the life o f the forest. But on balance the red m an gained little and lost much by the com ing of the E uropean, in spite of all the magic gifts spread before him . H e took m uch of the w orst and little of the best; and, failing to assim ilate him self to E uropean culture, gradually saw his hunting-grounds possessed by the invader, his heritage narrow ed to the pitiful reserves saved by tolerance from the broad acres of a once limitless domain. N o rth A m erica was to be the white m an’s heritage. W hile these great continents appeared at first only to block a trade ro u te to the east, experience soon proved that there w ere com ­ pensations, both directly for com m ercial interests and fo r the purposes of church and state. T he fisheries o f the banks of N ew foundland and in the G ulf o f St. L aw rence w ere exploited even before there were settlem ents, and the fu r trade developed from a casual barter by seam en to an industry w orthy o f pursuit. T h e early settlem ents m ade by F rance at P ort Royal and Quebec owed th eir origin to chartered com panies to w hom the obliga­ tion o f bringing colonists was a liability accepted in exchange fo r grants of m onopoly rights in trade. W hen it becam e evident th at the great St. Law rence led not to C hina but to the rapids of Lachine, com m ercial energy found an outlet in the trade with the Indians, just as the search for the north-w est passage by English adventurers was diverted to the trade at the south of H udson Bay. T he configuration o f N orth A m erica encouraged peneration tow ard the centre from widely separated coasts. T he n o rth ern approach was the least hospitable and was used only by the great English trading com pany as an access to factories on the bay, and thence gradually inland for the better conduct o f the fur trade. T he Russian advance from the north-w est was handicapped by m ountain barriers and had no direct effect on C anada. Spaniards, the pioneers in A m erican exploration, drove up from the south-w est, but w ere blocked before they reached th e fu tu re C anadian west. T he English settlem ents on the A tlantic coast grew by degrees until the advance guard crossed

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the A lleghanies and pointed tow ard the very area into which the F rench w ere sending traders and soldiers. M oving on con­ verging lines, the nationals of the two E uropean pow ers in­ creasingly found that they com peted for the sam e prizes; and in a series o f w ars each strove to drive the other back to the sea. T h e A nglo-French colonial rivalry thus found local causes in N o rth A m erica as in other parts of the w orld; w hich, com bined w ith m ore purely E uropean issues, forbade a peaceful division o f the still only partially explored continent. F ran ce planted her colonies a t two points accessible by sea: on the A nnapolis Basin o f A cadia and at the natural fortress of Quebec. Both survived in spite o f severity o f clim ate, Indian attacks, and the lukew arm support o f com panies th at were zealous only for trade; and both spread, w ith natural increase and im m igration, into the neighbouring areas. T here was, how ­ ever, a m arked difference in the strength o f the social and cultural groups th at resulted. In both colonies F rench institu­ tions w ere introduced, but the French society in A cadia never developed as far as th at in C anada. T he A tlantic colony, m ore­ over, was early distracted by the successive changes between F rench and English sovereignty; and the process o f w eakening was all but com pleted by the expulsion o f the A cadians in 1755. I t was on the banks of the St. Law rence that the heritage of F ran ce was cherished and preserved. T he form of governm ent was an adaptation o f that o f a French province, closely under the orders of the court, and w ith adm inistrative officers broadly sim ilar to those in France. T he laws w ere based on the Custom of Paris. T he church, while m ore ultram ontane than in France, was the sole one tolerated; and the bishop, like those in France, was appointed by the King. Education was in the hands of the church. T he system of land-holding was also m odelled on that o f F rance, though it lost in the new w orld m ost of w hat re­ m ained of feudalism in the old. By the fortunes o f w ar C anada followed A cadia into the British Em pire in 1763; but if F rance no longer held political sw ay in N orth A m erica the im print w hich she had m ade stood fresh and strong. U nder a tolerant rule, C anadians under­ w ent hardly m ore change than in owing allegiance to another flag. A nd even the old flag continued to w ave symbolically over C an ad a - to w ave long after it had been cut down at home. F or the fleur-de-lys, em blem o f the old regim e, m eant m ore in that once Bourbon province than the tricolore of the revolution and

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o f nineteenth-century F rance. T he speech of the eighteenth century, the church, and the laws w ere at tim es threatened but never seriously endangered. T h e society of the St. Law rence rem ained as it had been before the conquest: prim arily agrarian w ith little instinct for industry, conservative in outlook, attached to the church, introspective and self-sufficient, closely knit, and untouched by the N orth A m erican pressure tow ard worldly progress.This orphaned F rance, cut off from its parent as much by ideas as by conquest, gave to central C anada its first popula­ tio n and an enduring elem ent in the later w hole. T here could be no fu rth er additions to the population by m igration from France; b u t the original stock from the provinces of the north-w est, num bering no m ore than 65,000 at the tim e of the fall of Q uebec, m ultiplied and spread far beyond the bounds o f settle­ m ent a t the height of the old regime. T h e transfer o f British people, ideas, and institutions to the lands th at were to becom e the D om inion o f C anada was both direct and indirect: either straight from the British Isles, o r after passing through a process o f m odification in the other and older British colonies of the A tlantic seaboard. It is only later th at the p attern alters, to show British and A m erican peoples distinct politically, and to allow their influences to be labelled as different. Even in th at stage it is to be taken into account that the A m erican revolution could not rem ove all traces of racial origin. O f the three countries contributing m ain threads to the C anadian fabric before the m ore diversified im m igration o f the nineteenth century, F rance and E ngland had in com m on that they w ere both E uropean, E ngland and the U nited States that they w ere peopled by the sam e stock. T he second relation show ed m ore points o f sim ilarity than the first. N ova Scotia affords grounds for an investigation of British and A m erican influences both before and after those becam e politically two. T h e future of N ova Scotia w as m ade of im m ediate urgency both to Britain and her colonies because of its strategic position in the A nglo-French struggle. W hen Louisburg was returned to France as p art of the settlem ent o f 1748 a new base was begun at H alifax in the following year, and was developed as a naval station and seat of governm ent. T he deportation of the A ca­ dians on the eve of the Seven Y ears’ W ar lessened the threat o f attack from w ithin; but the scanty British population estim ated at 5,000 - offered little security for the peninsula from external aggression. In N ew England there w as apprehension lest N ova Scotia once m ore fall into F rench hands and become

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a danger to fisheries and com m erce. W illiam Shirley, governor o f M assachusetts, long urged also the positive im portance of the colony, pointing to its value fo r naval pow er in the A tlantic, and its ability to provide m asts fo r the royal navy. F o r a time opinion in M assachusetts favoured the annexation o f N ova Scotia as a precautionary m easure, but m ore consistently urged a policy of anglicization com bined w ith increased m ilitary strength. T he interests of the governm ents o f both G re at Britain and the A m erican colonies continued to depend on the succes­ sive political situations in the continent. W ith the fall of French pow er both w ere able to feel a sense o f security th at lessened their concern fo r N ova Scotia; b u t when the picture again altered to place an international frontier betw een British colo­ nies and the new U nited States, H alifax took on a new signifi­ cance as a British naval base. M eanw hile N ew England had m ade a m a rk on N ova Scotia. T ow ard the end o f the Seven Y ears’ W ar settlers began to move in fro m N ew E ngland, encouraged by offers of land and prom ises of civil and religious liberty. T he appeals through proclam ations and associations were the m ore readily received since a congestion o f population in parts o f N ew England created an econom ic pressure. W hile settlem ents were m ade or attem pted in several p arts o f N ova Scotia, the ones m ost favoured were the deserted lands of the A cadian farm ers and the valley o f the St. John River. W ith N ew Englanders form ing an increasingly larger proportion o f the population, their influ­ ence began to be show n in all aspects o f the life of the province, from architecture to political institutions. In the latter their aims not infrequently ran counter to those o f the officials and colo­ nists w ho had com e directly from England, and am ongst whom there was a sm all but pow erful conservative elem ent. T he establishm ent o f an elected assembly introduced the province to dem ocratic governm ent; and w hen the assembly m et it proved to be largely com posed of N ew Englanders. A n attem pt was m ade to introduce the N ew England system of local govern­ m ent by the tow n (tow nship) m eeting, but w ithout success; and the legal practice o f E ngland was also preserved against p ro ­ posals fo r A m ericanization.1 Being longer under F rench rule, C anada was later in receiv­ ing English-speaking im m igrants. T he vanguard w ho followed on the heels o f W olfe’s arm y, though few in num ber, soon m ade their presence felt. Q uite frankly they had com e fo r trade, and to the governors w ho looked coldly on these interlopers in an

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E den of orderly French, they pointed to the Royal Proclam ation and the scattered broadsheets which had urged them to take advantage of this new British dom ain. Com ing in the m ain from the neighbouring colonies and Scotland, they were neither able n o r willing to fit themselves to the agrarian econom y and au thoritarian governm ent th at they found in operation: govern­ m ent and laws m ust be re-m oulded to the English pattern, affording an institutional basis for econom ic developm ent and external trade. So long as their num bers rem ained sm all, the local officials were able to check the bustling reform ers, even w hen supported by the sedate periods of the despatches from the board of trade. But if they could lock the door of the house which they had so carefully built, not even the m ost vigorous governors could save it when the very foundations were swept away by the A m erican revolution. Paradoxically enough, it was n ot the appeal of the radical general congress a t Philadelphia that caused the upheaval in Quebec, but the com ing of the defeated tories, themselves fugitives from radicalism. It was at once obvious th at the U nited E m pire Loyalists would m odify the character o f the population. In N ova Scotia, already dom inated by the English-speaking, the change was rath er to reinforce ties with E ngland that had become som ew hat attenuated by early migrations from New England. N ew Bruns­ wick, carved out of N ova Scotia, was a direct result of loyalist additions to the scanty population o f the St. John Valley. In C anada the result was not a modification but a com plete altera­ tion of the balance o f population. Instead of a sm all group of traders as sole representatives o f British stock, there now appeared emigres from persecution, loyal to the crow n - men whose claims could not be disputed, and w hose very presence spelt a new Canada. So m uch was obvious. But that these sam e m en should becom e the allies of the traders in seeking dem o­ cratic institutions w as quite unexpected. “I have great Reason to believe,” w rote the governor, “ these unfortunate people have suffered too M uch by Com m ittees and H ouses of Assembly, to have retained any prepossession in favour of th at M ode of G overnm ent.”2 H aldim and, of course, was w rong - wrong because he saw the basis of division in the thirteen colonies as betw een radicals and tories instead of between those who would o r w ould not take up arm s against the King. A s in the m aritim e provinces, the loyalists in C anada built a strong bulw ark against any break in the British connection; but they w ere determ ined th at the colony should be British in local institutions as well as

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in its im perial setting. Just as the m igration from N ew England to N ova Scolia had hurried on the establishm ent o f an elected assembly, so, a generation later, the m ovem ent for elected institutions in C anada received the necessary impetus from the loyalist refugees. Those who followed the loyalists from the U nited States to C anada w ere influenced m ore by econom ic than political motives; and, as it proved, w ere in some cases opposed to the British connection and advocated republicanism . T hough no reliable figures are available, a contem porary, an im m igrant of 1808, estim ated in 1814 th at six-tenths of the population o f U pper C anada either were born in the U nited States o r were children of A m erican im m igrants.3 In all the provinces the W ar o f 1812 brought to an end the first period of im m igration. D uring the period o f hostilities A m ericans could not cross the border, and w hen hostilities were ended there was less desire to em igrate to the lands of a recent enem y. T here was also a policy, arising o u t of disaffection during the war, to restrict im m igrants w ho might fu rth er en­ danger the loyalty o f the populations. N o t only did positive encouragem ent com e to an end, but land-grants to aliens were either refused o r accom panied by conditions. W hat the prov­ inces lost in settlers from the U nited States they hoped to gain by im m igration from the British Isles. T he times w ere propi­ tious. T he years afte r W aterloo brought increasing hardship, particularly to the poorest classes, who w ere led by propaganda and organized aid to tu rn to em igration as an escape. O f the flood of people who found their way from Britain and the con­ tinent to N orth A m erica the British provinces received a share. F o r the m ost p art the new com ers were poor, some of them des­ titute. T here w ere British families with some little capital who brought furniture, books, and even pianos to the virgin forest of U pper C anada; Irish fam ilies w ho faced the miseries o f the voyage and the uncertainty o f a new land in flight from the horrors of fam ine; groups of G erm ans uprooted from their native soil by econom ic o r political motives. A griculture in U pper C anada attracted those w ho had the m eans to secure land and begin pioneer farm ing. F o r others there w ere possibilities of em ploym ent in lum bering, ship-building, o r the construction of canals and railways. Both for the new com ers and the older inhabitants the success o f the venture turned principally on econom ic conditions. W henever em ploym ent was available and m arkets receptive b oth groups w ere satisfied: in leaner years both had cause for

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regret. O pinion in every province oscillated between an anxiety fo r im m igrants and an apprehension lest they should be too num erous or too great a burden on th e com m unity. P auper im m igration was particularly feared in an age w hen no adequate provision was m ade for the poor in the country either of origin o r of settlem ent. In 1842 a fleet o f ships landed im m igrants in N ew Brunswick, w here in principle they w ere w anted but where in practice they had to find em ploym ent o r be a public expense. A St. Andrew s p aper reported th at the poorhouse was already crow ded with the wives and children o f destitute im m igrants, an d in Saint John an editor “ heard that several destitute blind persons, and even unfortunate maniacs, have arrived in this city in som e o f the em igrant vessels this Spring, who of course will at once add to ou r already heavy Parish C harges.”4 T he crisis caused by the sudden com ing o f thousands o f diseased and destitute Irish, driven by the fam ine of 1846, turned to a ghastly tragedy a t Quebec, w here cholera and typhus decim ated their ranks, carried off doctors and priests w ho m inistered to them, and spread fever throughout Canada. In spite of such real draw backs the advantages of securing large num bers o f im m igrants w ere seen as greater than the dis­ advantages, and the governm ents o f the provinces endeavoured to secure a steady flow. In this they found themselves in unsuc­ cessful com petition w ith the U nited States, in spite of low er ocean rates and the efforts o f agents and em igration societies. O ne particularly annoying phenom enon was th at only the poorer im m igrants were landed at H alifax, Saint John, o r Q uebec, while the m ore prosperous ones w ere carried on to A m erican ports. E m igration, either o f those w ho stayed but a few m onths in the British provinces or o f the native-born, was a constant drain on the population, unrecorded but not unnoticed. It was an old story. T h e first chapter tells o f the forcible rem oval of the F rench o f N ova Scotia and P rince E dw ard Island to the colonies along the A tlantic seaboard. L ater em igration was voluntary, and at times, from political motives, such as in the case of A m ericans who returned to their country during the W ar of 1812 or o f the emigres of 1837; but the largest and m ost persist­ ent em igration was owing to econom ic causes. O pportunities, both in agriculture and industry in the U nited States, constantly drew the young m en.5 O n rare occasions they cam e back, and there was also som e com pensating m ovem ent o f A m ericans to the British provinces; but on balance the latter were losing people to their greater neighbour, as they w ere well aware.

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Low er C anada was m ost conscious o f its losses, but it was not the only one. “A n exchange paper,” w rote a N ew Brunswick editor, “says there are 4,000 N ova Scotians in Boston and 200,000 Canadians in the U nited States. C an any person inform us how m any N ew -Brunsw ickers are now residing in the neigh­ bouring Republic? T here m ust be a goodly num ber there. We are rapidly annexing ourselves by em igration.”6 N o answ er to the editor’s query could be found in provincial records, but the census of the U nited States for 1850 show ed 100,000 persons born in the British provinces, and th at fo r 1860 a quarter o f a million. A study of the flow of people to and from the provinces reveals th at by the m iddle o f the nineteenth century no m ajor changes in the character o f the population had resulted. Prince E dw ard Island, blocked in its developm ent by absentee land­ lords, had had virtually no im m igrants. T he population of N ew Brunswick rem ained small and hom ogeneous except for French settlem ents in the northern p art o f the province. N ova Scotia and L ow er C anada had undergone no basic ethnological changes; and only in U pper C anada can a com paratively rapid grow th in population be attributed largely to im m igration. British Colum bia had a startling inrush o f prospectors when gold was discovered, but the m iners m ade but a shifting popula­ tion which drifted in or out according to th e prosperity of the gold fields. A ssiniboia had a m ixed population of Indians, halfbreeds, active o r retired servants of the H udson’s Bay Com pany, a few British and Canadians, and A m ericans whose increasing num bers and influence were the significant aspects of the col­ ony’s population. All in all, im m igration before confederation wove no pattern o f population as varied as th at caused by the com ing of E uropeans and A siatics in later years. But if there was less m ixture of nations and races, the effects o f the steady flow o f people from all parts o f the British Isles, and of the exchange o f population betw een the U nited States and British N o rth A m erica, m ay be judged to have had results as great, if n o t greater.

II T h e origins o f the people and the continuing intercourse with oth er countries were from the first strongly reflected in the cul­ tural life o f the provinces. T he schools of N ew F rance, the first

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o f which w ere established before the m iddle o f the seventeenth century, w ere in conscious im itation o f those o f F rance itself. T o the extent th at they differed it was because the conditions of the colony did not allow for an exact duplication of the schools o f the older society. W hen a college was founded by the Jesuits at Q uebec the course was m ade as sim ilar as possible to th at in the Jesuit colleges of F rance. T he text-books used in both p ri­ m ary and secondary education were brought from F rance, as indeed they had to be, since no printing was done in Canada under the F rench regim e. T he change from French to British rule threatened for a tim e to bring w ith it the abolition of the F rench system o f education in favour o f th at o f England. T he w hole staff of the Jesuit College returned to France, and restric­ tions on the religious orders seriously reduced the num bers of school teachers. U ndoubtedly it was an aim o f British policy to introduce protestant education into the new ly-acquired colony, b ut it was an aim th at was before long abandoned. W hile p ro ­ vision was m ade fo r protestant schools for the m inority, the education of the F rench m ajority returned to a parochial basis. E ducation becam e an essential elem ent in the cem ent of FrenchC anadian nationalism . One other danger from abroad was seen in the practice, said to be com m on, by w hich F rench Canadians sent their sons to the U nited States to learn English and study com m erce and industry. Objections were raised both on religious grounds and because it was said that the boys cam e to com pare C anada unfavourably to the U nited States.7 T h e early educational institutions o f N ova Scotia showed their E uropean origin as did those of N ew F rance. T he legisla­ tu re of the colony followed the contem porary rule th at only protestants might teach, and for some years a struggle w ent on between those who sought to keep a restricted and denom ina­ tional system and those who urged the com m on schools. Simi­ larly in N ew Brunsw ick different, and som etim es conflicting, points of view on education w ere brought by the various groups o f settlers. In the early gram m ar schools all teachers were m em ­ bers of the C hurch of E ngland, w hether in orders or not; and the Society for the Propagation of the G ospel sent teachers a t a tim e when they w ere badly needed. In 1820 the M adras system o f schools, under w hich the older pupils taught the younger, was im ported from England. It was not until 1871 th at a system o f free and non-sectarian schools was set up by a provincial statute. In U pper C anada the school system was influenced by E urope and the U nited States. A few private schools were

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opened from tim e to tim e, following the English public school tradition; but m ore characteristic w ere the com m on schools provided fo r under the legislation of the 1840’s. These undenom inational and free schools w ere w orked out mainly from A m erican models, w ith certain elem ents draw n from G erm any and Ireland. In V ancouver Island a system of district schools was inaugurated while the colony was still under the H u d so n ’s Bay C om pany, and in 1865 all com m on schools were m ade undenom inational and free. T he R om an Catholic Church, how ever, established schools in 1858-9 and the C hurch of England one for boys and one for girls a t about the sam e time. M any external influences m ay likewise be seen in the univer­ sities founded in the eastern and central provinces. As in Eng­ land, opinion was divided as to w hether higher education should be for the few o r the m any, and w hether it should be denom ina­ tional and exclusive or non-sectarian. K ing’s College in N ova Scotia was founded in t..e form er tradition, while Dalhousie U niversity was explicitly to have no political o r religious tests. Sim ilarly in U pper C anada cam e a tug-of-w ar over K ing’s Col­ lege at T oronto, in which the forces opposed to denom inationalism proved to be the stronger. Those w ho would have the doors o f the universities opened only to the few were impressed, per­ haps, by the fear th at such broadening o f opportunities would lead tow ard A m erican republicanism ; but while A m erican ideas encouraged those w ho wished to extend higher education to the m any, there was no indication of an accom panim ent o f political philosophy. M odels for organization and curricula were found in the British Isles and, to a lesser extent, in the U nited States and G erm any. Bishop’s College at Lennoxville consciously follow ed O xford and Cam bridge. F o r Q ueen’s U niversity in K ingston, Edinburgh was taken as a model. K ing’s College in T o ro n to drew on the experience of English, Scottish, Irish, and G erm an universities. A cadia U niversity alone, because of im­ m igration from N ew England, was largely affected by A m erican patterns. T he universities o f all the provinces had this in com ­ m on, that they recruited their teaching staffs largely from the British Isles, by which m eans a constant contact was m aintained with British scholarship and pedagogy.8 Beyond the form al education in schools and universities was the less organized reading by the public. In this, as in the text­ books, the direct influence o f the culture o f o ther countries may readily be seen. T o N ew F rance, where the absence of printing forbade the com petition o f any local productions, books o f all

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kinds w ere im ported from F rance, and apparently w idely read. In the libraries o f the citizens o f Q uebec and M ontreal w orks on religion and the L atin classics rubbed shoulders with contem ­ p o rary literature and the critical w ritings o f the philosophes.9 A fter N ew F rance was politically separated from its m otherland the cultural tie rem ained, and F rench influence was felt both directly through im ported books and indirectly in the writings o f F rench Canadians. T he w ritings o f the eighteenth-century F rench radicals m ade little im pact on N ew F rance, since the situations which they criticized did not exist there. T he French Revolution of 1789, however, had a m ore com plicated recep­ tion. T he clergy, seigneurs, and bourgeoisie w ere opposed to the ideas th at developed, but it m ade som e appeal to the general public. G enerally speaking, F rench C anada was conservative in religion and social ideas, b u t F rench-C anadian nationalism w as an im portant force from early days. T he com m ent of an observer from F ran ce is valid fo r the Q uebec o f m any genera­ tions. L es Canadiens ayant garde les qualites intellectuelles qui caracterisent notre race, on voit pour ainsi dire a chaque page dans leurs ceuvres, la m anifestation de cette clarte, de cette m ethode et de cette logique qui sont si frangaises. L eu r litterature se rattache done a la notre, non pas seulem ent parce q u ’elle a ete ecrite dans la m em e langue, m ais aussi parce que toutes les d eux procedent d ’un tem peram ent identique et d ’une form ation intellectuelle d ont les elem ents essentiels sont les m im e s. Elle est forcem ent, en outre d’inspiration frangaise, e ’est-a-dire que les auteurs, d ’une fagon generate, y developpent les m im e s idees et les m em es sentim ents que Von trouve dans la notre. M ais, bien entendu, cela ne signife pas q u ’ils adoptent toutes nos opinions. Certaines tendances de notre esprit leur repugnent absolum ent, et e ’est pourquoi ni le realisme, ni le scepticism e, ni nos idees revolutionnaires n’apparaissent dans leurs ouvrages. . . . Les ecrivains canadiens frangais, idealistes conservateurs, profondem en t croyants, ne ressem blent, par consequent, q u ’a certains des notres.10 English C anada too leant heavily on its m other country for the provision of books. F rom the com fortable houses of H alifax m erchants to the isolated huts o f H udson’s Bay traders English classics and contem porary books w ere to be found. A dvertise­ ments by booksellers show a range o f im ported works, and some favourite authors, such as D ickens, w ere reprinted in th e local

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newspapers. W hile the w riters of English C anada w ere not influenced by an aim of racial survival, they w ere none the less followers of English models. A n occasional case may be found o f o th er sources, such as the effect o f M azzini’s philosophy on F . G . C am eron; but m ore com m on was the rule o f looking to standard V ictorian w riters for ideas and form .11 Canadian w riters in both languages sought to depict C anada and Canadian scenes, but their w orks had no m ore natural a ring than the diaries and com m entaries of English im m igrants or travellers. It was n o t until the end o f the nineteenth century that a native ch aracter could be seen in C anadian literature, and even th en it developed slowly and with hesitation. In other arts there was even m ore borrow ing from abroad. M usic know s no national boundaries, and the culture o f any land would be p o o r indeed w ithout acceptance of the great E uropean com posers, whose w orks w ere perform ed in the British A m erican provinces as elsewhere. T he folk music o f the Province o f Q uebec was alm ost the only instance o f native grow th. T he d ram a in C anada was, at least until the tw entieth century, derivative in origin and largely so in perform ance. Painting, too, was chiefly the w ork o f foreign artists w ho had m igrated to C anada. O f the artists o f the confederation era B erthon was born and trained in France; Jacobi was a Prussian by origin and a recognized p ainter w hen he cam e to C anada; D aniel F ow ler was an English artist w ho m igrated to Canada fo r the sake o f his health; and Krieghoff cam e from R otter­ dam .12 A rchitecture in Q uebec show ed interesting adaptations to local clim atic conditions, b u t elsewhere developed no new characteristics. F ro m earliest days the colonists in N o rth A m erica had brought their churches w ith them , and links w ith the countries o f origin were m aintained n o t only by subsequent im m igration, b u t also by integral connections in organization, relationship to governm ents, o r the w ork o f the m issionary societies. C anada in the old regim e was uncom prom isingly R om an Catholic, and, aided by Jesuit influence, had becom e distinctly ultram ontane. Severed from F rance before the revolution, C anada h ad never to endure the religious vicissitudes th at afflicted the church in th e m o th er country, and looked askance a t th e anti-clericalism th a t m arked revolutionary F rance. In other provinces were found R om an Catholics, m ainly Irish and Scottish, w ho shared w ith those o f Low er C anada the organization and doctrines of th e church, w ith a com m on centre in Rome. T he C hurch of

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England was carried to British A m erica as naturally as the R om an C hurch to French A m erica. In all provinces it was in a m inority position, but as the church of the m ajority o f the influ­ ential groups in governm ent and business it held a place higher than the m ere num bers of its m em bers w ould have given, and in N ova Scotia and N ew Brunsw ick it was for a tim e legally established. W ith the support of the H udson’s Bay C om pany the church was extended into the prairies and across the Rockies. T h e P resbyterian churches in the British provinces reflected the divisions that had com e in the C hurch of Scotland. Presbyterianism also cam e from Ireland and the U nited States. T he M ethodist churches have special interest as an external influ­ ence, since they brought to N o rth A m erica the evangelicalism of the English m iddle class and of the U nited States. A lthough their double source strengthened the C anadian M ethodists both in num bers and ideas, it led in tim e to the necessity of a choice between A m erican and English connections. W hile the C hurch o f E ngland in C anada was one of the bulw arks of oligarchy and conservatism , the M ethodists stood for nineteenth-century English liberalism com bined with the frontier spirit of N orth A m erica. T he M ethodist circuit rider fitted into a landscape of prim itive roads and pioneer farm s as did the A nglican bishop into the m ore esoteric atm osphere of T oronto toryism or o f the H alifax Banking Com pany. O ther and sm aller denom inations appeared in the provinces as groups of im m igrants from the U nited States, the British Isles, o r continental E urope planted their churches in the new soil, som etim es greatly modified under new conditions, som etim es little changed from the parent stock. T ogether they added richness and colour and variety to the culture o f British N orth A m erica.13 I ll T he relations o f the provinces w ith the outside world w ere affected by the geography o f N o rth A m erica as well as by national origin. H ad there been a block o f population advancing steadily from the seaboard inland the story m ight have been a very different one. But conditions forbade such a developm ent. T he A tlantic colonies of Prince E dw ard Island, N ova Scotia, and N ew Brunswick looked eastw ard on the ocean and m ain­ tained connections by sea w ith the U nited K ingdom , the W est Indies, and the neighbouring N ew England states. Between them

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and C anada was a long stretch of largely unsettled country over which com m unication by m eans other than rail was difficult and at best seasonal. T hough C anadians owed a heavy debt to the St. Law rence, their route to E urope was past rather than through the m aritim e provinces; and in its low er reaches the river was only a link, for, unlike the people of the m aritim es, the eyes of C anadians w ere turned tow ard the west. A nother and a longer break in settlem ent, caused by the wild stretches to the' north of Lake Superior, separated C anada from the little colony of Assiniboia, which, isolated on the w est as it was on the east, felt an increasing pull to the A m erican settlem ents on the upper Red River. F a r to the west the colonies of V ancouver Island and British Colum bia fronted on the Pacific, and the stern ranges of m ountains set up behind them a barrier m ore form idable than the w ide prairie. T hey also were m aritim e provinces, m aintain­ ing contact with the A m erican states nearby; b u t the distance to England was longer by thousands of miles than from the prov­ inces on the A tlantic coast o f N orth A m erica. Spaced across the wide continent were these foundations on w hich a single British dom inion was later to be built; all fo r a tim e having as close relations w ith other countries as they had with each other. A nd thus the external influences on th e various colonies oper­ ated concurrently, and w ere accentuated by the com parative isolation of each colony from the other. T h e political philosophy and institutions o f the provinces cam e from beyond their own boundaries, though modified in response to local conditions and progressive stages of develop­ m ent. T he oldest colonies, N ova Scotia and C anada, un d er the successive F rench and English adm inistrations, w ere long gov­ erned by appointed officials; b u t the perm anent gift o f England to the political life o f her n orthern as to her southern colonies was the elective representative system. It was this w hich re­ placed both the centralized French bureaucracy and the conciliar system of early British rule. It was applied both to local and central governm ents. In the form er the m unicipal councils were set up to take over the functions of appointed officers, and in the provincial capitals parliam ents w ere called to follow the ancient traditions of the m other of parliam ents. M ore than one governor called his little parliam ent w ith all the pom p th at he could com m and; and, even in the forests of U pper C anada, the representatives legislated for the peace, w elfare, and good gov­ ernm ent o f their fellow colonists as their forefathers had done in the stately surroundings o f W estm inster. C rim inal and civil

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law, the form o f the courts, and, m ore im portant, the spirit of English justice, w ere faithfully reproduced in the new world. O nly in F rench C anada was there an exception, for there the F rench civil law, so long in practice, was allow ed to remain. Political ideas, as distinct from political form s, cam e through individuals rather than by official action. P erhaps now here else could have been foiind as great a variety o f political views as in the British provinces, for there they were held not only by those o f conservative o r liberal o r radical tem peram ents, but were borne by every ship th at docked, over every road th at led from th e south. T he sources of ideas corresponded to the origins of the m ain elements in population, with one outstanding excep­ tio n: the political philosophy o f F rench C anada show ed little reflection o f th at o f contem porary F rance. T he policies adopted by individuals o r groups in th e provinces carried at times touches o f continental E urope, but the m ajor program m es may be traced in m ost cases to either the U nited K ingdom o r the U nited States, o r to both. Such im ported ideas were seldom untouched by local conditions and traditions, but only an elab­ orate study w ould disclose the degree of transm utation. Som e of the p arty leaders w ere native-born, others w ere recent im m i­ grants; and each group had adherents o f the rig h t o r the left. R obert G ourlay, Jo h n Beverley Robinson, and R obert Baldwin had all drunk deep o f English political thought. Such diverse figures as T hom as H aliburton, W illiam L yon M ackenzie, and L ouis Joseph P apineau drew both on England and the U nited States. Ju st as the countries o f origin sent their rich and their poor, so they sent their conservatives and their liberals. Letters, new spapers, books, and travellers kept the links intact and added the m ost recent developments. I t was no accident th at in the British provinces could be seen in the years afte r W aterloo the sam e fundam ental cleavage between the forces o f conservatism and the forces of change that was so evident in Britain, in E urope, and in the U nited States. In each the struggle took its particular form . Jacksonian dem ocracy trium phed at W ashington, the liberals of continental E urope fought fo r their cause on a hundred fields, and the English parliam ent w as invaded by victorious reform . T he provinces too h ad their “reform ers,” seeking in the nam e of liberalism to dispossess entrenched oligarchies. T he right o f m ajorities, rights o f the people, the pow er of the purse, elected institutions, cabinet governm ent - these cries were not first heard in British N o rth A m erica. T he grievances attacked were

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local, b ut the line o f attack and the cures proposed w ere col­ oured strongly by the thought o f other lands. T he provinces had their revolutionaries and their m oderates. A M ackenzie o r a Papineau m anned the barricades like any Parisian o f 1830 and 1848; a Baldwin or a How e w ould have fitted readily into the left wing of the English whig party. N ew spapers w ere full o f political news. N o doubt their readers w ere interested in foreign events as such, but they con­ sciously or unconsciously looked a t them through the eyes of dom estic politics. T he F rench revolution o f 1848 was a case in point. Local new spapers, following it w ith great attention, tried to draw from it argum ents for their respective policies. A t first La M inerve saw in the revolution the trium ph o f the liberal principles which it entertained itself, and began to coin phrases about the m other country. P uissent les nobles enfants de la France que nous pouvons aim er co m m e des freres, sans m anquer a. nos devoirs envers la couronne d ’A ngleterre, rem plir avec calme, avec dignite, cet acte de souverainte nationale.1* A few weeks later the editor felt it necessary to explain why he gave so m uch space to the revolution. E n publiant une revue des evenem ents gigantesques qui se deroulent chaque jour en E urope, nous avons cru faire plaisir a nos lecteurs, tout en servant les interets du pays. Pouvons-nous rester etrangeres au reveils des peuples, des nationalites? Pouvons-nous rester froids en presence du spectacle grandiose qui nous est ofjert sur tous les points du continent a la fois? N e devons-nous pas, au contraire, en les suivant, d’un ceil attentif; y puiser d'utiles legons de sages avertissem ents, pour travailler avec perseverance, avec energie, avec prudence, a assurer les droits et les libertes de notre bien aim ee patrie.15 A s the revolution progressed, and socialism becam e a leading issue, L a M inerve becam e w orried, and was obliged to make pointed rem arks about the difference between liberty and licence, lest the growing extrem es of old F rance be followed in the new world. M ore conservative F rench papers, as well as the English papers, w ere even less tolerant and m ore suspicious. T h e Second Republic gave way to the Second Em pire, and while the conservatives m ay have been soothed, the radicals were not. L e Pays could not adm ire N apoleon III because it held that

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individual liberty was m ore im portant than m ilitary glory. Some o f its contem poraries differed. “L a Patrie, bleu d’habitude, est devenu indigo de colere parce que certains m em bres Canadiensfran?ais ont cru que l’occasion de la naissance de Louis N ap o ­ leon B onaparte n’interessait pas assez le peuple C anadien pour authoriser la legislature a se donner un conge sur un pareil pretexte. . . .” 1C Tw o years later L e Pays saw possible trouble in E urope, and told its readers th at they could not be disinterested, since A m erica was bound by m any ties to E urope.17 Such an idea, however, was not characteristic. T he English C anadians, and to some extent the French Canadians, had tangible interests in their connection with G reat Britain: governm ent, trade, de­ fence, im m igration. T he F rench C anadians had nothing so solid on w hich to base a connection with F rance. They therefore looked fo r com m on ideas o r for new ideas in the sam e way, and only in a greater degree, that C anadians studied Italy, Russia, H ungary, or any other continental power. In the realm of political ideas the provinces were closely attached to the w ider world. But a link m ore tangible bound them in the practice o f governm ent to a pow er beyond their shores; fo r colonial institutions operated w ithin the fram ew ork o f an im perial structure. T he degree o f control actually exer­ cised in the colonies by the m etropolitan governm ent differed from decade to decade. T he direction of change was tow ard greater provincial autonom y, and by the m iddle of the nine­ teenth century responsible governm ent was recognized as in practice in all the eastern colonies. Responsible governm ent, how ever, was intended to be limited to dom estic affairs, and indeed no dem and for its extension beyond th at existed until a m uch later date. T here rem ained the definition of “dom estic.” T o L ord D urham it seemed feasible to draw the line by an explicit division o f powers, but the list of reserved subjects w hich he suggested would never have been generally acceptable in the colonies. T o rem ove im m igration and crown lands, which he rightly saw to have im perial phases, altogether from the control o f the provinces was politically impossible. N o definite division was m ade, and legal flexibility allowed the interpreta­ tion o f dom estic to be widened. Sometimes this was for the benefit and a t the insistence o f the provinces, notably in regula­ tio n o f tariffs; som etim es it was against the will of the provinces, p articularly in the case of defence. T here w as no doubt th at the relations o f the provinces w ith foreign states were to be con­ ducted by the im perial governm ent; and the only ground for

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variation was in the decisions on policy. Tariff and trade ques­ tions generally cam e increasingly within the control of the pro­ vincial legislatures, but the determ ination o f “high policy” was indisputably in the im perial orbit. If the imperial connection, in the sense o f control, slackened in the nineteenth century, their position w ithin the British E m ­ pire was still a real and ever-present factor fo r the people of the British provinces in N orth A m erica; and they would have been dull o f wit indeed if they had never stopped to exam ine the assets and the liabilities, the best form and the possible future o f that connection. In the early years o f the provinces, during and after the A m erican revolution, there were elements in the provinces which were secretly o r openly disloyal. R ecent A m erican im m i­ grants to N ova Scotia would, had they been able, have joined the revolutionary cause; and in the W ar o f 1812 sim ilar groups in U pper C anada gave cause for apprehension, and from them individuals returned to the U nited States w hen the w ar broke out. A fter 1815, how ever, there is no evidence of sim ilar dis­ affection except to a limited extent in U pper C anada during the period o f rebellion; and there is little evidence o f any direct relation between the origins of the people and views as to the future position o f the provinces. N o r did the differences of opinion follow provincial boundaries: rath er they cut across racial groups, in any one o f which great diversity of attitude m ight be found. T hree possible courses m ay be distinguished as considered in the second qu arter of the nineteenth century: independence, annexation to the U nited States, o r continuance o f the im perial connection. T h e first was m entioned from tim e to tim e but w as never widely supported. N o t a few observers concluded that it was quite im practicable and would only lead to annexation. W illiam L yon M ackenzie expressed this m ost pithily when he concluded that, “on Britain we m ust depend, o r w ith A m erica we m ust unite, fo r national purposes. T here is no third course.” 18 A nnexation as a direct policy was m ore seriously advocated. T h e econom ic progress o f the U nited States was an obvious argum ent for annexation, o r at least for closer relations. One com prom ise proposal cam e from the Q uebec board o f trade, that the provinces should have in the U nited States a representa­ tive to look after their com m ercial interests, but the British goverm ent’s reply was that they were better left in the hands of its m inisters and consuls.10 A part from those with G re at Britain, the closest relations of the British provinces w ere w ith the

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U nited States. In every aspect o f their lives the colonists were influenced by their neighbours; and perhaps it was partly be­ cause o f the strength of that influence that the m ajority of the people of the provinces resisted the A m erican pressure. Perhaps, too, it was because they felt themselves being draw n tow ard a greater political and econom ic unit that they looked about for m eans of defence, and rath er self-consciously sought reasons to persuade themselves that there were fundam ental evils in the republic. C ertain it is that they did not hesitate to point to flaws in A m erican society. T he C anadian rouges w ere accused of favouring A m erican institutions in preference to their ow n,20 and perhaps they did at tim es. They w ere m ore sym pathetic than other groups, but on the whole opinion in the provinces was highly critical o f certain aspects o f A m erican institutions and policy. Slavery m et with universal condem nation, and from sources as different as M ackenzie’s W eekly Message and the British Colonist. Slavery in British N orth A m erica had not offi­ cially been abolished until 1834, but had long before that ceased to have any significance, and indeed had had little place in the econom y of the provinces at any time. T he Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 caused m igration o f negroes from the N orth to the w estern part o f C anada, and created, w ithin that area, both an econom ic and a racial problem . Early in 1851 the A nti-Slavery Society of C anada was organized, having as objects not only opposition to slavery on principle but also aid to the “victims of slavery flying to our shores.” Slavery, perhaps m ore than any other one thing, checked enthusiasm for the U nited States. But there were m any other criticisms. From both right and left came protests against financial conditions in the U nited States. It is quite clear to us that free institutions are not very likely to m ake honest m en out o f the A m ericans. T hey sham efully abuse the greatest privileges they enjoy. W e consider the recent bankruptcy o f 1,500 banks and 1,000 traders, an artful, fraudu­ lent, political m ove, to cheat Europe. England alone holds 450 m illions o f dollars value in A m erican securities.21 A tory paper, the British Colonist of T oronto, expressed the sam e views, pointed to the large English loans, and painted a gloom y picture o f conditions in the country.22 Lynching and im­ proper adm inistration of justice, corrupt governm ent, religious persecution, and harsh treatm ent of the Indians were other charges levelled against the A m ericans, w ith the m oral con­ stantly draw n th at British rule in C anada was superior in all

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these respects. In th e m aritim e provinces the com petition of A m erican fisherm en, “our tricky neighbours,” was a constant them e fo r com plaint; and in all agreem ents on fisheries, trade, o r boundaries the A m ericans w ere represented as driving hard bargains. T he vigour w ith w hich annexation was advocated varied according to the apparent advantages to be gained; and those in tu rn w ere relative to the varying advantages o f the imperial connection. T he shock to the econom y of the provinces resulting fro m the free trade policy o f England led to protests th at G reat Britain, having w ithdraw n h er preference, should leave the colonies alone. “Si lA n g leterre ne laisse plus a ses colonies aucun privilege com m ercial, qui peut attacher celles-ci longtem ps a leur m ere-patrie?” 23 A m em ber o f the N ew Brunswick assem bly suggested that parliam ent was no longer legislating for the w hole em pire but only fo r certain classes.24 In answer to such criticisms other w riters pointed to the positive advantages o f the connection, such as capital fo r public works, and provi­ sion o f m ilitary defence. O thers p u t their argum ents on different grounds, praising the liberty and the institutions w hich came fro m th e em pire. T he Novascotian w ould not “forfeit o u r con­ nection with the d ear old m other country,” even if it m eant sacrificing trade w ith the U nited States.25 A C anadian editor m ocked the grim earnestness w ith which his contem poraries w rote on trade and the em pire, and pointed to w ider considera­ tions. It is very gratifying that, w hile in Canada our public bodies, w hether they be Civic Corporations or Boards o f Trade, devote their pow ers either to m atters o f sectional im portance, or to finding o ut w hether a bale o f cotton goods or a barrel o f flour cannot be im ported with m ore advantage or carried fo r ship­ m en t at less cost through the U nited States than by the St. Lawrence, the attention o f our neighbours in N o v a Scotia and N e w B runsw ick, w hether in newspapers or a t public m eetings is turned alm ost exclusively to the advantages that will be per­ m anently gained by knitting together the w hole British E m pire as one family', and by w orking o u t the prosperity o f that fam ily through its ow n internal relations independent o f foreign interference,26 T h e closer integration o f the em pire, w hether by inform al understanding o r constitutional change, w ould m ore readily be secured if E ngland knew the colonies better. Pained feelings

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w ere n ot infrequently expressed at the lack of interest show n by Englishm en in the affairs o f British N orth A m erica. T he editor of a tory p aper in T oronto was shocked to read a speech by L ord Stanley on the state o f the world in w hich he com pletely ignored Canada. W e do not wish to m isunderstand our position. W e are Pro­ vincials. We are taught it daily; but still with all this sense o f our shortcom ings, judged by a cosm opolitan standard, we do not think that justice is done to us. Pained are we to think that we rank fa r higher at W ashington than at St. James. . . . W ould a m inister o f the Crown in Canada, in L o ndon be looked upon in any other light, than a person to w hom som ething civil has to be said, and to be got rid o f, so soon as official business is dis­ patched? Contrast his reception with som e F u rst o f Schw arzburg R a d o lsta d t.. . .27 T o rem ove this ignorance or indifference w riters in the m ari­ tim e provinces set themselves to explain the colonies to the m o th er country. O thers pleaded for closer integration. “W e wish England to give up addressing her colonies as a separate o r third party,” w rote a T oronto editor, “W e wish Colonial to be adopted as British interests, and we desire to argue fo r them only to the extent th at they are British. L et British o r foreign then be our sim ple question. Let England view C anada as part of herself, and let C anada never forget her duty as a p art of the Em pire.”28 As positive m achinery for closer co-operation two suggestions w ere m ade from tim e to tim e - a perm anent representative of C anada in London, and colonial representatives in the H ouse of Com m ons. But these were n o t pressed, and those w ho m ost actively supported the continuance o f the im perial connection devoted their efforts either to m ore general argum ents o r to proving that the provinces profited by their position w ithin the em pire. N either they nor those who took a m ore critical view could fo r long neglect two subjects m ost concretely apparent as colonial interests - defence and external trade.

CHAPTER 2

Diplomacy and War

International rivalries and w ar were carried by E uropeans to N o rth A m erica together w ith political institutions, econom ic structure, and culture. N o t that w arfare of a kind was strange to the aborigines: on the contrary, the tribes fought each other frequently and w ith a ferocity th at m ade the nam e of Indian a by-word for cruelty and a te rro r to the settlers. T hanks in p art to their own inept handling o f the natives the white men were from the first subject to Indian attacks; but they did not stop at defence, or even at calculated intervention in inter-tribal q u ar­ rels. T o the w arfare which they found and could scarcely have ended they added th at w hich sprang from the com petition of distant states, fought with weapons vastly m ore destructive than the tom ahaw k. It was in the course of w orld wars th at the north of the continent passed wholly under British sovereignty; and the process o f delim itation o f political boundaries continued with far-reaching diplom acy as its m eans and w ar as the final arbiter. F o r the colonies which w ere to form the nucleus o f the C anadian D om inion the causes, the course, and the results of w ar w ere placed in a m ixed setting o f local disputes and the colonial and foreign policies o f E uropean great powers. The very fact that they were colonies implied th at the determ ination and conduct o f policy were beyond their orbit, and th at term s of peace were reached at negotiations in which they took no part. It equally followed that a responsibility for the results o f policy rested on the imperial authorities. T he royal arm y and navy were intended to bear the brunt o f fighting, supported by such colonial forces as were from tim e to tim e available. T he posi­ tion, then, in respect of the w ars fought on C anadian soil was that the colonials had no voice in their origination o r conclusion but did have a subordinate place in the cam paigns. T he advan­ tages and disadvantages of that position m ight be - and indeed long have been - debated. On the one hand the colonies enjoyed the prestige and experience of the British governm ent, and on the other hand were m ade to suffer for its m istakes o r the results

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o f policies unrelated to their im m ediate interests. If they could have been regarded as unexposed to attack except as a result of im perial diplom acy the defence provided from E ngland would have been unnecessary. It is, how ever, safe to conclude that w hen defence was needed - w hatever the cause - the British arm ed forces w ere essential. H ow far those forces could effec­ tively operate in o r for the colonies depended in p art on the dem ands o f cam paigns in o th er parts o f the w orld and in part on th e geography o f N o rth A m erica. T h e h alf century from the end o f the Seven Y ears’ W ar to the end of the N apoleonic w ars is an unrivalled quarry for the study of diplom acy and w ar in relation to the British provinces. In the British E m pire and in F rance, the two countries from w hich cam e the people o f C anada and N ova Scotia, m ajor revolutions broke out, leading to issues w hich m ight be expected to divide the people o f the colonies, and to international com ­ plications o f the m ost far-reaching character. T he response of th e populations o f N ova Scotia and C anada to the appeals of revolutionary and anti-revolutionary parties throw s not a little light on the character and points o f view o f the groups which successively cam e to the provinces. T he two w ars o f the period dem onstrate the changing degree and the nature of co-operation between im perial and colonial forces; while the E uropean align­ m ents illustrate the effect o f the international balance on the m aking o f w ar and peace in N o rth A m erica. T he role o f the people o f N ova Scotia and C anada in the A m erican revolution was alm ost entirely negative, but the provinces as such w ere not u n im p o rtant in its outbreak, in the strategy o f the w ar, and in the settlem ent th at follow ed. T h a t the transfer o f Q uebec from th e F rench to the British E m pire would influence the attitude in th e other colonies h ad long been predicted. T he rem oval of F rench pressure from the n o rth gave to the thirteen colonies g reater freedom to press their claim s against the m other country. B ut while the fall o f N ew F ran ce thus eased the situation o f the thirteen colonies it did not by any m eans preclude the possibility o f a w ar on two fronts. Sir G uy C arleton, early discerning that he m ight inherit th e m ilitary pow er o f his F rench predecessors and use the fortress o f Q uebec and the trained m ilitia o f the colony if force should be needed, bent his efforts tow ard secur­ ing the loyalty and active aid of the F rench Canadians. T h at the Q uebec A ct o f 1774 was the practical m eans to th at end was hard ly disguised by its supporters, and was recognized by its opponents, both in E ngland and the thirteen colonies. It was

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bitterly denounced in both places as an instrum ent of oppres­ sion, designed not only to destroy liberty in the St. Law rence Valley but in the A tlantic colonies as well. O n the eve of hostilities the party of revolt in the colonies had, perforce, to find w hat m ethods they could of scotching a danger which they clearly saw to exist, for if C arleton’s schemes should succeed they would be in a m ost perilous position: threatened by a British fleet based on H alifax, by land forces of F rench C anadians and im perial regulars from Quebec, and by the hostile Indians of the west. Obviously the first move was to attem pt to secure the adhesion o f the people o f the two prov­ inces to the revolutionary cause. O pinion was divided every­ w here - in England, in the thirteen colonies themselves, and in N ova Scotia and C anada - and there appeared to be no inherent reason why two should not be added to the thirteen already being bound together to resist British policy. As a field for p ropaganda N ova Scotia w ould at first appear to be m ost hope­ ful, dotted as it was w ith N ew England fam ilies and in tune with the doctrines of self-governm ent. Yet w hatever w ere the feelings o f the inhabitants (and they were undoubtedly divided), they could hardly be translated into action, for the small British garrison at H alifax was in easy touch with the British fleet. It was literally impossible fo r the revolutionaries to effect a junc­ tion with their supporters in the province, o r even to prevent H alifax from being used as a base of naval operations against them . In all probability, therefore, the people of N ova Scotia w ould be unable to support them . T he aspect of C anada was very different. I f a com bination o f regulars, militia, and Indians could be gathered they m ight advance into the heart of New Y o rk and play havoc with the em bryonic arm ies of the colonies. But could th at offensive not be stopped at source? W as the population o f C anada ready to follow its governor? W as it even loyal in a negative sense? A m ongst the sm all English-speaking group in the province individuals and com m ittees had shown unm istakable sym pathy with the revolutionary cause, while the F rench were a recently-conquered people who might well be persuaded to throw off the foreign yoke. H ence the strategy was clear: to persuade the people of C anada to throw in their lot w ith the revolutionaries, and to enable them to do so by sending arm ed forces to their relief. T he troops a t the disposal o f the governor w ould be overw helm ed, the loyalists suppressed, and the tories in the thirteen colonies given a practical lesson. C anada could be reached by land, and w ith its interm ittent

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com m unication with E ngland be brought into the fold in a way that N ova Scotia never could be.1 Some m onths before the w ar began printed leaflets and agents w ere hurried to C anada to encourage the faithful, convert the uncertain, and intim idate opponents. T he m erchants o f M ont­ real, disgusted with the F rench institutions of the supposedly British province, received both literature and delegates with m ore than interest. Some o f them went over to the revolutionary side and others w ere suspected of passive disloyalty. O n the whole, however, they were unready to join in a fight fo r inde­ pendence of the Britain with which their business connections w ere vital, and chose to bear the known evils of the Q uebec Act rath er than abandon their com m ercial structure. French C an a­ dians were invited to escape from the tyranny of British rule, with a strong hint th at any other course would incur the enm ity of the sons of liberty. F o r m onths the bulk of the French Canadians w ere undecided as to the course they should take. T he A m erican prom ises of self-governm ent m ade little im ­ pression in themselves, but the Q uebec A ct had failed to con­ ciliate the habitants. By the seigneurs and the clergy loyalty to the crow n was unquestioned, and the influence o f the latter especially helped to turn the tide. But if the habitant was unim pressed by assemblies and juries, he found the new act oppressive after the relaxation of the strict rule of the French regime. T he F ranco-A m erican alliance of 1778 m ight have been used as another lever to move the French C anadians against their new governm ent, but neither signatory w anted to see the fieur-de-lys restored at Quebec, and the suggestion o f a com ­ bined attack by a French fleet and an A m erican arm y - which m ight have had a m arked effect - was never adopted. A com ­ bination o f factors - C arleton’s firm adm inistration, the influ­ ence of the church, resentm ent against incidents of oppression by the invaders, and finally the failure o f the invasion — drew m ost o f the F rench at least into passive obedience. W ith a population so uncertain the m ilitary problem o f de­ fending C anada, far m ore o f attem pting an offensive from it, was no light one. T he fact th at N ova Scotia was never seriously threatened illustrates the im portance o f British sea-power, as does, obversely, the vulnerability o f C anada. T he m ain route through the A lleghanies was form ed by the Richelieu R iv erL ake C ham plain-H udson R iver system, and, since it m ight be traversed by either belligerent, an A m erican raiding party wisely secured the fortified posts a t T iconderoga and C row n Point in

D I P L O M A C Y A ND WAR - 27

the spring o f 1775. T he real invasion o f C anada was in the autum n o f the sam e year, w hen one arm y, following that route, captured M ontreal and joined w ith a second arm y that had com e by the valley o f the K ennebec to besiege Quebec. H ere was the one strong defensive position in C anada. T he garrison, it is true, was sm all, and m ore than a half consisted of untrained C anadians; but the A m erican force was likewise small and was handicapped by long lines of com m unication and bad weather. In the spring the strong arm o f the royal navy had at last a chance; and w hen three m en-of-w ar sailed up to the rock the siege was raised - never to be resum ed. Some few hundreds of C anadians had taken p art in its defence (and others had fought on the side o f the enem y), but the w ar was essentially one betw een British and A m erican forces, the form er handicapped by the E uropean alliance against them . It was no national spirit th at saved the British provinces from absorption in the new union, and kept them the basis o f a second British em pire in A m erica: a national spirit was yet to be born. If the British provinces during the w ar w ere paw ns in the great international chess game, it was even m ore true th at they were so in the peace settlem ent.2 It did not, how ever, follow that the m inor role assigned to them was altogether a disadvantage, fo r to some degree they w ere protected by the moves and counter-m oves o f the m ajor pieces. W hile the U nited States had leant on F rench assistance in the w ar and was prepared to follow the F rench lead in the negotiations for peace, the aims of the two countries conflicted on im portant points. W ashington had frow ned on L afayette’s proposal for a joint invasion of Canada, fearing that it might restore Bourbon rule at Q uebec; and, though the A m ericans hoped at one tim e to secure the cession of both N o v a Scotia and C anada, they sacrificed even the hope of widened dom ains for the sake of the balance of power. The F rench governm ent seems to have had no am bition to regain its A m erican possessions, neither did it wish to strengthen the U nited States by such a broad acquisition. Its general plan was fo r a division between British, A m erican, and Spanish pow er on the continent; and its apparent support o f Spain’s claims to the east branch of the Mississippi so alarm ed the A m erican pleni­ potentiaries th at they hastily swung to support Britain in C anada and F lorida as a counter-w eight against the threatened Spanish encroachm ent on the west. It has been said, and with some justice, that G reat Britain m ade an inadequate diplom atic defence of her colonies in the negotiations, but it is evident that

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she had no thought o f abandoning them , and that the fault lay in p art in her insufficient appreciation of the im portance o f the boundaries, and in p art on the continued tension in Europe. F o r w hatever reason, the British let go the O hio Valley and the trad ­ ing posts on the south and west of the great lakes - a result w hich was viewed w ith horror by the M ontreal m erchants w ho knew every inch o f the terrain. On the A tlantic end of the boundary the selection o f the line from the St. Croix River to the highlands, threatened land com m unications by an A m erican wedge between N ew B runsw ick and Canada. T he treaty o f Paris left British colonies along the north of the continent. T h at they w ould rem ain British was to m any A m ericans no certainty: that they would be confined by the term s o f 1783 was not yet accepted in L ondon o r in M ontreal. M ore than a generation was to pass before the issues raised by the A m erican revolution were resolved. D uring th at time there was a spell o f peace, and in it intervals when the tension relaxed, but there could be little expectation o f perm anent peace until after a fu rth er resort to arm s. D anger to the prov­ inces cam e both from N orth A m erican and E uropean politics. In Britain and the U nited States it was believed that the boun­ dary o f 1783 was subject to change. T he British governm ent retained hold o f several im portant posts on the then A m erican side fo r m ore than ten years after the peace, and cherished some hope that centrifugal forces in the new federation - as exem pli­ fied by the secessionist m ovem ent in V e rm o n t-w o u ld lead to its collapse. T he U nited States, for their part, had not altogether abandoned earlier am bitions o f bringing the whole continent within their control. T o the general idea o f political expansion w ere added suspicion of a British alliance w ith the western Indians, land hunger, and designs on the fu r trade of the no rth ­ west. It is possible, however, that such local differences would not have led to w ar had it not been for the recurrence of E u ro ­ pean com plications. A t the very tim e w hen agreem ent over the posts was being negotiated the intrigues o f F rench agents in the U nited States w ere causing alarm in the C anadas; and even w hen the Jay T reaty had been signed the prom ise of peace was darkened by the repercussions of the A nglo-French war. T h e parallel with 1775 was all too apparent: would the U nited States again secure F rench assistance in A m erica? T he event proved that they did not; but nevertheless the E uropean w ar strongly influenced the situation in A m erica. T he British block­ ade seriously im paired A m erican shipping and foreign trade,

D I P L O M A C Y A N D WAR - 29

adding a new source of antagonism to those already existing; while the exigencies o f the struggle against N apoleon limited the ability o f G re at Britain to defend her colonies. T h e m ilitia system o f the British provinces, as it appeared in the first half o f the nineteenth century, was modelled on those o f both F rance and E ngland and had already a history on the continent o f N orth A m erica. In N ova Scotia there w as no break in continuity, and p a rt o f the provincial m ilitia was called up for garrison duty in the period o f the A m erican revolution. In C anada, how ever, the cession and the years of adjustm ent had necessitated a suspension o f the m ilitia system , and such inhabi­ tants as served in 1775 w ere volunteers enrolled as the authori­ ties could secure them . A year after the siege of Q uebec was raised the m ilitia system w as again restored by a series of ordinances, which, w ith the acts of the various provincial legis­ latures, m ade up a coherent system of w hich the principles were com m on to all provinces.3 C ertain central ideas run through the laws from the F rench regim e in C anada and early British ru le in N ova Scotia to the organization in the provinces as it was just p rio r to the W ar o f 1812. L iability to service, w ith specified exem ptions, was universal and com pulsory. A ll men o f m ilitary age were registered by districts and records were periodically sent to headquarters. M usters w ere held on two to four days in the sum m er, and at times som e slight provision was m ade for training. All o r p art o f the m ilitia m ight be em bodied fo r a lim ited period in tim e o f civil disturbance o r war, and when only detachm ents were required they were chosen by ballot. N o pay was provided, and in m ost cases the m en w ere obliged to provide their own w eapons and am m unition. M odifications were m ade during the tense years of the N apoleonic w ars by provin­ cial votes for training and by the introduction o f volunteering. “F lan k com panies” w ere form ed in each regim ent from volun­ teers who still received no pay but were obligated to drill for six days a m onth, and to find their own uniform s and muskets. T aken by itself the m ilitia w ould be judged as of little avail for w ar. B ut it was at no tim e intended to operate alone, only as an adjunct to regular troops. Led by trained officers and stiffened by regular regim ents it could, and did, give a good account of itself. In spite o f requirem ents in Europe, the British govern­ m ent increased its garrison in British N o rth A m erica from some 3,500 in 1804 to nearly 9,000 in 1808 and 1809. O f the total ab o u t one qu arter was m ade up o f regular fencible regim ents raised in the provinces; and while these w ere carried on the

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British budget they eased the problem o f m an-pow er. Such were the land forces on the eve of the W ar o f 1812. T he royal navy, the provincial m arine, and natural and artificial obstruc­ tions, com plete the tale of the means available for offensive or defensive w arfare.

II T h e testing o f the system of defence was neither unexpected n o r long delayed. In m any respects the W ar o f 1812 was strik­ ingly like th at o f 1775, both in its origins and its course. Both form ed p art o f larger international struggles; both involved invasions of C anada; and both illustrate the im portance of British sea and land forccs as the basis of the defence of the British provinces. But, while in neither case did the provincial governm ents have any voice in the diplom acy leading to the outbreak, the C anadian m ilitia and the civil population in general supported those governm ents in action in contrast to the slight response or even hostility of the earlier war. W hether the w ar was prim arily caused by m aritim e disputes incidental to the use o f British sea-power against N apoleon o r to the am bitions of A m erican im perialism ,4 it took the form not o f a dispute over colonial autonom y but of a contest between national states.T he A m erican invasion of the colonies w hich had rem ained British was a blow against the nearest territory of the enem y, and if successful m ust have resulted in conquest and perhaps their annexation. Colonial opinion on th at issue could n o t be represented as unanim ous, for there w ere groups of recent A m erican im m igrants whose allegiance was to the coun­ try o f their birth, and w ho either returned as the w ar cam e or created disloyal elem ents in the provinces. T he assembly of U pper C anada blocked em ergency m easures w hich the adm inis­ trato r considered to be necessary, and on some occasions units o f the m ilitia showed signs of disaffection. T he dom inant ele­ m ent in the population, how ever, w ith the U nited E m pire L oyal­ ists as its core, gave unquestioning obedience and support. In Low er C anada too, w here once both English and F rench C ana­ dians had w avered in their loyalty, the position had changed, but n o t in this case because o f an alteration in the character o f the population. It was tru e th at once again an attem pt at a return to F ren ch sovereignty m ight be feared; but F rance played only a rem ote p art in the A m erican W ar, and a F rance still coloured

D I P L O M A C Y A ND WAR - 31

with the red of revolution. Les Canadiens w ere finding their destiny. It was to be neither in a reversal of the decision of 1763 nor yet in unconditional absorption w ithin the world-wide operations o f British foreign policy. As yet the positive lines were hardly draw n, but the W ar o f 1812 dem onstrated that the F rench of Q uebec would defend their province against an invader. W ar and revolution on two continents had ham m ered o u t a pattern in which the provinces o f British N o rth A m erica saw themselves as at bay against the aggression o f a far m ore pow er­ ful neighbour. T he odds, how ever, were not as uneven as might at first appear. W hile the m orale o f the colonials was relatively high, the U nited States were as much, if not m ore, divided than they had been in 1775. N ew England was cold, if not actually opposed, to the w ar; and the British were careful to nurse this advantage by attacking only on the central and southern coasts, and by allowing the trade o f N ew England to be carried on. T he colonies were dependent on sea-com m unication across the w idth o f the A tlantic, but since the A m erican and French navies were unable to break th at com m unication, it was only the ele­ m ent o f time that was a handicap. T he long land frontier with the U nited States, from A tlantic to Pacific, was guarded by few troops, scanty forces on the lakes, and few fortified positions, but the section that was actually vulnerable was only the central portion of that great stretch. O n the east the m aritim e provinces, with th eir ice-free ports, were easily held by small garrisons in touch with the British fleet, while on the other extrem ity A m erican pow er was so negative that the fur-trading post of A storia was handed over to the N orth W est Com pany. F o r the British the A m erican w ar was not unlike that waged with N apoleon in that they m ade the fullest possible use o f su­ perior sea-power and w ere com paratively w eak in land forces.5 W hile A m erican m en-of-w ar w ere victorious in several separate engagem ents, the British fleet was able not only to m aintain com m unications, but to blockade the A m erican coast and make com bined naval and land attacks on A m erican cities. O n the other hand, the U nited States was able to take the offensive against the central British provinces o f U pper and Lower C anada, which could not be defended by the British fleet since the rapids o f the St. Law rence prevented navigation beyond M ontreal. T he im portance of naval force on the great lakes was fu rth er accentuated by the difficult transport over the crude C anadian roads. H onours on the lakes were not unevenly

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divided. W hen the U nited States secured control of L ake Erie in 1813 the British land forces w ere obliged to retire eastw ard; and, on the other side of the ledger, British ships on L ake O n­ tario held up the A m erican advance on the N iagara peninsula. O n p ap er the arm ies w ere fa r from equal. T he British regu­ lars (including those regim ents raised in the N o rth A m erican provinces) were few in num ber, particularly in the early p art of the w ar when they could w ith difficulty be spared from E urope; but they w ere highly trained, and the A m erican arm y on active service was only a portion o f its nom inal roll. T he C anadian m ilitia included only a handful of com panies w ith any serious training, but - w ith some exceptions - it was m ore successfully em ployed than the A m erican both as an auxiliary to the regulars and as a separate force. T he A m erican weaknesses in training and organization w ere hardly m ore serious than w ere those in strategy. T he chief objective of the A m erican staff should have been to cut the thin line o f British com m unications a t M ontreal o r K ingston, and thus isolate all forces, both on land and water, to the west. Instead o f this, how ever, they began by attacking on th eir left flank w ith the hope o f neutralizing o r securing as allies the pow erful Indian tribes to the west. T hough, after some reverses, they w ere able to invade and occupy the west of U pper C anada, the result o f the w ar was no m ore affected in th a t way than by their offensive in the centre over the N iagara peninsula. T h ree years o f cam paigns ended w ith no decisive victories by either side, and with each ready to m ake peace. F o r the U nited States the first abdication of N apoleon spelt m ore British forces in N o rth A m erica and on the A tlantic, b u t the British had no desire to continue a struggle which they had never w anted, w hich was purely defensive, and w hich dragged on at a time w hen they m ost w anted peace after the exhausting and p ro ­ tracted w ars w ith F rance, and freedom to face th e m ore im p o rtan t settlem ent in Europe. T h e settlem ent in A m erica w as m ade up of several instru­ m ents, o f which the T reaty o f G hent w as only one.6 In the negotiations both sides, according to custom , presented m axi­ m u m term s, the final result having the appearance o f a return to the status quo. T he British plenipotentiaries at first pressed fo r m easures designed to bring m ore security to their colonies: revision o f the N ew Brunsw ick-M aine boundary, an Indian buffer state, m inor adjustm ents elsewhere, and A m erican dis­ arm am ent on the lakes. T he territorial dem ands w ere eventually dropped, and the boundary rem ained as in the treaty o f 1783,

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subject to later settlem ent of certain sections. In 1818 the whole line from the L ake o f the W oods to the Rockies was, by agree­ m ent, established at the forty-ninth parallel of latitude. T he b oundary of N ew Brunswick was destined to rem ain longer a subject o f dispute. U nilateral w as changed to bilateral disarm a­ m ent in the Rush-Bagot agreem ent of 1817, under which arm ed vessels of both sides on the lakes were reduced to the size of police forces. A British attem pt to include an article explicitly nullifying A m erican fishing rights in British N o rth A m erican w aters was successfully resisted, and replaced by a convention of 1818 under which limited rights were allow ed.7 In C anada there was som e dissatisfaction th at better term s had not been secured. T he fur-traders had hoped th at the m istake of 1783 would be corrected, but their protests w ere o f little consequence in view of the im m inent transfer of the trade from M ontreal to H udson Bay. A m ore significant note was struck by John S trachan, later Bishop of T oronto. T hough a staunch tory and im perialist, he hinted th at British control o f diplom acy had its draw backs - an idea th at later was to be m ore com m only and m ore vigorously voiced. . . . W e have just heard that the conditions o f peace have been signed at G hent & ratified by the Prince Regent. O ur E nvoys were not I fear endow ed with m uch sagacity & firmness. I dread to see the articles. This country has certainly derived m any advantages fro m the war and if a proper line o f policy be adopted it will becom e a m ost valuable appendage to the British Em pire. In regard to the vast expence o f the war it is m ost true that m uch m ore m oney has been spent in the country than the soil is worth but this is not the proper way o f stating the question. These colonies are the relique o f happier tim es the m em orial o f the pow er and success o f the British E m pire under the m ost brilliant o f her adm inistrations and could not be given up w ithout disgrace. T h ey have also been a receptacle fo r the Loyalists during the A m erican rebellion and have claim s on the protection o f the M o th er country which to a m agnanim ous nation are irresistible. B ut the Inhabitants o f the Canadas had nothing to do about the Origin o f the W ar they were to becom e its victim s but the causes were national questions o f vital im portance to the welfare & prosperity o f the British E m pire. The great expence o f conduct­ ing the war ought not therefore to be charged upon the Canadas.8

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Seen in a perspective w ider than was possible for contem ­ poraries, the settlem ent of 1814-18 becomes a milestone in the history of British N o rth A m erica. T hough modified in detail and even threatened in its entirety, that settlem ent proved to be the end of a series of wars which covered m ore than a century. F rance, Spain, England, and the U nited States had, in various com binations, struggled for the control of N orth A m erica. The treaties of 1763 and 1783, in spite of the hopeful language in which they w ere couched, were tem porary, and were known even by contem poraries to be tem porary. W hile the peace­ m akers at V ienna - kings, m inisters, and generals - conscious o f the prime im portance o f their task, w ere able to legislate for but a generation, those who were appointed to the m ore humble task of m aking pcace in the new world w ere able to establish the lines on which two powers w ere to live peacefully in that great continent. N ot, indeed, that the peoples o f the provinces were able to discern the final outcom e o f the settlem ent, for there w ere to be m any m ore rum ours o f w ar in the next fifty years, and the problem of security was by no means seen as solved. But if the peace could not be taken as perm am ent, the w ar had brought a new consciousness of nationality, a m ore assured sense o f orientation. Canadians, both French and Eng­ lish, had been ready to fight for their lands, with not a little success; and if defects in the system o f defence had becom e m ore apparent, they were not beyond rem edy. Disloyal groups had been m ore clearly revealed, and steps were taken to remove such danger for the future by barriers against A m erican and encouragem ent o f British imm igrants. Ill Peace on alm ost any basis would have induced, as it custo­ m arily does, a relaxation of concern for m ilitary effort and reorganization; and, while the settlem ent of 1814-18 left much to be desired both in term s and prom ise of perm anence, it was obviously much m ore than a truce, and gave ground for hopes of peace at least for a time. T he peoples and the legislatures of the provinces turned to the problem s of imm igration and m ate­ rial progress, and revived political disputes which only later proved to be w ider than dom estic quarrels. But if the public thought m ore of pcace than of war, the sky of N orth A m erica was not so clear that the responsible authorities could neglect altogether questions of defence. F o r the next quarter-century

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the strategy o f the defence of the British provinces as seen by the British was consistent in principles and not materially changed by the threats to peace that occurred from time to time. All plans were based on the dual assum ption that, while offensive w arfare against the U nited States was not practicable, the provinces were defensible. It was believed that the W ar of 1812 had dem onstrated both the feasibility of successful defence, even against the larger neighbour, and also th at the organization o f land forces was fundam entally sound. T he im provem ents th at w ere considered to be necessary were to m eet weaknesses which were em phasized m ore than revealed by the war. In this last phase of the old colonial system it was taken for granted th at responsibility for defence both in thought and action, rested on the im perial governm ent. It followed, then, that the weight o f attack w ould fall upon the royal navy and the British regulars; but these two professional arm s, it was believed, could afford adequate protection if - and only if - the provinces continued to provide the additional m an-pow er o f the militia. T h e successful operation o f the three branches o f the defence force depended on a fortified naval base on the A tlantic, im­ proved com m unication w ithin the continent, and strengthened or additional fortifications at vulnerable points. Such was the attitude o f the British governm ent tow ard the problem of defending N orth A m erica from the sea to the head o f the great lakes. T h e w ar had am ply proved the ability of the royal navy to m aintain uninterrupted com m unications across the A tlantic, and not even a com bination of powers could challenge the sea-power that dated from the battle o f T rafalgar. T he fleet m ust, however, have a base th a t was safe against land attack o r raids from the sea, and for that reason Sir Jam es Carm ichaelSm yth, the head o f the com m ission sent to inspect the defences o f the provinces in 1825, advised a new citadel for H alifax.9 M inor works w ere recom m ended, for storing am m unition and as “alarm posts and rallying points” at A nnapolis and W indsor. N ew Brunswick was “ the connecting link between C anada and N ova Scotia,” and the com mission pointed to the military im portance o f a satisfactory boundary of N ew Brunswick with M aine. F o r p art of the year troops and supplies could be sent by way o f the St. Lawrence, but in the w inter the overland route through N ew Brunswick was the only one, and it w ould be endangered by the jutting north o f Maine. T he Tem iscouata P ortage road was not only close to the border but could only by

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politeness be called a road a t all. In order to provide a com ­ m unication safer in tim e o f w ar the K em pt road, fu rth er from the boundary, was projected, and was open over som e sections in the thirties. Since C anada was the only province th at was considered likely to be attacked it was essential to provide com m unications through as well as up to it. R apids on the upper St. Law rence barring navigation, the British governm ent, at its own expense, built the Rideau C anal, which had the additional advantage of being well back from the frontier. A t first the imperial experts frow ned on the im provem ent o f the St. L aw rence, as opening it to A m erican attack; b u t later encouraged canals on th at river as a necessary alternative to the R ideau route. T he seizure of control o f Lake Erie in the W ar of 1812 underlined the problem of reinforcing the defences of the western part o f the province, and gave a m ilitary im portance to the W elland Canal. W hile the inland waterways, like the low er St. Law rence, w ere frozen in the w inter, by a happy coincidence the roads of C anada w ere com paratively fit for use w hen the bottom less m ud was decently covered w ith snow. T h e sam e lakes which afforded a m eans o f com m unication for H is M ajesty’s forces w ould be useless fo r that purpose if com m anded by enem y ships, and becom e instead a highw ay for an invader. T he Rush-Bagot agreem ent o f 1817 was intended to cancel out all arm ed vessels save a few patrol boats, but, like m any another disarm am ent agreem ent, its im plem entation followed slowly. Being only required n o t'to keep arm ed ships in com mission, both sides w ere slow to scrap them altogether; and there w ere m any stories o f w arships being secretly built. A fu rth er com plication was th at com m ercial vessels could be converted into w arships w ithout great difficulty, and as the A m erican m erchant vessels w ere far m ore num erous, particu­ larly on Lake E rie, and had m ore ports, the British authorities had cause for w orry. In 1838, at a time o f strained relations, the British governm ent m aintained arm ed vessels in com mission over the m axim um , by consent o f the A m erican governm ent; an d the president was em pow ered, in case of danger, to take sim ilar action. In the m idst of the excitem ent caused by the M cLeod case congress appropriated $100,000 for w arships. In 1843 the British governm ent decided it could safely reduce tonnage to the figure of the agreem ent, only to reconsider its decision at the tim e of the O regon dispute. T he adm iralty sent a shipw right officer to C anada to direct the construction of m erch an t vessels capable o f conversion into arm ed vessels, but

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the w ork was not carried out because o f the m ore pacific attitude of congress.10 Study o f the W ar o f 1812 and o f the topography o f C anada satisfied Carm ichael-Sm yth’s com m ission th at invasion need be anticipated at only a lim ited num ber of places, all of which were in C anada. T he stronghold o f Q uebec had never been captured, b ut its fortifications were neglected. M ontreal had always been an object o f attack by way o f L ake C ham plain, and, in C ar­ m ichael-Sm yth’s view there should be a fortress on the island itself together w ith lesser w orks on the south side of the river. T h e next strategic point, K ingston, was not only a port, naval station, and dockyard, but controlled the entrance to the St. Law rence and the projected R ideau Canal. K ingston, too, m ust then be fortified. Y o rk was not regarded as of im m ediate im portance, b u t a fo rt was recom m ended fo r the N iagara frontier. Finally, som e m inor w orks w ere advised fo r the south-w est extrem ity of U pper C anada. T he proposals o f 1825 w ere m oderate and logical, but little was done to carry them into effect. O f the land forces, British regulars continued to be stationed in all the provinces, the num bers varying from tim e to tim e. In 1835 they were reduced to few er than five thousand, but five years later had again been raised to over fifteen thousand. T he im portance o f th e m ilitia was constantly stressed by the im perial governm ent, w ith suggestions th at im provem ents in the system w ere needed. W riting on the problem o f defence in the shadow o f the O regon dispute, the colonial secretary quoted Sir G eorge M urray as being o f the opinion th at there m u st be “a num erous, well-organized, and well-disposed local M ilitary Force, to co-operate with the R egular A rm y.” The D uk e of W ellington, he added, had stated th at “w ith p roper N aval and O rdnance preparations, C anada m ay be effectually defended by a force o f 10,000 British T roops, if supported by a loyal and w ell-organized M ilitia to the extent o f 35,000 m en.” T he m ini­ m um requirem ents, according to W ellington, were th at the m ilitia should be em bodied and organized, and perhaps given som e training.11 W hile the provinces accepted the principle th at the m ilitia m ust be m aintained, they did little to im prove its efficiency. T he Province of C anada adopted the legislation o f U pper and Low er C anada w ith little alteration except fo r a significant move in 1846 tow ard m ore em phasis on volunteer corps w ith som e training. Such were the plans and the forces fo r the defence o f the

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provinces. In all discussions on the subject, w hether official or unofficial, defensive w arfare was visualized. W as there, in reality, a prospect of attack by the U nited States? As a possibi­ lity it could not be, and was not, dismissed. T he m em ories of 1775 and 1812 were still too distinct, and there was no ground fo r certainty that British and A m ericans could am icably divide a continent. In addition to such general impressions held in varying degrees, were periodic crises whose m enace could not be ignored. T he first arose from a curious tangle of dom estic and foreign affairs that in itself illustrates the effects o f interchange o f populations and ideas. T he doctrines o f the rebellions of 1837 were in p art inspired directly by im m igrants from the U nited States o r indirectly by adm iration of A m erican institu­ tions and conditions. T he m ilitary problem of 1837 and the years imm ediately following was not the suppression of local and ill-organized revolts, but the prospect th at international war might result from sym pathy, from border incidents, or from aggression finding on opportunity. T he escape of the leader of the U pper C anada revolt, W illiam Lyon M ackenzie, to the U nited States raised the possibility of an invasion on behalf of his cause; but w hether the support he received, and the meetings in A m erican tow ns which passed resolutions of sym pathy and raised funds and even volunteers - w hether these were inspired wholly by devotion to dem ocracy o r in p art by anti-British sentim ent is not easy to decide. But w hatever the motives, the preparations on N avy Island created a m ilitary problem in C anada. T he reckless capture of the Caroline at an A m erican w h arf led to the arrest of A lexander M cLeod, a C anadian, and to his trial for the m urder of an A m erican killed in the scuffle. O f m any aw kw ard situations arising from border incidents the M cLeod case was the m ost serious. T he British m inister in W ashington w rote to Palm erston that the conviction of McLeod m ust m ean w ar,12 and Stanley inform ed Sydenham th at he m ight need to retain regim ents in H alifax.13 M eanwhile the Canadian border was disturbed by plans for invading C anada draw n up by A m erican secret societies - plans which bore fruit in actual crossing of the frontier by arm ed forces. L ate in 1838 the H unters sent a force across the St. Law rence, and a battle was fought at W indm ill Point, near Prescott.14 H appily for the peace of A m erica M cLeod was acquitted, the British governm ent expressed regret for the Caroline affair, and the H unters’ Lodges gradually subsided into threats. In response to the tenseness o f five years, there was reorganization and

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increase o f the m ilitary force, but no changes o f principle were m ade in the C anadian militia. T he 1837 affairs had not yet been sm oothed out w hen the first o f two m ajor boundary disputes arose. T he line between M aine and N ew Brunswick involved, as everyone knew, a m ilitary problem in th at an unfavourable settlem ent would seriously endanger com m unications between G reat Britain, the m aritim e provinces, and C anada.T he “ A roos­ took W ar” of 1838 hardly m erited the nam e; but there were actual m ovem ents of troops by both sides, and fighting was narrow ly avoided. In this, as in the Caroline affair, international negotiations rested entirely with the British governm ent. Its conclusion in the W ebster-A shburton T reaty o f 1842 cam e to be traditionally regarded as an exam ple o f British willingness to sacrifice C anadian interests, but later exam ination has re­ vealed the treaty as a reasonable diplom atic com prom ise. W hat­ ever a legal judgm ent of the evidence m ay show - and there is reason to believe that the British case was not a strong one - the settlem ent ended a long dispute at a tim e w hen relations w ere badly strained. Finally the Pacific coast was added to the sum of A nglo-A m erican controversies by the dispute over the bound­ ary o f O regon, held jointly since 1818. T he gravity of the situation may be seen from the fact that the successful candidate fo r the presidency had used the slogan o f “ F ifty-four forty or fight” as an election cry, while Peel told the H ouse o f Lords in m ore m easured but no less certain term s that, while the govern­ m ent would attem pt an am icable settlem ent, it was ready to m aintain British rights in O regon. A lthough the U nited States failed to realize its full am bition in the settlem ent, Britain too accepted a com prom ise. O nce again it was charged that the British governm ent had been weak, but once again the peace had not been broken. T he accum ulation o f crises on the borders o f British N orth A m erica, serious enough in itself, was over­ taken by another group of A nglo-Am erican disputes ranging over an even w ider area. IV T h e position of the British provinces was governed not only by bilateral relations with their im m ediate neighbour but by the w orld politics o f the era. T he nation o f shopkeepers, who had so long and so effectively wielded the sw ord, were struggling to re-build a world in which they could carry on business profitably and at peace. One m ajor object was to keep in the

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A m ericas an open door, through w hich to buy essential raw m aterials and to sell m anufactured goods. O ne attem pt a t out­ side interference by the E uropean powers was blocked by calling in th e new w orld; and if the M onroe D octrine was not the co-operative action that Canning had intended, it served the im m ediate purpose. It was, how ever, far from the wish of the British governm ent that the continents thus insulated from E u ropean, should be the object o f A m erican im perialism . N ot thus would the door be kept open. T he first area w hich th reat­ ened to be absorbed by the U nited States w as Texas, which sought to break aw ay from M exico and join the nation. Both E ngland and F ran ce w ere opposed to such a change, which w ould p u t w ithin a custom s area w hat otherw ise w ould be an excellent field fo r free trade, and - from the English poin t of view - w ould unduly strengthen the U nited States and expose th e rest of M exico to annexation. In p art a t least those fears w ere justified, fo r shortly afte r Texas was absorbed in 1845, N ew M exico and C alifornia w ere added to the rapidly expand­ ing republic. Soon afterw ards the U nited States sought to buy C uba from Spain, and again the British and F rench governm ents m ade clear their objections.15 H ow ever differently these events m ay be interpreted by historians, m any contem poraries saw them in the w orst light. A m erican opinion accused E ngland o f selfish interference in the affairs o f continents closed by the M onroe D octrine to E uropeans; while Britain, anxious to m aintain independent states, accused the U nited States o f aggressive im perialism . F or the British provinces the whole issue had a double significance: the disputes threatened w ar w ith the U nited States, and A m eri­ can expansionism m ight at any tim e be turned northw ard. T hro u g h o ut the provinces Texas, California, and C uba were held up as horrible examples o f the operation of a m anifest destiny w hich had been before, and m ight be again, directed against British N o rth A m erica. A n editorial in the Q uebec G azette is characteristic o f a view th at constantly found expres­ sion. The am bition o f acquiring territory, w ithout being very scrupulous as to the means, seem s to be inherent in the people o f the U nited States. T hey are living on land m ostly wrested fro m the aboriginal inhabitants, who have been exterm inated or driven back to countries now claim ed by the U nited States, and to w hich they profess to have an "unquestionable title." They

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acquired Louisiana and Florida rather as troublesom e neigh­ bours than by fair negotiation. Their citizens overran Texas, declared it independent, and it is now to be added to the U nited States. T hey have tw ice failed in their attem pts to conquer Canada, and subsequently, in an underhanded way, have en­ deavoured to favour attem pts to withdraw it fro m the authority o f the British governm ent. It would Seem that in the view o f m any o f them “m ight is right". . . . W hat m ay be the result o f the existing state o f things it is im possible to foresee; but it is evident that no country can be safe in the vicinity o f the U nited States, but by m eans o f power sufficient fo r its protection, and if needful, the punishm ent o f the aggressor.1G T h e people of the provinces saw boundary disputes on their own borders and A m erican expansion beyond them all as signs o f the onw ard m arch of a republic whose orators h ad not hesitated to announce that it was the destiny o f their country to spread on every side to the ocean. A s if A m erican affairs w ere not bad enough, British N o rth A m erica found itself draw n into the results of a dispute in the N e a r East. O n the Pacific coast there w as talk o f a Russian naval attack. In C anada a story circulated th at R ussian agents in the U nited States were looking fo r recruits to m an a vessel purchased by the T sar, and th at N ew B runsw ick o r C anada was to be attacked.17 But - except for British Colum bia - it was im probable th at the provinces them ­ selves would be attacked, and their m ore constant interest in the w ar w as in the aid they could give to Britain. T h e existence o f threats to the peace of British N o rth A m er­ ica was an old story, as was the need of provision against war resulting from them . T here w ere, however, in the forties and fifties, new factors in the situation w hich changed both the character of the forces and the purposes for w hich they m ight be used. T he prim e m ilitary interest for the people o f N orth A m erica was still the defence of their own soil, but the estab­ lishm ent o f colonies on the Pacific coast and the expectation o f settlem ent on the intervening prairies m eant th at British N o rth A m erica offered a greatly enlarged target. A second and fresh object o f m ilitary effort was support o f Britain in wars outside N o rth A m erica. W hile interest was show n in such wars as those against C hina in 1840 and A fghanistan in 1842, Britain was not, afte r the defeat o f N apoleon, engaged in a w ar w ith a great pow er until 1854. N ew s o f the C rim ean

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W ar brought in the British provinces a w idespread anxiety to aid the m other country in any way feasible, not that the British E m pire was felt to be in danger, or that th e colonies had any definable responsibility, but sim ply as a spontaneous wish to lend assistance. In M ontreal a public meeting was called by the m ayor and addressed by English- and French-speaking citizens, all o f whom laid stress on the A nglo-French alliance. A pplause greeted all references to the fight against the tyrannical T sar and proposals th at C anadians should help. A n address to the king was draw n up, expressing the sym pathy of the C anadian people and the determ ination to resist all aggression against C an ad a.18 N um erous offers o f volunteers were made, and legis­ latures and societies voted sum s for the patriotic fund. The Indian M utiny provoked fu rth er offers of men and money, and in that case the form er was accepted as well as the latter, for the im perial governm ent raised at its own expense, the 100th Royal C anadian Regim ent of Foot. W hile in both w ars the C anadian governm ent placed no obstacle in the way of British recruiting in Canada, the actual offers o f troops w ere m ade by volunteer corps rather than by the governm ent. T he latter was, indeed, w ary of sending from C anada the existing organized forces in view of continued apprehension of A m erican aggression. In case of an invasion British troops, needed elsewhere, m ight not be available for C anada; and in any event the British governm ent was already engaged in the gradual w ithdraw al of the imperial regiments. T his was another and a m ost im portant new factor in the m ilitary situation, for it m eant that the old principle of defence by British regulars aided by provincial m ilitia was being dis­ carded. A num ber of influences com bined tow ard m aking the decision to w ithdraw the garrisons. An im m ediate and practical difficulty was the size of the British arm y. In 1845 it totalled 118.000 men, of whom 53,000 w ere w ithin the British Isles, 26.000 in India, and but 39,000 available for all the colonies betw een 11,000 and 12,000 of the last being in British N orth A m erica.19 T he weakness o f such a distribution o f forces in time o f w ar was pointedly shown in the C rim ean W ar and the Indian M utiny. F urtherm ore, the cost o f the garrisons was increasingly unwelcome. F o r 1846-7 m ilitary expenditure was £ 4 7 4 ,7 8 9 fo r the Province o f C anada and £.170,464 fo r the m aritim e provinces and N ew foundland. T o a generation which was fast losing im perial enthusiasm , and tended to interpret the growth of autonom y as steps tow ard independence, such a burden was

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n o t only irksom e b ut illogical. In 1846 - the year o f the abolition o f the corn laws, and o f the British Possessions A ct - the first w ithdraw als were m ade. F u rth e r w ithdraw als in 1851 reduced the forces in C anada to 4,960 men and in N ova Scotia to 2,026 - the latter being chiefly the garrison at H alifax. By 1855, with the C rim ean W ar in progress, there were only 1,887 imperial troops in C anada, a t a cost o f £ .150,000, and in the m aritim e provinces but 1,086 m en. T here w ere none a t all in Prince Edw ard Island. W hatever m ay have been said at the tim e, there can be little doubt th at the people o f the provinces regretted the decision to call back the imperial troops. Som e com m ents, however, are interesting. W hile it was adm itted th at they had been sent solely fo r the defence of British N orth A m erica, it was often pointed o ut th at any w ar w ould arise out o f A nglo-A m erican disputes and n ot from local differences. O n the other hand, it was also argued that the colonials had not been bearing their share of defence, and had been too ready to let it all fall on the English tax-payers. L ord Elgin, the governor general w ho was attem p t­ ing to w ork out a new type o f im perial structure th at would allow for autonom y w ithout independence, saw the w ithdraw al of troops as p art o f a larger issue. H e constantly urged caution, pointing out that the argum ent that the colonies should assume a larger p art o f the cost of defence would encrease, I fear, the uneasy feeling which the Free Trade policy o f the M other C ountry and the language respecting the D e­ pendencies o f the E m pire in w hich British Statesm en have o f late years indulged both in and out o f Parliam ent have tended to produce in the Colonial m ind. —It would confirm the opinion, which already obtains too widely, that Great Britain begins to feel her colonies a burden and a nuisance — that she desires to sever one by one the bonds that unite her to them - that the connexion therefore will be o f but uncertain duration — and that annexation to the States m ust perforce be looked to as the inevitable goal, the only practicable m ode o f term inating a provisional and entering upon a definitive national existence.-0 T h e opinion began to gain weight that the vacuum caused by the rem oval of British regim ents m ust be filled by a reorganized militia. In the forties and early fifties the m ilitia in every prov­ ince was little different from w hat it had been at the beginning o f the century. Its p aper strength had little meaning. Such

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volunteer corps as existed w ere starved, and even those that struggled tow ard efficiency w ere too often objects of public scorn. T o avoid ridicule one T oronto u nit used to drill in the woods, the m en going to the rendezvous by separate paths.21 In N ova Scotia an act was passed in 1844 cancelling all musters, drills, and training unless specifically ordered, and the militia rem ained entirely passive until 1859. Joseph How e described the m ilitia o f N ova Scotia in his usual pungent style. B y the returns o f 1855, the m ilitia o f N o v a Scotia, on paper, includes 57,855 m en, o f w hom 1435 are com m issioned officers. H ow m any o f these can “set a squadron in the field,” it were vain to conjecture. N o n e o f these has had a squadron to set fo r 20 years. Som e o f them are “old fogies,” fighting the battle o f life with rheum atism , gout, asthm a, dropsy, and other such like enem ies, they are worse than Sepoys or Caffirs, or Zouaves, or Y a n kee riflem en a good deal. . . . These old gentlem en, if they ever knew anything did not kn o w m uch, and we fear that the little they were taught fo u r and tw enty years ago w ould hardly q ualify them to counteract the deviltries o f a Canrobert or a N ana Sahib, w ho have been m ade “wondrous wise” in the m odern schools o f m ilitary science. T hese elderly gentlem en, m ay, then fo r all purposes o f active warfare, be m arked “unserviceable," and set aside like old stores. T h en there are, am ongst the other 1435 “braves” who carry H er M ajesty’s com m ission in their pockets, we should suppose, at least a third w ho kn o w nothing o f the science they have bound themselves, by the acceptance o f their com m issions, to stu d y, and which the honour o f the C row n m ay require them a t any m om ent to teach. . . . There m ay be half a dozen good drills am ong the w hole 1435; but this we believe to be a very liberal calculation. . . . T he tw o Volunteer A rtillery C om panies o f H alifa x and P ictou . . . including perhaps 100 m en in all, are the only really efficient corps in the P rovince, and they, we opine, m ight be m uch im proved. In m aterial the m ilitia is sadly deficient. The w hole o f the arm s in their possession are reported “totally unserviceable and inefficient”. . . . T here is no organization, no science, no esprit de corps, no discipline. T he m ilitia o f N ew foundland, N ew Brunsw ick, Prince E dw ard Island, are, no doubt, in m uch the sam e condi­ tion. There ought to be in these provinces 80,000 m en capable

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o f bearing arm s - available at least fo r self-defence - a n d that m ig h t w ith a little care and forethought, and w ithout m uch waste o f labour, be brought to a condition m ore in accordance w ith the general interests and policy o f the E m pire than they are n ow .22 R eform cam e first in the P rovince o f C anada. Following the recom m endations of a com mission, the legislature passed an act in 1855 (18 V iet., c. 77) w hich, while it introduced no p rin ­ ciples wholly new, did in effect fundam entally alter the organiza­ tion o f th e militia. T he old rule that all m en of m ilitary age w ere liable for service was retained, but this “sedentary m ilitia,” as it was not unfittingly called, was still not to be trained, and gradually becam e little m ore than a m em ory. T he point o f the act was in its provisions for the “active” or “volunteer” militia. A few such units had existed in som e form for m any years, but h ad received neither public nor official encouragem ent. N ow the volunteer units w ere to be both trained and paid, and atten­ tion w as given to the need for m odern w eapons. A m axim um of 5,000 m en was set in the act, but in a few years it had been allowed to go beyond that un d er authority o f an am endm ent of 1856, providing for unpaid as well as paid units. M uch the sam e developm ents followed in the other provinces; though in N ova S cotia the plan was som ew hat different. T here the old m ilitia was retained as well as, and in preference to, the volunteers. T he effect was to drill a far larger num ber of m en, though for shorter periods. But everyw here there w as a new zeal fo r m ilitary preparedness. T he local legislatures voted substantial sum s of m oney, and the British governm ent sent large num bers of firearms to replace the ancient and condem ned veterans. A lthough the new life breathed into the m ilitia w as due to the g reater responsibility it w ould have to bear, it was not the only source o f the defence o f the provinces. T he British regulars w ere to be recalled only by degrees, and fo r the tim e being were in sufficient num bers to stiffen the militia, especially in the period o f reorganization. A s a m ore perm anent source o f aid it was taken fo r granted th at im perial troops w ould be sen t if actual need arose. “T he facilities of steam com m unication,” w rote the colonial secretary, “have greatly dim inished the necessity for a m ilitary force, as a m ere precautionary defence against a rem ote danger, and it m ust be borne in m ind th at, if the security o f C anada should ever-be threatened, troops could be forw arded fo r its assistance w ith the utm ost speed.”23 G iven the suprem acy o f the royal navy, no difficulty w ould exist in the

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tran sfer of such troops. T he navy, too, continued to act as a guard to both coasts of British N orth A m erica. H alifax had long been a naval base, and experience had show n that the m aritim e provinces w ere rendered safe from attack by the near presence o f the British warships. T he younger colonies on the Pacific coast saw their first need of defence during the C rim ean W ar. T he governor, Jam es D ouglas, advocated arm ing all the able-bodied w hites in the colony, along w ith an auxiliary force of Indians, but the council decided that the w hites would be less a protec­ tion than arm ed Indians were a m enace, and preferred to leave the defence of the colony to G reat B ritain.-4 D ouglas's appeals fo r a naval force perm anently stationed in the colony w ere at first received coldly in London, but in 1855 a naval base was established a t E squim ault, thus affording security to the Pacific as well as to the A tlantic coast. In the m iddle o f the century, then, the defences of British N o rth A m erica consisted o f the royal navy for the colonics on both extrem ities, a m ilitia in process o f reorganization, and the residue of im perial troops. A few fortifications had been added after the W ar o f 1812, but on too modest a scale to be a m ajor factor. Because of the disarm am ent agreem ent of 1817 neither C anada nor the U nited States had available naval forces on the lakes, which thus rem ained open to the passage of troops. T rans­ po rtatio n was greatly facilitated by the com pletion of the St. L aw rence canals at the end o f the forties, w hich, together with the W elland C anal, allowed for uninterrupted navigation as far as Sault Ste. M arie. Railways, too, w ere fast being built, and had an im portant place in w arfare both for the greater speed of transportation and because they could be used in w inter. But if C anada was fast building railways, the U nited States was build­ ing even faster. A m erican railways ran tow ards the Canadian border, making possible concentration of troops on a scale and at a speed heretofore impossible. Behind this new stategic factor lay the m ilitary m enace o f a population that was rapidly growing out o f all proportion to th at of British N orth A m erica. It was questionable w hether it could still be said th at the provinces w ere defensible. If hopes still lingered, they w ere soon to be all b ut shattered by the advent of the first great m odern armies, born o f the Civil W ar.

CHAPTER 3

Transition from Mercantilism

M ercantilism was the accepted dogm a and practice of all im perial states in the age w hen N o rth A m erica was opened to E uropean expansion. In conform ity w ith the prevailing prin­ ciples F rance and Britain w ere intent on obtaining from A m erica raw m aterials to supplem ent those available at home, and on securing at the sam e tim e m arkets for their m anufactured products. T rade and the flag w ere inseparable, for unsupported individuals had little chance of conducting com m erce beyond the seas while rival governm ents were closing preserves for the benefit o f their subjects alone. Econom ic m otives account for the exploration that revealed the new lands, the foundation of colonies, and readiness to expend blood and treasure upon defence and developm ent. But if the m otive was econom ic, it does not follow th at no other elem ents entered into colonization, o r th at colonies necessarily suffered because of that prim e purpose. In infant years a colony habitually required and ob­ tained m ost paternal care; but even in adolescence the balance of aid and restriction was not wholly uneven, as witness the zeal with w hich both parties looked to retaining advantages and dropping liabilities. Political institutions, protection, and culture should n ot be forgotten as assets gained by a colony; but even in the econom ic field, which will here be treated as a separate them e, an attem pt m ust be m ade to see the situation as a whole, and not only from the point of view of particular or tem porary interests. F o r m ore than two centuries the older provinces o f the dom inion were econom ically dom inated by the related factors of local conditions and im perial policy; and to the extent that the two could be dovetailed friction was avoided and profit accrued to those in the new and the old worlds. In so far as these provinces were concerned the principles o f m ercantilism , under the F rench or the English regim es, were sim ple enough. P ro ­ duction was to be concentrated on those goods which were not to be found in the parent state, and consum ption was to be of m anufactured articles bought in exchange. T hus an external

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trade for the colonies w as autom atically called into being, as p art o f the very reason fo r their existence. T h e second principle was th at the com m erce so created was to be carried in the ships o f the m etropolitan state (o r its colonies), so adding a profit and m aking possible an expansion in the volum e o f shipping, factors essential to a w orld pow er. E m ploym ent and m arkets w ere thus assured w ithin lim its, as was a supply of articles w hich, at least in the early stages, could n o t be produced in a new and undeveloped country. If the colonies w ere not free to buy in the open m arket they w ere able to sell in a closed one. T h ey need have no concern fo r the provision o r protection of the ships w hich w ere to carry their trade, although they were lim ited in th e choice of carriers m ore strictly than in the choice o f custom ers. T h e particular regulations by w hich im perial econom ic policy was defined and the rigour w ith w hich it was carried out varied from tim e to time. In the F rench regim e little difficulty was experienced in imposing the principles. Such initiative as existed for the foundation o f native industries cam e from F rance itself, as a self-im posed breach in th e m ercantilist system. C olbert’s encouragem ent o f industries o r the aid given to the iron w orks o f St. M aurice in the eighteenth century were not typical and w ere frownfed on by F rench producers; but the very slight effect th at they had in C anada shows how little opposition there w as to the rule of buying from F rance. A griculture, while engaging perhaps three-quarters o f the population of Canada, did little m ore than supply the local m arket. T he com m ercial instincts of the colonists w ere concentrated alm ost wholly on the fu r trade, an adm irable choice from the point of view o f the m other country since it created an export o f goods not produced in F ran ce and an im port of m anufactured articles for the trade w ith the Indians. U n d er British rule the position was never again so com para­ tively sim ple: partly because o f the m ore diversified econom ic am bitions of the colonists, partly because British policy itself was undergoing m odifications. T he n orthern colonies cam e u nder British rule before the revolt o f the southern thirteen, and thus into the old colonial system. In th at system the control o f shipping w as the m ain governing factor. “It w as clearly understood by contem poraries,” w rote M rs. K now les, “ th at the colonial system and the N avigation A cts w ere p art and parcel o f the sam e thing. Colonies w ere regarded as estates to be m anaged for the benefit o f the m other country, and the econo­

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m ic instrum ent o f their control was transport, and to regulate shipping to and from the colonies was to regulate the colonial trad e.” 1 T rade between the m other country and the colonies or between two colonies was to be in British (including colonial) ships only. Shortly after they becam e independent the U nited States w ere perm itted to deal directly w ith the British W est Indies and C anada. F rom 1822 on fu rth er relaxations in the navigation acts were m ade, allowing a lim ited trade between the colonies and foreign states. T he second instrum ent of con­ trol was the tariff. By the m iddle o f the nineteenth century the colonies had secured a m easure o f independence in setting tariffs against foreign states, but it rem ained to establish the principle o f placing tariffs against British goods. Related to the control of colonial tariffs w as the system under which Britain, by conceding preferential rates to certain colonial goods, could encourage certain industries and so indirectly discourage others. But it was also possible to use direct discouragem ent o f enter­ prises that threatened com petition with English industries. W hen a governor of N ova S cotia reported a project for a local colliery in 1752 he was w arned that “it w ould be contrary to those Rules of Policy, which this N ation has wisely observed in relation to its colonies, to bring coals into use in A m erica, as the use of them w ould naturally lead them into the D iscovery of a variety o f M anufactures, the raw m aterials of w hich we now receive from them , and afterw ards retu rn in M anufactures. . . .”2 A few years later another adm inistrator o f N ova Scotia could not “om it observing to your Lordship, that this G overnm ent have a t all times been extrem ely carefull not to give encouragem ent to any kind of m anufactures w hich m ight interfere w ith those o f G reat Britain.” 3 Such instances occurred, but they w ere not frequent. T here was a growing desire in the colonies to diversify their economies, b ut it is w orthy o f note that protests against British restraints becam e vigorous only when changing policy in Britain itself altered the balance o f advantages and disadvantages for the colonies. M eanw hile both parties w ere not ill satisfied with the exchange o f raw m aterials from British N o rth A m erica for m anufactured goods from E ngland, w hich form ed the mainstay o f the com m ercial activity of the form er. T he products which the colonies were able readily to export w ere fish, furs, forest products, and w heat.4 T here w ere natural products which could be provided in apparently unlim ited quantities in some o r all of the colonies; but the governing factor w as not the extent o f the

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supply but the conditions of sale, w hich, in turn, depended on the com m ercial policy and local dem and in Britain, and on the international situation. T he fisheries of the A tlantic coast, which first created a E uropean com m ercial interest in N o rth A m erica, w ere o f particular concern to N ova Scotia; and that province was enabled greatly to extend her p art in the industry in the period during w hich her rivals in N ew E ngland and France were handicapped by the w ars o f the end of the eighteenth and the beginning o f the nineteenth centuries. T he colony on the St. Law rence concentrated on the fur trade, after the conquest as before it. G oods and capital required for the trade were obtained from London firms associated with those in M ontreal, and ocean transport was conducted by English ships. T he busi­ ness was carried on in active com petition w ith concerns in New Y o rk and w ith the H udson’s Bay C om pany. T he boundaries as settled in 1783 and confirm ed in 1794 took from the M ontreal trad ers main posts and routes; they w ere gradually edged out o f the south-w est trade by the A stor interests and A m erican restrictions; and the m ore econom ical transportation secured to the English com pany by its possession of H udson Bay finally led to the collapse o f the C anadian trade in 1821. O ther changes in the international picture brought alternative opportunities to both the m aritim e provinces and C anada. If the fisheries were encouraged by E ngland as a nursery for seam en, the forest resources o f the colonies were also needed fo r the spars and hulls o f the w ooden ships of the royal navy and the m erchant m arine. In the early eighteenth century bounties on the tim ber industry o f the A m erican colonies were begun, and extended to N ova Scotia w hen th at colony finally becam e British. A fter the A m erican revolution an alternative source of supply o f m asts was successfully sought in New Brunswick, N ova Scotia having by th at tim e been denuded of suitable trees. Small exports o f oak, w ooden staves, and potash w ere also m ade from C anada in the second half of the eighteenth century, but any large increase was blocked by the grip on the English m arket held by Baltic tim ber. Som e increases of p re­ ference in the early years of the N apoleonic w ars helped to com pensate fo r the longer voyage, but m ade no m arked change in the volume o f im ports from the British colonies. It was only w hen N apoleon’s continental system closed the Baltic ports th at the British governm ent took rapid action. H eavy duties were placed against foreign lum ber, contracts to cut tim ber were aw arded, and British m erchants persuaded to turn tow ard

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the colonies. M easures designed as a guard against a dangerous shortage in lum ber were continued for a generation, introducing and continuing the tim ber industry as a m ain factor in the econom ic life o f N ew Brunswick and Canada. A griculture em ­ ployed a large p art of the population o f all the colonies but export of its products was slower in developing than that o f fish, furs o r tim ber. T he U nited K ingdom still grew a large portion o f the food for her own population and her landowners were averse to com petition. T he early years of the wars with F rance stim ulated some im ports of grains from British A m erica, but the volume dwindled to alm ost nothing in the later stages of the N apoleonic cam paigns. A fter the close o f the wars small pre­ ferences drew some C anadian grain to the British m arket, but it was n ot until the forties that- m ore generous encouragem ent swelled the grain trade into a m ajor export. In changing proportions and com binations these w ere the staple products on which the export trade of the colonies was built, and for which they exchanged m anufactured articles and such raw m aterials as were not found w ithin British N orth A m erica. Given a situation created by the resources of their lands and the im perial econom ic structure in which they found themselves, the colonials attem pted to m ake the best o f it. The direct approach was by seeking larger preferences and greater purchases in the U nited K ingdom , and this the m erchants of the provinces were not backw ard in doing. In both N ova Scotia and C anada, how ever, there were also devised plans for a wider external trade which should supplem ent the bilateral one with Britain, and arising from the position o f the provinces within the British Em pire. F o r the N ova Scotians the aim was to create an entrepot trade with C anada and the U nited States on the one h and and the British W est Indies on the other. W est Indian products would be forw arded to C anada, for example, and C anadian products sent on in return to the W est Indies. A t the sam e tim e there would be built up a trade with the other neighbouring colonies which w ere also w ithin the protected em pire.5 Tw o obstacles stood in the way - lack of shipping, and A m erican com petition in the W est Indies. T he first the N ova Scotians attem pted to surm ount by the encouragem ent of steam ship services, but success was slight. T he second was beyond their pow er to overcom e, for it depended on British restrictions on A m erican ships. These restrictions varied in a m ost alarm ing m anner, and it was all too apparent that the new gospel o f free trade was m aking converts in E ngland. The

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design o f the Canadians was sim ilar: to develop trade w ith the W est Indies, and to siphon the com m erce o f the nearby A m eri­ can states, especially those of the growing middle west, through the St. Law rence valley. T he belief th a t this plan could be realized arose from two assum ptions: th at the St. L aw rence was the “n atural” approach to the interior o f N o rth A m erica, and th a t A m erican goods could be fathered by C anada to enter British m arkets under the preference. A s in N ova Scotia, C ana­ dians w ere helpless to direct the course o f British tariff policy, b u t they could m ake them selves responsible for adequate transportation, first by canalization o f the w aterw ay and later by the construction o f railways. So im bued were the m erchants w ith the im portance of the plan for a great external trade that they staked everything on com m unications. W hether or not these cherished projects for the exploitation o f the m ercantile system could ever have been realized, they w ere in fact doom ed to failure, fo r the m ercantile system itself was dying. Free trade began to have solid support in England from about 1820, and H uskisson’s tariff reform s m ade breaches in the old citadel. In 1839 the A nti-C orn Law League was form ed and rapidly found a w ide response to a program m e w hich prom ised cheaper bread for the masses. T he w riting on the wall was visible across the broad stretch of the A tlantic. B ut if the old econom ic em pire was dying, it died slowly, and in a blaze o f glory and profit for the colonies. T he C anada Corn A ct o f 1843 adm itted C anadian w heat a t a fixed duty o f one shilling a quarter, and w heat milled in C anada at a proportion­ ate rate. T here were misgivings in England as to the w isdom of such an arrangem ent, especially when it allowed A m erican w heat to be entered as C anadian flour; and such objections were only partially m et by the C anadian action in placing a duty on A m erican w heat im ported into the province. T he tim ber trade, which was relatively m ore im portant in N ew Brunswick than in C anada, also continued to enjoy substantial preferences until th e early forties. In 1846 the blow fell w ith the news that the corn laws were to be abolished by successive reductions over a period of three years. A lready the duty on tim ber had been cut down and fu rth e r reductions had the effect o f cancelling the preference on that staple as well. In British N orth A m erica it seemed as if the bottom had fallen out of the whole econom ic structure, and th e outcry was loud and prolonged. Bitter things were said about the hollowness of im perial unity, and the tories o f M ontreal voted in disgust fo r peaceful annexation to the

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U nited States. T he British parliam ent, satisfied w ith the virtues o f free trade and faced w ith an im m ediate dem and fo r cheap food, w as im m ovable. It did, how ever, take steps to free the colonies from the restrictions o f the old system. T he British Possessions A ct o f 1846 enabled legislatures to rem ove the preferences on British goods, and the navigation laws ceased to op erate in 1849, allow ing foreign ships to trade w ith th e colo­ nies. So perished th e old im perial econom ic system.

II T o m any people in the British colonies it seemed as if the old em pire itself was to go as well. T he year 1846, in w hich the preferences began to be rem oved, saw also the first stage o f the w ithdraw al o f the British garrisons. T he two im perial props w ere pulled away a t the sam e tim e: would the structure rem ain, and if so in w hat form ? T here was pressing need th at the colonies tak e stock o f their ow n positions; o f the relationships w ith each o ther, w ith the U nited K ingdom , and w ith foreign states. T he fu tu re o f their external trad e w as a forem ost question fo r the colonists to consider, but it was im possible to conceive o f tariffs in a vacuum , fo r they were both cause and effect o f a m aze of political and social factors. So, while the thought on tariff veered wildly in this direction and that, it w ent deep into the basic econom ic aims o f the provinces them selves and deep into th e problem s o f external relationships. British colonies in an age of im perial disillusionm ent, A m erican provinces next to a restless giant, fellow colonists who hardly knew each other well m ight they ask themselves w here they stood and w hat path they should take. A fter the first revolt against the change in British policy had subsided, cooler second thoughts w ould reveal both th a t the provinces had attained a n o t unenviable position econom ically and th at the links w ith the m other country had by no means been severed. T he flow of capital, essential fo r the developm ent o f th e new w orld, h ad com e and continued to com e from L ondon. In the new west, becom ing of interest to the Province o f C anada, the H udson’s Bay C om pany had financed explora­ tio n , agriculture, and governm ent. In 1843 the British govern­ m en t enabled C anada to secure capital by guaranteeing the interest on bonds up to £.1,500,000, negotiated by the treasury. W ith such support the bonds sold at favourable prices, m ounting

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to £ .1 1 2 :1 0 . T he proceeds were used for public w orks, princi­ pally canals, and provided w ork both for old residents and newcomers. Railway construction in the fifties was also m ade possible by English capital. T he intervention o f the Brassey firm in the C anadian railway field gave the prestige o f the fam ous contractors to the G rand T ru n k , and fu rth er support was added by the banking firms of Barings and of G lyn, Mills. In days w hen railways alm ost anyw here w ere thought to be a profitable investm ent such encouragem ent was hardly needed to induce individuals to buy stock in C anadian com panies. Besides capital the provinces drew on G re at Britain for experience in determ in­ ing the lines on which their banks should be organized. From the first the general principles of Scottish banking w ere followed, allowing for branch-banking conducted by com paratively large concerns. T he heresy o f “free banking,” as practised in the U nited States, for a time had some support, with the idea that m ore banks would create m ore credit, and that local banks would be m ore sym pathetic to com m unity needs than large ones with distant head offices. In 1850 a concession was m ade to that opinion in C anada by the A ct to Establish F ree Banking in this Province, but little advantage was taken of it, and the “aberra­ tion from sound principles” was not m ore than a threat.6 Early life insurance policies were issued by the agencies of British com panies, and caused an estim ated export of £ 1 0 ,0 0 0 £ 1 5 ,0 0 0 in prem ium s. T he first com pany to be established in British N orth A m erica was the C anada Life A ssurance C om ­ pany, organized in 1847.7 British capital, British engineers, and British contractors played essential roles in the construction of the canals and railways of British N orth A m erica. Both m ethods of tran sp o rta­ tion w ere designed fo r foreign as well as local traffic by improving the St. Law rence entry to the great lakes o r by running steel up to the A m erican frontier. T he m aritim e prov­ inces and C anada laid plans for lines of transportation that would at once prom ote their own external trade and carry traffic between their own ports and eastern and central A m erica. The nam e o f the European and N o rth A m erican Railway proclaim ed that purpose to the world, and if the G reat W estern and G rand T ru n k railways had less descriptive nam es their objects w ere no less exalted. T hough in the fifties an impressive am ount of construction was com pleted in the Province of C anada, totalling some 2,000 miles, and providing rail transport from Riviere du Loup to W indsor, it was soon apparent th at A m erican traffic

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cam e now here n ear to expectations. M ontreal had been con­ nected w ith the w estern p art o f the province, and a line of railway to Portland, M aine, gave access to an ice-free port. T hus C anada was assured of a channel for her external trade through­ out-the year, provided that no.obstacles w ere placed in the way of com m unication through foreign territory. T he projects for connecting the all-year ports of the m aritim e provinces with the interior o f the continent still lagged, so th at no through route on British soil existed, and no links were forged to connect the province on the St. Law rence with those on the sea. O f the w estern colonies Assiniboia was m ore accessible from the U nited States than from Canada. F o r years goods w ere carried by the creaking Red River carts between F o rt G arry and St. Paul, and when steam ships began to operate on the Red River in 1857 transportation was m arkedly easier. Both British C olum ­ bia and V ancouver Island could be reached only by sea, except fo r the laborious and specialized land transport which the H u d ­ son’s Bay Com pany had built up for its own purposes. T he sea voyage from England took four to five m onths, though it could be shortened by proceeding to N ew Y ork and over the Isthm us o f P anam a. T he efficiency of the postal system depended very largely on the state o f facilities for transportation; and to some extent the reverse was also true, since the post office provided revenue for railways and steam ships, and encouraged the construction of roads. From 1851 C anada, N ova Scotia, and N ew Brunswick were all in charge o f the post office within their boundaries, but the carriage of mails between the m aritim e provinces and C anada, especially in w inter, was slow. F o r mail from E urope to C anada resort was had to A m erican railways. T he people of A ssiniboia also m ade use o f the A m erican postal system, and an attem pt to rem ove this cause o f A m ericanization of the colony by a mail service from C anada started in 1858 was soon aban­ doned. By the m iddle o f the century three o f the provinces had telegraph lines connecting w ith the A m erican systems. In C anada the M ontreal T elegraph C om pany ran from Q uebec to Buffalo, and the M ontreal and T roy C om pany built south to the border. N ew Brunsw ick had lines from Calais, M aine, to Saint John, and thence to A m herst, a t which point it m et the N ova Scotian governm ent’s telegraph to H alifax.8 These facilities m ade possible rapid com m unication with the U nited States, and constituted the fastest avenue o f news from Europe. D irect cable connection w ith Britain w as not established until 1866, though

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there was a local cable betw een N ew Brunsw ick and Prince E dw ard Island from 1852. In the fifties th e British colonies in N o rth A m erica had obtained better com m unication w ith the outside w orld than they had w ith each other. T o the advocates o f a political union the position was unsatisfactory; but from the point o f view of external trade there was less to regret, fo r m ore em phasis was laid on trade w ith Britain o r the U nited States than betw een the colonies themselves. T here are no m eans o f obtaining even an estim ate o f the relation betw een the external trade of the colo­ nies and their total national incomes, but it is clear th a t it form ed a large part. T hough C anada was m aking som e advance in that direction, none o f the provinces was industrialized, and all depended on the sale o f staple products abroad as a m eans of securing m anufactured goods o r other articles w hich they lacked. External trade created the greater p art o f their money incom e, leaving m aintenance agriculture o r fishing, and small industries - such as mills of various kinds - producing fo r local consum ption. A n exam ination o f the external trade o f the various provinces in the period between the adoption of free trad e by G reat Britain and the signature o f the reciprocity treaty indicates the extent, nature, and direction o f the trade. In 1852 the principal export o f N ova Scotia was, as before, fish, sent to the W est Indies, the U nited States, and elsewhere. L um ber cam e second in value, and was sold in the W est Indies and the U nited States. Coal was a poor third, and was bought in the U nited States and the o th er provinces. O f total exports valued a t £ 9 7 0 ,7 8 0 the largest buyers w ere the other British provinces ( £ 3 5 2 ,1 8 5 ) , the U nited States ( £ 2 5 7 ,8 4 9 ) , with the W est Indies not fa r behind. G reat B ritain bought goods to the extent o f only £ 6 2 ,6 7 5 . Im ports w ere som ew hat higher th an exports, am ounting to £ 1 ,1 9 4 ,1 7 5 . T he largest portion cam e from G re at Britain, the second from the U nited States, and the third from the other provinces. T he largest single item was cotton goods, com ing principally from Britain. W heat flour from the U nited States and C anada was close in value. O ther item s o f im portance, though considerably less than these two, were tea from the U nited States and the U nited K ingdom , sugar and molasses, fishing-tackle, iron, and leather.0 F o r the same year the exports o f N ew Brunsw ick w ere valued at £ 7 9 6 ,3 3 5 , this excluding ships sold abroad. T he order o f im portance of exports was the reverse o f th at o f N ova Scotia, forest p ro d ­ ucts m aking up m uch the largest item, and fish com ing second.

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T he first w ere sold principally to the U nited States, and fish sales were widely distributed. O f total im ports o f £.1,110,601 rath er m ore than a half cam e from the U nited K ingdom , the leading articles being haberdashery, cordage and rope, hardw are and iron, tea, and leather. W heat cam e alm ost altogether from the U nited States; flour from the U nited States and C anada; fruit, vegetables, and livestock from the other provinces.10 C anada’s exports of £ 3 ,5 1 3 ,9 9 3 were m ade up of w heat and flour to the U nited States, G reat Britain, and the other prov­ inces; tim ber, potash, and pearlash to Britain; and dried fish in lim ited quantities to foreign countries. H er im ports, show n as £ 5 ,0 7 1 ,6 2 3 , cam e chiefly from G reat B ritain and the U nited States, the principal items being as follow s: from G reat Britain - oil, cottons, woollens, silks, linen, haberdashery, fancy goods, iron and hardw are, coal, railway rails, earthenw are and glass­ w are; from the U nited States - sugar, tea, tobacco, salt, leather, oil, cotton, iron and hardw are, m achinery, hides, tallow, and books.11 E xternal trade had by no m eans been destroyed by the aban­ donm ent o f the old imperial system : if it had been the whole econom y of the provinces w ould have been shattered. But while the extrem e pessimism of the late forties had been exaggerated, it by no means followed th at the provinces w ere satisfied with the new order. They continued to believe in preferential m arkets as an objective, and w ere determ ined to find them w herever they could. Tariffs against im ports m ust be retained in some degree fo r revenue purposes, and there was a growing belief in tariffs fo r protection, especially in the m ore industrialized Province of Canada. T here had thus com e to be a conflict between the fiscal policies of G reat Britain and her N o rth A m erican colonies; the latter clinging to a regim e under which they had grown up, and seeking to build anew, on any available design, the structure which had in such a disconcerting fashion been blown down. T h e colonists did not cease to petition for a return, at least in p art, to the old protective system; but even thinly-veiled threats th at the new policy would bring the em pire to an end did not shock English opinion. T he em pire, was the reply, was based not only on trade, but in any case free trade was better for the colonies. N othing could shake this new belief in free trade, to w hich-the British governm ent now clung w ith all the passionate zeal of converts. Som e echoes o f the doctrine were heard in the provinces, w here it began to be argued that, since free trade was so advantageous, it should be adopted there as well. T he M ont­

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real E conom ist devoted itself to this cause and a free trade party was form ed in M ontreal. T h e Free T rade Association, however, adm itted the necessity of tariffs for revenue purposes, as was m ade clear in its m anifesto o f 1846. O n the w hole, however, there was little support for this position, it being pointed out th at England, with her m anufactures and shipping established, was in an altogether different position. T o the editor of the H alifax Tim es it appeared that such m easure of free trade as already existed had already displaced the m anufactures of G reat Britain and m ade the people of the province into “hew ers of wood and draw ers of w ater.” T he fu rth er extension of free trade, perhaps, could not m ake things any w orse.12 F ree trade in itself was not a popular policy; though reduc­ tion of tariffs through reciprocal agreem ents was generally thought to be hopeful. O n the other hand, opinion in favour of protection was significantly growing in C anada, but not as yet in the m aritim e provinces in which m anufacturing had hardly begun. Discussions inevitably arose as to w hether a protective system was suited to the econom y of C anada. T he argum ent on one side was that C anada m ust rem ain agricultural, could not com pete in m anufacturing, and therefore should have a low tariff. A fu rth er objection was th at protection was a tax on consum ers for the benefit of a small m inority.13 O thers held that the clim ate was too cold for extensive agriculture, while the existence of w ater-pow er was prom ising for m anufacturing. So far the picture of m anufacturing was n ot impressive. T here were cotton mills at Sherbrooke and Cham bly; woollen mills at S herbrooke and C obourg; three m anufacturers of rope at M ontreal; paper mills at P ortneuf, C ham bly, Stanstead, and in U pper C anada; iron at Long Point, T hree Rivers, and St. M aurice; glass at St. Jean; tanneries in M ontreal; and axes and nails were also m anufactured.14 It was all on a small scale, though it was to increase rapidly in the fifties. T h e C anadian tariff of 1847 was regarded by English ex­ porters as protective, and a group in Glasgow petitioned that it be disallowed. G rey brought this to Elgin’s attention, and, while adm itting the right o f the provincial legislature to adjust its own tariff for revenue purposes, he pointed out th at the effect might be a decreased purchase o f C anadian grain if the colonial m ar­ ket was closed against British exports in exchange. T he British governm ent refused to be persuaded of the virtues of another assault on the sacred citadel of free trade, and sternly resisted protective m easures in N ew Brunsw ick w hich began w ith a

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bounty on hem p, accom panying the refusal with a lecture on the new econom ics. If the colonies, as the colonial secretary m ore than once pointed out, could not see the advantages o f free trade over protection, they should a t least steer clear of differential duties.15 R. B. Sullivan m ade a protectionist speech in H am ilton, urging the prom otion of m anufacturing in the province as a m eans of increasing capital and population. H e disavowed any hostility to British m anufacturers, but suggested that they and A m ericans should establish plants in C anada.10 T here were m ore converts to protection in the next few years, and in 1852 and 1853 definitely protectionist m otions w ere debated in the assembly. T he m ovem ent gathered strength, and was im ple­ m ented in the Cayley tariff of 1858 and the G alt tariff of 1859. G enerally speaking the free trade m ovem ent was defended by pointing to the success o f that policy in England, and the protectionist m ovem ent by the exam ple of the U nited States. W hen the latter policy gained the ascendancy in C anada English opinion was not only shocked by the unw isdom of the C an a­ dians, b u t alarm ed as to the effect on British trade. F urth er protests against the G alt tariff w ere forw arded to H ead by N ew ­ castle, w ho pointed sorrow fully to the inability of C anada to follow the best fiscal tradition. It was in reply to this and the enclosed m em orial of the Sheffield C ham ber of C om m erce that G alt m ade his fam ous pronouncem ent.17 H e argued th at his was a revenue tariff, m ade necessary by the conditions o f C anadian public finance, and was unlikely to encourage any serious am ount o f m anufacturing. But the m ost im portant p art o f G alt’s rep o rt was the claim that the C anadian legislature had unlim ited control of its tariff. “I t is . . . the duty of the present G overn­ m ent distinctly to affirm the right of the C anadian legislature to adjust the taxation of the people in the w ay they deem best even if it should unfortunately happen to m eet the disapproval o f the Im perial M inistry. H er M ajesty cannot be advised to dis­ allow such acts, unless H er advisers are prepared to assum e the adm inistration o f the affairs o f the Colony, irrespective o f the views o f its inhabitants.” N othing could have been m ore definite. I t was a claim , and as it proved a successful claim , to the fiscal independence o f a colony. T he old im perial system was indeed passing. V ancouver Island deliberately followed a policy o f free trade, and proposals fo r a revenue tariff o f 5 per cent on all im ports, m ade from 1852 on, w ere rejected by the legislature. T he high tariff o f the U nited States bore heavily on the colony, and when

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the attem pts to have the reciprocity treaty o f 1854 extended to cover V ancouver Island failed, V ictoria was m ade a free p o rt in 1860, w ith the object of m aking the island a centre of trade on the coast.38 T he m ainland, on the other hand, im posed 10 per cen t duties on a large list of im ports fo r purposes of revenue; and in the united colony o f British Colum bia tariffs were retained. T h e m ovem ent fo r protection was severely lim ited in scope by the parallel attem pts to secure reciprocal trade agreem ents b oth as between the provinces them selves and with the U nited States. T h at an agreem ent betw een the provinces m et w ith less than enthusiastic and general support illustrates the lack o f ties betw een them . In 1847 N ova Scotia, and in 1848 Canada, passed perm issive acts allow ing the executive at any tim e to adm it, by proclam ation, th e products of any other province. T h e C anadian act, how ever, was never im plem ented. A n agree­ m ent was reached between N ova Scotia and N ew Brunswick, w hich was actually carried into effect; but P rince E dw ard Island abstained altogether, seeing no advantage to herself in the plan. In 1859, after it had accepted confederation in principle, and afte r G alt had conducted his tariff argum ent w ith the British governm ent, the C anadian governm ent initiated a m ovem ent for closer trade relations betw een the provinces. Tw o alternative suggestions w ere offered: that existing arrangem ents for the exchange o f produce or m anufactures o f the provinces should be extended; o r that there should be com plete freedom of trade betw een the provinces - a colonial zollverein. G alt’s m em o­ ran d u m w ent to the board o f trade, w hich returned a lengthy answer. In general the opinion was, as it had been before, that the plan was undesirable. Since the colonies used the tariff as a m eans of revenue, and since their products w ere highly varied, it seem ed impossible to have a w idespread agreem ent am ongst all British colonies. T he econom ies of the N o rth A m erican colonies, how ever, w ere sufficiently alike to allow o f limited arrangements,* but only u nder the condition th at any exem ption from im port duty, applied to the produce and m anufactures of these provinces respectively, shall be equally extended to all sim ilar produce and m anufactures of all countries.” T o do otherw ise w ould be to m agnify the C anadian sin against free trade, the ark of the covenant. A zollverein w ould probably be based on the high C anadian tariff, and was, therefore, ipso facto, objectionable.10 T he British governm ent was evidently prepared to disallow any acts intended to carry out such a plan, as it had

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already disallowed acts o f N ew Brunsw ick and P rince E dw ard Island which would have raised differential duties against the U nited States. W ith this cold reception the plan fo r econom ic federation fell to the ground. T h ere also follow ed on the abolition o f the im perial prefer­ ence system various attem pts to obtain access to the m arkets of the U nited States, particularly fo r the grain and lum ber which had form erly enjoyed a protected position in G reat Britain. T here were two ways o f doing this: by political union, o r by trade treaties. T he form er was an extrem e m easure, but the com m ercial class, particularly o f C anada and N ew Brunswick, saw ruin staring them in the face as a result o f British free trade. Inclined to think in term s o f black an d white, their finan­ cial discom fort was added to a w eakening im perial sentim ent on both sides of the A tlantic. If the m other country ignored their interests they m ust find salvation elsewhere. Few people could think o f Canada, o r even of British N o rth A m erica, as an eco­ nom ic u n it in itself: it m ust be attached to one o r other great pow er. A nd then there was the tradition th a t the U nited States prospered in contrast to the struggling colonies. T o m any people it seemed that the old am bition o f developing the St. Law rence valley as an econom ic avenue between N o rth A m erica and E urope had failed of realization. F ate was against it, and fate now pointed another way. In C anada the annexation m ovem ent was brought to a head by the test of responsible governm ent in the Rebellion Losses A ct. T ories shed loyalty w hen the world they had knowij and governed was turned upside down, and the M ontreal m anifesto o f 1849, calling fo r annexation to the U nited States, was an outburst o f econom ic and political griev­ ances. T h e chief force o f the m ovem ent was in M ontreal, the centre of the com m ercial interests. In U pper C anada there was little sym pathy and considerable resistance. In N ova Scotia and N ew B runsw ick the sam e com bination of political and econom ic events produced cries for annexation, particularly in H alifax and Saint John, and in the lum ber districts o f n orthern New Brunswick; also to som e extent in Prince E dw ard Island.20 It is doubtful w hether this annexation m ovem ent need be taken seriously as a political force. M uch o f it cam e from an angry opposition, and was o f an em otional type that tended to fade with time. A revival of prosperity helped to cure the ills of which the annexationists com plained, and the persistent efforts of E lgin’s governm ent to secure reciprocal tariff arrangem ents with the U nited States gave prom ise o f a cure th at was not so

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excitingly naughty but a t least m ore palatable. T he reciprocity treaty, long under discussion, was finally passed in 1854.21 It provided for the free exchange o f grains and flour, animals and meats, vegetables, dairy products, fish, coal, and lumber. L im ited reciprocal rights were given to coastal fisheries, and A m erican vessels were adm itted to equal rights w ith C anadian on the St. Law rence. T he treaty did not covcr any m anufactured goods, since it was believed that the “budding efforts” o f the provinces in that field w ould not stand against equal com peti­ tion. “Open the floodgates o f the U nited States to-day, and our thriving m anufactures would be assuredly sw am ped.” 22 The treaty included all the British provinces except those on the Pacific coast. T he governm ent of V ancouver Island attem pted to arrange for the inclusion o f that province, but w ithout success. T h e effects of the treaty on the provinces concerned, as show n by the statistics o f the years just before the A m erican Civil W ar created abnorm al conditions, were less than the optim ists had expected but still im portant. In N ova Scotia both im ports and exports increased m aterially, and the U nited States becam e the largest seller and buyer. Sales to the U nited K ing­ dom were sm aller absolutely as well as relatively.23 A sim ilar change occurred in N ew Brunswick. W hereas in 1852 that province exported goods valued at £.603,295 to the United K ingdom and only £ 8 3 ,7 9 2 to the U nited States, in 1859 the figures were £ 7 1 6 ,4 3 6 and £ 2 3 6 ,0 1 4 respectively; and in im ports the U nited States passed G re a t Britain.24 In the same year (1859) Prince E dw ard Island bought from N ova Scotia, the U nited K ingdom , and the U nited States, in th at order, and sold fish and farm products in the U nited States.25 In Canada too the volum e o f trade had increased. Types of goods im ported had changed little under the treaty, but while G reat Britain had been slightly ahead in 1852, by 1859 the U nited States had taken a decisive lead. In exports the change was even more m arked.2'1W hile a m arked increase of external trade had taken place - during, and perhaps because of, the reciprocity treaty the m illenium once pictured had not arrived. T he fisheries of the m aritim e provinces, w hich had been at a low ebb before the treaty, w ere now subjected to even greater com petition from A m ericans, who continued to receive a bounty. T he imposition of higher tarilfs, especially by C anada, antagonized A m erican m anufacturers. Intercolonial reciprocity, frow ned on in 1860, was accepted in principle in 1861. T he desire to retain the treaty

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w aned appreciably in the provinces and began to disappear altogether in the U nited States. T o facilitate trade relations with C anada a num ber o f foreign countries appointed residents o f M ontreal as consuls, these receiving exequaturs from the British governm ent. In 1850 Belgium, Portugal, and D enm ark all took this action, and in 1851 the H ansa towns and H anover followed suit. In 1856 the executive council recom m ended that F rance should appoint a consul-gencral in place of its consular agencies a t Q uebec and M ontreal. T he British governm ent was willing for the change and approached the F rench am bassador, who, how ever, re­ ported that his governm ent could not at the tim e take such action.27 But at the very tim e that the reply was m ade a F rench mission under M . Belveze, com m ander of a French m an-of-war, was touring C anada with the object of establishing com m ercial relations. G reat enthusiasm greeted the F rench party, and an elaborate survey of the conditions of the province was m ade.28 As a result of the trip the F rench tariff was modified so as to adm it C anadian w ood and ships, and a consul-general was appointed in 1859 w ho came to live in Q uebec.23 T h e external trade o f the provinces o f British N orth A m erica not only survived the radical fiscal changes undertaken in Eng­ land, b ut continued to grow. In tariff policy and arrangem ents significant alterations were m ade in the provinces, but on the whole they w ere alterations intended to preserve by other m eans the essential characteristics of the old regime. Budding industries com plicated the situation by causing the introduction o f protection for hom e products; but essentially the provinces looked to external trade, and to finding their m ain econom ic strength from the sale of the staples w ith w hich they had been richly endowed.

CHAPTER 4

The Path to Confederation

H ardly had British N o rth A m erica begun to settle dow n to plan a new order to take the place o f th e Gld w hen the shock of the A m erican Civil W ar threw out all calculations and forced a reconsideration o f plans. It was not so m uch th at the elements in the situation w ere new, fo r the provinces h ad long been accustom ed to A m erican influence in varying form and degree. N o r even was it th at entirely fresh ideas w ere evolved to fit the changed circum stances. T he m oves open to the provinces in constructing their external policies w ere strictly lim ited in nu m b er: it was only in em phasis, com bination, and speed that there was room fo r choice. T h e Civil W ar caught the provinces in a stage o f transition in every im portant aspect o f their external relations. T he old m er­ cantilist em pire had com e to an end am idst cries of despair and bitterness. T he im perial defence system, as it had been known, was doom ed; and so faint was the im perial faith in Britain that m any contem poraries on both sides o f the A tlantic believed that the em pire w ould not long outlast its traditional m anifestations. T h e older colonies w ere a t once seeking to repair the lines of trad e and to adjust them selves to an age o f iro n and steam . Bold steps in the construction o f railways had brought heavy com ­ m itm ents and uncertain results. T he people o f C anada were casting anxious looks tow ards Assiniboia, w ondering how they could arrest its growing attachm ent to the neighbouring states of the union. F a r to the w est the colony o f British Colum bia was in gloom y convalescence after the hectic fever o f the gold rush, looking for a sign as to th e w ay it should take tow ard renewed strength. T he problem s o f the sixties w ere, indeed, such as m ight challenge the wisest statesm anship. Civil W ar in the U nited States, w ith m ilitary operations m ounting in scale and tem pers fraying, could not but affect in som e degree those provinces bordering on the scene of action, accustom ed to constant interchange of people and goods, hardly know ing w hether they w ere m ore draw n by com m unity of in­ terests o r repelled by fear o f aggression.1 T he frequent crossing

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o f the border, w hich had becom e an accepted condition, was curtailed even before the outbreak o f hostilities by threatening conditions in the U nited States. F o r two periods, also, legal barriers w ere set up by the A m erican governm ent. In 1861 passports were required of C anadians em barking at A m erican ports, a rule w hich seriously im peded w inter travel between C an ad a and E urope. A few m onths later the regulation was w ithdraw n, but at the end o f 1864 again passports had to be carried by all foreigners entering the U nited States. In spite of the inconveniences resulting from general and particular restric­ tions to travel, the people o f the provinces m ight well have wished that the boundary could have been com pletely sealed, as the lesser evil com pared w ith the danger of being involved in the war. O n the issues o f the w ar there was no single opinion. H ad the N orth been fighting against slavery, as it first appeared to be, its cause would have m et w ith wide approval, for slavery was generally condem ned in all the provinces. But on the issue o f states’ rights there was no such settled conviction. T he coer­ cion o f the southern states received some adverse com m ent, and was som etim es related to the disturbing process by which the U nited States had been absorbing its neighbours. Judged in term s of practical aid it w ould seem th at the cause o f the N o rth was the m ore p opular one. In spite of the efforts of the authorities to enforce the F oreign Enlistm ent A ct, C ana­ dians enlisted in the federal arm ies, and offers w ere even m ade to raise regim ents in C anada. By far the largest num ber cam e from F rench C anada - perhaps three-quarters o f a total esti­ m ated by a contem porary a t 40,000, o f w hom , it was said, 14,000 were killed.2 W hile a portion o f these enlisted because of conviction, and others fo r adventure o r em ploym ent, m any w ere persuaded by the recruiting agents sent to C anadian towns, o r deluded into crossing the boundary on som e pretext. T he b ounty offered to recruits no doubt was often the inducem ent to enlist, and w hen th at failed attem pts w ere m ade to fill up the ranks by crim ping. T here are few indications o f enlistm ent by C anadians in the southern arm ies, but th a t can, at least in part, be explained by the wide barrier th at separated the provinces from the confederacy. T o international com plications arising o ut of C anadian enlistm ent - voluntary or forced - were added those created by th e desertion o f U nited States citizens from the federal arm ies to C anada. T he presence o f such deserters was unw elcom e both because they added to unem ploym ent, and m ore particularly because o f the friction caused on the border.

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T h ere were cases of their p ursuit on C anadian soil by A m erican forces, cases w hich could n o t be ignored by th e C anadian authorities. A ny gratitude that might have been felt in the N orth toward the colonials serving in their armies was m ore than offset by a belief that the provinces, like the m other country, really favoured the South, both in thought and in deed. British recog­ nition o f the confederacy as a belligerent, the activities o f the English-built privateer A labam a, and expressed sym pathy for the South in Britain once m ore fanned into a flame old em bers stirred by the seizure of confederate agents from the British ship Trent. T o the A nglo-A m erican disputes w ere added those that arose out o f the plots of confederates, w ho sw arm ed in the provinces as did federal recruiting officers and federal detec­ tives. C anada in particular was dangerously exposed to being forced into the position of territory added to the general conflict. In 1863 L ord M onck w arned the British m inister in W ashington of an intended raid from C anada, and so enabled the federal authorities to guard against it. As the w ar w ent against it, the confederate governm ent m ade desperate attem pts to create a diversion by opening up a new front. In the spring of 1864 three com m issioners w ere sent to represent the “C onfederate D ep artm ent in C anada,” and - apparently supplied w ith am ple funds —the unw elcom e visitors assumed extra-territorial status. T h e largest design, for a northw estern confederacy within the U nited States, cam e to nothing. Tw o or three abortive raids involved violations of C anadian neutrality. T he m ost futile of the plots was the one that caused the greatest repercussions. In O ctober, 1864, a raid from C anada w as organized against the tow n of St. A lbans, in V erm ont. Banks w ere robbed, a cashier was shot, and attem pts w ere m ade to burn the town. T he affair was condem ned in C anada, but when the returning raiders, though arrested prom ptly, w ere at first discharged on the ground th at the court possessed no jurisdiction, there was a bitter outcry in N o rthern papers. T he num ber o f actual arm ed outbreaks as a result of confederate plots was small, but there w ere fre­ q u en t alarm s w hich were alm ost as effective in m aintaining international tension. T hreats to neutrality im plicit in m aritim e disputes and border incidents were accom panied by a revival o f the old issue of annexation. A m ongst the A m erican public and press were men, o f w hom the m ost vociferous w as the editor of the N ew Y ork Herald, w ho urged annexation o f the provinces. W ith the close

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o f the w ar the A m erican governm ent was left w ith a great arm y, and m em ories o f quarrels with both G reat Britain and C anada. T h e old opposition from the South, based on resistance to the addition of fu rth e r free soil, was gone; no r was the South more friendly to either Britain o r her colonies. W ithin the republican adm inistration that took office in 1861 there w ere both anglophobes and expansionists, and the assassination of L incoln left Seward a freer hand under A ndrew Johnson, his imperialist zeal being curbed only by a Congress hostile to Johnson and cautious about expenditure. T he secretary of state’s roving eye fell on the C aribbean, A laska, the H aw aiian Islands, and C anada. He had visions o f extending A m erican pow er to the far east, to South A m erica, and to the A rctic Ocean. N o r was Seward the only p rophet o f m anifest destiny, for m any a w riter saw the blessings of A m erican governm ent extended to m ore than a continent.3 T he Fenian raids on N ew Brunswick and C anada in 1866 were greeted with scarcely concealed approval by the expansionists in the republican party; and a bill was introduced into the H ouse o f Representatives “for the adm ission o f the states o f N ova Scotia, N ew Brunswick, C anada East, and C anada W est, and fo r the organization o f the T erritories of Selkirk, Saskatchew an, and C olum bia.” If the provinces exaggerated their own im portance to a people preoccupied w ith w ar and post-w ar problem s they were at least not w ithout evidence of hostility o r even o f aggressive tendencies. T hey endeavoured to justify their claims to neu­ trality by enforcem ent o f its obligations, but there was no escape from the conclusion that m easures for m ilitary defence must accom pany legal correctness. F o r the defence o f the colonies three elem ents w ere to be considered: the militia, fortifications, and aid from England. A t the outbreak of the Civil W ar there were slightly m ore than 4,000 im perial troops in all British N o rth A m erica; about 5,000 equipped and partly drilled volun­ teers in C anada; and the sam e in the m aritim e provinces to­ gether.4 Steps w ere taken by the British governm ent to send im m ediate reinforcem ents to the extent of three regim ents and a field battery, and after the Trent affair, larger reinforcem ents still. These m easures were designed to m eet a tem porary em er­ gency, and did not alter the policy th at the governm ent had adopted in the forties: th at perm anent garrisons would gradu­ ally be w ithdraw n and im perial troops sent only to m eet specific dangers; and th at the defence of the provinces m ust prim arily depend on an adequate num ber of trained volunteers. Two

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exam inations o f the situation, m ade on the eve o f the Civil W ar, served to strengthen the adherence to th at policy. R eporting in 1859, the m ajority o f the three com m issioners appointed to consider the expense of m ilitary defences in the colonies found th at “ a system o f defence, based upon the presence o f Im perial garrisons in every p art o f the em pire, is as inefficient as it is burdensom e; and th at the right system w ould be one based on local efforts and local resources.” T o this they added that C an ad a was subject to attack only by the U nited States, and th a t the tim e required for th at country to prepare an invading force would be m ore than enough to allow for British troops to be transported to the colony. A select com m ittee o f the H ouse of Com m ons on colonial m ilitary expenditure reported in 1861 that, while some discretion should be left to the governm ent in judging individual cases, “ the responsibility and cost o f the defence of such dependencies [the colonies] from perils not arising from the results of Im perial policy ought m ainly to devolve upon themselves.” 5 T h at the willingness of the colonies to undertake m ilitary obligations should vary in direct ratio w ith the apparent danger o f w ar was to be expected. T he T rent affair produced a quick response. In C anada the existing volunteers drilled enthusiasti­ cally and offers o f fu rth er corps were m ade. Joseph How e offered every able-bodied m an in N ova Scotia for m ilitary service.6 A public m eeting in S aint John drew a large and en­ thusiastic crow d. Enthusiasm soon cooled. A t a second meeting in Saint John speakers expressed surprise th at attendance was slim .7 H ow e ceased to see danger from the U nited States. C an ad a was, as it always had been, the m ost vulnerable o f the colonies, and the apprehension o f w ar led th e governm ent to appoint in 1862 a com mission to consider m ilitary affairs. T he report, presented to parliam ent in M ay in the form of an enabling bill, was an am bitious one, providing for an active force of 50,000 m en w ith a reserve of the sam e size. C onscrip­ tion by ballot m ight be resorted to if necessary. T he annual cost was to be $1,100,000. T he bill was bitterly attacked by m em bers from both U pper and Low er C anada; was defeated; and the governm ent, already w eak, resigned. T h e succeeding m inistry, th at o f Sandfield M acdonald and L. V. Sicotte, returned to a v ariant o f the old system, at a cost of rath er less th a n half of w hat had been proposed in J. A. M acdonald’s bill. T h e failure o f the m ilitia bill served to bring out a variety of opinions both in E ngland and C anada. N ew argum ents w ere

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offered to those in England who felt th at C anada did not bear a fair share of h er own defence. In the press and in parliam ent criticism , some o f it bitter, was expressed. W riting to the gov­ ern o r general shortly after the session of parliam ent had closed, N ew castle hoped th at “the general spirit o f those debates will n ot have been m isinterpreted,” but adm itted th at “the rejection o f the M ilitia Bill has produced a disadvantageous im pression on the minds o f the English people.” C om ing to the practical problem of how to provide for defence he stated he had “the opinions o f the best m ilitary authorities, th a t no body o f troops w hich E ngland could send, would be able to m ake C anada safe w ithout the efficient aid o f the C anadian people. N o t only is it impossible to send sufficient troops but if these were fo u r times the num ber which we are m aintaining in British N orth A m erica, they could not secure the whole of the frontier. T he m ain de­ pendence of such a country m ust be upon its own people.” T he least n um ber o f m en which the provincial governm ent should look forw ard to drilling would be 50,000.8 In the provinces public opinion was divided on the fairness of the attitude o f the British governm ent. T he case was never fully presented, for colonials seized almost entirely on the allocation of costs, concluding th at they should o r should not bear a larger share. U ndoubtedly th at argum ent was also the one m ost obvi­ ously influential in England; but there was also the strategic factor, brought out both in the com m ission o f 1859 and the com m ittee o f 1861, th at assistance could be given m ore effec­ tively by an adequate force to be sent as occasion required than by perm anent and necessarily sm all garrisons. T he public in B ritish N o rth A m erica did not, however, miss the point that the need fo r defence m ight result from im perial rath er than local policy, and m ight be an im perial as well as a local interest. “It is som ething new,” w rote a Saint John editor, “to see the statesm en o f E ngland look forw ard to sham e and dishonour w ith such philosophical calm ness, such cold, calculating indifference. . . . W hile we form p a rt o f the E m pire E ngland m ust and will do all she can to p ro tec t our soil — not indeed for our sake but her ow n.”9 T he sam e them e was elaborated by a rival p ap e r in the sam e city. T h e C olonies should undoubtedly provide fo r their ow n in­ ternal security and peace, and they have already m anifested a disposition to do this; but that they should provide m eans to defen d their territories fro m enem ies externally, w hen m ade so

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by Im perial policy in which the colonies have no voice, we un­ equivocally and decidedly dispute. W hen Great Britain sent her trained and trusted warriors to these Provinces, after the per­ petration o f the outrage on board the T rent, it was n ot to defend Provincial interests, fo r none were jeopardized by any provin­ cial policy or likely to be so, but to m aintain im perial interests, if an attem pt had at that tim e been m ade to seriously imperil them , against all opposing forces.10 In C anada East the radical L e Pays burst o u t at the sugges­ tion th a t E ngland would n ot defend C anada. Situation singuliere! R ester colons, pour le plaisir de s’appeler sujets britanniques, pour les beaux ye u x de I’Angleterre, et cependant dem eurer obliges de nous defendre contre les ennem is de la m etropole com m e si nous etions independants! . . . C om m ent! S ’il plait a ux A nglais et aux A m ericains de se quereller a propos de bottes, pour des questions qui ne nous interessent pas plus que les affaires de C hine ou du Japon, nous serons tenus de verser notre sang et de nous ruiner parce que le Canada est une colonie Britannique . . -11 O ther papers of C anada East took a less decided line, arguing th at C anada and E ngland should share the burden. In both parts o f the province there w ere expressions o f opinion m ore sym pa­ thetic to England, and the attitude of L e Pays could be set off against that of the right-wing tories who urged large expenditure for defence, and placed unlim ited confidence in the British governm ent. E ach accused the other of sinister m otives: the left holding that peace could be m aintained w ere it not for the im perial connection and the misguided im perialism of the tories, and the right constantly hurling the epithet “annexationist.” T h e third factor to be considered in relation to the defence of the provinces was fortifications. In 1863 and 1864 LieutenantColonel W . F. D . Jervois was sent by the w ar office to Canada. In his first report he assum ed that, failing naval superiority on the lakes, the whole province w est of M ontreal was indefensible. T h e second report, how ever, included w orks a t K ingston, T o ­ ronto, and H am ilton, w ith an estim ated total cost of £ 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 . N aval force sufficient to m aintain com m unications would also be required. Q uebec and M ontreal, seaports and m ore readily defensible, w ere to be fortified at a cost o f £ .7 4 3 ,000.12 M ost of the plans were never im plem ented, though they did not cease to be discussed. Jervois’s first opinion, unpopular as it was, that

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C anada W est could not be defended, at least not w ithout con­ siderable naval pow er, was perhaps not far from the truth. A huge A m erican arm y, once freed from the Civil W ar, and with railways a t its disposal, was form idable out of all proportion to the arm y of 1812. F o r the m aritim e provinces the royal navy would always be a protection, but not even troops could reach C anada in w inter except by the arduous land route followed by the im perial reinforcem ents in 1861. T he problem of defence was clearly different in the several colonies both in the danger anticipated and the m eans of repelling it. T hey had in com m on, however, a continuing apprehension o f A m erican aggression and a realization th at the m ilitary em pire, as they had known it, was gone. T he econom ic problem s of the provinces were partly accen­ tuated, partly caused, by the Civil W ar. Factors beyond their control had been causing disturbing changes in the econom y of the British N o rth A m erican provinces. Industrialism and free trade had together upset the old regim e under which the natural products of the provinces had been carried to a protected m ar­ ket in ships built of N orth A m erican lum ber. T he new age of steam , iron, and free trade had called for m ajor adjustm ents. Coal and iron had now to be im ported, and m oney borrow ed fo r the railways that had becom e a necessity. F or a brief period all seemed to be well: capital and equipm ent flowed from E ng­ land, and the reciprocity treaty prom ised a new avenue of pro­ tected trade. But it was a delicate balance, all too easily upset by events abroad. Financial stringency in the U nited States and E ngland autom atically affected the provinces, and on the eve of the Civil W ar the provinces faced a partially-com pleted network of railways and a heavy debt. T he w ar had a disturbing effect in m any ways. A n observer in C anada W est found business de­ pressed, prices low, the value o f land down, the influx of British capital stopped, and money leaving the country. “ We are as a people,” he w rote, “affected m ost acutely by the abnorm al con­ ditions o f ou r great neighbour. . . . O ur currency is deranged, ou r exchanges affected, and, generally, the whole course of com m ercial transactions so governed and diverted that recipro­ cal trade has alm ost becom e an affair of gam bling.” 13 Even if difficult, the trade with the U nited States m ade up m ore than half o f the total external trade of the British provinces, and during the period o f the operation of the treaty the value of that trade had m ore than doubled. T h at this increase was only in part caused by the treaty itself was not fully realized at the tim e, and

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w hen abrogation becam e a possibility it seemed th at a m ajor catastrophe was im pending. T o som e extent, no doubt, the political friction o f the w ar years at least hurried on the A m eri­ can decision to term inate the arrangem ent. But only about 6 per cent of the total foreign trade o f the U nited States was w ith the British provinces, and the decision was not fo r them one of overw helm ing m om ent. T here had been growing resentm ent by A m erican m anufacturers against the increasing tariff protection adopted in Canada, and it w as argued th at the provinces had not lived up to the spirit o f the agreem ent. By taking the southern free traders out of Congress the Civil W ar opened the w ay fo r a policy o f protection. W hile intercolonial trade cam e to be thought o f as an alterna­ tive to th at w ith the U nited States (w hich w as expected greatly to diminish), it had also been investigated for its own m erits. In 1861 the governm ent o f N ew Brunswick proposed a plan fo r free trade between the m aritim e provinces; and the British gov­ ernm ent not only w ithdrew its opposition, but gave its blessing to the inclusion o f C anada as well. A difficulty which had stood in the w ay had always been the higher tariff o f C anada, but by the end of the w ar reductions in C anada had brought the tariffs o f the provinces sufficiently close to allow fo r a custom s u nion of som e type to be seriously considered. A collective effort was also m ade by the provinces to extend their trade w ith M exico, the W est Indies, and South A m erica. In Septem ber, 1865, “T he C onfederate C ouncil fo r T ra d e” m et at Q uebec “in reference to the Reciprocity T reaty with the U nited States and com m ercial m atters generally,” and agreed to recom m end the opening of negotiations for m ore extensive trade. T o this the colonial secre­ tary gave his w arm approval, and a com mission was appointed by the governm ents o f C anada, N ova Scotia, N ew Brunswick, and P rince E dw ard Island. A cting under instructions from their own governm ents, and w ith the necessary good offices o f the British governm ent in relations both w ith other colonies and foreign states, the com m issioners left on their to u r after a m eet­ ing in London. W hen their investigations w ere com pleted the com m issioners m ade a report, w ith som e definite suggestions: im provem ent o f transportation and postal facilities; a reduction o f duties, by reciprocal treaties o r otherw ise, levied in the W est Indies, Brazil, and the Spanish colonies on the staples o f British N o rth A m erica; and an assim ilation o f th e tariffs of the British W est Indies in respect of the sam e staples.14 F o u r years later plans w ere being considered fo r the extension o f trad e w ith

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Portugal and M editerranean countries. All these, how ever, were no m ore than plans, and no solid alternative had yet been found to replace the security of either the old im perial preference or the reciprocal agreem ent w ith the U nited States. A com bination of circum stances thus brought the people of the provinces consciously to consider their future. One possible course was to rem ain as they w ere, but to do so w ould sim ply be to accept present conditions th at were far from satisfactory and fu tu re ones w hich m ight be a great deal worse. Inevitably there was revived the recourse of peaceful annexation to the U nited States, by which the problem of defence would autom atically cease to exist and the ex-colonials would participate in the eco­ nom ic advantages enjoyed by the U nited States. It was tow ard this end that a t least some o f the cam paign against the reci­ procity treaty had been waged in the U nited States, and there were not lacking individuals in the provinces w ho were willing to join with the larger neighbour. In C anada E ast the conserva­ tive and liberal newspapers accused the radical party o f a dan­ gerous adm iration for A m erican institutions, and a tendency tow ard annexation. L ’Ordre was said to favour annexation openly, Le Pays to be always praising the U nited States, and the W itness and the H erald to follow L e Pays. T h eir adm iration for the republic’s institutions w as not shared by L a M inerve, which saw corruption in its people from the custom s officials up, and lam ented the fate o f those F rench C anadians w ho had em igrated to the U nited States.15 T he conservative Courrier du Canada used harsher w ords: L e Pays, de M ontreal, avec cette pertinacite m aladive qui characterise le m al, ne cesse d’exalter les autres pays mais surtou t les Etats-U nis aux depens du Canada; pour ce faire ils soustraient, m utilent, et com battent la verite a outrance. Les m alheureux lecteurs de ce m alheureux journal n’apprennent pas un m o t de la gangrene m orale qui ronge la societe am ericaine et q ui se traduit heure par heure dans la presse de cette infortunee republique.10 Such language was not unusual in days when editors were accustom ed to express their views with unrestrained vigour, but the accusations o f favouring annexation o r independence were m et w ith a revealing argum ent. 11 est fa u x qu'il y ait ici un parti a nnexationiste.. . . II y a tout sim p lem ent des gens qui voient clair, qui consultent Vavenir et

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q ui se dem andent: si VAngleterre nous abandonne, ou ne prom et pas de nous defendre en cas d ’attaque et n ’en prend pas les m oyens, que faudra-t-il faire? 11 y a deux m odes d ’existence politique possible en dehors des arrangem ents actuels: I inde­ pendence ou I'annexion, lequel choisir?17 T h e idea o f union with the U nited States was, in fact, based not on ideological principles but on specific interests. T here was always a m inority which supported annexation on general geo­ graphical or econom ic argum ents, but it was not that m inority which was influential. T he position in the sixties was not unlike that which gave rise to the annexation m anifesto of 1849, but the earlier m ovem ent had had m ore vitality and w ider support than the later. Belief in the im perial connection was strong throughout all the provinces, but scepticism would inevitably increase if no advantages, o r even positive disadvantages, ap ­ peared to be the only rew ard o f loyalty. T he provinces w ere still faced w ith the problem o f their external relations in the future. D iscouraged by the decline in foreign trade, alarm ed by the im perialism of the U nited States, they w anted to be reassured that British connection.spelt tangible aid and not merely risk of international friction. It was not only in C anada E ast that such ideas were being discussed. A supporter o f the governm ent, a journalist in W oodstock, C anada West, was alarm ed by w hat he heard around him. I t is rum oured, that a desire fo r annexation to the U nited States is widely spread absorbing all other questions. This is not true, but it is true, that there is a strong feeling in favou r o f independence taking possession o f the public m in d created and fo m e n te d chiefly by the leading m erchants, in this section, who are doubtless inspired by a desire to guard their ow n interests. The reasons the\y] adduce fo r the agitation are "that Canada is indefensible” —“that it is absurd to burden the country with an enorm ous debt as a condition o f the Im perial grant fo r the fo rti­ fication o f Q uebec" - “that Canada has no need o f expensive defences under the present friendly feeling which exists between Canada and the U nited States” - . . . it is m y du ty to inform you o f the feeling, that prevails here that if we are left to ourselves or fo rced to incur a burden o f debt fo r our defences the cry fo r independence 1 fear will be irresistible in this western peninsula.1S Peaceful annexation was being seriously discussed, though how m uch solid support it had is impossible to tell. T he other

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positive course w hich the provinces might take was tow ard political union, either by regions or of all the provinces together. L ong advocated by individuals, the idea o f a union of some or all of the colonies had lacked the force to carry it over the objections raised. In the sixties a rem arkable com bination of circum stances occurred: the m aritim e provinces were seriously contem plating a regional union; the Province o f C anada looked fo r a way out of its own ham pering dualism ; the colonies of the w est seemed to be slipping tow ard the U nited States. T h e two countries which exercised m ost influence on British N orth A m erica were, directly o r indirectly, exerting pressure tow ard union. T he U nited States supplied coercive force by the m ilitary and political threats that w ere read into the actions and speeches o f her politicians and publicists. T he British governm ent, lately lukew arm tow ard union, cam e to use every means at its disposal to encourage it.19 Pushed and pulled tow ard a decision, provin­ cial governm ents and legislatures gazed dow n the untracked path that led to a new British N o rth A m erica and a new British Em pire. II Responsible governm ent, which its ardent supporters saw as a deus ex m achina to solve the constitutional riddle of the old im perial system, set in bold relief the very problem s which it was intended to remove. A local m inistry in virtual control of the executive pow er was expected to draw a nice distinction between dom estic and external affairs. It is not surprising th at it sought to draw within its orbit those subjects which it could with advantage control, and to label as external equally controversial ground which could be held only with loss and worry. But the m ovem ent which culm inated in G alt’s assertion o f fiscal inde­ pendence in 1859 was a P yrrhic victory, for a British parliam ent and public could not follow a logic under which its soldiers but n ot its goods m ight be exported to the colonies. O ut of the w elter o f conflicting opinions on both sides of the A tlantic a few them es m ay be isolated. In G re at Britain there was little en­ thusiasm for the colonial connection, but a willingness to carry it on subject to a reasonable degree of com prom ise on the o ut­ standing questions. In the colonies, w hich w ere much m ore vitally affected, large m ajorities were anxious to rem ain within the em pire, but found the existing position am biguous and un­ satisfactory. U nion o f the provinces was welcome to both : to

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the m other country because it prom ised some solution o f the defence question, and to the colonies because they believed that it would give them econom ic, m ilitary, and political strength. It is, however, the paradox o f the confederation m ovem ent that the central issue o f the control o f external relations w as left alm ost untouched. T he idea of a union of some o r all of the provinces was not a new one, but - as in the case of the earlier union of the thirteen colonies - external pressure was required to bring them to ­ gether. T he collapse of the old econom ic em pire in the forties had forced the colonies to reconstruct their schem e of external trade, which they had attem pted to do by tariff agreem ents with each other and with the U nited States. T he latter seemed to fail with the abrogation o f reciprocity, and the form er could be extended only by a joint im provem ent o f transportation. T he Civil W ar forced a m ore serious consideration of the defence question, and the British policy of w ithdraw al of troops at least suggested defence based on political union. Finally, belief in colonies had reached its nadir in the m other country, and the British governm ent was ready to give its pow erful support to the federation m ovem ent, with its eyes open to the possibility th at it m ight be the fo rerunner o f independence. T hreats to territory, both that held by the colonies and th at in the w est to which they had som e aspirations, com bined w ith British coolness tow ard econom ic or political em pire, drove on the union m ovem ent over the obstacles o f provincial consciousness and m inority fears. In the com plexity of issues raised by the federation project no single aim - w hether of internal o r external application - can be said to have had a determ ining effect on any one province. T he public, the press, and the legislatures weighed the argu­ m ents for and against, exam ining the proposed constitutional m achinery, financial settlem ent, the possibilities of increased trade, effect on the im perial tie and on relations w ith foreign pow ers. E xternal factors by no m eans constituted the sole co n ­ siderations, but they did receive great attention at a tim e w hen the econom ic and m ilitary position of the provinces seem ed so uncertain. T ra d e played a leading p art in the debates in all provinces.20 A m inority party in Prince E dw ard Island argued that the re­ m oval o f custom s barriers w ould reduce the price of im ported goods, and that agricultural products could be sold in Saint John and H alifax, w hich was particularly necessary in view o f the com ing abrogation o f reciprocity. T he m ajority opinion, how ­

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ever, denied the validity o f this argum ent, and held th a t C anada w ould furnish no m arket for the Island’s staples in agriculture and fisheries, and th a t profitable m arkets already existed in G reat Britain, the U nited States, and the W est Indies. In N ova Scotia th e proponents of confederation argued th at the geo­ graphical position and the potential m anufactures o f the prov­ ince could be exploited only in union w ith a larger territory, of w hich N ova Scotia w ould becom e the “A tlantic frontage.” To this it was answered th at free trade could be secured w ithout political union, and that there was in any case some doubt as to w hether the infant m anufactures of the province should be exposed to the cold breeze o f free com petition. V ery m uch the sam e argum ents w ere used in N ew Brunswick. N either in N ova Scotia n o r N ew Brunsw ick did the trade issue bulk so large as other aspects o f the project. F o r British C olum bia the prospects o f trade w ith eastern A m erica w ere too visionary to have a p opular appeal, but com m ercial dependence on the Pacific states was objectionable because o f the high tariff against the province, and confederation - given effective transportation - m ight p ro ­ vide an alternative. T here was, how ever, som e fear th at a tariff controlled by the dom inion w ould possibly n o t be calculated in th e interests o f British C olum bian industries and agriculture. N o aspect o f confederation was given m ore attention; and advo­ cates o f confederation were even driven to suggest th at there m ight be a special tariff for the province. It was in C anada that th e com m ercial aspect o f confederation was debated m ost hotly, following a tradition o f signal optim ism o r pessimism tow ard each successive plan fo r the im provem ent o f trade. I f the m ari­ tim e provinces needed a hinterland, C anada, “shut up in prison fo r five m onths o f the year in fields of ice,” needed a sea-coast. T h ere w ere hopes, too, of intercolonial trade, which, as C artier pointed out, had been insignificant, but w hich m ight be consid­ erable. A nother defender o f confederation spoke o f exchanging C anadian grain and flour for fish, oil, and coal; but the opposi­ tio n replied th at there was little C anada could buy from the m aritim e provinces, and if there w ere a prospect o f such trade it could be arranged by tariff agreem ent as readily as by political union. O ther m em bers of the legislature w ere concerned about the possibility o f lowering the C anadian tariff, just as members in the m aritim e provinces w ere concerned about raising theirs. A constant argum ent in favour of confederation w as th at it would m ake possible the im provem ent of transportation. F or N o v a Scotia and N ew Brunsw ick this m eant an intercolonial

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railway connecting their ports with the cities of C anada. To them it was a sine qua non, and alm ost an undisputed advantage. C anada was less certain about the intercolonial rail­ way. It would, it was true, give them access to w inter ports, but it was generally recognized that it could not be profitable. T here was talk of better canals com ing as a result o f confederation but the m ost im portant project after the intercolonial was th at o f a railway to the Pacific coast. In the m aritim e provinces expansion to the west was a distant objective, but at least to an im portant body o f opinion in C anada it was essential, even if not pursued im m ediately. In British Colum bia com m unication with C anada was even m ore the price o f union than it was in the low er prov­ inces, and the adhesion of the Pacific province was m ade con­ tingent on the construction of a railway w ithin a stated period. T he Fenian raids - actual o r threatened - gave a background of realism to all discussions on union, as did the broken trade relations in the econom ic sphere. D efence, equally w ith trade, was dependent on adequate com m unications, though w hether or not the intercolonial railw ay, close as it m ight be at points to the A m erican border, was an effective instrum ent for the m ove­ m ent of troops and supplies was a m oot point. A t least it was m ore hopeful than the toilsome m arch overland which the imperial troops had been obliged to take during the Civil W ar. T here was one point undisputed about defence: the British governm ent was convinced that it could be effectively organized only by a single political unit, and for this reason m ore than any other urged on the confederation. T he executive council of New Brunswick, while adm itting that the wishes of G reat Britain were “entitled to great weight,” retained the right to settle the destiny o f the province, w ithout w hich right it claim ed that the conferring of self-governm ent would have been a m ockery. The Fenian raid of 1866, ineffective as it was, partially rem oved the argum ent that defence was prim arily a C anadian problem . In Prince E dw ard Island objections on other counts overrode the defence argum ent, and indeed the islanders had little conscious­ ness of danger to their own territory. D uring the debate in the assembly of N ova Scotia, T upper, A rchibald, and others agreed that the British view that the defence of the provinces could be effective only after confederation was a sound one. “If we are able to defend ourselves,” said C. J. C am pbell, “w ithout the assistance of G reat Britain, let us say so; but if we are not, let us concede w hat the m other country desires.” A gainst this the opposition expressed a readiness to m ake a joint contribution to

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defence w ithout confederation: and one m em ber, M cLelan, claim ed that N ova Scotia was already “one vast drill-shed,” and th at England w ould certainly aid against “the danger she has brought upon us.” In C anada, the m ost exposed colony, the discussions of the defence question were m ost lengthy, but followed m uch the sam e lines as in other provinces. O n the one hand it was said that the advice o f the British governm ent should be followed, in view of its place in the defence scheme of Canada, and having regard for the m ilitary pow er and possible aggression of the U nited States. M any m em bers spoke on the general them e of unity being strength, but there was apparently little knowledge of w h at this m eant in m ilitary organization. T he strategic im­ portance of N ew foundland was a m ore concrete consideration; but on the w hole the governm ent speakers left themselves open to the criticism that they could not show how added strength w ould be gained. O n the other hand, said m em bers of the opposition, confederation w ould increase territory to defend m ore than men and resources to defend it. T he m aritim e prov­ inces could hardly assist C anada, though C anada m ight be called upon to aid them . O n the whole the best policy was to rem ain neutral and avoid the appearance of possible conflict w ith the U nited States. M ilitary preparations might precipitate a preventive w ar waged by the A m ericans. F o r British Colum bia the relation between confederation and defence seemed remote, and was little discussed. Som e effort was m ade to represent the transcontinental railway as playing for British Colum bia the sam e sort o f role in defence as the intercolonial railway was expected to play for the eastern provinces. In point of fact it seemed difficult to believe that C anada could send o f her scanty m ilitary resources to the Pacific. Britain was thought of as the real source o f aid, and the naval station at Esquim alt bulked even larger than th at a t H alifax. But in any case there was less sense of danger in the west than the east. British Colum bia had had no acute problem s o f neutrality during the Civil W ar, and there was only a threat of a F enian raid. T he m enace of Russia, at one time in the picture, had been rem oved w ith the purchase of A laska in 1867. All discussions of defence in the provinces w ere surprisingly devoid of any real understanding of m ilitary affairs or of the broad strategy involved. W eakness on th at side, however, was m ore th an m ade up by the w ealth o f political controversy which tied defence to the im perial connection o r to union w ith the

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U nited States. A shocked m em ber o f the N ova Scotian assembly stated that no m an w ould openly advocate annexation, but, while there was certainly less talk o f it in the m aritim e provinces than elsewhere, it could not be dismissed. In the assembly of Prince E dw ard Island Coles said that “I look upon this talk about the M other C ountry casting us off from her apron strings, and this shaking o f the stars and stripes in ou r face, as only stories intended to frighten the tim id. L et us rem ain true to the M other C ountry and she will stand by us.” G ray, on the other hand, saw the issue squarely as a choice betw een federation and absorption by the U nited States. A lm ost the sam e w ords w ere used by C artier in the C anadian assembly, w ho added that only by confederation could “the whole strength of the em pire” be concentrated at the needed point in N o rth A m erica. In the opening speech o f the debate T ache had spoken of the inevita­ bility of C anada joining the U nited States, either by force or willingly, unless confederation w ere accepted. M acdonald ham ­ mered on the them e th at the im perial connection m ust be m ain­ tained, and th at w ith th at “alliance” cam e protection. M em ber after m em ber spoke o f A m erican aggression, and accepted the view th at it could only be m et by confederated provinces at­ tached to G reat Britain. T he governm ent supporters claim ed, too, th at confederation w ould not lead to independence; which, in any case, w ould be an untenable status. T here w ere not lack­ ing critics of these argum ents who deduced th a t confederation would both w eaken the bonds of em pire and antagonize the U nited States. T h e tide in C anada, how ever, was running strongly tow ard confederation, and its sponsors refused to adm it that it could be a step tow ard independence. H ad it n o t the blessing o f the British governm ent? In British Colum bia the debate concentrated m ore directly on the three alternatives: to m aintain the existing situation, accept annexation to the U nited States, o r enter the dom inion. In no other province did opinion appear to be so equally divided. T he particularism w hich was strong in the m aritim e provinces was even m ore m arked in British C olum bia, separated as it was by thousands of miles from C anada. T here was an active feeling for the im perial connection, based on tradition and constant, if difficult, intercourse. O ne opponent of union with C anada, speaking in the legislative council, balanced its advantages w ith th at o f em pire m em bership: T he question has always appeared to m e to be this: - C on­

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federation w ith England, w hich we have; confederation in its truest sense; C onfederation with all the security o f protection, and all the pride o f self-governm ent, now or hereafter to be, w hen the colony shall have population and wealth sufficient: or C onfederation — or, as it should be term ed, ‘'Incorporation” — w ith Canada. Incorporation w ith a country to which we are bound by no natural tie o f affection or duty, and rem ote in geographical position, and opposed to us in m aterial interests. O n the whole the m ainland was in favour o f confederation and V ancouver Island opposed. In both places - and especially in the island - there were m inorities actively prom oting an­ nexation. Econom ic connection w ith the U nited States and geographical proxim ity w ere supplem ented by the inrush of A m erican prospectors to the F raser in 1858 and the C ariboo in 1860. F requent signs in the U nited States that British Colum bia would be a welcome addition, and frequent signs in G reat Britain that a break in the im perial tie w ould not be opposed, helped to strengthen the m ovem ent. It was touch and go for a tim e, but in the end the province declared fo r confederation with C anada. W ith the addition of British Colum bia, the prairies, and P rince E dw ard Island the territorial unification o f the British N o rth A m erican provinces was com pleted, and there the deci­ sions on external relationships reached the end of a chapter. T h e old issues o f the previous generation did not at once die; but, once the choice was m ade, provincial independence and annexation to the U nited States were relegated to the class of m inority and unpatriotic opinions. As such they reappear, time after tim e, in new guises and under fresh circum stances, soft­ ened, reduced from the stark superlatives th at m ake o f the pre-confederation decades the frankest forum o f British N orth A m erican opinion on external relations.

CHAPTER 5

The Outlook of the Dominion

T h e federation m ovem ent w hich, ap art from N ew foundland, was com pleted in 1873, brought together as a political entity colonies and territories com prising the northern half o f N orth A m erica, an area o f some three and one half million square miles, o r nearly as m uch as the total area o f E urope. The dom inion reached from the A tlantic stronghold o f H alifax to the Pacific ports of V ancouver and V ictoria, and from the A m erican border into the barren and uncharted waste w ithin the A rctic circle. O n the east the ports o f the St. Law rence and o f the m aritim e provinces w ere established links w ith Europe; the w estern coast looked across the broad Pacific O cean, on the far side o f w hich Jap an was beginning to em erge from its feudal isolation and C hina had recently and reluctantly adm itted w esterners to a footing on its ancient state. O n the north-w est corner o f C anada lay Alaska, just pur­ chased by the U nited States from Russia; and along the whole southern frontier ran the w rit o f the governm ent at W ashington. Such w ere the limits. W ithin the boundaries of the dom inion w ere seven provinces. Prince Edw ard Island* N ova Scotia, and N ew Brunswick on the east occupied their present territory, as did British Colum bia at the other extrem ity. Q uebec and O n­ tario consisted then of only the southern portions of the present provinces, and M anitoba was but a tithe of w hat it was to be­ come. Across the north o f the central provinces and over the prairies ran the N orth-W est T erritories. F o r this spraw ling new country a start had been m ade in the provision of m eans of transportation. Roads did well enough for local travel and canals fo r a lim ited tim e and place. Railways already served the most thickly settled areas, but there w ere still big gaps. In the constitutional structure th at had been designed to bind together provinces and territories the influence of other coun­ tries m ay readily be distinguished. C anada was not a sovereign state b u t in a status th at defied existing term inology. In the w ords o f the British N o rth A m erica A ct it was a “Dom inion u nder the C row n o f the U nited K ingdom o f G reat Britain and

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Ireland, with a constitution sim ilar in principle to th at o f the U nited K ingdom .” T here was no necessity to refer in m ore detail to British parliam entary procedure and cabinet govern­ m ent, which, in varying degrees, had been followed in the prov­ inces since the assembly o f N ova Scotia had sat in 1758 and m iniature parliam ents w ere provided for the C anadas in 1791. By the sixties the process o f developm ent had assured local autonom y, through the cabinet system, over local affairs; and no dem and as yet existed for the extension o f control to foreign affairs. T he constitutional history of the provinces had been so m uch a reflection of that of G re at Britain th at the partial tu rn ­ ing to A m erican institutions, caused by the struggles of the early p art o f the century, had been alm ost forgotten. W hen the federal principle was borrow ed from the U nited States it was not because o f its intrinsic virtues, but because circum stances did n ot allow the unitary state th at some of the fathers of confedera­ tion w ould have preferred. T he expedient o f federalism was little used in the w orld of that day, except in the U nited States, and th at exam ple was not altogether a happy one. T he architects o f the C anadian system never failed to point out that their fed­ eration would escape the dangers that were so m anifest in the days of the Civil W ar. A fter all, there w ere A lexander H am ilton and the other federalists; and if their advice had once been fatally ignored, it was still good for those who would escape the centrifugal effects o f states’ rights. T h e constitution o f Canada, then, was intended to com bine the basic principles of the British parliam entary system with an im proved form o f federalism . A utonom y in local affairs was lim ited in law, if not always in practice, by the powers of the governor general and the right o f disallow ance vested in the British governm ent. T he British N orth A m erica A ct, being a statute, could be am ended only by the imperial parliam ent, and its final interpretation lay w ith the judicial com m ittee of the privy council. F o r external affairs the im perial authority in C anada was m ore than a shadow. Executive governm ent was explicitly vested in the queen, and in foreign o r imperial affairs her representative, the governor general, was subject to instruc­ tions from L ondon. T hrough him all dealings with foreign pow ers m ust be conducted, even between O ttaw a and W ashing­ ton. L ack of control over its own external affairs would have seemed to m ake the dom inion a colony, just as com plete control w ould have m ade it a sovereign state. N either extrem e was p opular on either side of the A tlantic; for, while C anadians w ere

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often critical o f supposed British neglect o f their interests abroad, they shied away from any suggestion of independence. In conform ity w ith the British tradition of com prom ise this situation was m et by progressive and practical changes in the m ethods by which C anada saw to her own affairs both in Lon­ don and foreign capitals. T he m achinery creaked, but on the w hole it served the purpose. Resources w ere there in plenty: land for farm ing, fisheries, tim ber, furs in dim inishing volume, gold and other m ineral deposits hardly as yet touched. T here was m uch to be done in this wide dom ain. W ho were the men who w ould exploit the new state that they had called into existence, and govern its relation to the outside world? F o r this great land the population was absurdly small. T he first census after confederation, th at of 1871, gives the population (including P rince Edw ard Island) as 3,689,257 persons. All but a million lived in O ntario and Quebec, and w est o f the great lakes w ere but a bare hundred thousand. Statistics o f racial origins are available only fo r the fo u r original provinces. T here w ere som e two million persons of British origin, one million of French origin, and small m inori­ ties from elsewhere. Of these latter m uch the largest group was G erm an, and th at was only two hundred thousand, m ost of whom lived in O ntario. T he British and F rench groups together m ade up 92 per cent of the total. T hus the population was not widely diversified, and early im m igration changed it little, for in the first ten years after con­ federation im m igration from all sources varied between 25,000 and 50,000 a year. A nd in any case it is questionable how far an analysis of the origins o r birthplaces of the people throw s any light on their attitudes tow ard the outside world. Those o f F rench origin were o f C anadian birth. T hey retained F rench traits, habits, and m ethods of thought. T hey had a sentim ental tie with F ran ce, but no love for the contem porary F rench state o r its rationalistic outlook. N o people in C anada were politically m ore N o rth A m erican. T he people o f N ova Scotia and N ew Bruns­ wick, native-born like their com patriots in Quebec, had a deep interest in the affairs o f G reat Britain and the U nited States, from one o r the other o f w hich m ost o f their ancestors had com e. T he num ber of recent im m igrants in O ntario from the British Isles gives no ratio of attachm ent to their country of birth. M any o f the Irish looked on the U nited K ingdom with unfriendly eyes, although they did n o t organize for hostile purposes as did som e o f the Irish in the U nited States. T he

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G erm an minorities in O ntario and N ova Scotia m aintained some cultural traits, but on the whole they had little in com m on with the G erm any o f Bismarck, and caused no modification politi­ cally in the foreign relations o f the dom inion. O n the other hand, it does not follow th at old and new com ers alike had at once taken on a single C anadian nationality strong enough to cover the traces o f origin and birth. The fathers o f confederation were politicians, n o t alchemists, and to create a new political unit out o f several sm aller ones was not at once to transm ute the whole. C onfederation, indeed, had opened the way for new divisions w ithout healing all those that already existed. O pposition had been least serious in the province of C anada, b ut in the other provinces - east and w est - it had been strong enough to delay, and alm ost to prevent, the com pletion o f the plan. In all the A tlantic provinces there were bitter p ro ­ tests against being sold to C anada, and th a t feeling did not die with the conversion o f Joseph H ow e. “ M aritim e grievances” be­ cam e a tradition in the history o f the dom inion, and so fam iliar was the them e that its real significance was som etim es unduly discounted. Even a transcontinental railway could not over­ com e the divergencies th at em erged between the outlook of the w estern and th at of the central provinces. T he failure to attain to a full national spirit m ust be p u t dow n to a variety of causes, a variety too com plex to be exam ined seriously here. O ne o r two com m ents, however, m ay be m ade in reference to the connection between regional division and external relations. T he pressure o f a com m on danger had been an im portant facto r in driving the provinces together; but the Fenian raids and threatened raids, w hich had evoked som e national spirit in the im m ediate era o f confederation, becam e only a m em ory. A greeable as was the decreasing tension in C anadian-A m erican relations, it inci­ dentally rem oved one o f the m ost potent centripetal forces. Decision on, and conduct of, all external relations were m ade m ore difficult not only by conflicting opinions and interests in various parts o f the dom inion, but also by the com petition for pow er between federal and provincial governm ents when “provincial rights” appeared as a barrier to the strong central governm ent th at had been envisaged by the fathers o f con­ federation. Provincialism and regionalism w ere not the only enemies of C anadian nationalism . T he racial division w hich D urham had found so far advanced in his day did not disappear with union of the provinces, but continued in two form s. C entred in the

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province of Q uebec was a self-conscious racial unit which found its inspiration not in contem porary F rance but in specially dis­ tilled traditions of the old regim e both in E urope and A m erica. T he other distinctive racialism was th at of groups in all the provinces w ho stressed attachm ent to the Britain o f their own day. In the nineteenth century at least no force of com parable m agnitude arose from the presence of other racial units in the dom inion. It is perhaps fair to add that no large elem ent in the Canadian population could be regarded, far less regarded itself, as hostile to a real C anadian unity; but cross-currents and con­ flicting priorities w ere none the less problem s to the Canadian nationalists. Indeed, the very w ord “nationalist” is difficult to apply to C anada for it m eant different things to different men; m ore especially was it suspect as seeming to imply a break in the im perial tie. T h at it proved possible to build C anadian political parties which em braced all provinces eased the pressure of centrifugal-forces, but the caution with which those parties approached the form ulation of external policy is in itself a reflection of conflicting opinions. T h e confederation of the British N orth A m erican provinces coincided w ith national m ovem ents on three continents. With blood and iron Bism arck and M oltke subdued the proud power of the H absburgs and overthrew a B onaparte at the head of the traditional m ilitary state of Europe. T he N orth G erm an C on­ federation, born in the sam e year as the original dom inion, was broadened into the G erm an E m pire while M anitoba, British Colum bia, and the prairies were being added to C anada. At the sam e time the unification of Italy trium phed dram atically as the arm ies of the king entered the city of the Caesars. In N orth A m crica the U nited States had just survived its civil w ar, with the forces o f separatism defeated. F ar across the Pacific Ocean the E m pire of Jap an was taking the first steps in its startling m arch tow ard the status of a w orld pow er, with an economy, governm ent, and defence forces modelled on those o f European states. It was an age of nationalism , the bitter fruits of which w ere n ot to ripen for two generations. Both in E urope and Asia nationalism w as an expansive, and frequently an aggressive, force. N o t long after her revolution, Jap an set out on the long road leading to dom ination o f the m ainland. T he European states com peted in the Balkans, and far beyond E urope into un­ explored and undeveloped colonial areas. Econom ic imperialism could not be practised w ithout annexation, and annexation by one pow er could n o t be ignored by its rivals. N either in, Europe,

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nor A sia, nor A frica could there be extension o f territory or influence w ithout a th reat to the interests of other am bitious states and to the balance o f pow er. In N o rth A m erica in the sam e period nationalism m anifested itself through the m ore peaceful exploitation of undeveloped territories, happily spacious enough not to arouse international com petition. I t w as on this latter type o f nationalism that C an ­ ada entered in the years im m ediately following political union. T h e decisions to explore the hinterland, control the Indian tribes, build railways from coast to coast, and people the un­ occupied lands, were the counterpart of the western drive o f the U nited States, and were typical o f the N o rth A m erican concep­ tion o f im perialism and national destiny. F o r C anada, w ith its sm all population and limited financial resources, the task of subduing half a continent to an econom ic and political system was form idable indeed. T here w as m ore than enough here to occupy all the energies and m eans available w ithout looking tow ard the distant scene. A nd yet the country’s activity could not stop at its own borders. T ru e, there w as no reason o r desire fo r territorial expansion, beyond that im plied in a series of boundary settlem ents; yet the dom inion was, as the old provinces had been, not w ithout essential external interests. T he spread of agriculture to the w estern prairies and the pursuit of m ining in the precam brian shield w ould but increase the need for foreign trade. N o r could the dom inion do other than inherit such international political issues as had existed for the old provinces. II T h e im m igration policy of the dom inion, at least for some decades, was influenced m ore by the need of peopling and de­ veloping the country than by any plan of selection designed to create a well-knit nationality. In the new spapers and parliam ent freq u en t references were m ade to the need o f m ore people, especially of w orkingm en. T he com petition from the U nited States, in taking m en both from E urope and from C anada, was all too clearly realized; but Canadians com forted themselves w ith the idea th at the U nited States was enjoying tem porary prosperity and an exaggerated reputation. By the general act of 1869 (32 and 33 V iet., c. 10), consequently, few barriers were placed. L unatics o r physically incapacitated persons w ere ex­ cluded lest they becom e a public charge; and the governor was em pow ered to prohibit the landing of paupers. F rom tim e to

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tim e advantage was taken o f this last enabling clause w ith the object o f preventing unem ploym ent. F oreigners com ing to reside in C anada m ight receive naturalization, but by a curious and aw kw ard arrangem ent they rem ained aliens in any other p art of the British Em pire. This situation, although frequently criti­ cized, was not cleared up until 1914.1 E qually anom alous, and m uch m ore inconvenient, was the absence o f com prehensive provision for the extradition o f crim inals. N either im perial nor C anadian legislation fully covered the field, and fo r m any years the effective rules were those laid down in the narrow confines o f the treaty o f 1842 betw een G reat Britain and the United States. A t every step of every case, said Edw ard Blake, quoting the w ords o f a judge, it was necessary “ to decide how m uch of the C anadian law is consistent w ith so m uch o f the imperial law as is consistent with the T reaty .”2 I t was another nine years before a C anadian act, designed to cover all countries not having treaties with E ngland and affecting C anada, received the royal assent. Som e analysis of the nature of education, of local writing, and o f books in circulation in Canada, m ay provide an indica­ tion as to w hether these revealed any national characteristics, and w hether there was any attem pt to influence the public mind tow ard a growing nationalism . If there had been any general purpose of adopting the ancient expedient o f using education fo r political ends it w ould have been alm ost com pletely defeated by the clauses in the British N o rth A m erica A ct which assigned control of education to the provinces. As in the period before confederation, the schools and universities drew heavily on the m ethods and the books in use in other countries, but there were occasional exam ples of attem pts to provide C anadian material. In O ntario the Ryerson Readers were designed to replace the M cG uffey Readers', but “ the R yerson Readers w ere m ore re­ strained in attem pting to cultivate national feeling. T hey did not glorify C anada w ith the exuberance with which the M cG uffey Readers glorified the U nited States. T o have done so in the years afte r 1867 w ould have seemed to m any in O ntario base dis­ loyalty to the Im perial tie.”3 A cleric in the eastern townships, w riting in 1870, was alarm ed by the spread o f A m erican heresy to th e ,C h u rc h of England in Canada. T he latitudinarianism introduced from the U nited States, he said, had extended to extrem e secularism in education, which “ has insinuated itself into a large num ber of our H igh Schools in the Eastern Tow n­ ships, which have been seed-plots for the propagandism o f ex­

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trem e A m erican ideas hereafter to bring forth their fruits.”4 It was a parallel to the efforts of the Rom an Catholic C hurch in the sam e province to protect the schools from French rationalism . P rinting and circulation o f books in C anada were to a con­ siderable extent governed by the eccentricities of the contem ­ porary laws o f copyright; and the objections raised in C anada to the operation o f those laws gave rise to problem s in imperial and foreign relations. T he story is a long and com plicated one, b ut the gist o f the C anadian protests was that, while the lack of copyright restrictions allowed A m erican publishers to reprint English works at will, the sam e freedom was not given to C an a­ dians.5 R eference to the correspondence on the subject reveals both the nature o f the dispute and the sources from which C anadians received books. W riting to the colonial secretary in 1890, the C anadian m inister of justice described the situation as he saw it. T h e reading public o f w hat is now the dom inion o f Canada has been principally supplied w ith British literature by A m eri­ can reprints. T he high prices o f British editions have m ade this unavoidable. In spite o f the pointed and repeated warning to British publishers given by the colonial office fo r 40 years, very little has been done to change this state o f things by providing cheap editions o f British works. E ven to this day the English editions cost fro m fo u r to ten-fold the price o f A m erican re­ prints. The result is that the business o f publishing British litera­ ture fo r the Canadian reading public is done alm ost exclusively in the U nited States. The A m erican publisher, unrestrained by any international copyright law or treaty, is free to reprint any British work and to supply it, not only to the reading public o f the U nited States, but to the reading public o f Canada, while the Canadian publisher is not free to reprint any such w ork on any terms, unless he can obtain the permission o f the holder o f the copyright in G reat Britain. In som e noted instances this has actually led to the transfer o f printing establishm ents from Canada to the U nited States. In other cases, English publishing houses have set up branches in N e w Y o rk or other A m erican cities, w ith the view o f reprinting fo r the U nited States and Canada the copyright w orks which they have issued in London. C anadian publishers, the m inister w ent on to say, cannot com pete in offers to reprint English books, because A m erican firm s have not only th^ir ow n great m arket but that o f C anada as well. “O ver-weighted, as we continually are, by reason o f the

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vast com petition o f the U nited States in every branch o f trade, industry and com m erce, your lordship will not w onder a t our being disposed to com plain w hen, in regard to so im portant a m atter as the furnishing o f literature fo r ou r people, we are hindered by a m onopoly; nom inally in favour o f the L ondon publishers, but really and practically in favour o f the publishers o f the U nited S ta te s .. . .”GT he governm ent claim ed that public opinion was strongly critical o f the arrangem ents as to copy­ right, and com m ents in the new spapers support the claim . T he ed ito r of the T oronto M ail, for exam ple, w rote that “ it is idle to suppose that A m erican reprints can be kept out of C anada, and C anadian publishers be prevented from supplying the void. Costly English editions are unsuited to C anada where everybody reads and every reader owns the books he reads. L othair at £ 1 .1 6 stg. m ay find its w ay into English circulating libraries and the m ansions o f the aristocracy; but a dollar edition is w hat is w anted for C anada.” T here was, he added, an A m erican dollar edition w hich supplied the C anadian m arket.7 T hro u g h ­ o ut the whole copyright controversy there was alm ost no reference to C anadian books o r authors. P erhaps it was partly because of tact and the particular point at issue that the dem and fo r British w orks was so constantly stressed, but it rem ains true th a t C anadian literature was not, apparently, a m ajor considera­ tion. C anadians read the books o f Britain, France, and the U nited States; and the national aspect of literature was in the attem pt to encourage printing and publishing. T he C anadian au th o r’s point o f view was urged on Sir John M acdonald by W illiam K irby, who argued th at the way to “prom ote C anadian L iterature and encourage C anadian A uthors” was “by establish­ ing a Prosperous Publishing business in C anada.”8 T he people of the dom inion, like their ancestors in the old provinces, followed the affairs as well as the literature o f other countries. Some events abroad were, of course, treated simply as news, with no p articular significance to C anadians. By dint of copying from British or A m erican papers, C anadian editors had always m anaged to eke out their own scanty sources o f inform a­ tion. T h e telegraph and the cable brought m ore recent and m ore steady news than the “latest advices from E urope” which had once form ed the basis of the periodic budgets in the newspapers o f the provinces. Som e events were regarded with detachm ent in one p art of C anada and with m ore direct interest in another. F o r exam ple, the Franco-Prussian W ar was to an O ntario editor “a pitched battle betw een sovereigns fo r kingly pow er an d ag­

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grandisem ent,”0 but a t the news o f an early F rench victory a Q uebec paper announced th at “A ujourd’hui, ce n’a ete p ar toute la ville qu’une joie, q u ’un delire.” 10 W hatever sym pathy may have existed in O ntario for either belligerent was purely passive, and probably the G lobe's approval o f British neutrality rep re­ sented general opinion, w hether or not the editor would be fol­ lowed in his desire fo r “the entire abstinence from participation in all E uropean com plications.” W hen an em issary cam e from F ran ce to start a recruiting office in M ontreal, offering free passages to F rance and a bounty on arrival, some Irishm en cam e forw ard, but F rench Canadians w aited to see w hat posi­ tion F rance would take on w ithdraw ing troops from Rom e.11 Positive proofs o f friendship took the form o f subscriptions for the F ren ch w ounded, and a message cam e through the consulgeneral from Jules Favre, thanking the subscribers and adding th a t “if the recollection o f the m other country has rem ained green in their hearts, neither has F rance forgotten them .”12 T he views of English C anada on the third republic w ere m ixed, the only strong opinion being condem nation of the Paris com m une. T o F rench Canadians, how ever, the third republic threatened a radical and secular conquest of a m otherland from w hich they still derived m uch o f their culture. If F rench C anadians hesitated to recruit for service in the F rench arm y because of the projected w ithdraw al from Rome, they had enthusiastically joined the Zouaves o f the pope’s own garrison. In response to an appeal from the pope, and enco u r­ aged by the bishop, a com m ittee was form ed in M ontreal at the end o f 1867 to organize a detachm ent and raise funds for its expenses. In February, a group o f 135 (all that could be accepted) sailed from N ew Y ork, and six other detachm ents followed. W hile som e never got beyond F rance, 328 men reached R om e and took p art in its defence against the arm y of Italy.13 These defenders o f the tem poral pow er symbolized the reality o f the link between the papacy and the church in Canada. A t hom e the clergy were holding the fort against the forces of liberalism. Since the days o f the early Jesuit missionaries Quebec had always been strongly ultram ontane, and had offered strong resistance against any contrary philosophy. T he general u ltra­ m ontane revival o f the sixties led in C anada, as it did in France and G erm any, to threats o f schism and to bitter controversy. T h e syllabus o f 1864 and the dogm a o f papal infallibility were, of course, noted in English-speaking C anada, but had no im por­ tan t repercussions. In T oronto the editor o f the G lobe badly

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misjudged the situation when he decided th at “the w orld will go on as usual.”14 T he editor o f the Leader was hostile tow ard the ultram ontane policy, but did not dismiss it so airily. T he chief p rotestant new spaper of M ontreal, the G azette, favoured resist­ ance to the pope’s actions. T he real effect of the ultram ontane policy, however, fell on the R om an C atholics of Q uebec. F or the church authorities to show displeasure o f liberalism or gallicanism was not new; for m any years they had labelled the Institut Canadien and the rouge party as undesirable. In the late sixties a strengthening o f the ultram ontane party am ongst the Q uebec clergy coincided w ith the corresponding ascendancy of that p arty at Rom e, and was encouraged by it.15 T he Institu t was pursued with increasing vigour, and Joseph G uibord, a m em ber w ho had been one o f the group that appealed to R om e against the condem nation o f the society, was refused burial in conse­ crated ground. T he “old catholics” o f Quebec, like those of G erm any, could m ake no headw ay against th e ultram ontanes, whose “Catholic P rogram m e” o f 1871 launched a new excursion into politics, like th at of the C entre party. N o com prom ise with liberalism was to be tolerated in church, culture, o r the state. W hile the influence of the papacy on C anada was continuous and im portant, th at of F rance was - except in the cultural field - hardly m ore than sentim ental. T he two countries th at m ost directly affected C anada w ere the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States. Even if there had been nothing m ore in com m on with the U nited States than a frontier, the affairs of a pow erful and expanding country m ust have been o f im m ediate interest to the dom inion. A nd the final delim itation of this particular fro n ­ tier was still seen as open to question, not so m uch from legal disputes over boundaries as frpm the rem aining force o f “m ani­ fest destiny.” A nnexation, peaceful or forced, was still discussed, and Canadians noted w ith ill-concealed alarm indications of expansionism in the republic w ith the not always unfavourable response in C anada. F enian threats, the perennial argum ent over fisheries, and incidents in the use of border waterways added p articular problem s to the general one of m aintaining friendly relations. But Canadians were n ot w holly occupied with defensive measures. T here w ere m any ties between the people of the two countries. Im m igration from one to the o ther, sim ilar environm ents, sim ilar ways o f life, and com m on reading brought the two peoples together. Canadians, too, never paused in the endeavour to establish favourable trad e relations w ith the U nited States; and while they never reached the com plete goal,

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they w ere conscious o f the place in the C anadian econom y o f w hatever trade did exist. Relations w ith the U nited Kingdom w ere in one sense m ore rem ote and in others less so. Distance was hardly m ore o f a barrier than the divergence between E uro p ean and N o rth A m erican social structures. O n the other h an d , the effective m ajority in C anada held a belief in the em pire th at was m ade up o f a variety of com ponents. M any C anadians came, o r their parents had com e, from the British Isles; and they, w ith others who had less blood relationship, w ere definitely, and sometim es aggressively, British. T here was a general confidence in British institutions o f governm ent and law - a confidence which was only strengthened by com parison w ith parallel institutions in the U nited States. W hile such ties o f em pire cannot be m easured they were none the less real. T here w ere also aspects of the relationship of the dom inion w ith the m other country which could be, and were, analysed and weighed. In the first years of the dom inion C anadian opinion was evoked by public expressions in England o n im perial affairs, by the im perial policies o f both English parties, and by English diplom acy affecting C anada. T here were then seen to be two m ajor schools of thought on colonial affairs: th e one, generally held by Liberals and particularly by the M an­ chester school, being that the fu tu re o f Britain lay in free trade, th a t the colonies w ere moving tow ard independence, and that it was desirable th at they should do so; the other, o f which Disraeli cam e to be the spokesm an, declared th at the L iberals had all but destroyed the em pire, and that it m ust be rebuilt by the estab­ lishm ent of som e form o f centralized institutions. T o most C anadians neither o f these propositions m ade any appeal, for they w anted to m aintain the em pire w ithout im posing on it centralized governm ent. T o occasional conferences in London little objection was raised, but a perm anent council was not then, and never becam e, popular. T here were minorities which w ere opposed even to the loose unity th at existed, and others w hich advocated definite m achinery of governm ent fo r the whole; b ut the great mass of C anadians took the m iddle position, favouring continuance o f the connection w ithout central gov­ ernm ent. Beyond ties of tradition, blood, and sentim ent, w hat positive advantages w ere seen? In trade the preferential system was gone, but there rem ained a substantial volum e that m ight be jettisoned by a political break. T he garrisons w ere alm ost gone, b u t aid in w ar was still assured. English diplom acy was fre­ quently criticized, but C anadians - in spite o f outbursts at times

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- still wished to retain the support o f the great naval pow er. It was tru e that Britain m ight pursue objectives of no interest to C anada, but in reality there was no obligation to aid in them , and no prospect of E ngland’s strength being threatened. A m ongst m any exam inations of the whole position, as it ap ­ peared in the age o f confederation, th at by the editor o f the M ontreal G azette is as frank and as representative of any in an im p o rtan t English-language newspaper. O ur present relations with the E m pire, if let alone by agita­ tors, either upon this side o f the water or the other, are satisfac­ tory. W hat is required is that an understanding should be arrived a t with the m other country that its policy is settled, and is not to be suddenly or capriciously altered. It is not fo r the sake o f effecting any great legislative or constitutional changes that we think these L ondon m eetings o f colonists are useful, or the pro­ posed colonial conference desirable. It is in order that public opinion, in the m other country as well as in the colonies, m ay be aroused, and definite opinions o f Im perial policy form ed, where now all is confused and uncertain. It is greater security o f tenure, not change, that is desirable. T he danger that we can ever becom e so entangled and in­ volved in the netw ork o f Im perial interests that we cannot free ourselves is a m ere chimera w hich can frighten nobody w ho is conversant w ith the facts. A n d if we should negotiate respecting tariffs or com m ercial intercourse with the m other country we should certainly not do so upon any less favourable term s with them than with our neighbours w hom som e are so eager to treat w ith now. . . . b ut if it can be show n that its [the em pire’s] preservation w ill involve burthens which we cannot bear, or disadvantages which are in no wise balanced by advantages, the tim e will com e to give it up.16 C an ad a was preoccupied w ith problem s of internal growth, b u t by no m eans exclusively; no r w ere even those problem s them selves dissociated from relations with other countries. The new federal governm ent w as developed, as it had originated, in th e light of exam ples elsewhere. O rganization of new dep art­ m ents and civil service reform , fo r exam ple, followed the ex­ perience of other states. T he railway to the Pacific, which bulked so large in C anadian politics for the first decades after confederation, brought experts, equipm ent, and capital from abroad. It required im m igrants fo r its construction, to give it

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business, and to build up the west. It was seen as an imperial road to the east and listed as a contribution to em pire defence. T h e w heat produced in O ntario and then in the prairies had to be carried to tidew ater and sold abroad. T he m en w ho cam e to develop C anadian industries form ed trade unions that either were m odelled on o r affiliated to those of Britain and the U nited States. T he w hole C anadian econom y assum ed foreign trade, and th at in tu rn called fo r diplom atic action. Looking about in the age of confederation C anadians w ere seeking to broaden the scope o f their com m ercial relations. T he entrance o f British C olum bia into the dom inion spelt a way to the trade of the far east. T h e W est Indies, South A m erica, and A ustralia were also new fields th at had hardly been touched. T he older channels to Britain, F rance, and the U nited States - needed to be cleared if the best results were to be obtained. Canadians, therefore, w ere increasingly concerned about their relations with the rest o f the w orld. T h a t C anada also form ed p art of a great im perial system accentuated that tend­ ency m ore than it restricted it. T here was, it is true, friction resulting from the process o f pursuing C anadian aims through British m eans; but the friction was noticed m ore than the m ore rem arkable adaptation of a colonial organization to a constantly changing need. In a generation after confederation a way had been found by w hich C anada could in effect conduct her own diplom acy, w ithout disrupting the em pire, and w ithout sacrific­ ing all the bargaining pow er held by civ is Britannicus. By an unorthodox process, and alm ost by the back door, Canadians entered the field o f diplom acy, there to try a t the lists the fo r­ tunes o f their country. T he first venture is of peculiar interest, since it involved alm ost every possible related issue: the imperial connection, defence, trade, and fisheries. A nd the setting was B ritish-A m erican-C anadian relations, the central avenue of C anadian external relations.

CHAPTER 6

A Venture in Diplomacy

In the years im m ediately succeeding confederation the exter­ nal relationships o f C anada fitted into the triangular pattern which had been, and was for long to be, dom inating. W ith the neighbouring U nited States and the distant centre of the British E m pire the dom inion had its closest connections; and on a satisfactory series o f arrangem ents with these two great powers depended her security and m uch of her strength. W hile m any of the links which C anada had with these countries w ere constant, they varied in strength from tim e to tim e; and there were aspects of their policies at this particular tim e - b o th as directly affecting C anada and tow ard each other - th at were beyond the ability of the dom inion to influence, and yet of im m ediate concern to her. O ne w orrying factor was the lack of im perial enthusiasm in G reat Britain, resulting in w hat was felt to be distressingly mild concern fo r C anadian interests. M acdonald poured out his woes in to the sym pathetic ear o f L ord C arnarvon: . . . W e are glad to know that we have in you a friend. 1 m ay alm ost say a friend in need, fo r we greatly distrust the m en at the helm in England, who cannot, I fear, be considered as appreciating the im portance o f m aintaining the em pire as it is, intact. W e indulge the belief here, however, that M essers Bright, L ow e and G ladstone (shall I say L ord Granville?) are not true exponents o f the people o f England. W e m ay perhaps be obliged to appeal fro m the governm ent to the people o f England.1 I t w as neither the first tim e nor the last th at C anada and the U nited K ingdom saw the im perial relationship differently. E ng­ lish com m erce was flourishing under the sun o f free trade, and there was little inducem ent to m ake com m itm ents for the sake o f a colony w hich had ceased to have the virtues of a “plan ta­ tio n ,” and whose im perial zeal m ust have seemed to rise with h er troubles and fall w ith her progress. I t was a phase of English policy w hich w as to pass w ith the revived im perialism o f the later seventies and eighties, b u t it cam e m ost inopportunely at a

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tim e when C anada needed diplom atic and perhaps even armed assistance in her relationships w ith the U nited States. T here had em erged from the once-doubtful strife of the Civil W ar a united country, freed from the divisions of the slavery issue, and with a large arm y. Incidents o f the w ar period had m ade fo r bad blood with G re at B ritain and - to only a lesser extent - with C anada. T here was talk of a post-w ar settlem ent of disputes: not in this case betw een belligerents, but to discuss issues w hich the w ar had raised. In such a settlem ent the governm ent of C anada wished to take part, having specific points to bring forw ard; but, as neither a strong n o r a sovereign pow er, had to appear in some type o f junior partnership w ith the British governm ent. The m atters of im m ediate concern to the dom inion w ere defence, the fisheries, trade, and an indem nity fo r losses incurred in the Fenian raids. T h e problem of defence was how to ensure protection against official o r unofficial aggression from the U nited States. T h e old fear o f annexation by force was not yet dead, kept alive both by m em ories of the past and by contem porary words and acts that seem ed to spell trouble.2 S enator Sum ner, Senator C handler, President Johnson, P resident G ran t, and H am ilton Fish, the secretary of state, all spoke o f the desirability of the peaceful annexation of C anada. These and sim ilar opinions in portions o f the press found their way to Canada. T he situations in M ani­ to b a and British Colum bia w ere both such as to give anxiety. T h e close connection of the Red River colony with M innesota, the rebellion there, and the fear of A m erican expansion into the new C anadian w est com bined to m ake an aw kw ard position. T he acquisition of A laska by the U nited States and the San Juan b oundary dispute m ade the Pacific C oast another vulnerable area, especially as com m unication w ith it from C anada was slow. T he C anadian governm ent was acutely conscious o f the possibilities. It is o f great im portance [wrote M acdonald to Rose] that a part o f the force [to the R ed River] should be R egular Troops, as it will convince the U nited States G overnm ent and people that H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent have no intention o f abandoning this continent. I t has got to be a fixed idea in W ashington that England wants to get rid o f her colonies, indeed M r. Fish has not hesitated to say so. I m ay m ention to you, in entire confi­ dence, that Fish had the im pudence to ask Thornton to ascertain whether H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent w ould offer any objection

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to a free vote being taken in Canada, or in any portions o f it, w hether the people desire to join the U nited States or not, and stated his conviction that if this vote were taken a large m ajority, nine-tenths he said o f the people, w ould vote fo r annexation. H e went further and stated that the refusal o f reciprocity was a legitim ate m ode o f coercion. . . . C ouncil has m ade an indignant m inute on the subject . . . we w alked into Fish at the rate o f a hunt.3 T h ere was indeed ground for apprehension on the p art of a w eak country faced by a great pow er in w hich even the high officials did not hesitate to talk of annexation. T ru e, they always called it peaceful annexation, but the line between persuasion and force has not infrequently been a narrow one. A dded to w ords w ere deeds - or, to be m ore accurate, the absence of deeds. It was a conviction in C anada th at the failure of the U nited States authorities to restrain o r punish the Fenians dem onstrated a lack o f goodwill that was little short o f hostility. T aking words and deeds together (and the two seemed to spring from the sam e attitude) there was at least prim a facie evidence fo r the belief th at m ilitary and naval forces in C anada m ust be calculated on the basis of a possible invasion. T he degree of that probability was a subject o f dispute, b u t there was at least agreem ent that defence m ust not be neglected. Ju st as C anada - in the eyes of m any C anadians - was in need of adequate defences, the imperial troops were being w ithdraw n. T he decision to reduce the garrisons in British N o rth A m erica had been taken m any years earlier, and had always been regretted by the colonials.4 T he British governm ent was determ ined to reduce all colonial garrisons, partly for the sake o f econom y, and partly because its available forces were too widely distributed. In the case o f C anada there was an additional reason arising out o f the belief that the dom inion should accept the burdens as well as the advantages of greater autonom y, and to som e extent an impression that C anada in any case was moving, if not tow ard com plete independence, at least tow ard a status which could no longer be called colonial. The exigencies of the Civil W ar period caused tem porary reinforce­ m ent o f the im perial troops, and the danger from Fenianism fu rth er delayed reduction. T he cost to the imperial treasury fo r the year 1867-8 was £ 1 ,2 4 3 ,4 2 3 , a figure considerably higher than that for either the Civil W ar years or previously. In C anada it was hoped th at circum stances would induce the British gov­

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ernm ent to delay o r m odify its plan of w ithdraw ing the troops. Both the Fenian m enace and the threatening aspect of affairs in the R ed River district were presented as argum ents in favour o f a t least tem porary delay; but the British governm ent was inexorable, and tow ard the end o f 1871 the last of the British garrisons (except that at the naval station of H alifax) m arched out o f Quebec, w here they had been stationed since they had first storm ed that fortress over a century earlier. It was said and understood th at the w ithdraw al o f the troops did n ot absolve G re at B ritain from rendering assistance to C anada in case o f need. It was obvious, how ever, that only naval forces could be rapidly brought to a N o rth A m erican scene of action; and in any case the British governm ent, both directly and through its governors, had persistently urged the doctrine of colonial responsibility for the first line o f defence. T he fortifica­ tions th at w ere agreed upon in 1865 w ere never created, except fo r additional w orks carried out by the im perial governm ent at Quebec. T he C anadian governm ent provided itself w ith money to proceed with the w orks planned for various cities, but the fortifications were n o t built, and in 1872 the original plan was dropped. Beginning with the last years o f the im perial garrisons a C anadian m ilitary organization was slowly built up. A statute o f 1868 (31 V iet., c. 40 ) retained in principle the obligation to m ilitary service, but in practice provided only for a volunteer militia. U nder the statute 40,000 m en w ere to be paid and drilled, b ut only at first was this num ber actually reached. T here was a departm ent of militia, but at first no headquarters staff and no auxiliary services, such as com m issariat. T he first steps tow ard a regular arm y were taken in 1871 w ith the raising of tw o batteries, one at Q uebec and the other a t K ingston, to take o ver and preserve the works and arsenals at those places. T h e Fenian m ovem ent was, as has been suggested, closely related to the whole m ilitary question; as it was, also, to the C anadian position in regard to the projected diplom atic settle­ m ent with the U nited States. T he Fenian B rotherhood, which w as form ed in 1858, turned after the Civil W ar to a plan fo r putting pressure on the British governm ent (by m eans o f inva­ sions o f C anada) to m ake concessions to the Irish revolutionary party. T h ere was m ore talk o f invasion than actual crossing of the frontier, but actual operations were sufficient to justify apprehension. T he public - especially near the border - was certainly alarm ed, and there were constant rum ours o f furth er attacks. T he danger m ade it necessary to spend m ore on the

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m ilitia than w ould otherw ise have been considered, and there was loss of life in repelling the invaders. W hat m ade the whole F enian question bulk so large was two related considerations: th at the Fenians m ight find reinforcem ents and do extensive harm ; and that the A m erican governm ent, by failure to prevent the raids or adequately to punish the participants, exhibited an unfriendly attitude. T he first apprehension proved to be illfounded. T he second was based on at least som e real evidence. W ithout going into the details of the m otives and acts of indi­ vidual A m ericans o r the governm ent, it is only necessary here to understand the C anadian point o f view. In sum m ary this was: th at the raids had cost C anada m en and m oney, that the United States had not m ade proper efforts to prevent them , th at an in­ dem nity should be paid, and th at the British governm ent should press the dom inion’s claim . W hen C artier and M cD ougall were in England they learnt o f negotiations on the A labam a claims, and suggested to G ranville th at if a tribunal were set up on that subject individuals in C anada and the governm ent should have an opportunity o f presenting their claim s about the Fenians.5 In the spring o f 1870 the C anadian governm ent stated its inten­ tion o f urging that the im perial governm ent dem and reparation, on the ground th at the A m erican governm ent had inform ation w hich would have enabled it to stop the raids. T hey pointed out th at the C anadian governm ent, though not being able to stop the St. A lbans raid o f 1864, because of lack o f fore-know ledge, had m ade pecuniary com pensation. Before this privy council report could reach England, G ranville had w ritten to the governor general, Sir John Y oung, saying that H is M ajesty’s governm ent w ould urge the A m erican governm ent to counteract any such m ovem ent in the future. T he C anadian cabinet was furious, and w rote a bitter m em orandum w hich Y oung refused to sign, but sent to G ranville. In it the council expressed its “ unfeigned regret” th at no dem and fo r reparation was being m ade. They believed that “ there is no precedent in the history of civilized nations for a great pow er such as G reat B ritain subm itting to such outrage on its loyal subjects w ithout m aking a dem and for adequate reparation.” A fter fu rth er pressing, K im berley, the new colonial secretary, suggested that the C anadian governm ent draw up a full statem ent o f facts and claims. T he resultant m em orandum , accepted by the council on January 25, 1871, w ent over the fam iliar argum ents at som e length, seeking to show by reference to particular cases th at the U nited States governm ent was well w arned in advance and could have pre­

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vented the raids.0 As a result o f this correspondence the imperial governm ent agreed to bring the claims before the joint high com mission w hich was to m eet at W ashington. N o t the least im portant o f the issues com ing to a head in the early years after confederation was that of the trade and com ­ m erce o f the dom inion. In no field was the close dependence of C anada on satisfactory relations w ith G re at B ritain and the U nited States better illustrated. O f the total external trade of C anada in 1870 as m uch as 89.5 p er cent o f the exports and 88.5 p er cent o f the im ports were accounted for by those powers together. A lthough G reat Britain bought from C anada consid­ erably less than she sold to her, the firmness with w hich freetrade doctrines w ere held left little prospect of preferential duties. In the case o f the U nited States, however, Canadians continued to cast longing glances at the reciprocity treaty of 1854, a renew al o f which, in some form , w ould be especially advantageous in consideration o f the growing height of the A m erican tariff. T he question was w hether the U nited States could be induced to m ake a new treaty, it being borne in mind th at she had renounced the previous one. It seemed probable that a case m ade solely on the virtues o f tariff agreem ents would be insufficient to carry the day. A s m ake-weights the Canadians had two inducem ents to offer: adm ission to their fisheries, and use of their canals. T he fisheries o f N ew foundland and C anada, plentiful and ac­ cessible to A m erican ships, constituted a real bargaining-point. T he fisheries controversy was an old one, both as to the interpre­ tation o f the treaty rights of A m erican citizens, and as p art of the general negotiations on com m ercial relations. T he conces­ sion in the T reaty of Paris o f 1783 to A m ericans of the right to fish in colonial w aters was considered by the British governm ent as abrogated by the W ar of 1812. A m ericans, how ever, did not accept this interpretation and continued to fish after the w ar as before, until some tw enty o f their boats w ere seized by British cruisers. T he convention o f 1818 defined the position by allow­ ing to A m erican citizens fishing rights in p arts of the shore of N ew foundland and L abrador, and the M agdalen Islands; the U nited States renouncing any claim to enter the three-m ile lim it elsewhere, except to obtain shelter, wood, and w ater, and to m ake repairs. T he Reciprocity T reaty of 1854 greatly enlarged the freedom of A m erican fisherm en by providing for reciprocal and free access to the coastal fisheries, with some exceptions; but w hen that treaty lapsed in 1866, the convention o f 1818 -

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with its limited concessions - once m ore cam e into force. The provincial governm ents assumed that the privileges accorded to A m erican fishermen autom atically cam e to an end, but at the solicitation o f the British governm ent agreed to retain them tem porarily. T he C anadian governm ent professed th at they had “no disposition to use the apprehension of national differences arising out of the fisheries, as a m eans of influencing the U nited States to replace their trade relations with British N o rth A m erica on a satisfactory footing,” 7 but it is probable th a t they believed th at the fisheries could be used as a m eans of pressure tow ard restoration o f reciprocity. T hey suggested that fo r the current year the provinces should allow A m erican ves­ sels to fish on paym ent of a licence fee, the proceeds from which should be used for “ the m aintenance o f a joint m arine police.” T he licence fee was duly instituted, consisting of 50 cents and later of $2 p er ton o f the vessel. In spite of the original intention the system was carried on from year to year - although there were constant com plaints from C anada o f w idespread evasion until 1870, when the dom inion governm ent decided to term inate it. T here followed a period in which the convention of 1818 cam e into operation once m ore, accom panied by disputes as to w hat were C anadian waters. Both before and after 1870 there was a necessity for naval policing, which was perform ed partly by the C anadian and partly by the British governm ent. In each of the first three years after the abrogation o f the Reciprocity T reaty there w ere four o r five vessels of the royal navy protecting fisheries in the G ulf o f St. Law rence, and during the sam e tim e, one o r two p ro ­ vincial boats. In 1870 there was one British vessel and eight Canadian - the latter officered as far as possible by retired naval officers. T he division of responsibility and expense was in dispute between the two governm ents, and constant com plaints were m ade in C anada that protection was insufficient. T he abolition o f the licensing system was received w ith outspoken criticisms in the U nited States, being described as unneighbourly; and a long argum ent w ent on as to exactly from w hat w aters the A m erican vessels were to be excluded.8 In the sum m er of 1870 the dom inion governm ent, after reviewing the whole co n tro ­ versy, urged the British authorities to suggest to the A m erican governm ent a joint high com m ission to settle the dispute.0 In the speech from the throne in 1871 it was stated that the fishery question w ould be subm itted to a joint com mission, which, how ever, would include it as only p art o f a large agenda.

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T h e coasting trade, too, was to be a m atter fo r reciprocal concessions. By a C anadian statute o f 1870 (33 V iet., c. xiv) the coasting trade from one C anadian po rt to another was for­ bidden to foreign ships, w ith the exception th at the governor in council m ight declare that this did not apply to ships o f a country which adm itted British ships to its coasting trade. The explanation of this move was m ade by the m inister o f m arine and fisheries in his annual report for 1868-1869. T h e U nited States, he argued, had not reciprocated in a liberal policy in relation to the coasting trade, the use of canals, or fisheries. I am o f opinion that the true policy o f the Canadian G overn­ m en t at present should be to retain all the privileges which it now possesses, until fresh negotiations take place fo r new trade relations between Canada and the U nited States, w hen the opening o f the coasting trade o f the D om inion to U nited States shipping can be included in any arrangem ents which m ay be m ade, if the Canadian governm ent should then be o f opinion that it would be advisable in the interests o f Canada to do so.10 T he second m ajor C anadian asset suitable for bargaining was a w aterw ay from the m iddle w est to the sea. It was a less certain asset than the control of fisheries, since there w ere alternative transportation routes, while the best fisheries were in C anadian w aters. Indeed, the diversion o f traffic to th e E rie C anal o r to A m erican railways at Buffalo was a constant nightm are to those Canadians who were directly o r indirectly interested. T here w ere, however, certain types o f freight which could be carried m ost econom ically to tidew ater by boat; and it was in the know ledge o f this that C anadians had banked on extensive A m erican use of the canal system which in the forties they had been com pleting a t great expense. T he Reciprocity T reaty for the first tim e adm itted U nited States vessels to navigation o f the St. Law rence and the C anadian canals w ith the sam e tolls as those paid by British subjects. U sed as a m ake-w eight in the negotiation o f that treaty, the navigation privilege autom atically fell w ith its term ination. T he U nited States had a quid pro quo in the coasting trade, to which C anadians had not been adm itted even under the Reciprocity T reaty, and in the bonding system. T h e latter enabled C anadian im ports and exports to be carried to and from A m erican all-year ports w ithout paying duty, and its w ithdraw al was a bogey th at was often displayed. But the U nited States h ad little to offer in w ater transport to set against the C anadian canals. T he treaty o f 1854 adm itted British sub­

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jects to the free navigation of L ake M ichigan. A nd until 1895, w hen a C anadian canal was opened at Sault Ste. M arie, C ana­ dian vessels w ere dependent on the A m erican one fo r entrance to L ake Superior. Fisheries and canals w ere consistently brought forw ard as inducem ents to the U nited States to re-enact a reciprocity agree­ m ent. A dded attractions were indeed needed. T he U nited States was in itself a huge free-trade area, rich in m ost natural re­ sources and well advanced in m anufacturing. C anada, on the oth er hand, was in a com paratively early stage o f m anufactu r­ ing, w ith lim ited m arkets, and dependent on a relatively large volum e o f foreign trade. She was, m oreover, attem pting a t the sam e tim e to build up a m ore m ixed econom y, and to sell her staples fo r im ported goods (w hich must, to a large extent, be m an u factu res). A m erican dissastisfaction w ith the treaty of 1854 was due not only to the political relations o f the Civil W ar period. T he C anadian protectionist tariffs o f the fifties were th ought by m any A m ericans to be striking a t the very roots of any perm anent reciprocity betw een the two countries, and to violate the treaty in spirit if not in letter. T here was never any doubt th at C anada w anted to reach an agreem ent w ith the U nited States, even if individuals tried to bolster national pride by statem ents that the U nited States m ust n ot th in k C anada dependent on her charity, and th at C anada could get on very well w ithout reciprocity. T he plain tru th was th a t all parties, and nearly all groups, were anxious to secure a successor to the treaty of 1854. T he only disagreem ent was on the term s to be accepted. Before the treaty had even ru n out the provincial governm ents w ere struggling to secure its renew al or replacem ent. W ith confederation the aim did n o t change, though at tim es it seemed politic not to press it. D eputations to W ash­ ington and inquiries m ade through the British m inister brought news th at there was little hope a t the tim e. It had not been easy to float the treaty o f 1854 - even on cham pagne - and subse­ q u en t events had m ade W ashington even less receptive. Y o u know [wrote M acdonald] that I have always held that a renewal o f those relations can only be effected by the pressure o f A m erican interests upon Congress. It is obvious that congress m ust look at the question fro m an A m erican point o f view entirely, and until convinced that it is .for the advantage o f the trade o f the U nited States to negotiate a new reciprocity treaty no such treaty can be obtained.

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In the state o f feeling that now exists tow ard England in the m inds o f too m any people in the U nited States, nothing like fa v o r can be expected by her. This feeling has absurdly enough been extended to Canada, although during the whole o f the C ivil W ar we spared no pains to perform our duty as a friendly neighbour. Still, the feeling exists, and therefore any appearance o f undue anxiety on the part o f Canada would only tend to defeat the object in view. Canada is quite ready, through the British Am bassador, to re­ new the negotiations at any tim e, and M r. Fish is fu lly inform ed o f that fact. W e can do no m ore. I t w ould be altogether in­ decorous and im proper fo r the Canadian governm ent to co m ­ m ence a system o f lobbying fo r the purpose o f securing the support o f individual m em bers o f congress. W e have gone to considerable expense already in dissem inat­ ing inform ation on the subject o f trade, and fro m tim e to time, as it m ay be necessary, will continue to do so. T he truth seem s to be that, until y o u r public m en get o ut o f their heads the ridiculous notion that by restricting m utual trade annexation will be secured, no earnest a ttem pt will be m ade to secure reciprocity. M eanw hile Canada w ill not entertain fo r a m o m en t the proposition11 to give the freedom o f the St. L aw ­ rence fo r the sake o f the reduction or abolition o f the im port duties on coal, lum ber and salt.12 It was becom ing increasingly evident th at no progress could be m ade in tariff negotiations except in relation to other subjects o f com m on interest, and probably not until the soreness still existing from the Civil W ar could be alleviated. In full-dress debates in the C anadian parliam ent in the spring of 1870 the opposition followed the obvious tactics of accusing the govern­ m ent of lack o f enthusiasm for, and inefficiency in the pursuit of, a reciprocity agreem ent. T he latter m ay, to some degree, have been true; but there is little doubt th at governm ent and opposition w ere one in their aims. T he wisdom of the new regu­ lations concerning the fisheries might be questioned in view of the need to conciliate A m erican opinion, b u t the governm ent believed that it had tried concession w ithout any good result. A p art from the fisheries altogether, there w ere m any groups represented a t W ashington opposed to tariff reductions on p articular classes o f goods - as there w ere always likely to be surrounding any legislature. T o m eet their attacks nothing was effective beyond a series of com prom ises. It was, however,

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possible to attem pt to rem ove political bones of dissension, w hich acted as a barrier against agreem ent on any subject. The British governm ent had for some tim e been moving tow ard a kind of peace conference w ith the U nited States. W hat form it should take, w hat subjects w ere to be included, and how C anada m ight be represented on it w ere all subjects o f vital concern to the dom inion. O ut o f a successful conference might com e the twin benefits o f better feeling between the British Em pire and the U nited States and accord on the m atters of particular inter­ est to C anada, the discussion of w hich seemed to have reached a stalem ate.

II T h e holding o f a conference at W ashington was the result o f a com bination of circum stances. T he British governm ent, apprehensive of the state of affairs in E urope, and particularly o f the denunciation by Russia of the Black Sea clauses of the T reaty of Paris, was anxious to avoid any possibility of a war on tw o continents. T he tradition that peace with the U nited States was a sine qua non of foreign policy had not yet been established in L ondon, but for the tim e a t least there was a pressing reason fo r the settlem ent of disputes. T he A m erican governm ent, recently freed from the encroachm ent of N apo­ leon III on N o rth A m erica as well as from its own Civil W ar, felt less necessity fo r im m ediate agreem ent, and there were not a few prom inent A m ericans w ho talked alm ost lightly o f a possible w ar w ith G reat Britain. But w ith the replacem ent of Sum ner by H am ilton Fish as secretary of state, there was m ore willingness to com prom ise. T he position of C anada in this situation has been differently interpreted. T o R ipon’s biographer the C anadian issues were incidental and an em barrassm ent.13 T o Canadians they seemed at the tim e and since as o f m ajor im portance. W hether the British governm ent w ould have been eager fo r settlem ent had there been no E uropean com plication, is purely speculative. As it proved, the situation was advanta­ geous to C anada is so far as it started the wheels of diplom acy; and disadvantageous in so fa r as it reduced the bargaining pow er o f the British governm ent, and m ade it too ready for concessions. Both British and A m erican statesm en were inclined to believe that the status of C anada was a provisional one which could hardly last. T he repeated prophecies in the U nited States th at annexation was a question o f tim e w ere based not, as once,

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on the assum ption o f m ilitary force, but on a doctrine o f in­ evitability tem pered by the peaceful persuasion of econom ic pow er. But while nursing this com fortable expectation o f the eventual acquisition o f m ost o f the rest o f N orth A m erica, A m ericans saw the need for settlem ent o f im m ediate questions, particularly in regard to the fisheries, and, to a lesser extent, the unsettled boundaries w ith M anitoba and British Colum bia. A bsorbed in European affairs, anxious to prom ote w orld com ­ m erce by means of free trade, and unim pressed by the value of quasi-colonies, British statesm en w ere tem pted to agree w ith the A m erican suggestion th at their bilateral differences w ould be m ore easily settled if C anada w ere no longer a p art of the British E m pire. But, while recognizing the possibility - even the proba­ bility - o f peaceful separation in the future, they were for the tim e being ready to sponsor the C anadian case up to the point at w hich it endangered the success of the settlem ent as a whole. T h e form o f the A nglo-A m erican negotiations is explained by the course of the A labam a dispute. A treaty o f arbitration fo r the A labam a claim s had been rejected by the A m erican Senate, and the British governm ent was therefore unw illing to risk indignity by pursuing the m atter through ordinary diplo­ m atic channels. I t was, however, urgently necessary to remove the U nited States as a possibly hostile force in case o f w ar with Russia. In the dilem m a Lord T enterden, the assistant under­ secretary for foreign affairs, m ade the ingenious suggestion o f a joint high com m ission.14 It was to be first proposed for the dis­ cussion of affairs other than that of the Alabam a, but w ith the private understanding that the A m erican governm ent should add the A labam a case, and that this be accepted. In conform ity with the tried diplom atic procedure of private agreem ent before official correspondence, Sir John Rose (then resident in London) was sent in January 1871 to W ashington, there, w here he was persona grata, to discuss plans with the secretary of state. Fish was already looking tow ard a general settlem ent having, in the previous Septem ber, suggested to T hornton (the British minister) th at all issues should be dealt with together. D espite the opposi­ tion of Sum ner - who wildly dem anded the w ithdraw al of Britain from the A m e ric a s-F ish found sufficient support before the m onth was out to accept the proposition brought by Rose.15 T he official correspondence was then solem nly conducted on the agreed lines, and the decision that a joint com m ission was to m eet in W ashington duly recorded.10 T h e negotiations leading to the creation o f the joint com m is­

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sion w ere apparently carried through w ithout consulting the C anadian governm ent and w ithout any decision as to w hat part, if any, C anada was to play in the com mission. I t was, o f course, clear th a t at least some of the subjects directly affecting the dom inion w ould be on the agenda, b u t th at alone w ould not satisfy C anada. W hile in E ngland in 1869 C artier and McD ougall had represented to G ranville th at no steps tow ard reciprocity should be taken w ithout consultation w ith their governm ent;17 sim ilarly they had asked th at the dom inion gov­ ernm ent and individual citizens should be allowed to appear before any tribunal considering claim s for dam age by Fenian raids.18 M acdonald had also told Rose, in w riting on the fisheries question, th at “should the question com e up you m ust press on H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent that no negotiation should be en­ tered upon or treaty concluded w ithout reference to the C ana­ dian governm ent.” 19 But by w hat m eans was C anada to take p art in the W ashington discussion? Obviously not by separate representation. T he proposal th at was hit upon in L ondon was to include a C anadian in the British com mission. Rose was th ought of, as having carried on the prelim inary discussions, but w as unacceptable in C anada as not a C anadian by birth, a resi­ dent in E ngland, and a p artn e r in an A m erican banking house.20 M acdonald him self was suggested, and the governor general p ut th e question before him a t the beginning o f February. I have thought over L o rd K im berley’s proposition [he wrote to Lisgar] that I should'act on the Joint C om m ission with the U nited States on Fishery and other m atters. I am a good deal embarrassed by not being able to com m unicate w ith m y col­ leagues on the subject. M y first im pression was that it w ould be better fo r Canada not to be represented on such a Com m ission. B u t then one m ust consider that if Canada allowed the m atter to go by default, and left its interests to be -adjudicated upon and settled by a C om m ission com posed exclusively o f A m ericans having an adverse interest, and Englishm en having little or no interest in Canada, the G ovt, here w ould be very m uch censured if the result was a sacrifice o f the rights o f the D om inion. Eng­ land w ould at once say that the offer was m ade to Canada to be represented on the C om m ission and that it was declined.21 M acdonald agreed, how ever, that he w ould act, subject to his colleagues’ consent (w hich was readily given), and after secur­ ing from K im berley an adm ission of C anada’s exclusive rights

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to fisheries w ithin the three-m ile limit. T here was indeed no app aren t alternative. It was obvious th a t a single C anadian w ould occupy an unenviable position, since he presum ably m ight fail to sway his fellow-com missioners, yet m ust accept responsibility in C anada for the decisions. O n the other hand, there was a t least a better chance of furthering C anadian inter­ ests by this m eans than by official correspondence over the long ro u te to W ashington by way o f London. D uring his stay in W ashington M acdonald kept in touch with his cabinet by m eans of an exchange o f letters and telegram s; but the course of the conference could by no m eans be plotted in advance, and to som e extent he w as obliged to act as best he could, with no time for consultation, as circum stances arose. T he British com mission was headed by E arl de G rey and R ipon, and the other m em bers w ere Sir Stafford N orthcote, a m em ber o f the opposition in the H ouse o f Com m ons, Sir E dw ard T h ornton, the British m inister to W ashington, M ontague Ber­ nard, professor of international law at O xford, and Sir John M acdonald. M acdonald was appointed a plenipotentiary under the great seal, and received his instructions22 from the foreign office. A t the first session de G rey “announced th at his Com m is­ sion - which he pointed out was not a British but an Im perial body, C anada being represented by Prim e M inister M acdonald - was fully em pow ered to sign a treaty.” 23 But w hen later de G rey explained th at any fishery treaty m ust be approved by the C anadian parliam ent, one of the A m erican com m issioners said “th at they thought they were dealing w ith the British E m pire and not with C anada.”24 It was the beginning o f the long story o f foreign uncertainty on the constitution o f the em pire. It was also a new departure that involved possible difficulties in the relations o f C anada and G reat Britain. E. B. C handler of New Brunsw ick and F rancis H incks of the Province o f C anada had accom panied Elgin to W ashington in 1854, but only in an advisory capacity. T he W ebster-A shburton T reaty of 1842 and the O regon T reaty o f 1846 had been negotiated by British plenipotentiaries. T here were no precedents. T h e high com m ission set to w ork on F eb ru ary 27, 1871, and the treaty was signed on M ay 6.25 T he subjects m ost discussed w ere the A labama claim s and the fisheries. In the form er C anada had no direct interest, and the U nited K ingdom had none in the latter. T o M acdonald the w hole conference was a dual struggle, w ith his fellow-com missioners first and w ith the A m ericans second. T o the British m em bers, on the other hand, the pressure

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o f C anadian dem ands com plicated their task o f securing a settlem ent. T o the A m ericans it was a constant puzzle w hether they w ere dealing w ith one country or two. T h at was the crux of the situation, and one not fully recognized by either M acdonald o r de G rey. T he British E m pire com m issioners com posed a body w hich was neither national nor international. C anadians were h u rt th a t their interests w ere not pursued with m ore zeal, and m ore than once M acdonald talked of w ithdraw ing. T here had been no previous agreem ent between U nited K ingdom and C anadian governm ents on the course to be pursued in respect of particu lar subjects. M acdonald, although appointed to the same status as the other com m issioners, seems to have felt no respon­ sibility in m atters not touching C anada, and to have given little w eight to the general attitude o f the British tow ard a settlem ent w ith the U nited States. “ . . . T he British Com m issioners [he w rote] seem to have only one idea in their minds, th at is, to go hom e to E ngland w ith a treaty in their pockets settling every­ thing, no m atter a t w hat cost to C anada.”26 H ad he not been so harassed by his particular problem s, M acdonald m ight have recognized m ore freely th at the British w ere prepared to make concessions for the sake of peace and their E uropean danger; and th at an established peace w ould a t the sam e tim e remove w hatever m enace there was to the security o f Canada. T o de G rey it seemed th at the C anadians gave too little weight to the need o f com prom ise fo r the sake of peace. “T hey are filled with a belief,” he w rote to the foreign office, “th at they can bully the A m ericans into giving w ay and seem indifferent to the risk they ru n by such a policy.”27 Y et it is not surprising that a prim e m inister responsible to the C anadian parliam ent and electorate should have envisaged w ith apprehension the reception of a treaty that w ould certainly be believed to be unfavourable to C anada. “I have taken strong ground w ith my colleagues [he wrote] th at it would be exceedingly unw ise to agree to any term s which it is not reasonably probable w ould be accepted by C anada as should any T reaty be m ade an d afterw ards rejected by o u r Parliam ent the feeling o f irritation w ould be greatly increased.”28 H e w as also playing the dom inion gam e with another object. Fish inquired w hether a fisheries treaty would have to be ratified by P rince E dw ard Island and N ew foundland, and de G rey was uncertain of the constitutional position. “I did n o t choose to enlighten them upon the p oint as I think it well to keep the case of C anada separate. If we com e to any satisfactory T reaty, I shall endeavour to have it lim ited to the D om inion of

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C anada, so that if Prince E dw ard Island and N ew foundland desire the advantages o f the T reaty they m ust come into C o n ­ federation.”20 In the light o f his own feelings and of the pressure fro m C anada, M acdonald was going far in the direction of sacrifices for the sake o f im perial unity. W hen it was first p ro ­ posed th at a fisheries treaty m ust be approved by the C anadian parliam ent M acdonald was p u t in an exceedingly difficult position. I f a m ajority o f m y colleagues should at any tim e conclude to accept term s w hich I do not approve of, I m ust o f course, either p rotest and withdraw, or remain on the com m ission and trust to 'the . . . ratification o f the Treaty by Canada. I f I take the first course, it will disclose to the A m ericans the fa ct o f a difference o f opinion, a conflict in fact, between Canada and England. This the A m ericans are anxious to estab­ lish, in order to get up a sort o f quarrel between the tw o, and strengthen that party in England who desire to get rid o f the colonies as a burden. I f I continue to act on the C om m ission I will be attacked fo r m aking an unw orthy sacrifice o f Canada’s right and m ay be com pelled to vote in Parliam ent against a Treaty which I had a hand in m aking.30 Anxious as M acdonald was to secure a satisfactory settlem ent of the fisheries, his determ ination m ust not go to the point of incurring a m ajor political disaster. A few days later, w hen de G rey said that M acdonald’s insistence w ould bring the negoti­ ations to an end, the latter felt it necessary to m odify his position previously taken th at parliam ent would not accept the projected treaty. M y reason fo r taking this line was it was evidently L o rd de G rey’s aim to m ake m e and Canada responsible fo r a breach o f the negotiations generally in case things w ent wrong. I was resolved not to let any blam e be attachable to Canada in that respect, and thus strengthen the hands o f the party in England w ho consider Canada a burden to be got rid o f and an obstacle to friendly relations with the U nited States.31 T hus the C anadian governm ent had, like the British, aim s in the negotiations w ider than the actual subjects discussed. M ac­ donald was a skilful negotiator and he fought a good fight, but the final term s w ere far from those w hich he, o r any other C anadian, w anted. T he San Ju a n boundary, being relatively

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unim portant, w as little discussed, and w as finally subm itted to arbitration by the G erm an E m peror (articles x x x i v - x l i i ) . 32 T h e Fenian claim s w ere, on A m erican insistence, ruled to be n ot w ithin the agenda - a result w hich M acdonald regarded as fortunate, since it had been arranged th at England would in­ dem nify C anada if the U nited States refused. T here rem ained reciprocity, com m unications, and fisheries, which the Canadians hoped to link together in the traditional m anner. In spite of M acdonald’s effort, however, no tariff agreem ent could be reached. T he articles on com m unications (xxv i-x x x ) provided fo r the free navigation o f the rivers St. Law rence, Y ukon, Por­ cupine and Stikine, and of L ake M ichigan. T he British agreed to urge the C anadian governm ent to allow to A m ericans the use o f C anadian canals on term s of equality with C anadians; and in retu rn the A m erican governm ent opened to Canadians the St. C lair Flats C anal, and agreed to urge the state governm ents to allow the use o f state canals connected with border waters. Bonding privilege was to be allowed to and from the ports of N ew Y ork, Boston, and P ortland, or other ports designated by the president (art. x x ix ). T he ships of either C anada or the U nited States m ight carry goods from one po rt in the other country to another, provided that p a rt o f the transport was by land carriage in bond (art. x x x ) . T he chief effort o f C anada was tow ard an acceptable solution of the fisheries. It was their chief asset, and M acdonald m ade repeated efforts to put it against at least som e degree o f reciprocal trade. T he A m ericans, however, were adam ant; and the only free trade was to be in fish and fish-oil (art. x x i) . T he inshore fisheries o f each country were throw n open to the citizens of the other (arts, x v m -x x ), and the claim of a superior value of the concession m ade by C anada was to be exam ined by a special com m ission (arts, x x n -x x v ).33 O n M ay 8 the W ashington T reaty w as ready for signature.331 Fish and de G rey w arm ly congratulated each o th e r - a n d it came to M acdonald’s turn to sign. W ith the pen in his hand he turned to F ish and w hispered “W ell, here go the fisheries” ; and, as he rose fro m the table, “T hey are gone.”34 HI M acdonald was not w ithout a sense o f d ram a, and his gesture in signing the treaty, as well as the violent protests he m ade during its negotiation, m ust be discounted. Certainly he had failed to secure the term s w hich governm ent and p opular opin­

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ion sought; b u t th at is not an uncom m on result o f any diplom atic com prom ise. T he original C anadian aims had not been set low, and w hat had actually been attained was not contem ptible. T he fisheries had not brought their price, but there was still a chance o f a dividend being voted by the com m ission to be set up. R eci­ procity had been denied, b ut the door was not closed. C anadians had no real desire to exclude A m erican shipping from their canals, o r to forgo the canal tolls. T he F enian claims had not been considered, but M acdonald considered th at he had a p ro m ­ ise from de G rey o f com pensation from the British governm ent. T h e San Juan boundary was to be arbitrated, and the decision m ight fall one w ay o r the other. It rem ained to m ake out a good case in Canada, both to placate C anadian opinion, and to per­ suade parliam ent to pass a bill im plem enting those p arts of the treaty which required legislative action. A s M acdonald now bent his energies to this task, he had, he found, rath er overplayed his hand in his letters from W ashington to the cabinet, and some o f his own colleagues had to be con­ verted. P arliam ent would not m eet for nearly a year, and in the m eantim e he w ould say as little as possible, while preparing his defences. First, he m ust see w hat could be obtained on the F enian account. A pparently the British governm ent was willing to p ay a m odest com pensation if all the other questions at dis­ pute w ith the U nited States w ere settled - th at is to say, if the C anadian parliam ent passed a fisheries act, o r at least if the C anadian governm ent used every m eans in its pow er to induce parliam ent to pass the act. A lthough M acdonald had talked of n o t supporting the treaty, it is m ost im probable that he ever intended to take such drastic action. A t W ashington he had tried to com pensate fo r the disadvantages o f his m inority position by threats that he w ould not sign, o r would sign only w ith reserva­ tions, or that he w ould not press legislation in parliam ent. And now his caution in com m itting him self was certainly done in p art as a wish to confuse the opposition, and probably in p a rt as a m ethod o f bargaining w ith the British governm ent, as here used. But having extracted this conditional prom ise o f a cash paym ent he and H incks soon turned to the m ore attractive alternative of a guaranteed loan to be used for the building of railways and the im provem ent o f canals. A fter a cabinet m eet­ ing, M acdonald w rote to L isgar th at the governm ent w ould do everything in their pow er to carry the treaty if the guarantee was m ade, and th at the popularity o f the loan w ould “ assure you of the m oral certainty o f their success in P arliam ent.”35 A surpris­

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ing note of optim ism was suddenly struck, w hich m ust have confirm ed the British governm ent in their suspicion th at M ac­ donald could get the treaty through if he so desired. A fter a correspondence covering m onths a cable was received on M arch 18 w hich prom ised to guarantee a loan of £ 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 w hen the C anadian acts to im plem ent the treaty had com e into effect, and subject to C anada’s abandoning all claim s on G reat B ritain for losses from F enians.36 N o one knew better than M acdonald th at there was real and w idespread opposition to the treaty. A s soon as the high com ­ mission was m ooted, suspicions were voiced, in parliam ent and out, th at C anada would be the loser, as, it was said, she always had been. M any C anadians regarded the U nited States as the traditional victor in all international disputes, and expressed the fear, too, th a t B ritain w ould sacrifice C anada to an easy settle­ m ent with the A m erican governm ent. T he im portant debates in parliam ent did not com e until the treaty was discussed in the spring of 1872, but for the intervening period som ething o f the tem per o f the country m ay be seen from the com m ents in news­ papers. T he im portance o f the subject of a settlem ent w ith the U nited States derived not only from the direct pecuniary inter­ ests o f the country, but also from the fact th at it related to the central them es of C anadian foreign relations. N othing so bared the thoughts of C anadians as any issue w hich brought up their relations w ith the U nited K ingdom o r the U nited States: and w hen both were involved (as was usually the case) the country began to take stock of its position. It w as the signal for sweeping statem ents, hazardous prophecies, and verbal battles w ithout quarter. T h e San Juan dispute w as distant to old C anada, and while there were various hopes expressed th at the m atter w ould be settled (and in the right w ay ), it m ade little stir in the east. T he F enian question cam e nearer hom e and invoked the C a n ad a U nited K ingdom -U nited States triangle. T he G lobe refused to be frightened, b u t drew interesting conclusions: the Fenian scare was perhaps being magnified in order to get through the m ilitary estim ates.37 T hen it had the effect o f stim ulating C ana­ dian nationalism . “C anadians have gained m ore in national ch aracter during the last six years than in any previous twenty and if we ask, w hat has caused this, we shall find that the o ut­ rageous proceedings o f the F enians and their abettors have been am ong the chief agencies.” 38 A m onth later the sam e pap er was m ore indignant w ith the A m erican governm ent for its “ tacit

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consent” to the raids, but declared th at C anada would not be driven into annexation by such tactics.39 T he chorus soon began o f calls for an indem nity to cover raids and threats said to have cost C anada $4,000,000. T he D aily N ew s o f M ontreal argued that England should either put sufficient pressure on the U nited States, or else provide troops to protect the border.40 T he coincidence o f Fenian raids and the w ithdraw al o f im­ perial troops was, to Canadians, a m ost u nfortunate one. T he G lobe refused to visualize the possibility o f a w ar w ith the U nited States, and took a firm line against a standing arm y. It was left to a small tow n paper to repeat the thought th at had so o ften been uttered: I f English statesm en im agine that Canada is going to turn her youth into policem en and establish a cordon along the frontier, to keep back the Fenian invaders, they are very m uch m istaken. The Canadians are ready to do their share o f the duty im posed, but they m ust not be expected to perform impossibilities. . . . It should be borne in m ind that Canada is at any tim e liable to be m ade the battleground fo r settling any dispute that m ay arise between Great Britain and the U nited States. . . . W hy then are we asked to defen d the country against these attacks occa­ sioned through quarrels in which we have no concern?41 Reciprocity was very m uch in the public eye from the tim e of the abrogation of the treaty of 1854, and the new spapers reflected the general interest. T here is no doubt that a renewal was desired, but there w ere m any com m ents by the editors (as by m em bers of parliam ent) to the effect th at C anada m ust not be considered as dependent on it, but could stand on her own feet. Even stronger w ere the objections raised against any sug­ gestion that by w ithholding reciprocity C anada could be forced into annexation. T he editor o f the Globe, one of the m ost pow erful organs of opinion, reacted violently to the A m erican suggestion o f a zollverein. Canada, we are always proud to assert, is at present an integ­ ral part o f the British Em pire; and whoever, in the whole history o f the past, heard o f an instance o f part o f a K ingdom or E m pire entering into a com m ercial arrangem ent with its great com m er­ cial and political rivals fo r the purpose, avow edly, o f putting excessive differential taxes on the produce o f the rest o f that K ingdom or Em pire? . . . Yes, the very sam e persons who have trotted o ut their Independence and A nnexation hobbies, and

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fo u n d they w ould never do, now fancy they can gain the same end by this uniform custom s plan. The only recom m endation about it is that it is not so m anly as the proposal fo r annexation, but has m ore o f the sneak about it. . . .42 T h e tory Leader o f T oro nto followed m uch the sam e argum ent. Exclusion from a reciprocity treaty w ould not induce C anada to leave the British Em pire. “N either annexation nor independence had held any place in the C anadian m ind.”43 O n the fisheries the G lobe steadfastly defended the C anadian policy o f abandoning the licence system, and argued for the protection of the gulf fisheries as a m ajor asset. A t the very tim e th at M acdonald was trying, in W ashington, to get some quid pro quo for the adm is­ sion to inshore fisheries, the G lobe w as announcing th a t an exchange of th at privilege for reciprocity would be one-sided. In the interval before parliam ent m et the governm ent did not define its stand on the W ashington T reaty, but M acdonald, as a good strategist, sought to protect him self against a new spaper onslaught. H e w rote to A lexander M orris from W ashington to persuade the friendly new spapers to hold back until the Globe had com m itted itself against the treaty. H e would then be free to criticize it him self w ithout allowing G eorge Brown to occupy the strategic position o f im perial loyalty.44 Brown obligingly attacked the treaty as one th at had “no parallel in British history - with one exception, the A shburton capitulation.”45 D uring the m onth of M ay, too, the G lobe collected com m ents from other new spapers. L e Pays had condem ned the treaty outright, and said th at the only honourable course open to C anada was to reject it. L e N ouveau M o nde rem arked th a t “no doubt we have sacrificed m ore than we have obtained; but there is one im por­ tant interest w hich has been protected — th at of peace.” L e C o n s titu tio n a l and the G azette de H yacinthe were both provi­ sionally opposed. T urning to O ntario, th e G lobe reported the attitude o f a num ber of new spapers there. T he St. T hom as H o m e Journal called it not a treaty but a surrender. T he Perth Courier believed th at with the fisheries C anada lost her only bargaining point. T he Belleville Intelligencer called it “ a one­ sided bargain.” T h e G alt R efo rm er rem arked th a t “we are anxious to have peace and harm ony betw een B rother Jonathan and ourselves, but to secure this, we are not willing to sacrifice great interests and receive therefor com paratively nothing in retu rn .” T he Collingwood B ulletin w rote th at “ . . . if the m other country imagines th at she can arbitrarily dispose of ou r fisheries

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to m eet h er own private needs she is m istaken” ; and the Ingersoll N e w s m ade the deduction th at “ if this treaty, o r that p art of it w hich concerns us, had been negotiated by Canadians we could have obtained better term s.” N o doubt the G lobe was to som e extent choosing its papers, but it also quoted the O ttaw a C itizen s survey o f the field, and its conclusion that “judging fro m the general tone o f the C anadian press, we should think th at the T reaty will not prove acceptable unless it contains some qualifications not yet m ade know n.” T he H alifax M orning Chronicle is quoted as calling it “a disastrous T reaty for this P rovince” ; and the G lobe claim ed th at “there is not a single p ap er o f any note in the M aritim e Provinces th at recom m ends the adoption o f the T reaty by the C anadian Parliam ent.” On the other hand, the W hitby Chronicle, which itself condem ned the treaty, reported the H alifax Express and T im es as in favour, though it stated th at N ew Brunswick was altogether hostile.4*5 T hroughout June and July Brow n continued to attack the treaty, and to quote other hostile com m ents on it. M acdonald was defended by some editors as “doing his duty,” and criticized by others for giving way. T he British governm ent was frequently accused o f ignoring C anadian interests for the sake o f its own selfish success. T he attacks on the treaty, said Brown, were not of a partisan nature —even if he did show a particular pleasure in coining phrases about M acdonald. T h at there was som e opinion on the other side o f the case m ay be seen from the editorial colum ns o f the Leader. “The clauses affecting C anada are conceived in a reasonable spirit of equity and are well calculated to cem ent a lasting union between the U nited States and C anada.”47 T he H alifax R eporter is quoted as saying that “w hat is w anted is a m arket [for fish]. T h at the treaty provides. A s for ‘ruin, etc.’ the fisherm en of the British provinces fished alongside the fisherm en' o f the U nited States for twelve years and w ithout finding themselves ruined by the near neighbourhood of their rivals.” L a M inerve defended the treaty on the ground th at C anada would be the first to suffer from trouble between G reat Britain and the U nited States, and th at it was a protection against annexation.48 A final quotation, suggestive fo r the future, m ay be noted. T he editor o f the K ingston Whig, surveying the W ashington settlem ent, con­ cluded that, “of course we have no wish to see C anada annexed to the U nited States, far on the contrary; but we desire to see C anada so far independent o f the H om e authorities, th at she can m ake com m ercial treaties o f h er own, and so bring about

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th e leading wish of all who desire to see C anada take h er due place am ong the nations o f the earth.” 19 Judging by the early editorial reactions to the treaty - even m aking allow ance fo r exaggerated and unrepresentative state­ m ents - the prospect of carrying the treaty in parliam ent m ust have seemed doubtful. By the tim e th at th e session opened on A pril 11 the cabinet was united in its defence o f the W ashington settlem ent. A reference was m ade to it in the speech from the throne, and in the debate on the address A lexander M ackenzie m ade a brief criticism and F rancis H incks a brief defence.50 T he m ain debate began on M ay 3, when M acdonald introduced a bill to give validity to the treaty, in so far as it affected C anada.51 H is speech covered the w hole question, both in the origin of the com m ission and the term s of the treaty. A fter pointing out that parliam ent was free to accept o r reject the treaty, he argued that it w as im portant for the security of C anada that G re at Britain should have an entente w ith the U nited States, and th a t the circum stances o f the tim e justified taking up C anadian com m er­ cial questions at the sam e tim e as the im perial m atter. H e ex­ plained his own appointm ent to the com m ission and why he had accepted, and then turned to a detailed defence o f the clauses affecting C anada. M ackenzie and E dw ard Blake, leading fo r the opposition, denied both the necessity o f the concessions m ade to th e U nited States and the advantages said to have been gained by C anada. O n M ay 16 a vote was taken on the second reading o f the bill and it was passed w ith a m ajority o f sixty-six. T h e bill returned from com m ittee w ithout am endm ent, and received the royal assent before parliam ent rose. T he act (35 V iet., c. 2) provided fo r the adm ission o f U nited States vessels to the eastern fisheries, fo r the im portation w ithout duty of fish and fish-oil, for the transit of goods through C anada in bond, and the carriage o f goods in A m erican vessels from one p art of C anada to another. T hus ended the dom inion’s first experience of diplom acy. T he governm ent had succeeded in getting support for its policy, and it survived the election of the sum m er of 1872, though with a reduced m ajority. M acdonald declared th a t to win the election he had w orked harder th a n he had ever done before or would ever do again. “H ad the result of the election,” he told Dufferin, “shown th a t the people o f C anada disapproved of the treaty and a new m inistry been form ed on th at basis, the relations between C an ad a and the m other country would have been the reverse of pleasant and one cannot foresee w hat political consequences

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would have flowed from the change.” 52 H e claim ed that he had endangered his own political futu re and sacrificed the interests o f C an ad a fo r the sake of the em pire. T hese lofty sentim ents show only one side o f the m edal, but one th at was prom inent to Canadians. It was a tradition - later to be reinforced by the A laska case - th at British diplom acy too often threw C anada to the wolves. T he high com m ission represented a com prom ise between abstention from , and full participation in, diplom atic negotiations. T he results were palatable neither to those who w ere openly critical n o r to those w ho nom inally supported the treaty. It rem ained to be seen by w hat other means this curious em pire could carry on its affairs w ith foreign states. In the m eantim e there was the settlem ent to be w orked out. T he value of the C anadian fisheries and the use o f C anadian canals by A m ericans had still to be dealt w ith; and then there was the perennial question o f reciprocity. H ope had not died: indeed there w ere signs in the U nited States o f a move fo r low er tariffs, and an agreem ent m ight perhaps be secured even if the fisheries card had already been played. A nd now relations with the U nited States w ere presum ably freed from any th reat o f war. This was indeed a relief and a change: ap a rt from th at the m ain them es in C anadian foreign relations - so fully played in 18691872 - w ere still to be carried on in repetition and variation.

CHAPTER 7

Trade, Fisheries, and Diplomacy

Since the C anadian econom y was so largely dependent on foreign trade it followed th at com m ercial conditions in other countries, and com m ercial relations with other countries, p ro ­ foundly affected C anadian well-being. F o r the first few years after confederation prosperity in England, E urope, and the U nited States brought an increase in the external trade of C anada and a corresponding developm ent in hom e industry, finance, and the construction o f railways. T he public revenue, arising almost entirely from custom s receipts, was com fortably m aintained so long as trade continued at a high level. Canadians could (and som e did) view w ith com parative equanim ity the collapse of their hopes of reciprocity in 1871, and tell themselves that they were not their neighbours’ slaves. But w ith the good they needs m ust accept the bad. L ate in 1873 cam e another swift descent of the business cycle. In E urope and A m erica prosperity suddenly turned into depression, and C anada could no m ore escape the effects o f the latter than welcome the m ore palatable fruits o f the form er. T he effect, it is true, was delayed: for it has been characteristic of C anada’s position th at she has neither soared to the heights nor plum bed the depths know n to som e of her large custom ers. T he total of external trade reached a new m axim um in 1874, faltered badly in 1875, and was materially reduced in 1876. Such was the situation th at forced itself on the Liberal adm inistration w hich cam e into office in 1873. F o r this, and fo r the succeeding governm ent, a prim ary task was to re­ store foreign trade a t least to its previous position; and the weapons which lay to their hands were com m ercial agreem ents w ith foreign states and stim ulation of trade by protection or low tariffs. H ere was am ple scope for decisions on policy and for C anadian diplom acy. A lexander M ackenzie’s governm ent leant tow ard a low tariff and tow ard a restoration of reciprocity w ith the U nited States. If the A m erican governm ent proved to be reluctant it m ight be persuaded by an offer to replace the proposed com pensation for C anadian fisheries with a reciprocity agreem ent. H aving ascer­

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tained that the British governm ent w ould have no objection to the change, the C anadian governm ent sent G eorge Brown to W ashington in F ebruary 1874 as a “confidential agent,” where he “speedily succeeded in ascertaining that a general willingness existed on the p art o f the leading statesm en of the U nited States to enter into a new com m ercial treaty.” 1 W hether Brown was misled by wishful thinking o r by A m erican hospitality, the report that he m ade to O ttaw a was optim istic enough to start arrangem ents fo r a form al negotiation. M ackenzie applied for the appointm ent by the im perial governm ent o f C anadian com ­ m issioners - Brown and a m em ber of the cabinet - to be asso­ ciated with the m inister at W ashington, and to occupy a position n ot inferior to th at of M acdonald in 1871.2 D ufferin at once telegraphed the wishes of his m inisters th at negotiations should be begun, and Sir E dw ard T hornton, the British m inister in W ashington, was prom ptly told to undertake them . A few days later Brown was accepted as a com m issioner (the proposal o f a cabinet m inister to serve with him having apparently been d ro p p ed ), and plenipotentiary pow ers w ere forw arded to him. M ackenzie had urged from the first th at the British minister, w ithout the support o f a C anadian with local knowledge, could not adequately handle negotiations w hich directly affected C anada alone. T he British governm ent fo r its part, m ade it clear that the responsibility for attem pting to change the operation of the T reaty of W ashington m ust rest on Canada. A s to the scope o f the negotiations, M ackenzie was satisfied that the restoration of the free list in the treaty of 1854 (as was proposed by the British governm ent) “could not now m eet the requirem ents o f the trad e o f the country nor be in itself a satis­ factory exchange for the fishery com pensation and other advan­ tages expected from C anada by the U nited States under the im plied term s o f the T reaty of W ashington.” 3 H e proposed to extend the list m aterially by adding m anufactured articles. T o this there were three objections: to the argum ent that it would injuriously affect British exporters he sim ply replied th at they also would receive the advantages of any reduction o f duties. H e satisfied him self by consulting C anadian m anufacturers that they would not m ake any protest. T he third difficulty, and the one w hich w orried him most, was the loss of revenue conse­ quent on partial rem oval of duties; and he was thus torn between a desire for lower tariffs and a fear of increased taxation, already felt to be threatened by the cost o f the Pacific railw ay.4 T he C anadian proposals w ere agreed on in A pril by correspondence

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betw een Brown, w ho was in W ashington as agent or plenipoten­ tiary from F ebruary to June, and M ackenzie, in consultation w ith C artw right (the m inister of finance). T hey finally took the form of a long m em orandum signed by T h ornton and Brown, and w ere read to H am ilton Fish, the secretary of state, on April 27. T h e tone o f the m em orandum 5 is set by the statem ent that “an im partial exam ination o f the com m ercial relations between the U nited States and the British N orth A m erican Provinces for the last fifty years, cannot fail to establish, we venture to think, beyond all doubt, th at the trade betw een them has been exceed­ ingly valuable to both countries, but th at the U nited States have, from first to last, reaped the largest advantage from it.” T he “im partial exam ination” then shows th at the U nited States had suffered m ore than C anada from abrogation of the treaty of 1854, and th at the A m erican tariff prevented enlarged trade with Canada. T he British representatives (Brown and T hornton) had, on M arch 28, proposed to Fish a renewal of the treaty of 1854 as a substitute for the arbitration provision of the W ash­ ington T reaty. Fish then suggested an enlargem ent o f the scope o f the treaty, and, while leaving it to the other side to m ake a proposition, m entioned enlargem ent o f the C anadian canals, and the addition o f some m anufactures to the free list. T h e C anadian proposals in the m em orandum w ere: (1 ) to add to the free list under the treaty o f 1854 m anufactures of iron, steel, o r w ood, agricultural im plem ents, oils, and some item s of lesser im portance; (2 ) th at A m erican fishermen should have access to the C anadian coast fisheries on the sam e term s as under the T reaty o f W ashington; (3 ) th a t the coasting trade of each country should be open to the vessels of the other; (4 ) that the canals o f each country should be open to the vessels of the other, the C anadian canals be enlarged, L ake M ichigan be open during the duration of the treaty to navigation by C anadian vessels, and that vessels o f either country be open to registry in the other; (5 ) th at joint com missions be form ed for the im­ provem ent of the rivers St. C lair and D etroit and Lake St. Clair, for the erection o f lighthouses, and for the preservation of fish in inland w aters; (6 ) that citizens of either country m ight secure patents in the other; and (7 ) th a t a joint study be m ade of the prevention of illicit trade. Fish received the m em orandum w ithout enthusiasm and car­ ried on fu rth er negotiations in a m anner hardly m ore satisfac­ tory to Brow n, w ho m anaged to retain, however, a restrained

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optim ism .6 A d raft treaty was agreed on in the middle of Ju n e,7 and Brown was alm ost frantic lest it be delayed too long fo r the Senate’s consideration. H is fears proved to be well founded, for the Senate declared that the last few days o f the session did not allow time for p roper consideration of the treaty; and w hen it did com e before th at body in the following F ebruary it was rejected. So fell, once m ore, the C anadian hopes o f reciprocity, and the Liberal governm ent w as obliged to tu rn from diplom acy to face the growing dem and for salvation by protective tariffs. In the session o f 1876 both houses of parliam ent devoted long hours o f debate to the causes and cure o f the depression. The m ain thread of the argum ent was the effect on C anada of her com m ercial relations with G reat Britain and the U nited States; and, following on that, w hether the solution o f the problem lay in m ore tariff protection. N o pretence was m ade th at there was not a depression: the difference o f opinion consisted in various views as to how it should be m et. D avid Mills, in moving fo r a select com m ittee to inquire into the causes, said th at he was of opinion “th at we are suffering to a very considerable extent from com m ercial depression in consequence o f o ur intim ate com m er­ cial relations w ith the trade o f the adjoining republic. . . . It is n ot very easy for the m erchant to rem ain prosperous while his custom ers are impoverished, and it is not very easy fo r the people o f this country who are engaged in com m ercial pursuits to be in a highly prosperous condition w hile those with whom they are dealing are suffering from financial depression.”8 The accusation was frequently m ade th at C anada was a “slaughterm ark et,” either fo r G reat Britain, o r the U nited States, o r both. O ne m em ber o f the H ouse o f Com m ons revived the argum ent th at the A m ericans were trying, by econom ic pressure, to drive C anada into annexation.0 A nd so the debate w ent on, for hour after hour, w ith lectures on the balance o f trade, presentation o f tables o f figures, and num erous accounts of the hardships o f this or that industry. The only practical focus o f the discussion could be the tariff. T o the supporters of free trade England stood as the exam ple o f suc­ cess; the advocates o f protection held up the U nited States as the leading case fo r their thesis. All this was ground th a t the legislatures o f the old provinces and o f the federation had gone over, again and again. Y et it seemed ever fresh to each genera­ tion. A nd perhaps the pressure o f econom ic hardship was real

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enough to justify yet another re-exam ination o f the Canadian policy. Certainly no better time could be found for the furth er­ ing o f the protectionist creed. In both houses it found a num ber of convinced advocates as well as m ore cautious m em bers who seemed to be on the verge of conversion. T he ranks of the defenders of “the grand principles o f free trad e” were by no m eans broken, but no count was taken w hen the battle was over. T he H ouse of C om m ons had the m ore specific task o f passing a budget. In his budget speech R. J. C artw right, the m inister of finance, pointed to the decreased trade and the consequently reduced revenue. T he governm ent, he said, had “been im por­ tuned from m any quarters to declare themselves in favour of a high tariff. Som e o f the gentlem en w ho have addressed us have done so as the advocates of protection, pure and simple; others . . . have contended, and not w ithout force, that circum stanced as we are, in connection w ith the people o f the U nited States, it becomes the duty of the A dm inistration to m eet the peculiar policy of that people with a reciprocal policy in the sam e direc­ tion.” C artw right was not prepared to take a free-trade stand, but he argued against the supposed advantages of high protec­ tion, and found that it had brought evils in its train in the U nited States. H igh protection, having failed in the U nited States, w ould not be introduced into C anada w here it w ould increase taxation and enrich the few. So the tariff should rem ain at its existing level.10 Resistance to tariff increases was m aintained with difficulty, and was partly unexpected in view o f increases already m ade. T he d rift tow ard higher protection, which in any case was becom ing m ore m arked, was fu rth er intensified by the continuance o f depression. Evidence taken by select com m ittees o f the H ouse o f C om m ons revealed the pressure by m anufactur­ ing interests tow ards higher protection. T he com m ittee of 1874, for exam ple, on the basis of replies to a questionnaire from 215 m anufacturers, reported a general com plaint against the “unequal com petition” w ith the U nited States, and a claim that higher rates would not necessarily raise prices to the consum er.11 In 1877 the T oronto Board of T rade changed to a policy of protection, and in the following year the M anufacturers’ Asso­ ciation of O ntario, w hich had form erly been divided on the issue, voted unanim ously for a national policy.12 U nder the circum stances the Liberal policy was hard to defend and the continual sniping o f the opposition foreshadow ed their adop­ tion of a program m e of protective duties. T he Conservatives, indeed, w ere not slow in taking advantage of the opportunity of

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offering a cure for an adm itted com plaint. Sir John M acdonald m ade a prolonged defence o f protection in the H ouse of C om ­ m ons. In the upper H ouse S enator Read, a confessed believer in protection, m oved fo r a “ national policy” by w hich reciprocity o f trade with the U nited States was obtained or a reciprocity of tariffs was established by C anada.13 In introducing the budget in 1877 C artw right was obliged to rep o rt a deficit o f nearly two million dollars for the previous year. T here w ere, however, in his opinion, special reasons for this: extraordinary expenditures, shrinkage o f trade, and a bad harvest. D epression was universal, and the U nited States, with its protective system, had suffered m ore than had Canada. But the depth o f the depression had, he believed, been reached; and while some m odifications in the tariff were proposed, there was to be no m aterial change. In the course of the long attack on the governm ent’s policy, T upper concluded th at there had been no im provem ent in econom ic conditions, “nothing to justify the hon. gentlem an in refusing to so readjust the tariff of C an ad a as to p rotect and preserve her credit.” T he governm ent, he said, “have nailed their colours to the free-trade m ast, and that sooner than yield, they will go down w ith the ship, and down they will go.” 14 In the session of 1878 the sam e debate, with m uch the sam e argum ents, was continued, and on M arch 7 Sir John M acdonald m oved: That the H ouse is o f the opinion that the welfare o f Canada requires the adoption o f a N ational Policy, which, by a judicious readjustm ent o f the tariff, will benefit and fo ster the agricultural, the m ining, the m anufacturing and other interests o f the D o­ m inion; that such a policy w ill retain in Canada thousands o f our fellow countrym en now obliged to expatriate them selves in search o f the em ploym ent denied them at hom e, will restore prosperity to our struggling industries, now so sadly depressed, will prevent Canada fro m being m ade a sacrifice m arket, will encourage and develop an active interprovincial trade, and m oving (as it ought to do) in the direction o f a reciprocity o f tariffs with our neighbour, so far as the varied interests o f Canada m ay dem and, will greatly tend to procure fo r this country, eventually, a reciprocity o f trade.15 This guarded but all-em bracing proposition was then defended. By sweeping references to history and to contem porary condi­ tions, M acdonald sought to prove that no country had risen to prosperity on free trade, and that none had survived which was

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entirely agricultural. Exam ples w ere adduced, from A thens to m odern Russia, to strengthen the case, and a sad picture was painted o f the depressed state o f industry in C anada and of the m any C anadians w ho were forced to seek em ploym ent in the U nited States. T h e election cam e in Septem ber, still in the m idst o f hard tim es, and the Conservatives w ere returned to office w ith a m ajority of eighty-six. In M arch 1879 Sir L eonard Tilley, the new m inister o f finance, introduced the budget th at was to give effect to the N ational Policy. T he C onservative party lived up to its pledge of greater protection. T he new tariff, as com pared w ith the previous one (th at of 1874), was m ore com plicated and considerably higher. W here fully m anufactured goods had form erly paid 17]/2 p er cent they w ere now to pay up to 30 per cent, and in som e cases the rate w as as high as 40 per cent. A wide range o f goods was covered, and in general the tariff “represented a decision to prom ote industrialization in term s of a C anadian rath er than a N o rth A m erican m arket.” 16 F o r ten years thereafter fu rth e r modifications in the tariff were all in an upw ard direction, until new circum stances forced reductions once m ore.

II T h e L iberal and Conservative parties differed on the height o f the tariff; and by an em phasis on the protection of hom e industries the latter m ight have seemed to m inim ize the sig­ nificance of external trade. T his, how ever, it was never intended to do. T h ere was a firm belief th a t C anadian industry and agri­ culture could flourish only behind the shelter of a tariff wall, but no C anadian governm ent had ever failed to point to the value o f foreign trade. T he H ansard o f these years is studded with statistics, and the deduction was constantly m ade that the woes o f the dom inion w ere due in large p art to a decline in the volume of trade. T he “N ational Policy” was intended not as a brake but as a stim ulant to trade, and w hether or not it was the cause, the event was w hat had been desired. T he picture began to look m ore cheerful, as the following figures show .17 YEAR

1879 1880 1881

IMPORTS FROM U.K.

$30,967,778 33,764,439 42,885,142

IMPORTS FROM U .S.

TOTAL

$42,170,306 28,193,783 36,338,701

$78,702,519 69,900,542 90,488,329

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M ore interest was centred on the figures for exports, which w ere distinctly encouraging.18 YEAR

EXPORTS TO U.K.

TO U.S.

EXPORTS TOTAL

1879 1880 1881

$29,393,424 35,208,031 42,637,219

$25,491,356 29,566,211 34,038,431

$62,431,025 72,899,697 83,944,701

T he balance of trad e was still unfavourable, which disturbed some of the parliam entary econom ists, but the volum e o f ex­ ports w as a respectable and an increasing one. N early half of C an ad a’s external trade was w ith the U nited K ingdom , som e 40 p er cen t w ith the U nited States, and only about 10 per cent with all o th er countries. T he N ational Policy explicitly left the door open fo r reciprocity, but it was im probable th at the U nited States would accept the invitation. T he free-trade policy o f the U nited K ingdom offered no opportunity fo r extension by gov­ ernm ental action. T here rem ained, how ever, the rest of the wide world w ith w hich to trade; and w hat was a relatively small volum e m ight be increased by m eans o f tariff bargaining as well as o th er means. T he m ost hopeful direction in w hich to look seemed to be the British, French, and Spanish W est Indies, trade with w hich was traditional, but had not grow n as was hoped. A t the sam e tim e w ere added, as possible custom ers, Brazil and M exico; and (arising out of negotiations on colonies) Spain itself. T h e only great pow er w ith w hich direct trad e negotiations w ere considered w as France. F o r the benefit of the H ouse o f C om m ons detailed statistics were prepared on trad e w ith the W est Indies, Brazil, and M exico since 1875.10 T rade w ith M exico proved to be insignificant. In 1874 and 1875 C anada had im ported a large am ount of sugar from Brazil, and in 1880 this was recom m enced. Im ports from British and foreign W est Indian islands w ere scattered over a n um ber o f items, but were only in large volum e in sugar, molasses, and salt. L um ber, fish, and m anufactured articles were exported to Brazil in sm all am ounts. Fish was m uch the largest export to the W est Indies, with sm all quantities o f agricultural and m an u factured products. P arliam ent was distressed by the slow grow th of W est Indian trade; particularly - as some m em ­ bers argued - on the ground th at it was highly profitable, show ­ ing a favourable balance o f trade, and offering opportunities for C anadian shipping. L ong hours of debate w ere spent in attem pts to analyse the reasons fo r the sm all am ount o f trade, and two

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m ain causes w ere put forw ard: th at steam com m unication was inadequate; and th at the C anadian tariff prevented the purchase o f raw sugar, w hich w ould be the natural exchange for C ana­ dian products. T h e second consideration becam e bogged in p arty discussions of the tariff. T he first was met by the com ple­ tion o f an agreem ent w ith the governm ent of Brazil, under which the two countries w ere to subsidize a line of steam ships to Brazil and the W est Indies. T he arrangem ent cam e into opera­ tion in 1882, but later broke down. O ne o f the chief com petitors in W est Indian trad e w as the U nited States, and w hen that co untry negotiated a flag treaty with Spain in 1885, allowing A m erican ships the sam e privileges as Spanish in the Spanish W est Indies, alarm was expressed in C anada. T he only answer could be the conclusion of an equally satisfactory arrangem ent w ith Spain. T he diplom ats were also needed to encourage trade with F rance. T he registry o f C anadian ships in that country was found to be - because of the form o f an A nglo-French treaty on less favourable term s than the registry of British ships. T o secure an equally advantageous position, the C anadian govern­ m ent was prepared to reduce the tariff on French wines, the bargain to be sealed in a com m ercial treaty. It was not enough to talk o f the superior ch aracter of C anadian goods: not enough even to exhibit w ares at international exhibitions, such as those at Sydney, Philadelphia, and Paris. T rading was bargaining; but international bargaining could be conducted only through tradi­ tional and recognized channels. By such logic w ere Canadians driven to study the com plicated structure o f the British Em pire. T h e position had to be exam ined from m ore than one point o f view: the effect on C anada o f existing British treaties, the extent to w hich C anada could conduct h er own foreign rela­ tions, and the m achinery - existing o r to be created - by which C anadian affairs abroad could be conducted. Before confedera­ tion, and in the first decade after it, th e practice was to include the colonies in British treaties o f com m erce. M any of these trea­ ties obligated C anada to give m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent to the countries concerned; and two of them —th at w ith Belgium of 1862, and that w ith the G erm an Zollverein o f 1865 —extended to the relations betw een C anada and G re at Britain, thus com pli­ cating the establishm ent of an im perial preferential tariff. In 1877 the British governm ent proposed th at the self-governing colonies should be notified o f a pending com m ercial treaty, and given the option o f adhering to it or being explicitly excluded. T h e adoption of this principle allowed the C anadian governm ent

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a new freedom o f action o f w hich it took advantage.20 In 1881, for exam ple, the colonial secretary transm itted to the governor general a letter from the foreign office stating that negotiations will probably be opened shortly w ith the E gyp ­ tian governm ent, fo r the conclusion o f a com m ercial treaty with E gypt; and I have to request that you will inform m e, at yo u r earliest convenience, w hether there are any m atters in respect o f which yo u r governm ent desires to m a ke any special proposals. T he colonial article referred to in the enclosed letter is the clause now adopted, exem pting the colony under your govern­ m ent, and others o f the m ore im portant colonies, fro m the operation o f the treaty, but providing that its stipulations m ay be applied to any such colonies on notice to that effect being given within one year fro m the date o f the exchange o f the ratifications o f the treaty. In this case the C anadian governm ent did not wish to be in ­ cluded; but in a convention of com m erce between the U nited K ingdom and M orocco, which had lim ited obligations, the opposite decision was m ade. A third negotiation of the same year was w ith E cuador. T he colonial secretary sent to the gov­ ern o r general a copy o f the treaty, already signed, together with a d raft protocol which was to be signed before ratification o f the treaty was executed. T he draft read as follows: T he undersigned, in proceeding to the exchange o f the ratifi­ cations o f the treaty . . . between H er M ajesty and the R epublic o f the Equator, have agreed to the present Protocol. T h e stipulations o f the aforesaid Treaty shall not be appli­ cable to the Colonies and foreign possessions o f H er Britannic M ajesty hereinafter nam ed, that is to say: T he D om inion o f Canada. . . . P rovided always that the stipulations o f the aforesaid Treaty shall be m ade applicable to any or all o f the above-m entioned colonies or foreign possessions o f H er B ritannic M ajesty, on whose behalf notice to that effect shall be given within one year fro m the date hereof, by H er Britannic M ajesty’s M inister at Q uito to the Ecuadorian M inister fo r Foreign Affairs. T he colonial secretary’s letter was dated July 8, 1881. On O ctober 14, 1882, a request for an early reply followed, and it was not until N ovem ber 16, 1882, th at the governor general was able to reply that the privy council had reported against inclu­

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sion in the treaty. T he wheels of O lym pus ground slow. In 1880 th e C anadian governm ent asked to be excluded from a treaty w ith Roum ania. In the sam e year a treaty was m ade w ith Serbia and, apparently inadvertently, C anada w as included w ithout being consulted. T he colonial office then inquired if this was satisfactory, and on hearing from O ttaw a that it was not, had to request the S erbian governm ent to have C anada excluded by action of the national assembly. A part from such a slip, the technique in respect o f new British treaties seemed to w ork sm oothly; and problem s arising out o f treaties concluded earlier had to be m et as they arose. All such treaties, w hether o r n ot they w ere advantageous to C anada, w ere not initiated w ith the object of m eeting particular C an a­ dian needs. Y et such needs existed, as, fo r exam ple, the im ­ provem ent of trade with the Spanish W est Indies and the sale of wooden ships to F rance. Since C anada had no pow er to con­ clude com m ercial (o r any oth er) treaties by her own authority, it becam e necessary to w ork out a system w ithin the imperial fram ew ork as it then was. Like m ost such imperial problem s, this one was m et by experim ents of practice rather than consti­ tutional definition. F ro m the C anadian point o f view it was essential that Canadians, versed in the m atter a t hand, should play a m ajor role in negotiations, w hatever their legal status m ight be. T here being no C anadian political representative abroad, Sir A lexander G alt was dispatched in the autum n of 1878 on a special mission to M adrid and Paris. F orm al negoti­ ations with the Spanish and French authorities w ere conducted by the British am bassadors at the capitals, it being left to them to consult with G alt and to arrange for him to discuss details w ith the governm ents in question. If a draft convention were concluded it w ould be sent to the British governm ent and would have to be approved both by it and the C anadian governm ent before its signature was authorized. A s it proved, th at stage was never reached, not apparently through the fault of the procedure o r the negotiators, but from the com plications caused by a third party in the F rench scene, and by a change of governm ent in M adrid. G alt’s official reports to the governm ent contain no hints as to the adequacy o f the procedure, being for the m ost p art accounts o f interviews and correspondence w ith British and F rench officials.21 H is private letters to M acdonald, however, describe the early difficulties that arose in Paris. H e arrived there in D ecem ber, arm ed w ith letters from the foreign office;

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but L ord Lyons acted w ith w hat G alt considered to be a dis­ courtesy and deliberation th at stood in the w ay of success.22 A fter bearing it w ith im patience for a short tim e, G alt w rote to the foreign office. H is appeal had “a w onderful effect. N ext day I got an affectionate note from L ord Lyons . . . before I had time to answ er it he called on me in person an d m ade all proper am ends, saying he had arranged an interview fo r to-day with the M inister o f C om m erce - apologized about not having asked us to dine and asked us to com e to-day. . . .”23 G alt then w ent ahead w ith direct negotiations, and considered that he was on the verge o f success when the F rench drew back because of a com plication caused by tariff relations w ith A ustria-H ungary. In sending his report hom e, he again show ed th at he was not w ithout a diplom atic sense, pointing o u t th at, if negotiations failed fo r the tim e being, the C anadian term s should be kept secret against a later renewal o f discussions.24 Passing on to M adrid G alt found his relations w ith the am bassador there w ere sm ooth, and in dealing with the Spanish he adopted the usual bargaining device of m axim um term s: “O ur m em orandum ,” he w rote to M acdonald, “covers concessions th at if granted would go fa r to give C anada the w hole carrying trade between the U nited States and C uba - as well as exceptional advantages fo r o u r own productions. But you m ust not expect us to obtain all this. I shall be quite satisfied if we get a substantial rebate on the duties on our productions, w ith the privilege o f the Spanish Flag - fo r the mail steam ship line. . . .” 25 T h e Spanish, like the French, negotiations failed of success at the tim e, but - as in the case of the A m erican negotiations the advantages o f participation in them o f a m an well-versed in C anadian affairs w ere fully dem onstrated. Exactly w hat the status o f the C anadian in such discussions should be was still an open question, but there was a growing feeling in C anada that it should be in som e w ay diplom atic, and th at the representative fo r the negotiation o f trade treaties m ight well be also the holder of a new office proposed to be set up in L ondon. T he im portance of having a C anadian representative in E ngland had led first to the appointm ent o f one with semi-official standing. Sir John Rose was, from 1869 to 1880, accredited to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent “ as a gentlem an possessing the confidence of the C anadian G overnm ent w ith w hom H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent m ay properly com m unicate on C anadian affairs.”20 T he experi­ m ent was fully justified by results, for Rose was able to handle such questions as the transfer o f the H udson’s Bay territory, the

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negotiations leading up to the joint high com mission at W ash­ ington, and C anadian Pacific Railway finance. T he C anadian governm ent, how ever, was anxious to regularize this ill-defined position, and while in E ngland in 1879 M acdonald, Tilley, and T u p p er w rote a m em orandum on the subject for the colonial secretary. In it they argued that the tim e had com e w hen rela­ tions between the dom inion and the hom e governm ent could no longer be satisfactorily m aintained purely by correspondence through the governor general, and th at an officer should be stationed in L ondon who would discuss directly the various m atters of com m on concern, thus obviating the necessity of periodic visits o f C anadian m inisters. Such officer, they sug­ gested, could be accredited, in association w ith the imperial representative, to a foreign court for particular negotiations. T he suggested title for the new officer was “ resident m inister,” and his status w ould be “quasi-diplom atic.” In N ovem ber the colonial secretary sent a copy of this m em orandum to the gov­ ern o r general, w ith a covering letter. T he British governm ent approved of the general idea, but suggested two m odifications: since C anada was an integral part of the em pire, the C anadian representative could hardly be diplom atic; the foreign secretary would decide w hat p art he m ight play in foreign negotiations. In D ecem ber the C anadian privy council reported that, while they still held th at the position was quasi-diplom atic, they were satisfied with the arrangem ents proposed by the colonial secre­ tary. They suggested, as a title, “High Com m issioner of C anada in L ondon.” A brief cable in F ebruary 1880 contained the recognition of Sir A lexander G alt as high com m issioner, and he sailed in M arch.27 Proposals th at there should be a diplom atic representative of C anada in London had m ore than once been m ade,28 and G alt was impressed by that aspect of his office. Shortly before sailing fo r England he discussed w ith M acdonald the term s of his instructions, and w rote a m em orandum em bodying his ideas.29 T h e proposals are startling in their extent, though G alt pointed o ut th at he w ould not advise putting them all in the official instructions, o r expect them to be carried out at once. The m em orandum reads as follows: N om ination o f R esident M inister m arks a new era in C olo­ nial adm inistration. To be attended w ith greatest probability o f success, it should be done with studied deliberation and fo r­ m ality. T he m inister should not present his credentials until the

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governm ents are prepared effectively to enter upon im portant negotiations, and his arrival should be sim ultaneous with the announcem ent o f such negotiations. In m y opinion it would be a grave error to allow the M ission to assum e the appearance o f having its real duties in the Finan­ cial and E m igration arrangem ents - which m ust inevitably arise if the advent o f the M inister be not m arked by serious ap­ proaches to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent, and if the first im pres­ sion relative to its im portance be fo rm e d by the British public through the announcem ent that the Financial and Em igration duties have been assum ed by the M ission. T o give due prom inence to the concession made by the Im ­ perial G overnm ent in this respect, the arrival o f the M inister should be accom panied with the announcem ent o f im portant international negotiations. Subsequently - w ithin fro m one to three m onths, but not sim ultaneously, the m inister should be instructed to take over the supervision o f finance and em igra­ tion — th u s in the m ost direct m anner, m aking it apparent to the governm ent and people o f E ngland that the real im port o f the mission is to be sought in its political aspect. Certain subjects have already been subm itted to the British G overnm ent and rem ain in abeyance. O f these the m ore im portant are — T he negotiation o f treaties with foreign nations. T he Pacific Railw ay - and developm ent o f N orth West. A review o f com m ercial relations - pointing to an im perial custom s union. In regard to the first subject the object is to secure the thor­ ough support o f the im perial governm ent. T he appointm ent o f a Canadian envoy is valuable and his inform ation indispensable, but success will largely depend on the bona fide support given by the Foreign Office. T his support will only be given w hen the views o f the Im perial G overnm ent on other subjects are brought into accord w ith those o f Canada. T he second subject is so connected w ith the last that they m a y be considered as one, because the principle o f a com m ercial union is that o f vital political identity and will be fo u n d the m ost p o w erfu l agent in arranging the others. C ircum stances peculiarly fa vo u r the present discussion o f all these subjects. The term ination o f all England’s com m ercial treaties perm its a change o f policy.

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A m arked change o f public feeling is growing up respecting free trade. T he agricultural distress is anxiously seeking a rem edy. T he great N o rth W est relieves E ngland fro m dependence on foreign nations fo r fo o d — and opens illim itable field fo r emigration. T he Pacific railway thus becom es as necessary fo r England as fo r Canada. Instead therefore o f asking fo r guarantee, let a larger and m ore com prehensive proposal be subm itted, to wit: Practically a substantial alliance fo r certain specific national objects, based on the principle that produce and m anufactures shall respectively receive m ore favoured nation treatm ent than those o f foreign nations. T hat the Pacific railway be constructed on joint account the cost to be recouped fro m the lands. A system o f aided em igration on joint account to be organ­ ized if desired by the im perial governm ent. T he subm ission o f such a proposal w ould am ply ju stify the urgency o f the governm ent in desiring to appoint a minister. It is in accord with the views o f the governm ent and people o f Canada. I t w ould greatly conciliate public opinion in England —a nd if entertained by the Im perial G overnm ent w ould ensure their cordial support in foreign negotiations. It w ould lead to united policy and action with the other colonies. T here is no record of M acdonald’s reply to this m em oran­ dum . In p art it coincided w ith the governm ent’s policy of m ak­ ing the office diplom atic or quasi-diplom atic, but the picture of an im perial alliance w ent far beyond any recorded policy of the governm ent. Certainly the official instructions were the palest reflection o f G alt’s grandiose scheme. Ill Sir A lexander G alt was appointed under the great seal of C anada, and his instructions cam e to him from the secretary of state. G eneral correspondence was to be carried on w ith the secretary o f state; th at on financial questions w ith the m inister of finance; and on em igration m atters with the m inister o f agri­ culture. G alt was to be chief em igration agent, and the instruc­ tions laid it dow n that the encouragem ent of em igration to the

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west o f C anada was to be his first consideration, fo r only in that way could the financial burden o f the w est on the C anadian taxpayer be reduced. In the near fu tu re th e m anagem ent o f the public debt and financial correspondence w ere to be transferred to the high com m issioner. H e was to carry on negotiations con­ cerning the Esquim alt graving dock; assist the C anadian cattle trade; and sound out the British governm ent o n th e delicate subjects o f assistance to the Pacific Railw ay and a British zollverein. In foreign affairs he was to w atch the fishery questions arising o u t of the W ashington T reaty, rem em bering th at the C anadian governm ent did not wish to take th e initiative in any negotiations on them . C areful instructions w ere given on com m ercial treaties. Treaties had been m ade since 1867 which affected the freedom o f action of the dom inion, and it was desired th at C anada should be relieved from obligations as occasion arose, and not fu rth er com m itted w ithout her approval. W henever special arrangem ents in a treaty w ere desired in the C anadian interest the British governm ent w ould be asked to accredit the high com m issioner to the foreign pow er, to act in concert w ith the im perial representative. In his short tenure o f office (1880-1883) G alt p u t his hand to the m ultifarious tasks outlined both in form al instructions and private letters from the m inisters. M uch of his tim e was spent on securing im m igrants, and - while other causes were a t w ork the num bers w ere m ultiplied during his years in London. A start was m ade tow ard trade treaties, but w ithout tangible progress. T he great plans o f the M ontreal m em orandum foundered on the change o f governm ent in E ngland, the failure o f his hopes of being regarded as a diplom at, and the lack o f m oney to establish a position in L ondon w hich he felt m ight enable him to circum ­ vent the caution o f the colonial office. A fter a year in L ondon he w rote to M acdonald. “I think you should insist now on your Representative being recognized as a m em ber o f the Corps D iplom atique. It is really the only proper definition of his rank, and the only w ay to ensure p roper respect here. A s a Colonial these ‘arro gant insulars’ turn up their noses a t us all.”30 N o such change, how ever, was m ade in the position o f the office; and w hether or not the C anadian governm ent wished to have diplo­ m atic status for the high com m issioner, they w ere able to quote the existing arrangem ent against one type o f parliam entary com plaint. Sir C harles T upper, G alt’s successor, was criticized fo r doubling the roles of high com m issioner and m inister of railways; and w hen he took p art in the election o f 1891, it was

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argued th at a diplom at should keep free from party politics. In reply Sir John T hom pson stated that the high com m issioner “is nothing but the agent o f the governm ent living in London. His Excellency the G overnor G eneral is the m edium o f com m unica­ tion betw een this governm ent and H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent, and no other can be h a d .. . . H e does not occupy, either at home o r abroad, such a position as an am bassador in the diplom atic service of the British G overnm ent holds.”31 A private letter from M acdonald to L ord Stanley, how ever, gives a som ew hat different picture o f the practice, if not of the constitutional position: B y degrees the Colonial M inisters [i.e., secretaries] have be­ gun to treat the colonial representatives as diplom atic agents, rather than as subordinate executive officers and to consult them as such. Canada has fo u n d it advantageous on several occasions to have Sir Charles Tupper dealt with as a quasi m em ber o f the corps diplom atique and I have no doubt the colonial secretary has been assisted by his experience w hich Sir Charles gained during his service as a cabinet m inister in Canada. W e do not desire, however, to give him a "free hand” on any subject in discussion with the Im perial G overnm ent. H e m ust take his instructions fro m the governm ent here, as m uch as Sir Julian Pauncefote fro m L ord Salisbury and cannot travel out o f “the fo u r corners” o f any m inute on which his nam e is m entioned.32 T u p p er, like G alt, had m any duties: rescuing C anadian cattle from being condem ned as diseased; encouraging im m igra­ tion; furthering C anadian loans (especially those of the C an a­ dian Pacific R ailw ay); and generally m aking C anada know n by speeches and a m ultitude o f social activities. In 1885, during the N orth-W est Rebellion, he was kept busy answering inquiries in England, getting inform ation from O ttaw a, and trying to correct the attitude o f the Tim es, w hich obtained its news from a cor­ respondent in Philadelphia. T he conduct o f foreign (as opposed to im perial) affairs was not the least p art of his w ork, and the one which m ost closely relates to this study. In this T upper inherited the negotiations for treaties w ith F rance and Spain, together w ith the constitutional question that had arisen in con­ nection with them , th at is, the status of a C anadian negotiator. F ro m the first T upper w as not satisfied to be appointed as an adviser instead of a plenipotentiary. In his early m onths o f office he had learned th at an international conference was to be held

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at Paris to discuss the protection o f subm arine cables. Believing th at this was a m atter o f interest to C anada, he suggested to M acdonald that he should attend, and the latter asked the gov­ ern o r general to cable a request to that effect to the colonial secretary. T he latter then applied to the foreign office for cre­ dentials, and T u p p er w as duly appointed to represent C anada. H e was pleased w ith the conference, and C anada’s place at it, and on his retu rn to L ondon he w rote to M acdonald that “I feel some pride in the fact that C anada took her place in the in ter­ national conference and on an equal footing with all the other Powers, and I m ay add that nothing could exceed the kindness and courtesy with w hich I was treated by all present.”33 In the following year the foreign secretary agreed to T upper’s request that he be m ade a plenipotentiary jointly w ith the am bassador, should the negotiations w ith Spain be officially renewed. “T his,” he w rote, “ is a very im portant point, and in the light o f G alt’s reports a very im portant one scored for C anada.”34 O n the one hand the Conservative governm ent was pressing fo r plenipotentiary pow ers, and on the o th er was resisting the claim s of the opposition for direct negotiations between C anada and foreign states. T he debate - which reappeared periodicallywas chiefly on two grounds: w hich system o f diplom acy would be m ore advantageous to C anada, and w hether greater inde­ pendence in th at one field would threaten the whole im perial structure. T he Senate w ent over the ground in 1879, the C om ­ m ons in 1882, both H ouses in 1891, and the C om m ons again in 1892. In each case there was a solid basis o f agreem ent that C anadian interests w ere not being adequately supported by the existing system o f treaty-m aking, and in each m ore general discussions of the w hole im perial question resulted. E dw ard Blake in the course o f a long speech, did not m ince his w ords: “T he history o f the diplom atic service of England, as far as C anada is concerned, has been a history o f error, blunder, w rong and concession.” His m otion was th at it would be ex­ pedient fo r C anada to obtain pow ers for direct negotiation of trade treaties, either w ith another British possession or a foreign state. M acdonald replied that it was not the failure o f the m ethod, but the effect o f unfavourable circum stances. If C anada w ere to rem ain a dependency, E ngland could hardly grant the suggested concession.35 T o some extent dem ands for direct relations with foreign states reflected the long-held belief th at English diplom ats had done little good fo r C anada. In p a rt such dem ands were the

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result of the slow speed at w hich negotiations moved. Those w ith Spain dragged on b u t seem ed always on the verge of success. T u p p er’s instructions from O ttaw a were to offer a reduction in the C anadian duty on sugar in exchange fo r a reduction on C anadian exports of fish, lum ber, potatoes, flour, and certain m anufactured goods to the W est Indies. In spite of all efforts no result was attained; though som e advantage did accrue to C anada from a British treaty w ith Spain, providing for m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent. T he local officials in H avana, how ever, proved to be a step ahead of the C anadian nationalists. T h e custom s officials w ere convinced th at Canada, being a nation, did not com e under the British treaty, and w ere only persuaded to the contrary by w ord from M adrid. T h e old system thus had its uses. In return for the concessions by Spain, certain W est Indian sugars, raw hides, coffee, and tea w ere adm itted into C anada free of duty. A futher agreem ent was reached betw een Britain and Spain through an exchange of notes in June 1894 w hereby advantages were conceded to the U nited K ingdom and the British colonies in return fo r the con­ tinuance of m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent to Spanish trade. T hough not negotiated by C anada, this w as not denounced by her, and therefore cam e into operation. T h e long negotiations w ith F rance had a m ore successful ending, though not w ithout m any difficulties. Polite rem arks w ere m ade by both parties on the affinity o f old and new France, b ut the results were due not to sentim ent but to a balancing of national interests. In the late autum n o f 1892 T upper w as sent as a plenipotentiary to Paris fo r w hat proved to be the final round. On arrival he explained to L ord D ufferin, the British am bassador, the C anadian position. This, in brief, w as to secure the adm ission o f C anadian goods under the m inim um F rench tariff and the rem oval of the surtaxe d ’entrepot as reciprocity for the existing favourable treatm ent afforded to F rench goods. T he C anadian governm ent, he explained, was no longer willing to reduce the duty on F rench wines. O n the advice of the British em bassy, T upper’s next call was at the office of the R epublique frangaise to secure favourable publicity. A fter a hurried visit to L ondon to consult w ith Sir Jo h n A bbott, he was introduced by the am bassador to the m inister fo r foreign affairs and officials of the com m erce and custom s departm ents. W ith the F rench com ­ missioners T u p p er discussed the actual figures o f trade and the concessions th at m ight be m ade by either party. H aving failed to im press the F rench representatives w ith his picture o f existing

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privileges and th e attem pts to establish steam com m unication, T u p p er fell back on the proposition to low er the duties on F ren ch wines, books, soaps, and o th er articles. Proposals and counter-proposals w ere exchanged in meetings o r by letter, T u pp er keeping in touch with his governm ent to obtain accept­ ances of each series o f m odification. T he next step was the exchange of d raft treaties. T he final term s took the form o f an “A greem ent regulating the com m ercial relations between C an­ ada and F rance in respect of custom s tariff,”30 between F rance and G re at Britain, signed for the queen by L ord D ufferin and Sir Charles T upper as plenipotentiaries on F ebruary 6, 1893. T h e duties on F rench wines, soaps, nuts, alm onds, prunes, and plum s w ere reduced. N ineteen C anadian products - including canned m eats, fish, fruit, tim ber, and wooden furniture, wooden ships, and boots and shoes - w ere to enter F rance, A lgeria, and F rench colonies un d er the m inim um tariff. In respect to these articles C anada was to enjoy m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent; w hile F ran ce and h er colonies were to have com plete m ost­ favoured-nation concessions from C anada. T he agreem ent was to be approved by the parliam ents of F rance and Canada. A fter w hat he considered to be the successful com pletion of his labours, T u p p er was surprised to find th at his governm ent was hesitant about its acceptance. A telegram instructing him not to sign until the term s had been received in O ttaw a arrived too late. T he principal points at issue were, first, a bounty to ships constructed in France, and, secondly, uncertainty as to w hether the m ost-favoured-nation clause in the treaty applied to the trade between C anada and other British possessions. O n the latter point the British governm ent gave an assurance th at it would not so apply, and the agreem ent was finally ratified in 1895, the C anadian parliam ent having passed an act (57 and 58 V iet., c. 2 ) in 1894 w hich em pow ered the governor general to proclaim assent a t a date to be settled.

IV In the sam e period as th at o f the protracted negotiations for trad e treaties w ith E uropean states the C anadian governm ent was obliged to re-enter the diplom atic field in N orth A m erica to settle the controversy once m ore raised by the apparently endless fishery dispute. T he rejection by the A m erican Senate o f the treaty of 1874 revived the arbitration provided for under the T reaty o f W ashington. F o r the board o f three, the U nited

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States nom inated E. H . K ellogg; C anada, A. T . G alt; and the neutral arb itrato r was the Belgian m inister a t W ashington, M aurice D elfosse - nam ed by the A ustrian am bassador after the failure of the interested parties to agree on other nam es which one or the other subm itted. T he com m ission finally assembled at H alifax in June 1877, accom panied by legal advisers and oth er assistants appointed by the parties. Elaborate w ritten cases w ere subm itted by the British representatives (on behalf of C an ad a and N ew foundland) and by those o f the U nited States. A fter a brief deliberation the com m issioners, by a m ajority decision, aw arded $5,500,000, payable over twelve years, as the balance due to C anada and N ew foundland for the superior value of their inshore fisheries. Kellogg dissented, and the award was received w ith general disapproval in th e U nited States. In C anada there was mild satisfaction, w hich m eant a good deal in view of the tradition o f A m erican diplom atic cunning and British defeats. Since it was an arbitration, it would hardly be p ro p er to describe G alt’s p art as th at of a successful C anadian advocate; but apparently his course w as m ade easier by a con­ viction of the justice o f the C anadian case.37 A lthough the British brief called for a sum nearly three tim es as large, th at can be put dow n to the usual technique o f bargaining. In effect there seems little doubt that C anada had obtained a generous price - though fo r th at she was to pay in international strain as well as in fish. W hether it was because o f A m erican discontent w ith the decision, o r because the arrangem ents in the treaty of 1871 failed to lay dow n an acceptable o r com plete set of rules, the fishery dispute flared up again before the ink was dry on the aw ard; and the actions and counter-actions, claims and counter­ claim s threatened those friendly relations by m eans o f which alone C anada could com fortably exist on the A m erican conti­ nent. In 1885 the A m erican governm ent announced th a t the fishery clauses of the T reaty of W ashington would be abrogated as from July 1 - th at is, in the m idst o f the season, a result which was only avoided by a tem porary agreem ent to suspend action until the end of the year.38 Following this suspension, the fishery question reverted to the pre-1871 position, and the C ana­ dian governm ent, vigorously enforcing protection of A tlantic fisheries, began to w arn off, detain, o r seize A m erican vessels, to a num ber during 1886 of forty-nine, according to the A m erican secretary o f state.39 T he C anadian parliam ent passed a retalia­ tory act stopping the purchase o f bait by A m erican fisherm en in

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C anadian ports, and perm itting the seizure of any foreign vessel illegally entering C anadian w aters, and Congress replied w ith an act (happily not p u t into effect) em pow ering the president to prevent C anadian vesels from using A m erican ports except in case o f distress. T he H ouse o f R epresentatives would have gone fu rth e r still by the stoppage o f transit by land as well as sea - a m easure o f com plete non-intercourse which it was induced by the Senate to drop. Literally the w aters w ere indeed troubled; and to the m utual seizure o f ships were added other causes of friction: A m erican discontent w ith the H alifax aw ard, com peti­ tion of C anadian fish w ith the interests of N ew E ngland packers, an inveterate taste on the p art o f certain elem ents to tw ist the lio n ’s tail (o r th at of the lion’s c u b ), and a w ell-founded suspi­ cion in the U nited States th a t C anadians were once m ore attem pting to use their fisheries as a lever to secure reciprocity. W illingness to attem pt a settlem ent was not lacking on either side, but by w hat m achinery could it be discussed? T he A m eri­ can governm ent, its m inister in L ondon declared, would not deal w ith Canada. Still less can the United. Slates’ G overnm ent consent to be drawn, at any tim e, into a discussion o f the subject with the Colonial G overnm ent o f Canada. The Treaty in question, and all the international relations arising out o f it, exist only as between the governm ents o f the U nited States and o f Great Britain, and betw een those governm ents only can they be dealt with. I f in entering upon that consideration o f the subject which the U nited States have insisted upon, the argum ents contained in the R eport o f the Canadian M inister should be advanced by H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent, I do not conceive that they will be fo u n d difficult to answ er.40 T h e m inister’s intransigent position seems not to have repre­ sented the views o f Bayard, the secretary of state, w ho had for som e tim e been struggling to m ove tow ard a peaceful settlem ent, an d w ho, in A pril, unofficially invited either M acdonald or T u p p er to discuss m atters personally w ith him .41 T upper called on Bayard in M ay and proposed the holding o f a conference in W ashington. A n exchange o f letters after his retu rn casts some light on the interview . B ayard, it now appeared, regretted the necessity o f the indirect com m unication w ith Canada, m ade necessary by her “im perfectly developed sovereignty,” but recognized th at only the envoys o f G reat B ritain could speak officially. H e w rote w arm ly of the necessity o f good relations

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w ith C anada, and w elcom ed a conference (as he said the presi­ d en t d id ), and presum ed th a t T u p p er w ould be a plenipoten­ tiary. T he British governm ent, having been driven into a dispute in w hich it had no direct interest, readily accepted the proposal; and appointed T upper, Joseph C ham berlain, and Sir Lionel Sackville W est, British m inister in W ashington, as plenipoten­ tiaries. T he official instructions called first for a discussion, and if possible am icable settlem ent, o f the N o rth A tlantic fisheries, b ut allowed w ide latitude on o th er subjects. “ Full liberty is given to you to enter upon the consideration o f any questions which m ay bear upon the issues involved, and to discuss and treat for any equivalents, w hether by m eans o f tariff concessions, or otherw ise, w hich the U nited States’ plenipotentiaries m ay be authorized to consider as a m eans of settlem ent.” T he Bering Sea fisheries m ight also be discussed if th e A m erican repre­ sentatives w ere authorized to do so.42 It was, and long had been, the C anadian aim to include the fisheries in a m ore general agreem ent th at em braced reciprocal tariff concessions, b u t the difficulty w as to get the A m ericans to broaden the agenda. M acdonald had prophesied th a t the w hole procedure was “a snare laid by the U nited States G overnm ent to entrap England into a com m ission to consider the expediency o f relaxing the term s o f the convention o f 1818” ;43 and at the first regular m eeting in W ashington the British representatives spent three hours arguing against the A m erican proposal so to lim it the conference.44 T upper had nothing but praise for C ham berlain in th at battle. O n D ecem ber 3 the British subm itted a proposal th at the fishery privileges should be revived in exchange fo r a tariff agreem ent, b u t this was refused.45 T he m eetings w ere then postponed while T u p p er and C ham berlain w ent to O ttaw a for consultation. N egotiations w ere continued in January, b ut with difficulty. A t one point C ham berlain becam e “wildly indignant” and proposed to retu rn to E ngland,46 but a treaty w as finally signed in the m iddle of F ebruary. T hough this also was rejected by the Senate, a m odus vivendi reached at the sam e tim e, p ro ­ viding for a system o f licences for A m erican fisherm en, came into effect and rem ained in effect for over thirty years. T hus the A tlantic fisheries issue was laid to rest. T upper, who pulled his full weight on the com mission, reported th a t C ham berlain and W est “could not have supported C anada w ith m ore untiring zeal than they have from first to last.”47 T h e Bering Sea question, w hich the A m ericans had kept off the agenda a t W ashington, rem ained unsettled. T he A m erican

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claim was th at it was necessary, in order to preserve the herds of seals, to prevent hunting during a p art o f the year. T he C anadian governm ent, how ever, supporting the interests of British C olum ­ bia fishermen, claim ed th a t this was a subterfuge designed to enable A m erican sealers to have a m onopoly on the coast.48 M eanw hile U nited States cutters were seizing C anadian fishing vessels on the ground th at they w ere poaching.49 Staving off an unfavourable settlem ent betw een the British and A m erican governm ents, the C anadian governm ent sent C. H. T upper, m inister o f m arine and fisheries, to W ashington in February 1890 to m eet the secretary o f state, Blaine. T he younger T upper proved to be less fortunate than his father, both in establishing a w orking arrangem ent w ith the am bassador (Sir Julian Pauncefote) and in negotiations w ith the secretary o f state. T u p p er’s status, it is true, was som ew hat am biguous, and Blaine bluntly said that he had not expected a C anadian representative, though he proved ready enough to talk to him .50 T u p p er believed that the R ussian representative w as “hand in glove w ith M r. Blaine,” and th at Pauncefote was m ore anxious to reach a settlem ent than to push C anadian interests.51 H e protested that no British m inister at W ashington was in a position to take a firm attitude. “If C anadians,” he protested, “cannot act for G reat Britain in the negotiations o f C anadian affairs the m other country should at least send out a strong and fearless m an from hom e who w ould be indifferent as to the im pression he m ight personally m ake upon the U nited States adm inistration.”52 T upper then concentrated his efforts on preventing Pauncefote from drafting a convention unfavourable to the C anadian interests. A ctually no agreem ent o f any kind was reached until 1891, w hen a tem porary stop to hunting was decided on. A t the end of that year the British and A m erican governm ents agreed on an investigation by two com m issioners, the form er appointing G . M . D aw son o f the C anadian G eological Survey and Sir G eorge Baden-Powell. A year later the whole question was referred to an international arbitral tribunal, and the aw ard was favourable to Britain and Canada. Tw o decades o f diplom acy had had diverse effects. A n obvi­ ous one was the experience gained by the C anadian governm ent and parliam ent in the problem s and procedure of negotiation. In dealing with both E uropean and A m erican governm ents C ana­ dians had encountered the advantages and the disadvantages of utilizing im perial m achinery. W hile contem poraries w ere not agreed as to w hether the balance was favourable o r not, there

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was clearly a desire for a t least a greater degree of control over diplom acy on com m ercial subjects. T he progress m ade in that direction in the eighties and early nineties appeared to be halted by the despatch o f the colonial secretary, the M arquess o f Ripon, to the governor general in Ju n e 1895, w hich laid down the principle th at “to give the colonies the pow er o f negotiating treaties fo r them selves w ithout reference to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent, would be to give them an international status as separate and sovereign states.” T h a t principle, how ever, was not pushed to an extrem e in operation; and in 1907, w hen the C anadian governm ent wished to open negotiations w ith F rance, the foreign secretary (Sir E dw ard G rey) ruled that it was the intention to prevent negotiations from being unknow n to the British governm ent; and explained to the am bassador in Paris th at C anadians w ould be the negotiators, th at they w ould doubt­ less keep him inform ed, and that he w ould sign an agreem ent with two C anadian plenipotentiaries.53 C hanges continued to be m ade in constitutional practice in respect o f com m ercial treaties. T o some C anadians th at deve­ lopm ent was alm ost an end in itself, but by others it was m ore properly judged as a m eans o f achieving satisfactory relation­ ships w ith foreign states. T he subject m atter o f the negotiations was in m ost cases com m ercial, and frequently there was no political issue involved. But the line of dem arcation was not exact, and the com m ercial merged into the political w here the m ost fundam ental external interests o f C anada w ere concerned. M ajor changes in tariff arrangem ents with the U nited K ingdom or the U nited States involved decisions on policy in a field w ider than com m erce, a n d - s o it seemed to co ntem poraries-decisio n s w hich w ould define the future relation of C anada w ith the two great pow ers w ith which her fate was bound.54

CH A PTER 8

Canada, the Empire, and the United States

T h e foreign policy of any state is an expression o f the attem pt to m aintain o r establish a series o f relationships w ith other countries, the whole being designed to prom ote security and prosperity. Any com bination of a variety o f factors, such as geography, race, historical connections, and econom ic position, m ay determ ine the nature o f the policy adopted. Being m ade up o f a series of relationships, foreign policy entails the balancing o f one objective against another, and not infrequently the balancing of one state against another. C hanging conditions at hom e o r abroad, changing relations between two foreign states, lead to m odifications o f policy from time to time. Such a general definition m ay be applied to the foreign, or, to be m ore exact, to the external, policy o f C anada. T he alteration o f phrase reveals the one unusual aspect o f the position of the dominion. C an ad a was not a sovereign state but a u nit w ithin an em pire, though grown beyond any know n m eaning o f the w ord colony. T h at im perial connection, in itself a changing one, w as con­ stantly reviewed both by the m other country and its adult child. It brought obligations as well as advantages to both, the relative strengths o f w hich w ere assessed anew by each generation. A s in the forties, C anadians in the last quarter of the nine­ teenth century were earnestly seeking to find an external policy best calculated to further the interests of their country.T heoreti­ cally there w ere, as usual, three simple answers: independence, annexation to the U nited States, o r com plete absorption within the em pire. E ach o f these extrem es had supporters, but m ore characteristic w ere the m any com prom ises. R ather than accept the stark black and w hite offered by the doctrinaires, most C anadians chose a grey, allowing for alm ost endless shades according to the m ixture. T he force o f attraction tow ard each o f the extrem e poles depended on the circum stances o f the time. Independence m ade its appeal w hen fear o f attack was absent, and w hen there was a w eakening of im perial sentim ent caused either by particular dissatisfaction w ith British handling of

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C anadian affairs o r British coolness tow ard “the connection.” T hose w ho favoured annexation to the U nited States could sim ilarly find argum ents when im perial sentim ent was low and some tangible econom ic advantage could be show n. T he picture m ust be seen from two angles to be correctly interpreted. Strengthened relations with either the U nited K ingdom o r the U nited States depended not only on the wishes of Canadians, b ut also on the policies o f those other countries. T h at a bargain requires the action o f two parties was am ply illustrated for C an ad a in her trade relations w ith both great powers. C ircum stances com bined in the eighties to bring to the fore in b oth G reat Britain and C anada serious consideration o f the future o f the em pire. In the m other country the influence of the “ little Englanders” of the m iddle of the century was giving way before a revived im perialism firmly grounded on discern­ ible interests and decorated by touches of em otion. Free trade lost som e of its charm in the face o f foreign tariff barriers and com petitive industrialism in E uropean states. T h e nationalism of the old w orld spread to colonial areas and threatened to shut out the British m erchant. L ivingstone’s discoveries in tropical A frica created a fresh interest am ongst the English, and a new era of expansion set in. H istorians like Sir John Seeley and J. A. F ro u d e p u t the m ovem ent in its setting, while Sir Charles D ilke portrayed the existing em pire o f his G reater Britain. Joseph C ham berlain led a succession of statesm en along the new path, while Cecil Rhodes showed again th at the flag follows trade. Im perialism found its poet in R udyard Kipling, who brought the em pire w ithin the understanding o f every schoolboy.1 T he new im perialism em braced the self-governing colonies as well as the lands fresh to E uropeans. T he search for new fields of investm ent turned British eyes tow ard the m ore advanced colo­ nies, and a t the sam e tim e projects of greater im perial integra­ tion appealed to those w ho had no conscious econom ic motive. F o r the average C anadian the tropical areas, with their ivory and rubber, their problem s of slavery, policing, and railways, w ere rom antic but rem ote. It was in the relations o f the U nited K ingdom and the self-governing colonies that he had a direct interest. Like the Englishm en, he m ight see visions o f a pax Britannica, of a w orld ruled and enlightened by British ideas and institutions; but, also like the Englishm an, he was aw ake to an understanding o f w hat th at m eant for him in the less distant fu tu re and w ith reference to his particular situation. C anada was a country deeply com m itted to external trade, with a great

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area to develop and defend, needing diplom atic m achinery and support to sustain those interests. T he receptive m ood o f the U nited K ingdom caused official and unofficial opinion in Canada to look m ore tow ard a closer alignm ent w ith her, but by no m eans w ithout conditions, w ithout frequent glances in other directions. Probably m ost C anadians who gave thought to the situation at all w ould have chosen, as the ideal, m ore favourable trad e agreem ents with both the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States, w ithout change in the political relation with either. A m inority would have accepted, o r even sought, closer union w ith G reat Britain. A much sm aller m inority w ould have been ready fo r closer union with the U nited States as an accom pani­ m ent to extensive reciprocity. In either case critics could point to the danger o f entangling alliances. T his broad question of external policy was many-sided. The chief aspects w ere political, econom ic, and m ilitary, each affecting the other, but each having tem porarily a leading im portance depending on the circum stances of the day. W hile bearing in m ind the necessary connection between these aspects, the approach in the present chapter will be in the m ain from a p articular side o f the econom ic phase, w hich took concrete form in the choice between two paths: the one leading tow ard im perial preferential trade, w ith o r w ithout political federation; the other tow ard unrestricted reciprocity o r “com m ercial union,” w ith the shadow o f political union behind it. F or the m ajor political parties there was dynam ite either way, and both looked fo r com prom ise form ulas w hich would encourage m ore voters than they alarm ed. O ne group - for it never becam e quite a political party - had struggled to create a national point of view m ore original than the phrasem aking o f the older parties. T he C anada First m ovem ent of the seventies had em phasized C ana­ dian achievem ents, C anadian unity, and a C anadian character not merely a copy o f the m odes o f other lands. A ttacked from all sides the m ovem ent was driven from its brief attem pt to form a political party, and its m em bers w ent in varied directions; but its influence on political thought was lasting. F o r purposes of im plem enting plans for external policy there rem ained the two political parties: the Conservatives, with traditions o f imperial loyalty, and a belief in lim ited reciprocity; and the Liberals, suspected o f less im perialism , historically attached to low tariffs, and laying m ore em phasis on reciprocity. Such prin­ ciples, if they had ever had any reality, proved alm ost m ean­ ingless in the face of events.

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T h e plan fo r com m ercial union w ith the U nited States, throw n into the ring in 1887, precipitated an active controversy and caused alternative plans to be m ore definitely supported. T he general scheme w ith its various form s of com m ercial union, unrestricted reciprocity, or a N orth A m erican zollverein had been suggested for tw enty years o r m ore, both in the U nited States and C anada, but only becam e a real issue for a few years fro m 1887. T he com paratively large support th at it received in C anada at that tim e was due partly to local conditions, partly to the ability of its advocates. C anada was in the m idst of a long depression. T ra d e had fallen off, the large im m igration during the building of the C anadian Pacific Railw ay had ceased, the exodus to the U nited States was alarm ing, prices w ere low, the w est was not filling up as had been hoped, and the U nited States threatened tariff retaliation over the fishery dispute. It was, in the w ords o f Sir Jo h n W illison, “a tim e o f gloom and doubt, o f suspicion and unrest, o f rash opinion and prem ature judg­ m ent.”2 Into the breach cam e Erastus W im an, a N ew Y ork businessm an born in Canada, with experience in journalism , and now president o f the G re at N orth-W estern Telegraph C om pany. W im an collaborated in the U nited States w ith Samuel R itchie, an A m erican with business interests in C anada, and H ezekiah B utterw orth, a m em ber of Congress, who introduced a m easure to provide for com m ercial union. In C anada he found the co-operation o f H . W. D arling, president of the T oro n to B oard of T rade, G oldw in Sm ith, and others. M eetings were addressed during the sum m er o f 1887, pam phlets w ritten, and a com m ercial union league organized, w ith G oldw in Sm ith as president. C ontem porary literature on the subject is alm ost entirely partisan and throw s m ore light on the argum ents m eant fo r p opular consum ption than on the m erits and dem erits o f an econom ic plan. T he plan itself, in fact, needs little elucidation. I t was proposed to rem ove all custom s barriers between the U nited States and C anada, and to establish an identic tariff against third countries. In O ntario com m ercial union received the w hole-hearted support o f the T oro n to M ail, and the condi­ tional support o f the Globe. T he G lobe's condition was that the arrangem ent should be purely econom ic. T h a t a custom s U nion between Canada and the U nited States w ould profit both countries in a pecuniary sense will scarcely be denied by anybody. It does n ot follow that the schem e should be em braced by Canadians. T hey have to enquire w hether their entrance into such a Union w ould involve political consequences

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fro m which they are averse. . . . The Canadian people would m ake the worst o f all trades if they bartered their sentim ents fo r a C ustom s Union. In this m atter we are entirely at variance with the Mail. O ur contem porary believes, as we do, that a C ustom s U nion w ould profit Canada, but it says: - “The only objection to it fro m this side o f the line is that it m ight endanger British connection, but let us seriously ask ourselves if a people situated such as w e are in this controversy can afford to be sw ayed by sentim ent.” To which there can be only one answer - if we cannot afford to be sw ayed by sentim ent we are not w orthy to draw breath as free m en . . . the proposition is m onstrous!3 T h e G lobe continued to hold to this condition, while sup­ porting com m ercial union as an econom ic m easure. It noted th at all its form er correspondents were in favour of the scheme, and “m any of them are willing to go the length o f annexation if they cannot get the benefit o f enlarged trad e with the U nited States in any other m anner.” 4 T here is, in fact, am ple evidence that m any farm ers throughout the country were enthusiastic supporters. T he M anitoba Free Press, representing an agrarian elem ent, rem arked th at “ the cry against C om m ercial U nion is distinctly a ‘vested interest’ cry.” “W hat,” it asked, “are our m anufacturers com pared w ith ou r miners, ou r fishermen, our Lum berm en, o u r farm ers? Shall the millions be kept back for th e benefit o f the score or hundreds?”5 T he M ontreal G azette, on the other hand, opposed com m ercial union on the ground th a t it would harm m anufacturers, and th a t it w ould lead to political absorption. T he C anadian M anufacturers’ A ssociation passed a resolution to the effect th at unrestricted reciprocity w ould be disastrous to m anufacturing, com m erce, and agricul­ ture. In H alifax the M orning H erald m ade alm ost daily attacks on w h at it called the “W im an fad ,” w hich it declared would bring all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of annexation. C anada’s m arkets w ould be open to A m erican m anufactured goods, w ithout any com parable benefit in return. T h e E vening M ail also inveighed against com m ercial union, w hich, it argued, w ould result in a 50 per cent higher duty on British goods. O ther new spapers w ere divided on the issue. The H am ilton Spectator held that com m ercial union m eant annexa­ tion, while the H am ilton T im es thought it w ould enlarge C anadian m arkets. T he M ontreal H erald and the O ttaw a Free Press both argued th at com m ercial union, because it m eant prosperity, would avert annexation. T he T oro n to W orld, O ttaw a

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C itizen, L ondon A dvertiser, and L ondon Free Press w ere all opposed. T h e Com m ercial U nion Club issued a H andbook o f C om ­ mercial Union, a series o f papers supporting the project. In this, as in other publications in favour of the plan, it was denied that annexation, o r even p artial loss of independence, was necessarily a result. G oldw in Sm ith, w ho w rote the introduction to the pam phlet, defended com m ercial union again in his Canada and the Canadian Question. A m ongst the pam phleteers Jam es Y oung (o f G alt) was one o f the m ost active. Com m ercial union, he w rote, w ould threaten the independence o f C anada, ruin her m anufacturers w ithout helping the farm ers, discrim inate against British trade, and rem ove the m ain source of the public revenue.6 P. N . F acktz’s pam phlet, Canada and the U nited States C om ­ pared, is m ore typical o f a type o f argum ent long fam iliar to C anadian readers. C anada, he found, was a country o f great' area and undeveloped natural resources, w ith a happy people and a rosy future. If com m ercial union were adopted annexation would follow, and C anadians find themselves under a corrupt governm ent in a land w here liberty had perished, and where Chicago bankers played poker on steam yachts all Sunday afternoon. E xhorted pro o r con by new spapers, pam phlets, boards of trade, and farm ers’ institutes, the C anadian public also w it­ nessed the passage o f the com m ercial union project across the political arena. T he Liberals, as the low-tariff party, m ight be expected to be the m ore friendly. T he new leader o f the party, W ilfrid L aurier, was anxious to adopt either com m ercial union o r unrestricted reciprocity, but there was som e opposition to the move, and shortly after he had been elected leader he m ade a speech at Som erset, Q uebec (A ugust 1887) in w hich he refused to com m it himself. “ If I am asked a t present fo r my opinion on the subject, I m ay say th at fo r m y p art I am not ready to declare th at com m ercial union should be adopted at the present m om ent. A great deal o f study and reflection are needed to solve this question, fo r and against w hich there is m uch to be said.” 7 Tw o m onths later, C artw right, the form er m inister of finance, becam e the first political leader to support com m ercial union. “I am as averse as any m an can be to annexation, o r to resign our political independence, but I cannot sh u t my eyes to the facts. W e have greatly misused ou r advan­ tages. W e have been m ost foolish and m ost w asteful in our expenditure. W e have no m eans o f satisfying the just dem ands

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o f large portions o f the D om inion except through such an arrangem ent as com m ercial union. T here is a risk, and I cannot overlook it. But it' is a choice of risks, and our present position is anything b ut one o f stable equilibrium .”8 O ther m em bers o f the p arty showed varying degrees o f sym pathy, b u t the L iberal cau­ cus held at the opening o f parliam ent in 1888 decided fo r u n re­ stricted reciprocity rath er than com m ercial union; the difference being th at each country would be free in respect o f tariffs against th ird parties. It was unthinkable th at the C onservative party should risk the cry o f disloyalty o r the disfavour o f the m anufac­ tu rers by adopting com m ercial union; b u t on the other h an d it had never ceased - in spite of the other elem ents o f the N ational Policy — to seek reciprocity, and continued to do so. In 1887 T u p p er w ent to W ashington in another attem pt to bargain for reciprocity in exchange for fishing rights.9 T he difference be­ tw een the two parties on the tariff, then, rem ained one of degree. By the beginning o f 1888 Sir Jo h n M acdonald was confident th a t the com m ercial union cause was lost. T he federal elections, he w rote to T upper, h ad all gone against it. Leading m en of the opposition, like A lexander M ackenzie, Jam es Y oung, and John M acdonald of T oronto, had denounced it. T he rural press of O ntario, he claim ed, opposed it. I t was, in fact, “a dead duck and I th in k L ord Lansdow ne sees now th a t my policy as an ­ nounced to him last spring o f allowing the cry of Com m ercial U nion to blaze, crackle and go out w ith a stink, w ithout giving it u n d u e im portance was a wise one. T he country here now by general consent have connected C. U. w ith annexation and repudiate b oth.”10 It rem ained to be seen w hether parliam ent would ratify this judgm ent. T h e debate in the H ouse o f C om ­ m ons began on M arch 14 w ith a m otion by C artw right to seek free trad e w ith the U nited States in m anufactured goods and n atu ral products.11 Pointing to the em igration o f C anadians and o f recent im m igrants, the slow settlem ent o f the west, and the low figures o f external trade, he argued th at the proper course was reciprocity w ith the rapidly growing U nited States. All classes o f the com m unity w ould benefit; and even if direct tax a­ tion w ere then needed for revenue, the total burden o f taxation would be no greater, and m ore fairly distributed. A s to the effect o f the proposed m easure on im perial relations, C artw right claim ed that, w hile Canadians should not feel any debt to E ng­ lish statesm en, a m ore prosperous C anada w ould buy m ore from E ngland, and, further, w ould “act as a link o f union and am ity betw een the two great English races.” A full-dress debate fol­

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lowed on th e lines laid dow n by C artw right; w hether em igration was such a serious facto r as it had been represented to be, and w hether reciprocity w ould alleviate it; if agriculture and industry would benefit, o r the latter at least be subm erged w ithout pro­ tection; the effect o f rem oving custom s revenue and replacing it by oth er taxes; and the influence of reciprocity on the political relations of C anada w ith the U nited K ingdom . E ach point was taken up at length, and the argum ents were serious and studded with statistics. T he Conservatives w ere careful to point o ut that the opposition h ad had no m onopoly o f a belief in reciprocity, and proposed in am endm ent th at trade relations with the U nited States should be cultivated in so fa r as they did not conflict with the N ational Policy. O n the governm ent side policy and flagwaving were a t tim es brought in to reinforce statistics o f trade, b ut L iberal m em bers urged th at reciprocity was really a defence against annexation, and th at the prospect of im perial preferen­ tial trade as an alternative was utterly unreal in the light of British fiscal policy. A fter three weeks of a debate which on the w hole was m aintained a t a high level, the H ouse divided on A pril 6, and the Conservative am endm ent was carried by 124 to 67 on a p arty vote.

II T h e cam paign fo r com m ercial union gave a new stim ulus to the m ovem ent for a closer integration o f the em pire, a m ove­ m ent which was by no m eans new, b u t had previously lacked w ide support and appeared as som ew hat academ ic. T he interest o f Canadians in the em pire outside the U nited K ingdom was lim ited, but in som e instances surprisingly active. T he affairs of Ireland, and especially the hom e rule m ovem ent, w ere those m ost consistently w atched. A s the G lobe pointed out, there were good reasons for this C anadian interest: there was a large Irish elem ent in the C anadian population; the Irish question was of such concern in the U nited States th at its peaceful settlem ent was necessary for good relations w ith C anada; and a settlem ent was also “necessary to th e peace, the strength, the w elfare, the influence and th e glory o f the E m pire.” 12 T he M anitoba Free Press held th at Ireland was now w ell governed, w hatever had been the case in the past, and condem ned in unm easured terms the “cut-throats” w ho w ere guided by no patriotic interest.18 O ther papers were m ore critical of the British governm ent. T he

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H alifax M orning H erald, for exam ple, frequently described Irish discontent, and labelled the British policy as reactionary. In 1885 a mass m eeting was held in H alifax by Irish sym pa­ thizers. T h e E vening M ail o f H alifax was also critical o f the British governm ent, and stated th at the sooner the Irish obtained self-governm ent, the better it would be fo r the em pire. T he S aint John D aily Telegraph accused the Salisbury governm ent o f engaging in a controversy w ith the T sar as a means of dis­ tracting attention from conditions in Ireland and England. In 1887 the C anadian parliam ent passed a resolution in favour of hom e rule, which, w ith other signs of sym pathy, so encouraged the Irish nationalists th at W illiam O ’Brien sailed for C anada to drive L ord Lansdow ne (an Irish landlord) out o f Canada. N o o th er issue touched the C anadian people as intim ately as the Irish one, but they w ere not oblivious to w hat was going on elsew here in the em pire. T he annexation by F rance and G er­ m any of islands in the w estern Pacific led the editor o f the M o rn in g H erald to draw a parallel between effects o f this on A ustralia and a sim ilar annexation of territory near P rince E dw ard Island.14 T he troubles in the Sudan in 1885 w ere closely followed w ith critical com m ents; in the sam e year the E vening M ail decided that the annexation o f B urm a by G reat Britain w ould rescue the inhabitants from oppression and “m ake a fine addition to ou r possessions.” 15 F oreign affairs had long been extensively reported in C an a­ d ian newspapers, and were, therefore, presum ably considered to be o f interest to readers. But the editors w ent fu rth er than news, for they frequently com m ented on British foreign policy, not hesitating to point to m istakes; w riting w ith such earnestness as to give the im pression that C anadian interests w ere a t stake th at is, th at the strength o f the em pire depended in p art on the success of British foreign policy, and th a t C anada was con­ cerned in the strength o f the em pire. A gain to refer to the editorial page o f the H alifax H era ld : the editor noted w ith satis­ faction th at the British governm ent “have determ ined to act for once with prom ptness and fortitude” in preventing T urkey from sending troops to Egypt. A few m onths later, objecting to w hat he considered to be British w eakness in resisting Russian ad­ vances tow ard India, the editor sweepingly described the cabinet as “ the m ost conspicuously foolish and imbecile m inistry that has ever ruled England for the p ast hundred years.”10 T he exact significance to C anada o f Russian im perialism m ay be seen in the apprehension in 1877-78 of Russian attacks on the west

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coast. A n im m ediate relevance to C anada was deduced from G erm an im perialism in Sam oa in 1887. G reat Britain, the editor o f the H erald suggested, should insist on the neutrality of Sam oa and H aw aii, because of their strategic position with respect to C an ad a’s new ocean route to A ustralia. M any other examples m ight be quoted, from this and other newspapers, to show the C anadian interest in British foreign policy. T he outstanding case, because it m ost directly affected C anada, was policy tow ard the U nited States. H ere C anadians w ere consistently inconsist­ ent, since they dem anded that Britain should be a t once relent­ less in pursuing p articular C anadian interests and conciliatory in o rd er to establish good relations. T hough they never secured anything like a m ajority support in C anada, the im perial federationists alone wove together the m any threads to m ake a logical pattern. In 1884 the Im perial F ederation League was organized in L ondon under the chair­ m anship o f W . E. F orster, a form er under-secretary fo r the colonies, and w ith various representatives of the U nited K ing­ dom and the colonies in attendance. Sir C harles T upper, then high com m issioner, was a speaker at the first conference. T he resolutions adopted indicated in general the purposes o f the league. They w ere: T hat the object o f the league be to secure by Federation the perm anent unity o f the E m pire. T hat no schem e o f federation should interfere w ith the exist­ ing rights o f local parliaments as regards local affairs. T hat any schem e o f Im perial Federation should com bine on an equitable basis the resources o f the E m pire fo r the m ain­ tenance o f com m on interests, and adequately provide fo r an organized defence o f com m on rights. That the league invites the support o f m en o f all political parties. N o attem pt was m ade to define the constitutional m achinery by w hich these ends were to be procured, and the emphasis was laid m ore on unity than on federalism . W hile individuals w orked out plans for a single parliam ent at W estm inster with representatives from all the colonies, the spokesm en o f the league on the whole refused to com m it themselves to any one plan. T hus the league was able to attract the support of men w ho might have found an imperial parliam ent unacceptable. Certainly the general platform of the league had m uch to com ­ m end it: th at there were m atters o f a local nature to be handled

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by the governing body of each unit, and also m atters which affected several o r all of the units. Canadians were, and long had been, very conscious th a t defence, foreign affairs, and trade had w ide ram ifications, which m ade them m ore than local sub­ jects, and th at at least raised the question as to w hether there was any m eans by w hich they could be handled jointly. T he whole project o f closer im perial integration, in its various form s, was one for long and active debate in C anada.17 T h e Im perial F ederation L eague in C anada was founded in M ontreal in 1885, and three branches started - at Ingersoll, Peterborough, and H alifax - in the next two years. Colonel D enison was urged to be the president o f a branch to be form ed in T o ronto, but he did not consider th at the tim e had com e for the country to spend m oney on imperial defence and refused. T he branch did not m aterialize a t that tim e, but only a year later a new factor led D enison to change his m ind. The progress the C om m ercial U nion m ovem ent was m aking [he w rote] and the great danger arising fro m it, led m y brother and m e to discuss it with a num ber o f loyal m en, and on all sides the opinion seem ed to be that active steps should be taken at once to w ork against it . . . and it was decided that the best policy was to advocate a C om m ercial U nion o f the British E m pire as an alternative to the proposition o f a C om m ercial Union with the U nited States, and that a schem e o f Im perial Federation based upon a C om m ercial Union o f the various parts o f the E m pire w ould be the best m ethod o f advocating our view s.18 T ow ard the end of 1887 a branch of the Im perial Federation League was form ed in T oronto, and w rote into its constitution a special clause stating that it looked tow ard im perial preferential trade. D enison m ade a vigorous speech at a public m eeting held by the league, calling on patriots “ to rally round the old flag and fru strate the evil designs of traitors.” Believing that there were traito rs in Canada, in touch with A m ericans who were w orking fo r annexation, D enison and his associates organized a modest system o f counter-espionage w hich produced at least some results. A w ritten statem ent by W im an in Septem ber 1888 directly connected com m ercial union w ith annexation, and this fu rth er confirm ed the suspicions o f the opponents of the first. W hile, therefore, the league in C anada never succeeded in establishing a definite program m e, but rath er contained men with varying views, it served for the tim e being as a focus for

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th e opposition to closer connection with th e U nited States and a generally sym pathetic attitude tow ard im perial co-operation of som e kind. T h e Senate discussed im perial federation on a m otion by C. A. Boulton th a t C anada m ight be accorded rep re­ sentation in the British H ouse o f C om m ons. T he m otion was w ithdraw n w ithout a vote being taken, but the debate gives some im pression o f the argum ents of the day, both on the specific question o f w hether representation w as feasible, and on the general issue o f closer links w ith the U nited K ingdom or the U nited States.19 A m ore direct alternative to unrestricted reciprocity w as a proposal introduced into the H ouse of C om m ons fo r closer trade relations betw een C anada and G reat Britain. D ’A lton M cC arthy, w ho led in the defence of the proposition, denied any hostility tow ard the U nited States, but claim ed th at C anadian trade w ould be m ore feasible w ith G reat Britain, whose products w ere less in com petition w ith those of C anada.20 C ontem porary com m ents in the new spapers give som e indi­ cation o f public opinion o n the im perial federation m ovem ent. T h e G lobe was opposed to any o f the constitutional plans p ut forw ard as unw orkable and undesirable, and could see imperial relations only as static o r less binding. T h e loyalty o f Canadians to-day is a reasonable loyalty. . . . B u t they see that, as all m en acknowledge, a change in the relations o f Canada with the E m pire m ust one day take place. W hether it w ill be fo u n d best fo r Canada to rem ain in the E m pire, as all w ould wish, or to m ake a further advance in the direction in w hich fo r som e tim e it has been proceeding, and to take outside o f the E m pire the place o f a loving child, an attached and devoted friend, is the question. . . .21 F ederation, said the editor tw o years later, w as “a grand jingo dream ,” w ith a danger of draw ing C anada into im perial w ars. T he M ail also held th at federation w as out of the question and had no strong popular support; b u t felt th at defence was m ore neces­ sary to discuss in days w hen “ the belligerent spirit am ong the nations betrays no disposition to subside.”22 T he M anitoba Free Press w as sarcastic about the federation proposals, and con­ cluded that “we are, as a people, well satisfied w ith o u r present relations. W hen there is a change it will be in a direction opposite to th a t sought by the Im perial F ederationists.” C anadians, said the editor, w ould never consent to pay taxes to be spent outside

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th e co untry, n o r did they wish to ru n the risk o f being involved in B ritish w ars.23 T he M ontreal Journal o f C om m erce found th at “the proposition for an organized defence o f com m on rights is entirely too vague to induce the Colonies to com m it themselves to the principle [of im perial federation].”24 T he H alifax H erald was read y to contem plate federation as a fu tu re possibility, b ut n ot as an im m ediate necessity. In contrast to the G lobe, it argued that, w hen a change cam e, it would be in th at direction. T h e H erald w elcom ed the establishm ent o f a branch o f the Im perial F ederation League in M ontreal, rem arking th at “the British E m pire m ust eventually be handled as a whole, o f w hich no p a rt is m aster and no p art dependent.”25 T he E vening M ail o f H alifax was strongly in favour o f an “E m pire com m ercial u nion” as m ore desirable to C anada than one w ith the U nited States.26 Such a plan w ould not be im perial federation, but w ould be a step tow ard it. S uch w ere the issues before the public, but they w ere reflected in only a distorted form in the election o f 1891. T he Liberal p arty held to its project of unrestricted reciprocity, but vigor­ ously denied th at th at im plied annexation o r any breaking o f the im perial bond. O liver M ow at claim ed th at only a fragm ent of either party was opposed to British connection. “A British sub­ ject I have lived fo r three-score years, and som ething m ore - I hope to live m y life a British subject and as a British subject die.” T h e Conservative party, w hile ham m ering a t the “veiled treason” o f unrestricted reciprocity, underm ined the L iberals’ appeal on trade grounds by letting it be know n th at negotiations w ere being initiated a t W ashington fo r a revival, in a modified form , o f the lim ited reciprocity treaty o f 1854. H aving taken th e edge off the L iberal sword, the Conservatives then m ade the m ost o f an appeal to traditional loyalty, both to C anada and the em pire. Sir C harles T upper was brought fro m E ngland to stum p the country, and M acdonald - in w hat proved to be his last election - told the electorate th at “a British subject I was born, a British subject I will die.” W hile M ow at’s sim ilar con­ fession w as lost in the denunciation o f an annexation m enace, the “old m an’s” cry echoed throughout the country. In reality the election o f 1891 settled nothing, save th at the Conservatives were retu rn ed to pow er for five years m ore, and that reciprocity, if obtainable, was to be restricted. Im perial preference, im perial federation, com m ercial and political relations with the U nited States - all rem ained to be defined and settled, and a choice - if choice there m ust be - m ade betw een them.

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III N either the return of the Conservatives in 1891 nor their defeat by the L iberals five years later m aterially changed the ch aracter of the issues before the C anadian people. T he several courses discussed before, centring around relations w ith the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States, continued to be dis­ cussed, and a choice was still to be m ade. In spite o f th e heat engendered, the elections w ere to some extent sham battles, for neither party stood com m itted to a definite policy in these im p o rtant questions. T he L iberal party dropped its aim of un­ restricted reciprocity, while the Conservative adm inistration in its last years of office found th at W ashington was unreceptive to the lim ited reciprocity th at it sought. Both parties then settled dow n to an acceptance of m oderate protection, modified, when possible, by special trade agreem ents. In the last years o f the old century and the early years of the new, how ever, a num ber of factors com bined to give a fresh setting to the C anadian problem o f im perial and continental relationships. T h e progress o f protectionism in the U nited States, under the M cKinley tariff of 1890 and the Dingley tariff of 1897, closed the d o o r to reciprocity negotiations for m ore than fifteen years, until such advanced protection began to be questioned as a cause o f the high cost of living. W hile on th e one hand the road to W ashington was at least tem porarily blocked, the m ovem ent fo r closer im perial ties received a new im petus. T he jubilee of 1897 provided the occasion and the atm osphere fo r a unique gathering o f em pire statesm en in L ondon, at a tim e w hen Joseph C ham berlain’s new im perialism was seeking practical expression. In spite o f the fact th at he held w hat was norm ally considered a m in o r portfolio, th a t of colonial secretary, C ham berlain led his advance guard along new and even alarm ing paths - tow ard continental alliance in place of isolation, tow ard m ilitant empirebuilding in South A frica, tow ard com m ercial union w ith the colonies, and even to a skirm ish against the sacred citadel of free trade. T he note was set by his speech at the C anada Club in the spring o f 1896. The recent isolation o f the U nited K ingdom , the dangers which seem ed to threaten us, have evoked fro m all our colonies, and especially fro m Canada, an outburst o f loyalty and affection w hich has reverberated throughout the w o r ld .. . . is this dem on­

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stration . . . to pass away w ithout a serious effort upon the part both o f colonial and Im perial statesm en to transform these sentim ents into practical results? . . . W e m a y endeavour to establish com m on interest and co m ­ m o n obligations. . . . W hat is the greatest o f our com m on obligations? It is Im perial defence. W hat is the greatest o f our co m m o n interests? I t is Im perial trade. A n d those tw o are very closely connected. I t is very difficult to see how yo u can pretend to deal w ith this great question o f Im perial defence w ithout having first dealt w ith the question o f Im perial trade. . . . M y . . . proposition is that a true Zollverein fo r the Em pire, that a free trade established throughout the Em pire, although it w ould involve the im position o f duties against foreign countries, and w ould be in that respect a derogation fro m the high prin­ ciples o f free trade, and fro m the practice o f the U nited K in g ­ d o m up to the present tim e, w ould still be a proper subject fo r discussion and m ight possibly lead to a satisfactory arrangem ent if the colonies on their part were willing to consider it . . . it would undoubtedly lead to the earliest possible developm ent o f their great natural resources, w ould bring to them population, would open to them the enorm ous m arket o f the U nited K in g d o m . . . .27 D ecisions on any changes in the im perial structure, w hether political, m ilitary, o r econom ic, m ust be m ade in G re at B ritain and C anada (since neither the A ustralian n o r South A frican colonies were as yet united) and in tariff questions m ust over­ com e the accepted policies o f free trade in G re at B ritain and protection in C anada. T h at either country should m ake such a radical departure m ust have seemed im probable, but C ham ­ b erlain’s gesture was followed by some encouragem ent from L aurier too. N o w the statesm en o f G reat Britain have thought [he said in Ju n e 1896] that the colonies have com e to a tim e when a new step m ust be taken in their developm ent. W hat is that? That there shall be a com m ercial agreem ent between England and the colonies. T hat practical statesm an, M r. Joseph Chamberlain, has com e to the conclusion that the tim e has com e when it is possible to have w ithin the bounds o f the E m pire a new step taken, w hich w ill give to the colonies in England, a preference fo r their products over the products o f other nations. . . . The possibilities are im m ense. . . . B u t Sir, if England is going to give

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us that preference, England w ould expect som ething fro m us in return . . . that we w ould com e as closely to her own system o f free trade, such as she has it, as it is possible fo r us to c o m e ... ,28 T h a t nearest point, L aurier w ent on to say, was to adopt a revenue instead of a protective tariff; and such was said to be the L iberal policy, although in reality the difference tended to be little m ore than one of nam e. A year la ter w hen Fielding intro­ duced the first budget of the L iberal governm ent it was found to contain a preferential rate for English goods, 12 Vi per cent at first and then increased to 25 per cent. T his preferential rate was, from one p o in t of view, simply a low er tariff, and as such alarm ing to not a few C anadian m anufacturers. As an imperial move it was greeted with enthusiasm by m em bers of the recently deceased Im perial F ederation League and others who looked tow ard closer im perial relations. G . W . Ross, a m em ber o f the O ntario cabinet, told the British Em pire League th at the prefer­ ence had not only “paved the w ay for the rapid developm ent of C anadian com m erce,” but had “ quieted for the time being, and I hope forever, the restlessness which prevailed in m any q uar­ ters as to the fu tu re of C anada.” Instead of the fluctuating m arkets of the U nited States, C anadians could now tu rn to the m ore certain ones o f England; and at the sam e tim e the C ana­ dian voice would be m ore influential in the councils o f the em pire.29 T here w ere, o f course, not lacking those w ho were equally vocal in condem ning the preference as the thin end of the im perial wedge. I t was with such a background that th e colonial conference m et in L ondon in 1897. In a sense the conference was an inci­ dental result o f the jubilee celebrations, b u t this very connection gave it an im portance, n o t only because o f the atm osphere, but because the jubilee brought the colonial prim e m inisters to E ngland. Both in its personnel and its subject m atter the third colonial conference had a new significance.30 T hat o f 1887 had touched on defence and trade, but had steered away from dis­ cussion o f im perial federation. T he O ttaw a conference o f 1894, called by the C anadian governm ent, dealt in p art w ith trade, b ut Britain was represented only by an observer. T he third conference, in L ondon in 1897, w as described as inform al as to its proceedings, but it was a conference o f governm ents: the U nited K ingdom being represented by the secretary o f state fo r the colonies, and the self-governing colonies by their prim e m inisters. C ham berlain’s opening speech, given prom inence in

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the published reco rd ,31 w as a frank presentation o f the thesis w hich he v/as already know n to hold. T he m ost im p o rtan t and the m ost difficult subject, he said, was the future relation between the U nited K ingdom and the self-governing colonies. H e was not prepared to say w hether the time was ripe fo r change: in E ngland the idea of federation was “ in the air,” and he personally had thought o f “a great council of the E m pire” to w hich the colonies would send plenipotentiaries. But if the tim e should com e w hen the colonies wished “to substitute fo r th e slight relationship w hich at present exists a true partnersh ip ” w ith a share in the m anagem ent o f the em pire, it w ould also have to be realized that “ obligations and responsibility” m ust accom pany control. If a representative body were to be estab­ lished it w ould settle the related problem of im perial defence, the cost of w hich was now borne by the U nited K ingdom , al­ though the arm y and navy w ere n o t even principally m aintained fo r local defence. O n the question of com m ercial relations he referred to the value of a zollverein, but adm itted the difficulties in the way. If the resolutions passed by the conference be taken as a test, its decisions were cautious and lim ited, but not w ithout significance. It was decided (by a m ajority) th a t political rela­ tions between the U nited K ingdom and the self-governing colo­ nies were “generally satisfactory under the existing condition of things.” N o decision was recorded on defence. It was agreed by the prem iers th at they should investigate the possibilities of tariff preferences to the U nited K ingdom . A separate resolution recom m ended the denunciation o f treaties ham pering the com ­ m ercial relations between G re a t Britain and th e colonies. T he reference was to treaties w ith Belgium and G erm any, which contained m ost-favoured-nation clauses standing in the w ay of such a preference. T he case cam e up particularly in relation to the C anadian preference o f 1897, but the British governm ent had long been requested to term inate the treaties, w hich they now did. Finally, a unanim ous resolution called fo r periodic conferences in the future. T hus there em erge from the conference o f 1897 one general issue and three particular ones, all of w hich continued to be discussed, at fu rth e r conferences and betw een them , for m any years. Tw o o f these - the n atu re o f the colonial conference and the defence question - will be exam ined in subsequent chap­ ters.32 T he general problem o f the political relations between the colonies and the U nited K ingdom runs through m ost aspects of the external relations o f C anada. T he particular phase o f it

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which followed the conference o f 1897 is closely linked with com m ercial policy, and m ay be considered here in th at connec­ tion. T h e policy o f the British governm ent in respect of imperial relations was, for the tim e being a t least, the policy of Joseph C ham berlain. W hatever m ay have been the opposition to it, in the governm ent o r outside, it was the policy that was adopted and the one therefore w ith w hich the self-governing colonies w ere concerned. T hose colonies differed in position, needs, and political developm ent, and viewed the im perial question differ­ ently as a result. T h eir attitudes had some, but relatively little, influence on governm ent and public in Canada. On the whole, and except perhaps for trade and the Pacific cable, Canadians w ere ignorant and alm ost oblivious of the other colonies. T heir interest was in the U nited K ingdom - by origin, trade, culture, defence, and governm ent. It happened, how ever, that the man w ho was prim e m inister throughout fifteen years w hen these subjects were to the fore was a French C anadian, the first to hold that office in the history of the dom inion. O n the w hole the F rench C anadians were little affected by the ties that bound th eir English-speaking com patriots to G re at Britain. T heir origin and culture were F rench; they p u t little em phasis on com m erce; minim ized the need for defence, even o f C anadian territory; and had no reason to share in the im perial vision seen by oth er groups of Canadians. C ut aw ay from F rance once and finally, they found their only patrie in C anada, w hich for them should be a p art o f the British E m pire only so long as the established m odus vivendi was retained. W ilfrid L aurier was descended from eight generations o f Canadians, b ut his upbringing was unusual, com bining English P rotestant with F ren ch Catholic schools and associates. N o r did L aurier accept the traditional ultram ontanism of the church in Quebec; indeed, one o f the causes fo r which he stood was the separation of politics and religion, and the freedom to follow liberalism in the one w ithout the accusation of being unorthodox in the other. W hen L aurier w ent to the jubilee in 1897 it was his first crossing of the A tlantic. In London, as the prim e m inister of the only united dom inion, he was given a leading p art in the colourful cerem onies carried out in the atm osphere of royalty and im perialism; and am idst it all he received a knighthood. In spite of the heady air, L aurier was cautious tow ard any com m itm ent, and in fact retu rn ed w ithout m aking any. He accepted C ham berlain’s form ula that responsibility m ust ac­ com pany control, and steered carefully away from both. N ev er­

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theless, L aurier seemed in the eyes o f some o f his countrym en to be caught in the toils of im perialism - a suspicion w hich they thought to be proven by C anadian participation in the w ar in South A frica. H e found him self threatened politically by the early stages o f a nationalist m ovem ent in his own province, a m ovem ent o f which H enri Bourassa was one of the earliest adherents and later the leader.33 T o such m en C ham berlain was an arch-villain, insidiously sapping at the autonom y o f Canada, draw ing her by subtle m eans into the m aelstrom o f imperial w ars, im perial taxes, im perial control. It was not only in French C anada that such views w ere to be found. T he nationalists am ong the English-speaking Canadians found an able pen in G oldw in Sm ith; but Sm ith was a liability as well as an asset, for his nationalism ended in the m anifest destiny of annexation. It was J. S. Ew art, a lawyer of O ttaw a, w ho took up the cause, and hewed to the straight and narrow line o f Canadianism . L aurier had critics to the right as w ell as to the left. If the nationalists later broke w ith him because o f the Boer W ar and the naval defence plans, it was the m ore im perially-m inded Canadians w ho forced him into those lim ited excursions. L aurier, in fact, occupied a m iddle position; and it is a tribute to his political ability that fo r m any years he escaped being crushed between the millstones. O n a policy o f im perial relations generally there is little difference between L aurier on the one hand and M ac­ donald and his successors on the other. T here were, it is true, m any Conservatives who accused L aurier o f being anti-im perial, but they never controlled their own party. L aurier could say w ith as m uch conviction as M acdonald that a British subject he w ould die, but the two w ere, in the practice of governm ent, alm ost equally shy o f com m itm ents. T h at a share in the control o f imperial policy, o r even consultation concerning it, entailed a t least a m oral obligation to bear the consequences becam e a dogm a accepted by w hatever party w as in power. In the decade following the Boer W ar there was active study and discussion of com m ercial policy as a p art of the imperial relationship. Shortly before the colonial conference o f 1902 the president o f the C anadian M anufacturers’ A ssociation an­ nounced that the chief object o f his organization was to bring all British countries into a closer union by means of a preferen ­ tial tariff, and the president o f the British Em pire League in C anada called for an additional duty in all British countries on foreign goods to provide a fund for defence; while the Cassandra voice o f G oldw in Sm ith repeated that no im perial zollverein

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could draw C anada aw ay from the N o rth A m erican continent.34 A t the conference itself the C anadian delegates presented a m em orandum intended to show that the preference had encour­ aged British im ports, though they continued to refrain from using it as a basis fo r bargaining. In his opening speech Joseph C ham berlain recognized that the preference had arrested the decline of British exports to C anada, but the volum e was still n ot great in relation to British im ports from C anada. Even with a preference, he said, a protective tariff m ight effectually exclude British goods; and he looked wistfully tow ard a self-sustaining em pire. T he only resolution adopted by the conference on the subject of tariffs gave a blessing to the principle of preference, and recognized th at a general system o f free trade was not practicable.35 W hile the discussions at the conference w ere not m ade public a t the tim e, it was the general im pression in C anada that L aurier and his colleagues had been w hat their supporters would call cautious and their critics destructive. T he vital issues of th a t conference, however, w ere not tariff levels b u t defence and an im perial constitution. A gainst com m itm ents on either of these latter L aurier set his face like flint. T h e conference had not long adjourned when the tariff ques­ tion once m ore cam e to the fore. T hrough Joseph C ham ber­ lain’s cam paign fo r “ tariff refo rm ,” a direct assault was m ade upon the citadel o f free trade as a m eans of attaining to that self-sustaining em pire of w hich he dream ed. “A sm all rem nant o f L ittle E nglanders o f the M anchester School” clung to the strict application o f free trad e in a w orld in which foreign countries and the colonies as well had adopted protection. Freedom of interchange should be retained as a principle, but the pow er of negotiation and even retaliation be resum ed. In parliam ent a storm o f opposition was raised, not only by the Liberal opposition, b u t also am ongst the lab o u r m em bers and even some of the U nionists. N othing daunted by the traditional cries against a tax on bread, C ham berlain gave blow for blow, and a battle w ent on in new spapers and periodicals and on the public platform . T he “ tariff refo rm ” project continued to be debated from its initiation in the spring of 1903, through 1904 and 1905. In C anada opinion was divided, but on the whole C ham berlain’s policy was supported, though som etim es with reservations. R. L. B orden’s com m ent on the opening speech was th at the Conservative p arty had been fighting for im perial preferential trade for ten years, and the veteran, Sir Charles T upper,. spoke o f C ham berlain’s “manly, straightforw ard and

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plucky stand.” M ost o f the new spapers, especially the Conserva­ tive ones, expressed approval, and various boards of trade passed resolutions in favour of the plan. L aurier was cautious in his com m ents but welcomed the idea o f treaties of com m erce betw een the British countries, each of w hich w ould have its own tariff. T he G lobe was cool about the plan, and in the province of Q uebec som e spokesm en, notably Bourassa, suspected th at trade unity would be a step tow ard political unity.36 T h e C anadian preference to English goods rem ained as the original and solid form o f im perial preference, and while it was often cited as advantageous to both countries, it was not always happily accepted by C anadian m anufacturers.37 W hile modified from tim e to tim e the C anadian preference nevertheless was retained: the rock on w hich the broader scheme was to be wrecked was the English aversion to duties on the necessities of life. C ham berlain had never quite converted the U nionists and Conservatives to tariff reform , but had m ade considerable head­ way. T h e fall o f the governm ent in 1905, and the accession to office o f the Liberals under C am pbell-B annerm an (w ho had denounced the C ham berlain plan) rem oved it, for the tim e at least, as a political possibility. IV In the tw entieth century both independence and annexation to th e U nited States were still talked o f but neither had any considerable m easure o f support. W hat did constitute a live issue was the revival o f projects of reciprocity, a revival m ade possible by a changing attitude in the U nited States w hich in tu rn h ap ­ pened to coincide w ith the British decision to cling to free trade. T he alternatives o f reciprocity and imperial preference for a time played som ew hat the role they had in the eighties, but in a m inor key and w ithout any o f the fighting spirit behind the form er that the advocates o f com m ercial union had show n. John C harlton m ade frequent references, in the H ouse o f C om m ons and the new spapers, to the advantages of reciprocity, which he com ­ pared with the C ham berlain plan, to the detrim ent o f the latter. But until there was some evidence of breaches in the A m erican tariff w all any C anadian thoughts on reciprocity could n o t be m uch m ore than pious hopes. Even while the general belief in high tariffs continued to exist in the U nited States there were scattered indications o f groups who saw advantages in reci­ procity. In 1901 the N ational A ssociation of M anufacturers

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held a N ational Reciprocity Convention at W ashington, and in the next two o r three years the m ovem ent began to gain m om en­ tum w ith the form ation of reciprocity leagues in N ew England and the west, advocacy in the new spapers, by boards o f trade, and delegations to Congress in its favour. T he argum ents were usually that the C anadian m arket could be opened to A m erican goods, and that action was necessary especially in view of the tendency tow ard m ore protection in C anada and the effect that the C ham berlain proposals w ould have on A m erican trade with C anada. T he advantages to A m erican railways of reciprocal trad e w ere often m entioned; and J. J. Hill, whose railways ran at various points to the C anadian border, was an active partisan in w hat was becoming a serious cam paign. In C anada, w here, for thirty years, reciprocity had been en ­ ergetically, at times frantically, sought, enthusiasm had calmed dow n o r was being deliberately suppressed. I t was recognized th at any move m ust com e from the U nited States, and there was a certain unwillingness to play once m ore the p art o f the un­ successful suitor. N o r, indeed, was it certain th at Barkis was now willing. T he tw entieth century had opened a new prosperity fo r C anada, w ith a relatively rapid developm ent o f the w est and growing industrialization in the east. T he C ham berlain tariff refo rm project offered possibilities of an alternative that was attractive to a t least a p art of the population, and might be upset by reciprocity w ith the U nited States. “C anada,” said Colonel D enison in a speech in T oronto in 1903, “should avoid reci­ procity as she w ould the plague.” 38 In the sam e year the C an a­ dian M anufacturers’ A ssociation passed a resolution against a reciprocity treaty affecting the m anufacturing interests of C an­ ada. In 1904 and 1905 m uch the sam e tone seemed to hold; that the U nited States had refused reciprocity w hen C anada wanted it, and that now the dom inion was following other paths. T he strength o f econom ic and political nationalism as a barrier to reciprocity could not as yet be assessed, but there were indica­ tions th at it was becoming a serious element. A further barrier, w hich might be m anned by a quite different group, was the objection that reciprocity w ould endanger the imperial relation. T h ere were, how ever, indications that an agreem ent limited to certain p roducts w ould not be unacceptable; and probably there was m uch m ore desire for such an arrangem ent than public utterances would indicate. T he exact state of C anadian opinion could be tested only when the question was p u t in a specific form .

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In 1909 and the early p art of 1910 the existing high protec­ tion began to be seriously questioned in W ashington, and a variety o f factors led tow ard negotiations with C anada. Im pressed by the dem ands of certain groups, notably the new s­ paper publishers, for lower tariffs with C anada, by using com ­ plaints against the high cost of living, and dissensions w ithin his own p arty, P resident T aft took steps to have the com m ercial relations o f the two countries reconsidered.39 T he subject of im m ediate discussion was the legal necessity of applying to C an ad a the m axim um rates of the Payne-A ldrich tariff due to the fact that the C anadian agreem ent w ith F rance was inter­ preted as a technical discrim ination. W hen the departm ent of state approached the British am bassador, Bryce inform ed the C anadian governm ent o f the departm ent’s desire for a confer­ ence, which the C anadian governm ent suggested should be in O ttaw a. T here the A m erican representatives proposed that C anada should offer her interm ediate rate, but the C anadians denied that there was discrim ination, though they finally agreed to the interm ediate rate on a few articles as a token concession. A series o f discussions, official and unofficial, then took place on the possibility o f considering tariff agreem ents on a broader basis, during w hich the C anadian governm ent expressed its will­ ingness to hold such a conversation at any convenient tim e. A ctual negotiations were conducted from N ovem ber 1910 to Jan u ary 1911. T he C anadian proposals covered a sm all, the A m erican a m uch larger, list o f articles; and by the m iddle of Jan u ary a com prom ise agreem ent was reached, under which m ost n atural products were to be on the free list and the duty on a lim ited num ber o f m anufactured articles to be reduced. T h e agreem ent was to be brought into effect by concurrent legislation. In spite of som e opposition, the necessary legislation was passed by Congress before the end o f July. I t only rem ained fo r C anada to do its part. T h e C anadian parliam ent consisted o f tw o m ajor parties, both of w hich in the past h ad em phatically announced their belief in reciprocity o f some kind. T raditionally the Liberals had been a low-tariff party, but o f recent years had show n little disposition to pay m ore than lip-service to th at faith. But, just as T a ft had experienced pressure for reduced tariffs, so had L aurier. In a to u r through the w estern provinces in the sum m er o f 1910 he was besieged by dem ands for the ending o f protec­ tion, and it seems clear that he was not a little im pressed.40 The caution of his governm ent in meeting the A m erican advances

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was m arked; b u t the L iberals found themselves in a favourable position for bargaining, and might well feel th at the agreem ent was so satisfactory as to be invaluable fo r the com ing election, an d to offer a p lan k especially needed in view of the Quebec revolt over the naval question.41 W hen the m easure was pre­ sented to the H ouse o f Com m ons the Conservative members w ere in a flurry, believing at first th at their constituents would fully support it. I t w as only afte r the lapse o f some tim e th at the opposition settled dow n to resist the passage o f the bill. In thus dividing on party lines parliam ent followed the action already taken by m ost o f the new spapers.42 But even the early exceptions to the rule of p arty allegiance w ere significant, and as tim e went on they becam e m ore so. T he m anufacturing, financial, and transportation interests, through individuals o r boards o f trade, becam e m ore and m ore vociferous in their opposition. In T o ro n to eighteen prom inent citizens, all Liberals, voiced their opposition, and founded the C anadian N ational League under the leadership of Z. A. Lash. Sim ilar defections from the party ranks were conspicuous in other cities. O ne serious blow to the governm ent was the decision of Clifford Sifton, one o f the ablest o f the L iberal strategists, to throw his w hole weight against reciprocity, and give aid to the opposition in the west, w here it w as m ost needed. W hen the Conservatives had blocked early passage of the bill, L au rier decided to go to the country, and thus precipitated an election w hich was fought alm ost entirely on external policies. T h at the reciprocity agreem ent presented advantages to C anada was show n by the favourable reception th at it first received. But the election was fought not on its term s but on its im plications. Tw o argum ents w ere m ainly used by the Con­ servatives and their Liberal allies in English-speaking Canada. T h e first, w hich brought m uch tangible support to the cam paign, was th at Canada, having failed earlier to secure reciprocity, had built up a national econom y with a heavy investm ent in railways and industries; and that both of these, being based on an eastw est pattern, would be endangered by a sudden flow o f north and south com m erce. T he second argum ent, appealing m ore to the general electorate as a whole, could be described by its opponents as pure flag-waving. A ided by indiscreet talk of annexation in the U nited States, orators pictured C anada as losing not only its connection w ith the em pire but its very national being as well. Borden, in his last shot of the cam paign, appealed on this ground: “I believe th at we are, in tru th , stand­

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ing today a t the parting o f the w ays-----W e m ust decide w hether the spirit of Canadianism o r of continentalism shall prevail on the northern half o f this continent.” T he issue, he said, was above party lines; it was for “the m aintenance o f our com m er­ cial and political freedom , fo r the perm anence o f C anada as an autonom ous nation w ithin the British E m pire.” 13 In the province of Q uebec the L aurier governm ent was opposed by the nationalists on another aspect of external rela­ tions. T h e governm ent’s naval bill accentuated the existing fears o f com m itm ent to “im perial w ars” and led to the form ation of a nationalist p arty in the province w here L au rier had hitherto been safe. H enri Bourassa, a t first mildly supporting reciprocity, finally cam e out against it; not th at he loved protection m ore, b ut the naval bill less. T hus was created th at extraordinary alliance o f the opposition in English C anada, w ith its appeal to the im perial tie, and the opposition in F rench C anada, loudly denouncing all signs of im perialism . Before th at com bination the L iberal governm ent, already beyond its prim e, could m ake no effective stand. A nd with the fall o f th e adm inistration was rejected the first - and perhaps the last - A m erican invitation to a reciprocity agreem ent. A decision, w hether wise or foolish, was thus a t last m ade on one im portant aspect o f external policy. T h e im plications of th a t decision could not as yet be assessed. A ll th at was certain was that reciprocity, in its proposed form , was rejected. But the purely com m ercial aspect o f the issue had becom e m ixed w ith wide political considerations - considera­ tions which in themselves w ere confused and even conflicting. H ad Canadians voted for w hat Borden had nam ed “C anadian­ ism” o r fo r closer im perial integration? T he answer lay in the future.

CH A PTER 9

Effects of External Forces on the Canadian Community

T ransportation and com m unications played an im portant part in the foreign relations of C anada as well as in her domestic econom y. Postal and telegraph facilities form ed links with the outside world, and - because o f the geography o f N orth A m erica - were in part dependent on arrangem ents with the U nited States. Railways and waterways involved that and more, fo r they ignored the international boundary and invited traffic to follow the shortest o r easiest lines. Shortly after confederation C anada began to take stock of her internal waterways. A royal com mission was appointed in 1870 to exam ine existing canals and consider the need for fu rth er construction. T he m ajority report,1 issued in the follow­ ing year, showed the strong influence o f the historic belief in the “n atural” role of the St. Law rence as the outlet for the A m erican middle west. “N ature has intended the St. Law rence,” the com m issioners w rote, “ to be the great com m ercial highway o f the west, and if it has not fulfilled its destiny to the extent it should have done, it is because the enterprise o f m an has endeavoured to divert its trade into other and artificial chan­ nels.” T he E rie C anal and the railways of N ew Y ork State had certainly played havoc w ith n ature’s purposes, for only a small proportion o f the possible traffic passed through the Welland C anal. This fact, the com m issioners stoutly m aintained, could be explained by the inadequate size of the W elland and St. Law rence canals. T heir faith still strong in the prospect of prosperous traffic following im provem ent of canals, the com ­ missioners urged that these should be deepened as soon as possible. F o r the W elland C anal, deepening, new locks, and an entirely new w ork for part of the route w ere com pleted in 1887, giving a depth of fourteen feet. Similar plans for the St. Law ­ rence were draw n up, and were carried to com pletion by stages; the whole being finished by 1903. If A m erican traffic was to be encouraged to pass through C anadian canals, it was also true th at Canadians w anted to m ake use of certain waterways in the

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U nited States. E ven the dogm a o f the great river could not disguise the advantage o f the L ake C ham plain-H udson River ro u te to N ew Y ork. In the absence of any C anadian canal until 1895 C anadian entrance to Lake Superior was dependent on the A m erican canal at Sault Ste. M arie. T he joint high commission a t W ashington m ade provision for the m utual use of waterways, b u t the term s o f the treaty w ere in p art only prom ises of recom m endations to the local authorities, being the C anadian governm ent on the one hand and the particular states concerned on the o ther.2 O n the ratification of the T reaty of W ashington the president asked the governm ents o f the interested states to take steps to carry it into effect. T he governor of N ew Y ork, the state m ost concerned, replied that no legal obstacles existed; b ut in 1874 the Canadian privy council declared that C anadian vessels had been prevented from passing through the Cham plain C anal to the H udson River, although A m erican vessels had been perm itted to go to any destination by w ay o f the Cham bly C anal; and the council asked that the British m inister take up the question at W ashington.3 A long diplom atic exchange fol­ lowed between H am ilton Fish, the secretary of state, and Sir E dw ard T hornton, the British minister, the form er using infor­ m ation from the governm ents o f the states and the latter from th at o f C an ad a.1 F o r a time an anti-clim ax was reached when the C anadian governm ent was unable to quote any cases, but in the sum m er o f 1875 it turned out that the C anadian right to use the C ham plain route was virtually negatived by the decision that a vessel m ust discharge her cargo at the first p o rt of entry, and that to proceed fu rth er would be to carry goods from one port in the U nited States to another. A n escape from this dilem m a lay in the pow er placed in the secretary o f the treasury to designate any ports at which vessels laden with the products of C anada might discharge their cargoes; and in 1876 this was p ut into effect, with the result that C anadian vessels were on a parity w ith A m erican in proceeding as far as A lbany, by way of Plattsburg, Oswego, o r Buffalo. T his com prom ise on the navigation o f the H udson R iver by C anadian ships, carrying goods in bond destined for the po rt of N ew Y ork, was regarded as a concession by the A m erican governm ent, w hich took the view that the H udson was an internal w aterw ay, not expressly opened by the T reaty of W ashington. T he St. L aw rence, on the other hand, was in p art an international river, and for the rest of its course was, by article x xvi o f the treaty, to be open for purposes of com m erce

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to the citizens o f the U nited States. In contrast to the A m erican position, which apparently was to m ake such a concession for the benefit of C anadian rath er than A m erican interests, C an a­ dians were anxious to encourage navigation of the St. Law rence in order to swell the volum e of business a t M ontreal, and thus to attract m ore shipping and low er the freight rates. T o this end they w ere m ore than willing to allow A m erican ships equal rights in the canals - except in the W elland to ships whose cargoes were then to be carried by rail o r w ater to N ew Y ork. T he general objective was entirely consistent w ith an old policy, tow ard which the circum stances o f the m om ent w ere to be bent. In 1882 tolls on the Erie C anal w ere abolished, and two years later the C anadian governm ent attem pted at once to m eet this com petition and to stim ulate the through C anadian route by giving a rebate of 90 per cent on all canal tolls on grain cargoes, w hether C anadian o r A m erican, w hich were carried^ as far as M ontreal and were shipped abroad. W as this discrim ina­ tion? T h e C anadian governm ent, in reply to protests, argued th a t it was discrim ination against U nited States ports, and intentionally so; b u t not against A m erican users o f the w ater­ w ay.0 T h e A m erican position was th at it logically involved discrim ination against A m erican citizens. Tw o visits o f C an a­ dian m inisters to W ashington in 1892 failed to produce a settlem ent, though a num ber o f com prom ises w ere suggested, including a C anadian proposal of w ithdraw al o f the discri­ m inatory tolls on the W elland C anal in exchange for navigation as far as N ew Y ork. T he A m erican officials adopted strong language in description o f the C anadian attitude and imposed tolls on the Sault Ste. M arie C anal as direct retaliation. Finally, in F ebruary 1893, the C anadian governm ent capitulated and changed the system of tolls to one acceptable to the U nited States.6 A p art from a general desire to m aintain friendly relations betw een the two countries, the result of the dispute m ay be explained by the superior bargaining position held by the U nited States. Both the S ault Ste. M arie and the C ham plain canals w ere, at th at tim e, m onopolies which could be opened or closed a t will. M oreover, it was not regarded as o f m ajor advantage to the U nited States to secure C anadian traffic. N o doubt it w ould swell the business o f the po rt o f N ew Y ork, but New Y o rk could in any case draw am ple shipping. T he C anadians, on the other hand, felt it necessary to give support to M ontreal, and in general w ere desirous of attracting traffic to Canadian

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routes in com petition w ith those of the U nited States. T he principle extended to railways as well as waterways. T he G rand T ru n k Railway and the G re at W estern Railway were both designed on the assum ption th at they could obtain a generous share o f the traffic between the A m erican m iddle west and the seaboard. By securing a line to Chicago the G rand T ru n k had a connection w ith A m erican railways and, w ith lines to M ontreal and Portland, was in a position to carry goods in either sum m er o r w inter. A fu rth er indication of the belief th at the cheapest ro u te between A tlantic ports and Chicago lay through C anada was seen in the construction o f the C anada Southern, an A m erican-ow ned railway joining the N ew Y ork C entral and M ichigan C entral, and designed to obviate the loop around the south of L ake Erie. T h e exploitation of w hat w ere conceived to be favourable geographical conditions never brought results on the scale that had been anticipated. T he projects for a railway to the C anadian west gave a new tu rn to the issue. T he G rand T ru n k clung to its conviction th at the logical route lay through the U nited States, by w ay o f Chicago; but the governm ental decision in favour of a line wholly on C anadian soil rendered the G rand T ru n k plan impossible, since it could be realized only w ith the aid of public m oney. T he decision to construct a railway to the Pacific coast by way o f the northern shore o f L ake S uperior m eant th at that railway, com pleted in 1885, had to com pete for traffic with A m erican transcontinental lines, and to protect itself against drainage o f business from its m ain line. T he m ost vulnerable points w ere Sault Ste. M arie, the Red R iver V alley, and the Pacific coast. A t these places w here connections w ith A m erican railways were, o r could be, m ade, a variety o f m easures w ere adopted as defence against com petition.7 H eavy investm ent in the C anadian Pacific and the later transcontinental railways - the C anadian N orthern and the N ational T ranscontinental-G rand T ru n k Pacific - represented a com m itm ent to a policy o f east-and-w est traffic in Canada w hich becam e a p art o f C anadian policy and form ed a leading argum ent in the opposition to reciprocity in 1911. W ith the acceptance o f the general strategy of C anadian railways the dream of the St. Law rence V alley as the m ain route to the centre o f N o rth A m erica faded. Y et m uch reality - and increas­ ing reality - rem ained of railway relations w ith the U nited States. Beginning w ith through rail com m unication between M ontreal and Boston in 1851, a netw ork o f connections between

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C anadian and A m erican railways was gradually built up, realized in p art by junctions at the frontier, and in p art by ow nership or operation of lines across the border. By 1933 there w ere fifty-five rail o r car-ferry crossings along the border, all the way from N ew Brunswick to British Colum bia. In the same year C anadian railways had control o r trackage rights over 7,312 miles o f rail in the U nited States, while A m erican railways had a corresponding mileage of 1,556 in C anada.8 T he eco­ nom ic effects of such an interrelationship w ere far-reaching, enabling the com m erce o f one country to have easy access to th at o f the other. Each railway com pany concerned aim ed, of course, to profit from the connection, and each therefore sought to attract traffic to its own lines. Because they were private com panies, the railways conducted, to som e extent, their own international relations, but were not reluctant to appeal to their respective governm ents against “unfair” com petition. Official negotiations resulted on such questions as freight rates and bonding privileges.9 In the m ovem ent for the im provem ent o f transportation by rail and w ater the chief em phasis was laid on satisfactory access to ocean ports in order to m aintain and develop the foreign trade which was a m ajor interest in Canada. W ith the progress of wheat-grow ing in the prairies, added to the staples for export in the east and centre, th at object becam e o f increasing im portance. T h e possible outlets were the sum m er ports of M ontreal and Quebec, the all-year ports o f Saint John and H alifax, the new port o f V ancouver, or the A m erican ports of N ew England and New Y ork. W hile the C anadians had struggled by diplom acy to secure use o f the H udson River route, and C anadian railways continued to obtain connections w ith A m erican railways across the border, the investm ent in C anadian canals and railways dem anded that both should be fed by ocean shipping at C an a­ dian ports. W ithout that, both the C anadian Pacific and the Intercolonial railways would be meaningless, and the expensive canals w ould lead to a blank end. F rom tim e im m em orial the men of the m aritim e provinces and of Q uebec had built and sailed ships, and had sold them abroad. T he gradual replacem ent of w ooden by iron ships, how ever, was fatal to the C anadian industry at that tim e, for local production o f iron was quite inadequate to supply the new need. T h e highest figure for the C anadian production of wooden ships was reached in 1874, and in a dozen years this was reduced by three-fourths. C anadian foreign trade, therefore, had to be

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carried in ships of foreign m anufacture - though not necessarily of foreign ow nership. O ne o f the most im portant o f modern shipping lines was founded by a native o f H alifax, Samuel C unard; but in 1867 the C unarders ceased to call a t H alifax, since the volum e o f traffic on the N ew Y ork route was so m uch g reater.10 T he C unard Com pany, how ever, retained a C anadian connection by its service to the St. L aw rence ports. A nother shipping line w hich originated in C anada was th at controlled by the A llan brothers o f M ontreal. T he com pany continued to use the St. Law rence route in spite o f the hazards of navigation and the com petition w ith N ew Y ork until increasing difficulties led to its sale to the new ly-form ed C anadian Pacific O cean Steam ­ ships. T he D om inion Line, organized in England in 1870, carried on a sum m er service to M ontreal until 1894 w hen financial difficulties caused the sale of its ships, which, however, continued in service to C anada first under the British and N orth A tlantic Steam N avigation C om pany and then under the W hite Star Line. T he im pending com pletion of the C anadian Pacific Railw ay brought prospects o f a com plete C anadian rou te to the orient, w ith the advantages o f through traffic for the railway and o f general trade for C anada. As a first tem porary m easure the railw ay com pany chartered three steam ships. In the m ean­ tim e negotiations w ere being conducted w ith the imperial governm ent on the project o f a Pacific service supported by a m ail subsidy. W ith the conclusion o f an agreem ent, a ten-year contract was aw arded to the C anadian Pacific in 1889 providing fo r a subsidy o f £ 4 5 ,0 0 0 from the im perial governm ent and £ 1 5 ,0 0 0 from the C anadian governm ent for the carriage of m ail to H ong K ong. T he first th ree E m presses were built in E ngland for the C anadian Pacific. A n im portant trade was thus built up, both betw een E urope and the far east, and in oriental goods - particularly silk and tea - im ported into C anada and the U nited States. T h e sea-going shipping entered and cleared at C anadian ports am ounted to 4,319,321 tons in 1868 and 14,175,121 tons in 1900. T his satisfactory increase was due not only to the initiative of individual com panies, but also to governm ental aid by the im provem ent of navigation and by m oney subsidies. T he chan­ nel in the St. Law rence was repeatedly deepened, to tw enty-tw o feet in 1877, and tw enty-seven and a half feet in 1887. A bout 1900 w ork on a thirty-foot channel was begun. C oncurrently with the im provem ent of the channel better harb o u r facilities were provided at Q uebec and M ontreal. T he need for subsidies

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as an encouragem ent to direct steam ship services to C anadian ports was early seen and constantly acted on. C onsiderable sums were paid to m aintain a line between C anada, the W est Indies, and Brazil; between C anada and F rance; and, in co-operation w ith the British governm ent, to Japan, A ustralia, and South A frica. Subsidies w ere also paid to com panies operating ships between C anadian and British ports, but in this case the steam ­ ship lines were handicapped by A m erican com petition.11 A s a fu rth e r m ethod o f encouraging foreign trade some investigation was m ade in 1910 and the next three years o f the possibility of control of the freight rates o f the ocean steam ship com panies by com m on action of the im perial and dom inion authorities. T here was som e discussion of the question at the im perial conference o f 1911, but w ithout tangible result. In 1913 the C anadian governm ent sent H . L. D rayton, head o f the board o f railway com missioners, to L ondon to discuss the m atter fu rth er, but again no agreem ent was reached.12 T he m ethod o f reaching freight rates by the N orth A tlantic C onference was under some criticism in C anada, and D ray to n ’s report gives the impression th at the charges w ere unduly high. C om m unications, like transportation, played their p art in the external relations o f Canada. T he two are closely connected, for the m ails were dependent on the railway and shipping facilities available. T he com pletion o f the Intercolonial Railw ay and the C anadian Pacific Railw ay m ade it possible fo r the post office to send m ail across C anada, and to connect w ith A tlantic and Pacific ports w ithout being obliged to m ake use of A m erican routes. T h e steady developm ent of ocean shipping at C anadian ports also allowed fo r direct com m unication w ith a growing num ber o f countries, and th at w ith greater speed and regularity. T he com plicated position existing before the establishm ent of the P ostal U nion in 1874 entailed not only high rates o f foreign postage, but varied rates according to the num ber of countries through which a letter passed and w hether o r not bilateral conventions existed. T he situation caused not only expense to concerns engaged in foreign trade b u t also the necessity of arriving at rates fo r alm ost every letter. I t was obviously advantageous, therefore, to secure entrance to th e U nion, but C anada was not adm itted until 1878. U nder the original con­ stitution any one m em ber could veto an application, and it happened th at F ran ce exercised this pow er on account o f a difference w ith G reat Britain over sea rates. T he situation was cleared up by the exertions of the British post office. Reductions

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o f postage rates w ere subsequently m ade both within C anada and fo r foreign letters. T he aspect o f this w hich caused m ost interest was th e project of im perial penny postage. Publicly advocated by an English m em ber o f parliam ent, M r. H enniker H eaton, it was discussed a t the colonial conference of 1887, but n ot adopted. Subsequently the plan was supported by the C ana­ dian governm ent, and cam e into effect in 1898 for the whole em pire w ith the exception o f A ustralia, w hich did not adhere to the arrangem ent until 1911. In 1899 the tw o-cent rate was applied also to letters from C anada to the U nited States.13 C om m unication by telegraph and cable was another subject o f im portance for C anada in its external relations. In respect of telegraphs there is a double interest: the adequacy of the lines fo r the purpose o f com m unication with the U nited States, and indirectly with British and foreign countries; and the connection between C anadian and A m erican com panies. In the years after confederation C anada had a netw ork o f telegraph lines th at joined the m ain cities w ith each other and w ith A m erican lines reaching to the border. T he A m erican com pany, W estern Union, was associated in eastern C anada w ith the M ontreal Telegraph C om pany; and in 1881 W estern U nion acquired lines in N ova Scotia and N ew Brunswick by taking over Jay G ould’s A m eri­ can U nion T elegraph Com pany. T he great N orthw estern T elegraph C om pany, incorporated in 1880, w ith its head office in W innipeg, had E rastus W im an as president. It absorbed the M ontreal C om pany and the D om inion Telegraph C om pany (w hich ow ned the m aritim e provinces’ lines), and thus the A m erican interests o f W estern U nion in C anada were consolidated, although the m ajority stock was held in C anada.14 A cable from N ew foundland to Ireland h ad been successfully laid in the year before confederation by a private com pany, and oth er lines across the A tlantic followed. T o com plete C anada’s cable com m unications w ith the outside w orld it rem ained to establish a Pacific cable. In the discussions of this, as in th at of the im perial penny postage, com m ercial interests were mingled w ith political. T h e initiative in a project fo r an all-British, state-ow ned cable from C anada to A ustralia and New Zealand was taken by S andford Flem ing, and in the score of years from the first proposal to actual construction the pressure for the realization o f the schem e cam e from Canada. W ith the com ing com pletion of the telegraph to the Pacific coast in m ind, F lem ­ ing began to form ulate his plan for the cable, to be the continua­ tion o f th e telegraph line.15 T hrough the early eighties the

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C anadian governm ent, w ith Flem ing’s assistance, collected inform ation w hich they placed before parliam ent. T he Pacific cable was discussed at the colonial conferences o f 1887 and 1897, and by other means in the intervals. N o t a few obstacles w ere raised - the cost, the route, and the claims o f existing com m ercial com panies - but they were all in tim e overcom e, and the Pacific cable was in operation in O ctober 1902. II Before the nineteenth century was out C anada had a system o f transportation th at linked her to the U nited States, Europe, and the far east, and that provided w ater o r rail facilities from one end o f the country to another. T he greater p art o f the railw ay system had been built during days o f depression, b ut in the faith th at better times w ould com e. Private investm ent in the railways, as well as governm ent support by land and money, were a gam ble on the grow th o f the country in the future. W ithout increased population, com m erce, and trade the whole foundation of the structure w ould be gone. T he late eighties and early nineties gave little ground for hope; stagnation was the dom inant feature in C anada as elsewhere. I t was only in the dying days of the century th at confidence and optim ism were rew arded, w hen the business cycle once m ore took an upw ard swing, and Canadians at. least could see the fu tu re w hich they had predicted and on w hich they had staked the present. T he m ines o f British Colum bia and northern O ntario, the forest resources of east and west, the budding m anufactures - all were ready fo r exploitation, and all called for labour. But the chief opening was in agriculture. T he lands o f the prairies w ere ready fo r w orking, but the labourers indeed w ere few. T h e C anadian public and C anadian officials were convinced that they had in the west an asset of incalculable value, not only because of the richness and accessibility o f the land, but because it had a scarcity value now th at the A m erican west was all but fu lly occupied. Im m igrants w ould be welcomed, within limits, in o th er areas and occupations, but the big need was strong farm ers for the virgin soil o f the prairie. In the past C anada had never obtained im m igrants in num bers com parable to her am bitions, and even the addition of such as had com e had been m ore than offset by the drain of people to the U nited States. It has been calculated th at net m igration since confederation showed a loss in every year but one (1873) until 1901.16 The

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inducem ent to m igrate was prim arily econom ic - the hope of people suffering from unsatisfactory conditions o f life in town o r country to better their lot in the new w orld. In som e cases, too, groups in continental E urope w ere led to em igrate because of religious o r political persecution. In the British Isles assist­ ance and encouragem ent had long been given by private persons or organizations to em igrants to C anada and elsewhere. In the early tw entieth century “ about forty societies carried on the w ork o f assisting em igrants, either by providing the passage in whole o r in part, o r in giving advice to intending em igrants, and putting them in touch with friendly societies o r individuals overseas.” 17 T rades unions continued to give some aid to m em ­ bers who wished to em igrate, though to a lesser extent than form erly.18 T he British governm ent in this period took little direct responsibility fo r assisting em igration; but, under various statutes, boards o f guardians, county councils, and borough councils were authorized to render assistance out o f local rates. In general, the efforts of organizations and of the governm ent in the British Isles w ere directed tow ard giving assistance to those w ho were unem ployed or otherw ise suffering from econo­ m ic hardships at hom e. T he C anadian interest in m igration was to secure enough suitable people to help to develop the country, by draw ing them from w herever they could be found. T he Liberal governm ent o f W ilfrid L aurier cam e into office (1896) just as the econom ic horizon brightened. T he vitality of a new governm ent com bined with better conditions to produce a fresh vigour and success in the search for im m igrants. A gents and advertising m atter w ere sent to the U nited K ingdom , the U nited States, and continental E u rope.T he departm ent of im m igration, under the stim ulus of Clifford Sifton, adopted new m ethods and explored new fields.10 T he results o f the cam paign in the U nited States were particularly striking; in 1897 only 9,000 im m igrants cam e from the U nited States, but by 1910 the num ber was over 100,000, and nearly 140,000 in 1913. Since the chief dem and and the. chief opportunity were for farm ers in the prairies, it was open to the governm ent to encourage their settlem ent in two other w ays: by seeing th at an adequate railway system was being provided, and by m aking land available on favourable term s. Even if railway branch lines could never quite keep up to the moving frontier of settlem ent, the C anadian Pacific’s m ain line was rapidly being supplem ented not only by its own branch lines but also by two additional transcontinental railways. In every step o f railway expansion governm ents, both federal and

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provincial, gave aid by w ay of loans, land grants, o r guarantee of bonds.20 A nd because o f its control over the natural resources of the west, the dom inion governm ent was able to organize the system of land grants so as to encourage settlem ent. F rom the first free-hom esteading w as provided for under a series of D om inion L and A cts, w ith conditions th at provided against misuse by speculators, in the attem pt to attract im m igrants. L ands granted to railways in aid o f construction were sold by the com panies, w hich were as anxious to secure the business that would accrue from the presence o f settlers as they w ere to m ake a direct profit out of the land.21 T he railway com panies also played an active p art in the search for im m igrants, carrying on an extensive cam paign abroad with an enthusiasm th at on occasion left them open to accusations o f m isrepresentation. L and com panies and other private organizations also joined in the h u n t for im m igrants, w hether to further their particular interests or in a m ore altruistic spirit of building up the dom inion. T he C anadian Pacific Railw ay followed as active a program m e in securing im m igrants as did the governm ent; and, like the governm ent, encouraged settlem ent by means also of aid to settlers afte r their arrival in the west.22 W hatever the motive might be, the num ber o f im m igrants began to increase in num bers that were pleasing if not all that might be desired. F rom 1884 (during the construction o f the C anadian Pacific Railw ay) the num ber of im m igrants had gone down from a little over 100,000 to a paltry 17,000 in 1896. In 1903 it passed well over the hundred-thousand m ark again; the tw o-hundred thousand m ark was first passed in 1906, and the three-hundred thousand m ark in 1911. T he figure for 1913, o f 400,870, was the all-time high. Even the early tw entieth-century enthusiasm for imm igration did not entirely overshadow the caution o f governm ent and public in the selection of im m igrants. T he balance between quantity and quality was not always easy to adjust, and there were disagreem ents on the desirability of certain types of im m igrants. T he obvious objections were generally entertained tow ard physical disabilities, paupers, and non-white races. T he first choice would be of fam ilies from G re at Britain o r the U nited States w ho w ould go on the land. T hese sources, how­ ever, were too lim ited for C anadian needs, and the governm ent then turned to the continent of Europe. Investigation revealed that few im m igrants could be secured from G erm any, France, Belgium, or th e Scandinavian countries, but th at there were

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possibilities in A ustria-H ungary and Russia of which Sifton had hopes.23 T he several im m igration acts and orders-in-council in the fifteen years before the w ar w ere aimed at encouraging the grow th o f rural, and discouraging th at o f urban, population; this purpose arising in p art from the already existing drift from co untry to town. T he acts also provided regulations intended to keep o ut those w ho w ould becom e a charge on the country, or races w hich could n o t be assim ilated. Between 1902 and 1912 some 60,000 persons were rejected at the ports o r frontier, and 5,629 persons were deported. T he general policy, then, w as to build up the rural popula­ tion, by im m igration, w ithout departing too fa r from the existing ethnic basis o f F rench and English. T he largest group of im m i­ grants was British, consisting o f agriculturists to western C anada and artisans to the cities o f the east. T he latter were em ployed particularly in the heavy industries th at were rapidly developing in the period - for exam ple, in and around M ontreal. A n effect o f this on the province o f Q uebec was to accentuate a difference th at already existed in some degree between the two races - that th e F rench w ere m ore often ru ral dwellers and the British urban. But no great problem of assim ilation to the C an a­ dian population as a whole was created, rath er one of adjustm ent to new conditions.24 A m ong those who w ent to the west w ere to be found agricultural labourers from large English farm s, and th e sons o f yeom an farm ers, of better education and imbued w ith som e spirit of adventure.25 F o r the m ost p art these English farm er-im m igrants were interspersed w ith other farm ers, but one attem pt, m ade in 1903, to form a w holly British colony at Lloydm inster, Saskatchew an, was an interesting but unsuccess­ ful experim ent. T he colony w as not only British in personnel, b ut intended to be so in social structure; the m em bers o f the colony were inexperienced in agriculture, and had little but m isfortune until the population of the district becam e m ore m ixed.26 O ther experim ents in the transplanting o f groups from E urope to settle together in the prairies offered greater problem s o f assimilation, though they som etim es ended in a greater eco­ nom ic success. One o f the m ost interesting examples was th at of the U krainians, who left Russia partly because of political oppression, and partly because o f econom ic hardships and lack o f land. T hey w ere ru ral people, and settled in blocks in all three provinces. “E ach settlem ent,” w rote an observer, “ is a little U kraine in w hich anything o f a foreign n ature rarely intervenes

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to m ar the even tenor of their w ays.”27 W hile the children learnt English, the adult m em bers of the families spoke U krainian. T hey brought w ith them their own culture and their own reli­ gion, the G reek Catholic C hurch. Some o f their art, m usic, and literatu re tended to be overshadow ed by th at w hich already existed in C anada, and a rich heritage w as in danger o f being lost. T o the attem pts m ade in the public schools to plunge their children into the C anadian m elting-pot the U krainians offered resistance, and a wise m easure of toleration allowed a place for the U krainian language. As in the case o f m any settlem ents of im m igrants, the U krainians encountered econom ic difficulties, usually arising out o f unproductive land. T hey w orked on railw ay-construction o r on older farm s, how ever, and w ere able to m aintain them ­ selves, even if on a low standard. F o r C anada such problem as was created by the com ing o f the U krainians was not econom ic but cultural. U p to a point they enriched, by variety, the C an a­ dian culture, b u t som e conform ity was necessary. T h at is to say, if foreign and unassim ilated groups w ere m ultiplied, a time would com e when the p attern would becom e so confused that national entity would be weakened. T h e D oukhobors, w ho settled in southern Saskatchew an, were a m uch sm aller group, but, because of their peculiar beliefs, can be regarded as a foreign influence rem arkable in degree if not in size. T he D oukhobors w ere an unorthodox religious sect w ho w ere persecuted in Russia because of their pacifist beliefs which forbade their doing the com pulsory mili­ tary service. C om ing to C anada, first in 1899, they established a num ber of colonies organized on a com m unal basis. Som e of them , indeed, broke away from com m unism and m aintained private property, but with the m ajority difficulties w ere m et in their first refusal to accept land grants as individuals o r to pay taxes fo r roads. In deference to their beliefs, they w ere accorded exem ption from m ilitary service. T hey proved to be a sober and industrious people, but, in the view of one w ho assisted the first m igration, they got “ drunk on theories and on superstitions.”28 A m inority am ong them was difficult to assimilate. T he m ost rem arkable dem onstration o f their em otional religion w as a pilgrim age across country in 1902, after discarding their pos­ sessions and finally their clothes. Such activities could only be frow ned on by m ajority opinion, and be handled as tactfully as possible by governm ent officials. Such freakish behaviour con­ tributed little to C anada; but it w as foreign only in the sense that

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these families cam e from abroad. T hey created no particularly Russian influence or connection.29 A nother, and a calm er, group of Russians were the M ennonites. T he first m em bers of this reli­ gious group to com e to C anada arrived from Pennsylvania after the A m erican revolution. F rom 1874 on several thousand m ore cam e direct from Russia, settling first in M anitoba and later fu rth er west. A s a m inority o f D utch extraction in Russia they form ed in that country separate colonies as they were to do in C anada after their em igration. T hey were influenced in leaving Russia because o f a policy o f assim ilation there, and it might therefore be supposed th at they w ould seek equally to m aintain themselves as distinct groups in Canada. T heir needs, however, were n ot extrem e: religious freedom , exem ption from m ilitary service, and some use of their own language (w hich was G er­ m a n ).30 O f the com paratively large G erm an and Scandinavian elem ents in the population, a portion cam e from the U nited States, while m any o f the G erm ans in eastern C anada had been there fo r generations. It was generally found that both these racial groups w ere good settlers not only in the sense o f their being industrious, b ut in that they readily fitted in w ith C anadian institutions and custom s. A n exam ination o f the M agyar settlers in Saskatchew an showed th a t by origin they w ere farm la­ bourers, and had naturally taken to the land in C anada. By inquiry from fifty-five fam ilies it appeared th at at least thirty took M agyar periodicals.31 O riental im m igration created a problem quite different from that arising o u t o f the presence in C anada of any other foreign group. T he colour difference in itself was regarded by many Canadians as objectionable, and added to th at were the differ­ ences in standards of living. T he difficulty was greatly accentu­ ated by the fact th at m ost of the orientals settled in one province, British Colum bia. O riental im m igrants cam e from three co u n ­ tries: C hina, Jap an , and India. Each o f these countries had a different relationship politically to Canada. India w as a p art of the British E m pire; with Jap an G reat B ritain had first com m er­ cial and later political treaties; C hina alone was not in a position to w arrant special consideration. The first orientals to arrive in any num ber were Chinese from the U nited States, attracted to British Colum bia by the gold rush of 1858, and am ounting to som e 2,000 in I8 60.32 F u rth e r im m igrants then cam e directly from China, to a num ber sufficient to provoke an inquiry by parliam ent in 1879. C ontractors on the C anadian Pacific Rail­ w ay construction provided w ork for fu rth er Chinese, and as

184 - A H IS T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

m any as 15,000 were estim ated to have entered British Colum bia betw een 1881 and 1884. Because of a ban on em igration from Japan before the revolutionary changes o f 1867 Japanese were later in com ing to Canada. T here were perhaps 1,000 in C anada in 1896. T he census of 1901 shows 4,738 and that o f 1911, 9,067. Im m igrants from India did not start to com e until 1905, and the only large num bers of entries w ere in 1907 (2,124) and 1908 (2 ,6 2 3 ). T he presence of orientals becam e a m ain issue in British Colum bia. T he objections w ere, principally, on two grounds. T he orientals, it was said, could not be assim ilated - nor was it desirable th at they should be. Mixed m arriages w ere held to be o ut of the question, and there were not even ordinary social relations between the races. W hether it was in town o r country, the orientals lived in groups, and lived, it was alleged, under unsanitary conditions th at w ere a m enace to the com m unity. T h e second objection was th at the orientals, w ho w ere virtually all uneducated labourers, deprived white people o f w ork because they were prepared to accept low er wages. This had the effect either of keeping white men unem ployed o r of lowering the whole wage scale. F rom th e m ines the orientals moved to rail­ way construction, and, w hen that w as finished, to fisheries, agriculture, dom estic w ork, and various other callings. In each o f the occupations in turn, it was said, w hite men were dispossessed. T h e provincial legislature and the British Colum bia mem bers o f parliam ent struggled for years to secure exclusion. T he legis­ lature continually attem pted to solve the problem by direct action, but its m easures w ere disallowed by the federal govern­ m ent as beyond provincial powers. T he federal governm ent and parliam ent did, however, take a num ber of steps. M ore than one commission o f inquiry was sent to the coast to investigate, and volum inous reports w ere m ade. V arious m eans were also adopted to restrict im m igration. In 1885 a head tax o f $50 was im posed on every Chinese im m igrant, and in 1900 the tax was doubled. Still the dam was not high enough to stop the flood of entries, and in 1904 the tax was raised as high as $500. T h at too failed in its purpose, and indeed it was interpreted as having the opposite effect by raising wages in a protected labour m arket, and so making it possible for new com ers to earn the tax in a short period.33 Sim ilar action could hardly be taken in respect of the Japanese because of political relations between their country and G reat B ritain. T here was, how ever, the sam e cause for steps o f som e kind to be taken, for the im m igration of Japanese was

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 185

fast increasing, and their rate of natural increase was higher. T h e solution was found not by exclusion, but by a “gentlem an’s agreem ent” o f 1907 with the Japanese governm ent by which passports were to be restricted, and the flow of labourers stopped. In order to discuss Indian im m igration with the British authorities, M r. M ackenzie King was sent to L ondon in 1908. H e found a sym pathetic hearing and a recognition that, on account of clim ate, m anners, and custom s, C anada was not a suitable place in which Indians might live. T he governm ent of In d ia agreed to inform its subjects as to the conditions of C an ­ ada; steam ship com panies w ere warned not to use misleading literature; and the Indian E m igration A ct m ade em igration of contract labour unlaw ful except to those countries which made provisions satisfactory to the governm ent of India. T he C ana­ dian governm ent, on its part, by orders-in-council, imposed as a condition that em igrants should be possessed of $200 and should pass by continuous voyage from their country of origin. Indian im m igration, as a result of these obstacles, dwindled to almost nil.34 T h e fears felt in British Colum bia were, by these various m easures, partly appeased; but the problem o f unassimilable races, threatening econom ic pressure on the w hite population, by no means wholly disappeared. T he population o f C anada, w hich was constantly recruited by im m igration, was equally constantly dim inished by em igra­ tion. T h e door to the U nited States was, in those years, wide open, and thousands of m en and women passed through it every year to seek opportunities o f em ploym ent. A portion of these had only paused in C anada on their way from E urope and can­ not be regarded as C anadians. O thers were native-born or long resident, with C anadian background and ties; and their depar­ ture changed the balance o f races rem aining in Canada, and planted an increasing elem ent in the U nited States. A n agent appointed by the C anadian governm ent to investigate the num ­ ber of Canadians in the U nited States concluded that in 1873 there were 800,000 C anadian-born residents there. A bout half o f these were F rench, and half o f these again were in New E ngland.35 M any o f the Canadians w ent to the expanding Am erican west, especially before the C anadian Pacific Railway opened a route to western Canada. A broad distinction m ay be draw n between the English- and French-speaking C anadian em igrants to the U nited States in that the form er m ixed as individuals with the rest of the popula­

186 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

tion, while the latter tended to form separate colonies and seek to avoid assim ilation. T he em igration o f French C anadians, which had caused alarm as early as the forties, reached larger proportions after the Civil W ar and rem ained considerable until about 1890, w hen it dim inished. It was in large part a m ovem ent o f farm ers to unskilled w ork in the factories o f New England, w here they, and their wives and children, were welcomed as em ployees by the m anagem ents o f expanding industries requir­ ing dependable w orkers at low wages. T he motive of em igration, then, was econom ic, and seems to have been unm ixed with any political or other discontent. T he men w ent simply to seek profitable em ploym ent, w ithout any of the bitterness of the emigre. A ccustom ed to the com m unity life of Quebec, and with little o r no know ledge of English, they early began to form small groups of their own. Separate F rench quarters - outposts of Q uebec - grew up in the factory towns. T he m igrants were not infrequently resented by the English-speaking w orkers, in som ething of the sam e spirit that Canadians resented the coming of Chinese o r other cheap foreign labour. T h eir going was no less regretted at home. Cries o f distress continued to rise in C anada at the loss of thousands after thousands. T he drain of people was regretted because it was held to im pede the econom ic developm ent of C anada, to w eaken the French-C anadian group, and to detach so m any from the church. Efforts at repatriation w ere m ade, and in 1875 the Q uebec legislature voted $50,000 fo r that purpose, p art of which was spent on agents to N ew England. T he results, how ever, were m eagre, and received little support am ongst the spokesm en of the em igres themselves.30 If they could not be induced to return, it rem ained only to encour­ age the m aintenance o f cultural links w ith a people w ho were voluntarily retaining m any of their native traits. T here m ight even result positive advantages. C ette depopulation en masse [wrote H am on] est sans doute une catamite pour le Canada. II eu t etc bien preferable de garder ces h om m es au pays, ou ils auraient fondes des fam ilies de colons attaches au sol. M ais, d'autre part, elle a perm is a la race frangaise et catholique de jeter de profondes racines dans les E tats de I'Est, et qui sait le role q u ’elle peut etre appelee a jouer dans I’avenir?37 H ad not the F rench long since learned the technique of m aintaining their own national characteristics in face of an English governm ent and population in C anada? T he cases were not dissimilar. T he binding forces were, in the m ain, three:

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 187

language, religion, and education; and all three were interde­ pendent. N ew England already had a large R om an Catholic elem ent, but it was Irish. T he im m igrants were handicapped by ignorance of English and fitted with difficulty into the custom s of the Irish parishes. M oreover, to do so would be to lose their entity, and this neither they nor their com patriots in Quebec would willingly see happen. A few F rench priests were estab­ lished in N ew E ngland before 1870, and after that date it becam e the rule. By 1890 eighty-six separate F rench Rom an C atholic parishes had been established, m ost of w hich were served by French priests.:!8 In 1911 there w ere said to be 202 parishes and 101 missions.30 W ith the churches w ent convents and parish schools. T he stress on separate education was the sam e as in Quebec, and w here local conditions m ade it neces­ sary fo r children to attend public schools the defenders of nationalism saw the defeat o f their aims. “L ’ecole publiaue,” w rote one, “est le tom beau de la race frangaise aux EtatsU nis.”40 In 1890 there were fifty convents in N ew England, and these, w ith the parish schools, were educating 30,000 children. T o H am on the education of girls in convents was all-im portant because it was the w om en that m aintained the F rench language. L e convent canadien-frangais sera done avec I’eglise, la citadelle puissante qui gardera a ux em igres leur religion et leur langue. La se form eront les jeunes filles qui devenues plus tard des m eres de fam ille, parleront le frangais au fo y e r dom estique et la fero n t parler a leurs enfants.41 N ew spapers, m any o f them short-lived, w ere founded in various N ew England centres to m aintain the language and corporate feeling of the F rench Canadians in the U nited States. A nother force intended to m aintain their entity lay in the F rench and C atholic societies, united in 1901 under the nam e of 1’Union Saint-Jean B aptiste d ’A m erique. A lready there had been a n um ber o f conventions of the local societies; and in 1874 they were invited to M ontreal to m eet w ith the society there, and sim ilarly in 1880 to Quebec.42 O rganized resistance to assim ilation, and conscious effort to m aintain nationality, were not found am ong the English C ana­ dians w ho m igrated to the U nited States. T he absence of a language difference, and the sim ilarity o f race w ith at least the predom inant part of the A m erican population, m ade it easy for English C anadians to fit into A m erican society. T hey were, m oreover, m ore of the business and professional classes than were the French-C anadian em igrants. In m any cases they

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m aintained links w ith C anada through friends and relations, or in some cases by sending their children back to school. T here w ere m any and frequent expressions o f regret at the constant drain of educated m en from English C anada, but no m issionary effort such as m arked the parallel relations in Quebec. In the early tw entieth century im m igration becam e larger than em igration until the net gain in the peak year (1913) reached 217,914 - slightly m ore than half of the total num ber of im m igrants. T he effects of this shifting of population on the character of the C anadian people cannot be defined w ith any accuracy, but some approach m ay be m ade to a study through the census returns. Since it is impossible to know w hat p ro p o r­ tion of the new com ers passed on shortly to the U nited States, an analysis of im m igrants has a limited value. A m ore fruitful m ethod will be an exam ination o f the population in the country, as show n in the census years. O ne series o f categories is by place o f birth. In 1881 the total population was 4,324,810. O f these approxim ately 86 p er cent were born in C anada, 11 per cent in the British Isles and British possessions, 0.9 per cent in Europe, none in Asia, and 1.7 per cent in the U nited States. T he total population in 1901 was 5,371,315. A large proportion - 86.9 per cent - was C anadian-born; only 7.8 per cent born in the British Isles and possessions; 2.3 per cent in E urope; 0.4 per cent in Asia; and 2.4 per cent in the U nited States. T en years later the population had grow n to 7,206,643. T he C anadianborn w ere proportionately sm aller - 77.9 per cent; 11.5 per cent were born in the British Isles and possessions, 5.6 per cent in Europe, 0.6 per cent in A sia, and 4.2 p er cent in the U nited States. T he population may also be divided by racial origins. (The census o f 1891 did not include this category.) F o r the years covered, im m igrants from the U nited States are not listed separately, as racial origin refers to origin before com ing to this cpntinent. In the lists th at follow only the larger groups are shown, and Indians and Eskim os are om itted.43 RACIAL ORIGIN tiacla

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian Asiatic

1881 4 ,3 2 4 ,8 1 0 2 ,5 4 8 ,5 1 4

1901 5 ,3 7 1 ,3 1 5 3 ,0 6 3 ,1 9 5

1 ,2 9 8 ,9 2 9 2 5 4 ,3 1 9 5 ,2 2 3

1 ,6 4 9 ,3 7 1 3 1 0 ,5 0 1 3 1 ,0 4 2

1911 7 ,2 0 6 ,6 4 3 3 ,9 9 9 ,0 8 1 2 ,0 6 1 ,7 1 9 4 0 3 ,4 1 7 1 1 2 ,6 8 2

4 ,3 8 3

5 ,4 8 5 2 3 ,7 2 1

6 4 ,3 1 5 4 3 ,2 1 3

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 189 RACIAL ORIGIN

P rince E dw ard Isla n d

1881

1 901

1911

1 0 8 ,8 9 1 9 5 ,9 1 6 1 0 ,7 5 1

1 0 3 ,2 5 9 8 7 ,8 8 3 1 3 ,8 6 6

8 8 ,6 1 5 7 9 ,2 6 6 1 3 ,1 2 4

N o v a Scotia

4 4 0 ,5 7 2

British French Germ an

3 4 2 ,2 3 8 4 1 ,2 1 9 4 0 ,0 6 5

4 5 9 ,5 7 4 3 5 9 ,0 6 4 4 5 ,1 6 1 4 1 ,0 2 0

4 9 2 ,3 3 8 3 8 0 ,2 0 5 5 1 ,9 1 9 3 8 ,8 9 4

N e w B ru n sw ick

3 2 1 ,2 3 3 2 4 5 ,9 7 4

3 3 1 ,1 2 0 2 3 7 ,5 2 4

2 3 8 ,1 6 0

5 6 ,6 3 5

7 9 ,9 7 9

9 8 ,7 9 5

1 ,3 5 9 ,0 2 7 2 6 0 ,5 3 8 1 ,0 7 3 ,8 2 0 7

1 ,6 4 8 ,8 9 8 2 9 0 ,1 6 9

2 ,0 0 5 ,7 7 6

1 ,9 2 6 ,9 2 2 1 ,5 4 9 ,1 6 0 1 0 3 ,0 0 4

2 ,1 8 2 ,9 4 7 1 ,6 3 2 ,1 4 4 1 5 8 ,6 7 1

2 ,5 2 7 ,2 9 2 1 ,9 7 0 ,9 8 0 2 0 3 ,6 6 8

1 8 8 ,4 1 4

2 0 3 ,3 1 9

1 9 3 ,6 1 3

6 2 ,2 6 0

2 5 5 ,2 1 1 1 6 4 ,2 3 9 1 6 ,0 2 1

4 6 1 ,3 9 4 2 7 6 ,2 5 9

British French

British French Q uebec

British French Asiatic O ntario

British French German M a n itoba

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian

3 7 ,1 5 5 9 ,6 8 8 8 ,6 3 2 952

Saskatchew an

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian A lb e rta

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian British C olum bia

British French Germ an Scandinavian Asiatic

4 9 ,4 5 9 1 4 ,6 6 0 916 858 236 4 ,3 5 0

1 ,3 2 2 ,1 1 5 1 ,6 0 0

3 5 1 ,8 8 9

3 1 8 ,7 9 9 1 ,6 0 6 ,5 3 5 2 ,3 4 3

2 7 ,2 6 5 1 1 ,9 2 4 3 ,8 9 4

3 1 ,2 9 3 3 4 ,9 7 9 1 7 ,6 4 4 3 1 ,0 5 3

9 1 ,2 7 9 4 0 ,0 9 4 2 ,6 3 4 1 1 ,7 4 3 1,4 5 2 1 ,0 9 4

4 9 2 ,4 3 2 2 6 9 ,5 1 3 2 5 ,4 9 7 7 1 ,0 0 3 3 5 ,1 5 7 2 2 ,2 7 6

7 3 ,0 2 2 3 4 ,9 0 3 4 ,5 1 1 7 ,8 3 6 3 ,9 4 0 634

3 7 4 ,2 9 5 2 1 5 ,1 7 4 2 0 ,6 0 0 4 1 ,6 5 6 2 9 ,5 4 7 1 7 ,5 8 4

1 7 8 ,6 5 7 1 0 6 ,4 0 3 4 ,6 0 0 5 ,7 0 7 4 ,8 8 0 1 9 ,5 2 4

3 9 2 ,4 8 0 2 6 6 ,2 9 5 9 ,3 4 1 1 2 ,7 2 6 1 6 ,0 8 7 3 0 ,8 6 4

190 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

A s in the case o f the racial character of the population im­ m ediately after confederation, the later censuses m ust not be taken at their face value to represent the attachm ents of the population. It is true th at the percentage o f those of British origin dim inished from 60.55 in 1871 to 54.07 in 1911, and that this decrease represented an increasing proportion of Europeans. B ut it is not clear that the change was reflected in changing views on external affairs. M oreover, if the racial com position is exam ined in detail, it will be apparent th at the eastern provinces w ere hardly touched. P rince E dw ard Island retained about the sam e proportion of British and French. N ova Scotia, too, was little affected; and the G erm an elem ent there represented an early im m igration. N ew Brunswick shows a larger percentage of people o f F rench origin who had moved from Q uebec into the n o rth ern p art of the province. T he only notable item in the figures fo r Q uebec is the appearance of Japanese and Chinese, b u t it was not of great significance. O ntario retained its old racial characteristics. In the w est there w ere m ore m ixture and m ore diversity, as was inevitable from its place as the object of im m igration. It can probably be assum ed, too, th at the E uropean groups there were of recent origin. T here m ight, therefore, be a distinction betw een the early G erm an im m igrants o f N ova Scotia and O ntario and the m uch later groups in the prairie provinces. T he m ost controversial issue arose out of the growing num bers of Japanese and Chinese in British Colum bia. In the period between 1871 and 1914 the population of C an ad a was basically British and French, those two together m aking up from 80 to 90 p er cent of the total. T he French, how ever, were F rench C anadian, less influenced by contem ­ porary external influences than any other group of Canadians. T hey had, of course, cultural elem ents w hich grew out o f their original m other country, and w hich to som e extent w ere fed by cu rren t F rench thought. But in respect o f political ideas it m ust be app arent th at they w ere the m ost native of C anadians. T he ranks of the British Canadians, on the other hand, w ere con­ stantly recruited by new com ers from the British Isles and from the U nited States. Those who cam e from the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States brought social and political ideas which they could relate, w ithout undue distortion, to C anadian condi­ tions. T hey readily obtained English o r A m erican periodicals, w hich had always form ed one source of C anadian thinking. T he position of E uropean im m igrants was very different. In some instances they w ere em igres representing a dissatisfied m inority,

E F F E C T S OF E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 191

in others they cam e from purely econom ic motives. T here is no indication o f any serious attem pt to introduce Russian, G erm an, o r Scandinavian institutions, but there was a tendency to cling to an old religion, language, or way of life. Such elements added v ariety - sometim es desirable and sometim es not - but never sufficient to change m aterially the character of C anada. T he British and French basis rem ained the dom inating force, and neither the institutions nor the external policy o f the dom inion appears to have been seriously modified by a growing diversity of peoples. Ill Enthusiasm fo r increased im m igration was vociferous and real, b ut not shared by all classes of the C anadian population. W hile governm ents, railway com panies, land com panies, and em ployers painted a bright picture o f a futu re C anada filled with energetic producers, the w age-earning class looked w ith some distrust on the whole idea. T he im m igrants w ere, and were bound to be, predom inantly o f the w orking class; and it was a question w hether their com ing did not endanger the level of wages and even o f em ploym ent. Led by those of British Colum ­ bia, the C anadian labour organizations repeatedly took a stand against the adm ission o f Chinese, Japanese, or E ast Indian im m igrants, w hose standard o f living enabled them to accept low er wages and thus imperil the position o f the w hite w orker. E ven o f selected im m igration there w as som e doubt, and at tim es opposition to it. D enials were m ade o f the frequent state­ m ents that C anada had alm ost unlim ited openings for immi­ grants. T he annual report to the T rades and L abor Congress of C anada in 1906 expressed a not untypical point of view: “T he few er our people and the g reater ou r w ealth, the m ore ideal will be the existing conditions. W e have no need of cheap peoples, they arc an aspiration of the get-rich-quick m an w ho desires to pile up a few extra thousands o r hundreds o f thousands of dol­ lars at the expense o f the fu tu re of C anada.” 14 T he least opposi­ tion was to agricultural w orkers going to the west, w here there was an evident need of labour. T h e various labour organizations w hich took a continued interest in this aspect of external policy w ere, in their origin and character, m aterially affected by other influences from outside C anada; such influences being carried either by im m igrants or im ported books and periodicals. T he early C anadian trade

192 - A H IS T O R Y O F CA N A D IA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

unions were based principally on English examples, and British influence continued to play a part. A fter confederation, how­ ever, A m erican m ovem ents cam e to be the stronger, and even the predom inant, forces affecting labour organization in Canada. W ith th eir legal status established under an act o f 1872 (35 V iet., c. 3 0 ), w hich was alm ost a verbal copy o f the British act o f the previous year, C anadian unions were m ore free to develop, and indeed show ed a rapid growth in an age o f indus­ trial expansion.45 Individual unions had, even before this, be­ com e affiliated w ith parallel bodies in the U nited States. In the seventies and eighties C anadian labour followed British and A m erican precedents by the linking together o f local unions into larg er bodies o f various sizes and types. T he K nights of Labor, which had a m ushroom grow th in the U nited States, fo r a tim e m et w ith a w elcom e in C anada. T he rival and successor, the A m erican F ederation of L abor, had a m ore lasting connection w ith C anadian organizations. T he Industrial W orkers o f the W orld first obtained adherents in the C anadian w est in 1906, and by 1911 claim ed 10,000 followers. A fter conducting a strike on the G rand T ru n k Pacific Railway in 1912, its num bers w ere cut in half. In 1913 it w as vigorously denounced by the C anadian F ederation of L abour as “attem pting to overthrow the present form s o f society by creating a state o f industrial anarchy,” and its radicalism prevented a wide support in C anada. T he agents o f the I.W .W ., together with delegates of m ore m oderate organizations, foreign groups in the cities, and visiting socialists w ere not infrequently labelled as “foreign agitators.” W hile the m ain trend was tow ard international unions form ed by the junction of C anadian and A m erican units in various trades, there was, am ongst C anadian labour organiza­ tions, a contrary opinion w hich believed in national rath er than international organizations. O ne m ain split began in 1902 with a secession from the T rades and L abor Congress. T he latter continued in the faith of international unions and confined its m em bership to those organizations which had A m erican affilia­ tions. T he seceding groups form ed w hat was first know n as the N ational T rades and L abour Congress, and later renam ed the C anadian F ederation of L abour. T he Federation, always the sm aller body, sought to be national and to include all C anadian unions. T h at position, how ever, it never attained, finding its strength, a t different periods, in Quebec, O ntario, o r the m ari­ tim e provinces. T h e T rades and L abor Congress, while holding

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 193

to the principle o f international affiliation, aimed at being the representative organization of C anadian trade unions. Obstacles were found in Q uebec w ith the rise of the C atholic and anti­ international unions; in British Colum bia, where the unions tended to follow their own course, with or w ithout international connections; and in N ova Scotia. In the last the Provincial W orkm en’s A ssociation shared the views of the F ederation and eventually becam e affiliated with it. T he W orkm en’s Association not only com peted with the Congress, but in 1908 found its field directly invaded by the U nited M ine W orkers, an international, and previously a w estern organization.40 Both the N ova Scotia union and the com pany concerned (T he D om inion Coal C om ­ p an y ) resisted the efforts o f the invaders to enlist the employees in an international union. T he U nited M ine W orkers called a strike in 1909, one which was accom panied by violence, and w hich broadened out into a general issue between national and international unionism . F o r the time being the invaders were repulsed w ith heavy financial losses, though such a decision proved to be the exception rather than the rule for international unionism in C anada as a whole. In the m any argum ents arising out of the dispute in N ova Scotia it was pointed out th at the “international” unions belied their nam e, since they had no affiliations with E uropean trade unions. T here w ere, of course, good reasons for the strong influence o f the U nited States: geographical contiguity and sim ilarity of conditions. T here seems to have been in C anada no im portant body o f opinion which sought affiliation with British labour unions; and there is no indication of m ore than a distant interest in the first and second Internationals in Europe. In 1906 M r. Ram say M acdonald visited C anada, looking for “ an u nder­ standing w ith the labour parties o f the colonies so that there may be harm ony and co-operation between ourselves and them ,” but any co-operation that resulted was only of a general kind.47 T here were, how ever, external forces affecting C anadian labour oth er than those com ing from the U nited States. T he plans and policies o f labour organizations in A ustralia, N ew Zealand, G reat Britain, and Europe w ere studied w ith some care, w ith a view to their lessons for C anada. Two them es were of particular interest: political action and socialist doctrines. M anifestly any labour m ovem ent m ust aim at legislation as one means of achieving its objectives. T he difference of opinion in the C anadian labour organizations was on w hether or not they should intervene directly in politics by creating labour

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parties in the provinces o r the dom inion. British and foreign examples could be cited on either side o f the argum ent. F o r som e years sporadic attem pts w ere m ade to further the desired legislation by running candidates for the various legislatures. In 1873 and 1874 the O ttaw a T rades Council secured the election of labour candidates to the O ntario House. In 1883, 1886, and 1894 the T oronto T rades Council attem pted, unsuc­ cessfully, to elect candidates to either the federal o r the provincial parliam ent. T he Provincial W orkm en’s Association m ade several attem pts in the eighties and nineties to elect candidates to the N ova Scotian Assembly, but w ith little success. T h e British Colum bia labour organizations w ere m ost interested in political action, and in 1902 form ed a Provincial Progressive P arty . T h e question also was frequently discussed by the C anadian organizations as a whole. T he T rades and L abor Congress, at its annual convention in 1894, adopted a general resolution in favour of direct political action, but w ith little result. T h e annual meeting in 1906 was the occasion for serious consideration o f the organization o f a labour party, the sup­ porters o f such a move being encouraged by the success of the L abour party in England and the statem ent o f the president of the A m erican F ederation o f L abor in favour of political action. A gain a general resolution was passed endorsing the sending of representatives o f labour to federal and provincial parliam ents, and again the fruits were small. O n the w hole the C anadian labour organizations steered a middle course between the British em phasis on parliam entary action and the A m erican tendency to m inim ize th at m ethod. T h e various socialist program m es o f G re at Britain, Europe, the U nited States, A ustralia, and N ew Z ealand w ere known in C anada and m et w ith some acceptance. In January 1905 the Socialist P arty of C anada was founded by Scottish and English adherents, together with some m em bers from the U nited States and E uropean countries. Its organization was planned to be provincial with a dom inion executive com m ittee, but its strength continued to be, as it started, in British Colum bia, and the proposed national convention was never held. T he principles of the party were strictly M arxian. T he em phasis was on pro p a­ ganda by lectures and pam phlets, and though the party had m em bers in the provincial legislature, political activity was never its m ain m ethod. T he Social D em ocratic Party, including m em bers who left the Socialist P arty, was founded at T oronto in 1910. Based on British and G erm an models, it continued to

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be centred in T o ro n to as the older body was in the west. A n attem p t to com m it the T rades and L abor Congress to political socialism by a m otion in favour o f “absolute independent politi­ cal action on the p art of the w orking class w ith the collective ow nership of the m eans of life as its ultim ate aim ” was voted down at a m eeting in 1907.48 Socialists from abroad - Britain, the U nited States, and E urope - toured the country from time to tim e. M ay D ay parades - som e o f w hich were prohibited w ere organized in M ontreal, T oronto, and other cities. O n the whole, however, socialism did not find wide support, though it was em braced by various small groups. A m ongst the farm ers of C anada two foreign organizations had fo r a time a considerable success. T he Patrons o f H us­ bandry, o r the G range, was founded in W ashington in 1867, and spread rapidly in the next few years. It was a fraternal society, organized in units, o r granges, and aimed at collective action to cure such farm ers’ ills as high railw ay rates, undue profit by m iddlem en, heavy taxes, and high interest rates on loans. Canadian farm ers w ith sim ilar worries became interested in the idea and granges began to be set up in Q uebec and O ntario from 1872.49 T he order was incorporated in C anada as the “D om inion G range of the Patrons of H usbandry,” and while it had a separate C anadian existence its principles were taken from those o f its A m erican parent. M em bership grew rapidly until it reached its zenith in 1879 with an estim ated 31,000 m em bers. O ntario was the centre of the m ovem ent; it had some success in Q uebec and the m aritim e provinces but alm ost none in the west. T he activities o f the G range included collective purchasing, a co-operative salt m anufacturing com pany, a trust and loan society, and a projected bank. W hile the G range had som e influence on legislation, it did not attem pt to organize a political party. A nother farm ers’ order im ported from the U nited States, the Patrons of Industry of N o rth A m erica, had som ew hat sim ilar organization and objectives, but followed a different course. T he Patrons o f Industry, incorporated in C anada in 1890, found strong support in the west. U nlike the G range, too, it entered the political field, but there m et with disaster in the federal election o f 1896. F o u r m em bers in the H ouse of Com m ons did not constitute a party.

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IV T h e econom ic grow th o f C anada from the late nineties depended partly on the im provem ent in general w orld condi­ tions; and to a large extent on the provision of adequate and costly modes of transportation, together w ith increase o f popu­ lation. T he financing o f all this developm ent, both in the actual expense of railways and the industrial and agricultural advance in w hich the new population was to be em ployed, assured in tu rn a sound internal financial structure w ith a supply of foreign capital. T he political union of the provinces opened the w ay for the utilization of w hat credit was available w ithin the dom inion, and provided a m ore favourable field for the foreign investor. T h e financial institutions of the dom inion, as of the old prov­ inces, were m odelled on those of G reat Britain and the U nited States; and as in the case o f so m any other of its institutions, C anada had to decide on w hether the practice of its m other country or of its neighbour was the m ore satisfactory to follow. T h e banks of all the provinces had, before confederation, dif­ fered little from those o f the U nited K ingdom : there were, however, som e steps taken by the Province of C anada to introduce the “ free banking” adopted by the U nited States. The act o f 1850 (13 and 14 V iet., c. 21) was little used, but there rem ained some body of opinion which preferred the American system o f a large num ber of local banks to the British system of few banks with num erous branches. By the British N orth A m erica Act of 1867 exclusive jurisdiction over banking was given to the federal parliam ent, and in its early sessions there w as discussion over the regulation of banks and currency. T he first decision reached by the governm ent was to organize C ana­ dian banks on the A m erican plan. T he m inister of finance, John Rose, prepared a series of resolutions to this end, and had the extra-parliam entary support o f E. H. King, general m anager of the Bank of M ontreal. R esolutions w ere introduced into the H ouse of C om m ons, but the opposition proved to be so form id­ able that they w ere w ithdraw n. T he two chief sponsors also left the field: M r. K ing died and M r. Rose resigned, to be succeeded by Sir Francis H incks, w ho returned to the orthodox principles of British banking. A cts of 1870 were replaced in the following year by the first general Bank A ct, to apply to all banks, and to rem ain in operation for ten years. T he system of branch-banking w as retained, and the proposal to base bank notes on dom inion securities deposited w ith the receiver-general was rejected. In

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the decennial revisions of the Bank A ct som e signs o f the old A m erican heresy again appeared, but never becam e effective. D ecision on the type o f currency to be used had already been m ade before confederation. In all the provinces the decimal system had been introduced, first as optional and finally as com pulsory. It rem ained only for the dom inion parliam ent to assim ilate the currency o f O ntario, Quebec, and New Brunswick. In spite of some opposition the currency o f N ova Scotia was, In in 1871, m ade uniform with th a t of the rest of C anada contrast to the decision on the type o f banking, no principle, o th er than th at o f convenience, was involved in the retention of the dollar currency, and only sentim ental glances were cast back to the old regim e. I f the currency was N o rth A m erican, the m oney used to build railways and prom ote industry was largely British in origin. G re at Britain was, as she had long been, an exporter o f capital o n a large scale, and the C anadian provinces had in years past been m aterially benefited by this fact. In the early tw entieth century the flow to C anada rapidly increased O f a total foreign investm ent in C anada in 1900 of som e thirty m illions of dollars, a third was British. In subsequent years, as the total investm ent increased, the British proportion was higher. In 1905 the total first passed one hundred million dollars, o f which about 70 per cent was British. T he external investm ent in C anada for the years 1900-1913 has been calculated as follows:

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B ritish: $1,753,118,000 A m erican: 629,794,000 O ther countries: 162,715,000 T otal: $2,545,627,000 A fu rth er stim ulant to C anadian econom ic life was in the establishm ent o f English o r foreign industries in Canada. To some extent this had long been the case: the H udson’s Bay C om pany, fo r exam ple, had played, and continued to play, an im portant p art in Canada, and the G rand T ru n k Railway was largely an English com pany. A m erican interests, too, had pene­ trated to C anada as early as the first half o f the nineteenth century; began to take an im portant place after 1870; and expanded m ore rapidly at the end of the century A voidance o f the tariff was a leading m otive in this m ovem ent; securing of raw m aterial - especially wood products and m etals - was another; transportation costs and adaptability to the m arket also played som e part.

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L abour, capital, and industry from abroad together consti­ tuted a large facto r in C anadian econom ic life. In som e cases there were com plaints that foreign w orkers and foreign indus­ tries dispossessed C anadian w orkers or com panies, but on the w hole they added to a general growth far m ore than they dis­ placed native people and enterprises. If to these there be added foreign trade it is apparent th at the C anadian econom y was largely dependent on external contributions and relationships.

C H A P T E R 10

The Conduct of High Policy: Subjects and Methods

T h e im portance and variety of the external relations o f C ana­ da, increasing from year to year, threw a growing burden on the m achinery o f governm ent, and led to an exam ination of the adequacy of th at m achinery. T hough modelled in general on the British constitution, the C anadian system o f governm ent in ­ cluded two im portant characteristics n o t to be found in th at of the m other country. W hen the union of 1867 was form ed it was decided that a federation rath er than a legislative union was best adapted to the conditions of the country, and subjects having any direct bearing on external affairs w ere assigned to the central authority. N o exception was taken to G eorge Brow n’s statem ent in the debate on the Quebec Resolution th at “for all dealings w ith the Im perial G overnm ent and foreign countries we have clothed the G eneral G overnm ent w ith the m ost am ple pow ers and fo r purposes o f external affairs C anada was virtually a unitary state. T he other leading difference between the constitu­ tions of G reat Britain and C anada - that the latter was n o t a sovereign state —h ad a m ore serious effect on external relations. W ithin the limits o f dom inion powers, the parliam ent at O ttaw a m ight exercise in respect o f external relations the sam e suprem e authority as did the parliam ent at W estm inster. It was a funda­ m ental principle o f the English system that parliam ent should retain, in every branch of public affairs, the right not only to form ulate policy, but also to hold such check as it m ight wish on the m inisters and civil servants concerned. I t has, however, been long recognized that parliam entary control is less easily exercised in foreign than in dom estic affairs: not because the subject is m ore technical, but simply because it is foreign. Except in tim es of crisis, the electors (and therefore the m em bers of parliam ent) are less interested in, and often ill-inform ed on, foreign relations. Inform ation m ay be w ithheld because of the necessity for at least some degree of secrecy in the conduct of diplom acy. U nder the British constitution, and those w hich stem from it, the elected body discusses publicly such aspects of

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foreign policy as treaties and other engagem ents to an extent unknow n under o th er systems o f governm ent, and at tim es to the em barrassm ent o f the diplom ats. On the other hand a study o f the foreign relations o f a dem ocracy will also reveal th at the diplom ats may, and sometim es do, conduct conversations with foreign representatives which, w ithout creating a binding com ­ m itm ent, go fa r tow ard an agreem ent just as real in practice. Exam ples of both types o f cases m ay be taken from recent English history. W hen negotiations for an A nglo-G erm an alliance w ere under w ay at the end of the nineteenth century, the G erm an governm ent saw, as an obstacle to the com pletion o f a treaty, th at it would either be m ade public by discussion in parliam ent, or, if it was not subm itted to parliam ent, would have less value. A n exam ple of lack o f parliam entary sanction is found in the relations built up by the diplom ats of F rance and England between 1904 and 1914, the full im plications of which w ere said not to have been know n even to the whole cabinet. W ith all its draw backs, it has been accepted that parliam en­ tary control of foreign policy is essential to dem ocratic govern­ m ent. T h at principle was autom atically accepted in C anada from the time o f confederation, and in later years becam e a veritable dogm a. In the C anadian, as in the English, parliam ent the subject of foreign relations m ight be introduced by m eans of a statem ent by a m inister o f the crown, by question and answer, by resolution, o r by debate on a convention o r treaty. F rom the very origin o f the C anadian parliam ent the pages of the debates o f the Senate and H ouse o f C om m ons are well larded with discussion o f a t least some aspects of external relations. The largest proportion o f space is taken by com m ercial questions, especially actual o r proposed tariff agreem ents. Reciprocity with the U nited States and the use o f C anadian fisheries would probably come first in length, followed by the various aspects of im perial relations. T he use of C anadian and A m erican inland waterways received the attention o f parliam ent from tim e to tim e, as did the few boundary disputes o f the period. Political relations cam e up m ore often indirectly than directly, as at the tim e o f the joint high com mission at W ashington in 1871 or in relation to im perial defence. Participation in the Boer W ar m ight well be regarded as a direct political question, but it is notew orthy th at the C anadian parliam ent had nothing to do w ith the decisions th at led to the outbreak of th at w ar o r to its conclusion. In political, far m ore than in com m ercial, questions it is ap parent th at the lim itations o f C anadian autonom y re­

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stricted the area and degree not only o f the actual conduct of foreign relations but also o f the policy by which it was governed. T he escape from these lim itations was a many-sided question, w hich will be exam ined later G iven the geographical position, the stress on internal developm ent, and the incom plete autonom y of C anada, it may not be an inaccurate generalization to say that p arliam ent displayed a reasonable know ledge of, and interest in, foreign affairs. W hen the tariff was being considered members w ould present a form idable array of statistics. But they did not stop at factual m aterial. N either H ouse was afraid to exam ine the very fundam entals o f the external relations of C anada: independence, closer or looser political connection w ith the U nited States - all these found advocates, and all were debated with a disarm ing frankness. These were the very bases on which all other external policy o f C anada was predicated, correspond­ ing, fo r example, to the question raised in England as to w hether isolation or alliances w ould be the w iser course. W hile the C anadian parliam ent thus continued on its way, doubts arose as to w hether th at p art o f the civil service w hich dealt with external relations was well designed. T h e old system, untouched for forty years after confedera­ tion, was that external relations were conducted by various m em bers of the cabinet and civil service, according to the subject, w ithout any departm ent or division o f a departm ent having p articular responsibility, and w ithout any recognition o f a need for continuous attention o r expert knowledge. The m ethod o f conducting m atters w ith other British countries or w ith foreign countries falls into two aspects. T he governor general in C anada and the colonial office in E ngland norm ally constituted the sole channel o f com m unication. T h e colonial office might, depending on the subject in question, refer to the adm iralty, w ar office, foreign office, o r other departm ent, and a fu rth er link was added w hen the foreign office referred to an em­ bassy abroad. A reply to a dispatch from O ttaw a might, there­ fore, represent the com pletion o f a process already having passed through several stages. T here w ere, how ever, in practice m odi­ fications to this cum brous m achinery. Com m ercial negotiations w ith foreign states cam e to be direct in all but form , and the C anadians associated in them corresponded directly w ith the prim e minister. O n occasions, as in the proposal for tariff discussions in 1910, the British am bassador in W ashington com m unicated directly w ith the governor general. T he link between the governor general and the C anadian governm ent was

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usually the privy council, and sometimes, on less im portant m atters, an individual minister. A n incom ing dispatch ordinarily w ent from the governor general to the privy council, by \vhi h body it was assigned to the departm ent m ost concerned in the subject. In due course the m inister at the head of the departm ent reported back to the council, the report becam e the basis of a m inute, and the m inute of a reply to the original dispatch. T he sam e process w ould operate fo r a correspondence initiated in Canada. F o r m any years the only criticism was levelled against the portion o f the m achinery first described, th at is o f the com ­ m unication through governor general and colonial office. It seemed at times hardly short of absurd th at correspondence between the C anadian and A m erican governm ents should go by way of London, and objections also w ere m ade to the process of negotiations on trade m atters with E uropean governm ents. But, as modifications were m ade which allowed C anadians virtually to negotiate com m ercial treaties, and as direct com ­ m unications with W ashington becam e m ore com m on, that criticism becam e less noticeable. M oreover, it was fully realized that a radical change in the procedure would m aterially alter the delicate balance o f im perial relations. T he question then was raised - rather late, it is true - as to w hether the purely C an a­ dian p art o f the m achinery was adequate for the purpose. Two facts stared an investigator in the face; now here could there be found com plete files covering even single cases in external affairs - f a r less the full record of the external relations of the dom inion with any particular country, or during any particular period; and secondly, th at there w ere no persons in the civil service specially trained in foreign affairs, o r even enabled to specialize in that field. A practical proposal to end this situation, anom al­ ous in a country which was no longer a colony and which had im portant external relations, was m ade in 1907 to the royal com m ission on the civil service by Joseph Pope, under-secretary o f state. Pope advised that a departm ent, or sub-departm ent, of external affairs be set up, w ith its own staff, and with such files as it could collect from the various places to which they had found their way. W hile the report of the royal com mission m ade only a passing and partial recom m endation following Pope’s m em orandum , the original proposal was adopted by the governm ent some two years later. In 1909 C harles M urphy, secretary of state, moved a resolu­ tion in the H ouse o f C om m ons that a departm ent of external

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affairs be set up, presided over by the secretary o f state, and w ith a deputy head and the necessary clerks In draw ing up the plan the governm ent had the advantage o f the recent precedent in A ustralia, w here a departm ent with a sim ilar nam e had been created. In both cases there was to be not a foreign office, as found in every sovereign state, but an office to handle both intra-im perial and foreign relations. T he reasons for this are obvious: not only was it questionable w hether there w ould be enough business fo r two departm ents; but - the m ore com ­ pelling reason - the two could not be separated, inasm uch as foreign relations w ere conducted through the colonial office. In other w ords, foreign and im perial relations were, to some extent, the same. Early in the debate, and again later, governm ent spokesm en m ade it clear that no change was intended except in the purely C anadian organization, and no contrary opinion was expressed in the H ouse o f Com m ons. T he debate was brief and unimpressive. Speakers on the governm ent side pointed to the growing volum e o f business in external affairs and argued the advantages of a separate organization. O pposition speakers were listless, and had little m ore to say than that things could go on as they were, w ithout additional cost. T he debate was in striking contrast to those on imperial relations o r tariff questions. It is app aren t that parliam ent had no appreciation of the fact that external affairs required expert adm inistration just as did dom es­ tic affairs. A nd in some quarters it was to be long before this fallacy died. T he act and 9 Edw . V II, c. 13) passed with little discussion or change. T he point was m ade, outside parlia­ m ent, that the phrase, “ the secretary of state, as head of the departm ent, shall have conduct of all official com m unications between the governm ent of C anada and the governm ent of any oth er country in connection with the external affairs o f C anada . . . was not an accurate description o f the situation; and that, in view of the continuing role of the governor general, “care” should.be used instead of “conduct.” T he substitution, however, was not m ade, and apparently no practical difficulty arose. T he im po rtan t change in the act was m ade in 1912 when the prim e m inister was m ade secretary o f state for external affairs, an arrangem ent suggested when the original act was drafted, but n o t adopted at th at time. T h e m achinery in force before the W ar o f 1914 was therefore sim ilar to that used in the U nited K ingdom , both on the parliam entary and adm inistrative sides, but lim ited in its powers. T h e parliam ent o f C anada retained a control over external

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affairs in so far as it wished and dom inion autonom y allowed. A portfolio of external affairs, though not held by a separate m inister, carried that subject into the inner councils o f govern­ m ent. O n the adm inistrative side appointm ents w ere m ade but the developm ent of the departm ent in size was slow. Even by the end of the w ar there was only one officer included in the delegation to the peace conference. T he C anadian m achinery fo r the conduct o f foreign affairs differed from the British in th at the form er was not only very sm all, b u t lacked diplom atic missions abroad, w ith all the flow o f inform ation th at they involve. II G enerally speaking, official relations between the C anadian and other governm ents w ere m aintained through British chan­ nels. T here w ere, how ever, m odifications to this rule, im portant enough to justify a separate analysis. T here w ere no perm anent diplom atic agents stationed in O ttaw a, nor w ere there C anadian agents abroad. In several cases C anadians were appointed as ad hoc plenipotentiaries, being, at least in form , representatives o f the British governm ent. In m ost instances appointm ents were m ade for the purpose of negotiation and signature of trade treaties, the relative place of the C anadian plenipotentiaries and their U nited K ingdom associates changing from tim e to time. In one im portant case, how ever, th at o f the W ashington joint com mission o f 1871, the subjects under discussion w ere m ore political than com m ercial. T hough certain disadvantages existed in this indirect diplom acy, they were partly rem oved in practice; and C anada actually negotiated her own trade agreem ents with the aid of the experience and prestige o f the British governm ent. It was through the frequent negotiations with foreign govern­ m ents, chiefly on tariff questions, fisheries, and the use of inland w aters, that C anadians played their m ost active and m ost direct p art in diplom acy. T here w ere also, how ever, a num ber of officials and bodies which w ere m ore perm anent, and were in som e way related to the conduct of diplom acy. Representatives o f C anada abroad w ere alm ost all non-diplom atic. Im m igration agents in various countries were confined to their own subject. A fter confederation m ost o f the provinces continued to appoint agents-general in L ondon, as they had done before; but such officers could not in any way be described as diplom atic, having to do only w ith im m igration and com m erce. T he office o f high

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com m issioner, described in a previous chapter, was in a different category A lthough the C anadian governm ent had originally proposed that its representative in L ondon should be diplom atic o r quasi-diplom atic, constitutional objections had prevented th at status being granted. Even after the departm ent o f external affairs was established the high com m issioner continued to correspond with the under-secretary of state. A large proportion o f the tim e of the high com m issioners was occupied in prom ot­ ing the financial, com m ercial, and im m igration interests of the dom inion, but they could be used for political questions as occasion arose, and w ere usually appointed as C anadian pleni­ potentiaries for the negotiation o f treaties. N o consular appointm ents w ere m ade; Canadians, like other British subjects, being able to avail themselves of the services of the consular representatives o f the im perial governm ent T here w ere, however, a num ber of foreign consuls in C anada, and their position had som e significance as the only representatives o f their countries in the dom inion. T he first rep o rt of the d ep art­ m ent o f external affairs contains a list o f consuls and consular agents in 1910, show ing th at thirty-tw o states had such rep re­ sentatives in C anada. In m ost cases there were several officers, stationed at different C anadian cities T hough the list does not m ake any such distinction, it is probable th at the m ajority of the representatives w ere perm anent residents, and th at only the consuls-general o r senior consuls were de carriere. M ost o f the head offices w ere either at O ttaw a o r M ontreal. T he procedure regulating the appointm ent o f consuls was as follows: a consular officer holding a com mission from the head o f the state required an exequatur, w hich was issued by the British governm ent. In the case o f those resident in C anada, the C anadian governm ent was consulted as to w hether the appointm ent was free from objection. In the case o f those sent specially to C anada, th at is, consuls de carriere, the appointm ent was m ade w ithout consul­ tation. F o r those consular officers appointed by a governm ent o r a superior consular officer a form al recognition, instead of an exequatur, w as granted by the British governm ent, after con­ sultation w ith th at o f C anada. T em porary appointm ents m ight be accepted by the governm ent o f C anada, pending reference to the British governm ent T h e C anadian governm ent was consulted as to the establishm ent of new consulates, and on occasion it took the initiative in suggesting th at approaches should be m ade to th at end. It was, how ever, the status rath er th an the m ethod of appointm ent o f consuls th at entailed ques­

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tions o f principle. A fter confederation, as before it, the general rule o f the British governm ent was that consuls w ere simply foreign residents. Special courtesies m ight well be extended to them, b ut none such as to entail change of status. They w ere not, for exam ple, granted their request to have private entry to the governor general’s D raw ing Room , for this was a privilege conferred on diplom ats. F rom tim e to time one or m ore o f the consuls protested th at they did in fact occupy a position not analogous to that of consuls in sovereign states, but w ere doing diplom atic w ork that would otherw ise be handled by embassies. F o r some years attem pts by the consuls to act as diplom ats were quashed. In 1876, for example, the D anish consul was discouraged from acting as an interm ediary in discussions over m utual rights o f D anish and C anadian ships in the coasting trade. A gain in 1881 Sir John M acdonald gracefully intim ated to the F rench consul that the latter’s views on trade negotiations w ere fo r the ear o f His M ajesty’s governm ent. In later years, however, principles w ere tacitly ignored to allow fo r the convenience o f utilizing a representative o f a foreign pow er resident in the dom inion. In w hat were a t first described as “inform al negotiations,” the C anadian govern­ m ent discussed w ith the G erm an consul-general the tariff quarrel between the two countries, and in 1910 the m inister o f finance and the consul reached an agreem ent for a settle­ m ent In the sam e year the m inister signed an agreem ent w ith th e Italian consul on tariff concessions T he Japanese consul-general took p art in the negotiations arising o u t of the im m igration o f Japanese, the V ancouver riots, and the relation of C anada to the A nglo-Japanese treaty of 1911.10 The contrast between the form al status of consuls and the role they actually played was, therefore, m arked. A nsw ering a question in the H ouse o f C om m ons as to the refusal o f consuls to attend the D raw ing Room , L aurier rem arked th at “ the question . . . is an im p ortant one, not perhaps so m uch on account o f the draw ing room as on account of the duties which consuls general now discharge in Canada. W e have no diplom atic service in C anada, and the consuls general are exercising by tolerance some, I shall not say diplom atic powers, but powers very often cognate to such. T he question is one w hich should be settled, and the m atter is now engaging the attention o f the govern­ m ent In the following session the position of consuls again cam e up in the H ouse, and on that occasion L aurier w ent fu rth er th an he had before. T he position of consuls in C anada, he said,

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like the status o f Canada, could hardly be defined. A lthough L au rier had “often taken the view that we are now a nation,” it was tru e th a t “we cannot have under present conditions diplom atic agents am ongst us other than the consular agents w ho are entrusted by their governm ents w ith com m ercial func­ tions. . . . By the force o f things these consuls general have becom e w ith us sem i-diplom atic agents, and m any of the consuls have really perform ed diplom atic duties.” Citing the cases of G erm an , Italian, and A m erican consuls as exercising diplom atic functions, L aurier adm itted th at “all this has been done w ithout authority, and is contrary to the rules th at apply am ong civilized nations.” T he position, he w ent on, should be regularized. “I th ink we should have an understanding w ith the im perial governm ent th at the consuls should have sem i-diplom atic recog­ nition am ongst us Looking back a t a practice w ith w hich he had been fam iliar, Sir R obert Borden concluded th at it had been “ both convenient and advantageous,” and cited a case during his ow n period of office: th at in 1913, when he had negotiated with the consul-general of Jap an over C anada’s adhesion to the A nglo-Japanese treaty o f 1911.13 L aurier’s suggestion that the practice be regularized was never taken up, probably because the W ar o f 1914 brought C anada nearer to participation in the m ore conventional diplom atic procedure. O ut o f the appointm ent of officers abroad who w ere to prom ote C anadian trade grew the practice o f utilizing these m en fo r functions w hich w ere properly consular. T he first step, in the nineties, was to nom inate businessmen in the British Isles and the W est Indies as “com m ercial agents” under the super­ vision o f the m inister of finance, with the object of receiving inform ation from the localities on the possibilities o f trade, and o f supplying inform ation to com m ercial firms there. W hen the departm ent o f trade and com m erce w as set up in 1892 the agents reported to it, but still gave only part-tim e services. In 1895 the first full-tim e com m ercial agent was appointed at Sydney, A ustralia, and subsequently others were sent to various cities. In 1907 th e nam e was changed to “ C anadian trade com m issioners.” T he prim ary duty o f the com m issioners was to fu rth er the foreign trade of C anada, but as a m atter o f conveni­ ence they cam e to vise docum ents and handle im m igration m atters. But, while they incidentally did consular w ork, they could not be called in any sense diplom atic. In all designs, projected o r adopted, o f m achinery for the conduct of C anadian foreign relations, two im m utable facts of

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C an ad a’s position - her proxim ity to the U nited States and her m em bership in the British E m pire - inevitably played an im­ p o rtan t part. T he form er led to exceptions in procedure and the creation o f a special organization. T he im perial aspect of C an ad a’s position produced a m uch m ore com plicated them e. A s has already been pointed out, the relations of C anada with foreign states w ere carried on to a considerable extent through British officials. A s the dom inion developed in internal strength an d national consciousness, differences o f opinion arose as to th e relative parts th a t should be taken by im perial and C anadian officers, and m odifications w ere m ade from tim e to tim e. But th at sam e grow th o f C anada also brought up an issue, with far w ider im plications and m uch less easily resolved. If this form er group o f detached colonies had becom e a single country with great resources and territory, if dependent status was steadily giving way to increasing autonom y; if C anada was, m o re and m ore, to determ ine and conduct her own foreign policy - was then that policy to be distinct from those o f other parts of the em pire? Such a com plete break w ould generally have been regarded as undesirable and im practicable. But if there was to be a single policy o r an integration of separate policies, by w hat m eans could either be accom plished? In the U nited K ingdom there w ere a com plete m echanism , expert personnel, and a long tradition fo r the carrying out of foreign policy. In C anada and the other dom inions none of the three was to be found. In the U nited K ingdom a realization o f growing foreign pressure on the w idespread em pire and even on the island itself was leading to a desire for support from those parts of the em pire w hich had grown to m anhood. T he dom inions, for their part, saw the problem in the light of their various circum stances. W hile there were as m any approaches to the question as there w ere solutions offered for it, there could hardly be disagreem ent on the leading place taken by defence and foreign policy. The two were, to a considerable extent, interdependent, and any m ajor plan for the one w ould also involve the other. In other respects, how ever, defence was a specialized subject, and will therefore be m ore fully treated in the following chapter. T urning now to foreign policy in general, it is apparent, as M r. D uncan H all points out, that com m on interests can be prom oted only by a single authority o r by co-operation betw een governm ents. In subdivision of the alternatives he finds th at the com m on author­ ity could be th at of the British governm ent o r of an imperial federal parliam ent; and th at co-operation between governm ents

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could be through interm ediaries (corresponding to diplom ats), o r in direct meetings. All fo u r m ethods w ere advocated, can­ vassed, and opposed; and three were in p art adopted T h e idea o f an im perial parliam ent m ade up of representa­ tives from all self-governing p arts of the em pire had the m ost obvious advantages and disadvantages; and m any designs for such a body w ere put forw ard from time to tim e T he general plan would provide fo r a parliam ent meeting in L ondon, having control over m atters o f com m on interest, o f which the m ost obvious w ere foreign policy, defence, and som e am ount of taxation. A n im perial cabinet, responsible to this parliam ent, w ould also be required. It being a federal constitution, each com ponent p art - including the U nited K ingdom —w ould retain its governm ental system for local affairs. T hrough the im perial m achinery a single foreign policy could be evolved and carried out, supported by the whole em pire. T he defence effort could be distributed and integrated, w ith all the advantages o f a single strategy and com m and. H aving a voice in the determ ination of policy, no p art o f the em pire would be com m itted to action - in peace o r w ar - w ithout its wish. T he w hole argum ent was, to some degree, built on the success o f federalism in single countries, particularly in the U n ited States and C anada. T he parallel, how ever, was n o t exact. It would be a union o f parts so divided geographically th at attendance a t a com m on parliam ent would offer difficulties. F urtherm ore, the federated countries would be so unequally represented - because o f the w ide differences in population - th at the U nited K ingdom m ust be the dom inant p artn er. Federalism was not an objective spon­ sored by G reat B ritain and opposed by the colonies. In both it found support, and in both severe criticism. M any people in the U nited K ingdom feared th at their freedom of action w ould be restricted, w ithout com pensating additions o f strength. W hile the dom inions were far from being in agreem ent w ith each other, the effective C anadian opinion was th at federation would spell the loss o f autonom y. A n acute com m on danger m ight conceivably have overridden these objections, but no such overw helm ing factor was felt to be present. D uring the W ar of 1914 th at outside pressure, so effective in the confederation of C an ad a itself, was heavily applied, and an im perial federation was then once m ore discussed. D irect co-operation on m atters o f com m on interest between the governm ents of the em pire was realized in som e degree through the meetings of the colonial (o r later, im perial) con­

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ference. Beginning as conversations betw een the colonial secre­ ta ry and m em bers o f the colonial cabinets, the conferences evolved into m ore organized and m ore authoritative discussions betw een prim e m inisters. W hile personal m eetings and ex­ changes of views w ere undoubtedly helpful, there was a lack of continuity and of provision fo r im plem enting decisions by legislative o r executive action. T he conference rem ained a body w ith no continuous life and its m em bers w ere helpless to do m ore than report back to their respective cabinets and legisla­ tures. T he conference o f 1897 passed a resolution in favour of periodic m eetings and that o f 1902 voted m ore definitely for conferences every four years. N either of these steps involved any essential change in the character o f the conference, but that question cam e up in concrete form at the meetings in 1907. In 1905 A lfred L yttleton, the colonial secretary, suggested in a dispatch to the various British governm ents that the title “colonial conference” should be changed to “ imperial council,” and th at a com mission o r secretariat should be added to give continuity. C anada, alone of the dom inions, objected to the proposals, L au rier’s governm ent seeing the thin end o f the wedge o f an im perial constitution, com m itm ents, and curtail­ m ent o f autonom y. T he proposal was w ithdraw n before the conference o f 1907, but the idea was discussed and it became app aren t that there was no support for any radical change in the conference. In the end a resolution was adopted, nam ing the conference “ im perial,” and m aking it clear th at the discussions w ere betw een governm ents. T he resolution also attem pted to bridge the four-year gap betw een conferences by advocating a secretariat and by allowing for subsidiary conferences on press­ ing o r m inor m atters, to be attended only by those governm ents im m ediately interested. B oth proposals bore fruit. T he secre­ tariat was provided through a reorganization within the colonial office, and the first subsidiary conference was held in 1909 on m ilitary and naval defence. O nce again, in 1911, a proposal for change was m ade, Sir Joseph W ard putting before the conference a plan for an im perial parliam ent, prim arily for defence, and also fo r some aspects of foreign policy and taxation. Even less than the tentative idea of a council did this m eet w ith any support, and the im perial conference rem ained as one between governm ents, w ith no legislative o r executive authority. R eturning now to the fo u r alternatives m entioned above, it is app aren t th at federation was unacceptable, and th at direct co-operation betw een governm ents was realized in som e degree

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through the im perial conference. In direct co-operation of governm ents, by m eans of interm ediaries, m ade little progress before 1914, since the only existing office w hich could have been utilized w ith respect to the relations o f C anada, and the U nited K ingdom was that of high com m issioner, an office which had rem ained non-diplom atic. T here rem ained only the British governm ent as a com m on authority in foreign relations. In certain fields - fiscal policy and relations w ith the U nited States - C anada kept the reins within her own hands. But in spite of adhesion to the doctrine of no com m itm ents - or perhaps because of it - it was left to the British governm ent to shape a foreign policy tow ard E urope that was technically not th at o f the dom inions but in practice charted the course which they were to follow. Relations w ith the U nited States, as with G reat Britain, were o f such prim ary im portance as to suggest special governm ental m achinery. D iplom atic procedure, as has been m entioned, fre­ quently departed from the strictly British channels to becom e m ore direct. In addition to this undefined m ethod was a special body, the International Joint Com m ission, created to deal with b oundary w aters on the long frontier between C anada and the U nited States T he com mission had characteristics which gave it special significance: it was perm anent, had judicial aspects, was purely C anadian and A m erican, and, while devoted to a special aspect o f international relations, capable of extension to other fields. T he origin of the idea o f a body to deal with b oundary w aters is to be found in the International Irrigation Congress, which met a t A lbuquerque, N ew M exico, in 1895. In addition to certain states of the union, C anada and M exico were also represented. A t the instigation of the delegates of the last two countries the congress passed a resolution inviting the U nited States to appoint an international commission to act with the governm ents of C anada and M exico in “ adjudicating the conflicting rights which have arisen.” In 1896 the British am bas­ sador in W ashington conveyed to the secretary of state the desire of the C anadian governm ent to co-operate in the proposed plan, but found no readiness for im m ediate action. It was not until 1902 that the A m erican governm ent appointed its three com missioners, and the C anadian governm ent then further delayed until 1905. T h e International W aterw ays Com mission was an experi­ m ent, and a fruitful one. Division o f w aters for irrigation and, increasingly, for electric pow er inevitably brought controversies

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and the need fo r agreem ent. O ver such rivers as the St. M ary and the Milk, rising in M ontana, and the N iagara the discussion had already begun when the first com mission cam e into being. Its duties w ere to investigate and to m ake reports - with recom m endations if required - to both governm ents. Such lim ited powers proved to be inadequate, and in the course of its reports the com mission proposed that its powers be extended o r a new com m ission established. E xploration and negotiation o f a treaty to im plem ent the suggestion w ent on over the course o f three years. M any m en had a hand in the process. O f the im perial representatives Bryce in W ashington and G rey in O ttaw a encouraged and facilitated the progress of the study. F o r the two governm ents im m ediately concerned, R oot, Laurier, and A ylesw orth w ere the m inisters m ost closely associated with the w ork. T he detailed negotiations, how ever, were shouldered by no one of these but by their appointees - G eorge C. G ibbons and G eorge Clinton, respectively C anadian and A m erican representatives on the old W aterw ays Com mission - who also m ade the first drafts of the treaty, w hich were then ham m ered into shape by G ibbons and C handler A nderson, the chief counsel for the state departm ent. N egotiations occupied a long period and were n ot w ithout difficulties. M r. R oot, with thoughts o f states’ rights and the Senate, at first resisted the C anadian proposal for a treaty which should lay dow n definite principles and give extensive pow ers to the com mission. His alternative plan was for a loose arrangem ent, w ith each problem to be considered afresh as it arose. T o Sir W ilfrid L aurier, on the o th er hand, such a com mission was not w orth creating. W hen R o o t finally gave way some fu rth er trouble developed by the insistence of the Senate in m aking am endm ents, and L aurier seems to have becom e suspicious of their im port and to have lost any enthusiasm he m ay earlier have had. T h e process o f negotiations, so largely direct between C ana­ dians and A m ericans, foreshadow ed an essential characteristic o f the new com mission. T he Boundary W aters T reaty o f 1909 was on its face a treaty betw een G reat Britain and the U nited States, but its purpose was the creation o f the International Jo in t Com m ission on w hich G reat Britain had no representa­ tives. By no one was Britain’s exclusion thought to be oth er than a benefit to her. T he active p art she had earlier played in Canadian-A m erican disputes had been necessary at a tim e when C anada had reason to fear m ilitary aggression, but it visited upon her both additional disputes w ith a great pow er w ith w hich she

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wished to be at peace and the criticism of the Canadians dissatisfied w ith the results obtained. It was hoped now th at purely N o rth A m erican questions w ould be settled m ore readily by the sim pler m ethod of bilateral agreem ent, uncom plicated either by A nglo-A m erican relations as such o r by intra-im perial questions. T he treaty, after defining boundary w aters, and laying dow n rules for com m on use o f them, provided for an Inter­ national Joint Com m ission to consist o f three com missioners on the p art of the U nited States, appointed by the president, and three on the p art o f the U nited K ingdom , appointed by the king on the advice of the governor in council. Equal representation from each country raised the question as to w hether the com ­ mission w ould divide on national lines and the unfortunate parallel of the A laska Boundary Com m ission could be cited as evidence for such a fear. It proved, how ever, to be the case th at m ost o f the decisions were unanim ous; and the only division on national lines was on a point o f procedure. T he pow ers o f the com m ission w ere quasi-judicial, executive, arbitral, and fo r purposes o f investigation and recom m endation Both as de­ fined in the treaty and from the cases considered by it, the w ork o f th e com m ission had to do prim arily w ith boundary w aters. I t was provided, how ever, in article x o f the treaty th at “any questions o r m atters o f difference arising betw een the H igh C ontracting Parties involving the rights, obligations, o r interests o f the U nited States o r o f the D om inion of C anada either in relation to each other o r to their respective inhabitants” m ight be referred to it, w ith the consent o f the A m erican Senate and the governor in council, for investigation and recom m endation. W hile oth er developm ents rendered this article less necessary in later years, it revealed both the tem per of the agreem ent and the wide results th at were expected to follow it. T h e governm ental m achinery for the conduct of C anadian foreign relations was evolved over a period o f years as the dom inion grew in strength and confidence, partly by a process o f trial and error, and as events showed the anachronism s in w hat already existed. It was natural, if u nfortunate, th at organi­ zation followed rath er than preceded the issues w ith w hich it w ould be concerned: natural, because it was only the pressure o f particu lar cases th at proved the need fo r change; unfortunate, because in some cases international disputes m ight have been m ore easily settled if the new m echanism had already existed. T he im portance o f the time-lag varied. T he International W ater­ ways Com m ission and the International Jo in t Com m ission, for

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exam ple, w ere set up soon enough to handle the m ajor cases. T he A laska boundary dispute, on the other hand, was settled by an a d hoc tribunal un d er circum stances which aroused the m axim um o f bitterness in C anada tow ard b oth the U nited States and the U nited K ingdom . Ill T h e determ ination o f foreign policy for C anada depended in the m ain on three factors: geographical position, trade interests, and im perial connection - the three operating singly o r in any com bination. C anadian interest o r activity spread over a w ide area abroad, varying in intensity from one region to another. In the A m ericas the dom inating political entity was the U nited States, w hich tended to overshadow the foreign relations o f C anada as of the other countries o f the w estern hem isphere. But, while they had always to keep in m ind the policies o f the U nited States, C anadians w ere not unm indful of th e lesser pow ers. N earest a t hand, in a position to control the approach to the St. Law rence, was N ew foundland. T h at oldest colony had rejected federation w ith the other provinces in the original discussions, but there was reason to believe that, like Prince E dw ard Island and British Colum bia, it m ight later becom e a p art o f the dom inion. T he atm osphere o f confederation w as not soon dissipated, and the final boundaries o f C anada w ere still uncertain. F o r several years there was talk o f union, both in the island and in C anada. F o r the latter the advantages w ere many. In the defence o f C anada N ew foundland could not be ignored, b u t th a t consideration was given less attention in the days when the suprem acy of the British navy was unquestioned. T he place o f N ew foundland in a shorter sea route to E urope was at times stressed; but the principal argum ents were possibilities o f ex­ tended trade, and - above all - the autom atic settlem ent o f the disputes over fisheries. C onferences betw een the tw o govern­ m ents broke dow n on the refusal o f C anada to take over the island’s debt, but the C anadian governm ent continued to express its general willingness fo r union, and the question was still an open one in 1914. T h e acquisition o f N ew foundland was generally thought to be desirable but not pressing. T he boundaries of th e dom inion in the north w ere fo r a tim e brought into prom inence by the fear th at A m erican zeal fo r the larger A laska w ould be a prelude to general expansion northw ard. F ears w ere expressed, in par­

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liam ent and the press, th at A m erican fishing in H udson Bay might lead to a denial o f com plete sovereignty there. In the Canadian Senate Paschal Poirier advocated a C anadian expedi­ tion to the pole, union with N ew foundland, and the acquisition of G reenland from D enm ark. A. B. A ylesw orth again drew attention to L abrador and G reenland, and the H alifax Chronicle editorially sponsored a C anadian “M onroe doctrine.” T his last was widely discussed by other newspapers, and was intended to em brace the islands o f St. Pierre and M iquelon, should the U nited States attem pt to purchase them from France, as it was feared she m ight d o W ith the rem oval of the danger o f this new stage of A m erican expansionism (if it had ever been a real danger) the idea o f a com petitive M onroe doctrine fell into discard. In the south, as well as in the east and north, was territory that was often spoken of as a possible addition to C anada. T he dom inion carried on a closc trade connection with the British W est Indies, built up in previous decades by N ova Scotia. T rad e between these British colonies was never as great as it was felt it should be between two com plem entary economies, and C an a­ dians had m ade m any attem pts to increase it, but w ithout great success. Both in C anada and the W est Indies it was prim al ily the hope o f extended trade th at led to the suggestions of political union. In 1905 isolated proposals changed to m ore general consideration. C anadian new spapers w ere divided in their views - some cautiously supporting union and others pointing to the problem s th at would arise from the racial com position and political im m aturity of the islands. T he M aritim e Provinces Board o f T rade and the C anadian M anufacturers’ Association both w ent on record in favour of union, and individuals in various parts of C anada were found as advocates O n sober second thought, how ever, C anadians decided th a t it was a step they w ere n ot yet ready to take, either at that tim e, o r even years later in the full glow o f nationalist consciousness. T he C aribbean m arked the southern boundary of the C anadian sphere of active interest in the A m ericas. W ith the republics o f South A m erica even trad e relations w ere slight. Politically the republics were rem ote — even a little m ysterious. Only once did a South A m erican question impinge on C anada, and th at only because o f its effect on A nglo-A m erican relations. R epeated refusals of the governm ent of V enezuela to respect the interests of foreigners led two o f the powers m ainly con­ cerned, G re at Britain and G erm any, to apply pressure by means

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o f a naval blockade in 1902. T here is no reason to believe that C anadians saw that this action had any bearing on the dom inion, but it soon proved to have an im portant indirect one. T he U nited States, sensitive to any E uropean intervention in South A m erica, was particularly disturbed by it w hen taking place close to the proposed canal in the isthm us, and strain developed in the relations of the two E uropean powers with the U nited States. T hough desiring to avoid a fu rth er break with G erm any, already opened by the failure o f the alliance negotiations, the British governm ent was even less willing to depart from its fixed p rin ­ ciple o f A m erican friendship, and in 1903 consented to the A m erican proposal of subm ission o f the V enezuela dispute to the H ague tribunal. It was during the last m onths o f the block­ ade, and when Britain was m aking its decision, that the arrange­ m ents for the submission of the A laska boundary dispute to an international tribunal were finally m ade. T he dispute was an old one. T h e boundary laid down in the treaty o f 1825 between Russia and G reat Britain antedated any accurate geographical know ledge o f the region, and created problem s com m on to all N o rth A m erican boundary questions. By 1867, w hen Alaska w as purchased by the U nited States, the population of British Colum bia was fully conscious o f a northern developm ent based on discoveries of gold, and saw in the southern extension of A laska a barrier against the necessary access from the hinterland to the sea. A fter the entrance o f British Colum bia into the federation its legislature and governm ent constantly called the attention of O ttaw a to the need for defining the boundary, and the C anadian governm ent in turn had negotiations initiated through British diplom atic channels. A ll attem pts to reach agreem ent on the m achinery for handling the dispute had, how ever, failed up to the end o f the century. In a conference between U nited States and C anadian representatives at W ash­ ington in F ebruary 1892 the C anadians proposed th at the dispute be subm itted to “som e im partial authority” ; and that following an aw ard a com m ittee o f experts be asked to report on the best w ay o f delim iting the boundary T h e Joint H igh Com m ission o f 1898-99, am ongst other C anadian-A m erican questions, considered th at o f A laska, and the C anadian proposal for a tribunal o f three narrow ly failed o f acceptance. The counter-proposal, for a tribunal of six - half British and half A m erican - w as unacceptable to C anada, and a British com ­ prom ise plan o f 1902, fo r the com m ission of six to include two neutral m em bers, was rejected in W ashington. Such was the

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position when L aurier w ent to the colonial conference o f 1902, having prom ised his colleagues not to yield to any English p ro ­ position for acccpting the A m erican proposal. O n his return, how ever, he confessed that he had agreed to such a commission, appointed by the two parties to the dispute. “ Pressed for details he refused to go beyond the statem ent that he had no option but to yield the point It rem ained, then, only to set the m achinery in motion. In January 1903 a treaty was signed by the British am bassador and the A m erican secretary of state, providing for a tribunal o f “six im partial jurists o f repute, w ho shall consider judicially the questions subm itted to them ,” which plan was reluctantly ac­ cepted by the C anadian governm ent. In F ebruary the bad news rea d ied O ttaw a th at Roosevelt had appointed Elihu Root, the secretary of state for w ar, Senator Lodge, and Senator T urner. T he Canadian governm ent quite properly objected that none of these was an im partial jurist: the first being a m em ber of the governm ent that was a party to the dispute, and the other two having declared themselves against the C anadian case. It was, they com plained, a violation o f the treaty. O n F ebruary 27 w ord cam e from L ondon that the selection o f A m erican m em ­ bers was as much a surprise there as in O ttaw a; that they felt it practically impossible to press for new appointm ents; were most unwilling to drop the whole negotiation; and could only suggest British m em bers “who will m eet the altered circum stances of the case.” By the tim e the governor general sent a reply to this (M arch ) the treaty had already been ratified (M arch 3 ), and, as the C anadian governm ent pointed out, fu rth er discussion was precluded. T hey would not, how ever, consider the suggestion of m atching the A m erican representatives T he British m em bers, as appointed, w ere L ord Alverstone, chief justice of England, Sir Louis Jette, lieutenant-governor o f Q uebec and form erly a judge of the superior court of Quebec, and A. B. Aylesworth, a C anadian lawyer. W hile the C anadian governm ent then lived up to the letter and spirit of a treaty o f w hich they had never approved, from the first they had good reason to suspect the good faith of the A m erican governm ent. Full study has been m ade of the argum ents adduced by both sides, o f the positions taken by the three governm ents con­ cerned, and in so far as it can be done - of the conversations th at w ent on behind the scenes T here is little disagreem ent on the m ain points, though the authorities differ as to the relative strength o f the C anadian and A m erican cases. O n the whole it

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seems clear that the latter was definitely a stronger one; and, while there was a C anadian case, and it was argued by counsel o f great ability, it would have been surpiising if it had been upheld in any court. U nfortunately the tribunal of 1903 never lived up to the judicial principles laid dow n for it. Theodore Roosevelt as m uch as told the A m erican m em bers th at they could find only one way; and, indeed, they seem to have needed no spur to run as partisans. N o criticism has been m ade of either the appointm ent o r actions o f the C anadian m em bers; yet they do seem to have been infected by the non-judicial atmosphere. Clifford Sifton, the British agent for the settlem ent, com plained after his return th a t “ Lord A lverstone did not stand by the P erhaps this was no m ore than an Canadian com m issioners u nfo rtu nate phrase; yet it is hard to conceive of the C anadian com missioners finding in favour o f the A m erican case. The aw ard, which substantially accepted the A m erican claims, was signed by the three A m ericans and Alverstone. Jette and Aylesw orth refused to sign the aw ard, and each voluntarily w rote an opinion with reasons for that refusal Both differed on several points from the m ajority decision. A ylesw orth finished his statem ent with the rem ark that “ the course the m ajority of this tribunal has decided to take in regard to the islands at the entrance o f P ortland channel is, in my hum ble judgm ent, so opposed to the plain requirem ents o f justice, and so absolutely irreconcilable w ith any disposition of th at branch o f the case upon principles o f a judicial character, th at I respectfully decline to affix my signature to their aw ard.” Jette concluded by saying that he “found it impossible . . . to concur in this arbitrary determ ination of a line w hich, although it does not concede all the territory they claim ed to the U nited States, nevertheless deprives C anada o f the greater p art of that to w hich she was entitled.” U nder no circum stances w ould it have been easy for a tribu­ nal consisting o f three nationals from each party to the dispute to decide entirely on judicial principles. T he charactcr o f the A m erican appointm ents finally rem oved any possibility of such procedure, leaving the only alternatives as a deadlock o r a diplom atic com prom ise. C anadians generally, would have ac­ cepted the form er in a choice of evils, but British opinion favoured the latter. It seems evident that A lverstone, perhaps under pressure from his governm ent, doubled the roles of diplom at and judge in the general interest of A nglo-Am erican understanding. O n their return to C anada the two C anadian

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com m issioners m aintained a dignified restraint in com m ents on the aw ard, refusing to achieve a cheap popularity by capitalizing on w h at was undoubtedly a very general resentm ent. A num ber o f C anadians urged m oderation, or supported the aw ard as an unpleasant but necessary one; but on the whole opinion - espe­ cially in the press - was m ore or less violently critical It was taken fo r granted that the C anadian case was unassailable, and the general com plaint was th at A lverstone had subm itted to the governm ent’s desire for peace at any price: the price being, as usual, the sacrifice of C anada. T he tradition o f the weakness of British diplom acy on behalf o f C anada was already deep-rooted. T hough not w ithout som e reason to support it, the argum ent was less often based on a study of the evidence than on senti­ ment: and a naive assum ption that the C anadian case was always right, and that right w ould always prevail. T hough not a few C anadians had had experience o f diplo­ macy, they had done little to apprise the public of the real character and place o f that art. Since the days of the W ashington com mission o f 1871 Canadians generally had gained little appreciation of diplom acy as a process of bargaining, in which com prom ise and sanctions played a large part. T he A laska “panhandle” was classed with the jutting north o f M aine. N either o f the two cases, as such, was studied seriously; nor could the average C anadian appreciate that firmness in pressing even a good case m ust be tem pered by gauging the resultant friction. In 1903 there was reason to believe that Roosevelt’s chauvinism was not m ere acting, and that it touched a highly responsive chord in the country. T o talk o f w ar was perhaps extrem e; but there was a state short of w ar that would have been as unw elcom e to C anada as to England. G iven the circum ­ stances, the best th at could be hoped from the Alaska tribunal was a deadlock. T o the British governm ent this spelled a set­ back to the entente policy pursued in Venezuela. To C anada it could bring no good; A laska would still be a bone of contention, with a possible (though im probable) later settlem ent m ore in favour of the dom inion. Bad relations between England and the U nited States would bedevil N o rth A m erican politics as well. If, how ever, C anada was dissatisfied w ith the results o f British diplom acy, the only logical course was to conduct her own affairs directly - supplying the m eans and accepting the respon­ sibility. It was a course which had m ore than once been p ro ­ posed in the past, but never with the authority which L aurier now gave to it in the H ouse o f Com m ons.

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I have often regretted . . . that we have not in our ow n hands the treaty-m aking power which would enable us to dispose o f o ur own affairs. B ut in this m atter we are dealing w ith a position that was forced on us - we have not the treaty-m aking power. . . . 1 am sorry not only that we have not the treaty-m aking power, but that we are not in such an independent position that it is in m y pow er to place before parliament the whole o f the correspondence as it passed between the Canadian governm ent and the British governm ent. B ut we shall have that correspond­ ence and it will be placed before parliament at the next session, - the whole o f it, no m atter what protest m ay com e from abroad. . . . But we have no such power. Our hands are tied to a large extent, owing to the fact o f our connection - which has its benefits, but which also has its disadvantages - the fa ct o f our connection with the m other country m aking us not free agents and obliging us to deal with questions, affecting ourselves through the instrum entality o f British ambassadors. . . . The difficulty as I conceive it to be, is that so long as Canada remains a depend­ ency o f the British crown the present pow ers that we have are n o t sufficient fo r the m aintenance o f our rights. It is im portant that we should ask the British parliam ent fo r m ore extensive powers so that if ever we have to deal w ith m atters o f a sim ilar nature again, we shall deal w ith them in our ow n way, in our ow n fashion, according to the best light that we have.23 If this was a statem ent o f policy it was one that was not im­ plem ented. In all probability L aurier, sm arting under a sense of injustice, spoke m ore strongly than he otherw ise would have done. C anada was already on the road to assume in greater degree the conduct of her own affairs, but it needed m ore than the authority of the British parliam ent to m ake the change. A fter the first burst o f indignation was over, it was questionable w hether the public w ould have w elcom ed such a radical depar­ ture in one step. M oreover, while C anadians had in the past show n skill in diplom acy, there were no civil servants trained in, o r even assigned to, that special field; and it is significant that W. Sanford Evans proposed that there should be a departm ent o f external affairs.29 In the establishm ent of th at departm en t in 1909, o f the International Joint Com m ission in the sam e year, the procedure over the F rench treaties in 1907 and 1909, and over the reciprocity agreem ent in 1911 it m ay be argued that the A laska affair played a part; but it is equally probable that these changes w ould have occurred in any case.

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N o one of the three countries derived m uch advantage from the A laska award. T o the U nited States fell a strip of territory barring the way to decaying m ines in an undeveloped wilder­ ness. G reat Britain secured som e degree o f reconciliation with the U nited States a t the cost of tem porary but real discontent in C anada. C anadian fears of A m erican expansionism were once m ore revived. T he whole afFair was a tem pest in a teapot: but of such stuff are international relations som etim es made. T h e political relations of C anada outside the A m erican con­ tinent w ere, in the period before 1914, alm ost entirely indirect: th a t is to say, arising out o f British, rath er than C anadian, foreign policy. But w hat is true o f political policy does not so generally apply to interests. Com m ercial advantages and selec­ tive im m igration depended in p art on satisfactory political rela­ tions w ith foreign states. M ore basic still was the aim to preserve for the em pire as a whole a position in the w orld sufficiently pow erful that its independence could not be seriously end an ­ gered, and - com ing closer to hom e - that C anada could not be invaded. T hus the balance o f pow er affected C anada like other countries. But unlike other countries with a sm all population she was draw n into these larger political issues not only on her own continent, but east and west as well. In the A m ericas there was no balance o f pow er, and presum ably never w ould be one. T he dom inance of the U nited States, however, was softened by a peaceful (if not always conciliatory) outlook. In the far east and in E urope the rivalry of the great powers, as they appeared after 1871, was assum ing a p attern and a severity th at was fast becom ing the leading political fact o f the period. T h e pow er o f Jap an was first dem onstrated in the SinoJapanese w ar o f 1894. F o r the British E m pire the rise o f a new great pow er in the Pacific had great im plications. T he U nited K ingdom had been the pioneer in opening C hina to trade, and was m aking heavy investm ents in railways, financial organiza­ tions, and com m erce. A ustralia and N ew Zealand could not b ut be affected by the expanding pow er o f Japan, and India too was w ithin the Pacific sphere. F o r C anada the im m ediate pressure o f the far east arose from A siatic im m igration, the attem pts to lim it w hich created a delicate political problem Less weight was placed on trad e w ith the countries o f the far east until the early tw entieth century. W hen G reat Britain m ade a com m ercial treaty w ith Japan in 1894 C anada was unwilling to accede to it unless she could retain the right to exclude both labourers and artisans; and even w hen the British am bassador had secured

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agreem ent to such a provision, the C anadian governm ent de­ layed becom ing a party to the treaty until 1906, by w hich time trade had assum ed proportions sufficient to balance anti-Asiatic sentim ent. W hile the policy o f virtual exclusion m aintained by the dom inions did not help neither did it seriously hinder the good relations of Japan and the U nited K ingdom as w ritten into com m ercial and political treaties. O n the other hand the friction th at m ight have resulted from the im m igration difficulty was softened by the satisfaction felt in T okyo over the AngloJapanese alliance. T he first alliance, o f 1902, was sought by Jap an , and served her well in her w ar w ith Russia. T he second treaty, in 1905, carried further obligations for both signatories, and was regarded as m utually advantageous. C anadians had no reason to criticize an alliance which paved the way to the volun­ tary lim itation of Japanese im m igration through the gentlem en’s agreem ent and strengthened the defensive position of the em pire as a whole. T he press or ihe U nited States w elcom ed the alliance o f 1902 as a m eans of m aintaining the open door W hen the treaty of 1905 was announced it could be said that “the C ana­ dian press alm ost universally approves the arrangem ent and con­ gratulates L ord Lansdow ne upon his successful diplom acy D uring the im perial conference of 1911 the dom inion rep re­ sentatives had, fo r the first tim e, an opportunity o f discussing foreign policy - not in the conference itself, but in secret meetings o f the com m ittee of imperial defence. T here Sir E dw ard G rey m ade a long statem ent of different aspects of British policy T he A nglo-Japanese alliance, he said, had been m ost satisfactory and he hoped it w ould be renewed. Before doing so, how ever, it was necessary to reconcile it with British policy tow ard the U nited States. If the U nited States became involved in a w ar with Japan, B ritain w ould be obligated to assist h er ally. T o avoid this he had proposed to the Japanese govern­ m ent that a clause should be included rem oving the obligation o f either signatory from going to w ar w ith a pow er w ith which it h ad a general arbitration treaty. W ritten into the alliance, a clause (iv) to th at effect saved England from difficulties with the U nited States by virtue of the new arbitration treaty. By this ingenious device G rey also rem oved a cause of w orry to C ana­ dian statesm en. G rey was able to w rite to the British em bassy at T okyo that the dom inion representatives had agreed cordially to the alliance T here is every reason to suppose that, as far as C anada was concerned, this was the case. Leaving AngloA m erican relations friendly, and easing the strain on C anadian-

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Japanese m igration arrangem ents, the alliance still strengthened the position of the British E m pire in the far east, and conse­ quently in the w orld as a whole. T h e alliance with Japan not only strengthened the position of G re at Britain in the far east, but also relieved her of the neces­ sity of m aintaining a large naval force there, m aking it possible to divert ships to E uropean w aters. It was in the N o rth Sea that they w ere now urgently needed. W hen the R o u n d Table, a quarterly devoted to the affairs of the British Em pire, was first published in 1910, the opening w ords were these: “T he central fact in the international situation to-day is the antagonism be­ tween England and G erm any.” T he events of the next four years m ore th an justified the assertion. C anada had no p art in foreign policy in E urope in the ten years before 1914: the ententes with F ran ce and Russia, the perm ission to the general staffs to con­ du ct conversations on m ilitary and naval co-operation, and the attem pts to prevent w ar in the Balkans. N o r did the C anadian governm ent give advice in, or share responsibility for, British policy in the last hectic days from the m urder o f the A rchduke F ran z F erdinand to the outbreak o f general hostilities. It was not th at C anada was deliberately excluded from British councils: it is probable that the British governm ent w ould have welcomed consultation. But consultation, as successive C anadian govern­ m ents had seen, involved responsibility; and they preferred to forgo the one in order to avoid the other. T h a t they were none the less com m itted to the results of British policy was the anom aly o f the position and the price they paid. F ro m the tu rn o f the century, w ith the failure of AngloG erm an negotiations fo r an alliance, the generally unfriendly attitude o f E urope tow ard the w ar in South A frica, and the beginning o f G erm an naval construction on a large scale, the urgency and the burden o f defence against a growing danger forced m ilitary and naval planning into the forefront of inter­ national relations. If no scheme was agreed on - though many were su g g e ste d -fo r a foreign policy draw n up and underw ritten by all the self-governing parts o f the em pire, the problem of defence becam e, m ore and m ore, one for the dom inions as well as the U nited K ingdom . Could C anada defend her own terri­ tory? C ould she, and would she, share in a com m on effort to guard against the th reat of G erm an aggression?

C H A P T E R 11

Defence

T h e w ord “defence,” widely enough interpreted in all coun­ tries, has in C anada been stretched beyond all reasonable bounds. It is, perhaps, not w ithout significance that this should be so: that no such term s as “w ar office” o r “adm iralty” should be cu rren t w here frontiers are know n as “boundaries,” where the regular arm y was not called by th at nam e, w here w ar, in fact, has never been visualized except as resistance to aggression. It is healthy th at this should have been so, and, on the w hole, consistent w ith the outlook an d interests o f the C anadian people. Y et C anada is not w ithout m ilitary history and achievem ents; and, as in other states, the threat o f force, even when n o t carried into effect, has played its p art in her foreign relationships. It will be well, therefore, first to discover w h at is m eant o r implied in C anada by the w ord defence. Basically it has stood for the m aintenance o f territory already possessed, and w ith th at purpose few C anadians have disagreed. Less obviously it has m eant the defence o f interests, such as trade, fisheries, o r rights o f citizens abroad. It has had a very real m eaning as the defence of C anada’s general political posi­ tion in the w orld: protection against a serious loss o f pow er or against a hostile alliance. It is tem pting, but misleading, to draw an absolute distinction between defence of C anadian soil and im perial defence, for im perial defence itself had not one but several aspects. In some cases it has touched C anada directly. Even in the period after the w ithdraw al o f the im perial garrisons th e naval bases at H alifax and Esquim alt played a dual role: as p art of the British naval system and as guards on the Canadian coasts. O ther points, such as N ew foundland and the W est Indies, m ight be regarded in p art as indirect o r outpost defences of C anada. T hirdly there has been the defence of the em pire as a political organization o f w hich C anada form ed p art and in w hose strength she had a direct stake. F o r this the leading exam ple w ould be the W ar of 1914. Finally cam e C anada’s place in British w ars whose outcom e was neither a direct nor an indirect th reat to Canada. F o r participation in these a m uch less

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obvious case could be m ade out, b u t events - such as the Sudan expeditions - proved th at there was a case and th at it had supporters. A ccepting the w ord defence, w ith its m anifold m eanings, it rem ains to exam ine in m ore detail the purposes for w hich mili­ tary and naval pow er would be m aintained, the local conditions to w hich they w ere related, their organization, and their use. Peace, consolidation, and econom y in arm am ent w ere naturally the desiderata o f a country whose area was vast, population sm all, and political unity recent. A saturated pow er has no zeal fo r territorial expansion, but even the broad acres o f the do­ m inion left som ething to be desired. T he jutting north of M aine was an old grievance w ith practical disadvantages that were real but not insuperable. C anadians w ould agree that they had been hardly treated, but had no idea o f attem pted revision by a show o r use o f force. N ew foundland w ould be a w elcom e addition to the federation, but th a t was a financial rath er than a m ilitary problem . In the A rctic the claim s of C anada m ight be disputed, but the m ajor territorial dispute was over the boundary of A laska. H ere it w as that C anadians, w ithout fully realizing it, experienced a clear case o f the delicate relation between diplom acy and arm ed force. Some A m ericans (including the president) hardly veiled their determ ination to resist any in ­ fringem ent of their rights, as they saw them . T he success of diplom acy is explained not a little by the skill o f the diplom at; but it is no accident that states capable o f exercising strong m ilitary o r naval force - and willing in the last resort to do so have a card to play in international negotiations that no m ere dexterity will take. T h e connection between foreign policy and m ilitary policy may, u nder the happiest conditions, be m ade rem ote, but in no case can it be abolished. A rm ed forces have no m eaning (leaving aside their police role) except in relation to possible but defined use against other states. It is the business o f soldiers to fight w hen called upon to do so in the pursuance of, o r as a result of, the foreign policy of the civil governm ent. T he first discussion o f foreign policy between the representatives o f the governm ents of the U nited K ingdom and the dom inions was in the com m ittee of im perial defence in 1911. T he foreign secretary, Sir E dw ard G rey, was invited by M r. A squith to give an exposition o f the international situation, and began by talking of the aspect of defence th at was then m ost to the fore. “T he starting point,” he said, . . of th e consultation w hich we are now going to have

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on F oreign Policy, and the foreign situation, is really the cre­ ation of growing strength of separate fleets and forces in the D om inions. . . . It is possible to have separate fleets in a united E m pire, but it is not possible to have separate Fleets in a united E m pire w ithout having a com m on F oreign Policy which shall determ ine the action of the different forces m aintained in dif­ T he nature and extent of feren t p arts of the Em pire. . . arm ed forces are dictated in p art by the capacity of a state to provide them and in p art by the use for which they m ay be required. M ilitary history is, to some extent, a them e in itself: in technical organization and the course of w arfare. F o r the rest it is dependent on political policies and event's. T o say that a country w ants peace m ay be the truth but not the w hole truth T h e real objective is peace on at least reasonably satisfactory term s. “Peace at any price” is alm ost a meaningless phrase, for there com es a point w here national pride and national interest will dem and the use o f arm ed force, perhaps as the answ er to the aggression of another state. M ilitary preparation in C anada in the generation before 1914 was governed by two sets of factors: dom estic interests and external pressure. T he period was one of rapid econom ic devel­ opm ent, with industrial expansion in the central provinces and the peaceful conquest of the western. Financial and hum an resources were alm ost wholly absorbed in great railway schemes to m ake possible the settlem ent of the prairies and the exploita­ tion o f its agricultural land. T o secure im m igrants and retain them in the dom inion, to build and finance transcontinental railways, and to prom ote the foreign trade which was a neces­ sary corollary of the other two - these were the subjects before p arliam ent and public. It is true th at foreign trade in itself w idened C anadians’ outlook beyond their own boundaries, but fo r m any years there was a peaceful w orld whose oceans were reassuringly patrolled by the ships of the British navy. E xternal pressure m ight be applied by another A m erican pow er or from beyond the coasts o f the continent. F rom her im m ediate neighbours C anada had little reason to fear aggres­ sion. R elations w ith N ew foundland were not w ithout friction. T h e fishery dispute trailed on for years', and there was an unsettled boundary between Quebec and L abrador. It would, how ever, have been absurd to think o f a British dom inion as a potential enem y. N ew foundland could be o f m ilitary signifi­ cance to C anada only if it were to com e under the control of a foreign pow er, an eventuality o f which there appeared to be

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no prospect. T he only other land frontier m arched with that of the U nited States, on the south and the north-w est. H ere, in one respect, the position was reversed: C anada being the weak pow er and its neighbour the strong. T here were not lacking grounds for controversy - fisheries again, and boundary dis­ putes - but Canadians were m ore and m ore assum ing that war, o r even serious friction, w ith the U nited States could be left out o f account. It was true that in the U nited States there was loose talk of annexation as late as 1911, but it was not taken as a threat. A fter the settlem ent a t W ashington in 1871, unpopular as that m ay have been at the tim e in C anada, the old fear of A m erican aggression, of m anifest destiny, and o f forced an­ nexation steadily dissipated. W hile relations with the country against which C anada had erected defences for nearly two cen­ turies at last becam e fixed and pacific, clouds cam e up from o th er directions. T o England Russia was the bogey in the nine­ teenth century, and to C anada too in the seventies and eighties. A t tim es attack on either coast was feared from the am orphous state which straddled the continents, and whose m ilitary strength was so consistently overrated. T hanks to her alliance with G reat Britain in 1902 and to the settlem ent of the im m igration ques­ tion, Jap an ’s growing pow er was not in these years regarded as involving any th reat to the Pacific coast of Canada. T he new danger, and the one which m ore and m ore dom inated all plan­ ning fo r defence, lay in G erm any’s frank struggle for world pow er, and the appearance, for the first tim e in a century, of a fleet intended to challenge the suprem acy o f the British navy. In retrospect there can be seen a change, not fully realized at the tim e, of the whole political position on w hich the defence policy of C anada was built. F o r decades before confederation and through the early years of the dom inion defence for C an a­ dians had m eant protection against the U nited Slates. T o aid them in this task they looked to G reat Britain, whose great navy, professional arm y, and am assed wealth m ight redress the bal­ ance of the w eak against the strong. In m om ents of E ngland’s troubles - the C rim ean W ar or the Indian M utiny - there were m any volunteers in British N orth A m erica ready to lend their swords in evidence o f loyalty and com m on feeling. It was not, however, because England was w eak or her national strength at stake th at these men cam e forw ard. In the days of the A m erican Civil W ar and im m ediately following it the w ithdraw al o f the im perial troops from C anada was regretted, even resented. The w eak still appealed to the strong for aid. In less than tw enty

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years came the th reat to the British position in A frica, ominous unpopularity throughout Europe, and the naval policy of T irpitz and the K aiser. N ow C anada, w ith a new sense of security on h er own borders, was forced for the first tim e to consider seriously the defence of the em pire of w hich she was a part. It was no longer a question of gestures by individuals; it was a problem of national policy. T he transition from the old balance to the new occupied some years; and the difficulty in under­ standing a change so close a t hand was magnified by confusion o f issues. To the opponents of im perial federation in all its forms the cry of the em pire in danger sm acked o f a plot to lure the unw ary into a political fram ew ork designed not for co-operation but dom inance. Even to those not persuaded by either faith it was apparent th at projects for im perial defence could never be wholly divorced from som e type of agreem ent on foreign policy w ithout which m ilitary o r naval plans would be either meaningless o r dangerous. If C anadian defence policy be judged to have been anachro­ nistic and its results to have been to some extent inadequate and inefficient, the governm ents im m ediately responsible m ust re­ ceive a m easure o f sym pathy. A gainst w hat danger m ust they guard? H appily against no neighbours. Could they believe the old argum ents o f the federationists? C ould the m ilitary burden on such a w ealthy country as E ngland be taken seriously in com parison to the burden on C anada o f opening a pioneer country? It is n o t wholly surprising th at the governm ents of these years steered by th e star o f im m ediate dom estic needs, avoiding as best they could the rocks of provincial and racial cleavages. D efence policy tended to be based on com prom ise, w ith inevitable technical draw backs - and some surprisingly effective results. C anadian defence forces m ay be divided into m ilitary and naval. In both there w ere im portant links w ith the imperial arm s; but the projects for an im perial defence organization were separate from the uniform ity o f drill, exchange of officers, and other convenient devices w hich were not intended to create a united force. II F ear of A m erican aggression during and after the Civil W ar stim ulated a new interest in the defence forces and was an im­ p o rtan t elem ent in the confederation m ovem ent. But such zeal

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as was tem porarily shown fo r expansion and im provem ent of the forces passed w ith the rem oval of the im m ediate danger. Little was left of the plans and talk of those years. T he fortifica­ tion scheme was dropped altogether and the m oney was spent on the Pacific railway. T he regular arm y - o r “perm anent fo rce” - had been started in 1871, and while it rem ained small, the principle soon becam e firmly established. T he Royal M ilitary College was opened at K ingston in 1876 and provided a m ixed academ ic and m ilitary training of a high standard. Everything, how ever, seemed to com bine against any forw ard m ovem ent in the m ilitia. T he N orth-W est Rebellion o f 1885 had no lasting effects. T he financial depression w hich began in the late seven­ ties, the expenditure on public w orks (especially railw ays), and peaceful relations w ith the U nited States all discouraged m ilitia reform . Even the rem oval of the im perial troops from all points except the naval bases failed to encourage m ilitary preparations. It was w hat an historian of the m ilitia has called “ the dead p eriod E xpenditure was cut alm ost in half; the num bers of the active m ilitia in training fell by a third; and the enthusiasm o f officers and m en waned. T h e V enezuela scare of 1895 and m ore especially the experi­ ence of the South A frican W ar sounded a note o f necessity that brought new life to the m ilitia. A lready there had been some slight signs o f progress. T he perm anent force was reorganized and enlarged; the obsolete Snider rifles w ere partially replaced; governm ent expenditure was m odestly increased; and public interest som ew hat revived It was, how ever, after the South A frican W ar th at the m ain changes occurred. T here w ere not lacking - and never had been lacking - critics of the m ilitia system : officers o f the m ilitia itself, C anadian civilians, and the English officers appointed in com m and in C anada pointed at tim es to weaknesses. T he p ap er strength of the m ilitia was said to be misleading; the period of training too short; equipm ent to be obsolete, incom plete, and insufficient in quantity; the p ay of both perm anent and non-perm anent m ilitia too small. N o one questioned the quality of the personnel, o r their efforts to m ake the best o f the situation, but the handicaps w ere said to be too great. O n the other hand, the opposition to reform was influ­ enced not only by parsim ony but by a disbelief in the necessity of m ilitary preparations on a large scale. A com m ent in the M ontreal H erald in 1902 on L ord D undonald’s proposals for change is not untypical:

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D undonald apparently shares a delusion dear to H utton . H e seem s to think the people of Canada are concerned about being in readiness fo r war, or that if they are not they are to blam e and should be stirred up. A n y m an who thinks that way - and all European soldiers do - fails to grasp the essential distinction between E urope and N o rth A m erica. W ith E urope war is a condition. W ith us it is a theory* T h e point of the Herald's, attack was perhaps sharpened by resentm ent against the prevailing rule under which the officer com m anding the C anadian m ilitia was appointed from the British regular arm y. It w ould be doing less than justice to the individuals w ho held the position not to record th at they made a valuable contribution to the C anadian militia. T hey were able to bring to the w ork training and experience w'ider than a C anadian officer could obtain, and undoubtedly m any o f their criticism s were valid and their recom m endations wise. M any, indeed, of the im provem ents in the m ilitia were due to one or oth er of these officers. It was an arrangem ent, how ever, which was almost bound to lead to trouble sooner o r later. W ith few exceptions, the com m anding officers seem to have established good relations with the C anadian officers, who w elcom ed their experience and w ere as anxious as they for reform . But it was n ot easy for non-C anadians to continue to hold the chief position in the C anadian m ilitia, in a period in which C anadian autonom y and national feeling were growing, w ithout arousing opposition. Especially was this true when the visiting com m anders found it necessary to m ake criticism s publicly. T he practical difficulty th at arose was in the relations between the com m anding officers and the m inisters of militia. T he division of powers was illdefined, and each accused the other of usurping authority. G eneral H utton had a series o f disagreem ents with the m inister o f militia, F. W. (L ater Sir F rederick) Borden. W hen H utton returned to England in 1900 to take p art in the South African W ar the question was bluntly asked in the C anadian H ouse of C om m ons if he had been dismissed because o f friction with the governm ent T o this L aurier replied coldly that the m atter was better not discussed, but nevertheless a debate ensued. M ost of the m em bers who spoke defended H utton, but the point was m ade, by Borden and others, th at it m ight be necessary in the future to appoint Canadians. In the course of his rem arks Borden also denied that there had ever been im proper political influence on the militia. T h at there had been such influence was

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a current charge, and one th at arose in acute form during the period in which L ord D undonald was com m anding officer. D undonald cam e to C anada in 1902 know ing som ething o f the difficulties that had arisen and having been w arned that he might well m eet trouble. H e was a soldier o f considerable experience, both in peace and war, and proved him self to be sincerely anxious for the best interests o f the C anadian militia. O n his m any tours of inspection he found much to criticize in the organization, equipm ent, and training of the militia, and in a num ber of public utterances was not slow in pointing to w eak­ nesses which he believed to exist and changes which he thought should be made. F rom the first he claimed that his efforts were impeded by political interference A p art of his report for 1902 was n ot presented to parliam ent, and in 1904 arose w hat has become know n as “the D undonald incident.” T he rights and wrongs o f the affair m ay still be debated. T o D undonald it was a case o f a m inister insisting on an appointm ent in the arm y for party reasons; to the governm ent it was an attem pt to overrule its suprem e authority D undonald was dismissed; but before he left C anada m ade public his views, w hich, while bringing him some applause and sym pathy, did nothing to ease w hat had become an intolerable situation. O ut of the tenure o f the chief com m and by English officers cam e a paradoxical com bination o f results: the adoption of m any of the reform s w hich they had urged, and the decision against sim ilar appointm ents in the future. Both H utton and D undonald had urged the developm ent o f a self-contained m ilitia in place of w hat the form er described as “a collection o f m ilitary units w ithout cohesion, w ithout staff, and w ithout those m ilitary departm ents by w hich an arm y is moved, fed, or m inistered to in sickness.” T he move tow ard an arm y com plete in all branches began in H u tto n ’s day and continued after it as a principal line o f developm ent Both results were found in the M ilitia A ct of 1904 (4 Edw. V II, c. 2 3 ), the m ost im portant of such acts since confederation. Indeed, as Borden pointed out in introducing the bill into the Com m ons, the existing m ilitia law was practically the sam e as th at before confederation T he new regim e, as defined by the act o r as brought into effect under its permissive clauses, showed traces o f national consciousness. T he form er rule under which imperial officers in the Canadian m ilitia had precedence over Canadians o f equal rank was abolished; and the im perial officer in com m and a t H alifax w a no longer autom atically to take charge of the militia at the

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outbreak of w ar. M ore im portant than either of these was the provision th at any qualified officer in the British Em pire w as to be eligible for the chief com m and, and not only an English officer as form erly. This provision was the answ er to the pre­ vious friction between governm ents and general officers com ­ manding, and was supplem ented by a clause enabling a militia council to be set up. T h e council was said to be follow ing the precedent recently established in E ngland, w here the army council, following the recom m endations of the E sher C om ­ mission, had the secretary o f state for w ar as chairm an, with the m ilitary m em bers as advisers. H enceforw ard the m inister of m ilitia becam e the sole centre o f authority, w ith the chief o f the general staff as the senior officer. T here was no longer any appointm ent com parable to that of the form er com m anders in chief. But the effect in practice, writes Colonel H am ilton, was that “ the m inister saw m ore of the technical men, the soldiers, and heard their case presented; and the influence o f the soldiers, and m ore especially o f the senior soldier, steadily grew. The result o f a step which ostensibly lowered the footing o f the soldier was to increase his influence in th e w orking of the D ep artm ent T he act also provided th at th e perm anent force m ight be raised from one to two thousand; th at the period of annual training for the non-perm anent force m ight be extended to thirty days; and th at the pay o f both branches o f the militia be increased. In the years following 1904 expenditure on the m ilitia was steadily increased from two and a half m illion dollars in 1903-04 to seven and a half in 1911-12. D uring the same period the num ber of m en trained in the active m ilitia rose from thirty-five to fifty thousand. T h e m em oranda of the new m ilitia council in 1905 reflect official views of the new regim e In their m em orandum to the m inister o f m ilitia the m ilitary m em bers of the council pointed o ut that they had not “a clean sheet' on which to draw out their plans, and they have constantly had to com prom ise between w hat was desirable and w hat was attainable.” T heir plans were not am bitious: gradual additions to the cavalry and artillery of the perm anent force, and organization o f the arm y service corps, ordnance corps, and arm y m edical corps. T he finance m em ber o f the council then explained in a m em orandum the estimates fo r 1905-6, showing the increased expenditure in some detail. By 1910 the council was ready with a m ore elaborate rep o rt Som e changes were reported: an inter-departm ental com m ittee fo r co-operation between the departm ents of m ilitia and defence

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and o f naval service; the appointm ent o f staff officers to train candidates for the British staff college; and a m obilization com m ittee at headquarters. But the form al picture draw n by the council looked less im pressive w hen exam ined by soldiers. T he them e o f the rep o rt o f the inspector-general, M ajor-G eneral L ake, was that the reduction of estim ates had seriously im paired the efficiency and developm ent of both perm anent and non­ perm anent m ilitia In the sam e year an outside opinion was given by Sir Jo h n F rench, who, as inspector-general o f the im perial forces, had been invited to inspect the C anadian m ili­ tary forces. His report pays tribute to th e m en and officers available and to som e aspects of their w ork; but the weaknesses he found were m ore conspicuous than the strength. H e took “ability to defend th e land frontiers o f C anada” as the standard by which he form ed his judgm ent, and his conclusions did little to give C anadians any sense of security. T he peace organization he found defective in th at the various arm s of the service were not in correct proportions either in total o r in any one district, n o r did they have opportunities of training together. U nits lacking in integration would have to be throw n together in time of w ar, w hen a fu rth e r difficulty w ould arise from a lack of adequate m obilization plans. F rench m ade som e suggestions for changes in the training o f the perm anent force, but on the w hole w rote w arm ly o f its efficiency. Some alterations, he thought, m ight be m ade in the organization of the staff. W hether the volunteer system w ould m eet C anadian conditions could not, he thought, be decided until it had been given a fair trial, w ith a b etter organization, better knowledge in the higher com m and, and the qualifications for officers and the engagem ents o f the ran k and file in the m ilitia being enforced Asked by the m inister of m ilitia to report on how far and in w hat m anner Sir John F re n ch ’s recom m endations could be im plem ented, M ajorG eneral Lake observed th at on the whole they followed the sam e lines on w hich the m ilitia council had been w orking. “T h ere are,” he w rote, “no proposals contained in Sir John F ren ch ’s report the adoption of w hich would involve any dep ar­ ture in principle from the policy w hich, under your direction, the m ilitia council has pursued since its inception in 1904 . . . the extent to w hich progress in carrying out his recom m enda­ tions can be m ade and the period which m ust elapse before they can becom e effective depends entirely upon how far Parliam ent is prepared to provide for the expenditure necessary Some at least o f the recom m endations m ade by F rench and

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endorsed by L ake were carried into effect. In eastern C anada the militia was organized in peace as it w ould be in war, into divisions each with a com m ander and staff, and each divi­ sional com m ander was to control all the troops within his area. But still the reports of the new inspector-general, a C anadian, G eneral O tter, pointed to continuance o f the old weaknesses: shortage of officers and m en, and inadequate qualifications. The last w ord before 1914 cam e from Sir Ian H am ilton, who inspected the C anadian forces in the sum m er o f 1913. O rganiza­ tion, training, and education he believed had all improved. He found, however, that th e active m ilitia was still short of instructors, and th at units w ere under strength. A bove all he stressed the unreality of the p aper liability for universal military service, and the absence in practice o f any reserve Such, in outline, w ere the m ilitary forces of C anada in the period between the w ithdraw al of the im perial troops and the W ar o f 1914. T hough theoretically based on universal service, the C anadian m ilitia was in reality purely a volunteer force. A part from the sm all perm anent force, the militia suffered from scanty resources and sketchy training - in spite of the zealous efforts of m any of its m em bers. T here was little that was distinctively C anadian about the militia. W hile frequently criticized as following too slowly o r im perfectly the British arm y, it was nevertheless organized and trained on the m ethods of th at arm y. From England cam e its drill, its weapons, and its training. C om m anding officers for m any years cam e from Eng­ land, as did m any of the staff o f the Royal M ilitary College. C anadian officers attended the English staff college. Advice cam e in generous am ounts from English officers in Canada, cither holding positions for a term o r on special inspections. T h e colonial defence com m ittee transm itted its views on C ana­ dian defences to O ttaw a. W hen changes were m ade they consisted in closer approxim ations to British practice: more m odern rifles, organization, m obilization plans, relations be­ tween civil and m ilitary officials concerned in defence. A reading o f either the reports of British experts o r discussions by C ana­ dians gives the impression th at the excellence of the m ilitia was in direct ratio to its likeness to its prototype. In addition to this technical relation o f the m ilitary forces o f the U nited Kingdom and Canada, was another and quite different one, found in the projects fo r concerted plans for im perial defence: organization for co-operative effort tow ard a com m on end.

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III Im perial defence, as has already been suggested, was not a single but a m ultiple problem , involving the defence of C anada, o f near-by British territories, of far-distant colonies, and of im perial pow er as a whole. T he protection of C anada itself was intended, after confederation, to be prim arily a C anadian re­ sponsibility, with the understanding that in case of attack G reat Britain would render assistance as she was able. T he m ajor part o f the imperial troops had been w ithdraw n by 1871, though a garrison was left at H alifax.T he m ilitary history of both H alifax and Esquim alt is o f peculiar interest in that they alone played a dual role: as conveniently-situated ports for the British navy, which happened to be situated in C anada; and as strategic posi­ tions through w hich C anada might be invaded. T he C anadian point o f view, both in the governm ent and am ongst the public, was that the cost of m aintenance should be shared; but the actual division was not so easily reached. W hen the w orld seemed peaceful Canadians tended to take the attitude that these bases were a British concern: when any threat loomed they em pha­ sized the necessity o f British naval and m ilitary forces being represented on both coasts. Because of this shifting atm osphere, and because of the impossibility of defining the relative values received by the U nited K ingdom and the dom inion, the negotia­ tions over the allocation of cost were protracted. Soon after British Colum bia joined the federation her governm ent pressed for the graving dock at Esquim alt, for which the dom inion had prom ised in the term s of union to guarantee the interest on a loan. Correspondence then ensued between the provincial, federal, and im perial governm ents. T he last agreed to contribute £ 3 0 ,0 0 0 on condition that the dock should be suitable in dim ension and character, and that His M ajesty’s ships have preferential treatm ent there fo r fifteen years. T he dom inion governm ent, for its part, offered a grant of £ 5 0 ,0 0 0 in lieu of its guarantee in the term s of union But in spite o f these early offers there rem ained some disagreem ent, and contracts were not aw arded until 1890.18 T he m aintenance of the defensive w orks and a garrison at Esquim alt was a m ore vital question which took even longer to settle. H ere again the pressure cam e from British Columbia, through the provincial governm ent and m em bers of parliam ent, b ut the arrangem ents were to be m ade between the governments o f the U nited K ingdom and Canada. T he Russian scares of

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1877-1885 drew attention to the weak state o f defences on the Pacific coast, and tem porary m easures were taken to strengthen Esquim alt. Several years w ere then passed in correspondence between the C anadian and British governm ents, with proposals and counter-proposals as to how the responsibility for defence m ight be shared. It was not until 1893 th at an agreem ent was reached under w hich the dom inion governm ent was to pay part of the cost o f construction and the m aintenance of the buildings and defence w orks, to pay for a detachm ent of Royal M arine A rtillery, and to supply some troops to supplem ent the garrison. This, with m odifications, continued to be the basis on which E squim alt was m aintained. N o such controversy took place over H alifax, presum ably because the British governm ent regarded it as a m ore im portant naval base. It was suggested, however, that C anadian troops in the neighbourhood would be available in case of need. A step tow ard a share in the defence of H alifax was taken during the South A frican W ar, w hen a battalion was provided to relieve the British troops there fo r service elsewhere. A fuller responsibility for the defence of both ports was first suggested by the C anadian representatives at the colonial con­ ference o f 1902 in an offer to garrison both H alifax and E squim alt and was form ally renewed early in 1905. T he offer was gratefully accepted, w ith the suggestion that the change m ight be m ade gradually, C anada in the m eanw hile defraying the cost o f such im perial troops as tem porarily rem ained T he proposal was accepted substantially as it was m ade, and in 1906 the last o f the im perial troops left H alifax and Esquim alt. A t the beginning of 1907 the C anadian governm ent also took over the H alifax dockyard, though privileges for the royal navy were reserved. T he changed position at the two ports coincided with the adoption o f a new policy by the adm iralty under w hich a local squadron was no longer to be stationed at either, but an equal o r greater degree of security prom ised from the larger units in which the ships w ere thereafter to operate. T o m any C anadians, on the A tlantic and Pacific coasts alike, even one ship that could be seen was a m ore real protection than m any th at were far away. Feelings were mixed over the changes of 1905. Protests against the British abandonm ent of the stations w ere accom panied by expressions of satisfaction that C anada was accepting a greater proportion of the burden of defence T h e buildings and other property at H alifax were form ally transferred to the C anadian governm ent in 1910, and those at E squim alt in 1911, subject to their being m aintained in a state

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of efficiency, to a supply of fuel being kept, and other facilities being provided for the royal navy. Excitem ent over the new policies for H alifax and Esquim alt arose not only from the im portance of these two ports but because the decisions respecting them w ere related to the wider issues of im perial defence, then receiving a growing am oun t of public attention. N o aspect of defence was as obviously a C ana­ dian interest as th a t o f the keys to h er eastern and western coasts, b u t there were other problem s th at had to be faced, and on w hich some decisions had to be made. T he story o f th e plans discussed in tim e of peace fo r co-operative im perial defence m ay be traced through the meetings of the colonial and imperial conferences. R eferring to the program m e of the first session in 1887 the colonial secretary w rote that “in the opinion o f H er M ajesty’s governm ent the question w hich is a t once urgent and capable o f useful consideration is th at of organization fo r m ili­ ta ry defence In the opening speech L ord Salisbury disclaimed any idea that “ this proposal fo r Im perial defence is a m ere contrivance on our p art to lighten ou r burden, o r that it results from any indolence o r selfishness o f ours,” b u t w ent on to say, in an apparent non sequitur, th at “we desire th a t all should take th eir fair and legitim ate p art in a task o f w hich all ought to be p ro u d N early half the w orking tim e o f the conference was devoted to considerations of defence, m ainly on naval problem s o f the Pacific, and the possible action to be taken by the A us­ tralian colonies. T he C anadian p art in the discussions was m eagre and negative. Sir A lexander Cam pbell m ade w hat were to becom e regulation references to the Intercolonial and C an a­ dian Pacific railways as contributions to defence, and virtually denied that the British navy was greater because of any respon­ sibility fo r th e defence o f C anada T en years elapsed before the next general discussion of defence (fo r it w as not taken up at the O ttaw a session o f 1894), and then the pace was soon seen to be quickening. Joseph C ham berlain w ent straight to the point of arguing th at the great m ilitary and naval defences o f G reat Britain w ere necessitated largely by her em pire. W ithout this force behind her Canada w ould be helpless in the face o f disagreem ents w ith Japan, Russia, or the U nited States, and becom e largely a dependent pow er. T h e colonial defence com m ittee, he said, had m ade some im provem ent, but the position in the colonies in regard to defences was still not satisfactory. As positive steps he proposed th at regim ents should tem porarily be exchanged between G reat

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Britain and the colonies, and th at a colonial regim ent thus in E ngland might take part in any m ilitary operations th at occurred. It is evident from the record of the conference that the colonial prem iers m ade no prom ise o f anything m ore than an exam ination o f the proposed interchange. Sir W ilfrid L aurier attended his second colonial conference in 1902 w ithout the South A frican W ar having shaken his inherent nationalism ; in L ondon he faced Joseph C ham berlain, whose im perialism had been fortified by the com m on efforts of that war. From other colonies came representatives w ith no less conflicting policies. In the p rep ara­ tions fo r the agenda, defence, am ongst other subjects, was suggested by the colonial secretary. In reply M into was obliged to report that his m inisters did not consider that “ in the varying conditions o f the Colonies there can be any scheme of defence applicable to all Taxed by the leader o f the opposition with returning a discourteous reply, L aurier denied any such inten­ tion, b ut repeated th at no useful purpose could be served by discussion o f defence. T he governm ent would, he said, be ready to discuss the defence of C anada, but som ething other than that was intended by a school in England and C anada “which wants to bring C anada into the vortex o f m ilitarism which is the curse and the blight of E urope D efence, how ever, appeared on the agenda; and indeed the conference w ould have been entirely unrealistic if th at had been excluded. In his opening speech C ham berlain again pointed to the heavy burden of defence borne by Britain - a burden which was largely due to the existence of the colonies. But the colonies were no longer young and poor: they w ere rich enough to offer tem ptation to aggression and strong enough to assum e a share o f their own defence To introduce the subject o f naval defence the first lord o f th e adm iralty spoke on the position of sea-power and m ade in particular two points: that the task o f the navy was n ot literally defence of certain places, but o f destroying the enem y fleet; and th at the m aritim e spirit of the em pire and the sense of personal interest should be aroused by having m ore colonials in the navy. H e had, he said, consulted the prem iers, all of w hom had offered m oney grants except L aurier, who had said that he was not able to m ake a sim ilar offer, but th at his governm ent was contem plating the establishm ent of a local naval force. Figures were produced showing the per capita naval expenditure (C anada being n il), and a d raft agreem ent on naval plans was m ade between the U nited K ingdom , A ustralia, and N ew Zealand; but the C anadian representatives rem ained aloof.

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On m ilitary policy m ore definite plans w ere p u t forw ard. T he secretary of state fo r w ar advocated a highly trained, if small, force in each colony to be held in readiness for im perial service. T o this the representatives o f both A ustralia and C anada ob­ jected on the ground that it would be a derogation of the principles of self-governm ent. A parallel plan by N ew Zealand for an im perial reserve force appeared w ith the approval of the colonial defence com m ittee; the com m ittee also sponsored a p ap er by L ieutenant-Colonel A ltham , assistant quarterm astergeneral at the w ar office, which proposed that specified troops in each colony (3,000 in C anada) should be ready to supple­ m ent the British arm y in case o f need. T he C anadian policy was sum m ed up in a m em orandum (printed as appendix vi to the rep o rt) draw n up by the C anadian m inisters regretting their inability to assent to suggestions o f either the adm iralty o r the w ar office. T heir objections arose, they said, “ not so m uch from the expense involved, as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposals w ould entail an im portant departure from the p rin ­ ciple o f colonial self-governm ent.” They recognized th at C anada should take over m ore of th e burden o f “self-defence,” and held that while the C anadian m ilitia had defects it was being im proved. On the naval side they contem plated a naval reserve. In any defence schemes they wished to co-operate w ith the im perial authorities, so far as that was com patible with selfgovernm ent. Im plicitly the m em orandum gave the impression th at C anada should be increasingly responsible for her own defence; but it avoided any reference to activities outside Canada. A t the colonial conference of 1907 the C anadian policy in regard to defence was substantially unchanged: no com m it­ m ents, no contributions to British naval o r land forces, and no outside control over any part of the C anadian forces. But w hatever the reason - w hether it was th at the atm osphere was better, o r th at the British governm ent had learned wisdom —the conference proceeded m ore sm oothly tow ard positive results. Progress, how ever, was least m arked in regard to naval defence. L ord T w eedm outh, first lord of the adm iralty, adm itted British responsibility for naval defence. Colonial aid would be wel­ com ed in any one of several form s, so long as consistent with control o f strategy and unity o f com m and T he C anadian reply was m ade by the m inister o f m arine and fisheries, L. P. Brodeur. T he C anadian position, he said, was different from th at of the other colonies and should be treated as such. H e objected to a

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docum ent show ing th at C anada had spent nothing on naval defence, citing the fisheries protection service, the naval militia, wireless stations, the hydrographic survey, and assum ption of the dockyards a t H alifax and Esquim alt. C anada was o f one m ind, he said, on the proposal to contribute directly to the British navy. A resolution m oved by one o f the representatives o f C ape Colony in favour of the principle of colonial contribu­ tions in som e form to the British navy was directly opposed by L aurier and w ithdraw n. It w as on m ilitary defence th at the conference reached positive agreem ent. L ord H aldane, secretary of state for war, explained how the general staff had grow n out of the recom m endations o f the E sher com m ittee of 1904, and suggested that the sam e principle might be applied to the em pire, to m eet w hat he described as “ the desirability o f a certain broad plan o f m ilitary organisation.” Sir Frederick Borden, after ascertaining that there was no idea o f creating a body with authority in C anada, accepted in principle one with advisory functions, and in which there should be interchange of officers with the general staff of C anada. T he proposal was then em bodied in a general resolution and accepted by all the m em bers of the conference. It was on these lines th a t im perial m ilitary defence was to develop from then on. “T he elaborate plans fo r pre-arranged contingents,” concludes Colonel H am ilton, “thus dropped to a proposal for an Im perial general staff. T his m eant m ore than the civilian reader m ight suspect, for it carried the idea of establishing in the E m pire com m on types o f organization, co-ordinated plans fo r action, a com m on way of thinking on m ilitary problem s, a com m on doctrine o f w ar It w as fully understood, and definitely stated over and over again, that no prom ise or guarantee was m ade by the dom inions to provide contingents, and th at there was no suprem e m ilitary authority in C anada save that of its governm ent. O n the other hand, the Canadian governm ent willingly entered into the plan fo r uni­ form ity of education and organization, and for com m on discus­ sion o f m ilitary problem s. Follow ing the general agreem ent at the conference of 1907 a m em orandum w as draw n up by the general staff and circulated to the dom inions at the end of 1908.31 F urth er progress along the sam e lines was m ade at the subsidiary conference o f 1909 (a form o f additional conference provided for under resolution o f the colonial conference of 1907, and called because of the im m ediacy o f the G erm an naval ch allen g e). T he m ilitary experts m et together under the chair­

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m anship o f the chief o f the im perial general staff and exam ined a m em orandum subm itted by him of “Proposals for so organiz­ ing the m ilitary forces of the em pire as to ensure their effective co-operation in the event o f w ar R ecom m endations were m ade by the experts designed to im plem ent the general objectives o f uniform ity of training, equipm ent, and organization, for the relations o f general staff officers in the dom inion and the U nited K ingdom , and fo r the education o f officers. These recom m enda­ tions were then accepted by the full conference and the com m ittee of im perial defence. “T he result,” M r. A squith told the H ouse of C om m ons, “is a plan for so organizing the forces o f the Crow n w herever they are that, while preserving the com plete autonom y of each D om inion, should the D om inions desire to assist in the defence o f the E m pire in a real em ergency, their forces could be rapidly com bined into one homogeneous Im perial A rm y.” W hen the conference again m et in 1911, under its new title o f “ im perial conference,” progress was reported on the plans generally accepted in 19 07.33 T he im perial general staff, al­ though only two years old, was said to have m ade progress, and a C anadian section to be in process of form ation. It was reported th at officers of the C anadian perm anent force w ere undergoing the sam e exam inations for prom otion as those in the British regular arm y. T he arm y council expressed its willingness that the inspector-general should inspect overseas forces a t the request o f a dom inion W hile these and other aspects of reorganization were going forw ard, an attem pt was m ade to change the principles then being followed by a revived plan for central political control over the defence forces of all parts of the em pire. A lthough other aspects of defence were brought before the com m ittee o f im perial defence ra th e r than the im­ perial conference, Sir Joseph W ard’s project for an imperial parliam ent o r council for im perial defence came, as a previous resolution, before the conference F rom the first of the discus­ sion W ard ’s plan evoked little sym pathy from any of the representatives of other p arts o f the em pire, and frank opposi­ tion from most. In the course o f being questioned, W ard adm itted that his parliam ent w ould have authority to com pel the dom inions to m ake contributions to an im perial navy - an idea w hich was s.o far rem oved from practical politics as to be hopeless of achievem ent. W ith this m otion w ithdraw n, the discussions o f defence proceeded in the com m ittee of imperial defence and at the w ar office and adm iralty.

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F ro m 1911 until 1914 the organization o f im perial defence lay, in the main, in two bodies: the im perial general staff and the com m ittee o f imperial defence. Both w ere advisory bodies, and both contained representatives of the dom inions. T he latter had no fixed m em bership, but dom inion representatives might attend, as full m em bers, as the occasion required. T hat the com m ittee was also used in 1911 as the body in which foreign policy was discussed has been seen as having dangerous impli­ cations for dom inion autonom y T he fact was, however, that c o o p e ra tio n in foreign policy was not keeping pace with co-operation in m ilitary policy: in other words, the control over the developm ent o f situations in which the m ilitary plans might be called into play was virtually left by the dominions (so cautious about m ilitary control) to the British foreign office. T he risk this involved was preferred, by C anada at least, to the m ore ap parent risk involved in consultation and responsibility.

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IV In the last qu arter of the nineteenth century wars and rum ours o f w ars gave reality to the m ilitary policy o f C anada in respect of both local and im perial defence. F ear of Russian attack, which had long been dorm ant, revived with the critical inter­ national situation in the near east in the years after 1877. Between the C rim ean and the Japanese wars the strength of Russia was com m only over-estim ated; and when the invasion of T urkey threatened an A nglo-Russian w ar m any Canadians found cause fo r alarm , not merely in the danger to the U nited K ing­ dom but also in threats to their own shipping and coasts. A nd in the sam e period, while fear o f A m erican aggression had m ateri­ ally abated, good relations with the U nited States were not taken fo r granted. O ne T oronto editor conjured up unpleasant visions of difficulties w ith both Russia and the U nited States. . . . we regard as absolutely fallacious the idea entertained in so m e quarters that there is anything in the Treaty o f Paris [of 1856] which will prevent Russia fro m issuing com m issions to vessels intended to prey upon the com m ercial m arine o f England and her colonies in case o f war, and if the Canadian G overnm ent is hugging itself on a contrary notion and so neglecting to provide fo r possible contingencies, we fear they, and all people here who hold them , are destined to a rough awakening . . . any Power can at any tim e issue com m issions to

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any vessel it pleases, and convert it into an addendum to its own belligerent navy. M oreover, it is quite on the cards that co m ­ plications m ay arise between Great Britain and the U nited States in connection with this delicate point, and it will not do fo r us in Canada to be slum bering in a fo o l’s paradise. . . . While Canada in fact has nothing w hatever to gain, as a colony, by war between Russia and England, it has a very great deal to lose, and hostilities are sure to subject us as a colonial depend­ ency to constant alarms and risks. This is a point which we fear is not y e t realized by our people. . .

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A few clays later the M ail pointed to the danger o f hostilities in the N orth Pacific. In fact the governm ent was not slum bering, b ut had already discussed the defenceless condition of the A tlan­ tic coast, and appealed to Britain for a fleet o f fast cruisers W hen the dispatch reached the adm iralty the reply was that the m atter had long been under consideration; that the A m erican Civil W ar had shown w hat dam age could be done by a single fast cruiser; and th at a considerable expenditure w ould be required to afford any adequate protection. “Looking,” the adm iralty reply continued, “at the very large m ercantile m arine possessed by the D om inion, it is only reasonable to assum e that the C anadian governm ent will avail themselves of their resources for the protection o f C anadian ports and shipping,” but sug­ gested aid by the loan of guns A lready the governm ent had authorized the expenditure o f $ “ in view of the precau­ tionary m easures now being taken for defensive purposes but apparently did not respond to the larger suggestion. A ppre­ hension continued for some tim e. In 1879 reports were circulated that a Russian steam er from the Baltic was off the coast of M aine, and was laden with guns and seamen to supply com nierce-raiders. In 1883 the Senate discussed the defenceless condition of the Pacific coast. W. J. M acdonald, who brought up the question, spoke of the com parative nearness of Russian naval bases, the possibility o f an Indian uprising in case of war, and the need for m ore protection by the royal navy In 1885 a sim ilar concern for the A tlantic coast was expressed by the Saint John Telegraph in a suggestion that a Russian w arship m ight quite possibly com e into th at h arb o u r Before the Russian danger had ceased to stir C anadian feel­ ings the affairs of Egypt brought on a new and different type of m ilitary question. W hen W olseley was organizing an expedition in 1884 to relieve G ordon, cut off at K hartoum , he cabled a

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request for voyageurs, like those who had gone w ith him to the R ed River in 1870, as steersm en for the N ile boats. A party num bering 386 all ranks was sent, m ade up in part of Indians and in p art o f lum berm en (fo r the voyageurs had all but disappeared T he expedition reached K hartoum too late, and as the situation in the Sudan becam e increasingly grave, N ew South W ales offered a contingent. Should C anada take sim ilar action? Individual C anadians prom ptly offered to raise regi­ m ents, and there were suggestions that the governm ent should send a contingent. F rom L ondon T upper cabled th at Canada should send and pay for troops. “T he cost,” he w rote later, “would not be m uch and C anada cannot in my judgm ent afford to do less after w hat New South W ales has done. It will be repaid to the country in m any ways and carry out the expectations raised by your speeches h e r e .. . T he W eek o f T oronto rather sur­ prisingly called for sending substantial aid A m ore general attitude, however, was that expressed by the M a il and the Globe o f T oronto and the Saint John D aily Telegraph.**.Britain, the argum ent ran, w as not in danger. Filial loyalty might properly inspire individual offers o f service, but only a m ajor crisis should lead the dom inion to m ake an official effort, at her own expense. A sim ilar but m ore vigorous opinion was expressed in the M anitoba Free Press, which com m ented that “ all the talk we have heard about C anada’s fighting the battles of England is very silly and quite likely to be h u rtfu l In this particular case the m atter was decided by the outbreak o f the N orth-W est Rebellion which required th at all available C anadian troops should rem ain in Canada. It was w orthy o f note that in this, unlike the first Riel rebellion, im perial troops were not needed. T en years later the V enezuela controversy caused m ore than a ripple in C anada, and had an interest in that it again involved the possibility - though perhaps a rem ote one - o f defence against the U nited States. This also m arked the last occasion on which considerable preparations were m ade as defence against the U nited States. But much the m ost im portant m ilitary event fo r C anada between the period of the Civil W ar and Fenian raids and the W ar of 1914 was the South A frican W ar. T he decision to be m ade by the C anadian governm ent was n ot an easy one, since the struggle with the Boers m ight be interpreted either as an episode in British im perial developm ent or as a crisis of dimensions sufficient to threaten the power and prestige o f the em pire o f w hich C anada was part. It was an imperial question m idw ay between the Sudan expeditions and the W ar of

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1914. In C anada, too, it m ight take the appearance o f the repression o f one ethnic group by another, and so touch a delicate nerve. In the sum m er of 1899, as the situation in South A frica becam e m ore acute, several British colonies m ade offers of m ilitary aid in the event of hostilities, and in C anada there were some suggestions th a t their exam ple should be followed. Both p arliam ent and public, how ever, w ere slow in reaching that conclusion. On July 31 the prim e m inister introduced a resolu­ tion into the H ouse o f C om m ons expressing sym pathy with the British governm ent in its attem pt to secure equal rights fo r British subjects in the Transvaal. W hether o r not this could be taken as an endorsem ent of British policy, it was not enough to satisfy the growing dem and fo r m ore tangible aid. J. S. W illison, then editor o f the G lobe, bluntly told L au rier th at he would have to send troops o r go out of office, a conclusion w ith which L aurier was reluctantly forced to agree before long A t the beginning o f O ctober events m oved rapidly. O n the third Joseph C ham berlain, the colonial secretary, who fo r three m onths had been angling for official prom ises o f aid, cabled an acknow ledg­ m ent o f private “offers to serve in South A frica” and described the m eans by w hich they could be carried o u t On the same day L aurier had given an interview in w hich he said that while C anadian forces m ight be sent abroad in defence o f C anada, the South A frican situation did n ot create any such menace. F o r this reason, and because parliam ent (w hich was not sitting) would have to grant the money, no troops had been offered. It has som etim es been said th at L aurier’s hand was forced by C ham ­ b erlain’s cable: it is m ore probable th at it was forced by the pressure of public opinion. C ertainly he was in an uncom fortable position. Personally reluctant to take any action, not believing that the South A frican affair w ould assum e large proportions, and pressed in his own province not to intervene, he found him self obliged either to do so, o r to allow the opposition free play w ith public sentim ent in m ost of English-speaking C anada. O nce the decision was m ade no constitutional difficulty was allowed to stand in the way. A n ingeniously w orded privy council rep o rt o f O ctober 14 show ed the hope o f the cabinet th at it was possible to accept a very lim ited liability. A fter quoting C ham berlain’s dispatch, the rep o rt states that,

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conditions, is o f opinion that the m oderate expenditure which would thus be involved fo r the equipm ent and transportation o f such volunteers m ay readily be undertaken by the governm ent o f Canada without sum m oning parliament, especially as such an expenditure under such circum stances cannot be regarded as a departure fro m the well know n principles o f constitutional governm ent and colonial practice, nor construed as a precedent fo r fu tu re action

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O n O ctober 30, within a day o f the last date set by Cham berlain, a battalion of over a thousand men sailed from Canada. As they had originally proposed, the British governm ent were to bear all expenses other than the differential between Canadian and British rates of pay from the tim e the troops landed, but one change w as m ade in that the C anadians were to be kept as a separate unit. O n N ovem ber 2, after news of reverses, the C anadian governm ent cabled an offer of another contingent, which, however, was not accepted until the situation had grown even worse in D ecem ber. Thus, when parliam ent m et in F ebruary 1900 the C anadian governm ent had, on its own authority, sent two contingents to a w ar th at had already show n itself to be the m ost serious in which G reat Britain had been engaged for half a century. The debates in both H ouses w ere prolonged and at times impressive. W hile the governm ent enjoyed an alm ost unanim ous support on m ain principles, criticism was not lacking. Some there were who held that m ore rapid and m ore generous aid should have been rendered, and in particular that C anada should have borne all expenses. O thers objected to any participation. Even the breezy language of the privy council report could not disguise the fact that the governm ent had acted w ithout sanction of parliam ent, but the great m ajority agreed that, under the cir­ cum stances, this was justifiable. T here w ere long discussions of the causes o f the war, of the im portance o f South A frica to G reat Britain, and o f the interest which C anada had in the struggle. T he general tenor of the debate was that British policy had been neither unreasonable nor aggressive; but a vocal m inority, led by Bourassa, condem ned the policy and the action of C anada in supporting it. T he em phasis constantly laid on the position of Q uebec revealed both the existence of an anti-war party there and the apprehension in the other provinces that that party might be dangerously strong. C onstant protests w ere made that Q uebec was “loyal,” but it was also apparent that the most

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critical speeches cam e from m em bers for Q uebec constituencies. O ne fu rth e r test of the governm ent’s policy cam e in the general election of 1900, an election largely fought on th at policy, and in w hich an elem ent o f bitterness was all too apparent. T he results o f the polling were som ew hat striking: in O ntario the governm ent lost fourteen seats, and in Quebec it gained all but seven. It was easily apparent, therefore, that there had been no serious revolt in Q uebec against L aurier; while the vote in O ntario m ust be explained not by any opposition to the w ar but, in p art, by dissatisfaction at such cautious participation. T h e C anadian contribution to the w ar w as not inconsider­ able. T h e forces sent overseas consisted, first, o f the second (special service) battalion o f the Royal C anadian Regim ent at a strength o f 1,150 officers and m en, under the com m and of a C anadian, L ieutenant-Colonel O tter. T he second contingent, recruited at the end of 1899, included the Royal C anadian D ragoons (tw o sq u ad ro n s), draw n largely from the perm anent force, the C anadian M ounted Rifles (tw o sq uadrons), recruited in p art from the N orth W est M ounted Police, and three batteries of Royal C anadian A rtillery, also recruited in p art from the perm anent force. In addition to the two first C anadian con­ tingents were troops later raised in C anada, but not directly by the C anadian governm ent. These included L ord S lrathcona’s H orse, o f three squadrons, the expenses o f w hich were m et by L ord Strathcona; twelve squadrons o f the South A frican co n ­ stabulary; the 2nd C anadian M ounted Rifles; the 10th C anadian Field H ospital; and the 3rd, 4 th, 5th, and th C anadian M ounted Rifles (these last arriving after the conclusion o f p eace). In all 7,300 m en w ent to South A frica In C anada the 3rd Battalion, R oyal C anadian R egim ent, was raised to relieve the imperial garrison at H alifax. Citizens contributed to the Red Cross and P atriotic F u n d organizations in C anada, and to provide insur­ ance and other funds fo r the troops. Owing to the short term of enlistm ent parts o f the forces returned to C anada before the end o f hostilities, no r w ere the reinforcem ents adequate to keep the units up to strength. A p art from these weaknesses the C anadian troops played an active and efficient p art in the war. T hough lacking in training and experience on arrival in South A frica, they perform ed their duties satisfactorily, and at tim es with conspicuous success W hile C anadians had thus played an active part in the war, th eir governm ent had had no influence on the circum stances w hich led to its outbreak o r on the m ethods by which it was

6

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conducted. It rem ained to be seen w hether the C anadian govern­ m ent would exercise, o r wish to exercise, any control over the term s on w hich peace was to be m ade. O n several occasions the criticism was m ade in parliam ent th at C anada h ad gone into a w ar fo r which she was in no way responsible, and the sim ilar objection was raised against a purely English peace. In 1900 and 1901 Bourassa asked in the H ouse of C om m ons w hether the governm ent had been consulted on the conditions o f peace, or intended to offer any opinion; and on both occasions the prim e m inister explicitly replied in the negative In 1902 John C harlton moved a cautious resolution asking for a m agnanim ous treatm ent o f the Boers. In the debate th at followed m ost o f the speakers agreed with the prim e m inister th at the C anadian parliam ent had a right to express such opinions, b u t th at to intervene w hen peace w as actually un d er discussion might prolong, rather than shorten, the w ar. O ther m em bers said that C anada had already been too free in expressing opinions The m otion was w ithdraw n; and the C anadian participation in the South A frican W ar continued to be confined to its m ilitary aspect.

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V N aval defence was no less im portant to C anada than land defence, afte r confederation as before it; but so long as the British navy m aintained unquestioned suprem acy on the seas C anadians could and did expect th a t their coasts w ould be protected by that great force w ithout their contributing ships themselves. F o r th at reason there was in the dom inion no pres­ sure to form ulate a naval policy until, in the tw entieth century, the dom inant position held since T rafalgar began to be th reat­ ened by G erm any. Even then the C anadian governm ent and parliam ent moved slowly to m eet the new circum stances. T h ro u g h the colonial conference of 1907 the C anadian attitude was alm ost w holly negative, being sim ply a refusal to m ake contributions to the British navy. In the following years, how­ ever, the vague suggestions o f a C anadian navy began to harden into a positive policy. T here had long been differing views in C an ad a on naval defence. O ne school o f thought concurred with the view, presented at earlier colonial conferences, that the English burden of naval defence was m aterially increased by the existence o f the colonies; and th at the latter should consequently take steps to share that burden. A nother held th at British naval

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pow er was designed fo r defence o f world-wide trade and was as large as it was because of a British conviction th at sea-power, fo r an island dependent on sea-com m unication for its prosperity and very life, m ust be unquestioned. T hose who held the form er view suggested either a direct contribution o f money o r ships to the British navy (the plan m ost acceptable to the adm iralty ), o r a C anadian navy acting, when occasion required, in concert with the royal navy. Occasionally, as at the tim e o f the Russian scares, the people o f both coasts at least w ere conscious o f the need of naval protection, but otherw ise the obviously superior pow er o f the British navy prevented any feeling of necessity. It was only in 1909 when the G erm an construction obviously began to threaten British suprem acy that the C anadian people were aroused to a desire for action. T here were, it is true, some w ho claim ed th a t the danger was unduly, and even im properly, m agnified; there were also those who continued to believe that naval defence was a British, and not a C anadian, responsibility. T h e effective m ajority, however, accepted the proposition that the threat was real, and that C anada m ust lend aid to com bat it. In w hat form th at aid was to be rendered rem ained a m atter of disagreem ent. T h e first substantive discussion o f the naval question in parliam ent showed a rem arkable unanim ity o f opinion On M arch 29, 1909, a prom inent Conservative, G. E. Foster, intro­ duced a resolution which, in general term s, expressed the responsibility o f C anada fo r a share in the defence of h er coasts. In an explanatory speech he said th at there were two ways of assuming this responsibility. O ne was by the contribution of m oney to the adm iralty. T o this he saw objec­ tions, and would prefer the creation o f a C anadian naval force. L aurier im m ediately expressed his agreem ent in principle, but suggested that the resolution relate only to the form ation o f a C anadian naval service. Borden intervened to propose that, while this was the proper course, the possibility of a contribu­ tion in case of em ergency should not be excluded. A fter further am endm ents a resolution was passed unanim ously. It recognized “the duty of the people of C anada, as they increase in numbers and w ealth, to assum e in large m easure the responsibilities of national defence,” stated that the paym ent “of regular and periodical contributions” would not be the best course, and approved expenditure for a C anadian naval service, recognizing that “the naval suprem acy o f B ritain is essential to the security

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of com m erce, the safety o f the em pire and the peace o f the w orld.” T h e scene then tem porarily shifted to London. A t about the sam e time as the C anadian resolution the governm ents of New Zealand and A ustralia had offered battleships. T he British gov­ ernm ent, in view of the actions of the three dom inions, and of its understanding that th e C anadian governm ent intended to send its m inister of m ilitia and defence to England fo r consulta­ tions, proposed the holding o f a subsidiary defence conference, as provided for by the colonial conference of 1907.50 W hen the conference duly m et at the end of July the adm iralty subm itied a m em orandum expressing its preference for a single navy, but agreeing that the conditions in some o f the dom inions led them to prefer local naval forces. F or those th at followed this policy it was recom m ended that a distinct fleet unit should be the aim. Such a unit should include one arm oured and three unarm oured cruisers, six destroyers, three subm arines, and the necessary auxiliaries. “T he estim ated first cost o f building and arm ing such a com plete fleet unit would be approxim ately £ 3 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 , and the cost of m aintenance, including upkeep of vessels, pay, and interest and sinking fund, at British rates, approxim ately £ 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 per annum .” T o these sum s should be added the pay o f persons in the auxiliary services, and of those in training, sick, and in reserve. Ship-building and repairing establishm ents would be required, training schools, and sources of stores. W hile a dom inion w ould thus provide its own navy com plete, there should be uniform ity in equipm ent, training, and discipline. It was understood that in time o f w ar the local naval forces should com e under the general direction o f the adm iralty. In the discussions that followed (of w hich only a sum m ary was printed) between the British and C anadian representatives, a m uch less am bitious program m e was considered. G iven C anada’s double seaboard, a fleet u nit was recognized as unsuitable, and the adm iralty, on ascertaining that C anada asked for two plans for naval forces involving a cost o f £ 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 or £ 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 annu­ ally, suggested lo u r cruisers and six destroyers or three cruisers and four destroyers. D uring the period of construction and training the adm iralty was prepared to lend two cruisers, and also volunteers from the royal navy to be paid by the Canadian governm ent. T he address from the throne in N ovem ber 1909 forecast a C anadian navy, and January 1910 L aurier introduced the N aval Service Bill providing for a departm ent o f the naval

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service, a naval reserve force, a naval volunteer force, and a naval college. In case of em ergency all o r p art of the navy could be placed at the service of the royal navy. T he prim e m inister explained that o f the two program m es drafted by the adm iralty at his request the governm ent would choose the larger one, providing eleven ships at a cost of $3 m illion. It soon became apparent, as had been indicated in the previous m onths, that unanim ity was at an end. T he Conservatives, though otherwise disunited, were opposed to the bill. T he official position of the party, as expressed by Borden, was that the electors should be consulted and that the plan was faulty in th at no provision was m ade to m eet the im m ediate em ergency. T he proper m ethod for doing so, he said, was to provide the royal navy w ith two dreadnoughts. F . D. M onk, leader of the Conservative party in Quebec, argued against either a C anadian navy or a contribu­ tion to the British one. T he governm ent’s plan w ould tie Canada to the foreign policy of Britain, in w hich she had no voice, and create a com m itm ent to fight in any British w ar. T here should, he said, be a plebiscite. In a speech outside the H ouse, H enri Bourassa continued to flay the whole policy. T here was no G erm an m enace; there was no threat to C anada; there was no prospect of Britain consulting C anada on foreign policy; there should be a plebiscite. In spite o f these and other criticisms the am endm ents w ere defeated and the bill passed by a com fortable m ajority. T h e first steps to im plem ent the act cam e quickly enough. A minister, deputy-m inister, and director o f naval services were appointed and a naval college established at H alifax. Tw o old cruisers were bought from the U nited K ingdom . T he N iobe was a very large and heavily-arm ed vessel and the R ainbow smaller. It was an encouraging beginning, m arked by flags, salutes, and speeches - and it was also virtually th e end. N io b e struck a rock off Cape Sable and was not repaired until the end of 1912. R ainbow , after som e cruises up and down the west coast, rested in Esquim alt fo r h arb o u r training. T enders were called for con­ struction of fu rth er ships in C anada but no contracts had been aw arded before the fall o f the Liberal governm ent. M eanw hile there w ere discussions of naval policy at the im­ perial conference o f 1911. Representatives of the adm iralty and o f A ustralia and C anada reached an agreem ent set forth in a m em orandum T he naval forces of the two dom inions w ere to be u n d er the control of their respective governm ents, but train­ ing and discipline were to be generally uniform , with those o f the

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fleet of the U nited K ingdom , and officers and m en m ight be interchanged. T he C anadian and A ustralian navies were to have their own naval stations, the limits of w hich were defined. “In time of war, w hen the naval service of a D om inion, o r any part thereof, has been p u t at the disposal of the Im perial governm ent by the D om inion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of the British fleet, and will rem ain under the control of the British A dm iralty during the continuance o f the w ar.” T he election o f 1911 stopped the further progress of the plans of 1910. O utside Quebec the dom inating issue in the elec­ tion was the reciprocity project, but in that province the issue was naval policy. Borden continued, in public statem ents, to describe the L iberals’ navy as expensive and useless, as a “politi­ cal m akeshift.” Significantly for his later policy he added that “responsibility for Em pire defence clearly involves som e voice in Em pire policy. C anada’s perm anent and effective co-operation in naval defence can only be accom plished by proposals which take account of this consideration and any such proposals should be subm itted to the people for their approval.” The nationalist point o f view in Quebec, as expressed by M onk and Bourassa, claim ed th at the Liberal policy would lead C anada into B ritain’s imperialist w ars and was not required for the defence of Canada. A s a result o f the vote the governm ent lost seriously in Q uebec and overwhelmingly in O ntario. W hen the Conservatives cam e into office in 1911 the N aval Service A ct stayed on the statute book but no contracts for additional ships w ere aw arded and the sm all force th at had been built up continued to disintegrate. On being questioned in the H ouse the m inister said th at a new policy w ould be brought forw ard; meanwhile no substantive change would be m ade. In June 1912 Borden w ent to E ngland, accom panied by three other m inisters and expert advisers, and there a series o f con­ versations was held with A squith, other cabinet ministers, offi­ cials of the adm iralty, and the com m ittee of im perial defence. T h ere were discussions of the international situation, the G er­ m an naval program m e, the action which C anada m ight take, and how the dom inions could have a voice in im perial foreign policy. T he first lord of the adm iralty, W inston C hurchill, stressed the need for an em ergency contribution to the royal navy. In D ecem ber 1912 Borden introduced the N aval Aid Bill into the H ouse of Com m ons. Starting from the point of view of developm ents w ithin the em pire, he said th at the problem was to

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reconcile co-operation w ith dom inion autonom y. It was fully understood th at sharing naval defence m ust be accom panied by sharing control o f foreign policy. T he naval suprem acy of the em pire was threatened, and for this reason there should be an im m ediate contribution o f the cost of three dreadnoughts ($35 m illion). C anadians could serve on these ships, which would necessarily be constructed in England; and the ships could later be recalled to form p art o f a C anadian u nit o f the royal navy. T he Conservative policy was to have even less success than the Liberal one. T he opposition argued th at the navy should be a C anadian one, though larger than they themselves had planned in 1910, and L au rier moved an am endm ent in th at sense. It was argued that there was no real em ergency, and that the Conserva­ tive policy endangered dom inion autonom y. R epresentation on the com m ittee of im perial defence (w hich the governm ent had accepted as a first step) w ould not be an effective way o f influ­ encing im perial foreign policy. Britain was richer than Canada. Only a C anadian navy would defend the C anadian coasts. In spite o f the loss o f M onk, who had resigned from the cabinet, the governm ent had am ple votes to pass the bill. T he opposition, how ever, adopted w hat was claim ed to be a policy of obstruc­ tion and the debate w ent on for week after week. F inally the governm ent introduced closure and the bill was passed through the C om m ons in M ay. T he Senate (which still had a Liberal m ajority) took, how ever, the unusual course of defeating the bill afte r advancing argum ents already fam iliar. T he question, said the Senate m ajority, should be “subm itted to the judgm ent o f the country.” A virtual stalem ate had been reached, partly because of sin­ cere differences of opinion and partly from party m anoeuvring. T h e governm ent was unwilling to renew a debate which could only have the sam e ending as before, and equally unwilling to reverse its policy by sponsoring the L iberal plan for a C anadian navy. N ot only was no progress m ade along either o f the two paths proposed by the parties, but even the naval force already acquired was not m aintained in a state o f efficiency. T he person­ nel was allowed to dwindle and the two cruisers were tem pora­ rily o ut of commission. C anada was thus left with no naval policy and alm ost no navy. Y et the danger which had brought the issue to a head was as real as the m ost pessimistic had described it. T he G erm an navy was a fact, and the policy which had brought it into being was soon to be translated into fact in the W ar of 1914.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

Origins o f the C anadian Society (PP. 1-22) 1. F o r the influence o f N ew England o n N o v a Scotia see J. B. B rebner, N ew E n g lan d ’s O utpost: A cad ia B efore the C onquest o f C anada (N ew Y o rk , 1927), and T he N e u tra l Y ankees o f N ova S cotia: A M arg in al C olony during the R evolutionary Years (New Y o rk , 1 9 3 7 )C arleton L ib rary N o. 45; also M . L. H ansen, T he M ingling o f the C anadian a n d A m erican Peoples (N ew H aven a n d T o ro n to , 1940). 2. W . P. M . K ennedy (e d .), S tatu tes, Treaties a n d D ocum ents o f tht C anadian C o nstitution, 1 7 1 3 -1 9 2 9 (T o ro n to , 1930), p. 171. 3. M . Sm ith, A G eographical View o f the B ritish Possessions in N o rth A m erica (B altim ore, 1814), p. 51. 4. S t . Jo h n N ew B runsw icker, Ju ly 15, 1842. 5. F o r a full study o f this subject see H ansen, M ingling o f the C anadian a n d A m erican P eoples, chap. vi. 6. The G leaner (M ira m ic h i), D ec. 30, 1850. 7. La M in e n e (M o n tre a l), F eb . 6, 1853. 8. Sir R obert F alco n er, “ Scottish Influence in the H ig h er E d u cation of C an a d a " ( Proceedings an d T ransactions o f the R oyal Society of C an ad a, 1927), “ E nglish Influence on the H igher E d u catio n of C an a d a ” (ib id ., 1928), “ A m erican Influence o n the H igher E ducation o f C an a d a ” (ib id ., 1930). 9. R . M . Saunders, “ T h e C u ltu ra l D evelopm ent o f N ew F ran c e B efore 1760” (E ssay s in C anadian H isto ry , ed. by R. Flenley, T o ro n to , 1939), p. 329. 10. G eorges V attier, Essai su r la m entality canadienne-fransalse (P aris, 1928), p. 133. 11. L om e Pierce, “ E nglish C an ad ian L iteratu re ” (T h e R oyal Society of C an ad a: Fifty Y ears R etro sp ect, T o ro n to , 1932), p. 57. 12. N ew ton M acTavish, T he F in e A rts in C an a d a (T oronto, 1925), p. 9 fj. 13. O n the P ro testa n t churches see G . W . B row n, “ T he E arly M ethodist C hurch and the C an ad ian P o in t o f View” (R ep o rt o f the C anadian H isto rical A ssociation, 1938), and “ T h e F o rm ativ e P eriod o f the C an ad ian P ro testan t C h u rch es" (E ssays in C anadian H isto ry , cd. by R. F len ley ). 14. L a M inerve, M arch 30, 1848. 15. Ib id ., M ay 18, 1848. 16. L e P ay s (M o n tre a l), A p ril 12, 1856. 17. Ib id ., M arch 23, 1858. 18. M ackenzie’s W eekly M essage (T o ro n to ), O ct. 22, 1859. 19. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, Series G , vol. 148, p. 142. 20. L a M inerve, D ec. 12, 1851. 21. M ackenzie's W eekly M essage, N ov. 20, 1857. 22. B ritish C olonist (T o ro n to ), O ct. 29, 1857.

256 - A H I S T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 23. L a M inerve, Feb. 26, 1846. 24. The G leaner, M ay 6, 1850. 25. The N ovascolian (H a lifa x ), A ug. 5, 1861. 26. The P ilo t, quoted in Q uebec G azette, M arch 18, 1846. 27. B ritish C olonist, A pril 3, 1858. 28. Ib id ., A p ril 14, 1841.

CHAPTER 2

D iplom acy and W ar (pp. 23-46) 1. F o r N o v a S cotia an d C an a d a d uring the A m erican revolution see, in ter a lia , J . B. B rebner, T he N e u tra l Y ankees o f N o v a S cotia: A M arg in al C olony d uring the R evolutionary Y ears (N ew Y o rk , 1937); G . M . W rong, C an ad a a n d the A m erican R evolution: T he D isruption o f the F irs t B ritish Em pire (N ew Y o rk , 1935); Ju stin H . Sm ith, Our Struggle f o r the F o u rteen th Colony: C an a d a during the A m erican R evolution (2 vols., N ew Y o rk , 1907). 2. F u ll acco u n t o f the p eace negotiations will be found in S. F . Bemis, "C a n a d a and th e Peace S ettlem ent o f 1782-3” ( C anadian H istorical Review, X IV , Sept. 1933), an d The D iplom acy o f the A m erican R evolution (N ew Y o rk , 1935); A . L. B u rt, The U nited States, G reat B ritain a n d B ritish N o rth A m erica fro m the R evolution to the Establishm ent o f P eace a fte r the W ar o f 1 8 1 2 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940). 3. Texts o f th e ordinances a re in the R ep o rt o f the W ork o f the Public A rchives fo r the Y ears 1 9 1 4 a n d 1 9 1 5 (O ttaw a, 1916). C orrespond­ ence relating to the ordinances is in A H istory o f the O rganization, D evelopm ent an d S e n ic e s o f the M ilitary an d N a v al F o rce s of C an a d a fro m the Peace o f P a ris in 1 7 6 3 , to th e Present Tim e, edited by the H isto rical Section o f the G eneral Staff (3 vols., n.p ., n .d .). F o r the history o f the m ilitia see C. F . H am ilto n , “ T h e C anadian M ilitia” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V , 1927-8); E. J. C ham bers, T he C an ad ian M ilitia: A H isto ry o f the O rigin an d D evelopm ent of the F o rce (M o n treal, 1907); J . P. E dw ards, “T he M ilitia o f N ova Scotia, 1749-1867” ( C ollections o f the N o v a S co tia H isto rical Society, X V II, 1913); B enjam in Suite, H isto ire d e la M ilice canadienne-franCaise, 1 7 6 0 -1 8 9 7 (M o n treal, 1897). G . F . G . Stanley, C anada's Soldiers (T o ro n to , 1960) is a useful sk etch o f the whole period. 4. O f tw o recent books co n tain in g discussions o f the W ar o f 1812 that by J . W . P ra tt, E xpansionists o f 1 8 1 2 (N ew Y ork, 1925), em phasizes A m erican expansionism ; w hile A . L. B u rt, in The U nited States, G reat B ritain a n d B ritish N o rth A m erica argues th a t th e m aritim e disputes w ere th e chief causes. 5. T here is a considerable lite ra tu re o n th e W ar o f 1812. A good general acco u n t is C. P. Lucas, T he C anadian W ar o f 181 2 (O xford, 1906). A . T. M ah a n ’s classic, Sea P o w er in its R elation to the W ar of 1 8 1 2 (2 vols., B oston, 1905), in terp rets the su b ject widely. 6. F o r the negotiations an d term s o f settlem ent see B urt, T he U nited S tates, G re a t B ritain an d B ritish N o rth A m erica.

N O T E S - 257 7. F o r the la te r history o f the fisheries disputes see below , p p . 139-43. 8. G eorge W . Spragge (e d .) , The Jo h n Strachan L e tte r B ook, 1 8 1 2 -1 8 3 4 (T o ro n to , 1946), S trach an to C olonel H arv ey , F eb ., 1815. 9. T h e rep o rt o f the com m ission, w ith the exception o f a n article (52) on the vulnerable p o in ts o f the U nited States, was lithographed under the title Copy o j a R ep o rt to H is G race the D u k e o f W ellington M aste r G en eral o f H is M ajesty’s O rdnance etc. relative to H is M ajesty’s N o rth A m erican Provinces by a C om m ission o j which M . G eneral S ir Jam es C arm ichael Sm yth w as P resident, Lieut. Colonel S ir G eorge H o ste, C ap tain H a rris m em bers (1 8 2 5 ). A sum m ary o f the conclusions is in S ir Jam es C arm ichael-Sm yth’s Precis o f the W ars in C an ad a, edited by his son, Sir Jam es C arm ichael (L ondon, 1862). 10. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, Series G , vol. 109, p. 458; vol. 116, p. 139; vol. 121, p p . 210, 217, 295; vol. 122, p. 458. See also J . M. C allah an , The N eutrality o f the A m erican L ak es a n d A nglo-A m erican R elations (Jo h n s H opkins Studies in H isto rical a n d P o litical Science, Scries X V I, nos. 1-4, B altim ore, 1898). 11. Series G , vol. 122, p. 99, Stanley to M etcalfe, Sept. 16, 1845. 12. Series G , vol. 108, p. 108, F o x to P alm erston, Jan . 10, 1841. 13. Series G , vol. 110, p. 451, Stanley to Sydenham , Sept. 10, 1841. 14. A full acco u n t o f these events is in A. B. C orey, The Crisis o f 18301 8 4 2 in C anadian-A m erican R elations (N ew H aven an d T o ro n to , 1941). 15. See J . H . Latanfi, A H isto ry o f A m erican Fo reig n Policy (N ew Y ork, 1934). 16. Q uebec G azette, A pril 28, 1845. 17. M ackenzie's W eekly M essage (T o ro n to ), A pril 7, 1854. 18. L a M inerve (M o n tre a l), M ay 6, 1854. 19. Series G , vol. 122, p. 99, Stanley to M etcalfe, Sept. 16, 1845. O n the w ithdraw al o f troops see C. P. Stacey, C an a d a a n d the B ritish A rm y, 1 8 4 6 -1 8 7 1 ; A Study in the P ractice o f R esponsible G overnm ent (L on­ don, 1936; T o ro n to , re p r., 1963), and C. F . H am ilto n , “T h e C anadian M ilitia” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V I, 1928-9). 20. A . G . D oughty (e d .), The E lgin-G rey P a p e rs, 1 8 4 6 -1 8 5 2 (4 vols., O ttaw a, 1937), I, 267. 21. G . T. D enison, Soldiering in C an ad a: R ecollections a n d Experiences (T o ro n to , 1900), p. 30. 22. T he N ovascotian (H a lifa x ), Ju n e 14, 1858. 23. Series G , vol. 143, p. 200, N ew castle to Elgin, M arch 31, 1853. 24. M inutes o f the Council o f V ancouver Isla n d , 1 8 5 1 -1 8 6 1 (A rchives of B ritish C olum bia, M em oir n o.-2 ) , Ju ly 12, 1854.

CHAPTER 3

T ransition from M ercantilism (pp. 47-63) 1. L. C. A . K now les, The In d u stria l a n d C om m ercial R evolutions in G re a t B ritain during the N ineteenth C entury (L o n d o n , 1933), p. 295. 2. H . A . Innis (e d .) , Select D ocum ents in C an ad ian E conom ic H istory, 1 4 9 7 -1 7 8 3 (T o ro n to , 1929), p . 212.

258 - A H IS T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 3. Ibid., p. 210. 4. M ary Q uayle Innis, A n E conom ic H istory o f C an a d a (T oronto, 1935); D . G . C reighton, T he C om m ercial Em pire o f th e S t. Law­ rence, 1 7 6 0 -1 8 5 0 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1937; repr., 1956); H . A. Innis, T he C o d Fisheries: The H istory o f a n In tern atio n al Econom y (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940; rev. ed., 1954); H . A . Innis, The F u r T rad e in C an ad a: A n In tro d u ctio n to C an ad ian E conom ic H istory (N ew H aven, 1930; rev. ed., 1956); A . R. M . Low er, “T h e T ra d e in Square T im ber” ( C ontributions to C anadian Econom ics, V I, 1933); D . A . M acG ibbon, T he C anadian G rain T rad e (T o ro n to , 1932); W . T. E asterb ro o k and H . G . J. A itken, C anadian E conom ic H istory (T o ro n to , 1961). 5. Innis, C od Fisheries, p. 267. 6. B. E. W alk er, A H istory o f B anking in C an a d a (T oronto, 1909), p. 41. 7. H . C. B aker, A L ecture on Life A ssurance (H am ilto n , 1848); P ro ­ spectus, an d F irst a n d Second A n n u al R ep o rts o f the C an a d a Life A ssurance C om pany (H am ilto n , 1849). 8. Jo h n M u rray, Story o f the T elegraph (M o n treal, 1905). 9. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assem bly o f N ova Scotia, 1853. 10. Jo u rn als o f the H o u se o f Assem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, 1853. 11. Tables o f T rad e and N avigation fo r 1 8 5 2 . 12. Sept. 29, 1846, quoted in the Q uebec G azette, O ct. 14. 13. Le Pays (M o n tre a l), Feb. 26, 1856. 14. T he Econom ist, quoted in L a M inerve (M o n tre a l), Sept. 24, 1846. 15. Jo u rn als o f the Legislative A ssem bly o f the Province o f C anada, 1856, appendix 28. 16. E dw ard P o rritt, Sixty Y ears o f P ro tectio n in C an ad a, 1 84 6-19 07 (L ondon, 1908), pp. 198 ff. 17. Province o f C anada, Sessional P apers, 1860, no. 38. 18. M inutes o f the Council o f V ancouver Islan d , 1 8 5 1-1861 (A rchives of British C olum bia, M em oir no. 2 ). 19. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assem bly o f N o v a Scotia, 1860. 20. C. D . A llin and G . M. Jones, A nnexation, P referen tial T rade and R eciprocity (T o ro n to , n .d .). 21. On the negotiation and term s o f the treaty see D . C. M asters, The R eciprocity Treaty of 1 8 5 4 (L ondon, 1937; rep rin ted in the C arleton L ibrary, 1963). 22. B ritish C olonist (T o ro n to ), D ec. 20, 1855. 23. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assem bly o f N ova Scotia, 1860. 24. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f A ssem bly o f N ew B runswick, 1860. 25. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assembly o f P rin ce E dw ard Islan d , 1860. 26. Province o f C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1860, no. 23. 27. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, Series G , vol. 151, pp. 92, 196. 28. Belveze’s rep o rt is prin ted in Le Pays, Sept. 2, 4, 6, 9, 1856. 29. L. P. T u rco tte, Le C an a d a sous I'union, 1 8 4 1 -1 8 6 7 (Q uebec, 1871), pp. 267-9.

N O T E S - 259 CHAPTER 4

T he P ath to C onfederation (p p . 64-81) 1. F o r (lie relations o f B ritish N o rth A m erica w ith the U nited States during the Civil W ar sec J . W . H olm es, “ B o rd er R elations between C an a d a and the U nited S tates during the A m erican Civil W ar” (un­ published m .a. thesis, U niversity o f T o ro n to , 1933); L. B. Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elations, 1 8 4 9 -1 8 7 4 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1939); M . L. H an sen , The M ingling o j the C an ad ian an d A m erican P eoples (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940; R. W . W inks, C an a d a a n d the U nited S tates in the Civil W ar Y ears (B altim ore, 1960). 2. L a M inerve (M o n tre a l), N ov. 16, 1865. 3. F o r contem porary A m erican opinion see J. P. Sm ith, T he R epublican Expansionists o f the E arly R econstruction E ra (privately pianographed, 1933). 4. C. P. Stacey, C an ad a a n d the British A rm y, 18 4 6 -1 8 7 1 : A Study in The P ractice o f R esponsible G overnm ent (L o n d o n , 1936), p. 118. T he m ilitary position during the Civil W ar is analysed in this w ork. 5. B oth re p o rts a re prin ted in Province o f C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1862, no. 17. 6. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, H ow e P ap ers, H ow e to M ulgravc, N ov. 30, 1861. 7. The M orning Freem an (S ain t J o h n ) , Ju ly 3, 1862. 8. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1867-8, n o . 63, N ew castle to M onck, A ugust 21, 1862. 9. The M orning F ree m a n , A ug. 7, 1862. 10. The C o u rier (S ain t J o h n ), A pril 12, 1862. 11. L e Pays (M o n tre a l), O ct. 11, 1864. 12. T h e second re p o rt is in Jo u rn als o f the H o u se o f Assembly o f N ova S co tia, 1865, appendix 35. 13. W hitby C hronicle, M arch 16, 1865. 14. R ep o rt o f the Com m issioners fro m British N o rth A m erica A ppointed to Inquire in to the T rade o f the W est Indies, M exico an d Brazil (O ttaw a, 1866). 15. L a M inerve, Ju n e 22, 1865. 16. Le C o u rrier d u C an a d a , Sept. 4, 1865. 17. Le Pays, M ay 18, 1865. 18. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, M acd o n ald P a p e rs, G eneral L etters, J. M cW hinnie to M acdonald, M ay 1, 1865. 19. C hester M artin , “ B ritish Policy in C anadian C o nfederation” ( C an a­ dian H isto rical Review, X III, M arch , 1932). 20. T he published debates o f the legislatures o f P rin ce E d w ard Island, N ova Scotia, N ew Brunsw ick, C an ad a, an d B ritish C olum bia have been used fo r the following passages. See also P . B. W aite, The Life an d Times o f C onfederation (T o ro n to , 1962).

260 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S CHAPTER 5

T he O utlook of the D om inion (pp. 82-95) 1. M . H an co ck , “N a tu ra liz atio n in C an a d a ” ( Papers a n d Proceedings o l (he C an ad ian Political Science A ssociation, V I, 1934). 2. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1880, p. 873. 3. H . F . A ngus (e d .) , C an a d a and H e r G re a t N eighbour (T oronto, 1938), p. 89. 4. I. C o nstantine, On the Influence o f A m erican Id eas in the Anglican C hurch in the D iocese o f M o n treal (M o n treal, 1870). 5. F o r a b rief acco u n t o f th e developm ent o f th e dispute see A . B. K eith, Responsible G overnm ent in the D om inions (3 vols., O xford, 1912), p. 1216 ff. 6. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1892, no. 81. 7. T he M ail (T o ro n to ), M ay 4, 1872. 8. L o m e Pierce, W illiam K irby: The P o rtra it o f a Tory Loyalist (T o ro n to , 1929), p. 378. 9. W hitby C hronicle, A ugust 4, 1870. 10. L ’EvSnem ent, quoted in G eorges V attier, E ssai s u r la m entality canadienne-frangaise (P aris, 1928), p. 252. 11. The G lobe (T o ro n to ), Ju ly 25 and 27, 1870. 12. Ib id ., Sept. 28, 1870. 13. B. M . C o rrig an , “ C an a d ia n C ru sad ers” (.Queen's Q uarterly, X L V II, spring, 1940). 14. The G lobe, M ay 16, 1870. 15. O. D . S kelton, L ife a n d L etters o f S ir W ilfrid L a u rier (2 vols., L ondon, 1922; rep rin ted in the C arleto n L ibrary, 1965), I , 30£f. 16. M o n tre al G azette, J a n . 5, 1870.

CHAPTER 6

A V enture in D iplom acy (p p . 96-119) 1. P ublic A rchives o f C an ad a, M acdonald P ap ers, L etter B ook 14, Private. A p ril 14, 1870. 2. L. B. Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elations, 18 4 9 -1 8 7 4 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1939), p. 200 ff. 3. M acd o n ald P apers, L e tte r B ook 13, Private. J a n . 26, 1870. 4. See above, pp. 42-43. 5. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1869, n o . 61. C artie r and M cD ougall to G overnor G eneral, M ay 20, 1869. 6. T h e docum ents are p rin ted in C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1872, no. 26. 7. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1871, no. 12. M inutes o f C an ad ian Gov­ ernm ent, M arch 23, 1866. 8. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1871, no. 12. 9. C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1885, n o. 101a. M em o, o f Ju ly 4, 1870, by the M inister o f M arine a n d Fisheries. T h is lengthy m em o sets o u t the

N O T E S - 261 C anadian position, a n d the h isto ry o f the fisheries question from th a t p o in t o f view. 10. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1870, no. 11. 11. A U nited S tates suggestion o f F e b ru a ry , 1870. See Shippee, C anadianA m erican R elatio n s, p. 315. 12. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B o o k 14. T o G . W . B rega, A pril 4, 1870. 13. L ucien W olf, L ife o f the F irst M arq u ess o f R ipon (2 vols., London, 1921), I, 239. 14. Ibid. 15. A llan N evins, H am ilton Fish: T he In n e r H isto ry o f the G ra n t A d­ m inistration (N ew Y ork, 1936), p p . 425, 441. 16. T h e text is in C an a d a , Sessional P ap ers, 1872, no. 18. 17. C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1869, n o. 59. Privy Council R eport, June 11, 1869. 18. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1869, no. 61. C artie r and M cD ougall to G o v ern o r G en eral, M ay 20, 1869. 19. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter Book 14. M arch 11, 1870. 20. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter B ook 15. M acd o n ald to Lisgar, F eb. 4, 1871. 21. Ibid. 2 2 . T h e text is in C an a d a , Sessional P ap ers, 1872, n o. 18, p p . 5, 11. 23. N evins, H am ilto n Fish , p. 470. 24. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter B ook 15. M acd o n ald to T u p p er, M arch 21, 1871. 25. F o r detailed accounts o f th e conference see N evins, H am ilton Fish, c hap. xx; Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elatio n s, chap. xv; G oldw in Sm ith, T he T reaty o f W ashington, 1 8 7 1 : A Study in Im p erial H istory (Ith a c a , 1941); D o n ald C reighton, Jo h n A . M acdonald: T he Old C hieftain (T o ro n to , 1955). 26. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L e tte r B o o k 15. M acd o n ald to T u p p er, A p ril 1, 1871. 27. Q uoted in Sm ith, T reaty o f W ashington, p. 70. 28. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter B ook 15. M acdonald to Tupper, M arch 21, 1871. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ib id . M acdonald to T u p p er, M arch 29, 1871. 32. T h e aw ard, dated O ctober 21, 1872, w as in fav o u r o f the U nited S tates’ claim. 33. T his a rran g em en t led to the H alifax Com m ission. See below , pp. 139-40. 33a. T h e text o f th e tre a ty is in T reaties a n d A greem ents A ffecting C an a d a in F o rc e Between H is M ajesty an d the U nited S tates of A m erica, with Subsidiary D ocu m en ts, 1 8 1 4 -1 9 2 5 (O ttaw a, 1927). 34. N evins, H am ilto n Fish , p. 490. 35. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L e tte r B o o k 17. M acd o n ald to Lisgar, J a n . 22, 1872. 36. Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elations, p . 399. 37. T he G lobe (T o ro n to ), A p ril 18, 1870. 38. Ib id ., A pril 25, 1870. 39. Ib id ., M ay 26, 1870. 40. Q uoted in W hitby C hronicle, Ju n e 9, 1870. 41. B arrie E x am in er, Jan . 21, 1869.

262 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

The G lobe, M arch 25, 1870. L eader (T o ro n to ), Jan . 1, 1870. M acdonald P ap ers, L etter B ook 15. A pril 21, 1871. The G lobe, M ay 19, 1871. W hitby C hronicle, Ju n e 1, 1871. L ead er, M ay 13, 1871. Q uoted in Sm ith, T reaty o f W ashington, p. 140. Q uoted in W hitby C hronicle, Ju n e 8, 1871. C anada, H o u se o j C om m ons D ebates, 1872, pp. 21, 24. Ib id ., pp. 294-345, 346 ff., 431 ff. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B ook 18. Sept. 2, 1872.

CHAPTER 7

T rade, Fisheries, and D iplom acy (pp. 120-144) 1. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1875, no. 51. Privy Council R ep o rt, M arch 26. 2. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, A lexander M ackenzie L e tte r B ooks, III. M ackenzie to D ufferin, F eb . 24, 1874. 3. M ackenzie L etter B ooks, II. M em o, by M ackenzie, M arch 9, 1874. 4. M ackenzie L e tte r B ooks, III. M ackenzie to B row n, M arch 28, 1874. 5. T h e text is printed, together w ith som e official correspondence, in C orrespondence R elating to the N egotiations fo r a R eciprocity Treaty (C m d. 1060, 1874; N o rth A m erica, no. 4 ) . 6. Som e o f his letters fro m W ashington a re in A lexander M ackenzie, The Life an d Speeches o f H o n . G eorge Brow n (T o ro n to , 1882), p. 212 ff. See also D ale C. T hom son, A lex an d er M ackenzie, C lear G rit (T o ro n to , 1960). 7. T h e text is in C orrespondence R elating to N egotiations fo r a Reci­ procity T reaty. 8. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1876, p. 65. 9. Ib id ., p. 129. 10. Ib id ., p. 253. 11. Jo u rn als o f the H o u se o f C om m ons o f the D om inion o f C anada, 1874, appendix 3. 12. S. D . C lark , The C anadian M an u factu rers’ A ssociation: A Study in C ollective B argaining an d P o litical P ressu re (U niversity o f T oronto Studies, H isto ry and E conom ics Series, vol. V II, T o ro n to , 1939), p. 6. 13. C an ad a, D ebates o f the Senate, 1877, p. 248. 14. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1877, p. 165. 15. Ib id ., 1878, p. 854. 16. W . A . M ackintosh, The E conom ic B ackground o f D om inionProvincial R elations (R ep o rt o f the R oyal C om m ission on Dom inionProvincial R elations, 1939, A ppendix 3 ); reprinted in the C arleton Library (1 9 6 4 ), p. 30. 17. C an ad a Y ear B ook, 1939, p. 507. 18. Ib id ., p. 506. 19. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1884, no. 67.

N O T E S - 263 20. F o r th e correspondence concerning treaties w ith Serbia, R oum ania, E cu ad o r, M orocco, E gypt, an d M ontenegro, see C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1883, n o. 89. 21. C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1880, no. 104. 22. Public A rchives o f C anada, M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ Sir A lexander G a lt.” G a lt to M acdonald, D ec. 18, 1878. 23. Ib id ., Dec. 20, 1878. 24. Ib id ., Jan . 1, 1879. 25. Ib id ., Jan . 20, 1879. 26. M. H . Long, “ S ir Jo h n R ose and the In fo rm al Beginnings of the C anadian H igh C om m issioncrship” ( C an ad ian H isto rical Review, X II, M arch , 1931). 27. C anada, Sessional P apers, 1880, no. 105. 28. E .g., by A lexander C am pbell in C an ad a, D ebates o f the Senate, 1874, p. 17. 29. E nclosed in M acd o n ald P a p e rs, “ S ir A lexander G alt.” G a lt to M ac ­ d onald, M arch 11, 1880. Confidential. 30. O . D . Skelton, The L ife an d Times o f S ir A lexander Tilloch G alt (T o ro n to , 1920); rep rin ted in the C arleton Library (1966), p. 271. 31. C an ad a, H ouse o f C om m ons D ebates, 1891, p. 575. 32. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B ook 27. A ug. 15, 1890. W hen m inutes w ere sen t to the colonial secretary, copies w ere forw arded to the high com m issioner. 33.M a c d o n a ld P a p e rs, “ Sir C harles T u p p e r.” T u p p e r to M acdonald, O ct. 31, 1883. 34. Ib id ., T u p p e r to M acdonald, Sept. 11, 1884. 35. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1882, p. 1068 ff. 36. T he text is in B ritish a n d F oreign State P a p e rs, L X X X V , 28. 37. Skelton, S ir A lex an d er Tilloch G alt (1920 e d itio n ), p. 512. 38. F o r the docum ents o n this question see th e B ritish C orrespondence R elative to the N o rth A m erican Fisheries, 1 8 8 4 -1 8 8 6 (U n ited States, n o . 1, 1887); F u rth e r C orrespondence R especting N o rth A m erican Fisheries, 1 8 8 6 -1 8 8 7 (U n ited States, no. 2, 1887); C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1887, no. 16. A full acco u n t o f th e negotiations, from the point o f view o f the A m erican governm ent, is in C. C. T ansill, The Fo reig n Policy o f T hom as F . B ay ard , 1 8 8 5 -1 8 9 7 (N ew Y o rk , 1940). 39. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1888, no. 36C. 40. Ib id ., E. J . Phelps to Salisbury, J a n . 26, 1887. 41. L. B. Shippee, T hom as F ran cis B ayard ( “T h e A m erican Secretaries o f State an d T h eir D iplom acy,” ed. by S. F . Bcm is, V III, N ew Y ork, 1927-8). 42. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1888, no. 36C. 43. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter Book 24. M acd o n ald to L ansdow ne, Sept. 24, 1887. 44. M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ W ashington T reaty , 1888,” vol. V II. T u p p er to M acdonald, N ov. 24, 1887. 45. E . M . Sau n d ers (e d .) , T he Life a n d L e tte rs o f the R t. H o n . S ir C harles T u p p er (2 vols., L o n d o n , 1916), II, 101. 46. Ib id ., p. 109. 47. M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ W ashington T reaty , 1888,” vol. V II. T u p p er to M acdonald, F eb . 10, 1888. 48. M em orandum by G . E . F o ste r, 1888. Q uoted in P. E. C orbett, The

264 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S S ettlem ent o f C anadian-A m erican D isputes: A C ritical Study of M ethods a n d R esults (N ew H av en a n d T o ro n to , 1937), p. 43. 49. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1887, no. 48. 50. M acd o n ald P apers, “ B ering Sea,” vol. I. C. H . T u p p er to M acdonald, F eb . 26, 1890. 51. Ib id ., M arch 3 and 10, 1890. 52. Ib id ., A pril 11, 1890. 53. C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1908, n o . 144. 54. M any aspects o f the relations o f C an a d a an d the U n ited K ingdom a re discussed in D . M . L. F a rr, The C olonial Office a n d C anada, 18 6 7 -1 8 8 7 (T o ro n to , 1955).

CHAPTER 8

C anada, the Em pire, and the U nited States (pp. 145-169) 1. F o r a n analysis o f the n a tu re and the literatu re o f B ritish im perial interests o f this period see \V. L. Langer, D iplom acy o f Im perialism , 1 8 9 0 -1 9 0 2 (2 vols., N ew Y o rk , 1935), I, ch ap . in. 2. J. S. W illison, S ir IVilfrid L au rier a n d the L ib eral P arty : A Political H isto ry (2 vols., T o ro n to , 1903), II, 120. See in general R. C. Brow n, C an a d a ’s N a tio n a l Policy, 1 8 8 3 -1 9 0 0 : A S tudy in C anadian-A m erican R elations (P rin ceto n , 1964). 3. T he G lobe (T o ro n to ), M arch 2, 1887. 4. Ib id ., A pril 5, 1887. 5. M an ito b a F ree P ress, Sept. 5, 1887. 6. Jam es Y oung, O ur N a tio n a l F u tu re (T o ro n to , 1888). 7. W illison, S ir IVilfrid L a u rier, I I , 141. 8. Ib id ., II, 138. 9. See above, pp. 141-42. 10. P ublic A rchives o f C an ad a, M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B o ok 24. M acdonald to T up p er, Jan . 15, 1888. 11. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1888, p . 144 ff. 12. The G lobe, A pril 18, 1887. 13. M an ito b a F re e P ress, O ct. 27, 1887. 14. M orning H e ra ld (H a lifa x ), Jan . 27, 1885. 15. Evening M ail (H a lifa x ), O ct. 22 and N ov. 12, 1885. 16. M orning H e ra ld , J a n . 20 a n d M ay 1, 1885. 17. R epresentative opinions m ay be found as follow s: p r o - G . T . D eni­ son, T he Struggle fo r Im p erial U nity: R ecollections a n d Experiences (L o n d o n , 1909); G . R . P a rk in , Im p erial F ed eratio n (L o n d o n , 1892); G . M . G ra n t, Im p erial Fed eratio n (W innipeg, 1890). c o n t r a - G old­ w in Sm ith, C an ad a an d the C anadian Q uestion (L ondon an d T oronto, 1891); and w ritings o f J . S. E w art a n d H en ri B ourassa. p r o an d CON - S. C. C heng, Schem es fo r th e F ed eratio n o f the B ritish Em pire (N ew Y o rk , 1931). 18. D enison, Struggle fo r Im p erial U nity, p p . 79, 85. 19. C anada, D eb ates o f the S en ate, 1890, p. 256 ff. 20. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1888, p. 1069 ff.

N O T ES - 265 The G lobe, Jan . 23, 1885. T he M ail (T o ro n to ), M arch 15, 22, A pril 6, 1887. M an ito b a F ree P ress, Jan . 16, 23, F eb . 3, 1887. Ib id ., Feb. 3, 1887. M orning H e ra ld , M ay 12, 1885. Evening M ail, Ju n e 11, Sept. 22, 1887. J. L. G arvin, The L ife o j Jo sep h C ham berlain (3 vols., London, 1934), III, 179. 28. W illison, S ir W ilfrid L au rier, I I , 287. 29. G . W . Ross, P referen tial T rade with G re a t B ritain an d R eciprocity with the U nited States (T o ro n to , 1897). 30. F o r a detailed study o f the conferences fro m 1887 to 1907 see R ichard Jeb b , T he Im p erial Conference: A H isto ry an d S tudy (2 vols., L ondon, 1911). 31. Proceedings o f a C onference betw een the Secretary o f S ta te fo r the C olonies a n d the P rem iers o f the Self-governing C olonies a t the C olonial Office, L on d o n , Ju n e an d Ju ly 1 8 9 7 (C d. 8596). 32. See below, ch ap ters 10 and 11. 33. F o r an acco u n t o f this m ovem ent, see H e n ri B ourassa, Q ue devonsnou s cl /’ A ngleterre? (M o n treal, 1915). 34. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1902, pp. 108-9. 35. P ap ers R elating to a C onference betw een the Secretary o f S ta te for the Colonies a n d the P rim e M inisters o f Self-governing C olonies; Ju n e to A ugust, 1 9 0 2 (C d . 1299). 36. F o r fu rth er C an ad ian com m ents see C anadian A n n u a l Review, 1903, p. 306 IJ.-, 1904, p. 390 ff.; 1905, p. 448 ff. 37. E d w ard P o rritt, Sixty Years o f P ro tectio n in C an ad a, 1 8 4 6-190 7 (L o n d o n , 1908). 38. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1903, p. 382. 39. F o r an analysis o f the A m erican position, as well as o th er aspects of the subject, see L. E . E llis, R eciprocity, 1 9 1 1 (N ew H aven and T oro n to , 1939). 40. T h e trip is described w ith docum ents in E d w ard P o rritt, T he R evolt in C an ad a ag ain st the N ew Feudalism : Tariff H istory from the R evi­ sion o f 1 9 0 7 to th e U prising o f the W est in 1 9 1 0 (L o n d o n , 1911), c hap. xii. 41. See below, p. 252. 42. Full analyses o f public opinion and the p arliam en tary debates a rc in the C anadian A n n u a l R eview , 1911, and in E llis, R eciprocity, 1 9 1 1 . 43. H enry B orden (e d .) , R o b ert L a ird B orden: H is M em oirs (2 vol3., T o ro n to , 1938), I, 327.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

CHAPTER 9

Effects o f E xternal Forces on the C anadian C om m unity (pp. 170-198) 1. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1871, n o. 54. 2. See above, p . 112. 3. C an ad a. Sessional P a p e rs, 1876, III.

266 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 4. Ib id ., and C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1879, n o. 64. 5. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1892, no. 99. 6. J. M. C allah an , A m erican Foreign Policy in C an ad ian R elations (N ew Y o rk , 1937), p. 423 ff. 7. G . P. deT. G lazebrook, A H istory o j T ran sp o rtatio n in C an a d a (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1938), and rep rin ted in the C arleton L ib rary in tw o volum es (1 9 64), II, 108 ff. 8. A detailed study o f this developm ent is in W . J. W ilgus, T he Railway In terrelatio n s o j th e U nited S tates a n d C an a d a (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1937). 9. See, fo r exam ple, C allah an , A m erican F oreign Policy, p. 394 ff. 10. F o r the history o f ocean shipping in relatio n to C an a d a see A dam S h o rtt and A . G . D oughty (e d s .), C an a d a an d Its Provinces (23 vols., T o ro n to , 1914), X , 589 ff. 11. N o rm a C laire T ay lo r, “T h e E conom ic D evelopm ent o f C anada’s M erch an t M arine” (u npublished m .a . thesis, U niversity o f T oronto, 1924, p. 25. 12. H . L. D ray to n , O cean F reight R ates (D e p a rtm e n t o f T rad e and C om m erce, O ttaw a, 1913). 13. F o r a n o u tlin e of the history o f the C an ad ian po st office since 1867, see S h o rtt and D oughty (e d s .), C an ad a a n d its Provinces, V II. 14. H . M arshall, F . A . S o u th ard , and K . W . T aylor, C anadian-A m erican In d u stry : A Study in In tern atio n al Investm ent (N ew H av en and T o ro n to , 1936), p. 125. 15. L. J . B urpee, Sand/ord Flem ing, Em pire B uilder (L o n d on and T o ro n to , 1915), p. 154 ff. 16. R oland W ilson, “ M igration M ovem ents in C anada, 1868-1925” ( C anadian H isto rical R eview , X III, Ju n e 1932). C f. A . R. M . Low er, “ T h e G ro w th o f C an a d a ’s P opulation in R ecent Y ears” ( C anadian H isto rical Review , X III, D ecem ber 1932). 17. W . A . C arro th ers, E m ig ratio n fro m the B ritish Isles, w ith Special R eference to the D evelopm ent o j the Overseas D om inions (L ondon, 1929), p. 253. 18. S. C . Jo h n so n , A H isto ry o f E m igration fro m the U nited K ingdom to N o rth A m erica, 1 7 6 3 -1 9 1 2 (L o n d o n , 1913), p. 80 ff. 19. J. W . D afoe, Clifford S ifton in R elation to H is Tim es (T oronto, 1931), p. 137 ff. 20. F o r th e relatio n o f railw ays to settlem ent see W . A . M ackintosh, P rairie Settlem ent: T he G eographical S etting (T o ro n to , 1934), chap. in .

21. F o r the principles an d practice o f land g ran ts see C h ester M artin, "D o m in io n L a n d s" Policy (T o ro n to , 1938). 22. F o r a detailed study see J . B. H edges, B uilding the C anadian West: The L and a n d C olonization Policies o f the C anadian Pacific Railway (N ew Y o rk , 1939). 23. D afoe, Clifford Sifton, p. 141. 24. L. G . R eynolds, T he B ritish Im m igrant: H is Social an d Econom ic A djustm ent in C an ad a (T o ro n to , 1935). 25. A . G . S treet, F a rm e r's G lory (L o n d o n , 1932). 26. C arro th ers, Em igration fro m the B ritish Isles, p. 247. 27. C. H . Y oung, The U krainian C anadians: A S tudy in A ssim ilation (T o ro n to , 1931), p. 76. 28. A . M aude, A Pecu liar People: T he D o u k h o b o rs (N ew Y o rk , 1904), p. 232.

N O T E S - 267 29. A full acco u n t o f the D o u k h o b o rs is in J . F . C. W right, Slava B ohu: T he Story o f the D o u k h o b o rs (N ew Y o rk , 1940). 30. R. E ngland, The C olonization o f W estern C an ad a: A Study o f C on­ tem porary L an d Settlem ent, 1 8 9 6 -1 9 3 4 (L o n d o n , 1936), p. 232 ff. 31. E. H . O liver, “ T he S ettlem ent o f Saskatchew an to 1914” ( Proceed­ ings an d T ransactions o f th e R oyal Society o f C an ad a, 1926). 32. F o r detailed studies o f the whole question o f o rien tal im m igration and its results see Cheng T ien-fang, O riental Im m igration in C anada (S hanghai, 1931), and C. J . W oodsw orth, C an ad a an d the O rient: A Study in In te rn a tio n a l R elations (T o ro n to , 1941). T he Japanese C an ad ian s by C. H . Y oung, H . R. Y. R eid, and W . A . C arrothers (T o ro n to , 1938) is m ore concerned with stan d a rd s o f living. 33. R ep o rt o f R oyal C om m ission A pp o in ted to Investigate th e M ethod by which O riental L abourers H av e Been In tro d u ced into C anada, 1908. Q uoted in Cheng T ien-fang, O rien tal Im m igration in C anada, p. 73. 34. Cheng T ien-fang, O riental Im m igration in C an ad a, p. 142 ff. 35. M . L. H ansen, The M ingling o f the C anadian a n d A m erican Peoples (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940), p. 168. 36. A. R. Foley “ F rench-C anadian C ontacts w ith N ew England” (.Con­ ference on E ducation Problem s in C anadian-A m erican R elations, ed. by R. L. M orrow , O rono, M aine, 1939). 37. E. H am on, Les C anadiens-frangais de la N ouvelle A ngleterre (Q ue­ bec, 1891), p. 11. 38 . G . T. P rio r, “ T he F ren ch C an ad ian s in N ew E n g lan d ” (unpublished m .a . thesis, Brow n U niversity, 1932 ) , p. 67 . Cf. H am o n , Les C anadiens-frangais, p. 89 , w ho gives 120 churches o r chapels. 39. A ddlard D esrosiers and P. A . F o u rn et, L a R ace frangaise en A m iriquc (M o n treal, 1911), p. 23. 40. Ib id ., p. 35. 41. H am on, Les C anadiens-frangais, p. 108. 42. D . M . A . M agnan, H istoire de la race frangaise aux E tats-U nis (P aris, 1912), p. 290 ff. 43. F ro m Seventh Census o f C an a d a , 1931, I, 710. C om plete figures will be found there, divided into ru ral and urban. 44. C anadian A n n u a l Review , 1906, p. 294. 45. F o r the history o f lab o u r organization in C an a d a see R. H . C oats, “ L ab o u r M ovem ent in C an a d a ” (S h o rtt and D oughty [eds.], C an ad a a n d its Provinces, I X ) ; H . A . Logan, The H istory o f TradeV nion O rganization in C an ad a (C hicago, 1928); N orm an J. W are and H . A . Logan, L ab o r in C anadian-A m erican R elations (T o ro n to , 1937); and H . A . Innis, " L a b o u r” (E ncyclopedia o f C an ad a, ed. by W . S. W allace, T o ro n to , 1936). 46. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1909, p. 297 ff. 47. Ib id ., 1906, p. 303. 48. Ib id ., 1907, p. 283. 49. F o r the history o f the G ran g e in C an ad a see L. A . W o od, A H istory of F arm ers' M ovem ents in C an a d a (T o ro n to , 1924). 50. R o b ert C halm ers, A H isto ry o f C urrency in the B ritish Colonies (L o n d o n , 1893). 51. Jac o b V iner, C an ad a's B alance o f In tern atio n al Indebtedness, 190019 1 3 (C am bridge, M ass., 1924), p. 139. 52. F o r a full acco u n t see M arshall, S outhard, and T aylor, C anadianA m erican In d u stry .

268 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S CHAPTER 1 0

T he C onduct of H igh Policy: Subjects and M ethods (pp. 199-223) 1. Parliam en tary D eb ates o n the Subject o f the C onfederation of the B ritish N o rth A m erican Provinces (Q uebec, 1865), p. 108. 2. In Section II o f this ch ap ter. 3. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1909, p. 1978. 4. See above, p. 131#. 5. C an ad ian s paid fees for w o rk done by B ritish consuls w hich a t least equalled th e c o st o f the service. T h e first C an ad ian consuls were app o in ted in 1940. 6. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1910, no. 29B. 7. T his p rocedure was la te r changed, leaving only form al action to the B ritish governm ent. See Sum m ary o f Proceedings, Im p erial C onfer­ ence o f 1926, p. 26. 8. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1910, no. 10G. 9. C anadian A n n u al Review, 1910, p. 619. 10. A. G . Dewey, The D om inions an d D iplom acy: The C anadian C on­ tribution (2 vols., L o n d o n and T o ro n to , 1929), I I , 291. 11. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1909-10, p. 853. 12. Ib id ., 1910-11, p. 953. 13. Sir R o b ert L aird B orden, C anadian C onstitu tio n al Studies (T oronto, 1922), p. 128. 14. H . D . H a ll, T he B ritish C om m onw ealth o f N ations: A Study o f its P a st an d F u tu re D evelopm ent (L o n d o n , 1920), p. 96. 15. O f a considerable literatu re on the subject, S. C. C heng, Schem es for the F e d e ra tio n o f the B ritish Em pire (N ew Y o rk , 1931) contains the m ost com prehensive analysis o f all the schem es, and o f the argum ents fo r an d ag ain st them. 16. M inutes o f P roceedings o f the C olonial C onference, 1 9 0 7 (C d . 3523), p. 24 ff. 17. F o r the history o f the com m ission a n d studies o f its organization and op eratio n see C . J . C h ack o , The In tern atio n al Jo in t C om m ission be­ tw een th e U nited S tates o f A m erica an d the D om inion o f C anada (N ew Y o rk , 1932); P a p e rs R elating to the W o rk o f the In ternational Jo in t C om m ission (O ttaw a, 1929); and J . M . C allah an , A m erican Foreign Policy in C anadian R elations (N ew Y o rk , 1937), p. 499 ff. 18. R. A . M acK ay, “ T h e In tern atio n al J o in t C om m ission betw een the U nited States and C an a d a ” ( P ap ers R elating to the W o rk o f the In tern atio n al J o in t C om m ission, O ttaw a, 1929). 19. C anadian A nnual Review , 1903, pp. 388-89. 20. Ib id ., 1905, p. 487 ff. 21. C an a d a , Sessional P a p e rs, 1892, no. 37. 22. J . W . D afoe, Clifford Sifton in R elatio n to H is Tim es (T oronto, 1931), p. 217. 23. C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1904, no. 46A. 24. See, fo r exam ple, II. L. K eenleyside, C an a d a a n d the U nited States: Som e A spects o f the H istory o f the R epublic a n d the D om inion (N ew Y o rk , 1929), p. 210 ff.\ C allahan, A m erican F oreign Policy in C ana­ d ia n R elations, chap. XIX; L . M . G elber, The Rise o f A nglo-A m erican

N O T E S - 269 Frien d sh ip (L o n d o n and T o ro n to , 1938), chap. vii; D afoe, Clifford Slfton, c h ap . v m ; P. C. Jessu p , E lih u R o o t (2 vols., N ew Y ork, 1938), I I , chap. x ix ; O. D . Skelton, Life a n d L etters o f S ir W ilfrid L a u rier (2 vols., T o ro n to , 1921); rep rin ted in the C arleto n Library (1 9 65), I I , 57 ff. 25. Q uoted in D afo e, Clifford Sifton, p. 236. 26. Printed, w ith th e aw ard, in C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1904, n o. 46A. 27. C an ad ian A n n u a l Review , 1903, p. 365 ff. 28. Q uoted in Skelton, L ife a n d L e tte rs o f L a u rier (C arleto n L ibrary, 1965), I I , 66. 29. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1903, p. 366. 30. See above, p p . 183-85. 31. C .-F. C hang, The A nglo-Japanese A lliance (B altim ore, 1931), p. 86. 32. C an ad ian A n n u a l Review , 1905, p. 421. 33. G . P. G ooch a n d H aro ld Tem perley (e d s .), B ritish D ocum ents on the O rigins o f the W ar, 1 8 9 8 -1 9 1 4 (11 vols., L o n d o n , 1927-1938), V I, 789. 34. Ib id ., V I, 525.

C H A PTE R 11

D efence (pp. 224-253) 1. G . P. G ooch and H aro ld Tem perley (e d s .), B ritish D ocum ents on the O rigins o f the W ar, 1 8 9 8 -1 9 1 4 , V I, 781 2. C. F . H am ilto n , “T h e C an ad ian M ilitia: T h e D e ad P eriod” ( C ana­ dian D efence Q uarterly, V II, 1929-30). 3. H am ilto n , “ T h e C an ad ian M ilitia: T h e Beginning o f R eform ” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V II, 1929-30). 4. Q uoted in C anadian A n n u al Review , 1902, p. 193. 5. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1900, p. 323. 6. T h e E a rl o f D u n donald, M y A rm y Life (L o n d o n , 1926). 7. F o r D u n d o n ald ’s case see M y A rm y L ife, chap. xxvi; fo r the gov­ ernm ent’s see O . D . Skelton Life an d L etters o f S ir W ilfrid L aurier (C arleto n L ibrary, 1965), II, 83. O n this p o in t an d in general see R ich ard A . P reston, C an a d a a n d "Im p eria l D efen ce" (T o ronto, 1967). 8. F o r a sum m ary o f this process see C. P . Stacey, The M ilitary P ro b ­ lem s o f C an ad a: A Survey o f D efence Policies a n d Strategic C ondi­ tio n s P a s t an d Present (T o ro n to , 1940), appendix B. 9. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1904, p. 205 ff. 10. “T h e C an ad ian M ilitia: T h e C hange in O rganization” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V III, 1930-1, p. 97). 11. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1905, n o . 130. 12. Ib id ., 1911, no. 35. 13. Ib id . 15. Ib id ., no. 35B. 14. Ib id ., no. 35A. 16. S ir C harles L ucas, The E m p ire a t W ar (L o n d o n and T o ro n to , 1921), I, 235-39.

270 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 17. C an a d a , Sessional P ap ers, 1875, n o . 64. 18. Ib id ., 1890, no. 59G. 19. N o m ention o f this a p p ea rs in the re p o rt o f the conference, b u t in a Privy C ouncil rep o rt o f J a n . 20, 1905, it is said to h av e been “ stated verbally” (.C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1905, no. 128). 20. Ibid. 21. F o r a sum m ary o f opinion in p arliam en t an d th e press see C anadian A n n u al Review , 1905, p. 461 ff. 22. R ichard Jeb b , T he Im p e rial C onference: A H isto ry a n d Study (2 vols., L ondon, 1911), I, 8. 23. Ib id ., p. 19. 24. Ib id ., p. 55. 25. Proceedings o f a C onference Between the Secretary o f State fo r the C olonies a n d the P rem iers o f the Self-governing C olonies, 1 8 9 7 . (Cd. 8596, 1897). 26. C anadian A n n u al Review, 1902, p. 106. 27. Ib id ., p. 107. 28. Papers R elatin g to a C onference Between the Secretary o f State fo r the C olonies an d the Prim e M inisters o f Self-governing C olonies, 1 9 0 2 . (C d . 1299, 1902). 29. M inutes o f Proceedings o f the. C olonial C onference, 1 9 0 7 . (C d. 3523, 1907). A verbatim reco rd o f th e discussions. 30. “ T he C an ad ian M ilitia: Im p erial O rganization” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V III, 1930-1, p. 2 4 4 ). 31. C orrespondence R elating o t the P roposed Fo rm atio n o f a n Im perial G eneral Staff. (C d. 4475, 1909.) 32. C orrespondence a n d P a p e rs R elating to a C onference w ith R epre­ sentatives o f the Self-governing D om inions on the N av al an d M ilitary D efence o f the E m pire, 1 9 0 9 . (C d . 4948, 1909.) 33. Papers L aid B efore th e Im p erial C onference: N av al a n d M ilitary D efence. (C d. 5746-2, 1911.) 34. Sir Ia n H am ilton inspected the C an ad ian m ilitia in 1913. See above, p. 234. 35. M inutes o f Proceedings o f the Im p erial C onference, 1 9 1 1 . (C d. 5745, 1911.) 36. See, e.g., R ichard Jeb b , T he B ritannic Q uestion: A Survey o f A lter­ natives (L o n d o n , N ew Y o rk , 1913), p. 43 ff.-, A . G . Dewey, The D om inions an d D iplom acy: T he C anadian C ontribution (2 vols., L ondon and T o ro n to , 1929), I, 294 ff. 37. T o ro n to M ail, M ay 7, 1878. 38. P ublic A rchives o f C an a d a , M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ D efence,” vol. II. Privy C ouncil R eport, M ay 4, 1878. 39. Ib id ., A dm iralty to C olonial Office, Ju n e 10, 1878. 40. Ib id ., Privy Council R ep o rt, M ay 22, 1878. 41. C an ad a, D ebates o f th e S en ate, 1883, p. 118 ff. 42. Saint Jo h n T elegraph, M ay 7, 1885. 43. C. P. Stacey, R ecords o f the N ile V oyageurs 1 8 8 4 -1 8 8 5 (T oronto, 1959). 44. M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ S ir C harles T u p p e r.” T u p p er to M acdonald, F eb . 27, 1885. 45. T he W eek (T o ro n to ), F e b . 19, 1885. 46. F eb ru ary and M arch , 1885. 47. M an ito b a F ree P ress, O ct. 24, 1885.

N O T E S - 271 48. S ir Jo h n W illison, R em iniscences, P o litical a n d P erso n al (T o ro n to , 1919), p. 303. 49. C anad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1900, n o. 20. 50. Ib id ., no. 49. 51. H am ilto n , “ T h e C an ad ian M ilitia : T h e S outh A frican W ar” ( C an a­ dian D efence Q uarterly, V II, 1929-30, p p. 537-42). 52. F o r a n acco u n t o f the C an ad ian forces in the w ar see W . S. Evans, T he C anadian C ontingents a n d C an ad ian Im perialism : A S to ry a n d a S tudy (L ondon, 1901). 53. C anad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1900, p . 6625; 1901, p. 1290. 54. Ib id ., 1902, p. 3316. 55. T h e m ost com plete and w ell-docum ented acco u n t o f the naval ques­ tion in the perio d 1909-1914 is in G . N . T u ck er, T he N av al Service of C an a d a (2 vols., O ttaw a, 1952) I, chaps. 6-9. F o r public a n d p a rlia ­ m entary opinion see the C an ad ian A n n u al Review . F o r contem porary com m ent see also the R ound T ab le, vols. 1-4. T h e positions o f the successive prim e m inisters a re outlined in S kelton, Life a n d L etters o f L au rier an d the B orden M em oirs. 56. F o r the correspondence see C orrespondence an d P ap ers R elating to the C onference with R epresentatives o f the Self-governing D om inions on th e N a v al a n d M ilitary D efence o f the E m pire, 1 9 0 9 . (C d . 4948, 1909.) 57. See P ap ers laid B efore the Im p e rial C onference: N a v al an d M ilitary D efence (C d. 5746-2, 1911).

N O TE ON T H E A U TH O R

A distinguished historian and public servant, G . P. deT. G lazebrook was born in London, O ntario, in 1899. E ducated at the U niversity of T oronto and a t O xford, he joined the D epart­ m ent o f H istory a t the U niversity of T oronto in 1924. D uring the Second W orld W ar he served as a Special A ssistant in the D epartm ent of E xternal Affairs, rejoining the U niversity of T o ronto faculty in 1946. A fter three years’ ser­ vice at the U niversity he returned to O ttaw a to re-enter the D epartm ent o f E xternal Affairs. F ro m 1953 to 1956 he was M inister in the C anadian Em bassy a t W ashington and later becam e an A ssistant U nder-Secretary of State for External Affairs. H e retired from the D epart­ m ent in 1963, to resum e lecturing and w riting at the U niversity o f T oronto. M r. G lazebrook has w ritten m any books on C anadian political and econom ic history. They include Sir Charles Bagot in Canada (1 9 2 9 ); A H istory o j Transportation in Canada (1 9 3 8 ); A H istory o f Canadian E xternal R elations (1 9 5 0 ); A Short H istory o f Canada (1 9 5 0 ); A H istory o f Canadian Political T hought (1 9 6 6 ); and L ife in Ontario: a Social H istory (1 9 6 8 ).

H IS T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

VOLUME I

The Formative Years to 1914

G. P. deT . G L A Z E B R O O K

A HISTORY OF

Canadian External Relations REVISED

EDITION

VOLUME THE

FORMATIVE TO

I YEARS

1914

Carleton Library No. 27 McClelland and Stewart Limited Toronto / Montreal

Copyright © Canada, 1966 by McClelland and Stewart Limited

Chapters 1-11 of A History o f Canadian External Relations were first published in 1942 by the Oxford University Press, Toronto, under the title Canadian External Relations: A n Historical Study to 1914. The whole work, comprising nineteen chapters, was published by Oxford under the present title in 1950. Both volumes were spon­ sored by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

T h e C a n a d ia n P u b lis h e r s

McClelland and Stewart Limited 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 374

P R IN T E D AND B O U N D IN CANADA BY T . H . B E S T P R IN T IN G C O M P A N Y L IM IT E D

THE

CARLETON

LIBRARY

A series o f C anadian reprints and new collections of source m aterial relating to C anada, issued under the editorial supervision of the Institute o f Canadian Studies of C arleton U niversity, O ttawa. DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE

P auline Jew ett GENERAL EDITOR

R obert L. M cD ougall

EDITORIAL BOARD

Carm an Bickerton ( H is to r y ) M ichael S. W hittington ( P o litic a l S c ie n c e ) H . Edw ard English ( E c o n o m i c s ) B ruce A . M cFarlane ( S o c io lo g y ) G ordon C. M errill ( G e o g r a p h y ) W ilfrid E ggleston ( J o u r n a lis m ) R obin S. Harris ( E d u c a ti o n )

Contents

IN T R O D U C T IO N T O T H E C A R L ET O N LIBRA RY E D IT IO N , fct

v o lu m e

i: The Formative Years to 1914

1: Origins o f the Canadian Society, 1 2: Diplomacy and War, 23 3: Transition from Mercantilism, 47 4: The Path to Confederation, 64 5: The Outlook o f the Dominion, 82 6: A Venture in Diplomacy, 96 7: Trade, Fisheries, and Diplomacy, 120 8: Canada, the Empire, and the United States, 145 9: Effects of External Forces on the Canadian Community, 170 10: The Conduct o f High Policy: Subjects and Methods, 199 11: Defence, 224 N otes, 255

Introduction to The Carleton Library Edition T h e first eleven chapters of this history w ere originally pub­ lished by the O xford U niversity Press in T o ro n to under the title Canadian E xternal Relations: A n Historical S tudy to 1914. W ith the addition o f another eight chapters to cover the subsequent years the book was brought o ut by the sam e publisher, under the present title, in 1950. Both volumes w ere sponsored by the C anadian Institute o f International Affairs. T he present publi­ cation is with the kind perm ission of the O xford U niversity Press and the C anadian Institute of International Affairs. T h e first fourteen chapters have been revised and chapters fifteen to eighteen have been expanded and largely rew ritten. Instead of a final chapter com parable to th at in the edition of 1950 there is provided in an appendix an outline of the subjects of principal interest in the years after the outbreak of the Second W orld W ar, together with a selective bibliography. T he com ­ plexity o f the foreign relations o f C anada in this last period is such that it is impossible to p o rtray them w ithout distortion on the sam e scale as is possible for the preceding century and a half. A volume, it is hoped, will one day be w ritten by some interested scholar on the years in which C anada had com e to play a m ore active p art in w orld affairs. M eanw hile the bibliog­ raphy may be of som e assistance as a guide to the study o f the m odern period. T h e new m aterial contained in this reprinting of A H istory o f Canadian External R elations has m ade it necessary to re-issue the w ork in tw o volumes. V olum e I, containing the first eleven chapters of the original edition, covers the period up to the outbreak of w ar in 1914; volum e II, containing chapters twelve to eighteen and the bibliographical essay m entioned above, covers th e years from 1914 until the entrance of C anada into the second w orld w ar. T he index will be found a t the end o f the second volume. G. P. deT. G lazebrook University o f Toronto N ovem ber, 1965.

CHAPTER 1

Origins of the Canadian Society

T h e history o f C anada, as of all the A m ericas, begins w ith its discovery by E uropeans as an incident in the expansion of trade; and continues as a result of the allied am bitions of com m erce, missions, im perial designs, and pure adventure. Six states of E urope planted their flags in the new w orld; Spain, Portugal, F rance, E ngland, Russia, and H olland. By chance o r by plan the original expeditions landed a t different parts of the long coast. Claim s to territory w ere modified by the rivalries o f the powers, so th at the influence o f each cam e to be exerted in a particu lar area, th e whole character o f w hich was coloured by the im ported culture of that nation. It was the peculiar fate of C an ad a to receive the stam p o f two o f the E uropean great powers; while by the fortunes o f international politics the in­ w ard drives of Spain and Russia were arrested. T hus, if the shadow y story o f the early m igration o f eastern and northern peoples be left aside, the history o f the external relations of C anada has a beginning th at is definite both in tim e and nature. Before the com ing of th e E uropeans there were in the lands th at now com prise C anada no organized states: only Indian tribes living under conditions of barbarism o r sem i-barbarism , know ing little of their neighbours and nothing of a world beyond the limited expanse over which each group ranged. T o this prim itive scene the F rench, and after them the English, brought a culture th at was utterly new and capable o f revolu­ tionizing the w hole life o f the region. T he scientific knowledge o f centuries was suddenly put before a people who knew none o f it: sails to supplem ent the hard labour of the paddle, horses and w heeled vehicles, flint and steel, m uskets for hunting or w ar, steel axes and knives. T o these and other instrum ents were added the m essage o f C hristianity, borne by devoted mission­ aries; and the m eans of education, backed by the learning and culture o f th e m ost advanced society o f E urope. T he F rench brought above all a sym pathetic attitude tow ard the savage, a readiness to teach, an aim not to destroy but to live in am ity. It

2 - A H I S T O R Y O F CANADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

was the tragedy o f the Indian tribes that they lacked the adapt­ ability to take advantage o f their opportunity. It was true that the E uropean brought evil as well as good: diseases that deci­ m ated the tribes; greed th at led the traders to use all m eans, fair o r foul; brandy and rum th at turned the Indians to m adm en; and a stim ulation rath er than a check to the inter-tribal w ars. T o som e extent the natives did m ake use o f European arts; and m uskets, tools, and im proved agriculture eased the life o f the forest. But on balance the red m an gained little and lost much by the com ing of the E uropean, in spite of all the magic gifts spread before him . H e took m uch of the w orst and little of the best; and, failing to assim ilate him self to E uropean culture, gradually saw his hunting-grounds possessed by the invader, his heritage narrow ed to the pitiful reserves saved by tolerance from the broad acres of a once limitless domain. N o rth A m erica was to be the white m an’s heritage. W hile these great continents appeared at first only to block a trade ro u te to the east, experience soon proved that there w ere com ­ pensations, both directly for com m ercial interests and fo r the purposes of church and state. T he fisheries o f the banks of N ew foundland and in the G ulf o f St. L aw rence w ere exploited even before there were settlem ents, and the fu r trade developed from a casual barter by seam en to an industry w orthy o f pursuit. T h e early settlem ents m ade by F rance at P ort Royal and Quebec owed th eir origin to chartered com panies to w hom the obliga­ tion o f bringing colonists was a liability accepted in exchange fo r grants of m onopoly rights in trade. W hen it becam e evident th at the great St. Law rence led not to C hina but to the rapids of Lachine, com m ercial energy found an outlet in the trade with the Indians, just as the search for the north-w est passage by English adventurers was diverted to the trade at the south of H udson Bay. T he configuration o f N orth A m erica encouraged peneration tow ard the centre from widely separated coasts. T he n o rth ern approach was the least hospitable and was used only by the great English trading com pany as an access to factories on the bay, and thence gradually inland for the better conduct o f the fur trade. T he Russian advance from the north-w est was handicapped by m ountain barriers and had no direct effect on C anada. Spaniards, the pioneers in A m erican exploration, drove up from the south-w est, but w ere blocked before they reached th e fu tu re C anadian west. T he English settlem ents on the A tlantic coast grew by degrees until the advance guard crossed

O R I G I N S O F T H E CANADIA N S O C I E T Y - 3

the A lleghanies and pointed tow ard the very area into which the F rench w ere sending traders and soldiers. M oving on con­ verging lines, the nationals of the two E uropean pow ers in­ creasingly found that they com peted for the sam e prizes; and in a series o f w ars each strove to drive the other back to the sea. T h e A nglo-French colonial rivalry thus found local causes in N o rth A m erica as in other parts of the w orld; w hich, com bined w ith m ore purely E uropean issues, forbade a peaceful division o f the still only partially explored continent. F ran ce planted her colonies a t two points accessible by sea: on the A nnapolis Basin o f A cadia and at the natural fortress of Quebec. Both survived in spite o f severity o f clim ate, Indian attacks, and the lukew arm support o f com panies th at were zealous only for trade; and both spread, w ith natural increase and im m igration, into the neighbouring areas. T here was, how ­ ever, a m arked difference in the strength o f the social and cultural groups th at resulted. In both colonies F rench institu­ tions w ere introduced, but the French society in A cadia never developed as far as th at in C anada. T he A tlantic colony, m ore­ over, was early distracted by the successive changes between F rench and English sovereignty; and the process o f w eakening was all but com pleted by the expulsion o f the A cadians in 1755. I t was on the banks of the St. Law rence that the heritage of F ran ce was cherished and preserved. T he form of governm ent was an adaptation o f that o f a French province, closely under the orders of the court, and w ith adm inistrative officers broadly sim ilar to those in France. T he laws w ere based on the Custom of Paris. T he church, while m ore ultram ontane than in France, was the sole one tolerated; and the bishop, like those in France, was appointed by the King. Education was in the hands of the church. T he system of land-holding was also m odelled on that o f F rance, though it lost in the new w orld m ost of w hat re­ m ained of feudalism in the old. By the fortunes o f w ar C anada followed A cadia into the British Em pire in 1763; but if F rance no longer held political sw ay in N orth A m erica the im print w hich she had m ade stood fresh and strong. U nder a tolerant rule, C anadians under­ w ent hardly m ore change than in owing allegiance to another flag. A nd even the old flag continued to w ave symbolically over C an ad a - to w ave long after it had been cut down at home. F or the fleur-de-lys, em blem o f the old regim e, m eant m ore in that once Bourbon province than the tricolore of the revolution and

4 - A H I S T O R Y O F CANADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

o f nineteenth-century F rance. T he speech of the eighteenth century, the church, and the laws w ere at tim es threatened but never seriously endangered. T h e society of the St. Law rence rem ained as it had been before the conquest: prim arily agrarian w ith little instinct for industry, conservative in outlook, attached to the church, introspective and self-sufficient, closely knit, and untouched by the N orth A m erican pressure tow ard worldly progress.This orphaned F rance, cut off from its parent as much by ideas as by conquest, gave to central C anada its first popula­ tio n and an enduring elem ent in the later w hole. T here could be no fu rth er additions to the population by m igration from France; b u t the original stock from the provinces of the north-w est, num bering no m ore than 65,000 at the tim e of the fall of Q uebec, m ultiplied and spread far beyond the bounds o f settle­ m ent a t the height of the old regime. T h e transfer o f British people, ideas, and institutions to the lands th at were to becom e the D om inion o f C anada was both direct and indirect: either straight from the British Isles, o r after passing through a process o f m odification in the other and older British colonies of the A tlantic seaboard. It is only later th at the p attern alters, to show British and A m erican peoples distinct politically, and to allow their influences to be labelled as different. Even in th at stage it is to be taken into account that the A m erican revolution could not rem ove all traces of racial origin. O f the three countries contributing m ain threads to the C anadian fabric before the m ore diversified im m igration o f the nineteenth century, F rance and E ngland had in com m on that they w ere both E uropean, E ngland and the U nited States that they w ere peopled by the sam e stock. T he second relation show ed m ore points o f sim ilarity than the first. N ova Scotia affords grounds for an investigation of British and A m erican influences both before and after those becam e politically two. T h e future of N ova Scotia w as m ade of im m ediate urgency both to Britain and her colonies because of its strategic position in the A nglo-French struggle. W hen Louisburg was returned to France as p art of the settlem ent o f 1748 a new base was begun at H alifax in the following year, and was developed as a naval station and seat of governm ent. T he deportation of the A ca­ dians on the eve of the Seven Y ears’ W ar lessened the threat o f attack from w ithin; but the scanty British population estim ated at 5,000 - offered little security for the peninsula from external aggression. In N ew England there w as apprehension lest N ova Scotia once m ore fall into F rench hands and become

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a danger to fisheries and com m erce. W illiam Shirley, governor o f M assachusetts, long urged also the positive im portance of the colony, pointing to its value fo r naval pow er in the A tlantic, and its ability to provide m asts fo r the royal navy. F o r a time opinion in M assachusetts favoured the annexation o f N ova Scotia as a precautionary m easure, but m ore consistently urged a policy of anglicization com bined w ith increased m ilitary strength. T he interests of the governm ents o f both G re at Britain and the A m erican colonies continued to depend on the succes­ sive political situations in the continent. W ith the fall of French pow er both w ere able to feel a sense o f security th at lessened their concern fo r N ova Scotia; b u t when the picture again altered to place an international frontier betw een British colo­ nies and the new U nited States, H alifax took on a new signifi­ cance as a British naval base. M eanw hile N ew England had m ade a m a rk on N ova Scotia. T ow ard the end o f the Seven Y ears’ W ar settlers began to move in fro m N ew E ngland, encouraged by offers of land and prom ises of civil and religious liberty. T he appeals through proclam ations and associations were the m ore readily received since a congestion o f population in parts o f N ew England created an econom ic pressure. W hile settlem ents were m ade or attem pted in several p arts o f N ova Scotia, the ones m ost favoured were the deserted lands of the A cadian farm ers and the valley o f the St. John River. W ith N ew Englanders form ing an increasingly larger proportion o f the population, their influ­ ence began to be show n in all aspects o f the life of the province, from architecture to political institutions. In the latter their aims not infrequently ran counter to those o f the officials and colo­ nists w ho had com e directly from England, and am ongst whom there was a sm all but pow erful conservative elem ent. T he establishm ent o f an elected assembly introduced the province to dem ocratic governm ent; and w hen the assembly m et it proved to be largely com posed of N ew Englanders. A n attem pt was m ade to introduce the N ew England system of local govern­ m ent by the tow n (tow nship) m eeting, but w ithout success; and the legal practice o f E ngland was also preserved against p ro ­ posals fo r A m ericanization.1 Being longer under F rench rule, C anada was later in receiv­ ing English-speaking im m igrants. T he vanguard w ho followed on the heels o f W olfe’s arm y, though few in num ber, soon m ade their presence felt. Q uite frankly they had com e fo r trade, and to the governors w ho looked coldly on these interlopers in an

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E den of orderly French, they pointed to the Royal Proclam ation and the scattered broadsheets which had urged them to take advantage of this new British dom ain. Com ing in the m ain from the neighbouring colonies and Scotland, they were neither able n o r willing to fit themselves to the agrarian econom y and au thoritarian governm ent th at they found in operation: govern­ m ent and laws m ust be re-m oulded to the English pattern, affording an institutional basis for econom ic developm ent and external trade. So long as their num bers rem ained sm all, the local officials were able to check the bustling reform ers, even w hen supported by the sedate periods of the despatches from the board of trade. But if they could lock the door of the house which they had so carefully built, not even the m ost vigorous governors could save it when the very foundations were swept away by the A m erican revolution. Paradoxically enough, it was n ot the appeal of the radical general congress a t Philadelphia that caused the upheaval in Quebec, but the com ing of the defeated tories, themselves fugitives from radicalism. It was at once obvious th at the U nited E m pire Loyalists would m odify the character o f the population. In N ova Scotia, already dom inated by the English-speaking, the change was rath er to reinforce ties with E ngland that had become som ew hat attenuated by early migrations from New England. N ew Bruns­ wick, carved out of N ova Scotia, was a direct result of loyalist additions to the scanty population o f the St. John Valley. In C anada the result was not a modification but a com plete altera­ tion of the balance o f population. Instead of a sm all group of traders as sole representatives o f British stock, there now appeared emigres from persecution, loyal to the crow n - men whose claims could not be disputed, and w hose very presence spelt a new Canada. So m uch was obvious. But that these sam e m en should becom e the allies of the traders in seeking dem o­ cratic institutions w as quite unexpected. “I have great Reason to believe,” w rote the governor, “ these unfortunate people have suffered too M uch by Com m ittees and H ouses of Assembly, to have retained any prepossession in favour of th at M ode of G overnm ent.”2 H aldim and, of course, was w rong - wrong because he saw the basis of division in the thirteen colonies as betw een radicals and tories instead of between those who would o r w ould not take up arm s against the King. A s in the m aritim e provinces, the loyalists in C anada built a strong bulw ark against any break in the British connection; but they w ere determ ined th at the colony should be British in local institutions as well as

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in its im perial setting. Just as the m igration from N ew England to N ova Scolia had hurried on the establishm ent o f an elected assembly, so, a generation later, the m ovem ent for elected institutions in C anada received the necessary impetus from the loyalist refugees. Those who followed the loyalists from the U nited States to C anada w ere influenced m ore by econom ic than political motives; and, as it proved, w ere in some cases opposed to the British connection and advocated republicanism . T hough no reliable figures are available, a contem porary, an im m igrant of 1808, estim ated in 1814 th at six-tenths of the population o f U pper C anada either were born in the U nited States o r were children of A m erican im m igrants.3 In all the provinces the W ar o f 1812 brought to an end the first period of im m igration. D uring the period o f hostilities A m ericans could not cross the border, and w hen hostilities were ended there was less desire to em igrate to the lands of a recent enem y. T here was also a policy, arising o u t of disaffection during the war, to restrict im m igrants w ho might fu rth er en­ danger the loyalty o f the populations. N o t only did positive encouragem ent com e to an end, but land-grants to aliens were either refused o r accom panied by conditions. W hat the prov­ inces lost in settlers from the U nited States they hoped to gain by im m igration from the British Isles. T he times w ere propi­ tious. T he years afte r W aterloo brought increasing hardship, particularly to the poorest classes, who w ere led by propaganda and organized aid to tu rn to em igration as an escape. O f the flood of people who found their way from Britain and the con­ tinent to N orth A m erica the British provinces received a share. F o r the m ost p art the new com ers were poor, some of them des­ titute. T here w ere British families with some little capital who brought furniture, books, and even pianos to the virgin forest of U pper C anada; Irish fam ilies w ho faced the miseries o f the voyage and the uncertainty o f a new land in flight from the horrors of fam ine; groups of G erm ans uprooted from their native soil by econom ic o r political motives. A griculture in U pper C anada attracted those w ho had the m eans to secure land and begin pioneer farm ing. F o r others there w ere possibilities of em ploym ent in lum bering, ship-building, o r the construction of canals and railways. Both for the new com ers and the older inhabitants the success o f the venture turned principally on econom ic conditions. W henever em ploym ent was available and m arkets receptive b oth groups w ere satisfied: in leaner years both had cause for

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regret. O pinion in every province oscillated between an anxiety fo r im m igrants and an apprehension lest they should be too num erous or too great a burden on th e com m unity. P auper im m igration was particularly feared in an age w hen no adequate provision was m ade for the poor in the country either of origin o r of settlem ent. In 1842 a fleet o f ships landed im m igrants in N ew Brunswick, w here in principle they w ere w anted but where in practice they had to find em ploym ent o r be a public expense. A St. Andrew s p aper reported th at the poorhouse was already crow ded with the wives and children o f destitute im m igrants, an d in Saint John an editor “ heard that several destitute blind persons, and even unfortunate maniacs, have arrived in this city in som e o f the em igrant vessels this Spring, who of course will at once add to ou r already heavy Parish C harges.”4 T he crisis caused by the sudden com ing o f thousands o f diseased and destitute Irish, driven by the fam ine of 1846, turned to a ghastly tragedy a t Quebec, w here cholera and typhus decim ated their ranks, carried off doctors and priests w ho m inistered to them, and spread fever throughout Canada. In spite of such real draw backs the advantages of securing large num bers o f im m igrants w ere seen as greater than the dis­ advantages, and the governm ents o f the provinces endeavoured to secure a steady flow. In this they found themselves in unsuc­ cessful com petition w ith the U nited States, in spite of low er ocean rates and the efforts o f agents and em igration societies. O ne particularly annoying phenom enon was th at only the poorer im m igrants were landed at H alifax, Saint John, o r Q uebec, while the m ore prosperous ones w ere carried on to A m erican ports. E m igration, either o f those w ho stayed but a few m onths in the British provinces or o f the native-born, was a constant drain on the population, unrecorded but not unnoticed. It was an old story. T h e first chapter tells o f the forcible rem oval of the F rench o f N ova Scotia and P rince E dw ard Island to the colonies along the A tlantic seaboard. L ater em igration was voluntary, and at times, from political motives, such as in the case of A m ericans who returned to their country during the W ar of 1812 or o f the emigres of 1837; but the largest and m ost persist­ ent em igration was owing to econom ic causes. O pportunities, both in agriculture and industry in the U nited States, constantly drew the young m en.5 O n rare occasions they cam e back, and there was also som e com pensating m ovem ent o f A m ericans to the British provinces; but on balance the latter were losing people to their greater neighbour, as they w ere well aware.

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Low er C anada was m ost conscious o f its losses, but it was not the only one. “A n exchange paper,” w rote a N ew Brunswick editor, “says there are 4,000 N ova Scotians in Boston and 200,000 Canadians in the U nited States. C an any person inform us how m any N ew -Brunsw ickers are now residing in the neigh­ bouring Republic? T here m ust be a goodly num ber there. We are rapidly annexing ourselves by em igration.”6 N o answ er to the editor’s query could be found in provincial records, but the census of the U nited States for 1850 show ed 100,000 persons born in the British provinces, and th at fo r 1860 a quarter o f a million. A study of the flow of people to and from the provinces reveals th at by the m iddle o f the nineteenth century no m ajor changes in the character o f the population had resulted. Prince E dw ard Island, blocked in its developm ent by absentee land­ lords, had had virtually no im m igrants. T he population of N ew Brunswick rem ained small and hom ogeneous except for French settlem ents in the northern p art o f the province. N ova Scotia and L ow er C anada had undergone no basic ethnological changes; and only in U pper C anada can a com paratively rapid grow th in population be attributed largely to im m igration. British Colum bia had a startling inrush o f prospectors when gold was discovered, but the m iners m ade but a shifting popula­ tion which drifted in or out according to th e prosperity of the gold fields. A ssiniboia had a m ixed population of Indians, halfbreeds, active o r retired servants of the H udson’s Bay Com pany, a few British and Canadians, and A m ericans whose increasing num bers and influence were the significant aspects of the col­ ony’s population. All in all, im m igration before confederation wove no pattern o f population as varied as th at caused by the com ing of E uropeans and A siatics in later years. But if there was less m ixture of nations and races, the effects o f the steady flow o f people from all parts o f the British Isles, and of the exchange o f population betw een the U nited States and British N o rth A m erica, m ay be judged to have had results as great, if n o t greater.

II T h e origins o f the people and the continuing intercourse with oth er countries were from the first strongly reflected in the cul­ tural life o f the provinces. T he schools of N ew F rance, the first

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o f which w ere established before the m iddle o f the seventeenth century, w ere in conscious im itation o f those o f F rance itself. T o the extent th at they differed it was because the conditions of the colony did not allow for an exact duplication of the schools o f the older society. W hen a college was founded by the Jesuits at Q uebec the course was m ade as sim ilar as possible to th at in the Jesuit colleges of F rance. T he text-books used in both p ri­ m ary and secondary education were brought from F rance, as indeed they had to be, since no printing was done in Canada under the F rench regim e. T he change from French to British rule threatened for a tim e to bring w ith it the abolition of the F rench system o f education in favour o f th at o f England. T he w hole staff of the Jesuit College returned to France, and restric­ tions on the religious orders seriously reduced the num bers of school teachers. U ndoubtedly it was an aim o f British policy to introduce protestant education into the new ly-acquired colony, b ut it was an aim th at was before long abandoned. W hile p ro ­ vision was m ade fo r protestant schools for the m inority, the education of the F rench m ajority returned to a parochial basis. E ducation becam e an essential elem ent in the cem ent of FrenchC anadian nationalism . One other danger from abroad was seen in the practice, said to be com m on, by w hich F rench Canadians sent their sons to the U nited States to learn English and study com m erce and industry. Objections were raised both on religious grounds and because it was said that the boys cam e to com pare C anada unfavourably to the U nited States.7 T h e early educational institutions o f N ova Scotia showed their E uropean origin as did those of N ew F rance. T he legisla­ tu re of the colony followed the contem porary rule th at only protestants might teach, and for some years a struggle w ent on between those who sought to keep a restricted and denom ina­ tional system and those who urged the com m on schools. Simi­ larly in N ew Brunsw ick different, and som etim es conflicting, points of view on education w ere brought by the various groups o f settlers. In the early gram m ar schools all teachers were m em ­ bers of the C hurch of E ngland, w hether in orders or not; and the Society for the Propagation of the G ospel sent teachers a t a tim e when they w ere badly needed. In 1820 the M adras system o f schools, under w hich the older pupils taught the younger, was im ported from England. It was not until 1871 th at a system o f free and non-sectarian schools was set up by a provincial statute. In U pper C anada the school system was influenced by E urope and the U nited States. A few private schools were

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opened from tim e to tim e, following the English public school tradition; but m ore characteristic w ere the com m on schools provided fo r under the legislation of the 1840’s. These undenom inational and free schools w ere w orked out mainly from A m erican models, w ith certain elem ents draw n from G erm any and Ireland. In V ancouver Island a system of district schools was inaugurated while the colony was still under the H u d so n ’s Bay C om pany, and in 1865 all com m on schools were m ade undenom inational and free. T he R om an Catholic Church, how ever, established schools in 1858-9 and the C hurch of England one for boys and one for girls a t about the sam e time. M any external influences m ay likewise be seen in the univer­ sities founded in the eastern and central provinces. As in Eng­ land, opinion was divided as to w hether higher education should be for the few o r the m any, and w hether it should be denom ina­ tional and exclusive or non-sectarian. K ing’s College in N ova Scotia was founded in t..e form er tradition, while Dalhousie U niversity was explicitly to have no political o r religious tests. Sim ilarly in U pper C anada cam e a tug-of-w ar over K ing’s Col­ lege at T oronto, in which the forces opposed to denom inationalism proved to be the stronger. Those w ho would have the doors o f the universities opened only to the few were impressed, per­ haps, by the fear th at such broadening o f opportunities would lead tow ard A m erican republicanism ; but while A m erican ideas encouraged those w ho wished to extend higher education to the m any, there was no indication of an accom panim ent o f political philosophy. M odels for organization and curricula were found in the British Isles and, to a lesser extent, in the U nited States and G erm any. Bishop’s College at Lennoxville consciously follow ed O xford and Cam bridge. F o r Q ueen’s U niversity in K ingston, Edinburgh was taken as a model. K ing’s College in T o ro n to drew on the experience of English, Scottish, Irish, and G erm an universities. A cadia U niversity alone, because of im­ m igration from N ew England, was largely affected by A m erican patterns. T he universities o f all the provinces had this in com ­ m on, that they recruited their teaching staffs largely from the British Isles, by which m eans a constant contact was m aintained with British scholarship and pedagogy.8 Beyond the form al education in schools and universities was the less organized reading by the public. In this, as in the text­ books, the direct influence o f the culture o f o ther countries may readily be seen. T o N ew F rance, where the absence of printing forbade the com petition o f any local productions, books o f all

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kinds w ere im ported from F rance, and apparently w idely read. In the libraries o f the citizens o f Q uebec and M ontreal w orks on religion and the L atin classics rubbed shoulders with contem ­ p o rary literature and the critical w ritings o f the philosophes.9 A fter N ew F rance was politically separated from its m otherland the cultural tie rem ained, and F rench influence was felt both directly through im ported books and indirectly in the writings o f F rench Canadians. T he w ritings o f the eighteenth-century F rench radicals m ade little im pact on N ew F rance, since the situations which they criticized did not exist there. T he French Revolution of 1789, however, had a m ore com plicated recep­ tion. T he clergy, seigneurs, and bourgeoisie w ere opposed to the ideas th at developed, but it m ade som e appeal to the general public. G enerally speaking, F rench C anada was conservative in religion and social ideas, b u t F rench-C anadian nationalism w as an im portant force from early days. T he com m ent of an observer from F ran ce is valid fo r the Q uebec o f m any genera­ tions. L es Canadiens ayant garde les qualites intellectuelles qui caracterisent notre race, on voit pour ainsi dire a chaque page dans leurs ceuvres, la m anifestation de cette clarte, de cette m ethode et de cette logique qui sont si frangaises. L eu r litterature se rattache done a la notre, non pas seulem ent parce q u ’elle a ete ecrite dans la m em e langue, m ais aussi parce que toutes les d eux procedent d ’un tem peram ent identique et d ’une form ation intellectuelle d ont les elem ents essentiels sont les m im e s. Elle est forcem ent, en outre d’inspiration frangaise, e ’est-a-dire que les auteurs, d ’une fagon generate, y developpent les m im e s idees et les m em es sentim ents que Von trouve dans la notre. M ais, bien entendu, cela ne signife pas q u ’ils adoptent toutes nos opinions. Certaines tendances de notre esprit leur repugnent absolum ent, et e ’est pourquoi ni le realisme, ni le scepticism e, ni nos idees revolutionnaires n’apparaissent dans leurs ouvrages. . . . Les ecrivains canadiens frangais, idealistes conservateurs, profondem en t croyants, ne ressem blent, par consequent, q u ’a certains des notres.10 English C anada too leant heavily on its m other country for the provision of books. F rom the com fortable houses of H alifax m erchants to the isolated huts o f H udson’s Bay traders English classics and contem porary books w ere to be found. A dvertise­ ments by booksellers show a range o f im ported works, and some favourite authors, such as D ickens, w ere reprinted in th e local

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newspapers. W hile the w riters of English C anada w ere not influenced by an aim of racial survival, they w ere none the less followers of English models. A n occasional case may be found o f o th er sources, such as the effect o f M azzini’s philosophy on F . G . C am eron; but m ore com m on was the rule o f looking to standard V ictorian w riters for ideas and form .11 Canadian w riters in both languages sought to depict C anada and Canadian scenes, but their w orks had no m ore natural a ring than the diaries and com m entaries of English im m igrants or travellers. It was n o t until the end o f the nineteenth century that a native ch aracter could be seen in C anadian literature, and even th en it developed slowly and with hesitation. In other arts there was even m ore borrow ing from abroad. M usic know s no national boundaries, and the culture o f any land would be p o o r indeed w ithout acceptance of the great E uropean com posers, whose w orks w ere perform ed in the British A m erican provinces as elsewhere. T he folk music o f the Province o f Q uebec was alm ost the only instance o f native grow th. T he d ram a in C anada was, at least until the tw entieth century, derivative in origin and largely so in perform ance. Painting, too, was chiefly the w ork o f foreign artists w ho had m igrated to C anada. O f the artists o f the confederation era B erthon was born and trained in France; Jacobi was a Prussian by origin and a recognized p ainter w hen he cam e to C anada; D aniel F ow ler was an English artist w ho m igrated to Canada fo r the sake o f his health; and Krieghoff cam e from R otter­ dam .12 A rchitecture in Q uebec show ed interesting adaptations to local clim atic conditions, b u t elsewhere developed no new characteristics. F ro m earliest days the colonists in N o rth A m erica had brought their churches w ith them , and links w ith the countries o f origin were m aintained n o t only by subsequent im m igration, b u t also by integral connections in organization, relationship to governm ents, o r the w ork o f the m issionary societies. C anada in the old regim e was uncom prom isingly R om an Catholic, and, aided by Jesuit influence, had becom e distinctly ultram ontane. Severed from F rance before the revolution, C anada h ad never to endure the religious vicissitudes th at afflicted the church in th e m o th er country, and looked askance a t th e anti-clericalism th a t m arked revolutionary F rance. In other provinces were found R om an Catholics, m ainly Irish and Scottish, w ho shared w ith those o f Low er C anada the organization and doctrines of th e church, w ith a com m on centre in Rome. T he C hurch of

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England was carried to British A m erica as naturally as the R om an C hurch to French A m erica. In all provinces it was in a m inority position, but as the church of the m ajority o f the influ­ ential groups in governm ent and business it held a place higher than the m ere num bers of its m em bers w ould have given, and in N ova Scotia and N ew Brunsw ick it was for a tim e legally established. W ith the support of the H udson’s Bay C om pany the church was extended into the prairies and across the Rockies. T h e P resbyterian churches in the British provinces reflected the divisions that had com e in the C hurch of Scotland. Presbyterianism also cam e from Ireland and the U nited States. T he M ethodist churches have special interest as an external influ­ ence, since they brought to N o rth A m erica the evangelicalism of the English m iddle class and of the U nited States. A lthough their double source strengthened the C anadian M ethodists both in num bers and ideas, it led in tim e to the necessity of a choice between A m erican and English connections. W hile the C hurch o f E ngland in C anada was one of the bulw arks of oligarchy and conservatism , the M ethodists stood for nineteenth-century English liberalism com bined with the frontier spirit of N orth A m erica. T he M ethodist circuit rider fitted into a landscape of prim itive roads and pioneer farm s as did the A nglican bishop into the m ore esoteric atm osphere of T oronto toryism or o f the H alifax Banking Com pany. O ther and sm aller denom inations appeared in the provinces as groups of im m igrants from the U nited States, the British Isles, o r continental E urope planted their churches in the new soil, som etim es greatly modified under new conditions, som etim es little changed from the parent stock. T ogether they added richness and colour and variety to the culture o f British N orth A m erica.13 I ll T he relations o f the provinces w ith the outside world w ere affected by the geography o f N o rth A m erica as well as by national origin. H ad there been a block o f population advancing steadily from the seaboard inland the story m ight have been a very different one. But conditions forbade such a developm ent. T he A tlantic colonies of Prince E dw ard Island, N ova Scotia, and N ew Brunswick looked eastw ard on the ocean and m ain­ tained connections by sea w ith the U nited K ingdom , the W est Indies, and the neighbouring N ew England states. Between them

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and C anada was a long stretch of largely unsettled country over which com m unication by m eans other than rail was difficult and at best seasonal. T hough C anadians owed a heavy debt to the St. Law rence, their route to E urope was past rather than through the m aritim e provinces; and in its low er reaches the river was only a link, for, unlike the people of the m aritim es, the eyes of C anadians w ere turned tow ard the west. A nother and a longer break in settlem ent, caused by the wild stretches to the' north of Lake Superior, separated C anada from the little colony of Assiniboia, which, isolated on the w est as it was on the east, felt an increasing pull to the A m erican settlem ents on the upper Red River. F a r to the west the colonies of V ancouver Island and British Colum bia fronted on the Pacific, and the stern ranges of m ountains set up behind them a barrier m ore form idable than the w ide prairie. T hey also were m aritim e provinces, m aintain­ ing contact with the A m erican states nearby; b u t the distance to England was longer by thousands of miles than from the prov­ inces on the A tlantic coast o f N orth A m erica. Spaced across the wide continent were these foundations on w hich a single British dom inion was later to be built; all fo r a tim e having as close relations w ith other countries as they had with each other. A nd thus the external influences on th e various colonies oper­ ated concurrently, and w ere accentuated by the com parative isolation of each colony from the other. T h e political philosophy and institutions o f the provinces cam e from beyond their own boundaries, though modified in response to local conditions and progressive stages of develop­ m ent. T he oldest colonies, N ova Scotia and C anada, un d er the successive F rench and English adm inistrations, w ere long gov­ erned by appointed officials; b u t the perm anent gift o f England to the political life o f her n orthern as to her southern colonies was the elective representative system. It was this w hich re­ placed both the centralized French bureaucracy and the conciliar system of early British rule. It was applied both to local and central governm ents. In the form er the m unicipal councils were set up to take over the functions of appointed officers, and in the provincial capitals parliam ents w ere called to follow the ancient traditions of the m other of parliam ents. M ore than one governor called his little parliam ent w ith all the pom p th at he could com m and; and, even in the forests of U pper C anada, the representatives legislated for the peace, w elfare, and good gov­ ernm ent o f their fellow colonists as their forefathers had done in the stately surroundings o f W estm inster. C rim inal and civil

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law, the form o f the courts, and, m ore im portant, the spirit of English justice, w ere faithfully reproduced in the new world. O nly in F rench C anada was there an exception, for there the F rench civil law, so long in practice, was allow ed to remain. Political ideas, as distinct from political form s, cam e through individuals rather than by official action. P erhaps now here else could have been foiind as great a variety o f political views as in the British provinces, for there they were held not only by those o f conservative o r liberal o r radical tem peram ents, but were borne by every ship th at docked, over every road th at led from th e south. T he sources of ideas corresponded to the origins of the m ain elements in population, with one outstanding excep­ tio n: the political philosophy o f F rench C anada show ed little reflection o f th at o f contem porary F rance. T he policies adopted by individuals o r groups in th e provinces carried at times touches o f continental E urope, but the m ajor program m es may be traced in m ost cases to either the U nited K ingdom o r the U nited States, o r to both. Such im ported ideas were seldom untouched by local conditions and traditions, but only an elab­ orate study w ould disclose the degree of transm utation. Som e of the p arty leaders w ere native-born, others w ere recent im m i­ grants; and each group had adherents o f the rig h t o r the left. R obert G ourlay, Jo h n Beverley Robinson, and R obert Baldwin had all drunk deep o f English political thought. Such diverse figures as T hom as H aliburton, W illiam L yon M ackenzie, and L ouis Joseph P apineau drew both on England and the U nited States. Ju st as the countries o f origin sent their rich and their poor, so they sent their conservatives and their liberals. Letters, new spapers, books, and travellers kept the links intact and added the m ost recent developments. I t was no accident th at in the British provinces could be seen in the years afte r W aterloo the sam e fundam ental cleavage between the forces o f conservatism and the forces of change that was so evident in Britain, in E urope, and in the U nited States. In each the struggle took its particular form . Jacksonian dem ocracy trium phed at W ashington, the liberals of continental E urope fought fo r their cause on a hundred fields, and the English parliam ent w as invaded by victorious reform . T he provinces too h ad their “reform ers,” seeking in the nam e of liberalism to dispossess entrenched oligarchies. T he right o f m ajorities, rights o f the people, the pow er of the purse, elected institutions, cabinet governm ent - these cries were not first heard in British N o rth A m erica. T he grievances attacked were

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local, b ut the line o f attack and the cures proposed w ere col­ oured strongly by the thought o f other lands. T he provinces had their revolutionaries and their m oderates. A M ackenzie o r a Papineau m anned the barricades like any Parisian o f 1830 and 1848; a Baldwin or a How e w ould have fitted readily into the left wing of the English whig party. N ew spapers w ere full o f political news. N o doubt their readers w ere interested in foreign events as such, but they con­ sciously or unconsciously looked a t them through the eyes of dom estic politics. T he F rench revolution o f 1848 was a case in point. Local new spapers, following it w ith great attention, tried to draw from it argum ents for their respective policies. A t first La M inerve saw in the revolution the trium ph o f the liberal principles which it entertained itself, and began to coin phrases about the m other country. P uissent les nobles enfants de la France que nous pouvons aim er co m m e des freres, sans m anquer a. nos devoirs envers la couronne d ’A ngleterre, rem plir avec calme, avec dignite, cet acte de souverainte nationale.1* A few weeks later the editor felt it necessary to explain why he gave so m uch space to the revolution. E n publiant une revue des evenem ents gigantesques qui se deroulent chaque jour en E urope, nous avons cru faire plaisir a nos lecteurs, tout en servant les interets du pays. Pouvons-nous rester etrangeres au reveils des peuples, des nationalites? Pouvons-nous rester froids en presence du spectacle grandiose qui nous est ofjert sur tous les points du continent a la fois? N e devons-nous pas, au contraire, en les suivant, d’un ceil attentif; y puiser d'utiles legons de sages avertissem ents, pour travailler avec perseverance, avec energie, avec prudence, a assurer les droits et les libertes de notre bien aim ee patrie.15 A s the revolution progressed, and socialism becam e a leading issue, L a M inerve becam e w orried, and was obliged to make pointed rem arks about the difference between liberty and licence, lest the growing extrem es of old F rance be followed in the new world. M ore conservative F rench papers, as well as the English papers, w ere even less tolerant and m ore suspicious. T h e Second Republic gave way to the Second Em pire, and while the conservatives m ay have been soothed, the radicals were not. L e Pays could not adm ire N apoleon III because it held that

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individual liberty was m ore im portant than m ilitary glory. Some o f its contem poraries differed. “L a Patrie, bleu d’habitude, est devenu indigo de colere parce que certains m em bres Canadiensfran?ais ont cru que l’occasion de la naissance de Louis N ap o ­ leon B onaparte n’interessait pas assez le peuple C anadien pour authoriser la legislature a se donner un conge sur un pareil pretexte. . . .” 1C Tw o years later L e Pays saw possible trouble in E urope, and told its readers th at they could not be disinterested, since A m erica was bound by m any ties to E urope.17 Such an idea, however, was not characteristic. T he English C anadians, and to some extent the French Canadians, had tangible interests in their connection with G reat Britain: governm ent, trade, de­ fence, im m igration. T he F rench C anadians had nothing so solid on w hich to base a connection with F rance. They therefore looked fo r com m on ideas o r for new ideas in the sam e way, and only in a greater degree, that C anadians studied Italy, Russia, H ungary, or any other continental power. In the realm of political ideas the provinces were closely attached to the w ider world. But a link m ore tangible bound them in the practice o f governm ent to a pow er beyond their shores; fo r colonial institutions operated w ithin the fram ew ork o f an im perial structure. T he degree o f control actually exer­ cised in the colonies by the m etropolitan governm ent differed from decade to decade. T he direction of change was tow ard greater provincial autonom y, and by the m iddle of the nine­ teenth century responsible governm ent was recognized as in practice in all the eastern colonies. Responsible governm ent, how ever, was intended to be limited to dom estic affairs, and indeed no dem and for its extension beyond th at existed until a m uch later date. T here rem ained the definition of “dom estic.” T o L ord D urham it seemed feasible to draw the line by an explicit division o f powers, but the list of reserved subjects w hich he suggested would never have been generally acceptable in the colonies. T o rem ove im m igration and crown lands, which he rightly saw to have im perial phases, altogether from the control o f the provinces was politically impossible. N o definite division was m ade, and legal flexibility allowed the interpreta­ tion o f dom estic to be widened. Sometimes this was for the benefit and a t the insistence o f the provinces, notably in regula­ tio n o f tariffs; som etim es it was against the will of the provinces, p articularly in the case of defence. T here w as no doubt th at the relations o f the provinces w ith foreign states were to be con­ ducted by the im perial governm ent; and the only ground for

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variation was in the decisions on policy. Tariff and trade ques­ tions generally cam e increasingly within the control of the pro­ vincial legislatures, but the determ ination o f “high policy” was indisputably in the im perial orbit. If the imperial connection, in the sense o f control, slackened in the nineteenth century, their position w ithin the British E m ­ pire was still a real and ever-present factor fo r the people of the British provinces in N orth A m erica; and they would have been dull o f wit indeed if they had never stopped to exam ine the assets and the liabilities, the best form and the possible future o f that connection. In the early years o f the provinces, during and after the A m erican revolution, there were elements in the provinces which were secretly o r openly disloyal. R ecent A m erican im m i­ grants to N ova Scotia would, had they been able, have joined the revolutionary cause; and in the W ar o f 1812 sim ilar groups in U pper C anada gave cause for apprehension, and from them individuals returned to the U nited States w hen the w ar broke out. A fter 1815, how ever, there is no evidence of sim ilar dis­ affection except to a limited extent in U pper C anada during the period o f rebellion; and there is little evidence o f any direct relation between the origins of the people and views as to the future position o f the provinces. N o r did the differences of opinion follow provincial boundaries: rath er they cut across racial groups, in any one o f which great diversity of attitude m ight be found. T hree possible courses m ay be distinguished as considered in the second qu arter of the nineteenth century: independence, annexation to the U nited States, o r continuance o f the im perial connection. T h e first was m entioned from tim e to tim e but w as never widely supported. N o t a few observers concluded that it was quite im practicable and would only lead to annexation. W illiam L yon M ackenzie expressed this m ost pithily when he concluded that, “on Britain we m ust depend, o r w ith A m erica we m ust unite, fo r national purposes. T here is no third course.” 18 A nnexation as a direct policy was m ore seriously advocated. T h e econom ic progress o f the U nited States was an obvious argum ent for annexation, o r at least for closer relations. One com prom ise proposal cam e from the Q uebec board o f trade, that the provinces should have in the U nited States a representa­ tive to look after their com m ercial interests, but the British goverm ent’s reply was that they were better left in the hands of its m inisters and consuls.10 A part from those with G re at Britain, the closest relations of the British provinces w ere w ith the

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U nited States. In every aspect o f their lives the colonists were influenced by their neighbours; and perhaps it was partly be­ cause o f the strength of that influence that the m ajority of the people of the provinces resisted the A m erican pressure. Perhaps, too, it was because they felt themselves being draw n tow ard a greater political and econom ic unit that they looked about for m eans of defence, and rath er self-consciously sought reasons to persuade themselves that there were fundam ental evils in the republic. C ertain it is that they did not hesitate to point to flaws in A m erican society. T he C anadian rouges w ere accused of favouring A m erican institutions in preference to their ow n,20 and perhaps they did at tim es. They w ere m ore sym pathetic than other groups, but on the whole opinion in the provinces was highly critical o f certain aspects o f A m erican institutions and policy. Slavery m et with universal condem nation, and from sources as different as M ackenzie’s W eekly Message and the British Colonist. Slavery in British N orth A m erica had not offi­ cially been abolished until 1834, but had long before that ceased to have any significance, and indeed had had little place in the econom y of the provinces at any time. T he Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 caused m igration o f negroes from the N orth to the w estern part o f C anada, and created, w ithin that area, both an econom ic and a racial problem . Early in 1851 the A nti-Slavery Society of C anada was organized, having as objects not only opposition to slavery on principle but also aid to the “victims of slavery flying to our shores.” Slavery, perhaps m ore than any other one thing, checked enthusiasm for the U nited States. But there were m any other criticisms. From both right and left came protests against financial conditions in the U nited States. It is quite clear to us that free institutions are not very likely to m ake honest m en out o f the A m ericans. T hey sham efully abuse the greatest privileges they enjoy. W e consider the recent bankruptcy o f 1,500 banks and 1,000 traders, an artful, fraudu­ lent, political m ove, to cheat Europe. England alone holds 450 m illions o f dollars value in A m erican securities.21 A tory paper, the British Colonist of T oronto, expressed the sam e views, pointed to the large English loans, and painted a gloom y picture o f conditions in the country.22 Lynching and im­ proper adm inistration of justice, corrupt governm ent, religious persecution, and harsh treatm ent of the Indians were other charges levelled against the A m ericans, w ith the m oral con­ stantly draw n th at British rule in C anada was superior in all

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these respects. In th e m aritim e provinces the com petition of A m erican fisherm en, “our tricky neighbours,” was a constant them e fo r com plaint; and in all agreem ents on fisheries, trade, o r boundaries the A m ericans w ere represented as driving hard bargains. T he vigour w ith w hich annexation was advocated varied according to the apparent advantages to be gained; and those in tu rn w ere relative to the varying advantages o f the imperial connection. T he shock to the econom y of the provinces resulting fro m the free trade policy o f England led to protests th at G reat Britain, having w ithdraw n h er preference, should leave the colonies alone. “Si lA n g leterre ne laisse plus a ses colonies aucun privilege com m ercial, qui peut attacher celles-ci longtem ps a leur m ere-patrie?” 23 A m em ber o f the N ew Brunswick assem bly suggested that parliam ent was no longer legislating for the w hole em pire but only fo r certain classes.24 In answer to such criticisms other w riters pointed to the positive advantages o f the connection, such as capital fo r public works, and provi­ sion o f m ilitary defence. O thers p u t their argum ents on different grounds, praising the liberty and the institutions w hich came fro m th e em pire. T he Novascotian w ould not “forfeit o u r con­ nection with the d ear old m other country,” even if it m eant sacrificing trade w ith the U nited States.25 A C anadian editor m ocked the grim earnestness w ith which his contem poraries w rote on trade and the em pire, and pointed to w ider considera­ tions. It is very gratifying that, w hile in Canada our public bodies, w hether they be Civic Corporations or Boards o f Trade, devote their pow ers either to m atters o f sectional im portance, or to finding o ut w hether a bale o f cotton goods or a barrel o f flour cannot be im ported with m ore advantage or carried fo r ship­ m en t at less cost through the U nited States than by the St. Lawrence, the attention o f our neighbours in N o v a Scotia and N e w B runsw ick, w hether in newspapers or a t public m eetings is turned alm ost exclusively to the advantages that will be per­ m anently gained by knitting together the w hole British E m pire as one family', and by w orking o u t the prosperity o f that fam ily through its ow n internal relations independent o f foreign interference,26 T h e closer integration o f the em pire, w hether by inform al understanding o r constitutional change, w ould m ore readily be secured if E ngland knew the colonies better. Pained feelings

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w ere n ot infrequently expressed at the lack of interest show n by Englishm en in the affairs o f British N orth A m erica. T he editor of a tory p aper in T oronto was shocked to read a speech by L ord Stanley on the state o f the world in w hich he com pletely ignored Canada. W e do not wish to m isunderstand our position. W e are Pro­ vincials. We are taught it daily; but still with all this sense o f our shortcom ings, judged by a cosm opolitan standard, we do not think that justice is done to us. Pained are we to think that we rank fa r higher at W ashington than at St. James. . . . W ould a m inister o f the Crown in Canada, in L o ndon be looked upon in any other light, than a person to w hom som ething civil has to be said, and to be got rid o f, so soon as official business is dis­ patched? Contrast his reception with som e F u rst o f Schw arzburg R a d o lsta d t.. . .27 T o rem ove this ignorance or indifference w riters in the m ari­ tim e provinces set themselves to explain the colonies to the m o th er country. O thers pleaded for closer integration. “W e wish England to give up addressing her colonies as a separate o r third party,” w rote a T oronto editor, “W e wish Colonial to be adopted as British interests, and we desire to argue fo r them only to the extent th at they are British. L et British o r foreign then be our sim ple question. Let England view C anada as part of herself, and let C anada never forget her duty as a p art of the Em pire.”28 As positive m achinery for closer co-operation two suggestions w ere m ade from tim e to tim e - a perm anent representative of C anada in London, and colonial representatives in the H ouse of Com m ons. But these were n o t pressed, and those w ho m ost actively supported the continuance o f the im perial connection devoted their efforts either to m ore general argum ents o r to proving that the provinces profited by their position w ithin the em pire. N either they nor those who took a m ore critical view could fo r long neglect two subjects m ost concretely apparent as colonial interests - defence and external trade.

CHAPTER 2

Diplomacy and War

International rivalries and w ar were carried by E uropeans to N o rth A m erica together w ith political institutions, econom ic structure, and culture. N o t that w arfare of a kind was strange to the aborigines: on the contrary, the tribes fought each other frequently and w ith a ferocity th at m ade the nam e of Indian a by-word for cruelty and a te rro r to the settlers. T hanks in p art to their own inept handling o f the natives the white men were from the first subject to Indian attacks; but they did not stop at defence, or even at calculated intervention in inter-tribal q u ar­ rels. T o the w arfare which they found and could scarcely have ended they added th at w hich sprang from the com petition of distant states, fought with weapons vastly m ore destructive than the tom ahaw k. It was in the course of w orld wars th at the north of the continent passed wholly under British sovereignty; and the process o f delim itation o f political boundaries continued with far-reaching diplom acy as its m eans and w ar as the final arbiter. F o r the colonies which w ere to form the nucleus o f the C anadian D om inion the causes, the course, and the results of w ar w ere placed in a m ixed setting o f local disputes and the colonial and foreign policies o f E uropean great powers. The very fact that they were colonies implied th at the determ ination and conduct o f policy were beyond their orbit, and th at term s of peace were reached at negotiations in which they took no part. It equally followed that a responsibility for the results o f policy rested on the imperial authorities. T he royal arm y and navy were intended to bear the brunt o f fighting, supported by such colonial forces as were from tim e to tim e available. T he posi­ tion, then, in respect of the w ars fought on C anadian soil was that the colonials had no voice in their origination o r conclusion but did have a subordinate place in the cam paigns. T he advan­ tages and disadvantages of that position m ight be - and indeed long have been - debated. On the one hand the colonies enjoyed the prestige and experience of the British governm ent, and on the other hand were m ade to suffer for its m istakes o r the results

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o f policies unrelated to their im m ediate interests. If they could have been regarded as unexposed to attack except as a result of im perial diplom acy the defence provided from E ngland would have been unnecessary. It is, how ever, safe to conclude that w hen defence was needed - w hatever the cause - the British arm ed forces w ere essential. H ow far those forces could effec­ tively operate in o r for the colonies depended in p art on the dem ands o f cam paigns in o th er parts o f the w orld and in part on th e geography o f N o rth A m erica. T h e h alf century from the end o f the Seven Y ears’ W ar to the end of the N apoleonic w ars is an unrivalled quarry for the study of diplom acy and w ar in relation to the British provinces. In the British E m pire and in F rance, the two countries from w hich cam e the people o f C anada and N ova Scotia, m ajor revolutions broke out, leading to issues w hich m ight be expected to divide the people o f the colonies, and to international com ­ plications o f the m ost far-reaching character. T he response of th e populations o f N ova Scotia and C anada to the appeals of revolutionary and anti-revolutionary parties throw s not a little light on the character and points o f view o f the groups which successively cam e to the provinces. T he two w ars o f the period dem onstrate the changing degree and the nature of co-operation between im perial and colonial forces; while the E uropean align­ m ents illustrate the effect o f the international balance on the m aking o f w ar and peace in N o rth A m erica. T he role o f the people o f N ova Scotia and C anada in the A m erican revolution was alm ost entirely negative, but the provinces as such w ere not u n im p o rtant in its outbreak, in the strategy o f the w ar, and in the settlem ent th at follow ed. T h a t the transfer o f Q uebec from th e F rench to the British E m pire would influence the attitude in th e other colonies h ad long been predicted. T he rem oval of F rench pressure from the n o rth gave to the thirteen colonies g reater freedom to press their claim s against the m other country. B ut while the fall o f N ew F ran ce thus eased the situation o f the thirteen colonies it did not by any m eans preclude the possibility o f a w ar on two fronts. Sir G uy C arleton, early discerning that he m ight inherit th e m ilitary pow er o f his F rench predecessors and use the fortress o f Q uebec and the trained m ilitia o f the colony if force should be needed, bent his efforts tow ard secur­ ing the loyalty and active aid of the F rench Canadians. T h at the Q uebec A ct o f 1774 was the practical m eans to th at end was hard ly disguised by its supporters, and was recognized by its opponents, both in E ngland and the thirteen colonies. It was

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bitterly denounced in both places as an instrum ent of oppres­ sion, designed not only to destroy liberty in the St. Law rence Valley but in the A tlantic colonies as well. O n the eve of hostilities the party of revolt in the colonies had, perforce, to find w hat m ethods they could of scotching a danger which they clearly saw to exist, for if C arleton’s schemes should succeed they would be in a m ost perilous position: threatened by a British fleet based on H alifax, by land forces of F rench C anadians and im perial regulars from Quebec, and by the hostile Indians of the west. Obviously the first move was to attem pt to secure the adhesion o f the people o f the two prov­ inces to the revolutionary cause. O pinion was divided every­ w here - in England, in the thirteen colonies themselves, and in N ova Scotia and C anada - and there appeared to be no inherent reason why two should not be added to the thirteen already being bound together to resist British policy. As a field for p ropaganda N ova Scotia w ould at first appear to be m ost hope­ ful, dotted as it was w ith N ew England fam ilies and in tune with the doctrines of self-governm ent. Yet w hatever w ere the feelings o f the inhabitants (and they were undoubtedly divided), they could hardly be translated into action, for the small British garrison at H alifax was in easy touch with the British fleet. It was literally impossible fo r the revolutionaries to effect a junc­ tion with their supporters in the province, o r even to prevent H alifax from being used as a base of naval operations against them . In all probability, therefore, the people of N ova Scotia w ould be unable to support them . T he aspect of C anada was very different. I f a com bination o f regulars, militia, and Indians could be gathered they m ight advance into the heart of New Y o rk and play havoc with the em bryonic arm ies of the colonies. But could th at offensive not be stopped at source? W as the population o f C anada ready to follow its governor? W as it even loyal in a negative sense? A m ongst the sm all English-speaking group in the province individuals and com m ittees had shown unm istakable sym pathy with the revolutionary cause, while the F rench were a recently-conquered people who might well be persuaded to throw off the foreign yoke. H ence the strategy was clear: to persuade the people of C anada to throw in their lot w ith the revolutionaries, and to enable them to do so by sending arm ed forces to their relief. T he troops a t the disposal o f the governor w ould be overw helm ed, the loyalists suppressed, and the tories in the thirteen colonies given a practical lesson. C anada could be reached by land, and w ith its interm ittent

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com m unication with E ngland be brought into the fold in a way that N ova Scotia never could be.1 Some m onths before the w ar began printed leaflets and agents w ere hurried to C anada to encourage the faithful, convert the uncertain, and intim idate opponents. T he m erchants o f M ont­ real, disgusted with the F rench institutions of the supposedly British province, received both literature and delegates with m ore than interest. Some o f them went over to the revolutionary side and others w ere suspected of passive disloyalty. O n the whole, however, they were unready to join in a fight fo r inde­ pendence of the Britain with which their business connections w ere vital, and chose to bear the known evils of the Q uebec Act rath er than abandon their com m ercial structure. French C an a­ dians were invited to escape from the tyranny of British rule, with a strong hint th at any other course would incur the enm ity of the sons of liberty. F o r m onths the bulk of the French Canadians w ere undecided as to the course they should take. T he A m erican prom ises of self-governm ent m ade little im ­ pression in themselves, but the Q uebec A ct had failed to con­ ciliate the habitants. By the seigneurs and the clergy loyalty to the crow n was unquestioned, and the influence o f the latter especially helped to turn the tide. But if the habitant was unim pressed by assemblies and juries, he found the new act oppressive after the relaxation of the strict rule of the French regime. T he F ranco-A m erican alliance of 1778 m ight have been used as another lever to move the French C anadians against their new governm ent, but neither signatory w anted to see the fieur-de-lys restored at Quebec, and the suggestion o f a com ­ bined attack by a French fleet and an A m erican arm y - which m ight have had a m arked effect - was never adopted. A com ­ bination o f factors - C arleton’s firm adm inistration, the influ­ ence of the church, resentm ent against incidents of oppression by the invaders, and finally the failure o f the invasion — drew m ost o f the F rench at least into passive obedience. W ith a population so uncertain the m ilitary problem o f de­ fending C anada, far m ore o f attem pting an offensive from it, was no light one. T he fact th at N ova Scotia was never seriously threatened illustrates the im portance o f British sea-power, as does, obversely, the vulnerability o f C anada. T he m ain route through the A lleghanies was form ed by the Richelieu R iv erL ake C ham plain-H udson R iver system, and, since it m ight be traversed by either belligerent, an A m erican raiding party wisely secured the fortified posts a t T iconderoga and C row n Point in

D I P L O M A C Y A ND WAR - 27

the spring o f 1775. T he real invasion o f C anada was in the autum n o f the sam e year, w hen one arm y, following that route, captured M ontreal and joined w ith a second arm y that had com e by the valley o f the K ennebec to besiege Quebec. H ere was the one strong defensive position in C anada. T he garrison, it is true, was sm all, and m ore than a half consisted of untrained C anadians; but the A m erican force was likewise small and was handicapped by long lines of com m unication and bad weather. In the spring the strong arm o f the royal navy had at last a chance; and w hen three m en-of-w ar sailed up to the rock the siege was raised - never to be resum ed. Some few hundreds of C anadians had taken p art in its defence (and others had fought on the side o f the enem y), but the w ar was essentially one betw een British and A m erican forces, the form er handicapped by the E uropean alliance against them . It was no national spirit th at saved the British provinces from absorption in the new union, and kept them the basis o f a second British em pire in A m erica: a national spirit was yet to be born. If the British provinces during the w ar w ere paw ns in the great international chess game, it was even m ore true th at they were so in the peace settlem ent.2 It did not, how ever, follow that the m inor role assigned to them was altogether a disadvantage, fo r to some degree they w ere protected by the moves and counter-m oves o f the m ajor pieces. W hile the U nited States had leant on F rench assistance in the w ar and was prepared to follow the F rench lead in the negotiations for peace, the aims of the two countries conflicted on im portant points. W ashington had frow ned on L afayette’s proposal for a joint invasion of Canada, fearing that it might restore Bourbon rule at Q uebec; and, though the A m ericans hoped at one tim e to secure the cession of both N o v a Scotia and C anada, they sacrificed even the hope of widened dom ains for the sake of the balance of power. The F rench governm ent seems to have had no am bition to regain its A m erican possessions, neither did it wish to strengthen the U nited States by such a broad acquisition. Its general plan was fo r a division between British, A m erican, and Spanish pow er on the continent; and its apparent support o f Spain’s claims to the east branch of the Mississippi so alarm ed the A m erican pleni­ potentiaries th at they hastily swung to support Britain in C anada and F lorida as a counter-w eight against the threatened Spanish encroachm ent on the west. It has been said, and with some justice, that G reat Britain m ade an inadequate diplom atic defence of her colonies in the negotiations, but it is evident that

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she had no thought o f abandoning them , and that the fault lay in p art in her insufficient appreciation of the im portance o f the boundaries, and in p art on the continued tension in Europe. F o r w hatever reason, the British let go the O hio Valley and the trad ­ ing posts on the south and west of the great lakes - a result w hich was viewed w ith horror by the M ontreal m erchants w ho knew every inch o f the terrain. On the A tlantic end of the boundary the selection o f the line from the St. Croix River to the highlands, threatened land com m unications by an A m erican wedge between N ew B runsw ick and Canada. T he treaty o f Paris left British colonies along the north of the continent. T h at they w ould rem ain British was to m any A m ericans no certainty: that they would be confined by the term s o f 1783 was not yet accepted in L ondon o r in M ontreal. M ore than a generation was to pass before the issues raised by the A m erican revolution were resolved. D uring th at time there was a spell o f peace, and in it intervals when the tension relaxed, but there could be little expectation o f perm anent peace until after a fu rth er resort to arm s. D anger to the prov­ inces cam e both from N orth A m erican and E uropean politics. In Britain and the U nited States it was believed that the boun­ dary o f 1783 was subject to change. T he British governm ent retained hold o f several im portant posts on the then A m erican side fo r m ore than ten years after the peace, and cherished some hope that centrifugal forces in the new federation - as exem pli­ fied by the secessionist m ovem ent in V e rm o n t-w o u ld lead to its collapse. T he U nited States, for their part, had not altogether abandoned earlier am bitions o f bringing the whole continent within their control. T o the general idea o f political expansion w ere added suspicion of a British alliance w ith the western Indians, land hunger, and designs on the fu r trade of the no rth ­ west. It is possible, however, that such local differences would not have led to w ar had it not been for the recurrence of E u ro ­ pean com plications. A t the very tim e w hen agreem ent over the posts was being negotiated the intrigues o f F rench agents in the U nited States w ere causing alarm in the C anadas; and even w hen the Jay T reaty had been signed the prom ise of peace was darkened by the repercussions of the A nglo-French war. T h e parallel with 1775 was all too apparent: would the U nited States again secure F rench assistance in A m erica? T he event proved that they did not; but nevertheless the E uropean w ar strongly influenced the situation in A m erica. T he British block­ ade seriously im paired A m erican shipping and foreign trade,

D I P L O M A C Y A N D WAR - 29

adding a new source of antagonism to those already existing; while the exigencies o f the struggle against N apoleon limited the ability o f G re at Britain to defend her colonies. T h e m ilitia system o f the British provinces, as it appeared in the first half o f the nineteenth century, was modelled on those o f both F rance and E ngland and had already a history on the continent o f N orth A m erica. In N ova Scotia there w as no break in continuity, and p a rt o f the provincial m ilitia was called up for garrison duty in the period o f the A m erican revolution. In C anada, how ever, the cession and the years of adjustm ent had necessitated a suspension o f the m ilitia system , and such inhabi­ tants as served in 1775 w ere volunteers enrolled as the authori­ ties could secure them . A year after the siege of Q uebec was raised the m ilitia system w as again restored by a series of ordinances, which, w ith the acts of the various provincial legis­ latures, m ade up a coherent system of w hich the principles were com m on to all provinces.3 C ertain central ideas run through the laws from the F rench regim e in C anada and early British ru le in N ova Scotia to the organization in the provinces as it was just p rio r to the W ar o f 1812. L iability to service, w ith specified exem ptions, was universal and com pulsory. A ll men o f m ilitary age were registered by districts and records were periodically sent to headquarters. M usters w ere held on two to four days in the sum m er, and at times som e slight provision was m ade for training. All o r p art o f the m ilitia m ight be em bodied fo r a lim ited period in tim e o f civil disturbance o r war, and when only detachm ents were required they were chosen by ballot. N o pay was provided, and in m ost cases the m en w ere obliged to provide their own w eapons and am m unition. M odifications were m ade during the tense years of the N apoleonic w ars by provin­ cial votes for training and by the introduction o f volunteering. “F lan k com panies” w ere form ed in each regim ent from volun­ teers who still received no pay but were obligated to drill for six days a m onth, and to find their own uniform s and muskets. T aken by itself the m ilitia w ould be judged as of little avail for w ar. B ut it was at no tim e intended to operate alone, only as an adjunct to regular troops. Led by trained officers and stiffened by regular regim ents it could, and did, give a good account of itself. In spite o f requirem ents in Europe, the British govern­ m ent increased its garrison in British N o rth A m erica from some 3,500 in 1804 to nearly 9,000 in 1808 and 1809. O f the total ab o u t one qu arter was m ade up o f regular fencible regim ents raised in the provinces; and while these w ere carried on the

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British budget they eased the problem o f m an-pow er. Such were the land forces on the eve of the W ar o f 1812. T he royal navy, the provincial m arine, and natural and artificial obstruc­ tions, com plete the tale of the means available for offensive or defensive w arfare.

II T h e testing o f the system of defence was neither unexpected n o r long delayed. In m any respects the W ar o f 1812 was strik­ ingly like th at o f 1775, both in its origins and its course. Both form ed p art o f larger international struggles; both involved invasions of C anada; and both illustrate the im portance of British sea and land forccs as the basis of the defence of the British provinces. But, while in neither case did the provincial governm ents have any voice in the diplom acy leading to the outbreak, the C anadian m ilitia and the civil population in general supported those governm ents in action in contrast to the slight response or even hostility of the earlier war. W hether the w ar was prim arily caused by m aritim e disputes incidental to the use o f British sea-power against N apoleon o r to the am bitions of A m erican im perialism ,4 it took the form not o f a dispute over colonial autonom y but of a contest between national states.T he A m erican invasion of the colonies w hich had rem ained British was a blow against the nearest territory of the enem y, and if successful m ust have resulted in conquest and perhaps their annexation. Colonial opinion on th at issue could n o t be represented as unanim ous, for there w ere groups of recent A m erican im m igrants whose allegiance was to the coun­ try o f their birth, and w ho either returned as the w ar cam e or created disloyal elem ents in the provinces. T he assembly of U pper C anada blocked em ergency m easures w hich the adm inis­ trato r considered to be necessary, and on some occasions units o f the m ilitia showed signs of disaffection. T he dom inant ele­ m ent in the population, how ever, w ith the U nited E m pire L oyal­ ists as its core, gave unquestioning obedience and support. In Low er C anada too, w here once both English and F rench C ana­ dians had w avered in their loyalty, the position had changed, but n o t in this case because o f an alteration in the character o f the population. It was tru e th at once again an attem pt at a return to F ren ch sovereignty m ight be feared; but F rance played only a rem ote p art in the A m erican W ar, and a F rance still coloured

D I P L O M A C Y A ND WAR - 31

with the red of revolution. Les Canadiens w ere finding their destiny. It was to be neither in a reversal of the decision of 1763 nor yet in unconditional absorption w ithin the world-wide operations o f British foreign policy. As yet the positive lines were hardly draw n, but the W ar o f 1812 dem onstrated that the F rench of Q uebec would defend their province against an invader. W ar and revolution on two continents had ham m ered o u t a pattern in which the provinces o f British N o rth A m erica saw themselves as at bay against the aggression o f a far m ore pow er­ ful neighbour. T he odds, how ever, were not as uneven as might at first appear. W hile the m orale o f the colonials was relatively high, the U nited States were as much, if not m ore, divided than they had been in 1775. N ew England was cold, if not actually opposed, to the w ar; and the British were careful to nurse this advantage by attacking only on the central and southern coasts, and by allowing the trade o f N ew England to be carried on. T he colonies were dependent on sea-com m unication across the w idth o f the A tlantic, but since the A m erican and French navies were unable to break th at com m unication, it was only the ele­ m ent o f time that was a handicap. T he long land frontier with the U nited States, from A tlantic to Pacific, was guarded by few troops, scanty forces on the lakes, and few fortified positions, but the section that was actually vulnerable was only the central portion of that great stretch. O n the east the m aritim e provinces, with th eir ice-free ports, were easily held by small garrisons in touch with the British fleet, while on the other extrem ity A m erican pow er was so negative that the fur-trading post of A storia was handed over to the N orth W est Com pany. F o r the British the A m erican w ar was not unlike that waged with N apoleon in that they m ade the fullest possible use o f su­ perior sea-power and w ere com paratively w eak in land forces.5 W hile A m erican m en-of-w ar w ere victorious in several separate engagem ents, the British fleet was able not only to m aintain com m unications, but to blockade the A m erican coast and make com bined naval and land attacks on A m erican cities. O n the other hand, the U nited States was able to take the offensive against the central British provinces o f U pper and Lower C anada, which could not be defended by the British fleet since the rapids o f the St. Law rence prevented navigation beyond M ontreal. T he im portance of naval force on the great lakes was fu rth er accentuated by the difficult transport over the crude C anadian roads. H onours on the lakes were not unevenly

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divided. W hen the U nited States secured control of L ake Erie in 1813 the British land forces w ere obliged to retire eastw ard; and, on the other side of the ledger, British ships on L ake O n­ tario held up the A m erican advance on the N iagara peninsula. O n p ap er the arm ies w ere fa r from equal. T he British regu­ lars (including those regim ents raised in the N o rth A m erican provinces) were few in num ber, particularly in the early p art of the w ar when they could w ith difficulty be spared from E urope; but they w ere highly trained, and the A m erican arm y on active service was only a portion o f its nom inal roll. T he C anadian m ilitia included only a handful of com panies w ith any serious training, but - w ith some exceptions - it was m ore successfully em ployed than the A m erican both as an auxiliary to the regulars and as a separate force. T he A m erican weaknesses in training and organization w ere hardly m ore serious than w ere those in strategy. T he chief objective of the A m erican staff should have been to cut the thin line o f British com m unications a t M ontreal o r K ingston, and thus isolate all forces, both on land and water, to the west. Instead o f this, how ever, they began by attacking on th eir left flank w ith the hope o f neutralizing o r securing as allies the pow erful Indian tribes to the west. T hough, after some reverses, they w ere able to invade and occupy the west of U pper C anada, the result o f the w ar was no m ore affected in th a t way than by their offensive in the centre over the N iagara peninsula. T h ree years o f cam paigns ended w ith no decisive victories by either side, and with each ready to m ake peace. F o r the U nited States the first abdication of N apoleon spelt m ore British forces in N o rth A m erica and on the A tlantic, b u t the British had no desire to continue a struggle which they had never w anted, w hich was purely defensive, and w hich dragged on at a time w hen they m ost w anted peace after the exhausting and p ro ­ tracted w ars w ith F rance, and freedom to face th e m ore im p o rtan t settlem ent in Europe. T h e settlem ent in A m erica w as m ade up of several instru­ m ents, o f which the T reaty o f G hent w as only one.6 In the negotiations both sides, according to custom , presented m axi­ m u m term s, the final result having the appearance o f a return to the status quo. T he British plenipotentiaries at first pressed fo r m easures designed to bring m ore security to their colonies: revision o f the N ew Brunsw ick-M aine boundary, an Indian buffer state, m inor adjustm ents elsewhere, and A m erican dis­ arm am ent on the lakes. T he territorial dem ands w ere eventually dropped, and the boundary rem ained as in the treaty o f 1783,

D I P L O M A C Y A ND W AR - 33

subject to later settlem ent of certain sections. In 1818 the whole line from the L ake o f the W oods to the Rockies was, by agree­ m ent, established at the forty-ninth parallel of latitude. T he b oundary of N ew Brunswick was destined to rem ain longer a subject o f dispute. U nilateral w as changed to bilateral disarm a­ m ent in the Rush-Bagot agreem ent of 1817, under which arm ed vessels of both sides on the lakes were reduced to the size of police forces. A British attem pt to include an article explicitly nullifying A m erican fishing rights in British N o rth A m erican w aters was successfully resisted, and replaced by a convention of 1818 under which limited rights were allow ed.7 In C anada there was som e dissatisfaction th at better term s had not been secured. T he fur-traders had hoped th at the m istake of 1783 would be corrected, but their protests w ere o f little consequence in view of the im m inent transfer of the trade from M ontreal to H udson Bay. A m ore significant note was struck by John S trachan, later Bishop of T oronto. T hough a staunch tory and im perialist, he hinted th at British control o f diplom acy had its draw backs - an idea th at later was to be m ore com m only and m ore vigorously voiced. . . . W e have just heard that the conditions o f peace have been signed at G hent & ratified by the Prince Regent. O ur E nvoys were not I fear endow ed with m uch sagacity & firmness. I dread to see the articles. This country has certainly derived m any advantages fro m the war and if a proper line o f policy be adopted it will becom e a m ost valuable appendage to the British Em pire. In regard to the vast expence o f the war it is m ost true that m uch m ore m oney has been spent in the country than the soil is worth but this is not the proper way o f stating the question. These colonies are the relique o f happier tim es the m em orial o f the pow er and success o f the British E m pire under the m ost brilliant o f her adm inistrations and could not be given up w ithout disgrace. T h ey have also been a receptacle fo r the Loyalists during the A m erican rebellion and have claim s on the protection o f the M o th er country which to a m agnanim ous nation are irresistible. B ut the Inhabitants o f the Canadas had nothing to do about the Origin o f the W ar they were to becom e its victim s but the causes were national questions o f vital im portance to the welfare & prosperity o f the British E m pire. The great expence o f conduct­ ing the war ought not therefore to be charged upon the Canadas.8

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Seen in a perspective w ider than was possible for contem ­ poraries, the settlem ent of 1814-18 becomes a milestone in the history of British N o rth A m erica. T hough modified in detail and even threatened in its entirety, that settlem ent proved to be the end of a series of wars which covered m ore than a century. F rance, Spain, England, and the U nited States had, in various com binations, struggled for the control of N orth A m erica. The treaties of 1763 and 1783, in spite of the hopeful language in which they w ere couched, were tem porary, and were known even by contem poraries to be tem porary. W hile the peace­ m akers at V ienna - kings, m inisters, and generals - conscious o f the prime im portance o f their task, w ere able to legislate for but a generation, those who were appointed to the m ore humble task of m aking pcace in the new world w ere able to establish the lines on which two powers w ere to live peacefully in that great continent. N ot, indeed, that the peoples o f the provinces were able to discern the final outcom e o f the settlem ent, for there w ere to be m any m ore rum ours o f w ar in the next fifty years, and the problem of security was by no means seen as solved. But if the peace could not be taken as perm am ent, the w ar had brought a new consciousness of nationality, a m ore assured sense o f orientation. Canadians, both French and Eng­ lish, had been ready to fight for their lands, with not a little success; and if defects in the system o f defence had becom e m ore apparent, they were not beyond rem edy. Disloyal groups had been m ore clearly revealed, and steps were taken to remove such danger for the future by barriers against A m erican and encouragem ent o f British imm igrants. Ill Peace on alm ost any basis would have induced, as it custo­ m arily does, a relaxation of concern for m ilitary effort and reorganization; and, while the settlem ent of 1814-18 left much to be desired both in term s and prom ise of perm anence, it was obviously much m ore than a truce, and gave ground for hopes of peace at least for a time. T he peoples and the legislatures of the provinces turned to the problem s of imm igration and m ate­ rial progress, and revived political disputes which only later proved to be w ider than dom estic quarrels. But if the public thought m ore of pcace than of war, the sky of N orth A m erica was not so clear that the responsible authorities could neglect altogether questions of defence. F o r the next quarter-century

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the strategy o f the defence of the British provinces as seen by the British was consistent in principles and not materially changed by the threats to peace that occurred from time to time. All plans were based on the dual assum ption that, while offensive w arfare against the U nited States was not practicable, the provinces were defensible. It was believed that the W ar of 1812 had dem onstrated both the feasibility of successful defence, even against the larger neighbour, and also th at the organization o f land forces was fundam entally sound. T he im provem ents th at w ere considered to be necessary were to m eet weaknesses which were em phasized m ore than revealed by the war. In this last phase of the old colonial system it was taken for granted th at responsibility for defence both in thought and action, rested on the im perial governm ent. It followed, then, that the weight o f attack w ould fall upon the royal navy and the British regulars; but these two professional arm s, it was believed, could afford adequate protection if - and only if - the provinces continued to provide the additional m an-pow er o f the militia. T h e successful operation o f the three branches o f the defence force depended on a fortified naval base on the A tlantic, im­ proved com m unication w ithin the continent, and strengthened or additional fortifications at vulnerable points. Such was the attitude o f the British governm ent tow ard the problem of defending N orth A m erica from the sea to the head o f the great lakes. T h e w ar had am ply proved the ability of the royal navy to m aintain uninterrupted com m unications across the A tlantic, and not even a com bination of powers could challenge the sea-power that dated from the battle o f T rafalgar. T he fleet m ust, however, have a base th a t was safe against land attack o r raids from the sea, and for that reason Sir Jam es Carm ichaelSm yth, the head o f the com m ission sent to inspect the defences o f the provinces in 1825, advised a new citadel for H alifax.9 M inor works w ere recom m ended, for storing am m unition and as “alarm posts and rallying points” at A nnapolis and W indsor. N ew Brunswick was “ the connecting link between C anada and N ova Scotia,” and the com mission pointed to the military im portance o f a satisfactory boundary of N ew Brunswick with M aine. F o r p art of the year troops and supplies could be sent by way o f the St. Lawrence, but in the w inter the overland route through N ew Brunswick was the only one, and it w ould be endangered by the jutting north o f Maine. T he Tem iscouata P ortage road was not only close to the border but could only by

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politeness be called a road a t all. In order to provide a com ­ m unication safer in tim e o f w ar the K em pt road, fu rth er from the boundary, was projected, and was open over som e sections in the thirties. Since C anada was the only province th at was considered likely to be attacked it was essential to provide com m unications through as well as up to it. R apids on the upper St. Law rence barring navigation, the British governm ent, at its own expense, built the Rideau C anal, which had the additional advantage of being well back from the frontier. A t first the imperial experts frow ned on the im provem ent o f the St. L aw rence, as opening it to A m erican attack; b u t later encouraged canals on th at river as a necessary alternative to the R ideau route. T he seizure of control o f Lake Erie in the W ar of 1812 underlined the problem of reinforcing the defences of the western part o f the province, and gave a m ilitary im portance to the W elland Canal. W hile the inland waterways, like the low er St. Law rence, w ere frozen in the w inter, by a happy coincidence the roads of C anada w ere com paratively fit for use w hen the bottom less m ud was decently covered w ith snow. T h e sam e lakes which afforded a m eans o f com m unication for H is M ajesty’s forces w ould be useless fo r that purpose if com m anded by enem y ships, and becom e instead a highw ay for an invader. T he Rush-Bagot agreem ent o f 1817 was intended to cancel out all arm ed vessels save a few patrol boats, but, like m any another disarm am ent agreem ent, its im plem entation followed slowly. Being only required n o t'to keep arm ed ships in com mission, both sides w ere slow to scrap them altogether; and there w ere m any stories o f w arships being secretly built. A fu rth er com plication was th at com m ercial vessels could be converted into w arships w ithout great difficulty, and as the A m erican m erchant vessels w ere far m ore num erous, particu­ larly on Lake E rie, and had m ore ports, the British authorities had cause for w orry. In 1838, at a time o f strained relations, the British governm ent m aintained arm ed vessels in com mission over the m axim um , by consent o f the A m erican governm ent; an d the president was em pow ered, in case of danger, to take sim ilar action. In the m idst of the excitem ent caused by the M cLeod case congress appropriated $100,000 for w arships. In 1843 the British governm ent decided it could safely reduce tonnage to the figure of the agreem ent, only to reconsider its decision at the tim e of the O regon dispute. T he adm iralty sent a shipw right officer to C anada to direct the construction of m erch an t vessels capable o f conversion into arm ed vessels, but

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the w ork was not carried out because o f the m ore pacific attitude of congress.10 Study o f the W ar o f 1812 and o f the topography o f C anada satisfied Carm ichael-Sm yth’s com m ission th at invasion need be anticipated at only a lim ited num ber of places, all of which were in C anada. T he stronghold o f Q uebec had never been captured, b ut its fortifications were neglected. M ontreal had always been an object o f attack by way o f L ake C ham plain, and, in C ar­ m ichael-Sm yth’s view there should be a fortress on the island itself together w ith lesser w orks on the south side of the river. T h e next strategic point, K ingston, was not only a port, naval station, and dockyard, but controlled the entrance to the St. Law rence and the projected R ideau Canal. K ingston, too, m ust then be fortified. Y o rk was not regarded as of im m ediate im portance, b u t a fo rt was recom m ended fo r the N iagara frontier. Finally, som e m inor w orks w ere advised fo r the south-w est extrem ity of U pper C anada. T he proposals o f 1825 w ere m oderate and logical, but little was done to carry them into effect. O f the land forces, British regulars continued to be stationed in all the provinces, the num bers varying from tim e to tim e. In 1835 they were reduced to few er than five thousand, but five years later had again been raised to over fifteen thousand. T he im portance o f th e m ilitia was constantly stressed by the im perial governm ent, w ith suggestions th at im provem ents in the system w ere needed. W riting on the problem o f defence in the shadow o f the O regon dispute, the colonial secretary quoted Sir G eorge M urray as being o f the opinion th at there m u st be “a num erous, well-organized, and well-disposed local M ilitary Force, to co-operate with the R egular A rm y.” The D uk e of W ellington, he added, had stated th at “w ith p roper N aval and O rdnance preparations, C anada m ay be effectually defended by a force o f 10,000 British T roops, if supported by a loyal and w ell-organized M ilitia to the extent o f 35,000 m en.” T he m ini­ m um requirem ents, according to W ellington, were th at the m ilitia should be em bodied and organized, and perhaps given som e training.11 W hile the provinces accepted the principle th at the m ilitia m ust be m aintained, they did little to im prove its efficiency. T he Province of C anada adopted the legislation o f U pper and Low er C anada w ith little alteration except fo r a significant move in 1846 tow ard m ore em phasis on volunteer corps w ith som e training. Such were the plans and the forces fo r the defence o f the

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provinces. In all discussions on the subject, w hether official or unofficial, defensive w arfare was visualized. W as there, in reality, a prospect of attack by the U nited States? As a possibi­ lity it could not be, and was not, dismissed. T he m em ories of 1775 and 1812 were still too distinct, and there was no ground fo r certainty that British and A m ericans could am icably divide a continent. In addition to such general impressions held in varying degrees, were periodic crises whose m enace could not be ignored. T he first arose from a curious tangle of dom estic and foreign affairs that in itself illustrates the effects o f interchange o f populations and ideas. T he doctrines o f the rebellions of 1837 were in p art inspired directly by im m igrants from the U nited States o r indirectly by adm iration of A m erican institu­ tions and conditions. T he m ilitary problem of 1837 and the years imm ediately following was not the suppression of local and ill-organized revolts, but the prospect th at international war might result from sym pathy, from border incidents, or from aggression finding on opportunity. T he escape of the leader of the U pper C anada revolt, W illiam Lyon M ackenzie, to the U nited States raised the possibility of an invasion on behalf of his cause; but w hether the support he received, and the meetings in A m erican tow ns which passed resolutions of sym pathy and raised funds and even volunteers - w hether these were inspired wholly by devotion to dem ocracy o r in p art by anti-British sentim ent is not easy to decide. But w hatever the motives, the preparations on N avy Island created a m ilitary problem in C anada. T he reckless capture of the Caroline at an A m erican w h arf led to the arrest of A lexander M cLeod, a C anadian, and to his trial for the m urder of an A m erican killed in the scuffle. O f m any aw kw ard situations arising from border incidents the M cLeod case was the m ost serious. T he British m inister in W ashington w rote to Palm erston that the conviction of McLeod m ust m ean w ar,12 and Stanley inform ed Sydenham th at he m ight need to retain regim ents in H alifax.13 M eanwhile the Canadian border was disturbed by plans for invading C anada draw n up by A m erican secret societies - plans which bore fruit in actual crossing of the frontier by arm ed forces. L ate in 1838 the H unters sent a force across the St. Law rence, and a battle was fought at W indm ill Point, near Prescott.14 H appily for the peace of A m erica M cLeod was acquitted, the British governm ent expressed regret for the Caroline affair, and the H unters’ Lodges gradually subsided into threats. In response to the tenseness o f five years, there was reorganization and

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increase o f the m ilitary force, but no changes o f principle were m ade in the C anadian militia. T he 1837 affairs had not yet been sm oothed out w hen the first o f two m ajor boundary disputes arose. T he line between M aine and N ew Brunswick involved, as everyone knew, a m ilitary problem in th at an unfavourable settlem ent would seriously endanger com m unications between G reat Britain, the m aritim e provinces, and C anada.T he “ A roos­ took W ar” of 1838 hardly m erited the nam e; but there were actual m ovem ents of troops by both sides, and fighting was narrow ly avoided. In this, as in the Caroline affair, international negotiations rested entirely with the British governm ent. Its conclusion in the W ebster-A shburton T reaty o f 1842 cam e to be traditionally regarded as an exam ple o f British willingness to sacrifice C anadian interests, but later exam ination has re­ vealed the treaty as a reasonable diplom atic com prom ise. W hat­ ever a legal judgm ent of the evidence m ay show - and there is reason to believe that the British case was not a strong one - the settlem ent ended a long dispute at a tim e w hen relations w ere badly strained. Finally the Pacific coast was added to the sum of A nglo-A m erican controversies by the dispute over the bound­ ary o f O regon, held jointly since 1818. T he gravity of the situation may be seen from the fact that the successful candidate fo r the presidency had used the slogan o f “ F ifty-four forty or fight” as an election cry, while Peel told the H ouse o f Lords in m ore m easured but no less certain term s that, while the govern­ m ent would attem pt an am icable settlem ent, it was ready to m aintain British rights in O regon. A lthough the U nited States failed to realize its full am bition in the settlem ent, Britain too accepted a com prom ise. O nce again it was charged that the British governm ent had been weak, but once again the peace had not been broken. T he accum ulation o f crises on the borders o f British N orth A m erica, serious enough in itself, was over­ taken by another group of A nglo-Am erican disputes ranging over an even w ider area. IV T h e position of the British provinces was governed not only by bilateral relations with their im m ediate neighbour but by the w orld politics o f the era. T he nation o f shopkeepers, who had so long and so effectively wielded the sw ord, were struggling to re-build a world in which they could carry on business profitably and at peace. One m ajor object was to keep in the

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A m ericas an open door, through w hich to buy essential raw m aterials and to sell m anufactured goods. O ne attem pt a t out­ side interference by the E uropean powers was blocked by calling in th e new w orld; and if the M onroe D octrine was not the co-operative action that Canning had intended, it served the im m ediate purpose. It was, how ever, far from the wish of the British governm ent that the continents thus insulated from E u ropean, should be the object o f A m erican im perialism . N ot thus would the door be kept open. T he first area w hich th reat­ ened to be absorbed by the U nited States w as Texas, which sought to break aw ay from M exico and join the nation. Both E ngland and F ran ce w ere opposed to such a change, which w ould p u t w ithin a custom s area w hat otherw ise w ould be an excellent field fo r free trade, and - from the English poin t of view - w ould unduly strengthen the U nited States and expose th e rest of M exico to annexation. In p art a t least those fears w ere justified, fo r shortly afte r Texas was absorbed in 1845, N ew M exico and C alifornia w ere added to the rapidly expand­ ing republic. Soon afterw ards the U nited States sought to buy C uba from Spain, and again the British and F rench governm ents m ade clear their objections.15 H ow ever differently these events m ay be interpreted by historians, m any contem poraries saw them in the w orst light. A m erican opinion accused E ngland o f selfish interference in the affairs o f continents closed by the M onroe D octrine to E uropeans; while Britain, anxious to m aintain independent states, accused the U nited States o f aggressive im perialism . F or the British provinces the whole issue had a double significance: the disputes threatened w ar w ith the U nited States, and A m eri­ can expansionism m ight at any tim e be turned northw ard. T hro u g h o ut the provinces Texas, California, and C uba were held up as horrible examples o f the operation of a m anifest destiny w hich had been before, and m ight be again, directed against British N o rth A m erica. A n editorial in the Q uebec G azette is characteristic o f a view th at constantly found expres­ sion. The am bition o f acquiring territory, w ithout being very scrupulous as to the means, seem s to be inherent in the people o f the U nited States. T hey are living on land m ostly wrested fro m the aboriginal inhabitants, who have been exterm inated or driven back to countries now claim ed by the U nited States, and to w hich they profess to have an "unquestionable title." They

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acquired Louisiana and Florida rather as troublesom e neigh­ bours than by fair negotiation. Their citizens overran Texas, declared it independent, and it is now to be added to the U nited States. T hey have tw ice failed in their attem pts to conquer Canada, and subsequently, in an underhanded way, have en­ deavoured to favour attem pts to withdraw it fro m the authority o f the British governm ent. It would Seem that in the view o f m any o f them “m ight is right". . . . W hat m ay be the result o f the existing state o f things it is im possible to foresee; but it is evident that no country can be safe in the vicinity o f the U nited States, but by m eans o f power sufficient fo r its protection, and if needful, the punishm ent o f the aggressor.1G T h e people of the provinces saw boundary disputes on their own borders and A m erican expansion beyond them all as signs o f the onw ard m arch of a republic whose orators h ad not hesitated to announce that it was the destiny o f their country to spread on every side to the ocean. A s if A m erican affairs w ere not bad enough, British N o rth A m erica found itself draw n into the results of a dispute in the N e a r East. O n the Pacific coast there w as talk o f a Russian naval attack. In C anada a story circulated th at R ussian agents in the U nited States were looking fo r recruits to m an a vessel purchased by the T sar, and th at N ew B runsw ick o r C anada was to be attacked.17 But - except for British Colum bia - it was im probable th at the provinces them ­ selves would be attacked, and their m ore constant interest in the w ar w as in the aid they could give to Britain. T h e existence o f threats to the peace of British N o rth A m er­ ica was an old story, as was the need of provision against war resulting from them . T here w ere, however, in the forties and fifties, new factors in the situation w hich changed both the character of the forces and the purposes for w hich they m ight be used. T he prim e m ilitary interest for the people o f N orth A m erica was still the defence of their own soil, but the estab­ lishm ent o f colonies on the Pacific coast and the expectation o f settlem ent on the intervening prairies m eant th at British N o rth A m erica offered a greatly enlarged target. A second and fresh object o f m ilitary effort was support o f Britain in wars outside N o rth A m erica. W hile interest was show n in such wars as those against C hina in 1840 and A fghanistan in 1842, Britain was not, afte r the defeat o f N apoleon, engaged in a w ar w ith a great pow er until 1854. N ew s o f the C rim ean

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W ar brought in the British provinces a w idespread anxiety to aid the m other country in any way feasible, not that the British E m pire was felt to be in danger, or that th e colonies had any definable responsibility, but sim ply as a spontaneous wish to lend assistance. In M ontreal a public meeting was called by the m ayor and addressed by English- and French-speaking citizens, all o f whom laid stress on the A nglo-French alliance. A pplause greeted all references to the fight against the tyrannical T sar and proposals th at C anadians should help. A n address to the king was draw n up, expressing the sym pathy of the C anadian people and the determ ination to resist all aggression against C an ad a.18 N um erous offers o f volunteers were made, and legis­ latures and societies voted sum s for the patriotic fund. The Indian M utiny provoked fu rth er offers of men and money, and in that case the form er was accepted as well as the latter, for the im perial governm ent raised at its own expense, the 100th Royal C anadian Regim ent of Foot. W hile in both w ars the C anadian governm ent placed no obstacle in the way of British recruiting in Canada, the actual offers o f troops w ere m ade by volunteer corps rather than by the governm ent. T he latter was, indeed, w ary of sending from C anada the existing organized forces in view of continued apprehension of A m erican aggression. In case of an invasion British troops, needed elsewhere, m ight not be available for C anada; and in any event the British governm ent was already engaged in the gradual w ithdraw al of the imperial regiments. T his was another and a m ost im portant new factor in the m ilitary situation, for it m eant that the old principle of defence by British regulars aided by provincial m ilitia was being dis­ carded. A num ber of influences com bined tow ard m aking the decision to w ithdraw the garrisons. An im m ediate and practical difficulty was the size of the British arm y. In 1845 it totalled 118.000 men, of whom 53,000 w ere w ithin the British Isles, 26.000 in India, and but 39,000 available for all the colonies betw een 11,000 and 12,000 of the last being in British N orth A m erica.19 T he weakness o f such a distribution o f forces in time o f w ar was pointedly shown in the C rim ean W ar and the Indian M utiny. F urtherm ore, the cost o f the garrisons was increasingly unwelcome. F o r 1846-7 m ilitary expenditure was £ 4 7 4 ,7 8 9 fo r the Province o f C anada and £.170,464 fo r the m aritim e provinces and N ew foundland. T o a generation which was fast losing im perial enthusiasm , and tended to interpret the growth of autonom y as steps tow ard independence, such a burden was

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n o t only irksom e b ut illogical. In 1846 - the year o f the abolition o f the corn laws, and o f the British Possessions A ct - the first w ithdraw als were m ade. F u rth e r w ithdraw als in 1851 reduced the forces in C anada to 4,960 men and in N ova Scotia to 2,026 - the latter being chiefly the garrison at H alifax. By 1855, with the C rim ean W ar in progress, there were only 1,887 imperial troops in C anada, a t a cost o f £ .150,000, and in the m aritim e provinces but 1,086 m en. T here w ere none a t all in Prince Edw ard Island. W hatever m ay have been said at the tim e, there can be little doubt th at the people o f the provinces regretted the decision to call back the imperial troops. Som e com m ents, however, are interesting. W hile it was adm itted th at they had been sent solely fo r the defence of British N orth A m erica, it was often pointed o ut th at any w ar w ould arise out o f A nglo-A m erican disputes and n ot from local differences. O n the other hand, it was also argued that the colonials had not been bearing their share of defence, and had been too ready to let it all fall on the English tax-payers. L ord Elgin, the governor general w ho was attem p t­ ing to w ork out a new type o f im perial structure th at would allow for autonom y w ithout independence, saw the w ithdraw al of troops as p art o f a larger issue. H e constantly urged caution, pointing out that the argum ent that the colonies should assume a larger p art o f the cost of defence would encrease, I fear, the uneasy feeling which the Free Trade policy o f the M other C ountry and the language respecting the D e­ pendencies o f the E m pire in w hich British Statesm en have o f late years indulged both in and out o f Parliam ent have tended to produce in the Colonial m ind. —It would confirm the opinion, which already obtains too widely, that Great Britain begins to feel her colonies a burden and a nuisance — that she desires to sever one by one the bonds that unite her to them - that the connexion therefore will be o f but uncertain duration — and that annexation to the States m ust perforce be looked to as the inevitable goal, the only practicable m ode o f term inating a provisional and entering upon a definitive national existence.-0 T h e opinion began to gain weight that the vacuum caused by the rem oval of British regim ents m ust be filled by a reorganized militia. In the forties and early fifties the m ilitia in every prov­ ince was little different from w hat it had been at the beginning o f the century. Its p aper strength had little meaning. Such

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volunteer corps as existed w ere starved, and even those that struggled tow ard efficiency w ere too often objects of public scorn. T o avoid ridicule one T oronto u nit used to drill in the woods, the m en going to the rendezvous by separate paths.21 In N ova Scotia an act was passed in 1844 cancelling all musters, drills, and training unless specifically ordered, and the militia rem ained entirely passive until 1859. Joseph How e described the m ilitia o f N ova Scotia in his usual pungent style. B y the returns o f 1855, the m ilitia o f N o v a Scotia, on paper, includes 57,855 m en, o f w hom 1435 are com m issioned officers. H ow m any o f these can “set a squadron in the field,” it were vain to conjecture. N o n e o f these has had a squadron to set fo r 20 years. Som e o f them are “old fogies,” fighting the battle o f life with rheum atism , gout, asthm a, dropsy, and other such like enem ies, they are worse than Sepoys or Caffirs, or Zouaves, or Y a n kee riflem en a good deal. . . . These old gentlem en, if they ever knew anything did not kn o w m uch, and we fear that the little they were taught fo u r and tw enty years ago w ould hardly q ualify them to counteract the deviltries o f a Canrobert or a N ana Sahib, w ho have been m ade “wondrous wise” in the m odern schools o f m ilitary science. T hese elderly gentlem en, m ay, then fo r all purposes o f active warfare, be m arked “unserviceable," and set aside like old stores. T h en there are, am ongst the other 1435 “braves” who carry H er M ajesty’s com m ission in their pockets, we should suppose, at least a third w ho kn o w nothing o f the science they have bound themselves, by the acceptance o f their com m issions, to stu d y, and which the honour o f the C row n m ay require them a t any m om ent to teach. . . . There m ay be half a dozen good drills am ong the w hole 1435; but this we believe to be a very liberal calculation. . . . T he tw o Volunteer A rtillery C om panies o f H alifa x and P ictou . . . including perhaps 100 m en in all, are the only really efficient corps in the P rovince, and they, we opine, m ight be m uch im proved. In m aterial the m ilitia is sadly deficient. The w hole o f the arm s in their possession are reported “totally unserviceable and inefficient”. . . . T here is no organization, no science, no esprit de corps, no discipline. T he m ilitia o f N ew foundland, N ew Brunsw ick, Prince E dw ard Island, are, no doubt, in m uch the sam e condi­ tion. There ought to be in these provinces 80,000 m en capable

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o f bearing arm s - available at least fo r self-defence - a n d that m ig h t w ith a little care and forethought, and w ithout m uch waste o f labour, be brought to a condition m ore in accordance w ith the general interests and policy o f the E m pire than they are n ow .22 R eform cam e first in the P rovince o f C anada. Following the recom m endations of a com mission, the legislature passed an act in 1855 (18 V iet., c. 77) w hich, while it introduced no p rin ­ ciples wholly new, did in effect fundam entally alter the organiza­ tion o f th e militia. T he old rule that all m en of m ilitary age w ere liable for service was retained, but this “sedentary m ilitia,” as it was not unfittingly called, was still not to be trained, and gradually becam e little m ore than a m em ory. T he point o f the act was in its provisions for the “active” or “volunteer” militia. A few such units had existed in som e form for m any years, but h ad received neither public nor official encouragem ent. N ow the volunteer units w ere to be both trained and paid, and atten­ tion w as given to the need for m odern w eapons. A m axim um of 5,000 m en was set in the act, but in a few years it had been allowed to go beyond that un d er authority o f an am endm ent of 1856, providing for unpaid as well as paid units. M uch the sam e developm ents followed in the other provinces; though in N ova S cotia the plan was som ew hat different. T here the old m ilitia was retained as well as, and in preference to, the volunteers. T he effect was to drill a far larger num ber of m en, though for shorter periods. But everyw here there w as a new zeal fo r m ilitary preparedness. T he local legislatures voted substantial sum s of m oney, and the British governm ent sent large num bers of firearms to replace the ancient and condem ned veterans. A lthough the new life breathed into the m ilitia w as due to the g reater responsibility it w ould have to bear, it was not the only source o f the defence o f the provinces. T he British regulars w ere to be recalled only by degrees, and fo r the tim e being were in sufficient num bers to stiffen the militia, especially in the period o f reorganization. A s a m ore perm anent source o f aid it was taken fo r granted th at im perial troops w ould be sen t if actual need arose. “T he facilities of steam com m unication,” w rote the colonial secretary, “have greatly dim inished the necessity for a m ilitary force, as a m ere precautionary defence against a rem ote danger, and it m ust be borne in m ind th at, if the security o f C anada should ever-be threatened, troops could be forw arded fo r its assistance w ith the utm ost speed.”23 G iven the suprem acy o f the royal navy, no difficulty w ould exist in the

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tran sfer of such troops. T he navy, too, continued to act as a guard to both coasts of British N orth A m erica. H alifax had long been a naval base, and experience had show n that the m aritim e provinces w ere rendered safe from attack by the near presence o f the British warships. T he younger colonies on the Pacific coast saw their first need of defence during the C rim ean W ar. T he governor, Jam es D ouglas, advocated arm ing all the able-bodied w hites in the colony, along w ith an auxiliary force of Indians, but the council decided that the w hites would be less a protec­ tion than arm ed Indians were a m enace, and preferred to leave the defence of the colony to G reat B ritain.-4 D ouglas's appeals fo r a naval force perm anently stationed in the colony w ere at first received coldly in London, but in 1855 a naval base was established a t E squim ault, thus affording security to the Pacific as well as to the A tlantic coast. In the m iddle o f the century, then, the defences of British N o rth A m erica consisted o f the royal navy for the colonics on both extrem ities, a m ilitia in process o f reorganization, and the residue of im perial troops. A few fortifications had been added after the W ar o f 1812, but on too modest a scale to be a m ajor factor. Because of the disarm am ent agreem ent of 1817 neither C anada nor the U nited States had available naval forces on the lakes, which thus rem ained open to the passage of troops. T rans­ po rtatio n was greatly facilitated by the com pletion of the St. L aw rence canals at the end o f the forties, w hich, together with the W elland C anal, allowed for uninterrupted navigation as far as Sault Ste. M arie. Railways, too, w ere fast being built, and had an im portant place in w arfare both for the greater speed of transportation and because they could be used in w inter. But if C anada was fast building railways, the U nited States was build­ ing even faster. A m erican railways ran tow ards the Canadian border, making possible concentration of troops on a scale and at a speed heretofore impossible. Behind this new stategic factor lay the m ilitary m enace o f a population that was rapidly growing out o f all proportion to th at of British N orth A m erica. It was questionable w hether it could still be said th at the provinces w ere defensible. If hopes still lingered, they w ere soon to be all b ut shattered by the advent of the first great m odern armies, born o f the Civil W ar.

CHAPTER 3

Transition from Mercantilism

M ercantilism was the accepted dogm a and practice of all im perial states in the age w hen N o rth A m erica was opened to E uropean expansion. In conform ity w ith the prevailing prin­ ciples F rance and Britain w ere intent on obtaining from A m erica raw m aterials to supplem ent those available at home, and on securing at the sam e tim e m arkets for their m anufactured products. T rade and the flag w ere inseparable, for unsupported individuals had little chance of conducting com m erce beyond the seas while rival governm ents were closing preserves for the benefit o f their subjects alone. Econom ic m otives account for the exploration that revealed the new lands, the foundation of colonies, and readiness to expend blood and treasure upon defence and developm ent. But if the m otive was econom ic, it does not follow th at no other elem ents entered into colonization, o r th at colonies necessarily suffered because of that prim e purpose. In infant years a colony habitually required and ob­ tained m ost paternal care; but even in adolescence the balance of aid and restriction was not wholly uneven, as witness the zeal with w hich both parties looked to retaining advantages and dropping liabilities. Political institutions, protection, and culture should n ot be forgotten as assets gained by a colony; but even in the econom ic field, which will here be treated as a separate them e, an attem pt m ust be m ade to see the situation as a whole, and not only from the point of view of particular or tem porary interests. F o r m ore than two centuries the older provinces o f the dom inion were econom ically dom inated by the related factors of local conditions and im perial policy; and to the extent that the two could be dovetailed friction was avoided and profit accrued to those in the new and the old worlds. In so far as these provinces were concerned the principles o f m ercantilism , under the F rench or the English regim es, were sim ple enough. P ro ­ duction was to be concentrated on those goods which were not to be found in the parent state, and consum ption was to be of m anufactured articles bought in exchange. T hus an external

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trade for the colonies w as autom atically called into being, as p art o f the very reason fo r their existence. T h e second principle was th at the com m erce so created was to be carried in the ships o f the m etropolitan state (o r its colonies), so adding a profit and m aking possible an expansion in the volum e o f shipping, factors essential to a w orld pow er. E m ploym ent and m arkets w ere thus assured w ithin lim its, as was a supply of articles w hich, at least in the early stages, could n o t be produced in a new and undeveloped country. If the colonies w ere not free to buy in the open m arket they w ere able to sell in a closed one. T h ey need have no concern fo r the provision o r protection of the ships w hich w ere to carry their trade, although they were lim ited in th e choice of carriers m ore strictly than in the choice o f custom ers. T h e particular regulations by w hich im perial econom ic policy was defined and the rigour w ith w hich it was carried out varied from tim e to time. In the F rench regim e little difficulty was experienced in imposing the principles. Such initiative as existed for the foundation o f native industries cam e from F rance itself, as a self-im posed breach in th e m ercantilist system. C olbert’s encouragem ent o f industries o r the aid given to the iron w orks o f St. M aurice in the eighteenth century were not typical and w ere frownfed on by F rench producers; but the very slight effect th at they had in C anada shows how little opposition there w as to the rule of buying from F rance. A griculture, while engaging perhaps three-quarters o f the population of Canada, did little m ore than supply the local m arket. T he com m ercial instincts of the colonists w ere concentrated alm ost wholly on the fu r trade, an adm irable choice from the point of view o f the m other country since it created an export o f goods not produced in F ran ce and an im port of m anufactured articles for the trade w ith the Indians. U n d er British rule the position was never again so com para­ tively sim ple: partly because o f the m ore diversified econom ic am bitions of the colonists, partly because British policy itself was undergoing m odifications. T he n orthern colonies cam e u nder British rule before the revolt o f the southern thirteen, and thus into the old colonial system. In th at system the control o f shipping w as the m ain governing factor. “It w as clearly understood by contem poraries,” w rote M rs. K now les, “ th at the colonial system and the N avigation A cts w ere p art and parcel o f the sam e thing. Colonies w ere regarded as estates to be m anaged for the benefit o f the m other country, and the econo­

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m ic instrum ent o f their control was transport, and to regulate shipping to and from the colonies was to regulate the colonial trad e.” 1 T rade between the m other country and the colonies or between two colonies was to be in British (including colonial) ships only. Shortly after they becam e independent the U nited States w ere perm itted to deal directly w ith the British W est Indies and C anada. F rom 1822 on fu rth er relaxations in the navigation acts were m ade, allowing a lim ited trade between the colonies and foreign states. T he second instrum ent of con­ trol was the tariff. By the m iddle o f the nineteenth century the colonies had secured a m easure o f independence in setting tariffs against foreign states, but it rem ained to establish the principle o f placing tariffs against British goods. Related to the control of colonial tariffs w as the system under which Britain, by conceding preferential rates to certain colonial goods, could encourage certain industries and so indirectly discourage others. But it was also possible to use direct discouragem ent o f enter­ prises that threatened com petition with English industries. W hen a governor of N ova S cotia reported a project for a local colliery in 1752 he was w arned that “it w ould be contrary to those Rules of Policy, which this N ation has wisely observed in relation to its colonies, to bring coals into use in A m erica, as the use of them w ould naturally lead them into the D iscovery of a variety o f M anufactures, the raw m aterials of w hich we now receive from them , and afterw ards retu rn in M anufactures. . . .”2 A few years later another adm inistrator o f N ova Scotia could not “om it observing to your Lordship, that this G overnm ent have a t all times been extrem ely carefull not to give encouragem ent to any kind of m anufactures w hich m ight interfere w ith those o f G reat Britain.” 3 Such instances occurred, but they w ere not frequent. T here was a growing desire in the colonies to diversify their economies, b ut it is w orthy o f note that protests against British restraints becam e vigorous only when changing policy in Britain itself altered the balance o f advantages and disadvantages for the colonies. M eanw hile both parties w ere not ill satisfied with the exchange o f raw m aterials from British N o rth A m erica for m anufactured goods from E ngland, w hich form ed the mainstay o f the com m ercial activity of the form er. T he products which the colonies were able readily to export w ere fish, furs, forest products, and w heat.4 T here w ere natural products which could be provided in apparently unlim ited quantities in some o r all of the colonies; but the governing factor w as not the extent o f the

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supply but the conditions of sale, w hich, in turn, depended on the com m ercial policy and local dem and in Britain, and on the international situation. T he fisheries of the A tlantic coast, which first created a E uropean com m ercial interest in N o rth A m erica, w ere o f particular concern to N ova Scotia; and that province was enabled greatly to extend her p art in the industry in the period during w hich her rivals in N ew E ngland and France were handicapped by the w ars o f the end of the eighteenth and the beginning o f the nineteenth centuries. T he colony on the St. Law rence concentrated on the fur trade, after the conquest as before it. G oods and capital required for the trade were obtained from London firms associated with those in M ontreal, and ocean transport was conducted by English ships. T he busi­ ness was carried on in active com petition w ith concerns in New Y o rk and w ith the H udson’s Bay C om pany. T he boundaries as settled in 1783 and confirm ed in 1794 took from the M ontreal trad ers main posts and routes; they w ere gradually edged out o f the south-w est trade by the A stor interests and A m erican restrictions; and the m ore econom ical transportation secured to the English com pany by its possession of H udson Bay finally led to the collapse o f the C anadian trade in 1821. O ther changes in the international picture brought alternative opportunities to both the m aritim e provinces and C anada. If the fisheries were encouraged by E ngland as a nursery for seam en, the forest resources o f the colonies were also needed fo r the spars and hulls o f the w ooden ships of the royal navy and the m erchant m arine. In the early eighteenth century bounties on the tim ber industry o f the A m erican colonies were begun, and extended to N ova Scotia w hen th at colony finally becam e British. A fter the A m erican revolution an alternative source of supply o f m asts was successfully sought in New Brunswick, N ova Scotia having by th at tim e been denuded of suitable trees. Small exports o f oak, w ooden staves, and potash w ere also m ade from C anada in the second half of the eighteenth century, but any large increase was blocked by the grip on the English m arket held by Baltic tim ber. Som e increases of p re­ ference in the early years of the N apoleonic w ars helped to com pensate fo r the longer voyage, but m ade no m arked change in the volume o f im ports from the British colonies. It was only w hen N apoleon’s continental system closed the Baltic ports th at the British governm ent took rapid action. H eavy duties were placed against foreign lum ber, contracts to cut tim ber were aw arded, and British m erchants persuaded to turn tow ard

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the colonies. M easures designed as a guard against a dangerous shortage in lum ber were continued for a generation, introducing and continuing the tim ber industry as a m ain factor in the econom ic life o f N ew Brunswick and Canada. A griculture em ­ ployed a large p art of the population o f all the colonies but export of its products was slower in developing than that o f fish, furs o r tim ber. T he U nited K ingdom still grew a large portion o f the food for her own population and her landowners were averse to com petition. T he early years of the wars with F rance stim ulated some im ports of grains from British A m erica, but the volume dwindled to alm ost nothing in the later stages of the N apoleonic cam paigns. A fter the close o f the wars small pre­ ferences drew some C anadian grain to the British m arket, but it was n ot until the forties that- m ore generous encouragem ent swelled the grain trade into a m ajor export. In changing proportions and com binations these w ere the staple products on which the export trade of the colonies was built, and for which they exchanged m anufactured articles and such raw m aterials as were not found w ithin British N orth A m erica. Given a situation created by the resources of their lands and the im perial econom ic structure in which they found themselves, the colonials attem pted to m ake the best o f it. The direct approach was by seeking larger preferences and greater purchases in the U nited K ingdom , and this the m erchants of the provinces were not backw ard in doing. In both N ova Scotia and C anada, how ever, there were also devised plans for a wider external trade which should supplem ent the bilateral one with Britain, and arising from the position o f the provinces within the British Em pire. F o r the N ova Scotians the aim was to create an entrepot trade with C anada and the U nited States on the one h and and the British W est Indies on the other. W est Indian products would be forw arded to C anada, for example, and C anadian products sent on in return to the W est Indies. A t the sam e tim e there would be built up a trade with the other neighbouring colonies which w ere also w ithin the protected em pire.5 Tw o obstacles stood in the way - lack of shipping, and A m erican com petition in the W est Indies. T he first the N ova Scotians attem pted to surm ount by the encouragem ent of steam ship services, but success was slight. T he second was beyond their pow er to overcom e, for it depended on British restrictions on A m erican ships. These restrictions varied in a m ost alarm ing m anner, and it was all too apparent that the new gospel o f free trade was m aking converts in E ngland. The

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design o f the Canadians was sim ilar: to develop trade w ith the W est Indies, and to siphon the com m erce o f the nearby A m eri­ can states, especially those of the growing middle west, through the St. Law rence valley. T he belief th a t this plan could be realized arose from two assum ptions: th at the St. L aw rence was the “n atural” approach to the interior o f N o rth A m erica, and th a t A m erican goods could be fathered by C anada to enter British m arkets under the preference. A s in N ova Scotia, C ana­ dians w ere helpless to direct the course o f British tariff policy, b u t they could m ake them selves responsible for adequate transportation, first by canalization o f the w aterw ay and later by the construction o f railways. So im bued were the m erchants w ith the im portance of the plan for a great external trade that they staked everything on com m unications. W hether or not these cherished projects for the exploitation o f the m ercantile system could ever have been realized, they w ere in fact doom ed to failure, fo r the m ercantile system itself was dying. Free trade began to have solid support in England from about 1820, and H uskisson’s tariff reform s m ade breaches in the old citadel. In 1839 the A nti-C orn Law League was form ed and rapidly found a w ide response to a program m e w hich prom ised cheaper bread for the masses. T he w riting on the wall was visible across the broad stretch of the A tlantic. B ut if the old econom ic em pire was dying, it died slowly, and in a blaze o f glory and profit for the colonies. T he C anada Corn A ct o f 1843 adm itted C anadian w heat a t a fixed duty o f one shilling a quarter, and w heat milled in C anada at a proportion­ ate rate. T here were misgivings in England as to the w isdom of such an arrangem ent, especially when it allowed A m erican w heat to be entered as C anadian flour; and such objections were only partially m et by the C anadian action in placing a duty on A m erican w heat im ported into the province. T he tim ber trade, which was relatively m ore im portant in N ew Brunswick than in C anada, also continued to enjoy substantial preferences until th e early forties. In 1846 the blow fell w ith the news that the corn laws were to be abolished by successive reductions over a period of three years. A lready the duty on tim ber had been cut down and fu rth e r reductions had the effect o f cancelling the preference on that staple as well. In British N orth A m erica it seemed as if the bottom had fallen out of the whole econom ic structure, and th e outcry was loud and prolonged. Bitter things were said about the hollowness of im perial unity, and the tories o f M ontreal voted in disgust fo r peaceful annexation to the

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U nited States. T he British parliam ent, satisfied w ith the virtues o f free trade and faced w ith an im m ediate dem and fo r cheap food, w as im m ovable. It did, how ever, take steps to free the colonies from the restrictions o f the old system. T he British Possessions A ct o f 1846 enabled legislatures to rem ove the preferences on British goods, and the navigation laws ceased to op erate in 1849, allow ing foreign ships to trade w ith th e colo­ nies. So perished th e old im perial econom ic system.

II T o m any people in the British colonies it seemed as if the old em pire itself was to go as well. T he year 1846, in w hich the preferences began to be rem oved, saw also the first stage o f the w ithdraw al o f the British garrisons. T he two im perial props w ere pulled away a t the sam e tim e: would the structure rem ain, and if so in w hat form ? T here was pressing need th at the colonies tak e stock o f their ow n positions; o f the relationships w ith each o ther, w ith the U nited K ingdom , and w ith foreign states. T he fu tu re o f their external trad e w as a forem ost question fo r the colonists to consider, but it was im possible to conceive o f tariffs in a vacuum , fo r they were both cause and effect o f a m aze of political and social factors. So, while the thought on tariff veered wildly in this direction and that, it w ent deep into the basic econom ic aims o f the provinces them selves and deep into th e problem s o f external relationships. British colonies in an age of im perial disillusionm ent, A m erican provinces next to a restless giant, fellow colonists who hardly knew each other well m ight they ask themselves w here they stood and w hat path they should take. A fter the first revolt against the change in British policy had subsided, cooler second thoughts w ould reveal both th a t the provinces had attained a n o t unenviable position econom ically and th at the links w ith the m other country had by no means been severed. T he flow of capital, essential fo r the developm ent o f th e new w orld, h ad com e and continued to com e from L ondon. In the new west, becom ing of interest to the Province o f C anada, the H udson’s Bay C om pany had financed explora­ tio n , agriculture, and governm ent. In 1843 the British govern­ m en t enabled C anada to secure capital by guaranteeing the interest on bonds up to £.1,500,000, negotiated by the treasury. W ith such support the bonds sold at favourable prices, m ounting

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to £ .1 1 2 :1 0 . T he proceeds were used for public w orks, princi­ pally canals, and provided w ork both for old residents and newcomers. Railway construction in the fifties was also m ade possible by English capital. T he intervention o f the Brassey firm in the C anadian railway field gave the prestige o f the fam ous contractors to the G rand T ru n k , and fu rth er support was added by the banking firms of Barings and of G lyn, Mills. In days w hen railways alm ost anyw here w ere thought to be a profitable investm ent such encouragem ent was hardly needed to induce individuals to buy stock in C anadian com panies. Besides capital the provinces drew on G re at Britain for experience in determ in­ ing the lines on which their banks should be organized. From the first the general principles of Scottish banking w ere followed, allowing for branch-banking conducted by com paratively large concerns. T he heresy o f “free banking,” as practised in the U nited States, for a time had some support, with the idea that m ore banks would create m ore credit, and that local banks would be m ore sym pathetic to com m unity needs than large ones with distant head offices. In 1850 a concession was m ade to that opinion in C anada by the A ct to Establish F ree Banking in this Province, but little advantage was taken of it, and the “aberra­ tion from sound principles” was not m ore than a threat.6 Early life insurance policies were issued by the agencies of British com panies, and caused an estim ated export of £ 1 0 ,0 0 0 £ 1 5 ,0 0 0 in prem ium s. T he first com pany to be established in British N orth A m erica was the C anada Life A ssurance C om ­ pany, organized in 1847.7 British capital, British engineers, and British contractors played essential roles in the construction of the canals and railways of British N orth A m erica. Both m ethods of tran sp o rta­ tion w ere designed fo r foreign as well as local traffic by improving the St. Law rence entry to the great lakes o r by running steel up to the A m erican frontier. T he m aritim e prov­ inces and C anada laid plans for lines of transportation that would at once prom ote their own external trade and carry traffic between their own ports and eastern and central A m erica. The nam e o f the European and N o rth A m erican Railway proclaim ed that purpose to the world, and if the G reat W estern and G rand T ru n k railways had less descriptive nam es their objects w ere no less exalted. T hough in the fifties an impressive am ount of construction was com pleted in the Province of C anada, totalling some 2,000 miles, and providing rail transport from Riviere du Loup to W indsor, it was soon apparent th at A m erican traffic

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cam e now here n ear to expectations. M ontreal had been con­ nected w ith the w estern p art o f the province, and a line of railway to Portland, M aine, gave access to an ice-free port. T hus C anada was assured of a channel for her external trade through­ out-the year, provided that no.obstacles w ere placed in the way of com m unication through foreign territory. T he projects for connecting the all-year ports of the m aritim e provinces with the interior o f the continent still lagged, so th at no through route on British soil existed, and no links were forged to connect the province on the St. Law rence with those on the sea. O f the w estern colonies Assiniboia was m ore accessible from the U nited States than from Canada. F o r years goods w ere carried by the creaking Red River carts between F o rt G arry and St. Paul, and when steam ships began to operate on the Red River in 1857 transportation was m arkedly easier. Both British C olum ­ bia and V ancouver Island could be reached only by sea, except fo r the laborious and specialized land transport which the H u d ­ son’s Bay Com pany had built up for its own purposes. T he sea voyage from England took four to five m onths, though it could be shortened by proceeding to N ew Y ork and over the Isthm us o f P anam a. T he efficiency of the postal system depended very largely on the state o f facilities for transportation; and to some extent the reverse was also true, since the post office provided revenue for railways and steam ships, and encouraged the construction of roads. From 1851 C anada, N ova Scotia, and N ew Brunswick were all in charge o f the post office within their boundaries, but the carriage of mails between the m aritim e provinces and C anada, especially in w inter, was slow. F o r mail from E urope to C anada resort was had to A m erican railways. T he people of A ssiniboia also m ade use o f the A m erican postal system, and an attem pt to rem ove this cause o f A m ericanization of the colony by a mail service from C anada started in 1858 was soon aban­ doned. By the m iddle o f the century three o f the provinces had telegraph lines connecting w ith the A m erican systems. In C anada the M ontreal T elegraph C om pany ran from Q uebec to Buffalo, and the M ontreal and T roy C om pany built south to the border. N ew Brunsw ick had lines from Calais, M aine, to Saint John, and thence to A m herst, a t which point it m et the N ova Scotian governm ent’s telegraph to H alifax.8 These facilities m ade possible rapid com m unication with the U nited States, and constituted the fastest avenue o f news from Europe. D irect cable connection w ith Britain w as not established until 1866, though

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there was a local cable betw een N ew Brunsw ick and Prince E dw ard Island from 1852. In the fifties th e British colonies in N o rth A m erica had obtained better com m unication w ith the outside w orld than they had w ith each other. T o the advocates o f a political union the position was unsatisfactory; but from the point o f view of external trade there was less to regret, fo r m ore em phasis was laid on trade w ith Britain o r the U nited States than betw een the colonies themselves. T here are no m eans o f obtaining even an estim ate o f the relation betw een the external trade of the colo­ nies and their total national incomes, but it is clear th a t it form ed a large part. T hough C anada was m aking som e advance in that direction, none o f the provinces was industrialized, and all depended on the sale o f staple products abroad as a m eans of securing m anufactured goods o r other articles w hich they lacked. External trade created the greater p art o f their money incom e, leaving m aintenance agriculture o r fishing, and small industries - such as mills of various kinds - producing fo r local consum ption. A n exam ination o f the external trade o f the various provinces in the period between the adoption of free trad e by G reat Britain and the signature o f the reciprocity treaty indicates the extent, nature, and direction o f the trade. In 1852 the principal export o f N ova Scotia was, as before, fish, sent to the W est Indies, the U nited States, and elsewhere. L um ber cam e second in value, and was sold in the W est Indies and the U nited States. Coal was a poor third, and was bought in the U nited States and the o th er provinces. O f total exports valued a t £ 9 7 0 ,7 8 0 the largest buyers w ere the other British provinces ( £ 3 5 2 ,1 8 5 ) , the U nited States ( £ 2 5 7 ,8 4 9 ) , with the W est Indies not fa r behind. G reat B ritain bought goods to the extent o f only £ 6 2 ,6 7 5 . Im ports w ere som ew hat higher th an exports, am ounting to £ 1 ,1 9 4 ,1 7 5 . T he largest portion cam e from G re at Britain, the second from the U nited States, and the third from the other provinces. T he largest single item was cotton goods, com ing principally from Britain. W heat flour from the U nited States and C anada was close in value. O ther item s o f im portance, though considerably less than these two, were tea from the U nited States and the U nited K ingdom , sugar and molasses, fishing-tackle, iron, and leather.0 F o r the same year the exports o f N ew Brunsw ick w ere valued at £ 7 9 6 ,3 3 5 , this excluding ships sold abroad. T he order o f im portance of exports was the reverse o f th at o f N ova Scotia, forest p ro d ­ ucts m aking up m uch the largest item, and fish com ing second.

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T he first w ere sold principally to the U nited States, and fish sales were widely distributed. O f total im ports o f £.1,110,601 rath er m ore than a half cam e from the U nited K ingdom , the leading articles being haberdashery, cordage and rope, hardw are and iron, tea, and leather. W heat cam e alm ost altogether from the U nited States; flour from the U nited States and C anada; fruit, vegetables, and livestock from the other provinces.10 C anada’s exports of £ 3 ,5 1 3 ,9 9 3 were m ade up of w heat and flour to the U nited States, G reat Britain, and the other prov­ inces; tim ber, potash, and pearlash to Britain; and dried fish in lim ited quantities to foreign countries. H er im ports, show n as £ 5 ,0 7 1 ,6 2 3 , cam e chiefly from G reat B ritain and the U nited States, the principal items being as follow s: from G reat Britain - oil, cottons, woollens, silks, linen, haberdashery, fancy goods, iron and hardw are, coal, railway rails, earthenw are and glass­ w are; from the U nited States - sugar, tea, tobacco, salt, leather, oil, cotton, iron and hardw are, m achinery, hides, tallow, and books.11 E xternal trade had by no m eans been destroyed by the aban­ donm ent o f the old imperial system : if it had been the whole econom y of the provinces w ould have been shattered. But while the extrem e pessimism of the late forties had been exaggerated, it by no means followed th at the provinces w ere satisfied with the new order. They continued to believe in preferential m arkets as an objective, and w ere determ ined to find them w herever they could. Tariffs against im ports m ust be retained in some degree fo r revenue purposes, and there was a growing belief in tariffs fo r protection, especially in the m ore industrialized Province of Canada. T here had thus com e to be a conflict between the fiscal policies of G reat Britain and her N o rth A m erican colonies; the latter clinging to a regim e under which they had grown up, and seeking to build anew, on any available design, the structure which had in such a disconcerting fashion been blown down. T h e colonists did not cease to petition for a return, at least in p art, to the old protective system; but even thinly-veiled threats th at the new policy would bring the em pire to an end did not shock English opinion. T he em pire, was the reply, was based not only on trade, but in any case free trade was better for the colonies. N othing could shake this new belief in free trade, to w hich-the British governm ent now clung w ith all the passionate zeal of converts. Som e echoes o f the doctrine were heard in the provinces, w here it began to be argued that, since free trade was so advantageous, it should be adopted there as well. T he M ont­

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real E conom ist devoted itself to this cause and a free trade party was form ed in M ontreal. T h e Free T rade Association, however, adm itted the necessity of tariffs for revenue purposes, as was m ade clear in its m anifesto o f 1846. O n the w hole, however, there was little support for this position, it being pointed out th at England, with her m anufactures and shipping established, was in an altogether different position. T o the editor of the H alifax Tim es it appeared that such m easure of free trade as already existed had already displaced the m anufactures of G reat Britain and m ade the people of the province into “hew ers of wood and draw ers of w ater.” T he fu rth er extension of free trade, perhaps, could not m ake things any w orse.12 F ree trade in itself was not a popular policy; though reduc­ tion of tariffs through reciprocal agreem ents was generally thought to be hopeful. O n the other hand, opinion in favour of protection was significantly growing in C anada, but not as yet in the m aritim e provinces in which m anufacturing had hardly begun. Discussions inevitably arose as to w hether a protective system was suited to the econom y of C anada. T he argum ent on one side was that C anada m ust rem ain agricultural, could not com pete in m anufacturing, and therefore should have a low tariff. A fu rth er objection was th at protection was a tax on consum ers for the benefit of a small m inority.13 O thers held that the clim ate was too cold for extensive agriculture, while the existence of w ater-pow er was prom ising for m anufacturing. So far the picture of m anufacturing was n ot impressive. T here were cotton mills at Sherbrooke and Cham bly; woollen mills at S herbrooke and C obourg; three m anufacturers of rope at M ontreal; paper mills at P ortneuf, C ham bly, Stanstead, and in U pper C anada; iron at Long Point, T hree Rivers, and St. M aurice; glass at St. Jean; tanneries in M ontreal; and axes and nails were also m anufactured.14 It was all on a small scale, though it was to increase rapidly in the fifties. T h e C anadian tariff of 1847 was regarded by English ex­ porters as protective, and a group in Glasgow petitioned that it be disallowed. G rey brought this to Elgin’s attention, and, while adm itting the right o f the provincial legislature to adjust its own tariff for revenue purposes, he pointed out th at the effect might be a decreased purchase o f C anadian grain if the colonial m ar­ ket was closed against British exports in exchange. T he British governm ent refused to be persuaded of the virtues of another assault on the sacred citadel of free trade, and sternly resisted protective m easures in N ew Brunsw ick w hich began w ith a

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bounty on hem p, accom panying the refusal with a lecture on the new econom ics. If the colonies, as the colonial secretary m ore than once pointed out, could not see the advantages o f free trade over protection, they should a t least steer clear of differential duties.15 R. B. Sullivan m ade a protectionist speech in H am ilton, urging the prom otion of m anufacturing in the province as a m eans of increasing capital and population. H e disavowed any hostility to British m anufacturers, but suggested that they and A m ericans should establish plants in C anada.10 T here were m ore converts to protection in the next few years, and in 1852 and 1853 definitely protectionist m otions w ere debated in the assembly. T he m ovem ent gathered strength, and was im ple­ m ented in the Cayley tariff of 1858 and the G alt tariff of 1859. G enerally speaking the free trade m ovem ent was defended by pointing to the success o f that policy in England, and the protectionist m ovem ent by the exam ple of the U nited States. W hen the latter policy gained the ascendancy in C anada English opinion was not only shocked by the unw isdom of the C an a­ dians, b u t alarm ed as to the effect on British trade. F urth er protests against the G alt tariff w ere forw arded to H ead by N ew ­ castle, w ho pointed sorrow fully to the inability of C anada to follow the best fiscal tradition. It was in reply to this and the enclosed m em orial of the Sheffield C ham ber of C om m erce that G alt m ade his fam ous pronouncem ent.17 H e argued th at his was a revenue tariff, m ade necessary by the conditions o f C anadian public finance, and was unlikely to encourage any serious am ount o f m anufacturing. But the m ost im portant p art o f G alt’s rep o rt was the claim that the C anadian legislature had unlim ited control of its tariff. “I t is . . . the duty of the present G overn­ m ent distinctly to affirm the right of the C anadian legislature to adjust the taxation of the people in the w ay they deem best even if it should unfortunately happen to m eet the disapproval o f the Im perial M inistry. H er M ajesty cannot be advised to dis­ allow such acts, unless H er advisers are prepared to assum e the adm inistration o f the affairs o f the Colony, irrespective o f the views o f its inhabitants.” N othing could have been m ore definite. I t was a claim , and as it proved a successful claim , to the fiscal independence o f a colony. T he old im perial system was indeed passing. V ancouver Island deliberately followed a policy o f free trade, and proposals fo r a revenue tariff o f 5 per cent on all im ports, m ade from 1852 on, w ere rejected by the legislature. T he high tariff o f the U nited States bore heavily on the colony, and when

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the attem pts to have the reciprocity treaty o f 1854 extended to cover V ancouver Island failed, V ictoria was m ade a free p o rt in 1860, w ith the object of m aking the island a centre of trade on the coast.38 T he m ainland, on the other hand, im posed 10 per cen t duties on a large list of im ports fo r purposes of revenue; and in the united colony o f British Colum bia tariffs were retained. T h e m ovem ent fo r protection was severely lim ited in scope by the parallel attem pts to secure reciprocal trade agreem ents b oth as between the provinces them selves and with the U nited States. T h at an agreem ent betw een the provinces m et w ith less than enthusiastic and general support illustrates the lack o f ties betw een them . In 1847 N ova Scotia, and in 1848 Canada, passed perm issive acts allow ing the executive at any tim e to adm it, by proclam ation, th e products of any other province. T h e C anadian act, how ever, was never im plem ented. A n agree­ m ent was reached between N ova Scotia and N ew Brunswick, w hich was actually carried into effect; but P rince E dw ard Island abstained altogether, seeing no advantage to herself in the plan. In 1859, after it had accepted confederation in principle, and afte r G alt had conducted his tariff argum ent w ith the British governm ent, the C anadian governm ent initiated a m ovem ent for closer trade relations betw een the provinces. Tw o alternative suggestions w ere offered: that existing arrangem ents for the exchange o f produce or m anufactures o f the provinces should be extended; o r that there should be com plete freedom of trade betw een the provinces - a colonial zollverein. G alt’s m em o­ ran d u m w ent to the board o f trade, w hich returned a lengthy answer. In general the opinion was, as it had been before, that the plan was undesirable. Since the colonies used the tariff as a m eans of revenue, and since their products w ere highly varied, it seem ed impossible to have a w idespread agreem ent am ongst all British colonies. T he econom ies of the N o rth A m erican colonies, how ever, w ere sufficiently alike to allow o f limited arrangements,* but only u nder the condition th at any exem ption from im port duty, applied to the produce and m anufactures of these provinces respectively, shall be equally extended to all sim ilar produce and m anufactures of all countries.” T o do otherw ise w ould be to m agnify the C anadian sin against free trade, the ark of the covenant. A zollverein w ould probably be based on the high C anadian tariff, and was, therefore, ipso facto, objectionable.10 T he British governm ent was evidently prepared to disallow any acts intended to carry out such a plan, as it had

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already disallowed acts o f N ew Brunsw ick and P rince E dw ard Island which would have raised differential duties against the U nited States. W ith this cold reception the plan fo r econom ic federation fell to the ground. T h ere also follow ed on the abolition o f the im perial prefer­ ence system various attem pts to obtain access to the m arkets of the U nited States, particularly fo r the grain and lum ber which had form erly enjoyed a protected position in G reat Britain. T here were two ways o f doing this: by political union, o r by trade treaties. T he form er was an extrem e m easure, but the com m ercial class, particularly o f C anada and N ew Brunswick, saw ruin staring them in the face as a result o f British free trade. Inclined to think in term s o f black an d white, their finan­ cial discom fort was added to a w eakening im perial sentim ent on both sides of the A tlantic. If the m other country ignored their interests they m ust find salvation elsewhere. Few people could think o f Canada, o r even of British N o rth A m erica, as an eco­ nom ic u n it in itself: it m ust be attached to one o r other great pow er. A nd then there was the tradition th a t the U nited States prospered in contrast to the struggling colonies. T o m any people it seemed that the old am bition o f developing the St. Law rence valley as an econom ic avenue between N o rth A m erica and E urope had failed of realization. F ate was against it, and fate now pointed another way. In C anada the annexation m ovem ent was brought to a head by the test of responsible governm ent in the Rebellion Losses A ct. T ories shed loyalty w hen the world they had knowij and governed was turned upside down, and the M ontreal m anifesto o f 1849, calling fo r annexation to the U nited States, was an outburst o f econom ic and political griev­ ances. T h e chief force o f the m ovem ent was in M ontreal, the centre of the com m ercial interests. In U pper C anada there was little sym pathy and considerable resistance. In N ova Scotia and N ew B runsw ick the sam e com bination of political and econom ic events produced cries for annexation, particularly in H alifax and Saint John, and in the lum ber districts o f n orthern New Brunswick; also to som e extent in Prince E dw ard Island.20 It is doubtful w hether this annexation m ovem ent need be taken seriously as a political force. M uch o f it cam e from an angry opposition, and was o f an em otional type that tended to fade with time. A revival of prosperity helped to cure the ills of which the annexationists com plained, and the persistent efforts of E lgin’s governm ent to secure reciprocal tariff arrangem ents with the U nited States gave prom ise o f a cure th at was not so

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excitingly naughty but a t least m ore palatable. T he reciprocity treaty, long under discussion, was finally passed in 1854.21 It provided for the free exchange o f grains and flour, animals and meats, vegetables, dairy products, fish, coal, and lumber. L im ited reciprocal rights were given to coastal fisheries, and A m erican vessels were adm itted to equal rights w ith C anadian on the St. Law rence. T he treaty did not covcr any m anufactured goods, since it was believed that the “budding efforts” o f the provinces in that field w ould not stand against equal com peti­ tion. “Open the floodgates o f the U nited States to-day, and our thriving m anufactures would be assuredly sw am ped.” 22 The treaty included all the British provinces except those on the Pacific coast. T he governm ent of V ancouver Island attem pted to arrange for the inclusion o f that province, but w ithout success. T h e effects of the treaty on the provinces concerned, as show n by the statistics o f the years just before the A m erican Civil W ar created abnorm al conditions, were less than the optim ists had expected but still im portant. In N ova Scotia both im ports and exports increased m aterially, and the U nited States becam e the largest seller and buyer. Sales to the U nited K ing­ dom were sm aller absolutely as well as relatively.23 A sim ilar change occurred in N ew Brunswick. W hereas in 1852 that province exported goods valued at £.603,295 to the United K ingdom and only £ 8 3 ,7 9 2 to the U nited States, in 1859 the figures were £ 7 1 6 ,4 3 6 and £ 2 3 6 ,0 1 4 respectively; and in im ports the U nited States passed G re a t Britain.24 In the same year (1859) Prince E dw ard Island bought from N ova Scotia, the U nited K ingdom , and the U nited States, in th at order, and sold fish and farm products in the U nited States.25 In Canada too the volum e o f trade had increased. Types of goods im ported had changed little under the treaty, but while G reat Britain had been slightly ahead in 1852, by 1859 the U nited States had taken a decisive lead. In exports the change was even more m arked.2'1W hile a m arked increase of external trade had taken place - during, and perhaps because of, the reciprocity treaty the m illenium once pictured had not arrived. T he fisheries of the m aritim e provinces, w hich had been at a low ebb before the treaty, w ere now subjected to even greater com petition from A m ericans, who continued to receive a bounty. T he imposition of higher tarilfs, especially by C anada, antagonized A m erican m anufacturers. Intercolonial reciprocity, frow ned on in 1860, was accepted in principle in 1861. T he desire to retain the treaty

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w aned appreciably in the provinces and began to disappear altogether in the U nited States. T o facilitate trade relations with C anada a num ber o f foreign countries appointed residents o f M ontreal as consuls, these receiving exequaturs from the British governm ent. In 1850 Belgium, Portugal, and D enm ark all took this action, and in 1851 the H ansa towns and H anover followed suit. In 1856 the executive council recom m ended that F rance should appoint a consul-gencral in place of its consular agencies a t Q uebec and M ontreal. T he British governm ent was willing for the change and approached the F rench am bassador, who, how ever, re­ ported that his governm ent could not at the tim e take such action.27 But at the very tim e that the reply was m ade a F rench mission under M . Belveze, com m ander of a French m an-of-war, was touring C anada with the object of establishing com m ercial relations. G reat enthusiasm greeted the F rench party, and an elaborate survey of the conditions of the province was m ade.28 As a result of the trip the F rench tariff was modified so as to adm it C anadian w ood and ships, and a consul-general was appointed in 1859 w ho came to live in Q uebec.23 T h e external trade o f the provinces o f British N orth A m erica not only survived the radical fiscal changes undertaken in Eng­ land, b ut continued to grow. In tariff policy and arrangem ents significant alterations were m ade in the provinces, but on the whole they w ere alterations intended to preserve by other m eans the essential characteristics of the old regime. Budding industries com plicated the situation by causing the introduction o f protection for hom e products; but essentially the provinces looked to external trade, and to finding their m ain econom ic strength from the sale of the staples w ith w hich they had been richly endowed.

CHAPTER 4

The Path to Confederation

H ardly had British N o rth A m erica begun to settle dow n to plan a new order to take the place o f th e Gld w hen the shock of the A m erican Civil W ar threw out all calculations and forced a reconsideration o f plans. It was not so m uch th at the elements in the situation w ere new, fo r the provinces h ad long been accustom ed to A m erican influence in varying form and degree. N o r even was it th at entirely fresh ideas w ere evolved to fit the changed circum stances. T he m oves open to the provinces in constructing their external policies w ere strictly lim ited in nu m b er: it was only in em phasis, com bination, and speed that there was room fo r choice. T h e Civil W ar caught the provinces in a stage o f transition in every im portant aspect o f their external relations. T he old m er­ cantilist em pire had com e to an end am idst cries of despair and bitterness. T he im perial defence system, as it had been known, was doom ed; and so faint was the im perial faith in Britain that m any contem poraries on both sides o f the A tlantic believed that the em pire w ould not long outlast its traditional m anifestations. T h e older colonies w ere a t once seeking to repair the lines of trad e and to adjust them selves to an age o f iro n and steam . Bold steps in the construction o f railways had brought heavy com ­ m itm ents and uncertain results. T he people o f C anada were casting anxious looks tow ards Assiniboia, w ondering how they could arrest its growing attachm ent to the neighbouring states of the union. F a r to the w est the colony o f British Colum bia was in gloom y convalescence after the hectic fever o f the gold rush, looking for a sign as to th e w ay it should take tow ard renewed strength. T he problem s o f the sixties w ere, indeed, such as m ight challenge the wisest statesm anship. Civil W ar in the U nited States, w ith m ilitary operations m ounting in scale and tem pers fraying, could not but affect in som e degree those provinces bordering on the scene of action, accustom ed to constant interchange of people and goods, hardly know ing w hether they w ere m ore draw n by com m unity of in­ terests o r repelled by fear o f aggression.1 T he frequent crossing

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o f the border, w hich had becom e an accepted condition, was curtailed even before the outbreak o f hostilities by threatening conditions in the U nited States. F o r two periods, also, legal barriers w ere set up by the A m erican governm ent. In 1861 passports were required of C anadians em barking at A m erican ports, a rule w hich seriously im peded w inter travel between C an ad a and E urope. A few m onths later the regulation was w ithdraw n, but at the end o f 1864 again passports had to be carried by all foreigners entering the U nited States. In spite of the inconveniences resulting from general and particular restric­ tions to travel, the people o f the provinces m ight well have wished that the boundary could have been com pletely sealed, as the lesser evil com pared w ith the danger of being involved in the war. O n the issues o f the w ar there was no single opinion. H ad the N orth been fighting against slavery, as it first appeared to be, its cause would have m et w ith wide approval, for slavery was generally condem ned in all the provinces. But on the issue o f states’ rights there was no such settled conviction. T he coer­ cion o f the southern states received some adverse com m ent, and was som etim es related to the disturbing process by which the U nited States had been absorbing its neighbours. Judged in term s of practical aid it w ould seem th at the cause o f the N o rth was the m ore p opular one. In spite of the efforts of the authorities to enforce the F oreign Enlistm ent A ct, C ana­ dians enlisted in the federal arm ies, and offers w ere even m ade to raise regim ents in C anada. By far the largest num ber cam e from F rench C anada - perhaps three-quarters o f a total esti­ m ated by a contem porary a t 40,000, o f w hom , it was said, 14,000 were killed.2 W hile a portion o f these enlisted because of conviction, and others fo r adventure o r em ploym ent, m any w ere persuaded by the recruiting agents sent to C anadian towns, o r deluded into crossing the boundary on som e pretext. T he b ounty offered to recruits no doubt was often the inducem ent to enlist, and w hen th at failed attem pts w ere m ade to fill up the ranks by crim ping. T here are few indications o f enlistm ent by C anadians in the southern arm ies, but th a t can, at least in part, be explained by the wide barrier th at separated the provinces from the confederacy. T o international com plications arising o ut of C anadian enlistm ent - voluntary or forced - were added those created by th e desertion o f U nited States citizens from the federal arm ies to C anada. T he presence o f such deserters was unw elcom e both because they added to unem ploym ent, and m ore particularly because o f the friction caused on the border.

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T h ere were cases of their p ursuit on C anadian soil by A m erican forces, cases w hich could n o t be ignored by th e C anadian authorities. A ny gratitude that might have been felt in the N orth toward the colonials serving in their armies was m ore than offset by a belief that the provinces, like the m other country, really favoured the South, both in thought and in deed. British recog­ nition o f the confederacy as a belligerent, the activities o f the English-built privateer A labam a, and expressed sym pathy for the South in Britain once m ore fanned into a flame old em bers stirred by the seizure of confederate agents from the British ship Trent. T o the A nglo-A m erican disputes w ere added those that arose out o f the plots of confederates, w ho sw arm ed in the provinces as did federal recruiting officers and federal detec­ tives. C anada in particular was dangerously exposed to being forced into the position of territory added to the general conflict. In 1863 L ord M onck w arned the British m inister in W ashington of an intended raid from C anada, and so enabled the federal authorities to guard against it. As the w ar w ent against it, the confederate governm ent m ade desperate attem pts to create a diversion by opening up a new front. In the spring of 1864 three com m issioners w ere sent to represent the “C onfederate D ep artm ent in C anada,” and - apparently supplied w ith am ple funds —the unw elcom e visitors assumed extra-territorial status. T h e largest design, for a northw estern confederacy within the U nited States, cam e to nothing. Tw o or three abortive raids involved violations of C anadian neutrality. T he m ost futile of the plots was the one that caused the greatest repercussions. In O ctober, 1864, a raid from C anada w as organized against the tow n of St. A lbans, in V erm ont. Banks w ere robbed, a cashier was shot, and attem pts w ere m ade to burn the town. T he affair was condem ned in C anada, but when the returning raiders, though arrested prom ptly, w ere at first discharged on the ground th at the court possessed no jurisdiction, there was a bitter outcry in N o rthern papers. T he num ber o f actual arm ed outbreaks as a result of confederate plots was small, but there w ere fre­ q u en t alarm s w hich were alm ost as effective in m aintaining international tension. T hreats to neutrality im plicit in m aritim e disputes and border incidents were accom panied by a revival o f the old issue of annexation. A m ongst the A m erican public and press were men, o f w hom the m ost vociferous w as the editor of the N ew Y ork Herald, w ho urged annexation o f the provinces. W ith the close

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o f the w ar the A m erican governm ent was left w ith a great arm y, and m em ories o f quarrels with both G reat Britain and C anada. T h e old opposition from the South, based on resistance to the addition of fu rth e r free soil, was gone; no r was the South more friendly to either Britain o r her colonies. W ithin the republican adm inistration that took office in 1861 there w ere both anglophobes and expansionists, and the assassination of L incoln left Seward a freer hand under A ndrew Johnson, his imperialist zeal being curbed only by a Congress hostile to Johnson and cautious about expenditure. T he secretary of state’s roving eye fell on the C aribbean, A laska, the H aw aiian Islands, and C anada. He had visions o f extending A m erican pow er to the far east, to South A m erica, and to the A rctic Ocean. N o r was Seward the only p rophet o f m anifest destiny, for m any a w riter saw the blessings of A m erican governm ent extended to m ore than a continent.3 T he Fenian raids on N ew Brunswick and C anada in 1866 were greeted with scarcely concealed approval by the expansionists in the republican party; and a bill was introduced into the H ouse o f Representatives “for the adm ission o f the states o f N ova Scotia, N ew Brunswick, C anada East, and C anada W est, and fo r the organization o f the T erritories of Selkirk, Saskatchew an, and C olum bia.” If the provinces exaggerated their own im portance to a people preoccupied w ith w ar and post-w ar problem s they were at least not w ithout evidence of hostility o r even o f aggressive tendencies. T hey endeavoured to justify their claims to neu­ trality by enforcem ent o f its obligations, but there was no escape from the conclusion that m easures for m ilitary defence must accom pany legal correctness. F o r the defence o f the colonies three elem ents w ere to be considered: the militia, fortifications, and aid from England. A t the outbreak of the Civil W ar there were slightly m ore than 4,000 im perial troops in all British N o rth A m erica; about 5,000 equipped and partly drilled volun­ teers in C anada; and the sam e in the m aritim e provinces to­ gether.4 Steps w ere taken by the British governm ent to send im m ediate reinforcem ents to the extent of three regim ents and a field battery, and after the Trent affair, larger reinforcem ents still. These m easures were designed to m eet a tem porary em er­ gency, and did not alter the policy th at the governm ent had adopted in the forties: th at perm anent garrisons would gradu­ ally be w ithdraw n and im perial troops sent only to m eet specific dangers; and th at the defence of the provinces m ust prim arily depend on an adequate num ber of trained volunteers. Two

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exam inations o f the situation, m ade on the eve o f the Civil W ar, served to strengthen the adherence to th at policy. R eporting in 1859, the m ajority o f the three com m issioners appointed to consider the expense of m ilitary defences in the colonies found th at “ a system o f defence, based upon the presence o f Im perial garrisons in every p art o f the em pire, is as inefficient as it is burdensom e; and th at the right system w ould be one based on local efforts and local resources.” T o this they added that C an ad a was subject to attack only by the U nited States, and th a t the tim e required for th at country to prepare an invading force would be m ore than enough to allow for British troops to be transported to the colony. A select com m ittee o f the H ouse of Com m ons on colonial m ilitary expenditure reported in 1861 that, while some discretion should be left to the governm ent in judging individual cases, “ the responsibility and cost o f the defence of such dependencies [the colonies] from perils not arising from the results of Im perial policy ought m ainly to devolve upon themselves.” 5 T h at the willingness of the colonies to undertake m ilitary obligations should vary in direct ratio w ith the apparent danger o f w ar was to be expected. T he T rent affair produced a quick response. In C anada the existing volunteers drilled enthusiasti­ cally and offers o f fu rth er corps were m ade. Joseph How e offered every able-bodied m an in N ova Scotia for m ilitary service.6 A public m eeting in S aint John drew a large and en­ thusiastic crow d. Enthusiasm soon cooled. A t a second meeting in Saint John speakers expressed surprise th at attendance was slim .7 H ow e ceased to see danger from the U nited States. C an ad a was, as it always had been, the m ost vulnerable o f the colonies, and the apprehension o f w ar led th e governm ent to appoint in 1862 a com mission to consider m ilitary affairs. T he report, presented to parliam ent in M ay in the form of an enabling bill, was an am bitious one, providing for an active force of 50,000 m en w ith a reserve of the sam e size. C onscrip­ tion by ballot m ight be resorted to if necessary. T he annual cost was to be $1,100,000. T he bill was bitterly attacked by m em bers from both U pper and Low er C anada; was defeated; and the governm ent, already w eak, resigned. T h e succeeding m inistry, th at o f Sandfield M acdonald and L. V. Sicotte, returned to a v ariant o f the old system, at a cost of rath er less th a n half of w hat had been proposed in J. A. M acdonald’s bill. T h e failure o f the m ilitia bill served to bring out a variety of opinions both in E ngland and C anada. N ew argum ents w ere

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offered to those in England who felt th at C anada did not bear a fair share of h er own defence. In the press and in parliam ent criticism , some o f it bitter, was expressed. W riting to the gov­ ern o r general shortly after the session of parliam ent had closed, N ew castle hoped th at “the general spirit o f those debates will n ot have been m isinterpreted,” but adm itted th at “the rejection o f the M ilitia Bill has produced a disadvantageous im pression on the minds o f the English people.” C om ing to the practical problem of how to provide for defence he stated he had “the opinions o f the best m ilitary authorities, th a t no body o f troops w hich E ngland could send, would be able to m ake C anada safe w ithout the efficient aid o f the C anadian people. N o t only is it impossible to send sufficient troops but if these were fo u r times the num ber which we are m aintaining in British N orth A m erica, they could not secure the whole of the frontier. T he m ain de­ pendence of such a country m ust be upon its own people.” T he least n um ber o f m en which the provincial governm ent should look forw ard to drilling would be 50,000.8 In the provinces public opinion was divided on the fairness of the attitude o f the British governm ent. T he case was never fully presented, for colonials seized almost entirely on the allocation of costs, concluding th at they should o r should not bear a larger share. U ndoubtedly th at argum ent was also the one m ost obvi­ ously influential in England; but there was also the strategic factor, brought out both in the com m ission o f 1859 and the com m ittee o f 1861, th at assistance could be given m ore effec­ tively by an adequate force to be sent as occasion required than by perm anent and necessarily sm all garrisons. T he public in B ritish N o rth A m erica did not, however, miss the point that the need fo r defence m ight result from im perial rath er than local policy, and m ight be an im perial as well as a local interest. “It is som ething new,” w rote a Saint John editor, “to see the statesm en o f E ngland look forw ard to sham e and dishonour w ith such philosophical calm ness, such cold, calculating indifference. . . . W hile we form p a rt o f the E m pire E ngland m ust and will do all she can to p ro tec t our soil — not indeed for our sake but her ow n.”9 T he sam e them e was elaborated by a rival p ap e r in the sam e city. T h e C olonies should undoubtedly provide fo r their ow n in­ ternal security and peace, and they have already m anifested a disposition to do this; but that they should provide m eans to defen d their territories fro m enem ies externally, w hen m ade so

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by Im perial policy in which the colonies have no voice, we un­ equivocally and decidedly dispute. W hen Great Britain sent her trained and trusted warriors to these Provinces, after the per­ petration o f the outrage on board the T rent, it was n ot to defend Provincial interests, fo r none were jeopardized by any provin­ cial policy or likely to be so, but to m aintain im perial interests, if an attem pt had at that tim e been m ade to seriously imperil them , against all opposing forces.10 In C anada East the radical L e Pays burst o u t at the sugges­ tion th a t E ngland would n ot defend C anada. Situation singuliere! R ester colons, pour le plaisir de s’appeler sujets britanniques, pour les beaux ye u x de I’Angleterre, et cependant dem eurer obliges de nous defendre contre les ennem is de la m etropole com m e si nous etions independants! . . . C om m ent! S ’il plait a ux A nglais et aux A m ericains de se quereller a propos de bottes, pour des questions qui ne nous interessent pas plus que les affaires de C hine ou du Japon, nous serons tenus de verser notre sang et de nous ruiner parce que le Canada est une colonie Britannique . . -11 O ther papers of C anada East took a less decided line, arguing th at C anada and E ngland should share the burden. In both parts o f the province there w ere expressions o f opinion m ore sym pa­ thetic to England, and the attitude of L e Pays could be set off against that of the right-wing tories who urged large expenditure for defence, and placed unlim ited confidence in the British governm ent. E ach accused the other of sinister m otives: the left holding that peace could be m aintained w ere it not for the im perial connection and the misguided im perialism of the tories, and the right constantly hurling the epithet “annexationist.” T h e third factor to be considered in relation to the defence of the provinces was fortifications. In 1863 and 1864 LieutenantColonel W . F. D . Jervois was sent by the w ar office to Canada. In his first report he assum ed that, failing naval superiority on the lakes, the whole province w est of M ontreal was indefensible. T h e second report, how ever, included w orks a t K ingston, T o ­ ronto, and H am ilton, w ith an estim ated total cost of £ 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 . N aval force sufficient to m aintain com m unications would also be required. Q uebec and M ontreal, seaports and m ore readily defensible, w ere to be fortified at a cost o f £ .7 4 3 ,000.12 M ost of the plans were never im plem ented, though they did not cease to be discussed. Jervois’s first opinion, unpopular as it was, that

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C anada W est could not be defended, at least not w ithout con­ siderable naval pow er, was perhaps not far from the truth. A huge A m erican arm y, once freed from the Civil W ar, and with railways a t its disposal, was form idable out of all proportion to the arm y of 1812. F o r the m aritim e provinces the royal navy would always be a protection, but not even troops could reach C anada in w inter except by the arduous land route followed by the im perial reinforcem ents in 1861. T he problem of defence was clearly different in the several colonies both in the danger anticipated and the m eans of repelling it. T hey had in com m on, however, a continuing apprehension o f A m erican aggression and a realization th at the m ilitary em pire, as they had known it, was gone. T he econom ic problem s of the provinces were partly accen­ tuated, partly caused, by the Civil W ar. Factors beyond their control had been causing disturbing changes in the econom y of the British N o rth A m erican provinces. Industrialism and free trade had together upset the old regim e under which the natural products of the provinces had been carried to a protected m ar­ ket in ships built of N orth A m erican lum ber. T he new age of steam , iron, and free trade had called for m ajor adjustm ents. Coal and iron had now to be im ported, and m oney borrow ed fo r the railways that had becom e a necessity. F or a brief period all seemed to be well: capital and equipm ent flowed from E ng­ land, and the reciprocity treaty prom ised a new avenue of pro­ tected trade. But it was a delicate balance, all too easily upset by events abroad. Financial stringency in the U nited States and E ngland autom atically affected the provinces, and on the eve of the Civil W ar the provinces faced a partially-com pleted network of railways and a heavy debt. T he w ar had a disturbing effect in m any ways. A n observer in C anada W est found business de­ pressed, prices low, the value o f land down, the influx of British capital stopped, and money leaving the country. “ We are as a people,” he w rote, “affected m ost acutely by the abnorm al con­ ditions o f ou r great neighbour. . . . O ur currency is deranged, ou r exchanges affected, and, generally, the whole course of com m ercial transactions so governed and diverted that recipro­ cal trade has alm ost becom e an affair of gam bling.” 13 Even if difficult, the trade with the U nited States m ade up m ore than half o f the total external trade of the British provinces, and during the period o f the operation of the treaty the value of that trade had m ore than doubled. T h at this increase was only in part caused by the treaty itself was not fully realized at the tim e, and

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w hen abrogation becam e a possibility it seemed th at a m ajor catastrophe was im pending. T o som e extent, no doubt, the political friction o f the w ar years at least hurried on the A m eri­ can decision to term inate the arrangem ent. But only about 6 per cent of the total foreign trade o f the U nited States was w ith the British provinces, and the decision was not fo r them one of overw helm ing m om ent. T here had been growing resentm ent by A m erican m anufacturers against the increasing tariff protection adopted in Canada, and it w as argued th at the provinces had not lived up to the spirit o f the agreem ent. By taking the southern free traders out of Congress the Civil W ar opened the w ay fo r a policy o f protection. W hile intercolonial trade cam e to be thought o f as an alterna­ tive to th at w ith the U nited States (w hich w as expected greatly to diminish), it had also been investigated for its own m erits. In 1861 the governm ent o f N ew Brunswick proposed a plan fo r free trade between the m aritim e provinces; and the British gov­ ernm ent not only w ithdrew its opposition, but gave its blessing to the inclusion o f C anada as well. A difficulty which had stood in the w ay had always been the higher tariff o f C anada, but by the end of the w ar reductions in C anada had brought the tariffs o f the provinces sufficiently close to allow fo r a custom s u nion of som e type to be seriously considered. A collective effort was also m ade by the provinces to extend their trade w ith M exico, the W est Indies, and South A m erica. In Septem ber, 1865, “T he C onfederate C ouncil fo r T ra d e” m et at Q uebec “in reference to the Reciprocity T reaty with the U nited States and com m ercial m atters generally,” and agreed to recom m end the opening of negotiations for m ore extensive trade. T o this the colonial secre­ tary gave his w arm approval, and a com mission was appointed by the governm ents o f C anada, N ova Scotia, N ew Brunswick, and P rince E dw ard Island. A cting under instructions from their own governm ents, and w ith the necessary good offices o f the British governm ent in relations both w ith other colonies and foreign states, the com m issioners left on their to u r after a m eet­ ing in London. W hen their investigations w ere com pleted the com m issioners m ade a report, w ith som e definite suggestions: im provem ent o f transportation and postal facilities; a reduction o f duties, by reciprocal treaties o r otherw ise, levied in the W est Indies, Brazil, and the Spanish colonies on the staples o f British N o rth A m erica; and an assim ilation o f th e tariffs of the British W est Indies in respect of the sam e staples.14 F o u r years later plans w ere being considered fo r the extension o f trad e w ith

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Portugal and M editerranean countries. All these, how ever, were no m ore than plans, and no solid alternative had yet been found to replace the security of either the old im perial preference or the reciprocal agreem ent w ith the U nited States. A com bination of circum stances thus brought the people of the provinces consciously to consider their future. One possible course was to rem ain as they w ere, but to do so w ould sim ply be to accept present conditions th at were far from satisfactory and fu tu re ones w hich m ight be a great deal worse. Inevitably there was revived the recourse of peaceful annexation to the U nited States, by which the problem of defence would autom atically cease to exist and the ex-colonials would participate in the eco­ nom ic advantages enjoyed by the U nited States. It was tow ard this end that a t least some o f the cam paign against the reci­ procity treaty had been waged in the U nited States, and there were not lacking individuals in the provinces w ho were willing to join with the larger neighbour. In C anada E ast the conserva­ tive and liberal newspapers accused the radical party o f a dan­ gerous adm iration for A m erican institutions, and a tendency tow ard annexation. L ’Ordre was said to favour annexation openly, Le Pays to be always praising the U nited States, and the W itness and the H erald to follow L e Pays. T h eir adm iration for the republic’s institutions w as not shared by L a M inerve, which saw corruption in its people from the custom s officials up, and lam ented the fate o f those F rench C anadians w ho had em igrated to the U nited States.15 T he conservative Courrier du Canada used harsher w ords: L e Pays, de M ontreal, avec cette pertinacite m aladive qui characterise le m al, ne cesse d’exalter les autres pays mais surtou t les Etats-U nis aux depens du Canada; pour ce faire ils soustraient, m utilent, et com battent la verite a outrance. Les m alheureux lecteurs de ce m alheureux journal n’apprennent pas un m o t de la gangrene m orale qui ronge la societe am ericaine et q ui se traduit heure par heure dans la presse de cette infortunee republique.10 Such language was not unusual in days when editors were accustom ed to express their views with unrestrained vigour, but the accusations o f favouring annexation o r independence were m et w ith a revealing argum ent. 11 est fa u x qu'il y ait ici un parti a nnexationiste.. . . II y a tout sim p lem ent des gens qui voient clair, qui consultent Vavenir et

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q ui se dem andent: si VAngleterre nous abandonne, ou ne prom et pas de nous defendre en cas d ’attaque et n ’en prend pas les m oyens, que faudra-t-il faire? 11 y a deux m odes d ’existence politique possible en dehors des arrangem ents actuels: I inde­ pendence ou I'annexion, lequel choisir?17 T h e idea o f union with the U nited States was, in fact, based not on ideological principles but on specific interests. T here was always a m inority which supported annexation on general geo­ graphical or econom ic argum ents, but it was not that m inority which was influential. T he position in the sixties was not unlike that which gave rise to the annexation m anifesto of 1849, but the earlier m ovem ent had had m ore vitality and w ider support than the later. Belief in the im perial connection was strong throughout all the provinces, but scepticism would inevitably increase if no advantages, o r even positive disadvantages, ap ­ peared to be the only rew ard o f loyalty. T he provinces w ere still faced w ith the problem o f their external relations in the future. D iscouraged by the decline in foreign trade, alarm ed by the im perialism of the U nited States, they w anted to be reassured that British connection.spelt tangible aid and not merely risk of international friction. It was not only in C anada E ast that such ideas were being discussed. A supporter o f the governm ent, a journalist in W oodstock, C anada West, was alarm ed by w hat he heard around him. I t is rum oured, that a desire fo r annexation to the U nited States is widely spread absorbing all other questions. This is not true, but it is true, that there is a strong feeling in favou r o f independence taking possession o f the public m in d created and fo m e n te d chiefly by the leading m erchants, in this section, who are doubtless inspired by a desire to guard their ow n interests. The reasons the\y] adduce fo r the agitation are "that Canada is indefensible” —“that it is absurd to burden the country with an enorm ous debt as a condition o f the Im perial grant fo r the fo rti­ fication o f Q uebec" - “that Canada has no need o f expensive defences under the present friendly feeling which exists between Canada and the U nited States” - . . . it is m y du ty to inform you o f the feeling, that prevails here that if we are left to ourselves or fo rced to incur a burden o f debt fo r our defences the cry fo r independence 1 fear will be irresistible in this western peninsula.1S Peaceful annexation was being seriously discussed, though how m uch solid support it had is impossible to tell. T he other

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positive course w hich the provinces might take was tow ard political union, either by regions or of all the provinces together. L ong advocated by individuals, the idea o f a union of some or all of the colonies had lacked the force to carry it over the objections raised. In the sixties a rem arkable com bination of circum stances occurred: the m aritim e provinces were seriously contem plating a regional union; the Province o f C anada looked fo r a way out of its own ham pering dualism ; the colonies of the w est seemed to be slipping tow ard the U nited States. T h e two countries which exercised m ost influence on British N orth A m erica were, directly o r indirectly, exerting pressure tow ard union. T he U nited States supplied coercive force by the m ilitary and political threats that w ere read into the actions and speeches o f her politicians and publicists. T he British governm ent, lately lukew arm tow ard union, cam e to use every means at its disposal to encourage it.19 Pushed and pulled tow ard a decision, provin­ cial governm ents and legislatures gazed dow n the untracked path that led to a new British N o rth A m erica and a new British Em pire. II Responsible governm ent, which its ardent supporters saw as a deus ex m achina to solve the constitutional riddle of the old im perial system, set in bold relief the very problem s which it was intended to remove. A local m inistry in virtual control of the executive pow er was expected to draw a nice distinction between dom estic and external affairs. It is not surprising th at it sought to draw within its orbit those subjects which it could with advantage control, and to label as external equally controversial ground which could be held only with loss and worry. But the m ovem ent which culm inated in G alt’s assertion o f fiscal inde­ pendence in 1859 was a P yrrhic victory, for a British parliam ent and public could not follow a logic under which its soldiers but n ot its goods m ight be exported to the colonies. O ut of the w elter o f conflicting opinions on both sides of the A tlantic a few them es m ay be isolated. In G re at Britain there was little en­ thusiasm for the colonial connection, but a willingness to carry it on subject to a reasonable degree of com prom ise on the o ut­ standing questions. In the colonies, w hich w ere much m ore vitally affected, large m ajorities were anxious to rem ain within the em pire, but found the existing position am biguous and un­ satisfactory. U nion o f the provinces was welcome to both : to

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the m other country because it prom ised some solution o f the defence question, and to the colonies because they believed that it would give them econom ic, m ilitary, and political strength. It is, however, the paradox o f the confederation m ovem ent that the central issue o f the control o f external relations w as left alm ost untouched. T he idea of a union of some o r all of the provinces was not a new one, but - as in the case of the earlier union of the thirteen colonies - external pressure was required to bring them to ­ gether. T he collapse of the old econom ic em pire in the forties had forced the colonies to reconstruct their schem e of external trade, which they had attem pted to do by tariff agreem ents with each other and with the U nited States. T he latter seemed to fail with the abrogation o f reciprocity, and the form er could be extended only by a joint im provem ent o f transportation. T he Civil W ar forced a m ore serious consideration of the defence question, and the British policy of w ithdraw al of troops at least suggested defence based on political union. Finally, belief in colonies had reached its nadir in the m other country, and the British governm ent was ready to give its pow erful support to the federation m ovem ent, with its eyes open to the possibility th at it m ight be the fo rerunner o f independence. T hreats to territory, both that held by the colonies and th at in the w est to which they had som e aspirations, com bined w ith British coolness tow ard econom ic or political em pire, drove on the union m ovem ent over the obstacles o f provincial consciousness and m inority fears. In the com plexity of issues raised by the federation project no single aim - w hether of internal o r external application - can be said to have had a determ ining effect on any one province. T he public, the press, and the legislatures weighed the argu­ m ents for and against, exam ining the proposed constitutional m achinery, financial settlem ent, the possibilities of increased trade, effect on the im perial tie and on relations w ith foreign pow ers. E xternal factors by no m eans constituted the sole co n ­ siderations, but they did receive great attention at a tim e w hen the econom ic and m ilitary position of the provinces seem ed so uncertain. T ra d e played a leading p art in the debates in all provinces.20 A m inority party in Prince E dw ard Island argued that the re­ m oval o f custom s barriers w ould reduce the price of im ported goods, and that agricultural products could be sold in Saint John and H alifax, w hich was particularly necessary in view o f the com ing abrogation o f reciprocity. T he m ajority opinion, how ­

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ever, denied the validity o f this argum ent, and held th a t C anada w ould furnish no m arket for the Island’s staples in agriculture and fisheries, and th a t profitable m arkets already existed in G reat Britain, the U nited States, and the W est Indies. In N ova Scotia th e proponents of confederation argued th at the geo­ graphical position and the potential m anufactures o f the prov­ ince could be exploited only in union w ith a larger territory, of w hich N ova Scotia w ould becom e the “A tlantic frontage.” To this it was answered th at free trade could be secured w ithout political union, and that there was in any case some doubt as to w hether the infant m anufactures of the province should be exposed to the cold breeze o f free com petition. V ery m uch the sam e argum ents w ere used in N ew Brunswick. N either in N ova Scotia n o r N ew Brunsw ick did the trade issue bulk so large as other aspects o f the project. F o r British C olum bia the prospects o f trade w ith eastern A m erica w ere too visionary to have a p opular appeal, but com m ercial dependence on the Pacific states was objectionable because o f the high tariff against the province, and confederation - given effective transportation - m ight p ro ­ vide an alternative. T here was, how ever, som e fear th at a tariff controlled by the dom inion w ould possibly n o t be calculated in th e interests o f British C olum bian industries and agriculture. N o aspect o f confederation was given m ore attention; and advo­ cates o f confederation were even driven to suggest th at there m ight be a special tariff for the province. It was in C anada that th e com m ercial aspect o f confederation was debated m ost hotly, following a tradition o f signal optim ism o r pessimism tow ard each successive plan fo r the im provem ent o f trade. I f the m ari­ tim e provinces needed a hinterland, C anada, “shut up in prison fo r five m onths o f the year in fields of ice,” needed a sea-coast. T h ere w ere hopes, too, of intercolonial trade, which, as C artier pointed out, had been insignificant, but w hich m ight be consid­ erable. A nother defender o f confederation spoke o f exchanging C anadian grain and flour for fish, oil, and coal; but the opposi­ tio n replied th at there was little C anada could buy from the m aritim e provinces, and if there w ere a prospect o f such trade it could be arranged by tariff agreem ent as readily as by political union. O ther m em bers of the legislature w ere concerned about the possibility o f lowering the C anadian tariff, just as members in the m aritim e provinces w ere concerned about raising theirs. A constant argum ent in favour of confederation w as th at it would m ake possible the im provem ent of transportation. F or N o v a Scotia and N ew Brunsw ick this m eant an intercolonial

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railway connecting their ports with the cities of C anada. To them it was a sine qua non, and alm ost an undisputed advantage. C anada was less certain about the intercolonial rail­ way. It would, it was true, give them access to w inter ports, but it was generally recognized that it could not be profitable. T here was talk of better canals com ing as a result o f confederation but the m ost im portant project after the intercolonial was th at o f a railway to the Pacific coast. In the m aritim e provinces expansion to the west was a distant objective, but at least to an im portant body o f opinion in C anada it was essential, even if not pursued im m ediately. In British Colum bia com m unication with C anada was even m ore the price o f union than it was in the low er prov­ inces, and the adhesion of the Pacific province was m ade con­ tingent on the construction of a railway w ithin a stated period. T he Fenian raids - actual o r threatened - gave a background of realism to all discussions on union, as did the broken trade relations in the econom ic sphere. D efence, equally w ith trade, was dependent on adequate com m unications, though w hether or not the intercolonial railw ay, close as it m ight be at points to the A m erican border, was an effective instrum ent for the m ove­ m ent of troops and supplies was a m oot point. A t least it was m ore hopeful than the toilsome m arch overland which the imperial troops had been obliged to take during the Civil W ar. T here was one point undisputed about defence: the British governm ent was convinced that it could be effectively organized only by a single political unit, and for this reason m ore than any other urged on the confederation. T he executive council of New Brunswick, while adm itting that the wishes of G reat Britain were “entitled to great weight,” retained the right to settle the destiny o f the province, w ithout w hich right it claim ed that the conferring of self-governm ent would have been a m ockery. The Fenian raid of 1866, ineffective as it was, partially rem oved the argum ent that defence was prim arily a C anadian problem . In Prince E dw ard Island objections on other counts overrode the defence argum ent, and indeed the islanders had little conscious­ ness of danger to their own territory. D uring the debate in the assembly of N ova Scotia, T upper, A rchibald, and others agreed that the British view that the defence of the provinces could be effective only after confederation was a sound one. “If we are able to defend ourselves,” said C. J. C am pbell, “w ithout the assistance of G reat Britain, let us say so; but if we are not, let us concede w hat the m other country desires.” A gainst this the opposition expressed a readiness to m ake a joint contribution to

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defence w ithout confederation: and one m em ber, M cLelan, claim ed that N ova Scotia was already “one vast drill-shed,” and th at England w ould certainly aid against “the danger she has brought upon us.” In C anada, the m ost exposed colony, the discussions of the defence question were m ost lengthy, but followed m uch the sam e lines as in other provinces. O n the one hand it was said that the advice o f the British governm ent should be followed, in view of its place in the defence scheme of Canada, and having regard for the m ilitary pow er and possible aggression of the U nited States. M any m em bers spoke on the general them e of unity being strength, but there was apparently little knowledge of w h at this m eant in m ilitary organization. T he strategic im­ portance of N ew foundland was a m ore concrete consideration; but on the w hole the governm ent speakers left themselves open to the criticism that they could not show how added strength w ould be gained. O n the other hand, said m em bers of the opposition, confederation w ould increase territory to defend m ore than men and resources to defend it. T he m aritim e prov­ inces could hardly assist C anada, though C anada m ight be called upon to aid them . O n the whole the best policy was to rem ain neutral and avoid the appearance of possible conflict w ith the U nited States. M ilitary preparations might precipitate a preventive w ar waged by the A m ericans. F o r British Colum bia the relation between confederation and defence seemed remote, and was little discussed. Som e effort was m ade to represent the transcontinental railway as playing for British Colum bia the sam e sort o f role in defence as the intercolonial railway was expected to play for the eastern provinces. In point of fact it seemed difficult to believe that C anada could send o f her scanty m ilitary resources to the Pacific. Britain was thought of as the real source o f aid, and the naval station at Esquim alt bulked even larger than th at a t H alifax. But in any case there was less sense of danger in the west than the east. British Colum bia had had no acute problem s o f neutrality during the Civil W ar, and there was only a threat of a F enian raid. T he m enace of Russia, at one time in the picture, had been rem oved w ith the purchase of A laska in 1867. All discussions of defence in the provinces w ere surprisingly devoid of any real understanding of m ilitary affairs or of the broad strategy involved. W eakness on th at side, however, was m ore th an m ade up by the w ealth o f political controversy which tied defence to the im perial connection o r to union w ith the

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U nited States. A shocked m em ber o f the N ova Scotian assembly stated that no m an w ould openly advocate annexation, but, while there was certainly less talk o f it in the m aritim e provinces than elsewhere, it could not be dismissed. In the assembly of Prince E dw ard Island Coles said that “I look upon this talk about the M other C ountry casting us off from her apron strings, and this shaking o f the stars and stripes in ou r face, as only stories intended to frighten the tim id. L et us rem ain true to the M other C ountry and she will stand by us.” G ray, on the other hand, saw the issue squarely as a choice betw een federation and absorption by the U nited States. A lm ost the sam e w ords w ere used by C artier in the C anadian assembly, w ho added that only by confederation could “the whole strength of the em pire” be concentrated at the needed point in N o rth A m erica. In the opening speech o f the debate T ache had spoken of the inevita­ bility of C anada joining the U nited States, either by force or willingly, unless confederation w ere accepted. M acdonald ham ­ mered on the them e th at the im perial connection m ust be m ain­ tained, and th at w ith th at “alliance” cam e protection. M em ber after m em ber spoke o f A m erican aggression, and accepted the view th at it could only be m et by confederated provinces at­ tached to G reat Britain. T he governm ent supporters claim ed, too, th at confederation w ould not lead to independence; which, in any case, w ould be an untenable status. T here w ere not lack­ ing critics of these argum ents who deduced th a t confederation would both w eaken the bonds of em pire and antagonize the U nited States. T h e tide in C anada, how ever, was running strongly tow ard confederation, and its sponsors refused to adm it that it could be a step tow ard independence. H ad it n o t the blessing o f the British governm ent? In British Colum bia the debate concentrated m ore directly on the three alternatives: to m aintain the existing situation, accept annexation to the U nited States, o r enter the dom inion. In no other province did opinion appear to be so equally divided. T he particularism w hich was strong in the m aritim e provinces was even m ore m arked in British C olum bia, separated as it was by thousands of miles from C anada. T here was an active feeling for the im perial connection, based on tradition and constant, if difficult, intercourse. O ne opponent of union with C anada, speaking in the legislative council, balanced its advantages w ith th at o f em pire m em bership: T he question has always appeared to m e to be this: - C on­

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federation w ith England, w hich we have; confederation in its truest sense; C onfederation with all the security o f protection, and all the pride o f self-governm ent, now or hereafter to be, w hen the colony shall have population and wealth sufficient: or C onfederation — or, as it should be term ed, ‘'Incorporation” — w ith Canada. Incorporation w ith a country to which we are bound by no natural tie o f affection or duty, and rem ote in geographical position, and opposed to us in m aterial interests. O n the whole the m ainland was in favour o f confederation and V ancouver Island opposed. In both places - and especially in the island - there were m inorities actively prom oting an­ nexation. Econom ic connection w ith the U nited States and geographical proxim ity w ere supplem ented by the inrush of A m erican prospectors to the F raser in 1858 and the C ariboo in 1860. F requent signs in the U nited States that British Colum bia would be a welcome addition, and frequent signs in G reat Britain that a break in the im perial tie w ould not be opposed, helped to strengthen the m ovem ent. It was touch and go for a tim e, but in the end the province declared fo r confederation with C anada. W ith the addition of British Colum bia, the prairies, and P rince E dw ard Island the territorial unification o f the British N o rth A m erican provinces was com pleted, and there the deci­ sions on external relationships reached the end of a chapter. T h e old issues o f the previous generation did not at once die; but, once the choice was m ade, provincial independence and annexation to the U nited States were relegated to the class of m inority and unpatriotic opinions. As such they reappear, time after tim e, in new guises and under fresh circum stances, soft­ ened, reduced from the stark superlatives th at m ake o f the pre-confederation decades the frankest forum o f British N orth A m erican opinion on external relations.

CHAPTER 5

The Outlook of the Dominion

T h e federation m ovem ent w hich, ap art from N ew foundland, was com pleted in 1873, brought together as a political entity colonies and territories com prising the northern half o f N orth A m erica, an area o f some three and one half million square miles, o r nearly as m uch as the total area o f E urope. The dom inion reached from the A tlantic stronghold o f H alifax to the Pacific ports of V ancouver and V ictoria, and from the A m erican border into the barren and uncharted waste w ithin the A rctic circle. O n the east the ports o f the St. Law rence and o f the m aritim e provinces w ere established links w ith Europe; the w estern coast looked across the broad Pacific O cean, on the far side o f w hich Jap an was beginning to em erge from its feudal isolation and C hina had recently and reluctantly adm itted w esterners to a footing on its ancient state. O n the north-w est corner o f C anada lay Alaska, just pur­ chased by the U nited States from Russia; and along the whole southern frontier ran the w rit o f the governm ent at W ashington. Such w ere the limits. W ithin the boundaries of the dom inion w ere seven provinces. Prince Edw ard Island* N ova Scotia, and N ew Brunswick on the east occupied their present territory, as did British Colum bia at the other extrem ity. Q uebec and O n­ tario consisted then of only the southern portions of the present provinces, and M anitoba was but a tithe of w hat it was to be­ come. Across the north o f the central provinces and over the prairies ran the N orth-W est T erritories. F o r this spraw ling new country a start had been m ade in the provision of m eans of transportation. Roads did well enough for local travel and canals fo r a lim ited tim e and place. Railways already served the most thickly settled areas, but there w ere still big gaps. In the constitutional structure th at had been designed to bind together provinces and territories the influence of other coun­ tries m ay readily be distinguished. C anada was not a sovereign state b u t in a status th at defied existing term inology. In the w ords o f the British N o rth A m erica A ct it was a “Dom inion u nder the C row n o f the U nited K ingdom o f G reat Britain and

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Ireland, with a constitution sim ilar in principle to th at o f the U nited K ingdom .” T here was no necessity to refer in m ore detail to British parliam entary procedure and cabinet govern­ m ent, which, in varying degrees, had been followed in the prov­ inces since the assembly o f N ova Scotia had sat in 1758 and m iniature parliam ents w ere provided for the C anadas in 1791. By the sixties the process o f developm ent had assured local autonom y, through the cabinet system, over local affairs; and no dem and as yet existed for the extension o f control to foreign affairs. T he constitutional history of the provinces had been so m uch a reflection of that of G re at Britain th at the partial tu rn ­ ing to A m erican institutions, caused by the struggles of the early p art o f the century, had been alm ost forgotten. W hen the federal principle was borrow ed from the U nited States it was not because o f its intrinsic virtues, but because circum stances did n ot allow the unitary state th at some of the fathers of confedera­ tion w ould have preferred. T he expedient o f federalism was little used in the w orld of that day, except in the U nited States, and th at exam ple was not altogether a happy one. T he architects o f the C anadian system never failed to point out that their fed­ eration would escape the dangers that were so m anifest in the days of the Civil W ar. A fter all, there w ere A lexander H am ilton and the other federalists; and if their advice had once been fatally ignored, it was still good for those who would escape the centrifugal effects o f states’ rights. T h e constitution o f Canada, then, was intended to com bine the basic principles of the British parliam entary system with an im proved form o f federalism . A utonom y in local affairs was lim ited in law, if not always in practice, by the powers of the governor general and the right o f disallow ance vested in the British governm ent. T he British N orth A m erica A ct, being a statute, could be am ended only by the imperial parliam ent, and its final interpretation lay w ith the judicial com m ittee of the privy council. F o r external affairs the im perial authority in C anada was m ore than a shadow. Executive governm ent was explicitly vested in the queen, and in foreign o r imperial affairs her representative, the governor general, was subject to instruc­ tions from L ondon. T hrough him all dealings with foreign pow ers m ust be conducted, even between O ttaw a and W ashing­ ton. L ack of control over its own external affairs would have seemed to m ake the dom inion a colony, just as com plete control w ould have m ade it a sovereign state. N either extrem e was p opular on either side of the A tlantic; for, while C anadians w ere

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often critical o f supposed British neglect o f their interests abroad, they shied away from any suggestion of independence. In conform ity w ith the British tradition of com prom ise this situation was m et by progressive and practical changes in the m ethods by which C anada saw to her own affairs both in Lon­ don and foreign capitals. T he m achinery creaked, but on the w hole it served the purpose. Resources w ere there in plenty: land for farm ing, fisheries, tim ber, furs in dim inishing volume, gold and other m ineral deposits hardly as yet touched. T here was m uch to be done in this wide dom ain. W ho were the men who w ould exploit the new state that they had called into existence, and govern its relation to the outside world? F o r this great land the population was absurdly small. T he first census after confederation, th at of 1871, gives the population (including P rince Edw ard Island) as 3,689,257 persons. All but a million lived in O ntario and Quebec, and w est o f the great lakes w ere but a bare hundred thousand. Statistics o f racial origins are available only fo r the fo u r original provinces. T here w ere som e two million persons of British origin, one million of French origin, and small m inori­ ties from elsewhere. Of these latter m uch the largest group was G erm an, and th at was only two hundred thousand, m ost of whom lived in O ntario. T he British and F rench groups together m ade up 92 per cent of the total. T hus the population was not widely diversified, and early im m igration changed it little, for in the first ten years after con­ federation im m igration from all sources varied between 25,000 and 50,000 a year. A nd in any case it is questionable how far an analysis of the origins o r birthplaces of the people throw s any light on their attitudes tow ard the outside world. Those o f F rench origin were o f C anadian birth. T hey retained F rench traits, habits, and m ethods of thought. T hey had a sentim ental tie with F ran ce, but no love for the contem porary F rench state o r its rationalistic outlook. N o people in C anada were politically m ore N o rth A m erican. T he people o f N ova Scotia and N ew Bruns­ wick, native-born like their com patriots in Quebec, had a deep interest in the affairs o f G reat Britain and the U nited States, from one o r the other o f w hich m ost o f their ancestors had com e. T he num ber of recent im m igrants in O ntario from the British Isles gives no ratio of attachm ent to their country of birth. M any o f the Irish looked on the U nited K ingdom with unfriendly eyes, although they did n o t organize for hostile purposes as did som e o f the Irish in the U nited States. T he

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G erm an minorities in O ntario and N ova Scotia m aintained some cultural traits, but on the whole they had little in com m on with the G erm any o f Bismarck, and caused no modification politi­ cally in the foreign relations o f the dom inion. O n the other hand, it does not follow th at old and new com ers alike had at once taken on a single C anadian nationality strong enough to cover the traces o f origin and birth. The fathers o f confederation were politicians, n o t alchemists, and to create a new political unit out o f several sm aller ones was not at once to transm ute the whole. C onfederation, indeed, had opened the way for new divisions w ithout healing all those that already existed. O pposition had been least serious in the province of C anada, b ut in the other provinces - east and w est - it had been strong enough to delay, and alm ost to prevent, the com pletion o f the plan. In all the A tlantic provinces there were bitter p ro ­ tests against being sold to C anada, and th a t feeling did not die with the conversion o f Joseph H ow e. “ M aritim e grievances” be­ cam e a tradition in the history o f the dom inion, and so fam iliar was the them e that its real significance was som etim es unduly discounted. Even a transcontinental railway could not over­ com e the divergencies th at em erged between the outlook of the w estern and th at of the central provinces. T he failure to attain to a full national spirit m ust be p u t dow n to a variety of causes, a variety too com plex to be exam ined seriously here. O ne o r two com m ents, however, m ay be m ade in reference to the connection between regional division and external relations. T he pressure o f a com m on danger had been an im portant facto r in driving the provinces together; but the Fenian raids and threatened raids, w hich had evoked som e national spirit in the im m ediate era o f confederation, becam e only a m em ory. A greeable as was the decreasing tension in C anadian-A m erican relations, it inci­ dentally rem oved one o f the m ost potent centripetal forces. Decision on, and conduct of, all external relations were m ade m ore difficult not only by conflicting opinions and interests in various parts o f the dom inion, but also by the com petition for pow er between federal and provincial governm ents when “provincial rights” appeared as a barrier to the strong central governm ent th at had been envisaged by the fathers o f con­ federation. Provincialism and regionalism w ere not the only enemies of C anadian nationalism . T he racial division w hich D urham had found so far advanced in his day did not disappear with union of the provinces, but continued in two form s. C entred in the

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province of Q uebec was a self-conscious racial unit which found its inspiration not in contem porary F rance but in specially dis­ tilled traditions of the old regim e both in E urope and A m erica. T he other distinctive racialism was th at of groups in all the provinces w ho stressed attachm ent to the Britain o f their own day. In the nineteenth century at least no force of com parable m agnitude arose from the presence of other racial units in the dom inion. It is perhaps fair to add that no large elem ent in the Canadian population could be regarded, far less regarded itself, as hostile to a real C anadian unity; but cross-currents and con­ flicting priorities w ere none the less problem s to the Canadian nationalists. Indeed, the very w ord “nationalist” is difficult to apply to C anada for it m eant different things to different men; m ore especially was it suspect as seeming to imply a break in the im perial tie. T h at it proved possible to build C anadian political parties which em braced all provinces eased the pressure of centrifugal-forces, but the caution with which those parties approached the form ulation of external policy is in itself a reflection of conflicting opinions. T h e confederation of the British N orth A m erican provinces coincided w ith national m ovem ents on three continents. With blood and iron Bism arck and M oltke subdued the proud power of the H absburgs and overthrew a B onaparte at the head of the traditional m ilitary state of Europe. T he N orth G erm an C on­ federation, born in the sam e year as the original dom inion, was broadened into the G erm an E m pire while M anitoba, British Colum bia, and the prairies were being added to C anada. At the sam e time the unification of Italy trium phed dram atically as the arm ies of the king entered the city of the Caesars. In N orth A m crica the U nited States had just survived its civil w ar, with the forces o f separatism defeated. F ar across the Pacific Ocean the E m pire of Jap an was taking the first steps in its startling m arch tow ard the status of a w orld pow er, with an economy, governm ent, and defence forces modelled on those o f European states. It was an age of nationalism , the bitter fruits of which w ere n ot to ripen for two generations. Both in E urope and Asia nationalism w as an expansive, and frequently an aggressive, force. N o t long after her revolution, Jap an set out on the long road leading to dom ination o f the m ainland. T he European states com peted in the Balkans, and far beyond E urope into un­ explored and undeveloped colonial areas. Econom ic imperialism could not be practised w ithout annexation, and annexation by one pow er could n o t be ignored by its rivals. N either in, Europe,

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nor A sia, nor A frica could there be extension o f territory or influence w ithout a th reat to the interests of other am bitious states and to the balance o f pow er. In N o rth A m erica in the sam e period nationalism m anifested itself through the m ore peaceful exploitation of undeveloped territories, happily spacious enough not to arouse international com petition. I t w as on this latter type o f nationalism that C an ­ ada entered in the years im m ediately following political union. T h e decisions to explore the hinterland, control the Indian tribes, build railways from coast to coast, and people the un­ occupied lands, were the counterpart of the western drive o f the U nited States, and were typical o f the N o rth A m erican concep­ tion o f im perialism and national destiny. F o r C anada, w ith its sm all population and limited financial resources, the task of subduing half a continent to an econom ic and political system was form idable indeed. T here w as m ore than enough here to occupy all the energies and m eans available w ithout looking tow ard the distant scene. A nd yet the country’s activity could not stop at its own borders. T ru e, there w as no reason o r desire fo r territorial expansion, beyond that im plied in a series of boundary settlem ents; yet the dom inion was, as the old provinces had been, not w ithout essential external interests. T he spread of agriculture to the w estern prairies and the pursuit of m ining in the precam brian shield w ould but increase the need for foreign trade. N o r could the dom inion do other than inherit such international political issues as had existed for the old provinces. II T h e im m igration policy of the dom inion, at least for some decades, was influenced m ore by the need of peopling and de­ veloping the country than by any plan of selection designed to create a well-knit nationality. In the new spapers and parliam ent freq u en t references were m ade to the need o f m ore people, especially of w orkingm en. T he com petition from the U nited States, in taking m en both from E urope and from C anada, was all too clearly realized; but Canadians com forted themselves w ith the idea th at the U nited States was enjoying tem porary prosperity and an exaggerated reputation. By the general act of 1869 (32 and 33 V iet., c. 10), consequently, few barriers were placed. L unatics o r physically incapacitated persons w ere ex­ cluded lest they becom e a public charge; and the governor was em pow ered to prohibit the landing of paupers. F rom tim e to

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tim e advantage was taken o f this last enabling clause w ith the object o f preventing unem ploym ent. F oreigners com ing to reside in C anada m ight receive naturalization, but by a curious and aw kw ard arrangem ent they rem ained aliens in any other p art of the British Em pire. This situation, although frequently criti­ cized, was not cleared up until 1914.1 E qually anom alous, and m uch m ore inconvenient, was the absence o f com prehensive provision for the extradition o f crim inals. N either im perial nor C anadian legislation fully covered the field, and fo r m any years the effective rules were those laid down in the narrow confines o f the treaty o f 1842 betw een G reat Britain and the United States. A t every step of every case, said Edw ard Blake, quoting the w ords o f a judge, it was necessary “ to decide how m uch of the C anadian law is consistent w ith so m uch o f the imperial law as is consistent with the T reaty .”2 I t was another nine years before a C anadian act, designed to cover all countries not having treaties with E ngland and affecting C anada, received the royal assent. Som e analysis of the nature of education, of local writing, and o f books in circulation in Canada, m ay provide an indica­ tion as to w hether these revealed any national characteristics, and w hether there was any attem pt to influence the public mind tow ard a growing nationalism . If there had been any general purpose of adopting the ancient expedient o f using education fo r political ends it w ould have been alm ost com pletely defeated by the clauses in the British N o rth A m erica A ct which assigned control of education to the provinces. As in the period before confederation, the schools and universities drew heavily on the m ethods and the books in use in other countries, but there were occasional exam ples of attem pts to provide C anadian material. In O ntario the Ryerson Readers were designed to replace the M cG uffey Readers', but “ the R yerson Readers w ere m ore re­ strained in attem pting to cultivate national feeling. T hey did not glorify C anada w ith the exuberance with which the M cG uffey Readers glorified the U nited States. T o have done so in the years afte r 1867 w ould have seemed to m any in O ntario base dis­ loyalty to the Im perial tie.”3 A cleric in the eastern townships, w riting in 1870, was alarm ed by the spread o f A m erican heresy to th e ,C h u rc h of England in Canada. T he latitudinarianism introduced from the U nited States, he said, had extended to extrem e secularism in education, which “ has insinuated itself into a large num ber of our H igh Schools in the Eastern Tow n­ ships, which have been seed-plots for the propagandism o f ex­

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trem e A m erican ideas hereafter to bring forth their fruits.”4 It was a parallel to the efforts of the Rom an Catholic C hurch in the sam e province to protect the schools from French rationalism . P rinting and circulation o f books in C anada were to a con­ siderable extent governed by the eccentricities of the contem ­ porary laws o f copyright; and the objections raised in C anada to the operation o f those laws gave rise to problem s in imperial and foreign relations. T he story is a long and com plicated one, b ut the gist o f the C anadian protests was that, while the lack of copyright restrictions allowed A m erican publishers to reprint English works at will, the sam e freedom was not given to C an a­ dians.5 R eference to the correspondence on the subject reveals both the nature o f the dispute and the sources from which C anadians received books. W riting to the colonial secretary in 1890, the C anadian m inister of justice described the situation as he saw it. T h e reading public o f w hat is now the dom inion o f Canada has been principally supplied w ith British literature by A m eri­ can reprints. T he high prices o f British editions have m ade this unavoidable. In spite o f the pointed and repeated warning to British publishers given by the colonial office fo r 40 years, very little has been done to change this state o f things by providing cheap editions o f British works. E ven to this day the English editions cost fro m fo u r to ten-fold the price o f A m erican re­ prints. The result is that the business o f publishing British litera­ ture fo r the Canadian reading public is done alm ost exclusively in the U nited States. The A m erican publisher, unrestrained by any international copyright law or treaty, is free to reprint any British work and to supply it, not only to the reading public o f the U nited States, but to the reading public o f Canada, while the Canadian publisher is not free to reprint any such w ork on any terms, unless he can obtain the permission o f the holder o f the copyright in G reat Britain. In som e noted instances this has actually led to the transfer o f printing establishm ents from Canada to the U nited States. In other cases, English publishing houses have set up branches in N e w Y o rk or other A m erican cities, w ith the view o f reprinting fo r the U nited States and Canada the copyright w orks which they have issued in London. C anadian publishers, the m inister w ent on to say, cannot com pete in offers to reprint English books, because A m erican firm s have not only th^ir ow n great m arket but that o f C anada as well. “O ver-weighted, as we continually are, by reason o f the

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vast com petition o f the U nited States in every branch o f trade, industry and com m erce, your lordship will not w onder a t our being disposed to com plain w hen, in regard to so im portant a m atter as the furnishing o f literature fo r ou r people, we are hindered by a m onopoly; nom inally in favour o f the L ondon publishers, but really and practically in favour o f the publishers o f the U nited S ta te s .. . .”GT he governm ent claim ed that public opinion was strongly critical o f the arrangem ents as to copy­ right, and com m ents in the new spapers support the claim . T he ed ito r of the T oronto M ail, for exam ple, w rote that “ it is idle to suppose that A m erican reprints can be kept out of C anada, and C anadian publishers be prevented from supplying the void. Costly English editions are unsuited to C anada where everybody reads and every reader owns the books he reads. L othair at £ 1 .1 6 stg. m ay find its w ay into English circulating libraries and the m ansions o f the aristocracy; but a dollar edition is w hat is w anted for C anada.” T here was, he added, an A m erican dollar edition w hich supplied the C anadian m arket.7 T hro u g h ­ o ut the whole copyright controversy there was alm ost no reference to C anadian books o r authors. P erhaps it was partly because of tact and the particular point at issue that the dem and fo r British w orks was so constantly stressed, but it rem ains true th a t C anadian literature was not, apparently, a m ajor considera­ tion. C anadians read the books o f Britain, France, and the U nited States; and the national aspect of literature was in the attem pt to encourage printing and publishing. T he C anadian au th o r’s point o f view was urged on Sir John M acdonald by W illiam K irby, who argued th at the way to “prom ote C anadian L iterature and encourage C anadian A uthors” was “by establish­ ing a Prosperous Publishing business in C anada.”8 T he people of the dom inion, like their ancestors in the old provinces, followed the affairs as well as the literature o f other countries. Some events abroad were, of course, treated simply as news, with no p articular significance to C anadians. By dint of copying from British or A m erican papers, C anadian editors had always m anaged to eke out their own scanty sources o f inform a­ tion. T h e telegraph and the cable brought m ore recent and m ore steady news than the “latest advices from E urope” which had once form ed the basis of the periodic budgets in the newspapers o f the provinces. Som e events were regarded with detachm ent in one p art of C anada and with m ore direct interest in another. F o r exam ple, the Franco-Prussian W ar was to an O ntario editor “a pitched battle betw een sovereigns fo r kingly pow er an d ag­

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grandisem ent,”0 but a t the news o f an early F rench victory a Q uebec paper announced th at “A ujourd’hui, ce n’a ete p ar toute la ville qu’une joie, q u ’un delire.” 10 W hatever sym pathy may have existed in O ntario for either belligerent was purely passive, and probably the G lobe's approval o f British neutrality rep re­ sented general opinion, w hether or not the editor would be fol­ lowed in his desire fo r “the entire abstinence from participation in all E uropean com plications.” W hen an em issary cam e from F ran ce to start a recruiting office in M ontreal, offering free passages to F rance and a bounty on arrival, some Irishm en cam e forw ard, but F rench Canadians w aited to see w hat posi­ tion F rance would take on w ithdraw ing troops from Rom e.11 Positive proofs o f friendship took the form o f subscriptions for the F ren ch w ounded, and a message cam e through the consulgeneral from Jules Favre, thanking the subscribers and adding th a t “if the recollection o f the m other country has rem ained green in their hearts, neither has F rance forgotten them .”12 T he views of English C anada on the third republic w ere m ixed, the only strong opinion being condem nation of the Paris com m une. T o F rench Canadians, how ever, the third republic threatened a radical and secular conquest of a m otherland from w hich they still derived m uch o f their culture. If F rench C anadians hesitated to recruit for service in the F rench arm y because of the projected w ithdraw al from Rome, they had enthusiastically joined the Zouaves o f the pope’s own garrison. In response to an appeal from the pope, and enco u r­ aged by the bishop, a com m ittee was form ed in M ontreal at the end o f 1867 to organize a detachm ent and raise funds for its expenses. In February, a group o f 135 (all that could be accepted) sailed from N ew Y ork, and six other detachm ents followed. W hile som e never got beyond F rance, 328 men reached R om e and took p art in its defence against the arm y of Italy.13 These defenders o f the tem poral pow er symbolized the reality o f the link between the papacy and the church in Canada. A t hom e the clergy were holding the fort against the forces of liberalism. Since the days o f the early Jesuit missionaries Quebec had always been strongly ultram ontane, and had offered strong resistance against any contrary philosophy. T he general u ltra­ m ontane revival o f the sixties led in C anada, as it did in France and G erm any, to threats o f schism and to bitter controversy. T h e syllabus o f 1864 and the dogm a o f papal infallibility were, of course, noted in English-speaking C anada, but had no im por­ tan t repercussions. In T oronto the editor o f the G lobe badly

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misjudged the situation when he decided th at “the w orld will go on as usual.”14 T he editor o f the Leader was hostile tow ard the ultram ontane policy, but did not dismiss it so airily. T he chief p rotestant new spaper of M ontreal, the G azette, favoured resist­ ance to the pope’s actions. T he real effect of the ultram ontane policy, however, fell on the R om an C atholics of Q uebec. F or the church authorities to show displeasure o f liberalism or gallicanism was not new; for m any years they had labelled the Institut Canadien and the rouge party as undesirable. In the late sixties a strengthening o f the ultram ontane party am ongst the Q uebec clergy coincided w ith the corresponding ascendancy of that p arty at Rom e, and was encouraged by it.15 T he Institu t was pursued with increasing vigour, and Joseph G uibord, a m em ber w ho had been one o f the group that appealed to R om e against the condem nation o f the society, was refused burial in conse­ crated ground. T he “old catholics” o f Quebec, like those of G erm any, could m ake no headw ay against th e ultram ontanes, whose “Catholic P rogram m e” o f 1871 launched a new excursion into politics, like th at of the C entre party. N o com prom ise with liberalism was to be tolerated in church, culture, o r the state. W hile the influence of the papacy on C anada was continuous and im portant, th at of F rance was - except in the cultural field - hardly m ore than sentim ental. T he two countries th at m ost directly affected C anada w ere the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States. Even if there had been nothing m ore in com m on with the U nited States than a frontier, the affairs of a pow erful and expanding country m ust have been o f im m ediate interest to the dom inion. A nd the final delim itation of this particular fro n ­ tier was still seen as open to question, not so m uch from legal disputes over boundaries as frpm the rem aining force o f “m ani­ fest destiny.” A nnexation, peaceful or forced, was still discussed, and Canadians noted w ith ill-concealed alarm indications of expansionism in the republic w ith the not always unfavourable response in C anada. F enian threats, the perennial argum ent over fisheries, and incidents in the use of border waterways added p articular problem s to the general one of m aintaining friendly relations. But Canadians were n ot w holly occupied with defensive measures. T here w ere m any ties between the people of the two countries. Im m igration from one to the o ther, sim ilar environm ents, sim ilar ways o f life, and com m on reading brought the two peoples together. Canadians, too, never paused in the endeavour to establish favourable trad e relations w ith the U nited States; and while they never reached the com plete goal,

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they w ere conscious o f the place in the C anadian econom y o f w hatever trade did exist. Relations w ith the U nited Kingdom w ere in one sense m ore rem ote and in others less so. Distance was hardly m ore o f a barrier than the divergence between E uro p ean and N o rth A m erican social structures. O n the other h an d , the effective m ajority in C anada held a belief in the em pire th at was m ade up o f a variety of com ponents. M any C anadians came, o r their parents had com e, from the British Isles; and they, w ith others who had less blood relationship, w ere definitely, and sometim es aggressively, British. T here was a general confidence in British institutions o f governm ent and law - a confidence which was only strengthened by com parison w ith parallel institutions in the U nited States. W hile such ties o f em pire cannot be m easured they were none the less real. T here w ere also aspects of the relationship of the dom inion w ith the m other country which could be, and were, analysed and weighed. In the first years of the dom inion C anadian opinion was evoked by public expressions in England o n im perial affairs, by the im perial policies o f both English parties, and by English diplom acy affecting C anada. T here were then seen to be two m ajor schools of thought on colonial affairs: th e one, generally held by Liberals and particularly by the M an­ chester school, being that the fu tu re o f Britain lay in free trade, th a t the colonies w ere moving tow ard independence, and that it was desirable th at they should do so; the other, o f which Disraeli cam e to be the spokesm an, declared th at the L iberals had all but destroyed the em pire, and that it m ust be rebuilt by the estab­ lishm ent of som e form o f centralized institutions. T o most C anadians neither o f these propositions m ade any appeal, for they w anted to m aintain the em pire w ithout im posing on it centralized governm ent. T o occasional conferences in London little objection was raised, but a perm anent council was not then, and never becam e, popular. T here were minorities which w ere opposed even to the loose unity th at existed, and others w hich advocated definite m achinery of governm ent fo r the whole; b ut the great mass of C anadians took the m iddle position, favouring continuance o f the connection w ithout central gov­ ernm ent. Beyond ties of tradition, blood, and sentim ent, w hat positive advantages w ere seen? In trade the preferential system was gone, but there rem ained a substantial volum e that m ight be jettisoned by a political break. T he garrisons w ere alm ost gone, b u t aid in w ar was still assured. English diplom acy was fre­ quently criticized, but C anadians - in spite o f outbursts at times

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- still wished to retain the support o f the great naval pow er. It was tru e that Britain m ight pursue objectives of no interest to C anada, but in reality there was no obligation to aid in them , and no prospect of E ngland’s strength being threatened. A m ongst m any exam inations of the whole position, as it ap ­ peared in the age o f confederation, th at by the editor o f the M ontreal G azette is as frank and as representative of any in an im p o rtan t English-language newspaper. O ur present relations with the E m pire, if let alone by agita­ tors, either upon this side o f the water or the other, are satisfac­ tory. W hat is required is that an understanding should be arrived a t with the m other country that its policy is settled, and is not to be suddenly or capriciously altered. It is not fo r the sake o f effecting any great legislative or constitutional changes that we think these L ondon m eetings o f colonists are useful, or the pro­ posed colonial conference desirable. It is in order that public opinion, in the m other country as well as in the colonies, m ay be aroused, and definite opinions o f Im perial policy form ed, where now all is confused and uncertain. It is greater security o f tenure, not change, that is desirable. T he danger that we can ever becom e so entangled and in­ volved in the netw ork o f Im perial interests that we cannot free ourselves is a m ere chimera w hich can frighten nobody w ho is conversant w ith the facts. A n d if we should negotiate respecting tariffs or com m ercial intercourse with the m other country we should certainly not do so upon any less favourable term s with them than with our neighbours w hom som e are so eager to treat w ith now. . . . b ut if it can be show n that its [the em pire’s] preservation w ill involve burthens which we cannot bear, or disadvantages which are in no wise balanced by advantages, the tim e will com e to give it up.16 C an ad a was preoccupied w ith problem s of internal growth, b u t by no m eans exclusively; no r w ere even those problem s them selves dissociated from relations with other countries. The new federal governm ent w as developed, as it had originated, in th e light of exam ples elsewhere. O rganization of new dep art­ m ents and civil service reform , fo r exam ple, followed the ex­ perience of other states. T he railway to the Pacific, which bulked so large in C anadian politics for the first decades after confederation, brought experts, equipm ent, and capital from abroad. It required im m igrants fo r its construction, to give it

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business, and to build up the west. It was seen as an imperial road to the east and listed as a contribution to em pire defence. T h e w heat produced in O ntario and then in the prairies had to be carried to tidew ater and sold abroad. T he m en w ho cam e to develop C anadian industries form ed trade unions that either were m odelled on o r affiliated to those of Britain and the U nited States. T he w hole C anadian econom y assum ed foreign trade, and th at in tu rn called fo r diplom atic action. Looking about in the age of confederation C anadians w ere seeking to broaden the scope o f their com m ercial relations. T he entrance o f British C olum bia into the dom inion spelt a way to the trade of the far east. T h e W est Indies, South A m erica, and A ustralia were also new fields th at had hardly been touched. T he older channels to Britain, F rance, and the U nited States - needed to be cleared if the best results were to be obtained. Canadians, therefore, w ere increasingly concerned about their relations with the rest o f the w orld. T h a t C anada also form ed p art of a great im perial system accentuated that tend­ ency m ore than it restricted it. T here was, it is true, friction resulting from the process o f pursuing C anadian aims through British m eans; but the friction was noticed m ore than the m ore rem arkable adaptation of a colonial organization to a constantly changing need. In a generation after confederation a way had been found by w hich C anada could in effect conduct her own diplom acy, w ithout disrupting the em pire, and w ithout sacrific­ ing all the bargaining pow er held by civ is Britannicus. By an unorthodox process, and alm ost by the back door, Canadians entered the field o f diplom acy, there to try a t the lists the fo r­ tunes o f their country. T he first venture is of peculiar interest, since it involved alm ost every possible related issue: the imperial connection, defence, trade, and fisheries. A nd the setting was B ritish-A m erican-C anadian relations, the central avenue of C anadian external relations.

CHAPTER 6

A Venture in Diplomacy

In the years im m ediately succeeding confederation the exter­ nal relationships o f C anada fitted into the triangular pattern which had been, and was for long to be, dom inating. W ith the neighbouring U nited States and the distant centre of the British E m pire the dom inion had its closest connections; and on a satisfactory series o f arrangem ents with these two great powers depended her security and m uch of her strength. W hile m any of the links which C anada had with these countries w ere constant, they varied in strength from tim e to tim e; and there were aspects of their policies at this particular tim e - b o th as directly affecting C anada and tow ard each other - th at were beyond the ability of the dom inion to influence, and yet of im m ediate concern to her. O ne w orrying factor was the lack of im perial enthusiasm in G reat Britain, resulting in w hat was felt to be distressingly mild concern fo r C anadian interests. M acdonald poured out his woes in to the sym pathetic ear o f L ord C arnarvon: . . . W e are glad to know that we have in you a friend. 1 m ay alm ost say a friend in need, fo r we greatly distrust the m en at the helm in England, who cannot, I fear, be considered as appreciating the im portance o f m aintaining the em pire as it is, intact. W e indulge the belief here, however, that M essers Bright, L ow e and G ladstone (shall I say L ord Granville?) are not true exponents o f the people o f England. W e m ay perhaps be obliged to appeal fro m the governm ent to the people o f England.1 I t w as neither the first tim e nor the last th at C anada and the U nited K ingdom saw the im perial relationship differently. E ng­ lish com m erce was flourishing under the sun o f free trade, and there was little inducem ent to m ake com m itm ents for the sake o f a colony w hich had ceased to have the virtues of a “plan ta­ tio n ,” and whose im perial zeal m ust have seemed to rise with h er troubles and fall w ith her progress. I t was a phase of English policy w hich w as to pass w ith the revived im perialism o f the later seventies and eighties, b u t it cam e m ost inopportunely at a

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tim e when C anada needed diplom atic and perhaps even armed assistance in her relationships w ith the U nited States. T here had em erged from the once-doubtful strife of the Civil W ar a united country, freed from the divisions of the slavery issue, and with a large arm y. Incidents o f the w ar period had m ade fo r bad blood with G re at B ritain and - to only a lesser extent - with C anada. T here was talk of a post-w ar settlem ent of disputes: not in this case betw een belligerents, but to discuss issues w hich the w ar had raised. In such a settlem ent the governm ent of C anada wished to take part, having specific points to bring forw ard; but, as neither a strong n o r a sovereign pow er, had to appear in some type o f junior partnership w ith the British governm ent. The m atters of im m ediate concern to the dom inion w ere defence, the fisheries, trade, and an indem nity fo r losses incurred in the Fenian raids. T h e problem of defence was how to ensure protection against official o r unofficial aggression from the U nited States. T h e old fear o f annexation by force was not yet dead, kept alive both by m em ories of the past and by contem porary words and acts that seem ed to spell trouble.2 S enator Sum ner, Senator C handler, President Johnson, P resident G ran t, and H am ilton Fish, the secretary of state, all spoke o f the desirability of the peaceful annexation of C anada. These and sim ilar opinions in portions o f the press found their way to Canada. T he situations in M ani­ to b a and British Colum bia w ere both such as to give anxiety. T h e close connection of the Red River colony with M innesota, the rebellion there, and the fear of A m erican expansion into the new C anadian w est com bined to m ake an aw kw ard position. T he acquisition of A laska by the U nited States and the San Juan b oundary dispute m ade the Pacific C oast another vulnerable area, especially as com m unication w ith it from C anada was slow. T he C anadian governm ent was acutely conscious o f the possibilities. It is o f great im portance [wrote M acdonald to Rose] that a part o f the force [to the R ed River] should be R egular Troops, as it will convince the U nited States G overnm ent and people that H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent have no intention o f abandoning this continent. I t has got to be a fixed idea in W ashington that England wants to get rid o f her colonies, indeed M r. Fish has not hesitated to say so. I m ay m ention to you, in entire confi­ dence, that Fish had the im pudence to ask Thornton to ascertain whether H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent w ould offer any objection

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to a free vote being taken in Canada, or in any portions o f it, w hether the people desire to join the U nited States or not, and stated his conviction that if this vote were taken a large m ajority, nine-tenths he said o f the people, w ould vote fo r annexation. H e went further and stated that the refusal o f reciprocity was a legitim ate m ode o f coercion. . . . C ouncil has m ade an indignant m inute on the subject . . . we w alked into Fish at the rate o f a hunt.3 T h ere was indeed ground for apprehension on the p art of a w eak country faced by a great pow er in w hich even the high officials did not hesitate to talk of annexation. T ru e, they always called it peaceful annexation, but the line between persuasion and force has not infrequently been a narrow one. A dded to w ords w ere deeds - or, to be m ore accurate, the absence of deeds. It was a conviction in C anada th at the failure of the U nited States authorities to restrain o r punish the Fenians dem onstrated a lack o f goodwill that was little short o f hostility. T aking words and deeds together (and the two seemed to spring from the sam e attitude) there was at least prim a facie evidence fo r the belief th at m ilitary and naval forces in C anada m ust be calculated on the basis of a possible invasion. T he degree of that probability was a subject o f dispute, b u t there was at least agreem ent that defence m ust not be neglected. Ju st as C anada - in the eyes of m any C anadians - was in need of adequate defences, the imperial troops were being w ithdraw n. T he decision to reduce the garrisons in British N o rth A m erica had been taken m any years earlier, and had always been regretted by the colonials.4 T he British governm ent was determ ined to reduce all colonial garrisons, partly for the sake o f econom y, and partly because its available forces were too widely distributed. In the case o f C anada there was an additional reason arising out o f the belief that the dom inion should accept the burdens as well as the advantages of greater autonom y, and to som e extent an impression that C anada in any case was moving, if not tow ard com plete independence, at least tow ard a status which could no longer be called colonial. The exigencies of the Civil W ar period caused tem porary reinforce­ m ent o f the im perial troops, and the danger from Fenianism fu rth er delayed reduction. T he cost to the imperial treasury fo r the year 1867-8 was £ 1 ,2 4 3 ,4 2 3 , a figure considerably higher than that for either the Civil W ar years or previously. In C anada it was hoped th at circum stances would induce the British gov­

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ernm ent to delay o r m odify its plan of w ithdraw ing the troops. Both the Fenian m enace and the threatening aspect of affairs in the R ed River district were presented as argum ents in favour o f a t least tem porary delay; but the British governm ent was inexorable, and tow ard the end o f 1871 the last of the British garrisons (except that at the naval station of H alifax) m arched out o f Quebec, w here they had been stationed since they had first storm ed that fortress over a century earlier. It was said and understood th at the w ithdraw al o f the troops did n ot absolve G re at B ritain from rendering assistance to C anada in case o f need. It was obvious, how ever, that only naval forces could be rapidly brought to a N o rth A m erican scene of action; and in any case the British governm ent, both directly and through its governors, had persistently urged the doctrine of colonial responsibility for the first line o f defence. T he fortifica­ tions th at w ere agreed upon in 1865 w ere never created, except fo r additional w orks carried out by the im perial governm ent at Quebec. T he C anadian governm ent provided itself w ith money to proceed with the w orks planned for various cities, but the fortifications were n o t built, and in 1872 the original plan was dropped. Beginning with the last years o f the im perial garrisons a C anadian m ilitary organization was slowly built up. A statute o f 1868 (31 V iet., c. 40 ) retained in principle the obligation to m ilitary service, but in practice provided only for a volunteer militia. U nder the statute 40,000 m en w ere to be paid and drilled, b ut only at first was this num ber actually reached. T here was a departm ent of militia, but at first no headquarters staff and no auxiliary services, such as com m issariat. T he first steps tow ard a regular arm y were taken in 1871 w ith the raising of tw o batteries, one at Q uebec and the other a t K ingston, to take o ver and preserve the works and arsenals at those places. T h e Fenian m ovem ent was, as has been suggested, closely related to the whole m ilitary question; as it was, also, to the C anadian position in regard to the projected diplom atic settle­ m ent with the U nited States. T he Fenian B rotherhood, which w as form ed in 1858, turned after the Civil W ar to a plan fo r putting pressure on the British governm ent (by m eans o f inva­ sions o f C anada) to m ake concessions to the Irish revolutionary party. T h ere was m ore talk o f invasion than actual crossing of the frontier, but actual operations were sufficient to justify apprehension. T he public - especially near the border - was certainly alarm ed, and there were constant rum ours o f furth er attacks. T he danger m ade it necessary to spend m ore on the

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m ilitia than w ould otherw ise have been considered, and there was loss of life in repelling the invaders. W hat m ade the whole F enian question bulk so large was two related considerations: th at the Fenians m ight find reinforcem ents and do extensive harm ; and that the A m erican governm ent, by failure to prevent the raids or adequately to punish the participants, exhibited an unfriendly attitude. T he first apprehension proved to be illfounded. T he second was based on at least som e real evidence. W ithout going into the details of the m otives and acts of indi­ vidual A m ericans o r the governm ent, it is only necessary here to understand the C anadian point o f view. In sum m ary this was: th at the raids had cost C anada m en and m oney, that the United States had not m ade proper efforts to prevent them , th at an in­ dem nity should be paid, and th at the British governm ent should press the dom inion’s claim . W hen C artier and M cD ougall were in England they learnt o f negotiations on the A labam a claims, and suggested to G ranville th at if a tribunal were set up on that subject individuals in C anada and the governm ent should have an opportunity o f presenting their claim s about the Fenians.5 In the spring o f 1870 the C anadian governm ent stated its inten­ tion o f urging that the im perial governm ent dem and reparation, on the ground th at the A m erican governm ent had inform ation w hich would have enabled it to stop the raids. T hey pointed out th at the C anadian governm ent, though not being able to stop the St. A lbans raid o f 1864, because of lack o f fore-know ledge, had m ade pecuniary com pensation. Before this privy council report could reach England, G ranville had w ritten to the governor general, Sir John Y oung, saying that H is M ajesty’s governm ent w ould urge the A m erican governm ent to counteract any such m ovem ent in the future. T he C anadian cabinet was furious, and w rote a bitter m em orandum w hich Y oung refused to sign, but sent to G ranville. In it the council expressed its “ unfeigned regret” th at no dem and fo r reparation was being m ade. They believed that “ there is no precedent in the history of civilized nations for a great pow er such as G reat B ritain subm itting to such outrage on its loyal subjects w ithout m aking a dem and for adequate reparation.” A fter fu rth er pressing, K im berley, the new colonial secretary, suggested that the C anadian governm ent draw up a full statem ent o f facts and claims. T he resultant m em orandum , accepted by the council on January 25, 1871, w ent over the fam iliar argum ents at som e length, seeking to show by reference to particular cases th at the U nited States governm ent was well w arned in advance and could have pre­

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vented the raids.0 As a result o f this correspondence the imperial governm ent agreed to bring the claims before the joint high com mission w hich was to m eet at W ashington. N o t the least im portant o f the issues com ing to a head in the early years after confederation was that of the trade and com ­ m erce o f the dom inion. In no field was the close dependence of C anada on satisfactory relations w ith G re at B ritain and the U nited States better illustrated. O f the total external trade of C anada in 1870 as m uch as 89.5 p er cent o f the exports and 88.5 p er cent o f the im ports were accounted for by those powers together. A lthough G reat Britain bought from C anada consid­ erably less than she sold to her, the firmness with w hich freetrade doctrines w ere held left little prospect of preferential duties. In the case o f the U nited States, however, Canadians continued to cast longing glances at the reciprocity treaty of 1854, a renew al o f which, in some form , w ould be especially advantageous in consideration o f the growing height of the A m erican tariff. T he question was w hether the U nited States could be induced to m ake a new treaty, it being borne in mind th at she had renounced the previous one. It seemed probable that a case m ade solely on the virtues o f tariff agreem ents would be insufficient to carry the day. A s m ake-weights the Canadians had two inducem ents to offer: adm ission to their fisheries, and use of their canals. T he fisheries o f N ew foundland and C anada, plentiful and ac­ cessible to A m erican ships, constituted a real bargaining-point. T he fisheries controversy was an old one, both as to the interpre­ tation o f the treaty rights of A m erican citizens, and as p art of the general negotiations on com m ercial relations. T he conces­ sion in the T reaty of Paris o f 1783 to A m ericans of the right to fish in colonial w aters was considered by the British governm ent as abrogated by the W ar of 1812. A m ericans, how ever, did not accept this interpretation and continued to fish after the w ar as before, until some tw enty o f their boats w ere seized by British cruisers. T he convention o f 1818 defined the position by allow­ ing to A m erican citizens fishing rights in p arts of the shore of N ew foundland and L abrador, and the M agdalen Islands; the U nited States renouncing any claim to enter the three-m ile lim it elsewhere, except to obtain shelter, wood, and w ater, and to m ake repairs. T he Reciprocity T reaty of 1854 greatly enlarged the freedom of A m erican fisherm en by providing for reciprocal and free access to the coastal fisheries, with some exceptions; but w hen that treaty lapsed in 1866, the convention o f 1818 -

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with its limited concessions - once m ore cam e into force. The provincial governm ents assumed that the privileges accorded to A m erican fishermen autom atically cam e to an end, but at the solicitation o f the British governm ent agreed to retain them tem porarily. T he C anadian governm ent professed th at they had “no disposition to use the apprehension of national differences arising out of the fisheries, as a m eans of influencing the U nited States to replace their trade relations with British N o rth A m erica on a satisfactory footing,” 7 but it is probable th a t they believed th at the fisheries could be used as a m eans of pressure tow ard restoration o f reciprocity. T hey suggested that fo r the current year the provinces should allow A m erican ves­ sels to fish on paym ent of a licence fee, the proceeds from which should be used for “ the m aintenance o f a joint m arine police.” T he licence fee was duly instituted, consisting of 50 cents and later of $2 p er ton o f the vessel. In spite of the original intention the system was carried on from year to year - although there were constant com plaints from C anada o f w idespread evasion until 1870, when the dom inion governm ent decided to term inate it. T here followed a period in which the convention of 1818 cam e into operation once m ore, accom panied by disputes as to w hat were C anadian waters. Both before and after 1870 there was a necessity for naval policing, which was perform ed partly by the C anadian and partly by the British governm ent. In each of the first three years after the abrogation o f the Reciprocity T reaty there w ere four o r five vessels of the royal navy protecting fisheries in the G ulf o f St. Law rence, and during the sam e tim e, one o r two p ro ­ vincial boats. In 1870 there was one British vessel and eight Canadian - the latter officered as far as possible by retired naval officers. T he division of responsibility and expense was in dispute between the two governm ents, and constant com plaints were m ade in C anada that protection was insufficient. T he abolition o f the licensing system was received w ith outspoken criticisms in the U nited States, being described as unneighbourly; and a long argum ent w ent on as to exactly from w hat w aters the A m erican vessels were to be excluded.8 In the sum m er of 1870 the dom inion governm ent, after reviewing the whole co n tro ­ versy, urged the British authorities to suggest to the A m erican governm ent a joint high com m ission to settle the dispute.0 In the speech from the throne in 1871 it was stated that the fishery question w ould be subm itted to a joint com mission, which, how ever, would include it as only p art o f a large agenda.

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T h e coasting trade, too, was to be a m atter fo r reciprocal concessions. By a C anadian statute o f 1870 (33 V iet., c. xiv) the coasting trade from one C anadian po rt to another was for­ bidden to foreign ships, w ith the exception th at the governor in council m ight declare that this did not apply to ships o f a country which adm itted British ships to its coasting trade. The explanation of this move was m ade by the m inister o f m arine and fisheries in his annual report for 1868-1869. T h e U nited States, he argued, had not reciprocated in a liberal policy in relation to the coasting trade, the use of canals, or fisheries. I am o f opinion that the true policy o f the Canadian G overn­ m en t at present should be to retain all the privileges which it now possesses, until fresh negotiations take place fo r new trade relations between Canada and the U nited States, w hen the opening o f the coasting trade o f the D om inion to U nited States shipping can be included in any arrangem ents which m ay be m ade, if the Canadian governm ent should then be o f opinion that it would be advisable in the interests o f Canada to do so.10 T he second m ajor C anadian asset suitable for bargaining was a w aterw ay from the m iddle w est to the sea. It was a less certain asset than the control of fisheries, since there w ere alternative transportation routes, while the best fisheries were in C anadian w aters. Indeed, the diversion o f traffic to th e E rie C anal o r to A m erican railways at Buffalo was a constant nightm are to those Canadians who were directly o r indirectly interested. T here w ere, however, certain types o f freight which could be carried m ost econom ically to tidew ater by boat; and it was in the know ledge o f this that C anadians had banked on extensive A m erican use of the canal system which in the forties they had been com pleting a t great expense. T he Reciprocity T reaty for the first tim e adm itted U nited States vessels to navigation o f the St. Law rence and the C anadian canals w ith the sam e tolls as those paid by British subjects. U sed as a m ake-w eight in the negotiation o f that treaty, the navigation privilege autom atically fell w ith its term ination. T he U nited States had a quid pro quo in the coasting trade, to which C anadians had not been adm itted even under the Reciprocity T reaty, and in the bonding system. T h e latter enabled C anadian im ports and exports to be carried to and from A m erican all-year ports w ithout paying duty, and its w ithdraw al was a bogey th at was often displayed. But the U nited States h ad little to offer in w ater transport to set against the C anadian canals. T he treaty o f 1854 adm itted British sub­

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jects to the free navigation of L ake M ichigan. A nd until 1895, w hen a C anadian canal was opened at Sault Ste. M arie, C ana­ dian vessels w ere dependent on the A m erican one fo r entrance to L ake Superior. Fisheries and canals w ere consistently brought forw ard as inducem ents to the U nited States to re-enact a reciprocity agree­ m ent. A dded attractions were indeed needed. T he U nited States was in itself a huge free-trade area, rich in m ost natural re­ sources and well advanced in m anufacturing. C anada, on the oth er hand, was in a com paratively early stage o f m anufactu r­ ing, w ith lim ited m arkets, and dependent on a relatively large volum e o f foreign trade. She was, m oreover, attem pting a t the sam e tim e to build up a m ore m ixed econom y, and to sell her staples fo r im ported goods (w hich must, to a large extent, be m an u factu res). A m erican dissastisfaction w ith the treaty of 1854 was due not only to the political relations o f the Civil W ar period. T he C anadian protectionist tariffs o f the fifties were th ought by m any A m ericans to be striking a t the very roots of any perm anent reciprocity betw een the two countries, and to violate the treaty in spirit if not in letter. T here was never any doubt th at C anada w anted to reach an agreem ent w ith the U nited States, even if individuals tried to bolster national pride by statem ents that the U nited States m ust n ot th in k C anada dependent on her charity, and th at C anada could get on very well w ithout reciprocity. T he plain tru th was th a t all parties, and nearly all groups, were anxious to secure a successor to the treaty of 1854. T he only disagreem ent was on the term s to be accepted. Before the treaty had even ru n out the provincial governm ents w ere struggling to secure its renew al or replacem ent. W ith confederation the aim did n o t change, though at tim es it seemed politic not to press it. D eputations to W ash­ ington and inquiries m ade through the British m inister brought news th at there was little hope a t the tim e. It had not been easy to float the treaty o f 1854 - even on cham pagne - and subse­ q u en t events had m ade W ashington even less receptive. Y o u know [wrote M acdonald] that I have always held that a renewal o f those relations can only be effected by the pressure o f A m erican interests upon Congress. It is obvious that congress m ust look at the question fro m an A m erican point o f view entirely, and until convinced that it is .for the advantage o f the trade o f the U nited States to negotiate a new reciprocity treaty no such treaty can be obtained.

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In the state o f feeling that now exists tow ard England in the m inds o f too m any people in the U nited States, nothing like fa v o r can be expected by her. This feeling has absurdly enough been extended to Canada, although during the whole o f the C ivil W ar we spared no pains to perform our duty as a friendly neighbour. Still, the feeling exists, and therefore any appearance o f undue anxiety on the part o f Canada would only tend to defeat the object in view. Canada is quite ready, through the British Am bassador, to re­ new the negotiations at any tim e, and M r. Fish is fu lly inform ed o f that fact. W e can do no m ore. I t w ould be altogether in­ decorous and im proper fo r the Canadian governm ent to co m ­ m ence a system o f lobbying fo r the purpose o f securing the support o f individual m em bers o f congress. W e have gone to considerable expense already in dissem inat­ ing inform ation on the subject o f trade, and fro m tim e to time, as it m ay be necessary, will continue to do so. T he truth seem s to be that, until y o u r public m en get o ut o f their heads the ridiculous notion that by restricting m utual trade annexation will be secured, no earnest a ttem pt will be m ade to secure reciprocity. M eanw hile Canada w ill not entertain fo r a m o m en t the proposition11 to give the freedom o f the St. L aw ­ rence fo r the sake o f the reduction or abolition o f the im port duties on coal, lum ber and salt.12 It was becom ing increasingly evident th at no progress could be m ade in tariff negotiations except in relation to other subjects o f com m on interest, and probably not until the soreness still existing from the Civil W ar could be alleviated. In full-dress debates in the C anadian parliam ent in the spring of 1870 the opposition followed the obvious tactics of accusing the govern­ m ent of lack o f enthusiasm for, and inefficiency in the pursuit of, a reciprocity agreem ent. T he latter m ay, to some degree, have been true; but there is little doubt th at governm ent and opposition w ere one in their aims. T he wisdom of the new regu­ lations concerning the fisheries might be questioned in view of the need to conciliate A m erican opinion, b u t the governm ent believed that it had tried concession w ithout any good result. A p art from the fisheries altogether, there w ere m any groups represented a t W ashington opposed to tariff reductions on p articular classes o f goods - as there w ere always likely to be surrounding any legislature. T o m eet their attacks nothing was effective beyond a series of com prom ises. It was, however,

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possible to attem pt to rem ove political bones of dissension, w hich acted as a barrier against agreem ent on any subject. The British governm ent had for some tim e been moving tow ard a kind of peace conference w ith the U nited States. W hat form it should take, w hat subjects w ere to be included, and how C anada m ight be represented on it w ere all subjects o f vital concern to the dom inion. O ut o f a successful conference might com e the twin benefits o f better feeling between the British Em pire and the U nited States and accord on the m atters of particular inter­ est to C anada, the discussion of w hich seemed to have reached a stalem ate.

II T h e holding o f a conference at W ashington was the result o f a com bination of circum stances. T he British governm ent, apprehensive of the state of affairs in E urope, and particularly o f the denunciation by Russia of the Black Sea clauses of the T reaty of Paris, was anxious to avoid any possibility of a war on tw o continents. T he tradition that peace with the U nited States was a sine qua non of foreign policy had not yet been established in L ondon, but for the tim e a t least there was a pressing reason fo r the settlem ent of disputes. T he A m erican governm ent, recently freed from the encroachm ent of N apo­ leon III on N o rth A m erica as well as from its own Civil W ar, felt less necessity fo r im m ediate agreem ent, and there were not a few prom inent A m ericans w ho talked alm ost lightly o f a possible w ar w ith G reat Britain. But w ith the replacem ent of Sum ner by H am ilton Fish as secretary of state, there was m ore willingness to com prom ise. T he position of C anada in this situation has been differently interpreted. T o R ipon’s biographer the C anadian issues were incidental and an em barrassm ent.13 T o Canadians they seemed at the tim e and since as o f m ajor im portance. W hether the British governm ent w ould have been eager fo r settlem ent had there been no E uropean com plication, is purely speculative. As it proved, the situation was advanta­ geous to C anada is so far as it started the wheels of diplom acy; and disadvantageous in so fa r as it reduced the bargaining pow er o f the British governm ent, and m ade it too ready for concessions. Both British and A m erican statesm en were inclined to believe that the status of C anada was a provisional one which could hardly last. T he repeated prophecies in the U nited States th at annexation was a question o f tim e w ere based not, as once,

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on the assum ption o f m ilitary force, but on a doctrine o f in­ evitability tem pered by the peaceful persuasion of econom ic pow er. But while nursing this com fortable expectation o f the eventual acquisition o f m ost o f the rest o f N orth A m erica, A m ericans saw the need for settlem ent o f im m ediate questions, particularly in regard to the fisheries, and, to a lesser extent, the unsettled boundaries w ith M anitoba and British Colum bia. A bsorbed in European affairs, anxious to prom ote w orld com ­ m erce by means of free trade, and unim pressed by the value of quasi-colonies, British statesm en w ere tem pted to agree w ith the A m erican suggestion th at their bilateral differences w ould be m ore easily settled if C anada w ere no longer a p art of the British E m pire. But, while recognizing the possibility - even the proba­ bility - o f peaceful separation in the future, they were for the tim e being ready to sponsor the C anadian case up to the point at w hich it endangered the success of the settlem ent as a whole. T h e form o f the A nglo-A m erican negotiations is explained by the course of the A labam a dispute. A treaty o f arbitration fo r the A labam a claim s had been rejected by the A m erican Senate, and the British governm ent was therefore unw illing to risk indignity by pursuing the m atter through ordinary diplo­ m atic channels. I t was, however, urgently necessary to remove the U nited States as a possibly hostile force in case o f w ar with Russia. In the dilem m a Lord T enterden, the assistant under­ secretary for foreign affairs, m ade the ingenious suggestion o f a joint high com m ission.14 It was to be first proposed for the dis­ cussion of affairs other than that of the Alabam a, but w ith the private understanding that the A m erican governm ent should add the A labam a case, and that this be accepted. In conform ity with the tried diplom atic procedure of private agreem ent before official correspondence, Sir John Rose (then resident in London) was sent in January 1871 to W ashington, there, w here he was persona grata, to discuss plans with the secretary of state. Fish was already looking tow ard a general settlem ent having, in the previous Septem ber, suggested to T hornton (the British minister) th at all issues should be dealt with together. D espite the opposi­ tion of Sum ner - who wildly dem anded the w ithdraw al of Britain from the A m e ric a s-F ish found sufficient support before the m onth was out to accept the proposition brought by Rose.15 T he official correspondence was then solem nly conducted on the agreed lines, and the decision that a joint com m ission was to m eet in W ashington duly recorded.10 T h e negotiations leading to the creation o f the joint com m is­

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sion w ere apparently carried through w ithout consulting the C anadian governm ent and w ithout any decision as to w hat part, if any, C anada was to play in the com mission. I t was, o f course, clear th a t at least some of the subjects directly affecting the dom inion w ould be on the agenda, b u t th at alone w ould not satisfy C anada. W hile in E ngland in 1869 C artier and McD ougall had represented to G ranville th at no steps tow ard reciprocity should be taken w ithout consultation w ith their governm ent;17 sim ilarly they had asked th at the dom inion gov­ ernm ent and individual citizens should be allowed to appear before any tribunal considering claim s for dam age by Fenian raids.18 M acdonald had also told Rose, in w riting on the fisheries question, th at “should the question com e up you m ust press on H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent that no negotiation should be en­ tered upon or treaty concluded w ithout reference to the C ana­ dian governm ent.” 19 But by w hat m eans was C anada to take p art in the W ashington discussion? Obviously not by separate representation. T he proposal th at was hit upon in L ondon was to include a C anadian in the British com mission. Rose was th ought of, as having carried on the prelim inary discussions, but w as unacceptable in C anada as not a C anadian by birth, a resi­ dent in E ngland, and a p artn e r in an A m erican banking house.20 M acdonald him self was suggested, and the governor general p ut th e question before him a t the beginning o f February. I have thought over L o rd K im berley’s proposition [he wrote to Lisgar] that I should'act on the Joint C om m ission with the U nited States on Fishery and other m atters. I am a good deal embarrassed by not being able to com m unicate w ith m y col­ leagues on the subject. M y first im pression was that it w ould be better fo r Canada not to be represented on such a Com m ission. B u t then one m ust consider that if Canada allowed the m atter to go by default, and left its interests to be -adjudicated upon and settled by a C om m ission com posed exclusively o f A m ericans having an adverse interest, and Englishm en having little or no interest in Canada, the G ovt, here w ould be very m uch censured if the result was a sacrifice o f the rights o f the D om inion. Eng­ land w ould at once say that the offer was m ade to Canada to be represented on the C om m ission and that it was declined.21 M acdonald agreed, how ever, that he w ould act, subject to his colleagues’ consent (w hich was readily given), and after secur­ ing from K im berley an adm ission of C anada’s exclusive rights

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to fisheries w ithin the three-m ile limit. T here was indeed no app aren t alternative. It was obvious th a t a single C anadian w ould occupy an unenviable position, since he presum ably m ight fail to sway his fellow-com missioners, yet m ust accept responsibility in C anada for the decisions. O n the other hand, there was a t least a better chance of furthering C anadian inter­ ests by this m eans than by official correspondence over the long ro u te to W ashington by way o f London. D uring his stay in W ashington M acdonald kept in touch with his cabinet by m eans of an exchange o f letters and telegram s; but the course of the conference could by no m eans be plotted in advance, and to som e extent he w as obliged to act as best he could, with no time for consultation, as circum stances arose. T he British com mission was headed by E arl de G rey and R ipon, and the other m em bers w ere Sir Stafford N orthcote, a m em ber o f the opposition in the H ouse o f Com m ons, Sir E dw ard T h ornton, the British m inister to W ashington, M ontague Ber­ nard, professor of international law at O xford, and Sir John M acdonald. M acdonald was appointed a plenipotentiary under the great seal, and received his instructions22 from the foreign office. A t the first session de G rey “announced th at his Com m is­ sion - which he pointed out was not a British but an Im perial body, C anada being represented by Prim e M inister M acdonald - was fully em pow ered to sign a treaty.” 23 But w hen later de G rey explained th at any fishery treaty m ust be approved by the C anadian parliam ent, one of the A m erican com m issioners said “th at they thought they were dealing w ith the British E m pire and not with C anada.”24 It was the beginning o f the long story o f foreign uncertainty on the constitution o f the em pire. It was also a new departure that involved possible difficulties in the relations o f C anada and G reat Britain. E. B. C handler of New Brunsw ick and F rancis H incks of the Province o f C anada had accom panied Elgin to W ashington in 1854, but only in an advisory capacity. T he W ebster-A shburton T reaty of 1842 and the O regon T reaty o f 1846 had been negotiated by British plenipotentiaries. T here were no precedents. T h e high com m ission set to w ork on F eb ru ary 27, 1871, and the treaty was signed on M ay 6.25 T he subjects m ost discussed w ere the A labama claim s and the fisheries. In the form er C anada had no direct interest, and the U nited K ingdom had none in the latter. T o M acdonald the w hole conference was a dual struggle, w ith his fellow-com missioners first and w ith the A m ericans second. T o the British m em bers, on the other hand, the pressure

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o f C anadian dem ands com plicated their task o f securing a settlem ent. T o the A m ericans it was a constant puzzle w hether they w ere dealing w ith one country or two. T h at was the crux of the situation, and one not fully recognized by either M acdonald o r de G rey. T he British E m pire com m issioners com posed a body w hich was neither national nor international. C anadians were h u rt th a t their interests w ere not pursued with m ore zeal, and m ore than once M acdonald talked of w ithdraw ing. T here had been no previous agreem ent between U nited K ingdom and C anadian governm ents on the course to be pursued in respect of particu lar subjects. M acdonald, although appointed to the same status as the other com m issioners, seems to have felt no respon­ sibility in m atters not touching C anada, and to have given little w eight to the general attitude o f the British tow ard a settlem ent w ith the U nited States. “ . . . T he British Com m issioners [he w rote] seem to have only one idea in their minds, th at is, to go hom e to E ngland w ith a treaty in their pockets settling every­ thing, no m atter a t w hat cost to C anada.”26 H ad he not been so harassed by his particular problem s, M acdonald m ight have recognized m ore freely th at the British w ere prepared to make concessions for the sake of peace and their E uropean danger; and th at an established peace w ould a t the sam e tim e remove w hatever m enace there was to the security o f Canada. T o de G rey it seemed th at the C anadians gave too little weight to the need o f com prom ise fo r the sake of peace. “T hey are filled with a belief,” he w rote to the foreign office, “th at they can bully the A m ericans into giving w ay and seem indifferent to the risk they ru n by such a policy.”27 Y et it is not surprising that a prim e m inister responsible to the C anadian parliam ent and electorate should have envisaged w ith apprehension the reception of a treaty that w ould certainly be believed to be unfavourable to C anada. “I have taken strong ground w ith my colleagues [he wrote] th at it would be exceedingly unw ise to agree to any term s which it is not reasonably probable w ould be accepted by C anada as should any T reaty be m ade an d afterw ards rejected by o u r Parliam ent the feeling o f irritation w ould be greatly increased.”28 H e w as also playing the dom inion gam e with another object. Fish inquired w hether a fisheries treaty would have to be ratified by P rince E dw ard Island and N ew foundland, and de G rey was uncertain of the constitutional position. “I did n o t choose to enlighten them upon the p oint as I think it well to keep the case of C anada separate. If we com e to any satisfactory T reaty, I shall endeavour to have it lim ited to the D om inion of

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C anada, so that if Prince E dw ard Island and N ew foundland desire the advantages o f the T reaty they m ust come into C o n ­ federation.”20 In the light o f his own feelings and of the pressure fro m C anada, M acdonald was going far in the direction of sacrifices for the sake o f im perial unity. W hen it was first p ro ­ posed th at a fisheries treaty m ust be approved by the C anadian parliam ent M acdonald was p u t in an exceedingly difficult position. I f a m ajority o f m y colleagues should at any tim e conclude to accept term s w hich I do not approve of, I m ust o f course, either p rotest and withdraw, or remain on the com m ission and trust to 'the . . . ratification o f the Treaty by Canada. I f I take the first course, it will disclose to the A m ericans the fa ct o f a difference o f opinion, a conflict in fact, between Canada and England. This the A m ericans are anxious to estab­ lish, in order to get up a sort o f quarrel between the tw o, and strengthen that party in England who desire to get rid o f the colonies as a burden. I f I continue to act on the C om m ission I will be attacked fo r m aking an unw orthy sacrifice o f Canada’s right and m ay be com pelled to vote in Parliam ent against a Treaty which I had a hand in m aking.30 Anxious as M acdonald was to secure a satisfactory settlem ent of the fisheries, his determ ination m ust not go to the point of incurring a m ajor political disaster. A few days later, w hen de G rey said that M acdonald’s insistence w ould bring the negoti­ ations to an end, the latter felt it necessary to m odify his position previously taken th at parliam ent would not accept the projected treaty. M y reason fo r taking this line was it was evidently L o rd de G rey’s aim to m ake m e and Canada responsible fo r a breach o f the negotiations generally in case things w ent wrong. I was resolved not to let any blam e be attachable to Canada in that respect, and thus strengthen the hands o f the party in England w ho consider Canada a burden to be got rid o f and an obstacle to friendly relations with the U nited States.31 T hus the C anadian governm ent had, like the British, aim s in the negotiations w ider than the actual subjects discussed. M ac­ donald was a skilful negotiator and he fought a good fight, but the final term s w ere far from those w hich he, o r any other C anadian, w anted. T he San Ju a n boundary, being relatively

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unim portant, w as little discussed, and w as finally subm itted to arbitration by the G erm an E m peror (articles x x x i v - x l i i ) . 32 T h e Fenian claim s w ere, on A m erican insistence, ruled to be n ot w ithin the agenda - a result w hich M acdonald regarded as fortunate, since it had been arranged th at England would in­ dem nify C anada if the U nited States refused. T here rem ained reciprocity, com m unications, and fisheries, which the Canadians hoped to link together in the traditional m anner. In spite of M acdonald’s effort, however, no tariff agreem ent could be reached. T he articles on com m unications (xxv i-x x x ) provided fo r the free navigation o f the rivers St. Law rence, Y ukon, Por­ cupine and Stikine, and of L ake M ichigan. T he British agreed to urge the C anadian governm ent to allow to A m ericans the use o f C anadian canals on term s of equality with C anadians; and in retu rn the A m erican governm ent opened to Canadians the St. C lair Flats C anal, and agreed to urge the state governm ents to allow the use o f state canals connected with border waters. Bonding privilege was to be allowed to and from the ports of N ew Y ork, Boston, and P ortland, or other ports designated by the president (art. x x ix ). T he ships of either C anada or the U nited States m ight carry goods from one po rt in the other country to another, provided that p a rt o f the transport was by land carriage in bond (art. x x x ) . T he chief effort o f C anada was tow ard an acceptable solution of the fisheries. It was their chief asset, and M acdonald m ade repeated efforts to put it against at least som e degree o f reciprocal trade. T he A m ericans, however, were adam ant; and the only free trade was to be in fish and fish-oil (art. x x i) . T he inshore fisheries o f each country were throw n open to the citizens of the other (arts, x v m -x x ), and the claim of a superior value of the concession m ade by C anada was to be exam ined by a special com m ission (arts, x x n -x x v ).33 O n M ay 8 the W ashington T reaty w as ready for signature.331 Fish and de G rey w arm ly congratulated each o th e r - a n d it came to M acdonald’s turn to sign. W ith the pen in his hand he turned to F ish and w hispered “W ell, here go the fisheries” ; and, as he rose fro m the table, “T hey are gone.”34 HI M acdonald was not w ithout a sense o f d ram a, and his gesture in signing the treaty, as well as the violent protests he m ade during its negotiation, m ust be discounted. Certainly he had failed to secure the term s w hich governm ent and p opular opin­

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ion sought; b u t th at is not an uncom m on result o f any diplom atic com prom ise. T he original C anadian aims had not been set low, and w hat had actually been attained was not contem ptible. T he fisheries had not brought their price, but there was still a chance o f a dividend being voted by the com m ission to be set up. R eci­ procity had been denied, b ut the door was not closed. C anadians had no real desire to exclude A m erican shipping from their canals, o r to forgo the canal tolls. T he F enian claims had not been considered, but M acdonald considered th at he had a p ro m ­ ise from de G rey o f com pensation from the British governm ent. T h e San Juan boundary was to be arbitrated, and the decision m ight fall one w ay o r the other. It rem ained to m ake out a good case in Canada, both to placate C anadian opinion, and to per­ suade parliam ent to pass a bill im plem enting those p arts of the treaty which required legislative action. A s M acdonald now bent his energies to this task, he had, he found, rath er overplayed his hand in his letters from W ashington to the cabinet, and some o f his own colleagues had to be con­ verted. P arliam ent would not m eet for nearly a year, and in the m eantim e he w ould say as little as possible, while preparing his defences. First, he m ust see w hat could be obtained on the F enian account. A pparently the British governm ent was willing to p ay a m odest com pensation if all the other questions at dis­ pute w ith the U nited States w ere settled - th at is to say, if the C anadian parliam ent passed a fisheries act, o r at least if the C anadian governm ent used every m eans in its pow er to induce parliam ent to pass the act. A lthough M acdonald had talked of n o t supporting the treaty, it is m ost im probable that he ever intended to take such drastic action. A t W ashington he had tried to com pensate fo r the disadvantages o f his m inority position by threats that he w ould not sign, o r would sign only w ith reserva­ tions, or that he w ould not press legislation in parliam ent. And now his caution in com m itting him self was certainly done in p art as a wish to confuse the opposition, and probably in p a rt as a m ethod o f bargaining w ith the British governm ent, as here used. But having extracted this conditional prom ise o f a cash paym ent he and H incks soon turned to the m ore attractive alternative of a guaranteed loan to be used for the building of railways and the im provem ent o f canals. A fter a cabinet m eet­ ing, M acdonald w rote to L isgar th at the governm ent w ould do everything in their pow er to carry the treaty if the guarantee was m ade, and th at the popularity o f the loan w ould “ assure you of the m oral certainty o f their success in P arliam ent.”35 A surpris­

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ing note of optim ism was suddenly struck, w hich m ust have confirm ed the British governm ent in their suspicion th at M ac­ donald could get the treaty through if he so desired. A fter a correspondence covering m onths a cable was received on M arch 18 w hich prom ised to guarantee a loan of £ 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 w hen the C anadian acts to im plem ent the treaty had com e into effect, and subject to C anada’s abandoning all claim s on G reat B ritain for losses from F enians.36 N o one knew better than M acdonald th at there was real and w idespread opposition to the treaty. A s soon as the high com ­ mission was m ooted, suspicions were voiced, in parliam ent and out, th at C anada would be the loser, as, it was said, she always had been. M any C anadians regarded the U nited States as the traditional victor in all international disputes, and expressed the fear, too, th a t B ritain w ould sacrifice C anada to an easy settle­ m ent with the A m erican governm ent. T he im portant debates in parliam ent did not com e until the treaty was discussed in the spring of 1872, but for the intervening period som ething o f the tem per o f the country m ay be seen from the com m ents in news­ papers. T he im portance o f the subject of a settlem ent w ith the U nited States derived not only from the direct pecuniary inter­ ests o f the country, but also from the fact th at it related to the central them es of C anadian foreign relations. N othing so bared the thoughts of C anadians as any issue w hich brought up their relations w ith the U nited K ingdom o r the U nited States: and w hen both were involved (as was usually the case) the country began to take stock of its position. It w as the signal for sweeping statem ents, hazardous prophecies, and verbal battles w ithout quarter. T h e San Juan dispute w as distant to old C anada, and while there were various hopes expressed th at the m atter w ould be settled (and in the right w ay ), it m ade little stir in the east. T he F enian question cam e nearer hom e and invoked the C a n ad a U nited K ingdom -U nited States triangle. T he G lobe refused to be frightened, b u t drew interesting conclusions: the Fenian scare was perhaps being magnified in order to get through the m ilitary estim ates.37 T hen it had the effect o f stim ulating C ana­ dian nationalism . “C anadians have gained m ore in national ch aracter during the last six years than in any previous twenty and if we ask, w hat has caused this, we shall find that the o ut­ rageous proceedings o f the F enians and their abettors have been am ong the chief agencies.” 38 A m onth later the sam e pap er was m ore indignant w ith the A m erican governm ent for its “ tacit

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consent” to the raids, but declared th at C anada would not be driven into annexation by such tactics.39 T he chorus soon began o f calls for an indem nity to cover raids and threats said to have cost C anada $4,000,000. T he D aily N ew s o f M ontreal argued that England should either put sufficient pressure on the U nited States, or else provide troops to protect the border.40 T he coincidence o f Fenian raids and the w ithdraw al o f im­ perial troops was, to Canadians, a m ost u nfortunate one. T he G lobe refused to visualize the possibility o f a w ar w ith the U nited States, and took a firm line against a standing arm y. It was left to a small tow n paper to repeat the thought th at had so o ften been uttered: I f English statesm en im agine that Canada is going to turn her youth into policem en and establish a cordon along the frontier, to keep back the Fenian invaders, they are very m uch m istaken. The Canadians are ready to do their share o f the duty im posed, but they m ust not be expected to perform impossibilities. . . . It should be borne in m ind that Canada is at any tim e liable to be m ade the battleground fo r settling any dispute that m ay arise between Great Britain and the U nited States. . . . W hy then are we asked to defen d the country against these attacks occa­ sioned through quarrels in which we have no concern?41 Reciprocity was very m uch in the public eye from the tim e of the abrogation of the treaty of 1854, and the new spapers reflected the general interest. T here is no doubt that a renewal was desired, but there w ere m any com m ents by the editors (as by m em bers of parliam ent) to the effect th at C anada m ust not be considered as dependent on it, but could stand on her own feet. Even stronger w ere the objections raised against any sug­ gestion that by w ithholding reciprocity C anada could be forced into annexation. T he editor o f the Globe, one of the m ost pow erful organs of opinion, reacted violently to the A m erican suggestion o f a zollverein. Canada, we are always proud to assert, is at present an integ­ ral part o f the British Em pire; and whoever, in the whole history o f the past, heard o f an instance o f part o f a K ingdom or E m pire entering into a com m ercial arrangem ent with its great com m er­ cial and political rivals fo r the purpose, avow edly, o f putting excessive differential taxes on the produce o f the rest o f that K ingdom or Em pire? . . . Yes, the very sam e persons who have trotted o ut their Independence and A nnexation hobbies, and

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fo u n d they w ould never do, now fancy they can gain the same end by this uniform custom s plan. The only recom m endation about it is that it is not so m anly as the proposal fo r annexation, but has m ore o f the sneak about it. . . .42 T h e tory Leader o f T oro nto followed m uch the sam e argum ent. Exclusion from a reciprocity treaty w ould not induce C anada to leave the British Em pire. “N either annexation nor independence had held any place in the C anadian m ind.”43 O n the fisheries the G lobe steadfastly defended the C anadian policy o f abandoning the licence system, and argued for the protection of the gulf fisheries as a m ajor asset. A t the very tim e th at M acdonald was trying, in W ashington, to get some quid pro quo for the adm is­ sion to inshore fisheries, the G lobe w as announcing th a t an exchange of th at privilege for reciprocity would be one-sided. In the interval before parliam ent m et the governm ent did not define its stand on the W ashington T reaty, but M acdonald, as a good strategist, sought to protect him self against a new spaper onslaught. H e w rote to A lexander M orris from W ashington to persuade the friendly new spapers to hold back until the Globe had com m itted itself against the treaty. H e would then be free to criticize it him self w ithout allowing G eorge Brown to occupy the strategic position o f im perial loyalty.44 Brown obligingly attacked the treaty as one th at had “no parallel in British history - with one exception, the A shburton capitulation.”45 D uring the m onth of M ay, too, the G lobe collected com m ents from other new spapers. L e Pays had condem ned the treaty outright, and said th at the only honourable course open to C anada was to reject it. L e N ouveau M o nde rem arked th a t “no doubt we have sacrificed m ore than we have obtained; but there is one im por­ tant interest w hich has been protected — th at of peace.” L e C o n s titu tio n a l and the G azette de H yacinthe were both provi­ sionally opposed. T urning to O ntario, th e G lobe reported the attitude o f a num ber of new spapers there. T he St. T hom as H o m e Journal called it not a treaty but a surrender. T he Perth Courier believed th at with the fisheries C anada lost her only bargaining point. T he Belleville Intelligencer called it “ a one­ sided bargain.” T h e G alt R efo rm er rem arked th a t “we are anxious to have peace and harm ony betw een B rother Jonathan and ourselves, but to secure this, we are not willing to sacrifice great interests and receive therefor com paratively nothing in retu rn .” T he Collingwood B ulletin w rote th at “ . . . if the m other country imagines th at she can arbitrarily dispose of ou r fisheries

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to m eet h er own private needs she is m istaken” ; and the Ingersoll N e w s m ade the deduction th at “ if this treaty, o r that p art of it w hich concerns us, had been negotiated by Canadians we could have obtained better term s.” N o doubt the G lobe was to som e extent choosing its papers, but it also quoted the O ttaw a C itizen s survey o f the field, and its conclusion that “judging fro m the general tone o f the C anadian press, we should think th at the T reaty will not prove acceptable unless it contains some qualifications not yet m ade know n.” T he H alifax M orning Chronicle is quoted as calling it “a disastrous T reaty for this P rovince” ; and the G lobe claim ed th at “there is not a single p ap er o f any note in the M aritim e Provinces th at recom m ends the adoption o f the T reaty by the C anadian Parliam ent.” On the other hand, the W hitby Chronicle, which itself condem ned the treaty, reported the H alifax Express and T im es as in favour, though it stated th at N ew Brunswick was altogether hostile.4*5 T hroughout June and July Brow n continued to attack the treaty, and to quote other hostile com m ents on it. M acdonald was defended by some editors as “doing his duty,” and criticized by others for giving way. T he British governm ent was frequently accused o f ignoring C anadian interests for the sake o f its own selfish success. T he attacks on the treaty, said Brown, were not of a partisan nature —even if he did show a particular pleasure in coining phrases about M acdonald. T h at there was som e opinion on the other side o f the case m ay be seen from the editorial colum ns o f the Leader. “The clauses affecting C anada are conceived in a reasonable spirit of equity and are well calculated to cem ent a lasting union between the U nited States and C anada.”47 T he H alifax R eporter is quoted as saying that “w hat is w anted is a m arket [for fish]. T h at the treaty provides. A s for ‘ruin, etc.’ the fisherm en of the British provinces fished alongside the fisherm en' o f the U nited States for twelve years and w ithout finding themselves ruined by the near neighbourhood of their rivals.” L a M inerve defended the treaty on the ground th at C anada would be the first to suffer from trouble between G reat Britain and the U nited States, and th at it was a protection against annexation.48 A final quotation, suggestive fo r the future, m ay be noted. T he editor o f the K ingston Whig, surveying the W ashington settlem ent, con­ cluded that, “of course we have no wish to see C anada annexed to the U nited States, far on the contrary; but we desire to see C anada so far independent o f the H om e authorities, th at she can m ake com m ercial treaties o f h er own, and so bring about

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th e leading wish of all who desire to see C anada take h er due place am ong the nations o f the earth.” 19 Judging by the early editorial reactions to the treaty - even m aking allow ance fo r exaggerated and unrepresentative state­ m ents - the prospect of carrying the treaty in parliam ent m ust have seemed doubtful. By the tim e th at th e session opened on A pril 11 the cabinet was united in its defence o f the W ashington settlem ent. A reference was m ade to it in the speech from the throne, and in the debate on the address A lexander M ackenzie m ade a brief criticism and F rancis H incks a brief defence.50 T he m ain debate began on M ay 3, when M acdonald introduced a bill to give validity to the treaty, in so far as it affected C anada.51 H is speech covered the w hole question, both in the origin of the com m ission and the term s of the treaty. A fter pointing out that parliam ent was free to accept o r reject the treaty, he argued that it w as im portant for the security of C anada that G re at Britain should have an entente w ith the U nited States, and th a t the circum stances o f the tim e justified taking up C anadian com m er­ cial questions at the sam e tim e as the im perial m atter. H e ex­ plained his own appointm ent to the com m ission and why he had accepted, and then turned to a detailed defence o f the clauses affecting C anada. M ackenzie and E dw ard Blake, leading fo r the opposition, denied both the necessity o f the concessions m ade to th e U nited States and the advantages said to have been gained by C anada. O n M ay 16 a vote was taken on the second reading o f the bill and it was passed w ith a m ajority o f sixty-six. T h e bill returned from com m ittee w ithout am endm ent, and received the royal assent before parliam ent rose. T he act (35 V iet., c. 2) provided fo r the adm ission o f U nited States vessels to the eastern fisheries, fo r the im portation w ithout duty of fish and fish-oil, for the transit of goods through C anada in bond, and the carriage o f goods in A m erican vessels from one p art of C anada to another. T hus ended the dom inion’s first experience of diplom acy. T he governm ent had succeeded in getting support for its policy, and it survived the election of the sum m er of 1872, though with a reduced m ajority. M acdonald declared th a t to win the election he had w orked harder th a n he had ever done before or would ever do again. “H ad the result of the election,” he told Dufferin, “shown th a t the people o f C anada disapproved of the treaty and a new m inistry been form ed on th at basis, the relations between C an ad a and the m other country would have been the reverse of pleasant and one cannot foresee w hat political consequences

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would have flowed from the change.” 52 H e claim ed that he had endangered his own political futu re and sacrificed the interests o f C an ad a fo r the sake of the em pire. T hese lofty sentim ents show only one side o f the m edal, but one th at was prom inent to Canadians. It was a tradition - later to be reinforced by the A laska case - th at British diplom acy too often threw C anada to the wolves. T he high com m ission represented a com prom ise between abstention from , and full participation in, diplom atic negotiations. T he results were palatable neither to those who w ere openly critical n o r to those w ho nom inally supported the treaty. It rem ained to be seen by w hat other means this curious em pire could carry on its affairs w ith foreign states. In the m eantim e there was the settlem ent to be w orked out. T he value of the C anadian fisheries and the use o f C anadian canals by A m ericans had still to be dealt w ith; and then there was the perennial question o f reciprocity. H ope had not died: indeed there w ere signs in the U nited States o f a move fo r low er tariffs, and an agreem ent m ight perhaps be secured even if the fisheries card had already been played. A nd now relations with the U nited States w ere presum ably freed from any th reat o f war. This was indeed a relief and a change: ap a rt from th at the m ain them es in C anadian foreign relations - so fully played in 18691872 - w ere still to be carried on in repetition and variation.

CHAPTER 7

Trade, Fisheries, and Diplomacy

Since the C anadian econom y was so largely dependent on foreign trade it followed th at com m ercial conditions in other countries, and com m ercial relations with other countries, p ro ­ foundly affected C anadian well-being. F o r the first few years after confederation prosperity in England, E urope, and the U nited States brought an increase in the external trade of C anada and a corresponding developm ent in hom e industry, finance, and the construction o f railways. T he public revenue, arising almost entirely from custom s receipts, was com fortably m aintained so long as trade continued at a high level. Canadians could (and som e did) view w ith com parative equanim ity the collapse of their hopes of reciprocity in 1871, and tell themselves that they were not their neighbours’ slaves. But w ith the good they needs m ust accept the bad. L ate in 1873 cam e another swift descent of the business cycle. In E urope and A m erica prosperity suddenly turned into depression, and C anada could no m ore escape the effects o f the latter than welcome the m ore palatable fruits o f the form er. T he effect, it is true, was delayed: for it has been characteristic of C anada’s position th at she has neither soared to the heights nor plum bed the depths know n to som e of her large custom ers. T he total of external trade reached a new m axim um in 1874, faltered badly in 1875, and was materially reduced in 1876. Such was the situation th at forced itself on the Liberal adm inistration w hich cam e into office in 1873. F o r this, and fo r the succeeding governm ent, a prim ary task was to re­ store foreign trade a t least to its previous position; and the weapons which lay to their hands were com m ercial agreem ents w ith foreign states and stim ulation of trade by protection or low tariffs. H ere was am ple scope for decisions on policy and for C anadian diplom acy. A lexander M ackenzie’s governm ent leant tow ard a low tariff and tow ard a restoration of reciprocity w ith the U nited States. If the A m erican governm ent proved to be reluctant it m ight be persuaded by an offer to replace the proposed com pensation for C anadian fisheries with a reciprocity agreem ent. H aving ascer­

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tained that the British governm ent w ould have no objection to the change, the C anadian governm ent sent G eorge Brown to W ashington in F ebruary 1874 as a “confidential agent,” where he “speedily succeeded in ascertaining that a general willingness existed on the p art o f the leading statesm en of the U nited States to enter into a new com m ercial treaty.” 1 W hether Brown was misled by wishful thinking o r by A m erican hospitality, the report that he m ade to O ttaw a was optim istic enough to start arrangem ents fo r a form al negotiation. M ackenzie applied for the appointm ent by the im perial governm ent o f C anadian com ­ m issioners - Brown and a m em ber of the cabinet - to be asso­ ciated with the m inister at W ashington, and to occupy a position n ot inferior to th at of M acdonald in 1871.2 D ufferin at once telegraphed the wishes of his m inisters th at negotiations should be begun, and Sir E dw ard T hornton, the British m inister in W ashington, was prom ptly told to undertake them . A few days later Brown was accepted as a com m issioner (the proposal o f a cabinet m inister to serve with him having apparently been d ro p p ed ), and plenipotentiary pow ers w ere forw arded to him. M ackenzie had urged from the first th at the British minister, w ithout the support o f a C anadian with local knowledge, could not adequately handle negotiations w hich directly affected C anada alone. T he British governm ent fo r its part, m ade it clear that the responsibility for attem pting to change the operation of the T reaty of W ashington m ust rest on Canada. A s to the scope o f the negotiations, M ackenzie was satisfied that the restoration of the free list in the treaty of 1854 (as was proposed by the British governm ent) “could not now m eet the requirem ents o f the trad e o f the country nor be in itself a satis­ factory exchange for the fishery com pensation and other advan­ tages expected from C anada by the U nited States under the im plied term s o f the T reaty of W ashington.” 3 H e proposed to extend the list m aterially by adding m anufactured articles. T o this there were three objections: to the argum ent that it would injuriously affect British exporters he sim ply replied th at they also would receive the advantages of any reduction o f duties. H e satisfied him self by consulting C anadian m anufacturers that they would not m ake any protest. T he third difficulty, and the one w hich w orried him most, was the loss of revenue conse­ quent on partial rem oval of duties; and he was thus torn between a desire for lower tariffs and a fear of increased taxation, already felt to be threatened by the cost o f the Pacific railw ay.4 T he C anadian proposals w ere agreed on in A pril by correspondence

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betw een Brown, w ho was in W ashington as agent or plenipoten­ tiary from F ebruary to June, and M ackenzie, in consultation w ith C artw right (the m inister of finance). T hey finally took the form of a long m em orandum signed by T h ornton and Brown, and w ere read to H am ilton Fish, the secretary of state, on April 27. T h e tone o f the m em orandum 5 is set by the statem ent that “an im partial exam ination o f the com m ercial relations between the U nited States and the British N orth A m erican Provinces for the last fifty years, cannot fail to establish, we venture to think, beyond all doubt, th at the trade betw een them has been exceed­ ingly valuable to both countries, but th at the U nited States have, from first to last, reaped the largest advantage from it.” T he “im partial exam ination” then shows th at the U nited States had suffered m ore than C anada from abrogation of the treaty of 1854, and th at the A m erican tariff prevented enlarged trade with Canada. T he British representatives (Brown and T hornton) had, on M arch 28, proposed to Fish a renewal of the treaty of 1854 as a substitute for the arbitration provision of the W ash­ ington T reaty. Fish then suggested an enlargem ent o f the scope o f the treaty, and, while leaving it to the other side to m ake a proposition, m entioned enlargem ent o f the C anadian canals, and the addition o f some m anufactures to the free list. T h e C anadian proposals in the m em orandum w ere: (1 ) to add to the free list under the treaty o f 1854 m anufactures of iron, steel, o r w ood, agricultural im plem ents, oils, and some item s of lesser im portance; (2 ) th at A m erican fishermen should have access to the C anadian coast fisheries on the sam e term s as under the T reaty o f W ashington; (3 ) th a t the coasting trade of each country should be open to the vessels of the other; (4 ) that the canals o f each country should be open to the vessels of the other, the C anadian canals be enlarged, L ake M ichigan be open during the duration of the treaty to navigation by C anadian vessels, and that vessels o f either country be open to registry in the other; (5 ) th at joint com missions be form ed for the im­ provem ent of the rivers St. C lair and D etroit and Lake St. Clair, for the erection o f lighthouses, and for the preservation of fish in inland w aters; (6 ) that citizens of either country m ight secure patents in the other; and (7 ) th a t a joint study be m ade of the prevention of illicit trade. Fish received the m em orandum w ithout enthusiasm and car­ ried on fu rth er negotiations in a m anner hardly m ore satisfac­ tory to Brow n, w ho m anaged to retain, however, a restrained

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optim ism .6 A d raft treaty was agreed on in the middle of Ju n e,7 and Brown was alm ost frantic lest it be delayed too long fo r the Senate’s consideration. H is fears proved to be well founded, for the Senate declared that the last few days o f the session did not allow time for p roper consideration of the treaty; and w hen it did com e before th at body in the following F ebruary it was rejected. So fell, once m ore, the C anadian hopes o f reciprocity, and the Liberal governm ent w as obliged to tu rn from diplom acy to face the growing dem and for salvation by protective tariffs. In the session o f 1876 both houses of parliam ent devoted long hours o f debate to the causes and cure o f the depression. The m ain thread of the argum ent was the effect on C anada of her com m ercial relations with G reat Britain and the U nited States; and, following on that, w hether the solution o f the problem lay in m ore tariff protection. N o pretence was m ade th at there was not a depression: the difference o f opinion consisted in various views as to how it should be m et. D avid Mills, in moving fo r a select com m ittee to inquire into the causes, said th at he was of opinion “th at we are suffering to a very considerable extent from com m ercial depression in consequence o f o ur intim ate com m er­ cial relations w ith the trade o f the adjoining republic. . . . It is n ot very easy for the m erchant to rem ain prosperous while his custom ers are impoverished, and it is not very easy fo r the people o f this country who are engaged in com m ercial pursuits to be in a highly prosperous condition w hile those with whom they are dealing are suffering from financial depression.”8 The accusation was frequently m ade th at C anada was a “slaughterm ark et,” either fo r G reat Britain, o r the U nited States, o r both. O ne m em ber o f the H ouse o f Com m ons revived the argum ent th at the A m ericans were trying, by econom ic pressure, to drive C anada into annexation.0 A nd so the debate w ent on, for hour after hour, w ith lectures on the balance o f trade, presentation o f tables o f figures, and num erous accounts of the hardships o f this or that industry. The only practical focus o f the discussion could be the tariff. T o the supporters of free trade England stood as the exam ple o f suc­ cess; the advocates o f protection held up the U nited States as the leading case fo r their thesis. All this was ground th a t the legislatures o f the old provinces and o f the federation had gone over, again and again. Y et it seemed ever fresh to each genera­ tion. A nd perhaps the pressure o f econom ic hardship was real

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enough to justify yet another re-exam ination o f the Canadian policy. Certainly no better time could be found for the furth er­ ing o f the protectionist creed. In both houses it found a num ber of convinced advocates as well as m ore cautious m em bers who seemed to be on the verge of conversion. T he ranks of the defenders of “the grand principles o f free trad e” were by no m eans broken, but no count was taken w hen the battle was over. T he H ouse of C om m ons had the m ore specific task o f passing a budget. In his budget speech R. J. C artw right, the m inister of finance, pointed to the decreased trade and the consequently reduced revenue. T he governm ent, he said, had “been im por­ tuned from m any quarters to declare themselves in favour of a high tariff. Som e o f the gentlem en w ho have addressed us have done so as the advocates of protection, pure and simple; others . . . have contended, and not w ithout force, that circum stanced as we are, in connection w ith the people o f the U nited States, it becomes the duty of the A dm inistration to m eet the peculiar policy of that people with a reciprocal policy in the sam e direc­ tion.” C artw right was not prepared to take a free-trade stand, but he argued against the supposed advantages of high protec­ tion, and found that it had brought evils in its train in the U nited States. H igh protection, having failed in the U nited States, w ould not be introduced into C anada w here it w ould increase taxation and enrich the few. So the tariff should rem ain at its existing level.10 Resistance to tariff increases was m aintained with difficulty, and was partly unexpected in view o f increases already m ade. T he d rift tow ard higher protection, which in any case was becom ing m ore m arked, was fu rth er intensified by the continuance o f depression. Evidence taken by select com m ittees o f the H ouse o f C om m ons revealed the pressure by m anufactur­ ing interests tow ards higher protection. T he com m ittee of 1874, for exam ple, on the basis of replies to a questionnaire from 215 m anufacturers, reported a general com plaint against the “unequal com petition” w ith the U nited States, and a claim that higher rates would not necessarily raise prices to the consum er.11 In 1877 the T oronto Board of T rade changed to a policy of protection, and in the following year the M anufacturers’ Asso­ ciation of O ntario, w hich had form erly been divided on the issue, voted unanim ously for a national policy.12 U nder the circum stances the Liberal policy was hard to defend and the continual sniping o f the opposition foreshadow ed their adop­ tion of a program m e of protective duties. T he Conservatives, indeed, w ere not slow in taking advantage of the opportunity of

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offering a cure for an adm itted com plaint. Sir John M acdonald m ade a prolonged defence o f protection in the H ouse of C om ­ m ons. In the upper H ouse S enator Read, a confessed believer in protection, m oved fo r a “ national policy” by w hich reciprocity o f trade with the U nited States was obtained or a reciprocity of tariffs was established by C anada.13 In introducing the budget in 1877 C artw right was obliged to rep o rt a deficit o f nearly two million dollars for the previous year. T here w ere, however, in his opinion, special reasons for this: extraordinary expenditures, shrinkage o f trade, and a bad harvest. D epression was universal, and the U nited States, with its protective system, had suffered m ore than had Canada. But the depth o f the depression had, he believed, been reached; and while some m odifications in the tariff were proposed, there was to be no m aterial change. In the course of the long attack on the governm ent’s policy, T upper concluded th at there had been no im provem ent in econom ic conditions, “nothing to justify the hon. gentlem an in refusing to so readjust the tariff of C an ad a as to p rotect and preserve her credit.” T he governm ent, he said, “have nailed their colours to the free-trade m ast, and that sooner than yield, they will go down w ith the ship, and down they will go.” 14 In the session of 1878 the sam e debate, with m uch the sam e argum ents, was continued, and on M arch 7 Sir John M acdonald m oved: That the H ouse is o f the opinion that the welfare o f Canada requires the adoption o f a N ational Policy, which, by a judicious readjustm ent o f the tariff, will benefit and fo ster the agricultural, the m ining, the m anufacturing and other interests o f the D o­ m inion; that such a policy w ill retain in Canada thousands o f our fellow countrym en now obliged to expatriate them selves in search o f the em ploym ent denied them at hom e, will restore prosperity to our struggling industries, now so sadly depressed, will prevent Canada fro m being m ade a sacrifice m arket, will encourage and develop an active interprovincial trade, and m oving (as it ought to do) in the direction o f a reciprocity o f tariffs with our neighbour, so far as the varied interests o f Canada m ay dem and, will greatly tend to procure fo r this country, eventually, a reciprocity o f trade.15 This guarded but all-em bracing proposition was then defended. By sweeping references to history and to contem porary condi­ tions, M acdonald sought to prove that no country had risen to prosperity on free trade, and that none had survived which was

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entirely agricultural. Exam ples w ere adduced, from A thens to m odern Russia, to strengthen the case, and a sad picture was painted o f the depressed state o f industry in C anada and of the m any C anadians w ho were forced to seek em ploym ent in the U nited States. T h e election cam e in Septem ber, still in the m idst o f hard tim es, and the Conservatives w ere returned to office w ith a m ajority of eighty-six. In M arch 1879 Sir L eonard Tilley, the new m inister o f finance, introduced the budget th at was to give effect to the N ational Policy. T he C onservative party lived up to its pledge of greater protection. T he new tariff, as com pared w ith the previous one (th at of 1874), was m ore com plicated and considerably higher. W here fully m anufactured goods had form erly paid 17]/2 p er cent they w ere now to pay up to 30 per cent, and in som e cases the rate w as as high as 40 per cent. A wide range o f goods was covered, and in general the tariff “represented a decision to prom ote industrialization in term s of a C anadian rath er than a N o rth A m erican m arket.” 16 F o r ten years thereafter fu rth e r modifications in the tariff were all in an upw ard direction, until new circum stances forced reductions once m ore.

II T h e L iberal and Conservative parties differed on the height o f the tariff; and by an em phasis on the protection of hom e industries the latter m ight have seemed to m inim ize the sig­ nificance of external trade. T his, how ever, it was never intended to do. T h ere was a firm belief th a t C anadian industry and agri­ culture could flourish only behind the shelter of a tariff wall, but no C anadian governm ent had ever failed to point to the value o f foreign trade. T he H ansard o f these years is studded with statistics, and the deduction was constantly m ade that the woes o f the dom inion w ere due in large p art to a decline in the volume of trade. T he “N ational Policy” was intended not as a brake but as a stim ulant to trade, and w hether or not it was the cause, the event was w hat had been desired. T he picture began to look m ore cheerful, as the following figures show .17 YEAR

1879 1880 1881

IMPORTS FROM U.K.

$30,967,778 33,764,439 42,885,142

IMPORTS FROM U .S.

TOTAL

$42,170,306 28,193,783 36,338,701

$78,702,519 69,900,542 90,488,329

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M ore interest was centred on the figures for exports, which w ere distinctly encouraging.18 YEAR

EXPORTS TO U.K.

TO U.S.

EXPORTS TOTAL

1879 1880 1881

$29,393,424 35,208,031 42,637,219

$25,491,356 29,566,211 34,038,431

$62,431,025 72,899,697 83,944,701

T he balance of trad e was still unfavourable, which disturbed some of the parliam entary econom ists, but the volum e o f ex­ ports w as a respectable and an increasing one. N early half of C an ad a’s external trade was w ith the U nited K ingdom , som e 40 p er cen t w ith the U nited States, and only about 10 per cent with all o th er countries. T he N ational Policy explicitly left the door open fo r reciprocity, but it was im probable th at the U nited States would accept the invitation. T he free-trade policy o f the U nited K ingdom offered no opportunity fo r extension by gov­ ernm ental action. T here rem ained, how ever, the rest of the wide world w ith w hich to trade; and w hat was a relatively small volum e m ight be increased by m eans o f tariff bargaining as well as o th er means. T he m ost hopeful direction in w hich to look seemed to be the British, French, and Spanish W est Indies, trade with w hich was traditional, but had not grow n as was hoped. A t the sam e tim e w ere added, as possible custom ers, Brazil and M exico; and (arising out of negotiations on colonies) Spain itself. T h e only great pow er w ith w hich direct trad e negotiations w ere considered w as France. F o r the benefit of the H ouse o f C om m ons detailed statistics were prepared on trad e w ith the W est Indies, Brazil, and M exico since 1875.10 T rade w ith M exico proved to be insignificant. In 1874 and 1875 C anada had im ported a large am ount of sugar from Brazil, and in 1880 this was recom m enced. Im ports from British and foreign W est Indian islands w ere scattered over a n um ber o f items, but were only in large volum e in sugar, molasses, and salt. L um ber, fish, and m anufactured articles were exported to Brazil in sm all am ounts. Fish was m uch the largest export to the W est Indies, with sm all quantities o f agricultural and m an u factured products. P arliam ent was distressed by the slow grow th of W est Indian trade; particularly - as some m em ­ bers argued - on the ground th at it was highly profitable, show ­ ing a favourable balance o f trade, and offering opportunities for C anadian shipping. L ong hours of debate w ere spent in attem pts to analyse the reasons fo r the sm all am ount o f trade, and two

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m ain causes w ere put forw ard: th at steam com m unication was inadequate; and th at the C anadian tariff prevented the purchase o f raw sugar, w hich w ould be the natural exchange for C ana­ dian products. T h e second consideration becam e bogged in p arty discussions of the tariff. T he first was met by the com ple­ tion o f an agreem ent w ith the governm ent of Brazil, under which the two countries w ere to subsidize a line of steam ships to Brazil and the W est Indies. T he arrangem ent cam e into opera­ tion in 1882, but later broke down. O ne o f the chief com petitors in W est Indian trad e w as the U nited States, and w hen that co untry negotiated a flag treaty with Spain in 1885, allowing A m erican ships the sam e privileges as Spanish in the Spanish W est Indies, alarm was expressed in C anada. T he only answer could be the conclusion of an equally satisfactory arrangem ent w ith Spain. T he diplom ats were also needed to encourage trade with F rance. T he registry o f C anadian ships in that country was found to be - because of the form o f an A nglo-French treaty on less favourable term s than the registry of British ships. T o secure an equally advantageous position, the C anadian govern­ m ent was prepared to reduce the tariff on French wines, the bargain to be sealed in a com m ercial treaty. It was not enough to talk o f the superior ch aracter of C anadian goods: not enough even to exhibit w ares at international exhibitions, such as those at Sydney, Philadelphia, and Paris. T rading was bargaining; but international bargaining could be conducted only through tradi­ tional and recognized channels. By such logic w ere Canadians driven to study the com plicated structure o f the British Em pire. T h e position had to be exam ined from m ore than one point o f view: the effect on C anada o f existing British treaties, the extent to w hich C anada could conduct h er own foreign rela­ tions, and the m achinery - existing o r to be created - by which C anadian affairs abroad could be conducted. Before confedera­ tion, and in the first decade after it, th e practice was to include the colonies in British treaties o f com m erce. M any of these trea­ ties obligated C anada to give m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent to the countries concerned; and two of them —th at w ith Belgium of 1862, and that w ith the G erm an Zollverein o f 1865 —extended to the relations betw een C anada and G re at Britain, thus com pli­ cating the establishm ent of an im perial preferential tariff. In 1877 the British governm ent proposed th at the self-governing colonies should be notified o f a pending com m ercial treaty, and given the option o f adhering to it or being explicitly excluded. T h e adoption of this principle allowed the C anadian governm ent

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a new freedom o f action o f w hich it took advantage.20 In 1881, for exam ple, the colonial secretary transm itted to the governor general a letter from the foreign office stating that negotiations will probably be opened shortly w ith the E gyp ­ tian governm ent, fo r the conclusion o f a com m ercial treaty with E gypt; and I have to request that you will inform m e, at yo u r earliest convenience, w hether there are any m atters in respect o f which yo u r governm ent desires to m a ke any special proposals. T he colonial article referred to in the enclosed letter is the clause now adopted, exem pting the colony under your govern­ m ent, and others o f the m ore im portant colonies, fro m the operation o f the treaty, but providing that its stipulations m ay be applied to any such colonies on notice to that effect being given within one year fro m the date o f the exchange o f the ratifications o f the treaty. In this case the C anadian governm ent did not wish to be in ­ cluded; but in a convention of com m erce between the U nited K ingdom and M orocco, which had lim ited obligations, the opposite decision was m ade. A third negotiation of the same year was w ith E cuador. T he colonial secretary sent to the gov­ ern o r general a copy o f the treaty, already signed, together with a d raft protocol which was to be signed before ratification o f the treaty was executed. T he draft read as follows: T he undersigned, in proceeding to the exchange o f the ratifi­ cations o f the treaty . . . between H er M ajesty and the R epublic o f the Equator, have agreed to the present Protocol. T h e stipulations o f the aforesaid Treaty shall not be appli­ cable to the Colonies and foreign possessions o f H er Britannic M ajesty hereinafter nam ed, that is to say: T he D om inion o f Canada. . . . P rovided always that the stipulations o f the aforesaid Treaty shall be m ade applicable to any or all o f the above-m entioned colonies or foreign possessions o f H er B ritannic M ajesty, on whose behalf notice to that effect shall be given within one year fro m the date hereof, by H er Britannic M ajesty’s M inister at Q uito to the Ecuadorian M inister fo r Foreign Affairs. T he colonial secretary’s letter was dated July 8, 1881. On O ctober 14, 1882, a request for an early reply followed, and it was not until N ovem ber 16, 1882, th at the governor general was able to reply that the privy council had reported against inclu­

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sion in the treaty. T he wheels of O lym pus ground slow. In 1880 th e C anadian governm ent asked to be excluded from a treaty w ith Roum ania. In the sam e year a treaty was m ade w ith Serbia and, apparently inadvertently, C anada w as included w ithout being consulted. T he colonial office then inquired if this was satisfactory, and on hearing from O ttaw a that it was not, had to request the S erbian governm ent to have C anada excluded by action of the national assembly. A part from such a slip, the technique in respect o f new British treaties seemed to w ork sm oothly; and problem s arising out o f treaties concluded earlier had to be m et as they arose. All such treaties, w hether o r n ot they w ere advantageous to C anada, w ere not initiated w ith the object of m eeting particular C an a­ dian needs. Y et such needs existed, as, fo r exam ple, the im ­ provem ent of trade with the Spanish W est Indies and the sale of wooden ships to F rance. Since C anada had no pow er to con­ clude com m ercial (o r any oth er) treaties by her own authority, it becam e necessary to w ork out a system w ithin the imperial fram ew ork as it then was. Like m ost such imperial problem s, this one was m et by experim ents of practice rather than consti­ tutional definition. F ro m the C anadian point o f view it was essential that Canadians, versed in the m atter a t hand, should play a m ajor role in negotiations, w hatever their legal status m ight be. T here being no C anadian political representative abroad, Sir A lexander G alt was dispatched in the autum n of 1878 on a special mission to M adrid and Paris. F orm al negoti­ ations with the Spanish and French authorities w ere conducted by the British am bassadors at the capitals, it being left to them to consult with G alt and to arrange for him to discuss details w ith the governm ents in question. If a draft convention were concluded it w ould be sent to the British governm ent and would have to be approved both by it and the C anadian governm ent before its signature was authorized. A s it proved, th at stage was never reached, not apparently through the fault of the procedure o r the negotiators, but from the com plications caused by a third party in the F rench scene, and by a change of governm ent in M adrid. G alt’s official reports to the governm ent contain no hints as to the adequacy o f the procedure, being for the m ost p art accounts o f interviews and correspondence w ith British and F rench officials.21 H is private letters to M acdonald, however, describe the early difficulties that arose in Paris. H e arrived there in D ecem ber, arm ed w ith letters from the foreign office;

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but L ord Lyons acted w ith w hat G alt considered to be a dis­ courtesy and deliberation th at stood in the w ay of success.22 A fter bearing it w ith im patience for a short tim e, G alt w rote to the foreign office. H is appeal had “a w onderful effect. N ext day I got an affectionate note from L ord Lyons . . . before I had time to answ er it he called on me in person an d m ade all proper am ends, saying he had arranged an interview fo r to-day with the M inister o f C om m erce - apologized about not having asked us to dine and asked us to com e to-day. . . .”23 G alt then w ent ahead w ith direct negotiations, and considered that he was on the verge o f success when the F rench drew back because of a com plication caused by tariff relations w ith A ustria-H ungary. In sending his report hom e, he again show ed th at he was not w ithout a diplom atic sense, pointing o u t th at, if negotiations failed fo r the tim e being, the C anadian term s should be kept secret against a later renewal o f discussions.24 Passing on to M adrid G alt found his relations w ith the am bassador there w ere sm ooth, and in dealing with the Spanish he adopted the usual bargaining device of m axim um term s: “O ur m em orandum ,” he w rote to M acdonald, “covers concessions th at if granted would go fa r to give C anada the w hole carrying trade between the U nited States and C uba - as well as exceptional advantages fo r o u r own productions. But you m ust not expect us to obtain all this. I shall be quite satisfied if we get a substantial rebate on the duties on our productions, w ith the privilege o f the Spanish Flag - fo r the mail steam ship line. . . .” 25 T h e Spanish, like the French, negotiations failed of success at the tim e, but - as in the case of the A m erican negotiations the advantages o f participation in them o f a m an well-versed in C anadian affairs w ere fully dem onstrated. Exactly w hat the status o f the C anadian in such discussions should be was still an open question, but there was a growing feeling in C anada that it should be in som e w ay diplom atic, and th at the representative fo r the negotiation o f trade treaties m ight well be also the holder of a new office proposed to be set up in L ondon. T he im portance of having a C anadian representative in E ngland had led first to the appointm ent o f one with semi-official standing. Sir John Rose was, from 1869 to 1880, accredited to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent “ as a gentlem an possessing the confidence of the C anadian G overnm ent w ith w hom H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent m ay properly com m unicate on C anadian affairs.”20 T he experi­ m ent was fully justified by results, for Rose was able to handle such questions as the transfer o f the H udson’s Bay territory, the

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negotiations leading up to the joint high com mission at W ash­ ington, and C anadian Pacific Railway finance. T he C anadian governm ent, how ever, was anxious to regularize this ill-defined position, and while in E ngland in 1879 M acdonald, Tilley, and T u p p er w rote a m em orandum on the subject for the colonial secretary. In it they argued that the tim e had com e w hen rela­ tions between the dom inion and the hom e governm ent could no longer be satisfactorily m aintained purely by correspondence through the governor general, and th at an officer should be stationed in L ondon who would discuss directly the various m atters of com m on concern, thus obviating the necessity of periodic visits o f C anadian m inisters. Such officer, they sug­ gested, could be accredited, in association w ith the imperial representative, to a foreign court for particular negotiations. T he suggested title for the new officer was “ resident m inister,” and his status w ould be “quasi-diplom atic.” In N ovem ber the colonial secretary sent a copy of this m em orandum to the gov­ ern o r general, w ith a covering letter. T he British governm ent approved of the general idea, but suggested two m odifications: since C anada was an integral part of the em pire, the C anadian representative could hardly be diplom atic; the foreign secretary would decide w hat p art he m ight play in foreign negotiations. In D ecem ber the C anadian privy council reported that, while they still held th at the position was quasi-diplom atic, they were satisfied with the arrangem ents proposed by the colonial secre­ tary. They suggested, as a title, “High Com m issioner of C anada in L ondon.” A brief cable in F ebruary 1880 contained the recognition of Sir A lexander G alt as high com m issioner, and he sailed in M arch.27 Proposals th at there should be a diplom atic representative of C anada in London had m ore than once been m ade,28 and G alt was impressed by that aspect of his office. Shortly before sailing fo r England he discussed w ith M acdonald the term s of his instructions, and w rote a m em orandum em bodying his ideas.29 T h e proposals are startling in their extent, though G alt pointed o ut th at he w ould not advise putting them all in the official instructions, o r expect them to be carried out at once. The m em orandum reads as follows: N om ination o f R esident M inister m arks a new era in C olo­ nial adm inistration. To be attended w ith greatest probability o f success, it should be done with studied deliberation and fo r­ m ality. T he m inister should not present his credentials until the

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governm ents are prepared effectively to enter upon im portant negotiations, and his arrival should be sim ultaneous with the announcem ent o f such negotiations. In m y opinion it would be a grave error to allow the M ission to assum e the appearance o f having its real duties in the Finan­ cial and E m igration arrangem ents - which m ust inevitably arise if the advent o f the M inister be not m arked by serious ap­ proaches to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent, and if the first im pres­ sion relative to its im portance be fo rm e d by the British public through the announcem ent that the Financial and Em igration duties have been assum ed by the M ission. T o give due prom inence to the concession made by the Im ­ perial G overnm ent in this respect, the arrival o f the M inister should be accom panied with the announcem ent o f im portant international negotiations. Subsequently - w ithin fro m one to three m onths, but not sim ultaneously, the m inister should be instructed to take over the supervision o f finance and em igra­ tion — th u s in the m ost direct m anner, m aking it apparent to the governm ent and people o f E ngland that the real im port o f the mission is to be sought in its political aspect. Certain subjects have already been subm itted to the British G overnm ent and rem ain in abeyance. O f these the m ore im portant are — T he negotiation o f treaties with foreign nations. T he Pacific Railw ay - and developm ent o f N orth West. A review o f com m ercial relations - pointing to an im perial custom s union. In regard to the first subject the object is to secure the thor­ ough support o f the im perial governm ent. T he appointm ent o f a Canadian envoy is valuable and his inform ation indispensable, but success will largely depend on the bona fide support given by the Foreign Office. T his support will only be given w hen the views o f the Im perial G overnm ent on other subjects are brought into accord w ith those o f Canada. T he second subject is so connected w ith the last that they m a y be considered as one, because the principle o f a com m ercial union is that o f vital political identity and will be fo u n d the m ost p o w erfu l agent in arranging the others. C ircum stances peculiarly fa vo u r the present discussion o f all these subjects. The term ination o f all England’s com m ercial treaties perm its a change o f policy.

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A m arked change o f public feeling is growing up respecting free trade. T he agricultural distress is anxiously seeking a rem edy. T he great N o rth W est relieves E ngland fro m dependence on foreign nations fo r fo o d — and opens illim itable field fo r emigration. T he Pacific railway thus becom es as necessary fo r England as fo r Canada. Instead therefore o f asking fo r guarantee, let a larger and m ore com prehensive proposal be subm itted, to wit: Practically a substantial alliance fo r certain specific national objects, based on the principle that produce and m anufactures shall respectively receive m ore favoured nation treatm ent than those o f foreign nations. T hat the Pacific railway be constructed on joint account the cost to be recouped fro m the lands. A system o f aided em igration on joint account to be organ­ ized if desired by the im perial governm ent. T he subm ission o f such a proposal w ould am ply ju stify the urgency o f the governm ent in desiring to appoint a minister. It is in accord with the views o f the governm ent and people o f Canada. I t w ould greatly conciliate public opinion in England —a nd if entertained by the Im perial G overnm ent w ould ensure their cordial support in foreign negotiations. It w ould lead to united policy and action with the other colonies. T here is no record of M acdonald’s reply to this m em oran­ dum . In p art it coincided w ith the governm ent’s policy of m ak­ ing the office diplom atic or quasi-diplom atic, but the picture of an im perial alliance w ent far beyond any recorded policy of the governm ent. Certainly the official instructions were the palest reflection o f G alt’s grandiose scheme. Ill Sir A lexander G alt was appointed under the great seal of C anada, and his instructions cam e to him from the secretary of state. G eneral correspondence was to be carried on w ith the secretary o f state; th at on financial questions w ith the m inister of finance; and on em igration m atters with the m inister o f agri­ culture. G alt was to be chief em igration agent, and the instruc­ tions laid it dow n that the encouragem ent of em igration to the

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west o f C anada was to be his first consideration, fo r only in that way could the financial burden o f the w est on the C anadian taxpayer be reduced. In the near fu tu re th e m anagem ent o f the public debt and financial correspondence w ere to be transferred to the high com m issioner. H e was to carry on negotiations con­ cerning the Esquim alt graving dock; assist the C anadian cattle trade; and sound out the British governm ent o n th e delicate subjects o f assistance to the Pacific Railw ay and a British zollverein. In foreign affairs he was to w atch the fishery questions arising o u t of the W ashington T reaty, rem em bering th at the C anadian governm ent did not wish to take th e initiative in any negotiations on them . C areful instructions w ere given on com m ercial treaties. Treaties had been m ade since 1867 which affected the freedom o f action of the dom inion, and it was desired th at C anada should be relieved from obligations as occasion arose, and not fu rth er com m itted w ithout her approval. W henever special arrangem ents in a treaty w ere desired in the C anadian interest the British governm ent w ould be asked to accredit the high com m issioner to the foreign pow er, to act in concert w ith the im perial representative. In his short tenure o f office (1880-1883) G alt p u t his hand to the m ultifarious tasks outlined both in form al instructions and private letters from the m inisters. M uch of his tim e was spent on securing im m igrants, and - while other causes were a t w ork the num bers w ere m ultiplied during his years in London. A start was m ade tow ard trade treaties, but w ithout tangible progress. T he great plans o f the M ontreal m em orandum foundered on the change o f governm ent in E ngland, the failure o f his hopes of being regarded as a diplom at, and the lack o f m oney to establish a position in L ondon w hich he felt m ight enable him to circum ­ vent the caution o f the colonial office. A fter a year in L ondon he w rote to M acdonald. “I think you should insist now on your Representative being recognized as a m em ber o f the Corps D iplom atique. It is really the only proper definition of his rank, and the only w ay to ensure p roper respect here. A s a Colonial these ‘arro gant insulars’ turn up their noses a t us all.”30 N o such change, how ever, was m ade in the position o f the office; and w hether or not the C anadian governm ent wished to have diplo­ m atic status for the high com m issioner, they w ere able to quote the existing arrangem ent against one type o f parliam entary com plaint. Sir C harles T upper, G alt’s successor, was criticized fo r doubling the roles of high com m issioner and m inister of railways; and w hen he took p art in the election o f 1891, it was

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argued th at a diplom at should keep free from party politics. In reply Sir John T hom pson stated that the high com m issioner “is nothing but the agent o f the governm ent living in London. His Excellency the G overnor G eneral is the m edium o f com m unica­ tion betw een this governm ent and H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent, and no other can be h a d .. . . H e does not occupy, either at home o r abroad, such a position as an am bassador in the diplom atic service of the British G overnm ent holds.”31 A private letter from M acdonald to L ord Stanley, how ever, gives a som ew hat different picture o f the practice, if not of the constitutional position: B y degrees the Colonial M inisters [i.e., secretaries] have be­ gun to treat the colonial representatives as diplom atic agents, rather than as subordinate executive officers and to consult them as such. Canada has fo u n d it advantageous on several occasions to have Sir Charles Tupper dealt with as a quasi m em ber o f the corps diplom atique and I have no doubt the colonial secretary has been assisted by his experience w hich Sir Charles gained during his service as a cabinet m inister in Canada. W e do not desire, however, to give him a "free hand” on any subject in discussion with the Im perial G overnm ent. H e m ust take his instructions fro m the governm ent here, as m uch as Sir Julian Pauncefote fro m L ord Salisbury and cannot travel out o f “the fo u r corners” o f any m inute on which his nam e is m entioned.32 T u p p er, like G alt, had m any duties: rescuing C anadian cattle from being condem ned as diseased; encouraging im m igra­ tion; furthering C anadian loans (especially those of the C an a­ dian Pacific R ailw ay); and generally m aking C anada know n by speeches and a m ultitude o f social activities. In 1885, during the N orth-W est Rebellion, he was kept busy answering inquiries in England, getting inform ation from O ttaw a, and trying to correct the attitude o f the Tim es, w hich obtained its news from a cor­ respondent in Philadelphia. T he conduct o f foreign (as opposed to im perial) affairs was not the least p art of his w ork, and the one which m ost closely relates to this study. In this T upper inherited the negotiations for treaties w ith F rance and Spain, together w ith the constitutional question that had arisen in con­ nection with them , th at is, the status of a C anadian negotiator. F ro m the first T upper w as not satisfied to be appointed as an adviser instead of a plenipotentiary. In his early m onths o f office he had learned th at an international conference was to be held

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at Paris to discuss the protection o f subm arine cables. Believing th at this was a m atter o f interest to C anada, he suggested to M acdonald that he should attend, and the latter asked the gov­ ern o r general to cable a request to that effect to the colonial secretary. T he latter then applied to the foreign office for cre­ dentials, and T u p p er w as duly appointed to represent C anada. H e was pleased w ith the conference, and C anada’s place at it, and on his retu rn to L ondon he w rote to M acdonald that “I feel some pride in the fact that C anada took her place in the in ter­ national conference and on an equal footing with all the other Powers, and I m ay add that nothing could exceed the kindness and courtesy with w hich I was treated by all present.”33 In the following year the foreign secretary agreed to T upper’s request that he be m ade a plenipotentiary jointly w ith the am bassador, should the negotiations w ith Spain be officially renewed. “T his,” he w rote, “ is a very im portant point, and in the light o f G alt’s reports a very im portant one scored for C anada.”34 O n the one hand the Conservative governm ent was pressing fo r plenipotentiary pow ers, and on the o th er was resisting the claim s of the opposition for direct negotiations between C anada and foreign states. T he debate - which reappeared periodicallywas chiefly on two grounds: w hich system o f diplom acy would be m ore advantageous to C anada, and w hether greater inde­ pendence in th at one field would threaten the whole im perial structure. T he Senate w ent over the ground in 1879, the C om ­ m ons in 1882, both H ouses in 1891, and the C om m ons again in 1892. In each case there was a solid basis o f agreem ent that C anadian interests w ere not being adequately supported by the existing system o f treaty-m aking, and in each m ore general discussions of the w hole im perial question resulted. E dw ard Blake in the course o f a long speech, did not m ince his w ords: “T he history o f the diplom atic service of England, as far as C anada is concerned, has been a history o f error, blunder, w rong and concession.” His m otion was th at it would be ex­ pedient fo r C anada to obtain pow ers for direct negotiation of trade treaties, either w ith another British possession or a foreign state. M acdonald replied that it was not the failure o f the m ethod, but the effect o f unfavourable circum stances. If C anada w ere to rem ain a dependency, E ngland could hardly grant the suggested concession.35 T o some extent dem ands for direct relations with foreign states reflected the long-held belief th at English diplom ats had done little good fo r C anada. In p a rt such dem ands were the

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result of the slow speed at w hich negotiations moved. Those w ith Spain dragged on b u t seem ed always on the verge of success. T u p p er’s instructions from O ttaw a were to offer a reduction in the C anadian duty on sugar in exchange fo r a reduction on C anadian exports of fish, lum ber, potatoes, flour, and certain m anufactured goods to the W est Indies. In spite of all efforts no result was attained; though som e advantage did accrue to C anada from a British treaty w ith Spain, providing for m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent. T he local officials in H avana, how ever, proved to be a step ahead of the C anadian nationalists. T h e custom s officials w ere convinced th at Canada, being a nation, did not com e under the British treaty, and w ere only persuaded to the contrary by w ord from M adrid. T h e old system thus had its uses. In return for the concessions by Spain, certain W est Indian sugars, raw hides, coffee, and tea w ere adm itted into C anada free of duty. A futher agreem ent was reached betw een Britain and Spain through an exchange of notes in June 1894 w hereby advantages were conceded to the U nited K ingdom and the British colonies in return fo r the con­ tinuance of m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent to Spanish trade. T hough not negotiated by C anada, this w as not denounced by her, and therefore cam e into operation. T h e long negotiations w ith F rance had a m ore successful ending, though not w ithout m any difficulties. Polite rem arks w ere m ade by both parties on the affinity o f old and new France, b ut the results were due not to sentim ent but to a balancing of national interests. In the late autum n o f 1892 T upper w as sent as a plenipotentiary to Paris fo r w hat proved to be the final round. On arrival he explained to L ord D ufferin, the British am bassador, the C anadian position. This, in brief, w as to secure the adm ission o f C anadian goods under the m inim um F rench tariff and the rem oval of the surtaxe d ’entrepot as reciprocity for the existing favourable treatm ent afforded to F rench goods. T he C anadian governm ent, he explained, was no longer willing to reduce the duty on F rench wines. O n the advice of the British em bassy, T upper’s next call was at the office of the R epublique frangaise to secure favourable publicity. A fter a hurried visit to L ondon to consult w ith Sir Jo h n A bbott, he was introduced by the am bassador to the m inister fo r foreign affairs and officials of the com m erce and custom s departm ents. W ith the F rench com ­ missioners T u p p er discussed the actual figures o f trade and the concessions th at m ight be m ade by either party. H aving failed to im press the F rench representatives w ith his picture o f existing

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privileges and th e attem pts to establish steam com m unication, T u p p er fell back on the proposition to low er the duties on F ren ch wines, books, soaps, and o th er articles. Proposals and counter-proposals w ere exchanged in meetings o r by letter, T u pp er keeping in touch with his governm ent to obtain accept­ ances of each series o f m odification. T he next step was the exchange of d raft treaties. T he final term s took the form o f an “A greem ent regulating the com m ercial relations between C an­ ada and F rance in respect of custom s tariff,”30 between F rance and G re at Britain, signed for the queen by L ord D ufferin and Sir Charles T upper as plenipotentiaries on F ebruary 6, 1893. T h e duties on F rench wines, soaps, nuts, alm onds, prunes, and plum s w ere reduced. N ineteen C anadian products - including canned m eats, fish, fruit, tim ber, and wooden furniture, wooden ships, and boots and shoes - w ere to enter F rance, A lgeria, and F rench colonies un d er the m inim um tariff. In respect to these articles C anada was to enjoy m ost-favoured-nation treatm ent; w hile F ran ce and h er colonies were to have com plete m ost­ favoured-nation concessions from C anada. T he agreem ent was to be approved by the parliam ents of F rance and Canada. A fter w hat he considered to be the successful com pletion of his labours, T u p p er was surprised to find th at his governm ent was hesitant about its acceptance. A telegram instructing him not to sign until the term s had been received in O ttaw a arrived too late. T he principal points at issue were, first, a bounty to ships constructed in France, and, secondly, uncertainty as to w hether the m ost-favoured-nation clause in the treaty applied to the trade between C anada and other British possessions. O n the latter point the British governm ent gave an assurance th at it would not so apply, and the agreem ent was finally ratified in 1895, the C anadian parliam ent having passed an act (57 and 58 V iet., c. 2 ) in 1894 w hich em pow ered the governor general to proclaim assent a t a date to be settled.

IV In the sam e period as th at o f the protracted negotiations for trad e treaties w ith E uropean states the C anadian governm ent was obliged to re-enter the diplom atic field in N orth A m erica to settle the controversy once m ore raised by the apparently endless fishery dispute. T he rejection by the A m erican Senate o f the treaty of 1874 revived the arbitration provided for under the T reaty o f W ashington. F o r the board o f three, the U nited

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States nom inated E. H . K ellogg; C anada, A. T . G alt; and the neutral arb itrato r was the Belgian m inister a t W ashington, M aurice D elfosse - nam ed by the A ustrian am bassador after the failure of the interested parties to agree on other nam es which one or the other subm itted. T he com m ission finally assembled at H alifax in June 1877, accom panied by legal advisers and oth er assistants appointed by the parties. Elaborate w ritten cases w ere subm itted by the British representatives (on behalf of C an ad a and N ew foundland) and by those o f the U nited States. A fter a brief deliberation the com m issioners, by a m ajority decision, aw arded $5,500,000, payable over twelve years, as the balance due to C anada and N ew foundland for the superior value of their inshore fisheries. Kellogg dissented, and the award was received w ith general disapproval in th e U nited States. In C anada there was mild satisfaction, w hich m eant a good deal in view of the tradition o f A m erican diplom atic cunning and British defeats. Since it was an arbitration, it would hardly be p ro p er to describe G alt’s p art as th at of a successful C anadian advocate; but apparently his course w as m ade easier by a con­ viction of the justice o f the C anadian case.37 A lthough the British brief called for a sum nearly three tim es as large, th at can be put dow n to the usual technique o f bargaining. In effect there seems little doubt that C anada had obtained a generous price - though fo r th at she was to pay in international strain as well as in fish. W hether it was because o f A m erican discontent w ith the decision, o r because the arrangem ents in the treaty of 1871 failed to lay dow n an acceptable o r com plete set of rules, the fishery dispute flared up again before the ink was dry on the aw ard; and the actions and counter-actions, claims and counter­ claim s threatened those friendly relations by m eans o f which alone C anada could com fortably exist on the A m erican conti­ nent. In 1885 the A m erican governm ent announced th a t the fishery clauses of the T reaty of W ashington would be abrogated as from July 1 - th at is, in the m idst o f the season, a result which was only avoided by a tem porary agreem ent to suspend action until the end of the year.38 Following this suspension, the fishery question reverted to the pre-1871 position, and the C ana­ dian governm ent, vigorously enforcing protection of A tlantic fisheries, began to w arn off, detain, o r seize A m erican vessels, to a num ber during 1886 of forty-nine, according to the A m erican secretary o f state.39 T he C anadian parliam ent passed a retalia­ tory act stopping the purchase o f bait by A m erican fisherm en in

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C anadian ports, and perm itting the seizure of any foreign vessel illegally entering C anadian w aters, and Congress replied w ith an act (happily not p u t into effect) em pow ering the president to prevent C anadian vesels from using A m erican ports except in case o f distress. T he H ouse o f R epresentatives would have gone fu rth e r still by the stoppage o f transit by land as well as sea - a m easure o f com plete non-intercourse which it was induced by the Senate to drop. Literally the w aters w ere indeed troubled; and to the m utual seizure o f ships were added other causes of friction: A m erican discontent w ith the H alifax aw ard, com peti­ tion of C anadian fish w ith the interests of N ew E ngland packers, an inveterate taste on the p art o f certain elem ents to tw ist the lio n ’s tail (o r th at of the lion’s c u b ), and a w ell-founded suspi­ cion in the U nited States th a t C anadians were once m ore attem pting to use their fisheries as a lever to secure reciprocity. W illingness to attem pt a settlem ent was not lacking on either side, but by w hat m achinery could it be discussed? T he A m eri­ can governm ent, its m inister in L ondon declared, would not deal w ith Canada. Still less can the United. Slates’ G overnm ent consent to be drawn, at any tim e, into a discussion o f the subject with the Colonial G overnm ent o f Canada. The Treaty in question, and all the international relations arising out o f it, exist only as between the governm ents o f the U nited States and o f Great Britain, and betw een those governm ents only can they be dealt with. I f in entering upon that consideration o f the subject which the U nited States have insisted upon, the argum ents contained in the R eport o f the Canadian M inister should be advanced by H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent, I do not conceive that they will be fo u n d difficult to answ er.40 T h e m inister’s intransigent position seems not to have repre­ sented the views o f Bayard, the secretary of state, w ho had for som e tim e been struggling to m ove tow ard a peaceful settlem ent, an d w ho, in A pril, unofficially invited either M acdonald or T u p p er to discuss m atters personally w ith him .41 T upper called on Bayard in M ay and proposed the holding o f a conference in W ashington. A n exchange o f letters after his retu rn casts some light on the interview . B ayard, it now appeared, regretted the necessity o f the indirect com m unication w ith Canada, m ade necessary by her “im perfectly developed sovereignty,” but recognized th at only the envoys o f G reat B ritain could speak officially. H e w rote w arm ly of the necessity o f good relations

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w ith C anada, and w elcom ed a conference (as he said the presi­ d en t d id ), and presum ed th a t T u p p er w ould be a plenipoten­ tiary. T he British governm ent, having been driven into a dispute in w hich it had no direct interest, readily accepted the proposal; and appointed T upper, Joseph C ham berlain, and Sir Lionel Sackville W est, British m inister in W ashington, as plenipoten­ tiaries. T he official instructions called first for a discussion, and if possible am icable settlem ent, o f the N o rth A tlantic fisheries, b ut allowed w ide latitude on o th er subjects. “ Full liberty is given to you to enter upon the consideration o f any questions which m ay bear upon the issues involved, and to discuss and treat for any equivalents, w hether by m eans o f tariff concessions, or otherw ise, w hich the U nited States’ plenipotentiaries m ay be authorized to consider as a m eans of settlem ent.” T he Bering Sea fisheries m ight also be discussed if th e A m erican repre­ sentatives w ere authorized to do so.42 It was, and long had been, the C anadian aim to include the fisheries in a m ore general agreem ent th at em braced reciprocal tariff concessions, b u t the difficulty w as to get the A m ericans to broaden the agenda. M acdonald had prophesied th a t the w hole procedure was “a snare laid by the U nited States G overnm ent to entrap England into a com m ission to consider the expediency o f relaxing the term s o f the convention o f 1818” ;43 and at the first regular m eeting in W ashington the British representatives spent three hours arguing against the A m erican proposal so to lim it the conference.44 T upper had nothing but praise for C ham berlain in th at battle. O n D ecem ber 3 the British subm itted a proposal th at the fishery privileges should be revived in exchange fo r a tariff agreem ent, b u t this was refused.45 T he m eetings w ere then postponed while T u p p er and C ham berlain w ent to O ttaw a for consultation. N egotiations w ere continued in January, b ut with difficulty. A t one point C ham berlain becam e “wildly indignant” and proposed to retu rn to E ngland,46 but a treaty w as finally signed in the m iddle of F ebruary. T hough this also was rejected by the Senate, a m odus vivendi reached at the sam e tim e, p ro ­ viding for a system o f licences for A m erican fisherm en, came into effect and rem ained in effect for over thirty years. T hus the A tlantic fisheries issue was laid to rest. T upper, who pulled his full weight on the com mission, reported th a t C ham berlain and W est “could not have supported C anada w ith m ore untiring zeal than they have from first to last.”47 T h e Bering Sea question, w hich the A m ericans had kept off the agenda a t W ashington, rem ained unsettled. T he A m erican

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claim was th at it was necessary, in order to preserve the herds of seals, to prevent hunting during a p art o f the year. T he C anadian governm ent, how ever, supporting the interests of British C olum ­ bia fishermen, claim ed th a t this was a subterfuge designed to enable A m erican sealers to have a m onopoly on the coast.48 M eanw hile U nited States cutters were seizing C anadian fishing vessels on the ground th at they w ere poaching.49 Staving off an unfavourable settlem ent betw een the British and A m erican governm ents, the C anadian governm ent sent C. H. T upper, m inister o f m arine and fisheries, to W ashington in February 1890 to m eet the secretary o f state, Blaine. T he younger T upper proved to be less fortunate than his father, both in establishing a w orking arrangem ent w ith the am bassador (Sir Julian Pauncefote) and in negotiations w ith the secretary o f state. T u p p er’s status, it is true, was som ew hat am biguous, and Blaine bluntly said that he had not expected a C anadian representative, though he proved ready enough to talk to him .50 T u p p er believed that the R ussian representative w as “hand in glove w ith M r. Blaine,” and th at Pauncefote was m ore anxious to reach a settlem ent than to push C anadian interests.51 H e protested that no British m inister at W ashington was in a position to take a firm attitude. “If C anadians,” he protested, “cannot act for G reat Britain in the negotiations o f C anadian affairs the m other country should at least send out a strong and fearless m an from hom e who w ould be indifferent as to the im pression he m ight personally m ake upon the U nited States adm inistration.”52 T upper then concentrated his efforts on preventing Pauncefote from drafting a convention unfavourable to the C anadian interests. A ctually no agreem ent o f any kind was reached until 1891, w hen a tem porary stop to hunting was decided on. A t the end of that year the British and A m erican governm ents agreed on an investigation by two com m issioners, the form er appointing G . M . D aw son o f the C anadian G eological Survey and Sir G eorge Baden-Powell. A year later the whole question was referred to an international arbitral tribunal, and the aw ard was favourable to Britain and Canada. Tw o decades o f diplom acy had had diverse effects. A n obvi­ ous one was the experience gained by the C anadian governm ent and parliam ent in the problem s and procedure of negotiation. In dealing with both E uropean and A m erican governm ents C ana­ dians had encountered the advantages and the disadvantages of utilizing im perial m achinery. W hile contem poraries w ere not agreed as to w hether the balance was favourable o r not, there

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was clearly a desire for a t least a greater degree of control over diplom acy on com m ercial subjects. T he progress m ade in that direction in the eighties and early nineties appeared to be halted by the despatch o f the colonial secretary, the M arquess o f Ripon, to the governor general in Ju n e 1895, w hich laid down the principle th at “to give the colonies the pow er o f negotiating treaties fo r them selves w ithout reference to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent, would be to give them an international status as separate and sovereign states.” T h a t principle, how ever, was not pushed to an extrem e in operation; and in 1907, w hen the C anadian governm ent wished to open negotiations w ith F rance, the foreign secretary (Sir E dw ard G rey) ruled that it was the intention to prevent negotiations from being unknow n to the British governm ent; and explained to the am bassador in Paris th at C anadians w ould be the negotiators, th at they w ould doubt­ less keep him inform ed, and that he w ould sign an agreem ent with two C anadian plenipotentiaries.53 C hanges continued to be m ade in constitutional practice in respect o f com m ercial treaties. T o some C anadians th at deve­ lopm ent was alm ost an end in itself, but by others it was m ore properly judged as a m eans o f achieving satisfactory relation­ ships w ith foreign states. T he subject m atter o f the negotiations was in m ost cases com m ercial, and frequently there was no political issue involved. But the line of dem arcation was not exact, and the com m ercial merged into the political w here the m ost fundam ental external interests o f C anada w ere concerned. M ajor changes in tariff arrangem ents with the U nited K ingdom or the U nited States involved decisions on policy in a field w ider than com m erce, a n d - s o it seemed to co ntem poraries-decisio n s w hich w ould define the future relation of C anada w ith the two great pow ers w ith which her fate was bound.54

CH A PTER 8

Canada, the Empire, and the United States

T h e foreign policy of any state is an expression o f the attem pt to m aintain o r establish a series o f relationships w ith other countries, the whole being designed to prom ote security and prosperity. Any com bination of a variety o f factors, such as geography, race, historical connections, and econom ic position, m ay determ ine the nature o f the policy adopted. Being m ade up o f a series of relationships, foreign policy entails the balancing o f one objective against another, and not infrequently the balancing of one state against another. C hanging conditions at hom e o r abroad, changing relations between two foreign states, lead to m odifications o f policy from time to time. Such a general definition m ay be applied to the foreign, or, to be m ore exact, to the external, policy o f C anada. T he alteration o f phrase reveals the one unusual aspect o f the position of the dominion. C an ad a was not a sovereign state but a u nit w ithin an em pire, though grown beyond any know n m eaning o f the w ord colony. T h at im perial connection, in itself a changing one, w as con­ stantly reviewed both by the m other country and its adult child. It brought obligations as well as advantages to both, the relative strengths o f w hich w ere assessed anew by each generation. A s in the forties, C anadians in the last quarter of the nine­ teenth century were earnestly seeking to find an external policy best calculated to further the interests of their country.T heoreti­ cally there w ere, as usual, three simple answers: independence, annexation to the U nited States, o r com plete absorption within the em pire. E ach o f these extrem es had supporters, but m ore characteristic w ere the m any com prom ises. R ather than accept the stark black and w hite offered by the doctrinaires, most C anadians chose a grey, allowing for alm ost endless shades according to the m ixture. T he force o f attraction tow ard each o f the extrem e poles depended on the circum stances o f the time. Independence m ade its appeal w hen fear o f attack was absent, and w hen there was a w eakening of im perial sentim ent caused either by particular dissatisfaction w ith British handling of

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C anadian affairs o r British coolness tow ard “the connection.” T hose w ho favoured annexation to the U nited States could sim ilarly find argum ents when im perial sentim ent was low and some tangible econom ic advantage could be show n. T he picture m ust be seen from two angles to be correctly interpreted. Strengthened relations with either the U nited K ingdom o r the U nited States depended not only on the wishes of Canadians, b ut also on the policies o f those other countries. T h at a bargain requires the action o f two parties was am ply illustrated for C an ad a in her trade relations w ith both great powers. C ircum stances com bined in the eighties to bring to the fore in b oth G reat Britain and C anada serious consideration o f the future o f the em pire. In the m other country the influence of the “ little Englanders” of the m iddle of the century was giving way before a revived im perialism firmly grounded on discern­ ible interests and decorated by touches of em otion. Free trade lost som e of its charm in the face o f foreign tariff barriers and com petitive industrialism in E uropean states. T h e nationalism of the old w orld spread to colonial areas and threatened to shut out the British m erchant. L ivingstone’s discoveries in tropical A frica created a fresh interest am ongst the English, and a new era of expansion set in. H istorians like Sir John Seeley and J. A. F ro u d e p u t the m ovem ent in its setting, while Sir Charles D ilke portrayed the existing em pire o f his G reater Britain. Joseph C ham berlain led a succession of statesm en along the new path, while Cecil Rhodes showed again th at the flag follows trade. Im perialism found its poet in R udyard Kipling, who brought the em pire w ithin the understanding o f every schoolboy.1 T he new im perialism em braced the self-governing colonies as well as the lands fresh to E uropeans. T he search for new fields of investm ent turned British eyes tow ard the m ore advanced colo­ nies, and a t the sam e tim e projects of greater im perial integra­ tion appealed to those w ho had no conscious econom ic motive. F o r the average C anadian the tropical areas, with their ivory and rubber, their problem s of slavery, policing, and railways, w ere rom antic but rem ote. It was in the relations o f the U nited K ingdom and the self-governing colonies that he had a direct interest. Like the Englishm en, he m ight see visions o f a pax Britannica, of a w orld ruled and enlightened by British ideas and institutions; but, also like the Englishm an, he was aw ake to an understanding o f w hat th at m eant for him in the less distant fu tu re and w ith reference to his particular situation. C anada was a country deeply com m itted to external trade, with a great

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area to develop and defend, needing diplom atic m achinery and support to sustain those interests. T he receptive m ood o f the U nited K ingdom caused official and unofficial opinion in Canada to look m ore tow ard a closer alignm ent w ith her, but by no m eans w ithout conditions, w ithout frequent glances in other directions. Probably m ost C anadians who gave thought to the situation at all w ould have chosen, as the ideal, m ore favourable trad e agreem ents with both the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States, w ithout change in the political relation with either. A m inority would have accepted, o r even sought, closer union w ith G reat Britain. A much sm aller m inority w ould have been ready fo r closer union with the U nited States as an accom pani­ m ent to extensive reciprocity. In either case critics could point to the danger o f entangling alliances. T his broad question of external policy was many-sided. The chief aspects w ere political, econom ic, and m ilitary, each affecting the other, but each having tem porarily a leading im portance depending on the circum stances of the day. W hile bearing in m ind the necessary connection between these aspects, the approach in the present chapter will be in the m ain from a p articular side o f the econom ic phase, w hich took concrete form in the choice between two paths: the one leading tow ard im perial preferential trade, w ith o r w ithout political federation; the other tow ard unrestricted reciprocity o r “com m ercial union,” w ith the shadow o f political union behind it. F or the m ajor political parties there was dynam ite either way, and both looked fo r com prom ise form ulas w hich would encourage m ore voters than they alarm ed. O ne group - for it never becam e quite a political party - had struggled to create a national point of view m ore original than the phrasem aking o f the older parties. T he C anada First m ovem ent of the seventies had em phasized C ana­ dian achievem ents, C anadian unity, and a C anadian character not merely a copy o f the m odes o f other lands. A ttacked from all sides the m ovem ent was driven from its brief attem pt to form a political party, and its m em bers w ent in varied directions; but its influence on political thought was lasting. F o r purposes of im plem enting plans for external policy there rem ained the two political parties: the Conservatives, with traditions o f imperial loyalty, and a belief in lim ited reciprocity; and the Liberals, suspected o f less im perialism , historically attached to low tariffs, and laying m ore em phasis on reciprocity. Such prin­ ciples, if they had ever had any reality, proved alm ost m ean­ ingless in the face of events.

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T h e plan fo r com m ercial union w ith the U nited States, throw n into the ring in 1887, precipitated an active controversy and caused alternative plans to be m ore definitely supported. T he general scheme w ith its various form s of com m ercial union, unrestricted reciprocity, or a N orth A m erican zollverein had been suggested for tw enty years o r m ore, both in the U nited States and C anada, but only becam e a real issue for a few years fro m 1887. T he com paratively large support th at it received in C anada at that tim e was due partly to local conditions, partly to the ability of its advocates. C anada was in the m idst of a long depression. T ra d e had fallen off, the large im m igration during the building of the C anadian Pacific Railw ay had ceased, the exodus to the U nited States was alarm ing, prices w ere low, the w est was not filling up as had been hoped, and the U nited States threatened tariff retaliation over the fishery dispute. It was, in the w ords o f Sir Jo h n W illison, “a tim e o f gloom and doubt, o f suspicion and unrest, o f rash opinion and prem ature judg­ m ent.”2 Into the breach cam e Erastus W im an, a N ew Y ork businessm an born in Canada, with experience in journalism , and now president o f the G re at N orth-W estern Telegraph C om pany. W im an collaborated in the U nited States w ith Samuel R itchie, an A m erican with business interests in C anada, and H ezekiah B utterw orth, a m em ber of Congress, who introduced a m easure to provide for com m ercial union. In C anada he found the co-operation o f H . W. D arling, president of the T oro n to B oard of T rade, G oldw in Sm ith, and others. M eetings were addressed during the sum m er o f 1887, pam phlets w ritten, and a com m ercial union league organized, w ith G oldw in Sm ith as president. C ontem porary literature on the subject is alm ost entirely partisan and throw s m ore light on the argum ents m eant fo r p opular consum ption than on the m erits and dem erits o f an econom ic plan. T he plan itself, in fact, needs little elucidation. I t was proposed to rem ove all custom s barriers between the U nited States and C anada, and to establish an identic tariff against third countries. In O ntario com m ercial union received the w hole-hearted support o f the T oro n to M ail, and the condi­ tional support o f the Globe. T he G lobe's condition was that the arrangem ent should be purely econom ic. T h a t a custom s U nion between Canada and the U nited States w ould profit both countries in a pecuniary sense will scarcely be denied by anybody. It does n ot follow that the schem e should be em braced by Canadians. T hey have to enquire w hether their entrance into such a Union w ould involve political consequences

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fro m which they are averse. . . . The Canadian people would m ake the worst o f all trades if they bartered their sentim ents fo r a C ustom s Union. In this m atter we are entirely at variance with the Mail. O ur contem porary believes, as we do, that a C ustom s U nion w ould profit Canada, but it says: - “The only objection to it fro m this side o f the line is that it m ight endanger British connection, but let us seriously ask ourselves if a people situated such as w e are in this controversy can afford to be sw ayed by sentim ent.” To which there can be only one answer - if we cannot afford to be sw ayed by sentim ent we are not w orthy to draw breath as free m en . . . the proposition is m onstrous!3 T h e G lobe continued to hold to this condition, while sup­ porting com m ercial union as an econom ic m easure. It noted th at all its form er correspondents were in favour of the scheme, and “m any of them are willing to go the length o f annexation if they cannot get the benefit o f enlarged trad e with the U nited States in any other m anner.” 4 T here is, in fact, am ple evidence that m any farm ers throughout the country were enthusiastic supporters. T he M anitoba Free Press, representing an agrarian elem ent, rem arked th at “ the cry against C om m ercial U nion is distinctly a ‘vested interest’ cry.” “W hat,” it asked, “are our m anufacturers com pared w ith ou r miners, ou r fishermen, our Lum berm en, o u r farm ers? Shall the millions be kept back for th e benefit o f the score or hundreds?”5 T he M ontreal G azette, on the other hand, opposed com m ercial union on the ground th a t it would harm m anufacturers, and th a t it w ould lead to political absorption. T he C anadian M anufacturers’ A ssociation passed a resolution to the effect th at unrestricted reciprocity w ould be disastrous to m anufacturing, com m erce, and agricul­ ture. In H alifax the M orning H erald m ade alm ost daily attacks on w h at it called the “W im an fad ,” w hich it declared would bring all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of annexation. C anada’s m arkets w ould be open to A m erican m anufactured goods, w ithout any com parable benefit in return. T h e E vening M ail also inveighed against com m ercial union, w hich, it argued, w ould result in a 50 per cent higher duty on British goods. O ther new spapers w ere divided on the issue. The H am ilton Spectator held that com m ercial union m eant annexa­ tion, while the H am ilton T im es thought it w ould enlarge C anadian m arkets. T he M ontreal H erald and the O ttaw a Free Press both argued th at com m ercial union, because it m eant prosperity, would avert annexation. T he T oro n to W orld, O ttaw a

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C itizen, L ondon A dvertiser, and L ondon Free Press w ere all opposed. T h e Com m ercial U nion Club issued a H andbook o f C om ­ mercial Union, a series o f papers supporting the project. In this, as in other publications in favour of the plan, it was denied that annexation, o r even p artial loss of independence, was necessarily a result. G oldw in Sm ith, w ho w rote the introduction to the pam phlet, defended com m ercial union again in his Canada and the Canadian Question. A m ongst the pam phleteers Jam es Y oung (o f G alt) was one o f the m ost active. Com m ercial union, he w rote, w ould threaten the independence o f C anada, ruin her m anufacturers w ithout helping the farm ers, discrim inate against British trade, and rem ove the m ain source of the public revenue.6 P. N . F acktz’s pam phlet, Canada and the U nited States C om ­ pared, is m ore typical o f a type o f argum ent long fam iliar to C anadian readers. C anada, he found, was a country o f great' area and undeveloped natural resources, w ith a happy people and a rosy future. If com m ercial union were adopted annexation would follow, and C anadians find themselves under a corrupt governm ent in a land w here liberty had perished, and where Chicago bankers played poker on steam yachts all Sunday afternoon. E xhorted pro o r con by new spapers, pam phlets, boards of trade, and farm ers’ institutes, the C anadian public also w it­ nessed the passage o f the com m ercial union project across the political arena. T he Liberals, as the low-tariff party, m ight be expected to be the m ore friendly. T he new leader o f the party, W ilfrid L aurier, was anxious to adopt either com m ercial union o r unrestricted reciprocity, but there was som e opposition to the move, and shortly after he had been elected leader he m ade a speech at Som erset, Q uebec (A ugust 1887) in w hich he refused to com m it himself. “ If I am asked a t present fo r my opinion on the subject, I m ay say th at fo r m y p art I am not ready to declare th at com m ercial union should be adopted at the present m om ent. A great deal o f study and reflection are needed to solve this question, fo r and against w hich there is m uch to be said.” 7 Tw o m onths later, C artw right, the form er m inister of finance, becam e the first political leader to support com m ercial union. “I am as averse as any m an can be to annexation, o r to resign our political independence, but I cannot sh u t my eyes to the facts. W e have greatly misused ou r advan­ tages. W e have been m ost foolish and m ost w asteful in our expenditure. W e have no m eans o f satisfying the just dem ands

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o f large portions o f the D om inion except through such an arrangem ent as com m ercial union. T here is a risk, and I cannot overlook it. But it' is a choice of risks, and our present position is anything b ut one o f stable equilibrium .”8 O ther m em bers o f the p arty showed varying degrees o f sym pathy, b u t the L iberal cau­ cus held at the opening o f parliam ent in 1888 decided fo r u n re­ stricted reciprocity rath er than com m ercial union; the difference being th at each country would be free in respect o f tariffs against th ird parties. It was unthinkable th at the C onservative party should risk the cry o f disloyalty o r the disfavour o f the m anufac­ tu rers by adopting com m ercial union; b u t on the other h an d it had never ceased - in spite of the other elem ents o f the N ational Policy — to seek reciprocity, and continued to do so. In 1887 T u p p er w ent to W ashington in another attem pt to bargain for reciprocity in exchange for fishing rights.9 T he difference be­ tw een the two parties on the tariff, then, rem ained one of degree. By the beginning o f 1888 Sir Jo h n M acdonald was confident th a t the com m ercial union cause was lost. T he federal elections, he w rote to T upper, h ad all gone against it. Leading m en of the opposition, like A lexander M ackenzie, Jam es Y oung, and John M acdonald of T oronto, had denounced it. T he rural press of O ntario, he claim ed, opposed it. I t was, in fact, “a dead duck and I th in k L ord Lansdow ne sees now th a t my policy as an ­ nounced to him last spring o f allowing the cry of Com m ercial U nion to blaze, crackle and go out w ith a stink, w ithout giving it u n d u e im portance was a wise one. T he country here now by general consent have connected C. U. w ith annexation and repudiate b oth.”10 It rem ained to be seen w hether parliam ent would ratify this judgm ent. T h e debate in the H ouse o f C om ­ m ons began on M arch 14 w ith a m otion by C artw right to seek free trad e w ith the U nited States in m anufactured goods and n atu ral products.11 Pointing to the em igration o f C anadians and o f recent im m igrants, the slow settlem ent o f the west, and the low figures o f external trade, he argued th at the proper course was reciprocity w ith the rapidly growing U nited States. All classes o f the com m unity w ould benefit; and even if direct tax a­ tion w ere then needed for revenue, the total burden o f taxation would be no greater, and m ore fairly distributed. A s to the effect o f the proposed m easure on im perial relations, C artw right claim ed that, w hile Canadians should not feel any debt to E ng­ lish statesm en, a m ore prosperous C anada w ould buy m ore from E ngland, and, further, w ould “act as a link o f union and am ity betw een the two great English races.” A full-dress debate fol­

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lowed on th e lines laid dow n by C artw right; w hether em igration was such a serious facto r as it had been represented to be, and w hether reciprocity w ould alleviate it; if agriculture and industry would benefit, o r the latter at least be subm erged w ithout pro­ tection; the effect o f rem oving custom s revenue and replacing it by oth er taxes; and the influence of reciprocity on the political relations of C anada w ith the U nited K ingdom . E ach point was taken up at length, and the argum ents were serious and studded with statistics. T he Conservatives w ere careful to point o ut that the opposition h ad had no m onopoly o f a belief in reciprocity, and proposed in am endm ent th at trade relations with the U nited States should be cultivated in so fa r as they did not conflict with the N ational Policy. O n the governm ent side policy and flagwaving were a t tim es brought in to reinforce statistics o f trade, b ut L iberal m em bers urged th at reciprocity was really a defence against annexation, and th at the prospect of im perial preferen­ tial trade as an alternative was utterly unreal in the light of British fiscal policy. A fter three weeks of a debate which on the w hole was m aintained a t a high level, the H ouse divided on A pril 6, and the Conservative am endm ent was carried by 124 to 67 on a p arty vote.

II T h e cam paign fo r com m ercial union gave a new stim ulus to the m ovem ent for a closer integration o f the em pire, a m ove­ m ent which was by no m eans new, b u t had previously lacked w ide support and appeared as som ew hat academ ic. T he interest o f Canadians in the em pire outside the U nited K ingdom was lim ited, but in som e instances surprisingly active. T he affairs of Ireland, and especially the hom e rule m ovem ent, w ere those m ost consistently w atched. A s the G lobe pointed out, there were good reasons for this C anadian interest: there was a large Irish elem ent in the C anadian population; the Irish question was of such concern in the U nited States th at its peaceful settlem ent was necessary for good relations w ith C anada; and a settlem ent was also “necessary to th e peace, the strength, the w elfare, the influence and th e glory o f the E m pire.” 12 T he M anitoba Free Press held th at Ireland was now w ell governed, w hatever had been the case in the past, and condem ned in unm easured terms the “cut-throats” w ho w ere guided by no patriotic interest.18 O ther papers were m ore critical of the British governm ent. T he

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H alifax M orning H erald, for exam ple, frequently described Irish discontent, and labelled the British policy as reactionary. In 1885 a mass m eeting was held in H alifax by Irish sym pa­ thizers. T h e E vening M ail o f H alifax was also critical o f the British governm ent, and stated th at the sooner the Irish obtained self-governm ent, the better it would be fo r the em pire. T he S aint John D aily Telegraph accused the Salisbury governm ent o f engaging in a controversy w ith the T sar as a means of dis­ tracting attention from conditions in Ireland and England. In 1887 the C anadian parliam ent passed a resolution in favour of hom e rule, which, w ith other signs of sym pathy, so encouraged the Irish nationalists th at W illiam O ’Brien sailed for C anada to drive L ord Lansdow ne (an Irish landlord) out o f Canada. N o o th er issue touched the C anadian people as intim ately as the Irish one, but they w ere not oblivious to w hat was going on elsew here in the em pire. T he annexation by F rance and G er­ m any of islands in the w estern Pacific led the editor o f the M o rn in g H erald to draw a parallel between effects o f this on A ustralia and a sim ilar annexation of territory near P rince E dw ard Island.14 T he troubles in the Sudan in 1885 w ere closely followed w ith critical com m ents; in the sam e year the E vening M ail decided that the annexation o f B urm a by G reat Britain w ould rescue the inhabitants from oppression and “m ake a fine addition to ou r possessions.” 15 F oreign affairs had long been extensively reported in C an a­ d ian newspapers, and were, therefore, presum ably considered to be o f interest to readers. But the editors w ent fu rth er than news, for they frequently com m ented on British foreign policy, not hesitating to point to m istakes; w riting w ith such earnestness as to give the im pression that C anadian interests w ere a t stake th at is, th at the strength o f the em pire depended in p art on the success of British foreign policy, and th a t C anada was con­ cerned in the strength o f the em pire. A gain to refer to the editorial page o f the H alifax H era ld : the editor noted w ith satis­ faction th at the British governm ent “have determ ined to act for once with prom ptness and fortitude” in preventing T urkey from sending troops to Egypt. A few m onths later, objecting to w hat he considered to be British w eakness in resisting Russian ad­ vances tow ard India, the editor sweepingly described the cabinet as “ the m ost conspicuously foolish and imbecile m inistry that has ever ruled England for the p ast hundred years.”10 T he exact significance to C anada o f Russian im perialism m ay be seen in the apprehension in 1877-78 of Russian attacks on the west

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coast. A n im m ediate relevance to C anada was deduced from G erm an im perialism in Sam oa in 1887. G reat Britain, the editor o f the H erald suggested, should insist on the neutrality of Sam oa and H aw aii, because of their strategic position with respect to C an ad a’s new ocean route to A ustralia. M any other examples m ight be quoted, from this and other newspapers, to show the C anadian interest in British foreign policy. T he outstanding case, because it m ost directly affected C anada, was policy tow ard the U nited States. H ere C anadians w ere consistently inconsist­ ent, since they dem anded that Britain should be a t once relent­ less in pursuing p articular C anadian interests and conciliatory in o rd er to establish good relations. T hough they never secured anything like a m ajority support in C anada, the im perial federationists alone wove together the m any threads to m ake a logical pattern. In 1884 the Im perial F ederation League was organized in L ondon under the chair­ m anship o f W . E. F orster, a form er under-secretary fo r the colonies, and w ith various representatives of the U nited K ing­ dom and the colonies in attendance. Sir C harles T upper, then high com m issioner, was a speaker at the first conference. T he resolutions adopted indicated in general the purposes o f the league. They w ere: T hat the object o f the league be to secure by Federation the perm anent unity o f the E m pire. T hat no schem e o f federation should interfere w ith the exist­ ing rights o f local parliaments as regards local affairs. T hat any schem e o f Im perial Federation should com bine on an equitable basis the resources o f the E m pire fo r the m ain­ tenance o f com m on interests, and adequately provide fo r an organized defence o f com m on rights. That the league invites the support o f m en o f all political parties. N o attem pt was m ade to define the constitutional m achinery by w hich these ends were to be procured, and the emphasis was laid m ore on unity than on federalism . W hile individuals w orked out plans for a single parliam ent at W estm inster with representatives from all the colonies, the spokesm en o f the league on the whole refused to com m it themselves to any one plan. T hus the league was able to attract the support of men w ho might have found an imperial parliam ent unacceptable. Certainly the general platform of the league had m uch to com ­ m end it: th at there were m atters o f a local nature to be handled

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by the governing body of each unit, and also m atters which affected several o r all of the units. Canadians were, and long had been, very conscious th a t defence, foreign affairs, and trade had w ide ram ifications, which m ade them m ore than local sub­ jects, and th at at least raised the question as to w hether there was any m eans by w hich they could be handled jointly. T he whole project o f closer im perial integration, in its various form s, was one for long and active debate in C anada.17 T h e Im perial F ederation L eague in C anada was founded in M ontreal in 1885, and three branches started - at Ingersoll, Peterborough, and H alifax - in the next two years. Colonel D enison was urged to be the president o f a branch to be form ed in T o ronto, but he did not consider th at the tim e had com e for the country to spend m oney on imperial defence and refused. T he branch did not m aterialize a t that tim e, but only a year later a new factor led D enison to change his m ind. The progress the C om m ercial U nion m ovem ent was m aking [he w rote] and the great danger arising fro m it, led m y brother and m e to discuss it with a num ber o f loyal m en, and on all sides the opinion seem ed to be that active steps should be taken at once to w ork against it . . . and it was decided that the best policy was to advocate a C om m ercial U nion o f the British E m pire as an alternative to the proposition o f a C om m ercial Union with the U nited States, and that a schem e o f Im perial Federation based upon a C om m ercial Union o f the various parts o f the E m pire w ould be the best m ethod o f advocating our view s.18 T ow ard the end of 1887 a branch of the Im perial Federation League was form ed in T oronto, and w rote into its constitution a special clause stating that it looked tow ard im perial preferential trade. D enison m ade a vigorous speech at a public m eeting held by the league, calling on patriots “ to rally round the old flag and fru strate the evil designs of traitors.” Believing that there were traito rs in Canada, in touch with A m ericans who were w orking fo r annexation, D enison and his associates organized a modest system o f counter-espionage w hich produced at least some results. A w ritten statem ent by W im an in Septem ber 1888 directly connected com m ercial union w ith annexation, and this fu rth er confirm ed the suspicions o f the opponents of the first. W hile, therefore, the league in C anada never succeeded in establishing a definite program m e, but rath er contained men with varying views, it served for the tim e being as a focus for

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th e opposition to closer connection with th e U nited States and a generally sym pathetic attitude tow ard im perial co-operation of som e kind. T h e Senate discussed im perial federation on a m otion by C. A. Boulton th a t C anada m ight be accorded rep re­ sentation in the British H ouse o f C om m ons. T he m otion was w ithdraw n w ithout a vote being taken, but the debate gives some im pression o f the argum ents of the day, both on the specific question o f w hether representation w as feasible, and on the general issue o f closer links w ith the U nited K ingdom or the U nited States.19 A m ore direct alternative to unrestricted reciprocity w as a proposal introduced into the H ouse of C om m ons fo r closer trade relations betw een C anada and G reat Britain. D ’A lton M cC arthy, w ho led in the defence of the proposition, denied any hostility tow ard the U nited States, but claim ed th at C anadian trade w ould be m ore feasible w ith G reat Britain, whose products w ere less in com petition w ith those of C anada.20 C ontem porary com m ents in the new spapers give som e indi­ cation o f public opinion o n the im perial federation m ovem ent. T h e G lobe was opposed to any o f the constitutional plans p ut forw ard as unw orkable and undesirable, and could see imperial relations only as static o r less binding. T h e loyalty o f Canadians to-day is a reasonable loyalty. . . . B u t they see that, as all m en acknowledge, a change in the relations o f Canada with the E m pire m ust one day take place. W hether it w ill be fo u n d best fo r Canada to rem ain in the E m pire, as all w ould wish, or to m ake a further advance in the direction in w hich fo r som e tim e it has been proceeding, and to take outside o f the E m pire the place o f a loving child, an attached and devoted friend, is the question. . . .21 F ederation, said the editor tw o years later, w as “a grand jingo dream ,” w ith a danger of draw ing C anada into im perial w ars. T he M ail also held th at federation w as out of the question and had no strong popular support; b u t felt th at defence was m ore neces­ sary to discuss in days w hen “ the belligerent spirit am ong the nations betrays no disposition to subside.”22 T he M anitoba Free Press w as sarcastic about the federation proposals, and con­ cluded that “we are, as a people, well satisfied w ith o u r present relations. W hen there is a change it will be in a direction opposite to th a t sought by the Im perial F ederationists.” C anadians, said the editor, w ould never consent to pay taxes to be spent outside

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th e co untry, n o r did they wish to ru n the risk o f being involved in B ritish w ars.23 T he M ontreal Journal o f C om m erce found th at “the proposition for an organized defence o f com m on rights is entirely too vague to induce the Colonies to com m it themselves to the principle [of im perial federation].”24 T he H alifax H erald was read y to contem plate federation as a fu tu re possibility, b ut n ot as an im m ediate necessity. In contrast to the G lobe, it argued that, w hen a change cam e, it would be in th at direction. T h e H erald w elcom ed the establishm ent o f a branch o f the Im perial F ederation League in M ontreal, rem arking th at “the British E m pire m ust eventually be handled as a whole, o f w hich no p a rt is m aster and no p art dependent.”25 T he E vening M ail o f H alifax was strongly in favour o f an “E m pire com m ercial u nion” as m ore desirable to C anada than one w ith the U nited States.26 Such a plan w ould not be im perial federation, but w ould be a step tow ard it. S uch w ere the issues before the public, but they w ere reflected in only a distorted form in the election o f 1891. T he Liberal p arty held to its project of unrestricted reciprocity, but vigor­ ously denied th at th at im plied annexation o r any breaking o f the im perial bond. O liver M ow at claim ed th at only a fragm ent of either party was opposed to British connection. “A British sub­ ject I have lived fo r three-score years, and som ething m ore - I hope to live m y life a British subject and as a British subject die.” T h e Conservative party, w hile ham m ering a t the “veiled treason” o f unrestricted reciprocity, underm ined the L iberals’ appeal on trade grounds by letting it be know n th at negotiations w ere being initiated a t W ashington fo r a revival, in a modified form , o f the lim ited reciprocity treaty o f 1854. H aving taken th e edge off the L iberal sword, the Conservatives then m ade the m ost o f an appeal to traditional loyalty, both to C anada and the em pire. Sir C harles T upper was brought fro m E ngland to stum p the country, and M acdonald - in w hat proved to be his last election - told the electorate th at “a British subject I was born, a British subject I will die.” W hile M ow at’s sim ilar con­ fession w as lost in the denunciation o f an annexation m enace, the “old m an’s” cry echoed throughout the country. In reality the election o f 1891 settled nothing, save th at the Conservatives were retu rn ed to pow er for five years m ore, and that reciprocity, if obtainable, was to be restricted. Im perial preference, im perial federation, com m ercial and political relations with the U nited States - all rem ained to be defined and settled, and a choice - if choice there m ust be - m ade betw een them.

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III N either the return of the Conservatives in 1891 nor their defeat by the L iberals five years later m aterially changed the ch aracter of the issues before the C anadian people. T he several courses discussed before, centring around relations w ith the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States, continued to be dis­ cussed, and a choice was still to be m ade. In spite o f th e heat engendered, the elections w ere to some extent sham battles, for neither party stood com m itted to a definite policy in these im p o rtant questions. T he L iberal party dropped its aim of un­ restricted reciprocity, while the Conservative adm inistration in its last years of office found th at W ashington was unreceptive to the lim ited reciprocity th at it sought. Both parties then settled dow n to an acceptance of m oderate protection, modified, when possible, by special trade agreem ents. In the last years o f the old century and the early years of the new, how ever, a num ber of factors com bined to give a fresh setting to the C anadian problem o f im perial and continental relationships. T h e progress o f protectionism in the U nited States, under the M cKinley tariff of 1890 and the Dingley tariff of 1897, closed the d o o r to reciprocity negotiations for m ore than fifteen years, until such advanced protection began to be questioned as a cause o f the high cost of living. W hile on th e one hand the road to W ashington was at least tem porarily blocked, the m ovem ent fo r closer im perial ties received a new im petus. T he jubilee of 1897 provided the occasion and the atm osphere fo r a unique gathering o f em pire statesm en in L ondon, at a tim e w hen Joseph C ham berlain’s new im perialism was seeking practical expression. In spite o f the fact th at he held w hat was norm ally considered a m in o r portfolio, th a t of colonial secretary, C ham berlain led his advance guard along new and even alarm ing paths - tow ard continental alliance in place of isolation, tow ard m ilitant empirebuilding in South A frica, tow ard com m ercial union w ith the colonies, and even to a skirm ish against the sacred citadel of free trade. T he note was set by his speech at the C anada Club in the spring o f 1896. The recent isolation o f the U nited K ingdom , the dangers which seem ed to threaten us, have evoked fro m all our colonies, and especially fro m Canada, an outburst o f loyalty and affection w hich has reverberated throughout the w o r ld .. . . is this dem on­

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stration . . . to pass away w ithout a serious effort upon the part both o f colonial and Im perial statesm en to transform these sentim ents into practical results? . . . W e m a y endeavour to establish com m on interest and co m ­ m o n obligations. . . . W hat is the greatest o f our com m on obligations? It is Im perial defence. W hat is the greatest o f our co m m o n interests? I t is Im perial trade. A n d those tw o are very closely connected. I t is very difficult to see how yo u can pretend to deal w ith this great question o f Im perial defence w ithout having first dealt w ith the question o f Im perial trade. . . . M y . . . proposition is that a true Zollverein fo r the Em pire, that a free trade established throughout the Em pire, although it w ould involve the im position o f duties against foreign countries, and w ould be in that respect a derogation fro m the high prin­ ciples o f free trade, and fro m the practice o f the U nited K in g ­ d o m up to the present tim e, w ould still be a proper subject fo r discussion and m ight possibly lead to a satisfactory arrangem ent if the colonies on their part were willing to consider it . . . it would undoubtedly lead to the earliest possible developm ent o f their great natural resources, w ould bring to them population, would open to them the enorm ous m arket o f the U nited K in g d o m . . . .27 D ecisions on any changes in the im perial structure, w hether political, m ilitary, o r econom ic, m ust be m ade in G re at B ritain and C anada (since neither the A ustralian n o r South A frican colonies were as yet united) and in tariff questions m ust over­ com e the accepted policies o f free trade in G re at B ritain and protection in C anada. T h at either country should m ake such a radical departure m ust have seemed im probable, but C ham ­ b erlain’s gesture was followed by some encouragem ent from L aurier too. N o w the statesm en o f G reat Britain have thought [he said in Ju n e 1896] that the colonies have com e to a tim e when a new step m ust be taken in their developm ent. W hat is that? That there shall be a com m ercial agreem ent between England and the colonies. T hat practical statesm an, M r. Joseph Chamberlain, has com e to the conclusion that the tim e has com e when it is possible to have w ithin the bounds o f the E m pire a new step taken, w hich w ill give to the colonies in England, a preference fo r their products over the products o f other nations. . . . The possibilities are im m ense. . . . B u t Sir, if England is going to give

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us that preference, England w ould expect som ething fro m us in return . . . that we w ould com e as closely to her own system o f free trade, such as she has it, as it is possible fo r us to c o m e ... ,28 T h a t nearest point, L aurier w ent on to say, was to adopt a revenue instead of a protective tariff; and such was said to be the L iberal policy, although in reality the difference tended to be little m ore than one of nam e. A year la ter w hen Fielding intro­ duced the first budget of the L iberal governm ent it was found to contain a preferential rate for English goods, 12 Vi per cent at first and then increased to 25 per cent. T his preferential rate was, from one p o in t of view, simply a low er tariff, and as such alarm ing to not a few C anadian m anufacturers. As an imperial move it was greeted with enthusiasm by m em bers of the recently deceased Im perial F ederation League and others who looked tow ard closer im perial relations. G . W . Ross, a m em ber o f the O ntario cabinet, told the British Em pire League th at the prefer­ ence had not only “paved the w ay for the rapid developm ent of C anadian com m erce,” but had “ quieted for the time being, and I hope forever, the restlessness which prevailed in m any q uar­ ters as to the fu tu re of C anada.” Instead of the fluctuating m arkets of the U nited States, C anadians could now tu rn to the m ore certain ones o f England; and at the sam e tim e the C ana­ dian voice would be m ore influential in the councils o f the em pire.29 T here w ere, o f course, not lacking those w ho were equally vocal in condem ning the preference as the thin end of the im perial wedge. I t was with such a background that th e colonial conference m et in L ondon in 1897. In a sense the conference was an inci­ dental result o f the jubilee celebrations, b u t this very connection gave it an im portance, n o t only because o f the atm osphere, but because the jubilee brought the colonial prim e m inisters to E ngland. Both in its personnel and its subject m atter the third colonial conference had a new significance.30 T hat o f 1887 had touched on defence and trade, but had steered away from dis­ cussion o f im perial federation. T he O ttaw a conference o f 1894, called by the C anadian governm ent, dealt in p art w ith trade, b ut Britain was represented only by an observer. T he third conference, in L ondon in 1897, w as described as inform al as to its proceedings, but it was a conference o f governm ents: the U nited K ingdom being represented by the secretary o f state fo r the colonies, and the self-governing colonies by their prim e m inisters. C ham berlain’s opening speech, given prom inence in

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the published reco rd ,31 w as a frank presentation o f the thesis w hich he v/as already know n to hold. T he m ost im p o rtan t and the m ost difficult subject, he said, was the future relation between the U nited K ingdom and the self-governing colonies. H e was not prepared to say w hether the time was ripe fo r change: in E ngland the idea of federation was “ in the air,” and he personally had thought o f “a great council of the E m pire” to w hich the colonies would send plenipotentiaries. But if the tim e should com e w hen the colonies wished “to substitute fo r th e slight relationship w hich at present exists a true partnersh ip ” w ith a share in the m anagem ent o f the em pire, it w ould also have to be realized that “ obligations and responsibility” m ust accom pany control. If a representative body were to be estab­ lished it w ould settle the related problem of im perial defence, the cost of w hich was now borne by the U nited K ingdom , al­ though the arm y and navy w ere n o t even principally m aintained fo r local defence. O n the question of com m ercial relations he referred to the value of a zollverein, but adm itted the difficulties in the way. If the resolutions passed by the conference be taken as a test, its decisions were cautious and lim ited, but not w ithout significance. It was decided (by a m ajority) th a t political rela­ tions between the U nited K ingdom and the self-governing colo­ nies were “generally satisfactory under the existing condition of things.” N o decision was recorded on defence. It was agreed by the prem iers th at they should investigate the possibilities of tariff preferences to the U nited K ingdom . A separate resolution recom m ended the denunciation o f treaties ham pering the com ­ m ercial relations between G re a t Britain and th e colonies. T he reference was to treaties w ith Belgium and G erm any, which contained m ost-favoured-nation clauses standing in the w ay of such a preference. T he case cam e up particularly in relation to the C anadian preference o f 1897, but the British governm ent had long been requested to term inate the treaties, w hich they now did. Finally, a unanim ous resolution called fo r periodic conferences in the future. T hus there em erge from the conference o f 1897 one general issue and three particular ones, all of w hich continued to be discussed, at fu rth e r conferences and betw een them , for m any years. Tw o o f these - the n atu re o f the colonial conference and the defence question - will be exam ined in subsequent chap­ ters.32 T he general problem o f the political relations between the colonies and the U nited K ingdom runs through m ost aspects of the external relations o f C anada. T he particular phase o f it

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which followed the conference o f 1897 is closely linked with com m ercial policy, and m ay be considered here in th at connec­ tion. T h e policy o f the British governm ent in respect of imperial relations was, for the tim e being a t least, the policy of Joseph C ham berlain. W hatever m ay have been the opposition to it, in the governm ent o r outside, it was the policy that was adopted and the one therefore w ith w hich the self-governing colonies w ere concerned. T hose colonies differed in position, needs, and political developm ent, and viewed the im perial question differ­ ently as a result. T h eir attitudes had some, but relatively little, influence on governm ent and public in Canada. On the whole, and except perhaps for trade and the Pacific cable, Canadians w ere ignorant and alm ost oblivious of the other colonies. T heir interest was in the U nited K ingdom - by origin, trade, culture, defence, and governm ent. It happened, how ever, that the man w ho was prim e m inister throughout fifteen years w hen these subjects were to the fore was a French C anadian, the first to hold that office in the history of the dom inion. O n the w hole the F rench C anadians were little affected by the ties that bound th eir English-speaking com patriots to G re at Britain. T heir origin and culture were F rench; they p u t little em phasis on com m erce; minim ized the need for defence, even o f C anadian territory; and had no reason to share in the im perial vision seen by oth er groups of Canadians. C ut aw ay from F rance once and finally, they found their only patrie in C anada, w hich for them should be a p art o f the British E m pire only so long as the established m odus vivendi was retained. W ilfrid L aurier was descended from eight generations o f Canadians, b ut his upbringing was unusual, com bining English P rotestant with F ren ch Catholic schools and associates. N o r did L aurier accept the traditional ultram ontanism of the church in Quebec; indeed, one o f the causes fo r which he stood was the separation of politics and religion, and the freedom to follow liberalism in the one w ithout the accusation of being unorthodox in the other. W hen L aurier w ent to the jubilee in 1897 it was his first crossing of the A tlantic. In London, as the prim e m inister of the only united dom inion, he was given a leading p art in the colourful cerem onies carried out in the atm osphere of royalty and im perialism; and am idst it all he received a knighthood. In spite of the heady air, L aurier was cautious tow ard any com m itm ent, and in fact retu rn ed w ithout m aking any. He accepted C ham berlain’s form ula that responsibility m ust ac­ com pany control, and steered carefully away from both. N ev er­

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theless, L aurier seemed in the eyes o f some o f his countrym en to be caught in the toils of im perialism - a suspicion w hich they thought to be proven by C anadian participation in the w ar in South A frica. H e found him self threatened politically by the early stages o f a nationalist m ovem ent in his own province, a m ovem ent o f which H enri Bourassa was one of the earliest adherents and later the leader.33 T o such m en C ham berlain was an arch-villain, insidiously sapping at the autonom y o f Canada, draw ing her by subtle m eans into the m aelstrom o f imperial w ars, im perial taxes, im perial control. It was not only in French C anada that such views w ere to be found. T he nationalists am ong the English-speaking Canadians found an able pen in G oldw in Sm ith; but Sm ith was a liability as well as an asset, for his nationalism ended in the m anifest destiny of annexation. It was J. S. Ew art, a lawyer of O ttaw a, w ho took up the cause, and hewed to the straight and narrow line o f Canadianism . L aurier had critics to the right as w ell as to the left. If the nationalists later broke w ith him because o f the Boer W ar and the naval defence plans, it was the m ore im perially-m inded Canadians w ho forced him into those lim ited excursions. L aurier, in fact, occupied a m iddle position; and it is a tribute to his political ability that fo r m any years he escaped being crushed between the millstones. O n a policy o f im perial relations generally there is little difference between L aurier on the one hand and M ac­ donald and his successors on the other. T here were, it is true, m any Conservatives who accused L aurier o f being anti-im perial, but they never controlled their own party. L aurier could say w ith as m uch conviction as M acdonald that a British subject he w ould die, but the two w ere, in the practice of governm ent, alm ost equally shy o f com m itm ents. T h at a share in the control o f imperial policy, o r even consultation concerning it, entailed a t least a m oral obligation to bear the consequences becam e a dogm a accepted by w hatever party w as in power. In the decade following the Boer W ar there was active study and discussion of com m ercial policy as a p art of the imperial relationship. Shortly before the colonial conference o f 1902 the president o f the C anadian M anufacturers’ A ssociation an­ nounced that the chief object o f his organization was to bring all British countries into a closer union by means of a preferen ­ tial tariff, and the president o f the British Em pire League in C anada called for an additional duty in all British countries on foreign goods to provide a fund for defence; while the Cassandra voice o f G oldw in Sm ith repeated that no im perial zollverein

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could draw C anada aw ay from the N o rth A m erican continent.34 A t the conference itself the C anadian delegates presented a m em orandum intended to show that the preference had encour­ aged British im ports, though they continued to refrain from using it as a basis fo r bargaining. In his opening speech Joseph C ham berlain recognized that the preference had arrested the decline of British exports to C anada, but the volum e was still n ot great in relation to British im ports from C anada. Even with a preference, he said, a protective tariff m ight effectually exclude British goods; and he looked wistfully tow ard a self-sustaining em pire. T he only resolution adopted by the conference on the subject of tariffs gave a blessing to the principle of preference, and recognized th at a general system o f free trade was not practicable.35 W hile the discussions at the conference w ere not m ade public a t the tim e, it was the general im pression in C anada that L aurier and his colleagues had been w hat their supporters would call cautious and their critics destructive. T he vital issues of th a t conference, however, w ere not tariff levels b u t defence and an im perial constitution. A gainst com m itm ents on either of these latter L aurier set his face like flint. T h e conference had not long adjourned when the tariff ques­ tion once m ore cam e to the fore. T hrough Joseph C ham ber­ lain’s cam paign fo r “ tariff refo rm ,” a direct assault was m ade upon the citadel o f free trade as a m eans of attaining to that self-sustaining em pire of w hich he dream ed. “A sm all rem nant o f L ittle E nglanders o f the M anchester School” clung to the strict application o f free trad e in a w orld in which foreign countries and the colonies as well had adopted protection. Freedom of interchange should be retained as a principle, but the pow er of negotiation and even retaliation be resum ed. In parliam ent a storm o f opposition was raised, not only by the Liberal opposition, b u t also am ongst the lab o u r m em bers and even some of the U nionists. N othing daunted by the traditional cries against a tax on bread, C ham berlain gave blow for blow, and a battle w ent on in new spapers and periodicals and on the public platform . T he “ tariff refo rm ” project continued to be debated from its initiation in the spring of 1903, through 1904 and 1905. In C anada opinion was divided, but on the whole C ham berlain’s policy was supported, though som etim es with reservations. R. L. B orden’s com m ent on the opening speech was th at the Conservative p arty had been fighting for im perial preferential trade for ten years, and the veteran, Sir Charles T upper,. spoke o f C ham berlain’s “manly, straightforw ard and

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plucky stand.” M ost o f the new spapers, especially the Conserva­ tive ones, expressed approval, and various boards of trade passed resolutions in favour of the plan. L aurier was cautious in his com m ents but welcomed the idea o f treaties of com m erce betw een the British countries, each of w hich w ould have its own tariff. T he G lobe was cool about the plan, and in the province of Q uebec som e spokesm en, notably Bourassa, suspected th at trade unity would be a step tow ard political unity.36 T h e C anadian preference to English goods rem ained as the original and solid form o f im perial preference, and while it was often cited as advantageous to both countries, it was not always happily accepted by C anadian m anufacturers.37 W hile modified from tim e to tim e the C anadian preference nevertheless was retained: the rock on w hich the broader scheme was to be wrecked was the English aversion to duties on the necessities of life. C ham berlain had never quite converted the U nionists and Conservatives to tariff reform , but had m ade considerable head­ way. T h e fall o f the governm ent in 1905, and the accession to office o f the Liberals under C am pbell-B annerm an (w ho had denounced the C ham berlain plan) rem oved it, for the tim e at least, as a political possibility. IV In the tw entieth century both independence and annexation to th e U nited States were still talked o f but neither had any considerable m easure o f support. W hat did constitute a live issue was the revival o f projects of reciprocity, a revival m ade possible by a changing attitude in the U nited States w hich in tu rn h ap ­ pened to coincide w ith the British decision to cling to free trade. T he alternatives o f reciprocity and imperial preference for a time played som ew hat the role they had in the eighties, but in a m inor key and w ithout any o f the fighting spirit behind the form er that the advocates o f com m ercial union had show n. John C harlton m ade frequent references, in the H ouse o f C om m ons and the new spapers, to the advantages of reciprocity, which he com ­ pared with the C ham berlain plan, to the detrim ent o f the latter. But until there was some evidence of breaches in the A m erican tariff w all any C anadian thoughts on reciprocity could n o t be m uch m ore than pious hopes. Even while the general belief in high tariffs continued to exist in the U nited States there were scattered indications o f groups who saw advantages in reci­ procity. In 1901 the N ational A ssociation of M anufacturers

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held a N ational Reciprocity Convention at W ashington, and in the next two o r three years the m ovem ent began to gain m om en­ tum w ith the form ation of reciprocity leagues in N ew England and the west, advocacy in the new spapers, by boards o f trade, and delegations to Congress in its favour. T he argum ents were usually that the C anadian m arket could be opened to A m erican goods, and that action was necessary especially in view of the tendency tow ard m ore protection in C anada and the effect that the C ham berlain proposals w ould have on A m erican trade with C anada. T he advantages to A m erican railways of reciprocal trad e w ere often m entioned; and J. J. Hill, whose railways ran at various points to the C anadian border, was an active partisan in w hat was becoming a serious cam paign. In C anada, w here, for thirty years, reciprocity had been en ­ ergetically, at times frantically, sought, enthusiasm had calmed dow n o r was being deliberately suppressed. I t was recognized th at any move m ust com e from the U nited States, and there was a certain unwillingness to play once m ore the p art o f the un­ successful suitor. N o r, indeed, was it certain th at Barkis was now willing. T he tw entieth century had opened a new prosperity fo r C anada, w ith a relatively rapid developm ent o f the w est and growing industrialization in the east. T he C ham berlain tariff refo rm project offered possibilities of an alternative that was attractive to a t least a p art of the population, and might be upset by reciprocity w ith the U nited States. “C anada,” said Colonel D enison in a speech in T oronto in 1903, “should avoid reci­ procity as she w ould the plague.” 38 In the sam e year the C an a­ dian M anufacturers’ A ssociation passed a resolution against a reciprocity treaty affecting the m anufacturing interests of C an­ ada. In 1904 and 1905 m uch the sam e tone seemed to hold; that the U nited States had refused reciprocity w hen C anada wanted it, and that now the dom inion was following other paths. T he strength o f econom ic and political nationalism as a barrier to reciprocity could not as yet be assessed, but there were indica­ tions th at it was becoming a serious element. A further barrier, w hich might be m anned by a quite different group, was the objection that reciprocity w ould endanger the imperial relation. T h ere were, how ever, indications that an agreem ent limited to certain p roducts w ould not be unacceptable; and probably there was m uch m ore desire for such an arrangem ent than public utterances would indicate. T he exact state of C anadian opinion could be tested only when the question was p u t in a specific form .

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In 1909 and the early p art of 1910 the existing high protec­ tion began to be seriously questioned in W ashington, and a variety o f factors led tow ard negotiations with C anada. Im pressed by the dem ands of certain groups, notably the new s­ paper publishers, for lower tariffs with C anada, by using com ­ plaints against the high cost of living, and dissensions w ithin his own p arty, P resident T aft took steps to have the com m ercial relations o f the two countries reconsidered.39 T he subject of im m ediate discussion was the legal necessity of applying to C an ad a the m axim um rates of the Payne-A ldrich tariff due to the fact that the C anadian agreem ent w ith F rance was inter­ preted as a technical discrim ination. W hen the departm ent of state approached the British am bassador, Bryce inform ed the C anadian governm ent o f the departm ent’s desire for a confer­ ence, which the C anadian governm ent suggested should be in O ttaw a. T here the A m erican representatives proposed that C anada should offer her interm ediate rate, but the C anadians denied that there was discrim ination, though they finally agreed to the interm ediate rate on a few articles as a token concession. A series o f discussions, official and unofficial, then took place on the possibility o f considering tariff agreem ents on a broader basis, during w hich the C anadian governm ent expressed its will­ ingness to hold such a conversation at any convenient tim e. A ctual negotiations were conducted from N ovem ber 1910 to Jan u ary 1911. T he C anadian proposals covered a sm all, the A m erican a m uch larger, list o f articles; and by the m iddle of Jan u ary a com prom ise agreem ent was reached, under which m ost n atural products were to be on the free list and the duty on a lim ited num ber o f m anufactured articles to be reduced. T h e agreem ent was to be brought into effect by concurrent legislation. In spite of som e opposition, the necessary legislation was passed by Congress before the end o f July. I t only rem ained fo r C anada to do its part. T h e C anadian parliam ent consisted o f tw o m ajor parties, both of w hich in the past h ad em phatically announced their belief in reciprocity o f some kind. T raditionally the Liberals had been a low-tariff party, but o f recent years had show n little disposition to pay m ore than lip-service to th at faith. But, just as T a ft had experienced pressure for reduced tariffs, so had L aurier. In a to u r through the w estern provinces in the sum m er o f 1910 he was besieged by dem ands for the ending o f protec­ tion, and it seems clear that he was not a little im pressed.40 The caution of his governm ent in meeting the A m erican advances

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was m arked; b u t the L iberals found themselves in a favourable position for bargaining, and might well feel th at the agreem ent was so satisfactory as to be invaluable fo r the com ing election, an d to offer a p lan k especially needed in view of the Quebec revolt over the naval question.41 W hen the m easure was pre­ sented to the H ouse o f Com m ons the Conservative members w ere in a flurry, believing at first th at their constituents would fully support it. I t w as only afte r the lapse o f some tim e th at the opposition settled dow n to resist the passage o f the bill. In thus dividing on party lines parliam ent followed the action already taken by m ost o f the new spapers.42 But even the early exceptions to the rule of p arty allegiance w ere significant, and as tim e went on they becam e m ore so. T he m anufacturing, financial, and transportation interests, through individuals o r boards o f trade, becam e m ore and m ore vociferous in their opposition. In T o ro n to eighteen prom inent citizens, all Liberals, voiced their opposition, and founded the C anadian N ational League under the leadership of Z. A. Lash. Sim ilar defections from the party ranks were conspicuous in other cities. O ne serious blow to the governm ent was the decision of Clifford Sifton, one o f the ablest o f the L iberal strategists, to throw his w hole weight against reciprocity, and give aid to the opposition in the west, w here it w as m ost needed. W hen the Conservatives had blocked early passage of the bill, L au rier decided to go to the country, and thus precipitated an election w hich was fought alm ost entirely on external policies. T h at the reciprocity agreem ent presented advantages to C anada was show n by the favourable reception th at it first received. But the election was fought not on its term s but on its im plications. Tw o argum ents w ere m ainly used by the Con­ servatives and their Liberal allies in English-speaking Canada. T h e first, w hich brought m uch tangible support to the cam paign, was th at Canada, having failed earlier to secure reciprocity, had built up a national econom y with a heavy investm ent in railways and industries; and that both of these, being based on an eastw est pattern, would be endangered by a sudden flow o f north and south com m erce. T he second argum ent, appealing m ore to the general electorate as a whole, could be described by its opponents as pure flag-waving. A ided by indiscreet talk of annexation in the U nited States, orators pictured C anada as losing not only its connection w ith the em pire but its very national being as well. Borden, in his last shot of the cam paign, appealed on this ground: “I believe th at we are, in tru th , stand­

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ing today a t the parting o f the w ays-----W e m ust decide w hether the spirit of Canadianism o r of continentalism shall prevail on the northern half o f this continent.” T he issue, he said, was above party lines; it was for “the m aintenance o f our com m er­ cial and political freedom , fo r the perm anence o f C anada as an autonom ous nation w ithin the British E m pire.” 13 In the province of Q uebec the L aurier governm ent was opposed by the nationalists on another aspect of external rela­ tions. T h e governm ent’s naval bill accentuated the existing fears o f com m itm ent to “im perial w ars” and led to the form ation of a nationalist p arty in the province w here L au rier had hitherto been safe. H enri Bourassa, a t first mildly supporting reciprocity, finally cam e out against it; not th at he loved protection m ore, b ut the naval bill less. T hus was created th at extraordinary alliance o f the opposition in English C anada, w ith its appeal to the im perial tie, and the opposition in F rench C anada, loudly denouncing all signs of im perialism . Before th at com bination the L iberal governm ent, already beyond its prim e, could m ake no effective stand. A nd with the fall o f th e adm inistration was rejected the first - and perhaps the last - A m erican invitation to a reciprocity agreem ent. A decision, w hether wise or foolish, was thus a t last m ade on one im portant aspect o f external policy. T h e im plications of th a t decision could not as yet be assessed. A ll th at was certain was that reciprocity, in its proposed form , was rejected. But the purely com m ercial aspect o f the issue had becom e m ixed w ith wide political considerations - considera­ tions which in themselves w ere confused and even conflicting. H ad Canadians voted for w hat Borden had nam ed “C anadian­ ism” o r fo r closer im perial integration? T he answer lay in the future.

CH A PTER 9

Effects of External Forces on the Canadian Community

T ransportation and com m unications played an im portant part in the foreign relations of C anada as well as in her domestic econom y. Postal and telegraph facilities form ed links with the outside world, and - because o f the geography o f N orth A m erica - were in part dependent on arrangem ents with the U nited States. Railways and waterways involved that and more, fo r they ignored the international boundary and invited traffic to follow the shortest o r easiest lines. Shortly after confederation C anada began to take stock of her internal waterways. A royal com mission was appointed in 1870 to exam ine existing canals and consider the need for fu rth er construction. T he m ajority report,1 issued in the follow­ ing year, showed the strong influence o f the historic belief in the “n atural” role of the St. Law rence as the outlet for the A m erican middle west. “N ature has intended the St. Law rence,” the com m issioners w rote, “ to be the great com m ercial highway o f the west, and if it has not fulfilled its destiny to the extent it should have done, it is because the enterprise o f m an has endeavoured to divert its trade into other and artificial chan­ nels.” T he E rie C anal and the railways of N ew Y ork State had certainly played havoc w ith n ature’s purposes, for only a small proportion o f the possible traffic passed through the Welland C anal. This fact, the com m issioners stoutly m aintained, could be explained by the inadequate size of the W elland and St. Law rence canals. T heir faith still strong in the prospect of prosperous traffic following im provem ent of canals, the com ­ missioners urged that these should be deepened as soon as possible. F o r the W elland C anal, deepening, new locks, and an entirely new w ork for part of the route w ere com pleted in 1887, giving a depth of fourteen feet. Similar plans for the St. Law ­ rence were draw n up, and were carried to com pletion by stages; the whole being finished by 1903. If A m erican traffic was to be encouraged to pass through C anadian canals, it was also true th at Canadians w anted to m ake use of certain waterways in the

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U nited States. E ven the dogm a o f the great river could not disguise the advantage o f the L ake C ham plain-H udson River ro u te to N ew Y ork. In the absence of any C anadian canal until 1895 C anadian entrance to Lake Superior was dependent on the A m erican canal at Sault Ste. M arie. T he joint high commission a t W ashington m ade provision for the m utual use of waterways, b u t the term s o f the treaty w ere in p art only prom ises of recom m endations to the local authorities, being the C anadian governm ent on the one hand and the particular states concerned on the o ther.2 O n the ratification of the T reaty of W ashington the president asked the governm ents o f the interested states to take steps to carry it into effect. T he governor of N ew Y ork, the state m ost concerned, replied that no legal obstacles existed; b ut in 1874 the Canadian privy council declared that C anadian vessels had been prevented from passing through the Cham plain C anal to the H udson River, although A m erican vessels had been perm itted to go to any destination by w ay o f the Cham bly C anal; and the council asked that the British m inister take up the question at W ashington.3 A long diplom atic exchange fol­ lowed between H am ilton Fish, the secretary of state, and Sir E dw ard T hornton, the British minister, the form er using infor­ m ation from the governm ents o f the states and the latter from th at o f C an ad a.1 F o r a time an anti-clim ax was reached when the C anadian governm ent was unable to quote any cases, but in the sum m er o f 1875 it turned out that the C anadian right to use the C ham plain route was virtually negatived by the decision that a vessel m ust discharge her cargo at the first p o rt of entry, and that to proceed fu rth er would be to carry goods from one port in the U nited States to another. A n escape from this dilem m a lay in the pow er placed in the secretary o f the treasury to designate any ports at which vessels laden with the products of C anada might discharge their cargoes; and in 1876 this was p ut into effect, with the result that C anadian vessels were on a parity w ith A m erican in proceeding as far as A lbany, by way of Plattsburg, Oswego, o r Buffalo. T his com prom ise on the navigation o f the H udson R iver by C anadian ships, carrying goods in bond destined for the po rt of N ew Y ork, was regarded as a concession by the A m erican governm ent, w hich took the view that the H udson was an internal w aterw ay, not expressly opened by the T reaty of W ashington. T he St. L aw rence, on the other hand, was in p art an international river, and for the rest of its course was, by article x xvi o f the treaty, to be open for purposes of com m erce

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to the citizens o f the U nited States. In contrast to the A m erican position, which apparently was to m ake such a concession for the benefit of C anadian rath er than A m erican interests, C an a­ dians were anxious to encourage navigation of the St. Law rence in order to swell the volum e of business a t M ontreal, and thus to attract m ore shipping and low er the freight rates. T o this end they w ere m ore than willing to allow A m erican ships equal rights in the canals - except in the W elland to ships whose cargoes were then to be carried by rail o r w ater to N ew Y ork. T he general objective was entirely consistent w ith an old policy, tow ard which the circum stances o f the m om ent w ere to be bent. In 1882 tolls on the Erie C anal w ere abolished, and two years later the C anadian governm ent attem pted at once to m eet this com petition and to stim ulate the through C anadian route by giving a rebate of 90 per cent on all canal tolls on grain cargoes, w hether C anadian o r A m erican, w hich were carried^ as far as M ontreal and were shipped abroad. W as this discrim ina­ tion? T h e C anadian governm ent, in reply to protests, argued th a t it was discrim ination against U nited States ports, and intentionally so; b u t not against A m erican users o f the w ater­ w ay.0 T h e A m erican position was th at it logically involved discrim ination against A m erican citizens. Tw o visits o f C an a­ dian m inisters to W ashington in 1892 failed to produce a settlem ent, though a num ber o f com prom ises w ere suggested, including a C anadian proposal of w ithdraw al o f the discri­ m inatory tolls on the W elland C anal in exchange for navigation as far as N ew Y ork. T he A m erican officials adopted strong language in description o f the C anadian attitude and imposed tolls on the Sault Ste. M arie C anal as direct retaliation. Finally, in F ebruary 1893, the C anadian governm ent capitulated and changed the system of tolls to one acceptable to the U nited States.6 A p art from a general desire to m aintain friendly relations betw een the two countries, the result of the dispute m ay be explained by the superior bargaining position held by the U nited States. Both the S ault Ste. M arie and the C ham plain canals w ere, at th at tim e, m onopolies which could be opened or closed a t will. M oreover, it was not regarded as o f m ajor advantage to the U nited States to secure C anadian traffic. N o doubt it w ould swell the business o f the po rt o f N ew Y ork, but New Y o rk could in any case draw am ple shipping. T he C anadians, on the other hand, felt it necessary to give support to M ontreal, and in general w ere desirous of attracting traffic to Canadian

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routes in com petition w ith those of the U nited States. T he principle extended to railways as well as waterways. T he G rand T ru n k Railway and the G re at W estern Railway were both designed on the assum ption th at they could obtain a generous share o f the traffic between the A m erican m iddle west and the seaboard. By securing a line to Chicago the G rand T ru n k had a connection w ith A m erican railways and, w ith lines to M ontreal and Portland, was in a position to carry goods in either sum m er o r w inter. A fu rth er indication of the belief th at the cheapest ro u te between A tlantic ports and Chicago lay through C anada was seen in the construction o f the C anada Southern, an A m erican-ow ned railway joining the N ew Y ork C entral and M ichigan C entral, and designed to obviate the loop around the south of L ake Erie. T h e exploitation of w hat w ere conceived to be favourable geographical conditions never brought results on the scale that had been anticipated. T he projects for a railway to the C anadian west gave a new tu rn to the issue. T he G rand T ru n k clung to its conviction th at the logical route lay through the U nited States, by w ay o f Chicago; but the governm ental decision in favour of a line wholly on C anadian soil rendered the G rand T ru n k plan impossible, since it could be realized only w ith the aid of public m oney. T he decision to construct a railway to the Pacific coast by way o f the northern shore o f L ake S uperior m eant th at that railway, com pleted in 1885, had to com pete for traffic with A m erican transcontinental lines, and to protect itself against drainage o f business from its m ain line. T he m ost vulnerable points w ere Sault Ste. M arie, the Red R iver V alley, and the Pacific coast. A t these places w here connections w ith A m erican railways were, o r could be, m ade, a variety o f m easures w ere adopted as defence against com petition.7 H eavy investm ent in the C anadian Pacific and the later transcontinental railways - the C anadian N orthern and the N ational T ranscontinental-G rand T ru n k Pacific - represented a com m itm ent to a policy o f east-and-w est traffic in Canada w hich becam e a p art o f C anadian policy and form ed a leading argum ent in the opposition to reciprocity in 1911. W ith the acceptance o f the general strategy of C anadian railways the dream of the St. Law rence V alley as the m ain route to the centre o f N o rth A m erica faded. Y et m uch reality - and increas­ ing reality - rem ained of railway relations w ith the U nited States. Beginning w ith through rail com m unication between M ontreal and Boston in 1851, a netw ork o f connections between

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C anadian and A m erican railways was gradually built up, realized in p art by junctions at the frontier, and in p art by ow nership or operation of lines across the border. By 1933 there w ere fifty-five rail o r car-ferry crossings along the border, all the way from N ew Brunswick to British Colum bia. In the same year C anadian railways had control o r trackage rights over 7,312 miles o f rail in the U nited States, while A m erican railways had a corresponding mileage of 1,556 in C anada.8 T he eco­ nom ic effects of such an interrelationship w ere far-reaching, enabling the com m erce o f one country to have easy access to th at o f the other. Each railway com pany concerned aim ed, of course, to profit from the connection, and each therefore sought to attract traffic to its own lines. Because they were private com panies, the railways conducted, to som e extent, their own international relations, but were not reluctant to appeal to their respective governm ents against “unfair” com petition. Official negotiations resulted on such questions as freight rates and bonding privileges.9 In the m ovem ent for the im provem ent o f transportation by rail and w ater the chief em phasis was laid on satisfactory access to ocean ports in order to m aintain and develop the foreign trade which was a m ajor interest in Canada. W ith the progress of wheat-grow ing in the prairies, added to the staples for export in the east and centre, th at object becam e o f increasing im portance. T h e possible outlets were the sum m er ports of M ontreal and Quebec, the all-year ports o f Saint John and H alifax, the new port o f V ancouver, or the A m erican ports of N ew England and New Y ork. W hile the C anadians had struggled by diplom acy to secure use o f the H udson River route, and C anadian railways continued to obtain connections w ith A m erican railways across the border, the investm ent in C anadian canals and railways dem anded that both should be fed by ocean shipping at C an a­ dian ports. W ithout that, both the C anadian Pacific and the Intercolonial railways would be meaningless, and the expensive canals w ould lead to a blank end. F rom tim e im m em orial the men of the m aritim e provinces and of Q uebec had built and sailed ships, and had sold them abroad. T he gradual replacem ent of w ooden by iron ships, how ever, was fatal to the C anadian industry at that tim e, for local production o f iron was quite inadequate to supply the new need. T h e highest figure for the C anadian production of wooden ships was reached in 1874, and in a dozen years this was reduced by three-fourths. C anadian foreign trade, therefore, had to be

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carried in ships of foreign m anufacture - though not necessarily of foreign ow nership. O ne o f the most im portant o f modern shipping lines was founded by a native o f H alifax, Samuel C unard; but in 1867 the C unarders ceased to call a t H alifax, since the volum e o f traffic on the N ew Y ork route was so m uch g reater.10 T he C unard Com pany, how ever, retained a C anadian connection by its service to the St. L aw rence ports. A nother shipping line w hich originated in C anada was th at controlled by the A llan brothers o f M ontreal. T he com pany continued to use the St. Law rence route in spite o f the hazards of navigation and the com petition w ith N ew Y ork until increasing difficulties led to its sale to the new ly-form ed C anadian Pacific O cean Steam ­ ships. T he D om inion Line, organized in England in 1870, carried on a sum m er service to M ontreal until 1894 w hen financial difficulties caused the sale of its ships, which, however, continued in service to C anada first under the British and N orth A tlantic Steam N avigation C om pany and then under the W hite Star Line. T he im pending com pletion of the C anadian Pacific Railw ay brought prospects o f a com plete C anadian rou te to the orient, w ith the advantages o f through traffic for the railway and o f general trade for C anada. As a first tem porary m easure the railw ay com pany chartered three steam ships. In the m ean­ tim e negotiations w ere being conducted w ith the imperial governm ent on the project o f a Pacific service supported by a m ail subsidy. W ith the conclusion o f an agreem ent, a ten-year contract was aw arded to the C anadian Pacific in 1889 providing fo r a subsidy o f £ 4 5 ,0 0 0 from the im perial governm ent and £ 1 5 ,0 0 0 from the C anadian governm ent for the carriage of m ail to H ong K ong. T he first th ree E m presses were built in E ngland for the C anadian Pacific. A n im portant trade was thus built up, both betw een E urope and the far east, and in oriental goods - particularly silk and tea - im ported into C anada and the U nited States. T h e sea-going shipping entered and cleared at C anadian ports am ounted to 4,319,321 tons in 1868 and 14,175,121 tons in 1900. T his satisfactory increase was due not only to the initiative of individual com panies, but also to governm ental aid by the im provem ent of navigation and by m oney subsidies. T he chan­ nel in the St. Law rence was repeatedly deepened, to tw enty-tw o feet in 1877, and tw enty-seven and a half feet in 1887. A bout 1900 w ork on a thirty-foot channel was begun. C oncurrently with the im provem ent of the channel better harb o u r facilities were provided at Q uebec and M ontreal. T he need for subsidies

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as an encouragem ent to direct steam ship services to C anadian ports was early seen and constantly acted on. C onsiderable sums were paid to m aintain a line between C anada, the W est Indies, and Brazil; between C anada and F rance; and, in co-operation w ith the British governm ent, to Japan, A ustralia, and South A frica. Subsidies w ere also paid to com panies operating ships between C anadian and British ports, but in this case the steam ­ ship lines were handicapped by A m erican com petition.11 A s a fu rth e r m ethod o f encouraging foreign trade some investigation was m ade in 1910 and the next three years o f the possibility of control of the freight rates o f the ocean steam ship com panies by com m on action of the im perial and dom inion authorities. T here was som e discussion of the question at the im perial conference o f 1911, but w ithout tangible result. In 1913 the C anadian governm ent sent H . L. D rayton, head o f the board o f railway com missioners, to L ondon to discuss the m atter fu rth er, but again no agreem ent was reached.12 T he m ethod o f reaching freight rates by the N orth A tlantic C onference was under some criticism in C anada, and D ray to n ’s report gives the impression th at the charges w ere unduly high. C om m unications, like transportation, played their p art in the external relations o f Canada. T he two are closely connected, for the m ails were dependent on the railway and shipping facilities available. T he com pletion o f the Intercolonial Railw ay and the C anadian Pacific Railw ay m ade it possible fo r the post office to send m ail across C anada, and to connect w ith A tlantic and Pacific ports w ithout being obliged to m ake use of A m erican routes. T h e steady developm ent of ocean shipping at C anadian ports also allowed fo r direct com m unication w ith a growing num ber o f countries, and th at w ith greater speed and regularity. T he com plicated position existing before the establishm ent of the P ostal U nion in 1874 entailed not only high rates o f foreign postage, but varied rates according to the num ber of countries through which a letter passed and w hether o r not bilateral conventions existed. T he situation caused not only expense to concerns engaged in foreign trade b u t also the necessity of arriving at rates fo r alm ost every letter. I t was obviously advantageous, therefore, to secure entrance to th e U nion, but C anada was not adm itted until 1878. U nder the original con­ stitution any one m em ber could veto an application, and it happened th at F ran ce exercised this pow er on account o f a difference w ith G reat Britain over sea rates. T he situation was cleared up by the exertions of the British post office. Reductions

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o f postage rates w ere subsequently m ade both within C anada and fo r foreign letters. T he aspect o f this w hich caused m ost interest was th e project of im perial penny postage. Publicly advocated by an English m em ber o f parliam ent, M r. H enniker H eaton, it was discussed a t the colonial conference of 1887, but n ot adopted. Subsequently the plan was supported by the C ana­ dian governm ent, and cam e into effect in 1898 for the whole em pire w ith the exception o f A ustralia, w hich did not adhere to the arrangem ent until 1911. In 1899 the tw o-cent rate was applied also to letters from C anada to the U nited States.13 C om m unication by telegraph and cable was another subject o f im portance for C anada in its external relations. In respect of telegraphs there is a double interest: the adequacy of the lines fo r the purpose o f com m unication with the U nited States, and indirectly with British and foreign countries; and the connection between C anadian and A m erican com panies. In the years after confederation C anada had a netw ork o f telegraph lines th at joined the m ain cities w ith each other and w ith A m erican lines reaching to the border. T he A m erican com pany, W estern Union, was associated in eastern C anada w ith the M ontreal Telegraph C om pany; and in 1881 W estern U nion acquired lines in N ova Scotia and N ew Brunswick by taking over Jay G ould’s A m eri­ can U nion T elegraph Com pany. T he great N orthw estern T elegraph C om pany, incorporated in 1880, w ith its head office in W innipeg, had E rastus W im an as president. It absorbed the M ontreal C om pany and the D om inion Telegraph C om pany (w hich ow ned the m aritim e provinces’ lines), and thus the A m erican interests o f W estern U nion in C anada were consolidated, although the m ajority stock was held in C anada.14 A cable from N ew foundland to Ireland h ad been successfully laid in the year before confederation by a private com pany, and oth er lines across the A tlantic followed. T o com plete C anada’s cable com m unications w ith the outside w orld it rem ained to establish a Pacific cable. In the discussions of this, as in th at of the im perial penny postage, com m ercial interests were mingled w ith political. T h e initiative in a project fo r an all-British, state-ow ned cable from C anada to A ustralia and New Zealand was taken by S andford Flem ing, and in the score of years from the first proposal to actual construction the pressure for the realization o f the schem e cam e from Canada. W ith the com ing com pletion of the telegraph to the Pacific coast in m ind, F lem ­ ing began to form ulate his plan for the cable, to be the continua­ tion o f th e telegraph line.15 T hrough the early eighties the

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C anadian governm ent, w ith Flem ing’s assistance, collected inform ation w hich they placed before parliam ent. T he Pacific cable was discussed at the colonial conferences o f 1887 and 1897, and by other means in the intervals. N o t a few obstacles w ere raised - the cost, the route, and the claims o f existing com m ercial com panies - but they were all in tim e overcom e, and the Pacific cable was in operation in O ctober 1902. II Before the nineteenth century was out C anada had a system o f transportation th at linked her to the U nited States, Europe, and the far east, and that provided w ater o r rail facilities from one end o f the country to another. T he greater p art o f the railw ay system had been built during days o f depression, b ut in the faith th at better times w ould com e. Private investm ent in the railways, as well as governm ent support by land and money, were a gam ble on the grow th o f the country in the future. W ithout increased population, com m erce, and trade the whole foundation of the structure w ould be gone. T he late eighties and early nineties gave little ground for hope; stagnation was the dom inant feature in C anada as elsewhere. I t was only in the dying days of the century th at confidence and optim ism were rew arded, w hen the business cycle once m ore took an upw ard swing, and Canadians at. least could see the fu tu re w hich they had predicted and on w hich they had staked the present. T he m ines o f British Colum bia and northern O ntario, the forest resources of east and west, the budding m anufactures - all were ready fo r exploitation, and all called for labour. But the chief opening was in agriculture. T he lands o f the prairies w ere ready fo r w orking, but the labourers indeed w ere few. T h e C anadian public and C anadian officials were convinced that they had in the west an asset of incalculable value, not only because of the richness and accessibility o f the land, but because it had a scarcity value now th at the A m erican west was all but fu lly occupied. Im m igrants w ould be welcomed, within limits, in o th er areas and occupations, but the big need was strong farm ers for the virgin soil o f the prairie. In the past C anada had never obtained im m igrants in num bers com parable to her am bitions, and even the addition of such as had com e had been m ore than offset by the drain of people to the U nited States. It has been calculated th at net m igration since confederation showed a loss in every year but one (1873) until 1901.16 The

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inducem ent to m igrate was prim arily econom ic - the hope of people suffering from unsatisfactory conditions o f life in town o r country to better their lot in the new w orld. In som e cases, too, groups in continental E urope w ere led to em igrate because of religious o r political persecution. In the British Isles assist­ ance and encouragem ent had long been given by private persons or organizations to em igrants to C anada and elsewhere. In the early tw entieth century “ about forty societies carried on the w ork o f assisting em igrants, either by providing the passage in whole o r in part, o r in giving advice to intending em igrants, and putting them in touch with friendly societies o r individuals overseas.” 17 T rades unions continued to give some aid to m em ­ bers who wished to em igrate, though to a lesser extent than form erly.18 T he British governm ent in this period took little direct responsibility fo r assisting em igration; but, under various statutes, boards o f guardians, county councils, and borough councils were authorized to render assistance out o f local rates. In general, the efforts of organizations and of the governm ent in the British Isles w ere directed tow ard giving assistance to those w ho were unem ployed or otherw ise suffering from econo­ m ic hardships at hom e. T he C anadian interest in m igration was to secure enough suitable people to help to develop the country, by draw ing them from w herever they could be found. T he Liberal governm ent o f W ilfrid L aurier cam e into office (1896) just as the econom ic horizon brightened. T he vitality of a new governm ent com bined with better conditions to produce a fresh vigour and success in the search for im m igrants. A gents and advertising m atter w ere sent to the U nited K ingdom , the U nited States, and continental E u rope.T he departm ent of im m igration, under the stim ulus of Clifford Sifton, adopted new m ethods and explored new fields.10 T he results o f the cam paign in the U nited States were particularly striking; in 1897 only 9,000 im m igrants cam e from the U nited States, but by 1910 the num ber was over 100,000, and nearly 140,000 in 1913. Since the chief dem and and the. chief opportunity were for farm ers in the prairies, it was open to the governm ent to encourage their settlem ent in two other w ays: by seeing th at an adequate railway system was being provided, and by m aking land available on favourable term s. Even if railway branch lines could never quite keep up to the moving frontier of settlem ent, the C anadian Pacific’s m ain line was rapidly being supplem ented not only by its own branch lines but also by two additional transcontinental railways. In every step o f railway expansion governm ents, both federal and

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provincial, gave aid by w ay of loans, land grants, o r guarantee of bonds.20 A nd because o f its control over the natural resources of the west, the dom inion governm ent was able to organize the system of land grants so as to encourage settlem ent. F rom the first free-hom esteading w as provided for under a series of D om inion L and A cts, w ith conditions th at provided against misuse by speculators, in the attem pt to attract im m igrants. L ands granted to railways in aid o f construction were sold by the com panies, w hich were as anxious to secure the business that would accrue from the presence o f settlers as they w ere to m ake a direct profit out of the land.21 T he railway com panies also played an active p art in the search for im m igrants, carrying on an extensive cam paign abroad with an enthusiasm th at on occasion left them open to accusations o f m isrepresentation. L and com panies and other private organizations also joined in the h u n t for im m igrants, w hether to further their particular interests or in a m ore altruistic spirit of building up the dom inion. T he C anadian Pacific Railw ay followed as active a program m e in securing im m igrants as did the governm ent; and, like the governm ent, encouraged settlem ent by means also of aid to settlers afte r their arrival in the west.22 W hatever the motive might be, the num ber o f im m igrants began to increase in num bers that were pleasing if not all that might be desired. F rom 1884 (during the construction o f the C anadian Pacific Railw ay) the num ber of im m igrants had gone down from a little over 100,000 to a paltry 17,000 in 1896. In 1903 it passed well over the hundred-thousand m ark again; the tw o-hundred thousand m ark was first passed in 1906, and the three-hundred thousand m ark in 1911. T he figure for 1913, o f 400,870, was the all-time high. Even the early tw entieth-century enthusiasm for imm igration did not entirely overshadow the caution o f governm ent and public in the selection of im m igrants. T he balance between quantity and quality was not always easy to adjust, and there were disagreem ents on the desirability of certain types of im m igrants. T he obvious objections were generally entertained tow ard physical disabilities, paupers, and non-white races. T he first choice would be of fam ilies from G re at Britain o r the U nited States w ho w ould go on the land. T hese sources, how­ ever, were too lim ited for C anadian needs, and the governm ent then turned to the continent of Europe. Investigation revealed that few im m igrants could be secured from G erm any, France, Belgium, or th e Scandinavian countries, but th at there were

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possibilities in A ustria-H ungary and Russia of which Sifton had hopes.23 T he several im m igration acts and orders-in-council in the fifteen years before the w ar w ere aimed at encouraging the grow th o f rural, and discouraging th at o f urban, population; this purpose arising in p art from the already existing drift from co untry to town. T he acts also provided regulations intended to keep o ut those w ho w ould becom e a charge on the country, or races w hich could n o t be assim ilated. Between 1902 and 1912 some 60,000 persons were rejected at the ports o r frontier, and 5,629 persons were deported. T he general policy, then, w as to build up the rural popula­ tion, by im m igration, w ithout departing too fa r from the existing ethnic basis o f F rench and English. T he largest group of im m i­ grants was British, consisting o f agriculturists to western C anada and artisans to the cities o f the east. T he latter were em ployed particularly in the heavy industries th at were rapidly developing in the period - for exam ple, in and around M ontreal. A n effect o f this on the province o f Q uebec was to accentuate a difference th at already existed in some degree between the two races - that th e F rench w ere m ore often ru ral dwellers and the British urban. But no great problem of assim ilation to the C an a­ dian population as a whole was created, rath er one of adjustm ent to new conditions.24 A m ong those who w ent to the west w ere to be found agricultural labourers from large English farm s, and th e sons o f yeom an farm ers, of better education and imbued w ith som e spirit of adventure.25 F o r the m ost p art these English farm er-im m igrants were interspersed w ith other farm ers, but one attem pt, m ade in 1903, to form a w holly British colony at Lloydm inster, Saskatchew an, was an interesting but unsuccess­ ful experim ent. T he colony w as not only British in personnel, b ut intended to be so in social structure; the m em bers o f the colony were inexperienced in agriculture, and had little but m isfortune until the population of the district becam e m ore m ixed.26 O ther experim ents in the transplanting o f groups from E urope to settle together in the prairies offered greater problem s o f assimilation, though they som etim es ended in a greater eco­ nom ic success. One o f the m ost interesting examples was th at of the U krainians, who left Russia partly because of political oppression, and partly because o f econom ic hardships and lack o f land. T hey w ere ru ral people, and settled in blocks in all three provinces. “E ach settlem ent,” w rote an observer, “ is a little U kraine in w hich anything o f a foreign n ature rarely intervenes

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to m ar the even tenor of their w ays.”27 W hile the children learnt English, the adult m em bers of the families spoke U krainian. T hey brought w ith them their own culture and their own reli­ gion, the G reek Catholic C hurch. Some o f their art, m usic, and literatu re tended to be overshadow ed by th at w hich already existed in C anada, and a rich heritage w as in danger o f being lost. T o the attem pts m ade in the public schools to plunge their children into the C anadian m elting-pot the U krainians offered resistance, and a wise m easure of toleration allowed a place for the U krainian language. As in the case o f m any settlem ents of im m igrants, the U krainians encountered econom ic difficulties, usually arising out o f unproductive land. T hey w orked on railw ay-construction o r on older farm s, how ever, and w ere able to m aintain them ­ selves, even if on a low standard. F o r C anada such problem as was created by the com ing o f the U krainians was not econom ic but cultural. U p to a point they enriched, by variety, the C an a­ dian culture, b u t som e conform ity was necessary. T h at is to say, if foreign and unassim ilated groups w ere m ultiplied, a time would com e when the p attern would becom e so confused that national entity would be weakened. T h e D oukhobors, w ho settled in southern Saskatchew an, were a m uch sm aller group, but, because of their peculiar beliefs, can be regarded as a foreign influence rem arkable in degree if not in size. T he D oukhobors w ere an unorthodox religious sect w ho w ere persecuted in Russia because of their pacifist beliefs which forbade their doing the com pulsory mili­ tary service. C om ing to C anada, first in 1899, they established a num ber of colonies organized on a com m unal basis. Som e of them , indeed, broke away from com m unism and m aintained private property, but with the m ajority difficulties w ere m et in their first refusal to accept land grants as individuals o r to pay taxes fo r roads. In deference to their beliefs, they w ere accorded exem ption from m ilitary service. T hey proved to be a sober and industrious people, but, in the view of one w ho assisted the first m igration, they got “ drunk on theories and on superstitions.”28 A m inority am ong them was difficult to assimilate. T he m ost rem arkable dem onstration o f their em otional religion w as a pilgrim age across country in 1902, after discarding their pos­ sessions and finally their clothes. Such activities could only be frow ned on by m ajority opinion, and be handled as tactfully as possible by governm ent officials. Such freakish behaviour con­ tributed little to C anada; but it w as foreign only in the sense that

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these families cam e from abroad. T hey created no particularly Russian influence or connection.29 A nother, and a calm er, group of Russians were the M ennonites. T he first m em bers of this reli­ gious group to com e to C anada arrived from Pennsylvania after the A m erican revolution. F rom 1874 on several thousand m ore cam e direct from Russia, settling first in M anitoba and later fu rth er west. A s a m inority o f D utch extraction in Russia they form ed in that country separate colonies as they were to do in C anada after their em igration. T hey were influenced in leaving Russia because o f a policy o f assim ilation there, and it might therefore be supposed th at they w ould seek equally to m aintain themselves as distinct groups in Canada. T heir needs, however, were n ot extrem e: religious freedom , exem ption from m ilitary service, and some use of their own language (w hich was G er­ m a n ).30 O f the com paratively large G erm an and Scandinavian elem ents in the population, a portion cam e from the U nited States, while m any o f the G erm ans in eastern C anada had been there fo r generations. It was generally found that both these racial groups w ere good settlers not only in the sense o f their being industrious, b ut in that they readily fitted in w ith C anadian institutions and custom s. A n exam ination o f the M agyar settlers in Saskatchew an showed th a t by origin they w ere farm la­ bourers, and had naturally taken to the land in C anada. By inquiry from fifty-five fam ilies it appeared th at at least thirty took M agyar periodicals.31 O riental im m igration created a problem quite different from that arising o u t o f the presence in C anada of any other foreign group. T he colour difference in itself was regarded by many Canadians as objectionable, and added to th at were the differ­ ences in standards of living. T he difficulty was greatly accentu­ ated by the fact th at m ost of the orientals settled in one province, British Colum bia. O riental im m igrants cam e from three co u n ­ tries: C hina, Jap an , and India. Each o f these countries had a different relationship politically to Canada. India w as a p art of the British E m pire; with Jap an G reat B ritain had first com m er­ cial and later political treaties; C hina alone was not in a position to w arrant special consideration. The first orientals to arrive in any num ber were Chinese from the U nited States, attracted to British Colum bia by the gold rush of 1858, and am ounting to som e 2,000 in I8 60.32 F u rth e r im m igrants then cam e directly from China, to a num ber sufficient to provoke an inquiry by parliam ent in 1879. C ontractors on the C anadian Pacific Rail­ w ay construction provided w ork for fu rth er Chinese, and as

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m any as 15,000 were estim ated to have entered British Colum bia betw een 1881 and 1884. Because of a ban on em igration from Japan before the revolutionary changes o f 1867 Japanese were later in com ing to Canada. T here were perhaps 1,000 in C anada in 1896. T he census of 1901 shows 4,738 and that o f 1911, 9,067. Im m igrants from India did not start to com e until 1905, and the only large num bers of entries w ere in 1907 (2,124) and 1908 (2 ,6 2 3 ). T he presence of orientals becam e a m ain issue in British Colum bia. T he objections w ere, principally, on two grounds. T he orientals, it was said, could not be assim ilated - nor was it desirable th at they should be. Mixed m arriages w ere held to be o ut of the question, and there were not even ordinary social relations between the races. W hether it was in town o r country, the orientals lived in groups, and lived, it was alleged, under unsanitary conditions th at w ere a m enace to the com m unity. T h e second objection was th at the orientals, w ho w ere virtually all uneducated labourers, deprived white people o f w ork because they were prepared to accept low er wages. This had the effect either of keeping white men unem ployed o r of lowering the whole wage scale. F rom th e m ines the orientals moved to rail­ way construction, and, w hen that w as finished, to fisheries, agriculture, dom estic w ork, and various other callings. In each o f the occupations in turn, it was said, w hite men were dispossessed. T h e provincial legislature and the British Colum bia mem bers o f parliam ent struggled for years to secure exclusion. T he legis­ lature continually attem pted to solve the problem by direct action, but its m easures w ere disallowed by the federal govern­ m ent as beyond provincial powers. T he federal governm ent and parliam ent did, however, take a num ber of steps. M ore than one commission o f inquiry was sent to the coast to investigate, and volum inous reports w ere m ade. V arious m eans were also adopted to restrict im m igration. In 1885 a head tax o f $50 was im posed on every Chinese im m igrant, and in 1900 the tax was doubled. Still the dam was not high enough to stop the flood of entries, and in 1904 the tax was raised as high as $500. T h at too failed in its purpose, and indeed it was interpreted as having the opposite effect by raising wages in a protected labour m arket, and so making it possible for new com ers to earn the tax in a short period.33 Sim ilar action could hardly be taken in respect of the Japanese because of political relations between their country and G reat B ritain. T here was, how ever, the sam e cause for steps o f som e kind to be taken, for the im m igration of Japanese was

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fast increasing, and their rate of natural increase was higher. T h e solution was found not by exclusion, but by a “gentlem an’s agreem ent” o f 1907 with the Japanese governm ent by which passports were to be restricted, and the flow of labourers stopped. In order to discuss Indian im m igration with the British authorities, M r. M ackenzie King was sent to L ondon in 1908. H e found a sym pathetic hearing and a recognition that, on account of clim ate, m anners, and custom s, C anada was not a suitable place in which Indians might live. T he governm ent of In d ia agreed to inform its subjects as to the conditions of C an ­ ada; steam ship com panies w ere warned not to use misleading literature; and the Indian E m igration A ct m ade em igration of contract labour unlaw ful except to those countries which made provisions satisfactory to the governm ent of India. T he C ana­ dian governm ent, on its part, by orders-in-council, imposed as a condition that em igrants should be possessed of $200 and should pass by continuous voyage from their country of origin. Indian im m igration, as a result of these obstacles, dwindled to almost nil.34 T h e fears felt in British Colum bia were, by these various m easures, partly appeased; but the problem o f unassimilable races, threatening econom ic pressure on the w hite population, by no means wholly disappeared. T he population o f C anada, w hich was constantly recruited by im m igration, was equally constantly dim inished by em igra­ tion. T h e door to the U nited States was, in those years, wide open, and thousands of m en and women passed through it every year to seek opportunities o f em ploym ent. A portion of these had only paused in C anada on their way from E urope and can­ not be regarded as C anadians. O thers were native-born or long resident, with C anadian background and ties; and their depar­ ture changed the balance o f races rem aining in Canada, and planted an increasing elem ent in the U nited States. A n agent appointed by the C anadian governm ent to investigate the num ­ ber of Canadians in the U nited States concluded that in 1873 there were 800,000 C anadian-born residents there. A bout half o f these were F rench, and half o f these again were in New E ngland.35 M any o f the Canadians w ent to the expanding Am erican west, especially before the C anadian Pacific Railway opened a route to western Canada. A broad distinction m ay be draw n between the English- and French-speaking C anadian em igrants to the U nited States in that the form er m ixed as individuals with the rest of the popula­

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tion, while the latter tended to form separate colonies and seek to avoid assim ilation. T he em igration o f French C anadians, which had caused alarm as early as the forties, reached larger proportions after the Civil W ar and rem ained considerable until about 1890, w hen it dim inished. It was in large part a m ovem ent o f farm ers to unskilled w ork in the factories o f New England, w here they, and their wives and children, were welcomed as em ployees by the m anagem ents o f expanding industries requir­ ing dependable w orkers at low wages. T he motive of em igration, then, was econom ic, and seems to have been unm ixed with any political or other discontent. T he men w ent simply to seek profitable em ploym ent, w ithout any of the bitterness of the emigre. A ccustom ed to the com m unity life of Quebec, and with little o r no know ledge of English, they early began to form small groups of their own. Separate F rench quarters - outposts of Q uebec - grew up in the factory towns. T he m igrants were not infrequently resented by the English-speaking w orkers, in som ething of the sam e spirit that Canadians resented the coming of Chinese o r other cheap foreign labour. T h eir going was no less regretted at home. Cries o f distress continued to rise in C anada at the loss of thousands after thousands. T he drain of people was regretted because it was held to im pede the econom ic developm ent of C anada, to w eaken the French-C anadian group, and to detach so m any from the church. Efforts at repatriation w ere m ade, and in 1875 the Q uebec legislature voted $50,000 fo r that purpose, p art of which was spent on agents to N ew England. T he results, how ever, were m eagre, and received little support am ongst the spokesm en of the em igres themselves.30 If they could not be induced to return, it rem ained only to encour­ age the m aintenance o f cultural links w ith a people w ho were voluntarily retaining m any of their native traits. T here m ight even result positive advantages. C ette depopulation en masse [wrote H am on] est sans doute une catamite pour le Canada. II eu t etc bien preferable de garder ces h om m es au pays, ou ils auraient fondes des fam ilies de colons attaches au sol. M ais, d'autre part, elle a perm is a la race frangaise et catholique de jeter de profondes racines dans les E tats de I'Est, et qui sait le role q u ’elle peut etre appelee a jouer dans I’avenir?37 H ad not the F rench long since learned the technique of m aintaining their own national characteristics in face of an English governm ent and population in C anada? T he cases were not dissimilar. T he binding forces were, in the m ain, three:

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language, religion, and education; and all three were interde­ pendent. N ew England already had a large R om an Catholic elem ent, but it was Irish. T he im m igrants were handicapped by ignorance of English and fitted with difficulty into the custom s of the Irish parishes. M oreover, to do so would be to lose their entity, and this neither they nor their com patriots in Quebec would willingly see happen. A few F rench priests were estab­ lished in N ew E ngland before 1870, and after that date it becam e the rule. By 1890 eighty-six separate F rench Rom an C atholic parishes had been established, m ost of w hich were served by French priests.:!8 In 1911 there w ere said to be 202 parishes and 101 missions.30 W ith the churches w ent convents and parish schools. T he stress on separate education was the sam e as in Quebec, and w here local conditions m ade it neces­ sary fo r children to attend public schools the defenders of nationalism saw the defeat o f their aims. “L ’ecole publiaue,” w rote one, “est le tom beau de la race frangaise aux EtatsU nis.”40 In 1890 there were fifty convents in N ew England, and these, w ith the parish schools, were educating 30,000 children. T o H am on the education of girls in convents was all-im portant because it was the w om en that m aintained the F rench language. L e convent canadien-frangais sera done avec I’eglise, la citadelle puissante qui gardera a ux em igres leur religion et leur langue. La se form eront les jeunes filles qui devenues plus tard des m eres de fam ille, parleront le frangais au fo y e r dom estique et la fero n t parler a leurs enfants.41 N ew spapers, m any o f them short-lived, w ere founded in various N ew England centres to m aintain the language and corporate feeling of the F rench Canadians in the U nited States. A nother force intended to m aintain their entity lay in the F rench and C atholic societies, united in 1901 under the nam e of 1’Union Saint-Jean B aptiste d ’A m erique. A lready there had been a n um ber o f conventions of the local societies; and in 1874 they were invited to M ontreal to m eet w ith the society there, and sim ilarly in 1880 to Quebec.42 O rganized resistance to assim ilation, and conscious effort to m aintain nationality, were not found am ong the English C ana­ dians w ho m igrated to the U nited States. T he absence of a language difference, and the sim ilarity o f race w ith at least the predom inant part of the A m erican population, m ade it easy for English C anadians to fit into A m erican society. T hey were, m oreover, m ore of the business and professional classes than were the French-C anadian em igrants. In m any cases they

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m aintained links w ith C anada through friends and relations, or in some cases by sending their children back to school. T here w ere m any and frequent expressions o f regret at the constant drain of educated m en from English C anada, but no m issionary effort such as m arked the parallel relations in Quebec. In the early tw entieth century im m igration becam e larger than em igration until the net gain in the peak year (1913) reached 217,914 - slightly m ore than half of the total num ber of im m igrants. T he effects of this shifting of population on the character of the C anadian people cannot be defined w ith any accuracy, but some approach m ay be m ade to a study through the census returns. Since it is impossible to know w hat p ro p o r­ tion of the new com ers passed on shortly to the U nited States, an analysis of im m igrants has a limited value. A m ore fruitful m ethod will be an exam ination o f the population in the country, as show n in the census years. O ne series o f categories is by place o f birth. In 1881 the total population was 4,324,810. O f these approxim ately 86 p er cent were born in C anada, 11 per cent in the British Isles and British possessions, 0.9 per cent in Europe, none in Asia, and 1.7 per cent in the U nited States. T he total population in 1901 was 5,371,315. A large proportion - 86.9 per cent - was C anadian-born; only 7.8 per cent born in the British Isles and possessions; 2.3 per cent in E urope; 0.4 per cent in Asia; and 2.4 per cent in the U nited States. T en years later the population had grow n to 7,206,643. T he C anadianborn w ere proportionately sm aller - 77.9 per cent; 11.5 per cent were born in the British Isles and possessions, 5.6 per cent in Europe, 0.6 per cent in A sia, and 4.2 p er cent in the U nited States. T he population may also be divided by racial origins. (The census o f 1891 did not include this category.) F o r the years covered, im m igrants from the U nited States are not listed separately, as racial origin refers to origin before com ing to this cpntinent. In the lists th at follow only the larger groups are shown, and Indians and Eskim os are om itted.43 RACIAL ORIGIN tiacla

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian Asiatic

1881 4 ,3 2 4 ,8 1 0 2 ,5 4 8 ,5 1 4

1901 5 ,3 7 1 ,3 1 5 3 ,0 6 3 ,1 9 5

1 ,2 9 8 ,9 2 9 2 5 4 ,3 1 9 5 ,2 2 3

1 ,6 4 9 ,3 7 1 3 1 0 ,5 0 1 3 1 ,0 4 2

1911 7 ,2 0 6 ,6 4 3 3 ,9 9 9 ,0 8 1 2 ,0 6 1 ,7 1 9 4 0 3 ,4 1 7 1 1 2 ,6 8 2

4 ,3 8 3

5 ,4 8 5 2 3 ,7 2 1

6 4 ,3 1 5 4 3 ,2 1 3

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 189 RACIAL ORIGIN

P rince E dw ard Isla n d

1881

1 901

1911

1 0 8 ,8 9 1 9 5 ,9 1 6 1 0 ,7 5 1

1 0 3 ,2 5 9 8 7 ,8 8 3 1 3 ,8 6 6

8 8 ,6 1 5 7 9 ,2 6 6 1 3 ,1 2 4

N o v a Scotia

4 4 0 ,5 7 2

British French Germ an

3 4 2 ,2 3 8 4 1 ,2 1 9 4 0 ,0 6 5

4 5 9 ,5 7 4 3 5 9 ,0 6 4 4 5 ,1 6 1 4 1 ,0 2 0

4 9 2 ,3 3 8 3 8 0 ,2 0 5 5 1 ,9 1 9 3 8 ,8 9 4

N e w B ru n sw ick

3 2 1 ,2 3 3 2 4 5 ,9 7 4

3 3 1 ,1 2 0 2 3 7 ,5 2 4

2 3 8 ,1 6 0

5 6 ,6 3 5

7 9 ,9 7 9

9 8 ,7 9 5

1 ,3 5 9 ,0 2 7 2 6 0 ,5 3 8 1 ,0 7 3 ,8 2 0 7

1 ,6 4 8 ,8 9 8 2 9 0 ,1 6 9

2 ,0 0 5 ,7 7 6

1 ,9 2 6 ,9 2 2 1 ,5 4 9 ,1 6 0 1 0 3 ,0 0 4

2 ,1 8 2 ,9 4 7 1 ,6 3 2 ,1 4 4 1 5 8 ,6 7 1

2 ,5 2 7 ,2 9 2 1 ,9 7 0 ,9 8 0 2 0 3 ,6 6 8

1 8 8 ,4 1 4

2 0 3 ,3 1 9

1 9 3 ,6 1 3

6 2 ,2 6 0

2 5 5 ,2 1 1 1 6 4 ,2 3 9 1 6 ,0 2 1

4 6 1 ,3 9 4 2 7 6 ,2 5 9

British French

British French Q uebec

British French Asiatic O ntario

British French German M a n itoba

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian

3 7 ,1 5 5 9 ,6 8 8 8 ,6 3 2 952

Saskatchew an

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian A lb e rta

British French Germ an Scandinavian Ukrainian British C olum bia

British French Germ an Scandinavian Asiatic

4 9 ,4 5 9 1 4 ,6 6 0 916 858 236 4 ,3 5 0

1 ,3 2 2 ,1 1 5 1 ,6 0 0

3 5 1 ,8 8 9

3 1 8 ,7 9 9 1 ,6 0 6 ,5 3 5 2 ,3 4 3

2 7 ,2 6 5 1 1 ,9 2 4 3 ,8 9 4

3 1 ,2 9 3 3 4 ,9 7 9 1 7 ,6 4 4 3 1 ,0 5 3

9 1 ,2 7 9 4 0 ,0 9 4 2 ,6 3 4 1 1 ,7 4 3 1,4 5 2 1 ,0 9 4

4 9 2 ,4 3 2 2 6 9 ,5 1 3 2 5 ,4 9 7 7 1 ,0 0 3 3 5 ,1 5 7 2 2 ,2 7 6

7 3 ,0 2 2 3 4 ,9 0 3 4 ,5 1 1 7 ,8 3 6 3 ,9 4 0 634

3 7 4 ,2 9 5 2 1 5 ,1 7 4 2 0 ,6 0 0 4 1 ,6 5 6 2 9 ,5 4 7 1 7 ,5 8 4

1 7 8 ,6 5 7 1 0 6 ,4 0 3 4 ,6 0 0 5 ,7 0 7 4 ,8 8 0 1 9 ,5 2 4

3 9 2 ,4 8 0 2 6 6 ,2 9 5 9 ,3 4 1 1 2 ,7 2 6 1 6 ,0 8 7 3 0 ,8 6 4

190 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

A s in the case o f the racial character of the population im­ m ediately after confederation, the later censuses m ust not be taken at their face value to represent the attachm ents of the population. It is true th at the percentage o f those of British origin dim inished from 60.55 in 1871 to 54.07 in 1911, and that this decrease represented an increasing proportion of Europeans. B ut it is not clear that the change was reflected in changing views on external affairs. M oreover, if the racial com position is exam ined in detail, it will be apparent th at the eastern provinces w ere hardly touched. P rince E dw ard Island retained about the sam e proportion of British and French. N ova Scotia, too, was little affected; and the G erm an elem ent there represented an early im m igration. N ew Brunswick shows a larger percentage of people o f F rench origin who had moved from Q uebec into the n o rth ern p art of the province. T he only notable item in the figures fo r Q uebec is the appearance of Japanese and Chinese, b u t it was not of great significance. O ntario retained its old racial characteristics. In the w est there w ere m ore m ixture and m ore diversity, as was inevitable from its place as the object of im m igration. It can probably be assum ed, too, th at the E uropean groups there were of recent origin. T here m ight, therefore, be a distinction betw een the early G erm an im m igrants o f N ova Scotia and O ntario and the m uch later groups in the prairie provinces. T he m ost controversial issue arose out of the growing num bers of Japanese and Chinese in British Colum bia. In the period between 1871 and 1914 the population of C an ad a was basically British and French, those two together m aking up from 80 to 90 p er cent of the total. T he French, how ever, were F rench C anadian, less influenced by contem ­ porary external influences than any other group of Canadians. T hey had, of course, cultural elem ents w hich grew out o f their original m other country, and w hich to som e extent w ere fed by cu rren t F rench thought. But in respect o f political ideas it m ust be app arent th at they w ere the m ost native of C anadians. T he ranks of the British Canadians, on the other hand, w ere con­ stantly recruited by new com ers from the British Isles and from the U nited States. Those who cam e from the U nited K ingdom and the U nited States brought social and political ideas which they could relate, w ithout undue distortion, to C anadian condi­ tions. T hey readily obtained English o r A m erican periodicals, w hich had always form ed one source of C anadian thinking. T he position of E uropean im m igrants was very different. In some instances they w ere em igres representing a dissatisfied m inority,

E F F E C T S OF E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 191

in others they cam e from purely econom ic motives. T here is no indication o f any serious attem pt to introduce Russian, G erm an, o r Scandinavian institutions, but there was a tendency to cling to an old religion, language, or way of life. Such elements added v ariety - sometim es desirable and sometim es not - but never sufficient to change m aterially the character of C anada. T he British and French basis rem ained the dom inating force, and neither the institutions nor the external policy o f the dom inion appears to have been seriously modified by a growing diversity of peoples. Ill Enthusiasm fo r increased im m igration was vociferous and real, b ut not shared by all classes of the C anadian population. W hile governm ents, railway com panies, land com panies, and em ployers painted a bright picture o f a futu re C anada filled with energetic producers, the w age-earning class looked w ith some distrust on the whole idea. T he im m igrants w ere, and were bound to be, predom inantly o f the w orking class; and it was a question w hether their com ing did not endanger the level of wages and even o f em ploym ent. Led by those of British Colum ­ bia, the C anadian labour organizations repeatedly took a stand against the adm ission o f Chinese, Japanese, or E ast Indian im m igrants, w hose standard o f living enabled them to accept low er wages and thus imperil the position o f the w hite w orker. E ven o f selected im m igration there w as som e doubt, and at tim es opposition to it. D enials were m ade o f the frequent state­ m ents that C anada had alm ost unlim ited openings for immi­ grants. T he annual report to the T rades and L abor Congress of C anada in 1906 expressed a not untypical point of view: “T he few er our people and the g reater ou r w ealth, the m ore ideal will be the existing conditions. W e have no need of cheap peoples, they arc an aspiration of the get-rich-quick m an w ho desires to pile up a few extra thousands o r hundreds o f thousands of dol­ lars at the expense o f the fu tu re of C anada.” 14 T he least opposi­ tion was to agricultural w orkers going to the west, w here there was an evident need of labour. T h e various labour organizations w hich took a continued interest in this aspect of external policy w ere, in their origin and character, m aterially affected by other influences from outside C anada; such influences being carried either by im m igrants or im ported books and periodicals. T he early C anadian trade

192 - A H IS T O R Y O F CA N A D IA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

unions were based principally on English examples, and British influence continued to play a part. A fter confederation, how­ ever, A m erican m ovem ents cam e to be the stronger, and even the predom inant, forces affecting labour organization in Canada. W ith th eir legal status established under an act o f 1872 (35 V iet., c. 3 0 ), w hich was alm ost a verbal copy o f the British act o f the previous year, C anadian unions were m ore free to develop, and indeed show ed a rapid growth in an age o f indus­ trial expansion.45 Individual unions had, even before this, be­ com e affiliated w ith parallel bodies in the U nited States. In the seventies and eighties C anadian labour followed British and A m erican precedents by the linking together o f local unions into larg er bodies o f various sizes and types. T he K nights of Labor, which had a m ushroom grow th in the U nited States, fo r a tim e m et w ith a w elcom e in C anada. T he rival and successor, the A m erican F ederation of L abor, had a m ore lasting connection w ith C anadian organizations. T he Industrial W orkers o f the W orld first obtained adherents in the C anadian w est in 1906, and by 1911 claim ed 10,000 followers. A fter conducting a strike on the G rand T ru n k Pacific Railway in 1912, its num bers w ere cut in half. In 1913 it w as vigorously denounced by the C anadian F ederation of L abour as “attem pting to overthrow the present form s o f society by creating a state o f industrial anarchy,” and its radicalism prevented a wide support in C anada. T he agents o f the I.W .W ., together with delegates of m ore m oderate organizations, foreign groups in the cities, and visiting socialists w ere not infrequently labelled as “foreign agitators.” W hile the m ain trend was tow ard international unions form ed by the junction of C anadian and A m erican units in various trades, there was, am ongst C anadian labour organiza­ tions, a contrary opinion w hich believed in national rath er than international organizations. O ne m ain split began in 1902 with a secession from the T rades and L abor Congress. T he latter continued in the faith of international unions and confined its m em bership to those organizations which had A m erican affilia­ tions. T he seceding groups form ed w hat was first know n as the N ational T rades and L abour Congress, and later renam ed the C anadian F ederation of L abour. T he Federation, always the sm aller body, sought to be national and to include all C anadian unions. T h at position, how ever, it never attained, finding its strength, a t different periods, in Quebec, O ntario, o r the m ari­ tim e provinces. T h e T rades and L abor Congress, while holding

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 193

to the principle o f international affiliation, aimed at being the representative organization of C anadian trade unions. Obstacles were found in Q uebec w ith the rise of the C atholic and anti­ international unions; in British Colum bia, where the unions tended to follow their own course, with or w ithout international connections; and in N ova Scotia. In the last the Provincial W orkm en’s A ssociation shared the views of the F ederation and eventually becam e affiliated with it. T he W orkm en’s Association not only com peted with the Congress, but in 1908 found its field directly invaded by the U nited M ine W orkers, an international, and previously a w estern organization.40 Both the N ova Scotia union and the com pany concerned (T he D om inion Coal C om ­ p an y ) resisted the efforts o f the invaders to enlist the employees in an international union. T he U nited M ine W orkers called a strike in 1909, one which was accom panied by violence, and w hich broadened out into a general issue between national and international unionism . F o r the time being the invaders were repulsed w ith heavy financial losses, though such a decision proved to be the exception rather than the rule for international unionism in C anada as a whole. In the m any argum ents arising out of the dispute in N ova Scotia it was pointed out th at the “international” unions belied their nam e, since they had no affiliations with E uropean trade unions. T here w ere, of course, good reasons for the strong influence o f the U nited States: geographical contiguity and sim ilarity of conditions. T here seems to have been in C anada no im portant body o f opinion which sought affiliation with British labour unions; and there is no indication of m ore than a distant interest in the first and second Internationals in Europe. In 1906 M r. Ram say M acdonald visited C anada, looking for “ an u nder­ standing w ith the labour parties o f the colonies so that there may be harm ony and co-operation between ourselves and them ,” but any co-operation that resulted was only of a general kind.47 T here were, how ever, external forces affecting C anadian labour oth er than those com ing from the U nited States. T he plans and policies o f labour organizations in A ustralia, N ew Zealand, G reat Britain, and Europe w ere studied w ith some care, w ith a view to their lessons for C anada. Two them es were of particular interest: political action and socialist doctrines. M anifestly any labour m ovem ent m ust aim at legislation as one means of achieving its objectives. T he difference of opinion in the C anadian labour organizations was on w hether or not they should intervene directly in politics by creating labour

194 - A H IS T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

parties in the provinces o r the dom inion. British and foreign examples could be cited on either side o f the argum ent. F o r som e years sporadic attem pts w ere m ade to further the desired legislation by running candidates for the various legislatures. In 1873 and 1874 the O ttaw a T rades Council secured the election of labour candidates to the O ntario House. In 1883, 1886, and 1894 the T oronto T rades Council attem pted, unsuc­ cessfully, to elect candidates to either the federal o r the provincial parliam ent. T he Provincial W orkm en’s Association m ade several attem pts in the eighties and nineties to elect candidates to the N ova Scotian Assembly, but w ith little success. T h e British Colum bia labour organizations w ere m ost interested in political action, and in 1902 form ed a Provincial Progressive P arty . T h e question also was frequently discussed by the C anadian organizations as a whole. T he T rades and L abor Congress, at its annual convention in 1894, adopted a general resolution in favour of direct political action, but w ith little result. T h e annual meeting in 1906 was the occasion for serious consideration o f the organization o f a labour party, the sup­ porters o f such a move being encouraged by the success of the L abour party in England and the statem ent o f the president of the A m erican F ederation o f L abor in favour of political action. A gain a general resolution was passed endorsing the sending of representatives o f labour to federal and provincial parliam ents, and again the fruits were small. O n the w hole the C anadian labour organizations steered a middle course between the British em phasis on parliam entary action and the A m erican tendency to m inim ize th at m ethod. T h e various socialist program m es o f G re at Britain, Europe, the U nited States, A ustralia, and N ew Z ealand w ere known in C anada and m et w ith some acceptance. In January 1905 the Socialist P arty of C anada was founded by Scottish and English adherents, together with some m em bers from the U nited States and E uropean countries. Its organization was planned to be provincial with a dom inion executive com m ittee, but its strength continued to be, as it started, in British Colum bia, and the proposed national convention was never held. T he principles of the party were strictly M arxian. T he em phasis was on pro p a­ ganda by lectures and pam phlets, and though the party had m em bers in the provincial legislature, political activity was never its m ain m ethod. T he Social D em ocratic Party, including m em bers who left the Socialist P arty, was founded at T oronto in 1910. Based on British and G erm an models, it continued to

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 195

be centred in T o ro n to as the older body was in the west. A n attem p t to com m it the T rades and L abor Congress to political socialism by a m otion in favour o f “absolute independent politi­ cal action on the p art of the w orking class w ith the collective ow nership of the m eans of life as its ultim ate aim ” was voted down at a m eeting in 1907.48 Socialists from abroad - Britain, the U nited States, and E urope - toured the country from time to tim e. M ay D ay parades - som e o f w hich were prohibited w ere organized in M ontreal, T oronto, and other cities. O n the whole, however, socialism did not find wide support, though it was em braced by various small groups. A m ongst the farm ers of C anada two foreign organizations had fo r a time a considerable success. T he Patrons o f H us­ bandry, o r the G range, was founded in W ashington in 1867, and spread rapidly in the next few years. It was a fraternal society, organized in units, o r granges, and aimed at collective action to cure such farm ers’ ills as high railw ay rates, undue profit by m iddlem en, heavy taxes, and high interest rates on loans. Canadian farm ers w ith sim ilar worries became interested in the idea and granges began to be set up in Q uebec and O ntario from 1872.49 T he order was incorporated in C anada as the “D om inion G range of the Patrons of H usbandry,” and while it had a separate C anadian existence its principles were taken from those o f its A m erican parent. M em bership grew rapidly until it reached its zenith in 1879 with an estim ated 31,000 m em bers. O ntario was the centre of the m ovem ent; it had some success in Q uebec and the m aritim e provinces but alm ost none in the west. T he activities o f the G range included collective purchasing, a co-operative salt m anufacturing com pany, a trust and loan society, and a projected bank. W hile the G range had som e influence on legislation, it did not attem pt to organize a political party. A nother farm ers’ order im ported from the U nited States, the Patrons of Industry of N o rth A m erica, had som ew hat sim ilar organization and objectives, but followed a different course. T he Patrons o f Industry, incorporated in C anada in 1890, found strong support in the west. U nlike the G range, too, it entered the political field, but there m et with disaster in the federal election o f 1896. F o u r m em bers in the H ouse of Com m ons did not constitute a party.

196 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

IV T h e econom ic grow th o f C anada from the late nineties depended partly on the im provem ent in general w orld condi­ tions; and to a large extent on the provision of adequate and costly modes of transportation, together w ith increase o f popu­ lation. T he financing o f all this developm ent, both in the actual expense of railways and the industrial and agricultural advance in w hich the new population was to be em ployed, assured in tu rn a sound internal financial structure w ith a supply of foreign capital. T he political union of the provinces opened the w ay for the utilization of w hat credit was available w ithin the dom inion, and provided a m ore favourable field for the foreign investor. T h e financial institutions of the dom inion, as of the old prov­ inces, were m odelled on those of G reat Britain and the U nited States; and as in the case o f so m any other of its institutions, C anada had to decide on w hether the practice of its m other country or of its neighbour was the m ore satisfactory to follow. T h e banks of all the provinces had, before confederation, dif­ fered little from those o f the U nited K ingdom : there were, however, som e steps taken by the Province of C anada to introduce the “ free banking” adopted by the U nited States. The act o f 1850 (13 and 14 V iet., c. 21) was little used, but there rem ained some body of opinion which preferred the American system o f a large num ber of local banks to the British system of few banks with num erous branches. By the British N orth A m erica Act of 1867 exclusive jurisdiction over banking was given to the federal parliam ent, and in its early sessions there w as discussion over the regulation of banks and currency. T he first decision reached by the governm ent was to organize C ana­ dian banks on the A m erican plan. T he m inister of finance, John Rose, prepared a series of resolutions to this end, and had the extra-parliam entary support o f E. H. King, general m anager of the Bank of M ontreal. R esolutions w ere introduced into the H ouse of C om m ons, but the opposition proved to be so form id­ able that they w ere w ithdraw n. T he two chief sponsors also left the field: M r. K ing died and M r. Rose resigned, to be succeeded by Sir Francis H incks, w ho returned to the orthodox principles of British banking. A cts of 1870 were replaced in the following year by the first general Bank A ct, to apply to all banks, and to rem ain in operation for ten years. T he system of branch-banking w as retained, and the proposal to base bank notes on dom inion securities deposited w ith the receiver-general was rejected. In

E F F E C T S O F E X T E R N A L F O R C E S - 197

the decennial revisions of the Bank A ct som e signs o f the old A m erican heresy again appeared, but never becam e effective. D ecision on the type o f currency to be used had already been m ade before confederation. In all the provinces the decimal system had been introduced, first as optional and finally as com pulsory. It rem ained only for the dom inion parliam ent to assim ilate the currency o f O ntario, Quebec, and New Brunswick. In spite of some opposition the currency o f N ova Scotia was, In in 1871, m ade uniform with th a t of the rest of C anada contrast to the decision on the type o f banking, no principle, o th er than th at o f convenience, was involved in the retention of the dollar currency, and only sentim ental glances were cast back to the old regim e. I f the currency was N o rth A m erican, the m oney used to build railways and prom ote industry was largely British in origin. G re at Britain was, as she had long been, an exporter o f capital o n a large scale, and the C anadian provinces had in years past been m aterially benefited by this fact. In the early tw entieth century the flow to C anada rapidly increased O f a total foreign investm ent in C anada in 1900 of som e thirty m illions of dollars, a third was British. In subsequent years, as the total investm ent increased, the British proportion was higher. In 1905 the total first passed one hundred million dollars, o f which about 70 per cent was British. T he external investm ent in C anada for the years 1900-1913 has been calculated as follows:

.50

.51

B ritish: $1,753,118,000 A m erican: 629,794,000 O ther countries: 162,715,000 T otal: $2,545,627,000 A fu rth er stim ulant to C anadian econom ic life was in the establishm ent o f English o r foreign industries in Canada. To some extent this had long been the case: the H udson’s Bay C om pany, fo r exam ple, had played, and continued to play, an im portant p art in Canada, and the G rand T ru n k Railway was largely an English com pany. A m erican interests, too, had pene­ trated to C anada as early as the first half o f the nineteenth century; began to take an im portant place after 1870; and expanded m ore rapidly at the end of the century A voidance o f the tariff was a leading m otive in this m ovem ent; securing of raw m aterial - especially wood products and m etals - was another; transportation costs and adaptability to the m arket also played som e part.

.52

198 - A H I S T O R Y O F CANADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S

L abour, capital, and industry from abroad together consti­ tuted a large facto r in C anadian econom ic life. In som e cases there were com plaints that foreign w orkers and foreign indus­ tries dispossessed C anadian w orkers or com panies, but on the w hole they added to a general growth far m ore than they dis­ placed native people and enterprises. If to these there be added foreign trade it is apparent th at the C anadian econom y was largely dependent on external contributions and relationships.

C H A P T E R 10

The Conduct of High Policy: Subjects and Methods

T h e im portance and variety of the external relations o f C ana­ da, increasing from year to year, threw a growing burden on the m achinery o f governm ent, and led to an exam ination of the adequacy of th at m achinery. T hough modelled in general on the British constitution, the C anadian system o f governm ent in ­ cluded two im portant characteristics n o t to be found in th at of the m other country. W hen the union of 1867 was form ed it was decided that a federation rath er than a legislative union was best adapted to the conditions of the country, and subjects having any direct bearing on external affairs w ere assigned to the central authority. N o exception was taken to G eorge Brow n’s statem ent in the debate on the Quebec Resolution th at “for all dealings w ith the Im perial G overnm ent and foreign countries we have clothed the G eneral G overnm ent w ith the m ost am ple pow ers and fo r purposes o f external affairs C anada was virtually a unitary state. T he other leading difference between the constitu­ tions of G reat Britain and C anada - that the latter was n o t a sovereign state —h ad a m ore serious effect on external relations. W ithin the limits o f dom inion powers, the parliam ent at O ttaw a m ight exercise in respect o f external relations the sam e suprem e authority as did the parliam ent at W estm inster. It was a funda­ m ental principle o f the English system that parliam ent should retain, in every branch of public affairs, the right not only to form ulate policy, but also to hold such check as it m ight wish on the m inisters and civil servants concerned. I t has, however, been long recognized that parliam entary control is less easily exercised in foreign than in dom estic affairs: not because the subject is m ore technical, but simply because it is foreign. Except in tim es of crisis, the electors (and therefore the m em bers of parliam ent) are less interested in, and often ill-inform ed on, foreign relations. Inform ation m ay be w ithheld because of the necessity for at least some degree of secrecy in the conduct of diplom acy. U nder the British constitution, and those w hich stem from it, the elected body discusses publicly such aspects of

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foreign policy as treaties and other engagem ents to an extent unknow n under o th er systems o f governm ent, and at tim es to the em barrassm ent o f the diplom ats. On the other hand a study o f the foreign relations o f a dem ocracy will also reveal th at the diplom ats may, and sometim es do, conduct conversations with foreign representatives which, w ithout creating a binding com ­ m itm ent, go fa r tow ard an agreem ent just as real in practice. Exam ples of both types o f cases m ay be taken from recent English history. W hen negotiations for an A nglo-G erm an alliance w ere under w ay at the end of the nineteenth century, the G erm an governm ent saw, as an obstacle to the com pletion o f a treaty, th at it would either be m ade public by discussion in parliam ent, or, if it was not subm itted to parliam ent, would have less value. A n exam ple of lack o f parliam entary sanction is found in the relations built up by the diplom ats of F rance and England between 1904 and 1914, the full im plications of which w ere said not to have been know n even to the whole cabinet. W ith all its draw backs, it has been accepted that parliam en­ tary control of foreign policy is essential to dem ocratic govern­ m ent. T h at principle was autom atically accepted in C anada from the time o f confederation, and in later years becam e a veritable dogm a. In the C anadian, as in the English, parliam ent the subject of foreign relations m ight be introduced by m eans of a statem ent by a m inister o f the crown, by question and answer, by resolution, o r by debate on a convention o r treaty. F rom the very origin o f the C anadian parliam ent the pages of the debates o f the Senate and H ouse o f C om m ons are well larded with discussion o f a t least some aspects of external relations. The largest proportion o f space is taken by com m ercial questions, especially actual o r proposed tariff agreem ents. Reciprocity with the U nited States and the use o f C anadian fisheries would probably come first in length, followed by the various aspects of im perial relations. T he use of C anadian and A m erican inland waterways received the attention o f parliam ent from tim e to tim e, as did the few boundary disputes o f the period. Political relations cam e up m ore often indirectly than directly, as at the tim e o f the joint high com mission at W ashington in 1871 or in relation to im perial defence. Participation in the Boer W ar m ight well be regarded as a direct political question, but it is notew orthy th at the C anadian parliam ent had nothing to do w ith the decisions th at led to the outbreak of th at w ar o r to its conclusion. In political, far m ore than in com m ercial, questions it is ap parent th at the lim itations o f C anadian autonom y re­

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stricted the area and degree not only o f the actual conduct of foreign relations but also o f the policy by which it was governed. T he escape from these lim itations was a many-sided question, w hich will be exam ined later G iven the geographical position, the stress on internal developm ent, and the incom plete autonom y of C anada, it may not be an inaccurate generalization to say that p arliam ent displayed a reasonable know ledge of, and interest in, foreign affairs. W hen the tariff was being considered members w ould present a form idable array of statistics. But they did not stop at factual m aterial. N either H ouse was afraid to exam ine the very fundam entals o f the external relations of C anada: independence, closer or looser political connection w ith the U nited States - all these found advocates, and all were debated with a disarm ing frankness. These were the very bases on which all other external policy o f C anada was predicated, correspond­ ing, fo r example, to the question raised in England as to w hether isolation or alliances w ould be the w iser course. W hile the C anadian parliam ent thus continued on its way, doubts arose as to w hether th at p art o f the civil service w hich dealt with external relations was well designed. T h e old system, untouched for forty years after confedera­ tion, was that external relations were conducted by various m em bers of the cabinet and civil service, according to the subject, w ithout any departm ent or division o f a departm ent having p articular responsibility, and w ithout any recognition o f a need for continuous attention o r expert knowledge. The m ethod o f conducting m atters w ith other British countries or w ith foreign countries falls into two aspects. T he governor general in C anada and the colonial office in E ngland norm ally constituted the sole channel o f com m unication. T h e colonial office might, depending on the subject in question, refer to the adm iralty, w ar office, foreign office, o r other departm ent, and a fu rth er link was added w hen the foreign office referred to an em­ bassy abroad. A reply to a dispatch from O ttaw a might, there­ fore, represent the com pletion o f a process already having passed through several stages. T here w ere, how ever, in practice m odi­ fications to this cum brous m achinery. Com m ercial negotiations w ith foreign states cam e to be direct in all but form , and the C anadians associated in them corresponded directly w ith the prim e minister. O n occasions, as in the proposal for tariff discussions in 1910, the British am bassador in W ashington com m unicated directly w ith the governor general. T he link between the governor general and the C anadian governm ent was

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usually the privy council, and sometimes, on less im portant m atters, an individual minister. A n incom ing dispatch ordinarily w ent from the governor general to the privy council, by \vhi h body it was assigned to the departm ent m ost concerned in the subject. In due course the m inister at the head of the departm ent reported back to the council, the report becam e the basis of a m inute, and the m inute of a reply to the original dispatch. T he sam e process w ould operate fo r a correspondence initiated in Canada. F o r m any years the only criticism was levelled against the portion o f the m achinery first described, th at is o f the com ­ m unication through governor general and colonial office. It seemed at times hardly short of absurd th at correspondence between the C anadian and A m erican governm ents should go by way of London, and objections also w ere m ade to the process of negotiations on trade m atters with E uropean governm ents. But, as modifications were m ade which allowed C anadians virtually to negotiate com m ercial treaties, and as direct com ­ m unications with W ashington becam e m ore com m on, that criticism becam e less noticeable. M oreover, it was fully realized that a radical change in the procedure would m aterially alter the delicate balance o f im perial relations. T he question then was raised - rather late, it is true - as to w hether the purely C an a­ dian p art o f the m achinery was adequate for the purpose. Two facts stared an investigator in the face; now here could there be found com plete files covering even single cases in external affairs - f a r less the full record of the external relations of the dom inion with any particular country, or during any particular period; and secondly, th at there w ere no persons in the civil service specially trained in foreign affairs, o r even enabled to specialize in that field. A practical proposal to end this situation, anom al­ ous in a country which was no longer a colony and which had im portant external relations, was m ade in 1907 to the royal com m ission on the civil service by Joseph Pope, under-secretary o f state. Pope advised that a departm ent, or sub-departm ent, of external affairs be set up, w ith its own staff, and with such files as it could collect from the various places to which they had found their way. W hile the report of the royal com mission m ade only a passing and partial recom m endation following Pope’s m em orandum , the original proposal was adopted by the governm ent some two years later. In 1909 C harles M urphy, secretary of state, moved a resolu­ tion in the H ouse o f C om m ons that a departm ent of external

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affairs be set up, presided over by the secretary o f state, and w ith a deputy head and the necessary clerks In draw ing up the plan the governm ent had the advantage o f the recent precedent in A ustralia, w here a departm ent with a sim ilar nam e had been created. In both cases there was to be not a foreign office, as found in every sovereign state, but an office to handle both intra-im perial and foreign relations. T he reasons for this are obvious: not only was it questionable w hether there w ould be enough business fo r two departm ents; but - the m ore com ­ pelling reason - the two could not be separated, inasm uch as foreign relations w ere conducted through the colonial office. In other w ords, foreign and im perial relations were, to some extent, the same. Early in the debate, and again later, governm ent spokesm en m ade it clear that no change was intended except in the purely C anadian organization, and no contrary opinion was expressed in the H ouse o f Com m ons. T he debate was brief and unimpressive. Speakers on the governm ent side pointed to the growing volum e o f business in external affairs and argued the advantages of a separate organization. O pposition speakers were listless, and had little m ore to say than that things could go on as they were, w ithout additional cost. T he debate was in striking contrast to those on imperial relations o r tariff questions. It is app aren t that parliam ent had no appreciation of the fact that external affairs required expert adm inistration just as did dom es­ tic affairs. A nd in some quarters it was to be long before this fallacy died. T he act and 9 Edw . V II, c. 13) passed with little discussion or change. T he point was m ade, outside parlia­ m ent, that the phrase, “ the secretary of state, as head of the departm ent, shall have conduct of all official com m unications between the governm ent of C anada and the governm ent of any oth er country in connection with the external affairs o f C anada . . . was not an accurate description o f the situation; and that, in view of the continuing role of the governor general, “care” should.be used instead of “conduct.” T he substitution, however, was not m ade, and apparently no practical difficulty arose. T he im po rtan t change in the act was m ade in 1912 when the prim e m inister was m ade secretary o f state for external affairs, an arrangem ent suggested when the original act was drafted, but n o t adopted at th at time. T h e m achinery in force before the W ar o f 1914 was therefore sim ilar to that used in the U nited K ingdom , both on the parliam entary and adm inistrative sides, but lim ited in its powers. T h e parliam ent o f C anada retained a control over external

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affairs in so far as it wished and dom inion autonom y allowed. A portfolio of external affairs, though not held by a separate m inister, carried that subject into the inner councils o f govern­ m ent. O n the adm inistrative side appointm ents w ere m ade but the developm ent of the departm ent in size was slow. Even by the end of the w ar there was only one officer included in the delegation to the peace conference. T he C anadian m achinery fo r the conduct o f foreign affairs differed from the British in th at the form er was not only very sm all, b u t lacked diplom atic missions abroad, w ith all the flow o f inform ation th at they involve. II G enerally speaking, official relations between the C anadian and other governm ents w ere m aintained through British chan­ nels. T here w ere, how ever, m odifications to this rule, im portant enough to justify a separate analysis. T here w ere no perm anent diplom atic agents stationed in O ttaw a, nor w ere there C anadian agents abroad. In several cases C anadians were appointed as ad hoc plenipotentiaries, being, at least in form , representatives o f the British governm ent. In m ost instances appointm ents were m ade for the purpose of negotiation and signature of trade treaties, the relative place of the C anadian plenipotentiaries and their U nited K ingdom associates changing from tim e to time. In one im portant case, how ever, th at o f the W ashington joint com mission o f 1871, the subjects under discussion w ere m ore political than com m ercial. T hough certain disadvantages existed in this indirect diplom acy, they were partly rem oved in practice; and C anada actually negotiated her own trade agreem ents with the aid of the experience and prestige o f the British governm ent. It was through the frequent negotiations with foreign govern­ m ents, chiefly on tariff questions, fisheries, and the use of inland w aters, that C anadians played their m ost active and m ost direct p art in diplom acy. T here w ere also, how ever, a num ber of officials and bodies which w ere m ore perm anent, and were in som e way related to the conduct of diplom acy. Representatives o f C anada abroad w ere alm ost all non-diplom atic. Im m igration agents in various countries were confined to their own subject. A fter confederation m ost o f the provinces continued to appoint agents-general in L ondon, as they had done before; but such officers could not in any way be described as diplom atic, having to do only w ith im m igration and com m erce. T he office o f high

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com m issioner, described in a previous chapter, was in a different category A lthough the C anadian governm ent had originally proposed that its representative in L ondon should be diplom atic o r quasi-diplom atic, constitutional objections had prevented th at status being granted. Even after the departm ent o f external affairs was established the high com m issioner continued to correspond with the under-secretary of state. A large proportion o f the tim e of the high com m issioners was occupied in prom ot­ ing the financial, com m ercial, and im m igration interests of the dom inion, but they could be used for political questions as occasion arose, and w ere usually appointed as C anadian pleni­ potentiaries for the negotiation o f treaties. N o consular appointm ents w ere m ade; Canadians, like other British subjects, being able to avail themselves of the services of the consular representatives o f the im perial governm ent T here w ere, however, a num ber of foreign consuls in C anada, and their position had som e significance as the only representatives o f their countries in the dom inion. T he first rep o rt of the d ep art­ m ent o f external affairs contains a list o f consuls and consular agents in 1910, show ing th at thirty-tw o states had such rep re­ sentatives in C anada. In m ost cases there were several officers, stationed at different C anadian cities T hough the list does not m ake any such distinction, it is probable th at the m ajority of the representatives w ere perm anent residents, and th at only the consuls-general o r senior consuls were de carriere. M ost o f the head offices w ere either at O ttaw a o r M ontreal. T he procedure regulating the appointm ent o f consuls was as follows: a consular officer holding a com mission from the head o f the state required an exequatur, w hich was issued by the British governm ent. In the case o f those resident in C anada, the C anadian governm ent was consulted as to w hether the appointm ent was free from objection. In the case o f those sent specially to C anada, th at is, consuls de carriere, the appointm ent was m ade w ithout consul­ tation. F o r those consular officers appointed by a governm ent o r a superior consular officer a form al recognition, instead of an exequatur, w as granted by the British governm ent, after con­ sultation w ith th at o f C anada. T em porary appointm ents m ight be accepted by the governm ent o f C anada, pending reference to the British governm ent T h e C anadian governm ent was consulted as to the establishm ent of new consulates, and on occasion it took the initiative in suggesting th at approaches should be m ade to th at end. It was, how ever, the status rath er th an the m ethod of appointm ent o f consuls th at entailed ques­

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tions o f principle. A fter confederation, as before it, the general rule o f the British governm ent was that consuls w ere simply foreign residents. Special courtesies m ight well be extended to them, b ut none such as to entail change of status. They w ere not, for exam ple, granted their request to have private entry to the governor general’s D raw ing Room , for this was a privilege conferred on diplom ats. F rom tim e to time one or m ore o f the consuls protested th at they did in fact occupy a position not analogous to that of consuls in sovereign states, but w ere doing diplom atic w ork that would otherw ise be handled by embassies. F o r some years attem pts by the consuls to act as diplom ats were quashed. In 1876, for example, the D anish consul was discouraged from acting as an interm ediary in discussions over m utual rights o f D anish and C anadian ships in the coasting trade. A gain in 1881 Sir John M acdonald gracefully intim ated to the F rench consul that the latter’s views on trade negotiations w ere fo r the ear o f His M ajesty’s governm ent. In later years, however, principles w ere tacitly ignored to allow fo r the convenience o f utilizing a representative o f a foreign pow er resident in the dom inion. In w hat were a t first described as “inform al negotiations,” the C anadian govern­ m ent discussed w ith the G erm an consul-general the tariff quarrel between the two countries, and in 1910 the m inister o f finance and the consul reached an agreem ent for a settle­ m ent In the sam e year the m inister signed an agreem ent w ith th e Italian consul on tariff concessions T he Japanese consul-general took p art in the negotiations arising o u t of the im m igration o f Japanese, the V ancouver riots, and the relation of C anada to the A nglo-Japanese treaty of 1911.10 The contrast between the form al status of consuls and the role they actually played was, therefore, m arked. A nsw ering a question in the H ouse o f C om m ons as to the refusal o f consuls to attend the D raw ing Room , L aurier rem arked th at “ the question . . . is an im p ortant one, not perhaps so m uch on account o f the draw ing room as on account of the duties which consuls general now discharge in Canada. W e have no diplom atic service in C anada, and the consuls general are exercising by tolerance some, I shall not say diplom atic powers, but powers very often cognate to such. T he question is one w hich should be settled, and the m atter is now engaging the attention o f the govern­ m ent In the following session the position of consuls again cam e up in the H ouse, and on that occasion L aurier w ent fu rth er th an he had before. T he position of consuls in C anada, he said,

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like the status o f Canada, could hardly be defined. A lthough L au rier had “often taken the view that we are now a nation,” it was tru e th a t “we cannot have under present conditions diplom atic agents am ongst us other than the consular agents w ho are entrusted by their governm ents w ith com m ercial func­ tions. . . . By the force o f things these consuls general have becom e w ith us sem i-diplom atic agents, and m any of the consuls have really perform ed diplom atic duties.” Citing the cases of G erm an , Italian, and A m erican consuls as exercising diplom atic functions, L aurier adm itted th at “all this has been done w ithout authority, and is contrary to the rules th at apply am ong civilized nations.” T he position, he w ent on, should be regularized. “I th ink we should have an understanding w ith the im perial governm ent th at the consuls should have sem i-diplom atic recog­ nition am ongst us Looking back a t a practice w ith w hich he had been fam iliar, Sir R obert Borden concluded th at it had been “ both convenient and advantageous,” and cited a case during his ow n period of office: th at in 1913, when he had negotiated with the consul-general of Jap an over C anada’s adhesion to the A nglo-Japanese treaty o f 1911.13 L aurier’s suggestion that the practice be regularized was never taken up, probably because the W ar o f 1914 brought C anada nearer to participation in the m ore conventional diplom atic procedure. O ut o f the appointm ent of officers abroad who w ere to prom ote C anadian trade grew the practice o f utilizing these m en fo r functions w hich w ere properly consular. T he first step, in the nineties, was to nom inate businessmen in the British Isles and the W est Indies as “com m ercial agents” under the super­ vision o f the m inister of finance, with the object of receiving inform ation from the localities on the possibilities o f trade, and o f supplying inform ation to com m ercial firms there. W hen the departm ent o f trade and com m erce w as set up in 1892 the agents reported to it, but still gave only part-tim e services. In 1895 the first full-tim e com m ercial agent was appointed at Sydney, A ustralia, and subsequently others were sent to various cities. In 1907 th e nam e was changed to “ C anadian trade com m issioners.” T he prim ary duty o f the com m issioners was to fu rth er the foreign trade of C anada, but as a m atter o f conveni­ ence they cam e to vise docum ents and handle im m igration m atters. But, while they incidentally did consular w ork, they could not be called in any sense diplom atic. In all designs, projected o r adopted, o f m achinery for the conduct of C anadian foreign relations, two im m utable facts of

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C an ad a’s position - her proxim ity to the U nited States and her m em bership in the British E m pire - inevitably played an im­ p o rtan t part. T he form er led to exceptions in procedure and the creation o f a special organization. T he im perial aspect of C an ad a’s position produced a m uch m ore com plicated them e. A s has already been pointed out, the relations of C anada with foreign states w ere carried on to a considerable extent through British officials. A s the dom inion developed in internal strength an d national consciousness, differences o f opinion arose as to th e relative parts th a t should be taken by im perial and C anadian officers, and m odifications w ere m ade from tim e to tim e. But th at sam e grow th o f C anada also brought up an issue, with far w ider im plications and m uch less easily resolved. If this form er group o f detached colonies had becom e a single country with great resources and territory, if dependent status was steadily giving way to increasing autonom y; if C anada was, m o re and m ore, to determ ine and conduct her own foreign policy - was then that policy to be distinct from those o f other parts of the em pire? Such a com plete break w ould generally have been regarded as undesirable and im practicable. But if there was to be a single policy o r an integration of separate policies, by w hat m eans could either be accom plished? In the U nited K ingdom there w ere a com plete m echanism , expert personnel, and a long tradition fo r the carrying out of foreign policy. In C anada and the other dom inions none of the three was to be found. In the U nited K ingdom a realization o f growing foreign pressure on the w idespread em pire and even on the island itself was leading to a desire for support from those parts of the em pire w hich had grown to m anhood. T he dom inions, for their part, saw the problem in the light of their various circum stances. W hile there were as m any approaches to the question as there w ere solutions offered for it, there could hardly be disagreem ent on the leading place taken by defence and foreign policy. The two were, to a considerable extent, interdependent, and any m ajor plan for the one w ould also involve the other. In other respects, how ever, defence was a specialized subject, and will therefore be m ore fully treated in the following chapter. T urning now to foreign policy in general, it is apparent, as M r. D uncan H all points out, that com m on interests can be prom oted only by a single authority o r by co-operation betw een governm ents. In subdivision of the alternatives he finds th at the com m on author­ ity could be th at of the British governm ent o r of an imperial federal parliam ent; and th at co-operation between governm ents

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could be through interm ediaries (corresponding to diplom ats), o r in direct meetings. All fo u r m ethods w ere advocated, can­ vassed, and opposed; and three were in p art adopted T h e idea o f an im perial parliam ent m ade up of representa­ tives from all self-governing p arts of the em pire had the m ost obvious advantages and disadvantages; and m any designs for such a body w ere put forw ard from time to tim e T he general plan would provide fo r a parliam ent meeting in L ondon, having control over m atters o f com m on interest, o f which the m ost obvious w ere foreign policy, defence, and som e am ount of taxation. A n im perial cabinet, responsible to this parliam ent, w ould also be required. It being a federal constitution, each com ponent p art - including the U nited K ingdom —w ould retain its governm ental system for local affairs. T hrough the im perial m achinery a single foreign policy could be evolved and carried out, supported by the whole em pire. T he defence effort could be distributed and integrated, w ith all the advantages o f a single strategy and com m and. H aving a voice in the determ ination of policy, no p art o f the em pire would be com m itted to action - in peace o r w ar - w ithout its wish. T he w hole argum ent was, to some degree, built on the success o f federalism in single countries, particularly in the U n ited States and C anada. T he parallel, how ever, was n o t exact. It would be a union o f parts so divided geographically th at attendance a t a com m on parliam ent would offer difficulties. F urtherm ore, the federated countries would be so unequally represented - because o f the w ide differences in population - th at the U nited K ingdom m ust be the dom inant p artn er. Federalism was not an objective spon­ sored by G reat B ritain and opposed by the colonies. In both it found support, and in both severe criticism. M any people in the U nited K ingdom feared th at their freedom of action w ould be restricted, w ithout com pensating additions o f strength. W hile the dom inions were far from being in agreem ent w ith each other, the effective C anadian opinion was th at federation would spell the loss o f autonom y. A n acute com m on danger m ight conceivably have overridden these objections, but no such overw helm ing factor was felt to be present. D uring the W ar of 1914 th at outside pressure, so effective in the confederation of C an ad a itself, was heavily applied, and an im perial federation was then once m ore discussed. D irect co-operation on m atters o f com m on interest between the governm ents of the em pire was realized in som e degree through the meetings of the colonial (o r later, im perial) con­

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ference. Beginning as conversations betw een the colonial secre­ ta ry and m em bers o f the colonial cabinets, the conferences evolved into m ore organized and m ore authoritative discussions betw een prim e m inisters. W hile personal m eetings and ex­ changes of views w ere undoubtedly helpful, there was a lack of continuity and of provision fo r im plem enting decisions by legislative o r executive action. T he conference rem ained a body w ith no continuous life and its m em bers w ere helpless to do m ore than report back to their respective cabinets and legisla­ tures. T he conference o f 1897 passed a resolution in favour of periodic m eetings and that o f 1902 voted m ore definitely for conferences every four years. N either of these steps involved any essential change in the character o f the conference, but that question cam e up in concrete form at the meetings in 1907. In 1905 A lfred L yttleton, the colonial secretary, suggested in a dispatch to the various British governm ents that the title “colonial conference” should be changed to “ imperial council,” and th at a com mission o r secretariat should be added to give continuity. C anada, alone of the dom inions, objected to the proposals, L au rier’s governm ent seeing the thin end o f the wedge o f an im perial constitution, com m itm ents, and curtail­ m ent o f autonom y. T he proposal was w ithdraw n before the conference o f 1907, but the idea was discussed and it became app aren t that there was no support for any radical change in the conference. In the end a resolution was adopted, nam ing the conference “ im perial,” and m aking it clear th at the discussions w ere betw een governm ents. T he resolution also attem pted to bridge the four-year gap betw een conferences by advocating a secretariat and by allowing for subsidiary conferences on press­ ing o r m inor m atters, to be attended only by those governm ents im m ediately interested. B oth proposals bore fruit. T he secre­ tariat was provided through a reorganization within the colonial office, and the first subsidiary conference was held in 1909 on m ilitary and naval defence. O nce again, in 1911, a proposal for change was m ade, Sir Joseph W ard putting before the conference a plan for an im perial parliam ent, prim arily for defence, and also fo r some aspects of foreign policy and taxation. Even less than the tentative idea of a council did this m eet w ith any support, and the im perial conference rem ained as one between governm ents, w ith no legislative o r executive authority. R eturning now to the fo u r alternatives m entioned above, it is app aren t th at federation was unacceptable, and th at direct co-operation betw een governm ents was realized in som e degree

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through the im perial conference. In direct co-operation of governm ents, by m eans of interm ediaries, m ade little progress before 1914, since the only existing office w hich could have been utilized w ith respect to the relations o f C anada, and the U nited K ingdom was that of high com m issioner, an office which had rem ained non-diplom atic. T here rem ained only the British governm ent as a com m on authority in foreign relations. In certain fields - fiscal policy and relations w ith the U nited States - C anada kept the reins within her own hands. But in spite of adhesion to the doctrine of no com m itm ents - or perhaps because of it - it was left to the British governm ent to shape a foreign policy tow ard E urope that was technically not th at o f the dom inions but in practice charted the course which they were to follow. Relations w ith the U nited States, as with G reat Britain, were o f such prim ary im portance as to suggest special governm ental m achinery. D iplom atic procedure, as has been m entioned, fre­ quently departed from the strictly British channels to becom e m ore direct. In addition to this undefined m ethod was a special body, the International Joint Com m ission, created to deal with b oundary w aters on the long frontier between C anada and the U nited States T he com mission had characteristics which gave it special significance: it was perm anent, had judicial aspects, was purely C anadian and A m erican, and, while devoted to a special aspect o f international relations, capable of extension to other fields. T he origin of the idea o f a body to deal with b oundary w aters is to be found in the International Irrigation Congress, which met a t A lbuquerque, N ew M exico, in 1895. In addition to certain states of the union, C anada and M exico were also represented. A t the instigation of the delegates of the last two countries the congress passed a resolution inviting the U nited States to appoint an international commission to act with the governm ents of C anada and M exico in “ adjudicating the conflicting rights which have arisen.” In 1896 the British am bas­ sador in W ashington conveyed to the secretary of state the desire of the C anadian governm ent to co-operate in the proposed plan, but found no readiness for im m ediate action. It was not until 1902 that the A m erican governm ent appointed its three com missioners, and the C anadian governm ent then further delayed until 1905. T h e International W aterw ays Com mission was an experi­ m ent, and a fruitful one. Division o f w aters for irrigation and, increasingly, for electric pow er inevitably brought controversies

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and the need fo r agreem ent. O ver such rivers as the St. M ary and the Milk, rising in M ontana, and the N iagara the discussion had already begun when the first com mission cam e into being. Its duties w ere to investigate and to m ake reports - with recom m endations if required - to both governm ents. Such lim ited powers proved to be inadequate, and in the course of its reports the com mission proposed that its powers be extended o r a new com m ission established. E xploration and negotiation o f a treaty to im plem ent the suggestion w ent on over the course o f three years. M any m en had a hand in the process. O f the im perial representatives Bryce in W ashington and G rey in O ttaw a encouraged and facilitated the progress of the study. F o r the two governm ents im m ediately concerned, R oot, Laurier, and A ylesw orth w ere the m inisters m ost closely associated with the w ork. T he detailed negotiations, how ever, were shouldered by no one of these but by their appointees - G eorge C. G ibbons and G eorge Clinton, respectively C anadian and A m erican representatives on the old W aterw ays Com mission - who also m ade the first drafts of the treaty, w hich were then ham m ered into shape by G ibbons and C handler A nderson, the chief counsel for the state departm ent. N egotiations occupied a long period and were n ot w ithout difficulties. M r. R oot, with thoughts o f states’ rights and the Senate, at first resisted the C anadian proposal for a treaty which should lay dow n definite principles and give extensive pow ers to the com mission. His alternative plan was for a loose arrangem ent, w ith each problem to be considered afresh as it arose. T o Sir W ilfrid L aurier, on the o th er hand, such a com mission was not w orth creating. W hen R o o t finally gave way some fu rth er trouble developed by the insistence of the Senate in m aking am endm ents, and L aurier seems to have becom e suspicious of their im port and to have lost any enthusiasm he m ay earlier have had. T h e process o f negotiations, so largely direct between C ana­ dians and A m ericans, foreshadow ed an essential characteristic o f the new com mission. T he Boundary W aters T reaty o f 1909 was on its face a treaty betw een G reat Britain and the U nited States, but its purpose was the creation o f the International Jo in t Com m ission on w hich G reat Britain had no representa­ tives. By no one was Britain’s exclusion thought to be oth er than a benefit to her. T he active p art she had earlier played in Canadian-A m erican disputes had been necessary at a tim e when C anada had reason to fear m ilitary aggression, but it visited upon her both additional disputes w ith a great pow er w ith w hich she

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wished to be at peace and the criticism of the Canadians dissatisfied w ith the results obtained. It was hoped now th at purely N o rth A m erican questions w ould be settled m ore readily by the sim pler m ethod of bilateral agreem ent, uncom plicated either by A nglo-A m erican relations as such o r by intra-im perial questions. T he treaty, after defining boundary w aters, and laying dow n rules for com m on use o f them, provided for an Inter­ national Joint Com m ission to consist o f three com missioners on the p art of the U nited States, appointed by the president, and three on the p art o f the U nited K ingdom , appointed by the king on the advice of the governor in council. Equal representation from each country raised the question as to w hether the com ­ mission w ould divide on national lines and the unfortunate parallel of the A laska Boundary Com m ission could be cited as evidence for such a fear. It proved, how ever, to be the case th at m ost o f the decisions were unanim ous; and the only division on national lines was on a point o f procedure. T he pow ers o f the com m ission w ere quasi-judicial, executive, arbitral, and fo r purposes o f investigation and recom m endation Both as de­ fined in the treaty and from the cases considered by it, the w ork o f th e com m ission had to do prim arily w ith boundary w aters. I t was provided, how ever, in article x o f the treaty th at “any questions o r m atters o f difference arising betw een the H igh C ontracting Parties involving the rights, obligations, o r interests o f the U nited States o r o f the D om inion of C anada either in relation to each other o r to their respective inhabitants” m ight be referred to it, w ith the consent o f the A m erican Senate and the governor in council, for investigation and recom m endation. W hile oth er developm ents rendered this article less necessary in later years, it revealed both the tem per of the agreem ent and the wide results th at were expected to follow it. T h e governm ental m achinery for the conduct of C anadian foreign relations was evolved over a period o f years as the dom inion grew in strength and confidence, partly by a process o f trial and error, and as events showed the anachronism s in w hat already existed. It was natural, if u nfortunate, th at organi­ zation followed rath er than preceded the issues w ith w hich it w ould be concerned: natural, because it was only the pressure o f particu lar cases th at proved the need fo r change; unfortunate, because in some cases international disputes m ight have been m ore easily settled if the new m echanism had already existed. T he im portance o f the time-lag varied. T he International W ater­ ways Com m ission and the International Jo in t Com m ission, for

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exam ple, w ere set up soon enough to handle the m ajor cases. T he A laska boundary dispute, on the other hand, was settled by an a d hoc tribunal un d er circum stances which aroused the m axim um o f bitterness in C anada tow ard b oth the U nited States and the U nited K ingdom . Ill T h e determ ination o f foreign policy for C anada depended in the m ain on three factors: geographical position, trade interests, and im perial connection - the three operating singly o r in any com bination. C anadian interest o r activity spread over a w ide area abroad, varying in intensity from one region to another. In the A m ericas the dom inating political entity was the U nited States, w hich tended to overshadow the foreign relations o f C anada as of the other countries o f the w estern hem isphere. But, while they had always to keep in m ind the policies o f the U nited States, C anadians w ere not unm indful of th e lesser pow ers. N earest a t hand, in a position to control the approach to the St. Law rence, was N ew foundland. T h at oldest colony had rejected federation w ith the other provinces in the original discussions, but there was reason to believe that, like Prince E dw ard Island and British Colum bia, it m ight later becom e a p art o f the dom inion. T he atm osphere o f confederation w as not soon dissipated, and the final boundaries o f C anada w ere still uncertain. F o r several years there was talk o f union, both in the island and in C anada. F o r the latter the advantages w ere many. In the defence o f C anada N ew foundland could not be ignored, b u t th a t consideration was given less attention in the days when the suprem acy of the British navy was unquestioned. T he place o f N ew foundland in a shorter sea route to E urope was at times stressed; but the principal argum ents were possibilities o f ex­ tended trade, and - above all - the autom atic settlem ent o f the disputes over fisheries. C onferences betw een the tw o govern­ m ents broke dow n on the refusal o f C anada to take over the island’s debt, but the C anadian governm ent continued to express its general willingness fo r union, and the question was still an open one in 1914. T h e acquisition o f N ew foundland was generally thought to be desirable but not pressing. T he boundaries of th e dom inion in the north w ere fo r a tim e brought into prom inence by the fear th at A m erican zeal fo r the larger A laska w ould be a prelude to general expansion northw ard. F ears w ere expressed, in par­

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liam ent and the press, th at A m erican fishing in H udson Bay might lead to a denial o f com plete sovereignty there. In the Canadian Senate Paschal Poirier advocated a C anadian expedi­ tion to the pole, union with N ew foundland, and the acquisition of G reenland from D enm ark. A. B. A ylesw orth again drew attention to L abrador and G reenland, and the H alifax Chronicle editorially sponsored a C anadian “M onroe doctrine.” T his last was widely discussed by other newspapers, and was intended to em brace the islands o f St. Pierre and M iquelon, should the U nited States attem pt to purchase them from France, as it was feared she m ight d o W ith the rem oval of the danger o f this new stage of A m erican expansionism (if it had ever been a real danger) the idea o f a com petitive M onroe doctrine fell into discard. In the south, as well as in the east and north, was territory that was often spoken of as a possible addition to C anada. T he dom inion carried on a closc trade connection with the British W est Indies, built up in previous decades by N ova Scotia. T rad e between these British colonies was never as great as it was felt it should be between two com plem entary economies, and C an a­ dians had m ade m any attem pts to increase it, but w ithout great success. Both in C anada and the W est Indies it was prim al ily the hope o f extended trade th at led to the suggestions of political union. In 1905 isolated proposals changed to m ore general consideration. C anadian new spapers w ere divided in their views - some cautiously supporting union and others pointing to the problem s th at would arise from the racial com position and political im m aturity of the islands. T he M aritim e Provinces Board o f T rade and the C anadian M anufacturers’ Association both w ent on record in favour of union, and individuals in various parts of C anada were found as advocates O n sober second thought, how ever, C anadians decided th a t it was a step they w ere n ot yet ready to take, either at that tim e, o r even years later in the full glow o f nationalist consciousness. T he C aribbean m arked the southern boundary of the C anadian sphere of active interest in the A m ericas. W ith the republics o f South A m erica even trad e relations w ere slight. Politically the republics were rem ote — even a little m ysterious. Only once did a South A m erican question impinge on C anada, and th at only because o f its effect on A nglo-A m erican relations. R epeated refusals of the governm ent of V enezuela to respect the interests of foreigners led two o f the powers m ainly con­ cerned, G re at Britain and G erm any, to apply pressure by means

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o f a naval blockade in 1902. T here is no reason to believe that C anadians saw that this action had any bearing on the dom inion, but it soon proved to have an im portant indirect one. T he U nited States, sensitive to any E uropean intervention in South A m erica, was particularly disturbed by it w hen taking place close to the proposed canal in the isthm us, and strain developed in the relations of the two E uropean powers with the U nited States. T hough desiring to avoid a fu rth er break with G erm any, already opened by the failure o f the alliance negotiations, the British governm ent was even less willing to depart from its fixed p rin ­ ciple o f A m erican friendship, and in 1903 consented to the A m erican proposal of subm ission o f the V enezuela dispute to the H ague tribunal. It was during the last m onths o f the block­ ade, and when Britain was m aking its decision, that the arrange­ m ents for the submission of the A laska boundary dispute to an international tribunal were finally m ade. T he dispute was an old one. T h e boundary laid down in the treaty o f 1825 between Russia and G reat Britain antedated any accurate geographical know ledge o f the region, and created problem s com m on to all N o rth A m erican boundary questions. By 1867, w hen Alaska w as purchased by the U nited States, the population of British Colum bia was fully conscious o f a northern developm ent based on discoveries of gold, and saw in the southern extension of A laska a barrier against the necessary access from the hinterland to the sea. A fter the entrance o f British Colum bia into the federation its legislature and governm ent constantly called the attention of O ttaw a to the need for defining the boundary, and the C anadian governm ent in turn had negotiations initiated through British diplom atic channels. A ll attem pts to reach agreem ent on the m achinery for handling the dispute had, how ever, failed up to the end o f the century. In a conference between U nited States and C anadian representatives at W ash­ ington in F ebruary 1892 the C anadians proposed th at the dispute be subm itted to “som e im partial authority” ; and that following an aw ard a com m ittee o f experts be asked to report on the best w ay o f delim iting the boundary T h e Joint H igh Com m ission o f 1898-99, am ongst other C anadian-A m erican questions, considered th at o f A laska, and the C anadian proposal for a tribunal o f three narrow ly failed o f acceptance. The counter-proposal, for a tribunal of six - half British and half A m erican - w as unacceptable to C anada, and a British com ­ prom ise plan o f 1902, fo r the com m ission of six to include two neutral m em bers, was rejected in W ashington. Such was the

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position when L aurier w ent to the colonial conference o f 1902, having prom ised his colleagues not to yield to any English p ro ­ position for acccpting the A m erican proposal. O n his return, how ever, he confessed that he had agreed to such a commission, appointed by the two parties to the dispute. “ Pressed for details he refused to go beyond the statem ent that he had no option but to yield the point It rem ained, then, only to set the m achinery in motion. In January 1903 a treaty was signed by the British am bassador and the A m erican secretary of state, providing for a tribunal o f “six im partial jurists o f repute, w ho shall consider judicially the questions subm itted to them ,” which plan was reluctantly ac­ cepted by the C anadian governm ent. In F ebruary the bad news rea d ied O ttaw a th at Roosevelt had appointed Elihu Root, the secretary of state for w ar, Senator Lodge, and Senator T urner. T he Canadian governm ent quite properly objected that none of these was an im partial jurist: the first being a m em ber of the governm ent that was a party to the dispute, and the other two having declared themselves against the C anadian case. It was, they com plained, a violation o f the treaty. O n F ebruary 27 w ord cam e from L ondon that the selection o f A m erican m em ­ bers was as much a surprise there as in O ttaw a; that they felt it practically impossible to press for new appointm ents; were most unwilling to drop the whole negotiation; and could only suggest British m em bers “who will m eet the altered circum stances of the case.” By the tim e the governor general sent a reply to this (M arch ) the treaty had already been ratified (M arch 3 ), and, as the C anadian governm ent pointed out, fu rth er discussion was precluded. T hey would not, how ever, consider the suggestion of m atching the A m erican representatives T he British m em bers, as appointed, w ere L ord Alverstone, chief justice of England, Sir Louis Jette, lieutenant-governor o f Q uebec and form erly a judge of the superior court of Quebec, and A. B. Aylesworth, a C anadian lawyer. W hile the C anadian governm ent then lived up to the letter and spirit of a treaty o f w hich they had never approved, from the first they had good reason to suspect the good faith of the A m erican governm ent. Full study has been m ade of the argum ents adduced by both sides, o f the positions taken by the three governm ents con­ cerned, and in so far as it can be done - of the conversations th at w ent on behind the scenes T here is little disagreem ent on the m ain points, though the authorities differ as to the relative strength o f the C anadian and A m erican cases. O n the whole it

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seems clear that the latter was definitely a stronger one; and, while there was a C anadian case, and it was argued by counsel o f great ability, it would have been surpiising if it had been upheld in any court. U nfortunately the tribunal of 1903 never lived up to the judicial principles laid dow n for it. Theodore Roosevelt as m uch as told the A m erican m em bers th at they could find only one way; and, indeed, they seem to have needed no spur to run as partisans. N o criticism has been m ade of either the appointm ent o r actions o f the C anadian m em bers; yet they do seem to have been infected by the non-judicial atmosphere. Clifford Sifton, the British agent for the settlem ent, com plained after his return th a t “ Lord A lverstone did not stand by the P erhaps this was no m ore than an Canadian com m issioners u nfo rtu nate phrase; yet it is hard to conceive of the C anadian com missioners finding in favour o f the A m erican case. The aw ard, which substantially accepted the A m erican claims, was signed by the three A m ericans and Alverstone. Jette and Aylesw orth refused to sign the aw ard, and each voluntarily w rote an opinion with reasons for that refusal Both differed on several points from the m ajority decision. A ylesw orth finished his statem ent with the rem ark that “ the course the m ajority of this tribunal has decided to take in regard to the islands at the entrance o f P ortland channel is, in my hum ble judgm ent, so opposed to the plain requirem ents o f justice, and so absolutely irreconcilable w ith any disposition of th at branch o f the case upon principles o f a judicial character, th at I respectfully decline to affix my signature to their aw ard.” Jette concluded by saying that he “found it impossible . . . to concur in this arbitrary determ ination of a line w hich, although it does not concede all the territory they claim ed to the U nited States, nevertheless deprives C anada o f the greater p art of that to w hich she was entitled.” U nder no circum stances w ould it have been easy for a tribu­ nal consisting o f three nationals from each party to the dispute to decide entirely on judicial principles. T he charactcr o f the A m erican appointm ents finally rem oved any possibility of such procedure, leaving the only alternatives as a deadlock o r a diplom atic com prom ise. C anadians generally, would have ac­ cepted the form er in a choice of evils, but British opinion favoured the latter. It seems evident that A lverstone, perhaps under pressure from his governm ent, doubled the roles of diplom at and judge in the general interest of A nglo-Am erican understanding. O n their return to C anada the two C anadian

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com m issioners m aintained a dignified restraint in com m ents on the aw ard, refusing to achieve a cheap popularity by capitalizing on w h at was undoubtedly a very general resentm ent. A num ber o f C anadians urged m oderation, or supported the aw ard as an unpleasant but necessary one; but on the whole opinion - espe­ cially in the press - was m ore or less violently critical It was taken fo r granted that the C anadian case was unassailable, and the general com plaint was th at A lverstone had subm itted to the governm ent’s desire for peace at any price: the price being, as usual, the sacrifice of C anada. T he tradition o f the weakness of British diplom acy on behalf o f C anada was already deep-rooted. T hough not w ithout som e reason to support it, the argum ent was less often based on a study of the evidence than on senti­ ment: and a naive assum ption that the C anadian case was always right, and that right w ould always prevail. T hough not a few C anadians had had experience o f diplo­ macy, they had done little to apprise the public of the real character and place o f that art. Since the days of the W ashington com mission o f 1871 Canadians generally had gained little appreciation of diplom acy as a process of bargaining, in which com prom ise and sanctions played a large part. T he A laska “panhandle” was classed with the jutting north o f M aine. N either o f the two cases, as such, was studied seriously; nor could the average C anadian appreciate that firmness in pressing even a good case m ust be tem pered by gauging the resultant friction. In 1903 there was reason to believe that Roosevelt’s chauvinism was not m ere acting, and that it touched a highly responsive chord in the country. T o talk o f w ar was perhaps extrem e; but there was a state short of w ar that would have been as unw elcom e to C anada as to England. G iven the circum ­ stances, the best th at could be hoped from the Alaska tribunal was a deadlock. T o the British governm ent this spelled a set­ back to the entente policy pursued in Venezuela. To C anada it could bring no good; A laska would still be a bone of contention, with a possible (though im probable) later settlem ent m ore in favour of the dom inion. Bad relations between England and the U nited States would bedevil N o rth A m erican politics as well. If, how ever, C anada was dissatisfied w ith the results o f British diplom acy, the only logical course was to conduct her own affairs directly - supplying the m eans and accepting the respon­ sibility. It was a course which had m ore than once been p ro ­ posed in the past, but never with the authority which L aurier now gave to it in the H ouse o f Com m ons.

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I have often regretted . . . that we have not in our ow n hands the treaty-m aking power which would enable us to dispose o f o ur own affairs. B ut in this m atter we are dealing w ith a position that was forced on us - we have not the treaty-m aking power. . . . 1 am sorry not only that we have not the treaty-m aking power, but that we are not in such an independent position that it is in m y pow er to place before parliament the whole o f the correspondence as it passed between the Canadian governm ent and the British governm ent. B ut we shall have that correspond­ ence and it will be placed before parliament at the next session, - the whole o f it, no m atter what protest m ay com e from abroad. . . . But we have no such power. Our hands are tied to a large extent, owing to the fact o f our connection - which has its benefits, but which also has its disadvantages - the fa ct o f our connection with the m other country m aking us not free agents and obliging us to deal with questions, affecting ourselves through the instrum entality o f British ambassadors. . . . The difficulty as I conceive it to be, is that so long as Canada remains a depend­ ency o f the British crown the present pow ers that we have are n o t sufficient fo r the m aintenance o f our rights. It is im portant that we should ask the British parliam ent fo r m ore extensive powers so that if ever we have to deal w ith m atters o f a sim ilar nature again, we shall deal w ith them in our ow n way, in our ow n fashion, according to the best light that we have.23 If this was a statem ent o f policy it was one that was not im­ plem ented. In all probability L aurier, sm arting under a sense of injustice, spoke m ore strongly than he otherw ise would have done. C anada was already on the road to assume in greater degree the conduct of her own affairs, but it needed m ore than the authority of the British parliam ent to m ake the change. A fter the first burst o f indignation was over, it was questionable w hether the public w ould have w elcom ed such a radical depar­ ture in one step. M oreover, while C anadians had in the past show n skill in diplom acy, there were no civil servants trained in, o r even assigned to, that special field; and it is significant that W. Sanford Evans proposed that there should be a departm ent o f external affairs.29 In the establishm ent of th at departm en t in 1909, o f the International Joint Com m ission in the sam e year, the procedure over the F rench treaties in 1907 and 1909, and over the reciprocity agreem ent in 1911 it m ay be argued that the A laska affair played a part; but it is equally probable that these changes w ould have occurred in any case.

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N o one of the three countries derived m uch advantage from the A laska award. T o the U nited States fell a strip of territory barring the way to decaying m ines in an undeveloped wilder­ ness. G reat Britain secured som e degree o f reconciliation with the U nited States a t the cost of tem porary but real discontent in C anada. C anadian fears of A m erican expansionism were once m ore revived. T he whole afFair was a tem pest in a teapot: but of such stuff are international relations som etim es made. T h e political relations of C anada outside the A m erican con­ tinent w ere, in the period before 1914, alm ost entirely indirect: th a t is to say, arising out o f British, rath er than C anadian, foreign policy. But w hat is true o f political policy does not so generally apply to interests. Com m ercial advantages and selec­ tive im m igration depended in p art on satisfactory political rela­ tions w ith foreign states. M ore basic still was the aim to preserve for the em pire as a whole a position in the w orld sufficiently pow erful that its independence could not be seriously end an ­ gered, and - com ing closer to hom e - that C anada could not be invaded. T hus the balance o f pow er affected C anada like other countries. But unlike other countries with a sm all population she was draw n into these larger political issues not only on her own continent, but east and west as well. In the A m ericas there was no balance o f pow er, and presum ably never w ould be one. T he dom inance of the U nited States, however, was softened by a peaceful (if not always conciliatory) outlook. In the far east and in E urope the rivalry of the great powers, as they appeared after 1871, was assum ing a p attern and a severity th at was fast becom ing the leading political fact o f the period. T h e pow er o f Jap an was first dem onstrated in the SinoJapanese w ar o f 1894. F o r the British E m pire the rise o f a new great pow er in the Pacific had great im plications. T he U nited K ingdom had been the pioneer in opening C hina to trade, and was m aking heavy investm ents in railways, financial organiza­ tions, and com m erce. A ustralia and N ew Zealand could not b ut be affected by the expanding pow er o f Japan, and India too was w ithin the Pacific sphere. F o r C anada the im m ediate pressure o f the far east arose from A siatic im m igration, the attem pts to lim it w hich created a delicate political problem Less weight was placed on trad e w ith the countries o f the far east until the early tw entieth century. W hen G reat Britain m ade a com m ercial treaty w ith Japan in 1894 C anada was unwilling to accede to it unless she could retain the right to exclude both labourers and artisans; and even w hen the British am bassador had secured

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agreem ent to such a provision, the C anadian governm ent de­ layed becom ing a party to the treaty until 1906, by w hich time trade had assum ed proportions sufficient to balance anti-Asiatic sentim ent. W hile the policy o f virtual exclusion m aintained by the dom inions did not help neither did it seriously hinder the good relations of Japan and the U nited K ingdom as w ritten into com m ercial and political treaties. O n the other hand the friction th at m ight have resulted from the im m igration difficulty was softened by the satisfaction felt in T okyo over the AngloJapanese alliance. T he first alliance, o f 1902, was sought by Jap an , and served her well in her w ar w ith Russia. T he second treaty, in 1905, carried further obligations for both signatories, and was regarded as m utually advantageous. C anadians had no reason to criticize an alliance which paved the way to the volun­ tary lim itation of Japanese im m igration through the gentlem en’s agreem ent and strengthened the defensive position of the em pire as a whole. T he press or ihe U nited States w elcom ed the alliance o f 1902 as a m eans of m aintaining the open door W hen the treaty of 1905 was announced it could be said that “the C ana­ dian press alm ost universally approves the arrangem ent and con­ gratulates L ord Lansdow ne upon his successful diplom acy D uring the im perial conference of 1911 the dom inion rep re­ sentatives had, fo r the first tim e, an opportunity o f discussing foreign policy - not in the conference itself, but in secret meetings o f the com m ittee of imperial defence. T here Sir E dw ard G rey m ade a long statem ent of different aspects of British policy T he A nglo-Japanese alliance, he said, had been m ost satisfactory and he hoped it w ould be renewed. Before doing so, how ever, it was necessary to reconcile it with British policy tow ard the U nited States. If the U nited States became involved in a w ar with Japan, B ritain w ould be obligated to assist h er ally. T o avoid this he had proposed to the Japanese govern­ m ent that a clause should be included rem oving the obligation o f either signatory from going to w ar w ith a pow er w ith which it h ad a general arbitration treaty. W ritten into the alliance, a clause (iv) to th at effect saved England from difficulties with the U nited States by virtue of the new arbitration treaty. By this ingenious device G rey also rem oved a cause of w orry to C ana­ dian statesm en. G rey was able to w rite to the British em bassy at T okyo that the dom inion representatives had agreed cordially to the alliance T here is every reason to suppose that, as far as C anada was concerned, this was the case. Leaving AngloA m erican relations friendly, and easing the strain on C anadian-

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Japanese m igration arrangem ents, the alliance still strengthened the position of the British E m pire in the far east, and conse­ quently in the w orld as a whole. T h e alliance with Japan not only strengthened the position of G re at Britain in the far east, but also relieved her of the neces­ sity of m aintaining a large naval force there, m aking it possible to divert ships to E uropean w aters. It was in the N o rth Sea that they w ere now urgently needed. W hen the R o u n d Table, a quarterly devoted to the affairs of the British Em pire, was first published in 1910, the opening w ords were these: “T he central fact in the international situation to-day is the antagonism be­ tween England and G erm any.” T he events of the next four years m ore th an justified the assertion. C anada had no p art in foreign policy in E urope in the ten years before 1914: the ententes with F ran ce and Russia, the perm ission to the general staffs to con­ du ct conversations on m ilitary and naval co-operation, and the attem pts to prevent w ar in the Balkans. N o r did the C anadian governm ent give advice in, or share responsibility for, British policy in the last hectic days from the m urder o f the A rchduke F ran z F erdinand to the outbreak o f general hostilities. It was not th at C anada was deliberately excluded from British councils: it is probable that the British governm ent w ould have welcomed consultation. But consultation, as successive C anadian govern­ m ents had seen, involved responsibility; and they preferred to forgo the one in order to avoid the other. T h a t they were none the less com m itted to the results of British policy was the anom aly o f the position and the price they paid. F ro m the tu rn o f the century, w ith the failure of AngloG erm an negotiations fo r an alliance, the generally unfriendly attitude o f E urope tow ard the w ar in South A frica, and the beginning o f G erm an naval construction on a large scale, the urgency and the burden o f defence against a growing danger forced m ilitary and naval planning into the forefront of inter­ national relations. If no scheme was agreed on - though many were su g g e ste d -fo r a foreign policy draw n up and underw ritten by all the self-governing parts o f the em pire, the problem of defence becam e, m ore and m ore, one for the dom inions as well as the U nited K ingdom . Could C anada defend her own terri­ tory? C ould she, and would she, share in a com m on effort to guard against the th reat of G erm an aggression?

C H A P T E R 11

Defence

T h e w ord “defence,” widely enough interpreted in all coun­ tries, has in C anada been stretched beyond all reasonable bounds. It is, perhaps, not w ithout significance that this should be so: that no such term s as “w ar office” o r “adm iralty” should be cu rren t w here frontiers are know n as “boundaries,” where the regular arm y was not called by th at nam e, w here w ar, in fact, has never been visualized except as resistance to aggression. It is healthy th at this should have been so, and, on the w hole, consistent w ith the outlook an d interests o f the C anadian people. Y et C anada is not w ithout m ilitary history and achievem ents; and, as in other states, the threat o f force, even when n o t carried into effect, has played its p art in her foreign relationships. It will be well, therefore, first to discover w h at is m eant o r implied in C anada by the w ord defence. Basically it has stood for the m aintenance o f territory already possessed, and w ith th at purpose few C anadians have disagreed. Less obviously it has m eant the defence o f interests, such as trade, fisheries, o r rights o f citizens abroad. It has had a very real m eaning as the defence of C anada’s general political posi­ tion in the w orld: protection against a serious loss o f pow er or against a hostile alliance. It is tem pting, but misleading, to draw an absolute distinction between defence of C anadian soil and im perial defence, for im perial defence itself had not one but several aspects. In some cases it has touched C anada directly. Even in the period after the w ithdraw al o f the im perial garrisons th e naval bases at H alifax and Esquim alt played a dual role: as p art of the British naval system and as guards on the Canadian coasts. O ther points, such as N ew foundland and the W est Indies, m ight be regarded in p art as indirect o r outpost defences of C anada. T hirdly there has been the defence of the em pire as a political organization o f w hich C anada form ed p art and in w hose strength she had a direct stake. F o r this the leading exam ple w ould be the W ar of 1914. Finally cam e C anada’s place in British w ars whose outcom e was neither a direct nor an indirect th reat to Canada. F o r participation in these a m uch less

D E F E N C E - 225

obvious case could be m ade out, b u t events - such as the Sudan expeditions - proved th at there was a case and th at it had supporters. A ccepting the w ord defence, w ith its m anifold m eanings, it rem ains to exam ine in m ore detail the purposes for w hich mili­ tary and naval pow er would be m aintained, the local conditions to w hich they w ere related, their organization, and their use. Peace, consolidation, and econom y in arm am ent w ere naturally the desiderata o f a country whose area was vast, population sm all, and political unity recent. A saturated pow er has no zeal fo r territorial expansion, but even the broad acres o f the do­ m inion left som ething to be desired. T he jutting north of M aine was an old grievance w ith practical disadvantages that were real but not insuperable. C anadians w ould agree that they had been hardly treated, but had no idea o f attem pted revision by a show o r use o f force. N ew foundland w ould be a w elcom e addition to the federation, but th a t was a financial rath er than a m ilitary problem . In the A rctic the claim s of C anada m ight be disputed, but the m ajor territorial dispute was over the boundary of A laska. H ere it w as that C anadians, w ithout fully realizing it, experienced a clear case o f the delicate relation between diplom acy and arm ed force. Some A m ericans (including the president) hardly veiled their determ ination to resist any in ­ fringem ent of their rights, as they saw them . T he success of diplom acy is explained not a little by the skill o f the diplom at; but it is no accident that states capable o f exercising strong m ilitary o r naval force - and willing in the last resort to do so have a card to play in international negotiations that no m ere dexterity will take. T h e connection between foreign policy and m ilitary policy may, u nder the happiest conditions, be m ade rem ote, but in no case can it be abolished. A rm ed forces have no m eaning (leaving aside their police role) except in relation to possible but defined use against other states. It is the business o f soldiers to fight w hen called upon to do so in the pursuance of, o r as a result of, the foreign policy of the civil governm ent. T he first discussion o f foreign policy between the representatives o f the governm ents of the U nited K ingdom and the dom inions was in the com m ittee of im perial defence in 1911. T he foreign secretary, Sir E dw ard G rey, was invited by M r. A squith to give an exposition o f the international situation, and began by talking of the aspect of defence th at was then m ost to the fore. “T he starting point,” he said, . . of th e consultation w hich we are now going to have

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on F oreign Policy, and the foreign situation, is really the cre­ ation of growing strength of separate fleets and forces in the D om inions. . . . It is possible to have separate fleets in a united E m pire, but it is not possible to have separate Fleets in a united E m pire w ithout having a com m on F oreign Policy which shall determ ine the action of the different forces m aintained in dif­ T he nature and extent of feren t p arts of the Em pire. . . arm ed forces are dictated in p art by the capacity of a state to provide them and in p art by the use for which they m ay be required. M ilitary history is, to some extent, a them e in itself: in technical organization and the course of w arfare. F o r the rest it is dependent on political policies and event's. T o say that a country w ants peace m ay be the truth but not the w hole truth T h e real objective is peace on at least reasonably satisfactory term s. “Peace at any price” is alm ost a meaningless phrase, for there com es a point w here national pride and national interest will dem and the use o f arm ed force, perhaps as the answ er to the aggression of another state. M ilitary preparation in C anada in the generation before 1914 was governed by two sets of factors: dom estic interests and external pressure. T he period was one of rapid econom ic devel­ opm ent, with industrial expansion in the central provinces and the peaceful conquest of the western. Financial and hum an resources were alm ost wholly absorbed in great railway schemes to m ake possible the settlem ent of the prairies and the exploita­ tion o f its agricultural land. T o secure im m igrants and retain them in the dom inion, to build and finance transcontinental railways, and to prom ote the foreign trade which was a neces­ sary corollary of the other two - these were the subjects before p arliam ent and public. It is true th at foreign trade in itself w idened C anadians’ outlook beyond their own boundaries, but fo r m any years there was a peaceful w orld whose oceans were reassuringly patrolled by the ships of the British navy. E xternal pressure m ight be applied by another A m erican pow er or from beyond the coasts o f the continent. F rom her im m ediate neighbours C anada had little reason to fear aggres­ sion. R elations w ith N ew foundland were not w ithout friction. T h e fishery dispute trailed on for years', and there was an unsettled boundary between Quebec and L abrador. It would, how ever, have been absurd to think o f a British dom inion as a potential enem y. N ew foundland could be o f m ilitary signifi­ cance to C anada only if it were to com e under the control of a foreign pow er, an eventuality o f which there appeared to be

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no prospect. T he only other land frontier m arched with that of the U nited States, on the south and the north-w est. H ere, in one respect, the position was reversed: C anada being the weak pow er and its neighbour the strong. T here were not lacking grounds for controversy - fisheries again, and boundary dis­ putes - but Canadians were m ore and m ore assum ing that war, o r even serious friction, w ith the U nited States could be left out o f account. It was true that in the U nited States there was loose talk of annexation as late as 1911, but it was not taken as a threat. A fter the settlem ent a t W ashington in 1871, unpopular as that m ay have been at the tim e in C anada, the old fear of A m erican aggression, of m anifest destiny, and o f forced an­ nexation steadily dissipated. W hile relations with the country against which C anada had erected defences for nearly two cen­ turies at last becam e fixed and pacific, clouds cam e up from o th er directions. T o England Russia was the bogey in the nine­ teenth century, and to C anada too in the seventies and eighties. A t tim es attack on either coast was feared from the am orphous state which straddled the continents, and whose m ilitary strength was so consistently overrated. T hanks to her alliance with G reat Britain in 1902 and to the settlem ent of the im m igration ques­ tion, Jap an ’s growing pow er was not in these years regarded as involving any th reat to the Pacific coast of Canada. T he new danger, and the one which m ore and m ore dom inated all plan­ ning fo r defence, lay in G erm any’s frank struggle for world pow er, and the appearance, for the first tim e in a century, of a fleet intended to challenge the suprem acy o f the British navy. In retrospect there can be seen a change, not fully realized at the tim e, of the whole political position on w hich the defence policy of C anada was built. F o r decades before confederation and through the early years of the dom inion defence for C an a­ dians had m eant protection against the U nited Slates. T o aid them in this task they looked to G reat Britain, whose great navy, professional arm y, and am assed wealth m ight redress the bal­ ance of the w eak against the strong. In m om ents of E ngland’s troubles - the C rim ean W ar or the Indian M utiny - there were m any volunteers in British N orth A m erica ready to lend their swords in evidence o f loyalty and com m on feeling. It was not, however, because England was w eak or her national strength at stake th at these men cam e forw ard. In the days of the A m erican Civil W ar and im m ediately following it the w ithdraw al o f the im perial troops from C anada was regretted, even resented. The w eak still appealed to the strong for aid. In less than tw enty

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years came the th reat to the British position in A frica, ominous unpopularity throughout Europe, and the naval policy of T irpitz and the K aiser. N ow C anada, w ith a new sense of security on h er own borders, was forced for the first tim e to consider seriously the defence of the em pire of w hich she was a part. It was no longer a question of gestures by individuals; it was a problem of national policy. T he transition from the old balance to the new occupied some years; and the difficulty in under­ standing a change so close a t hand was magnified by confusion o f issues. To the opponents of im perial federation in all its forms the cry of the em pire in danger sm acked o f a plot to lure the unw ary into a political fram ew ork designed not for co-operation but dom inance. Even to those not persuaded by either faith it was apparent th at projects for im perial defence could never be wholly divorced from som e type of agreem ent on foreign policy w ithout which m ilitary o r naval plans would be either meaningless o r dangerous. If C anadian defence policy be judged to have been anachro­ nistic and its results to have been to some extent inadequate and inefficient, the governm ents im m ediately responsible m ust re­ ceive a m easure o f sym pathy. A gainst w hat danger m ust they guard? H appily against no neighbours. Could they believe the old argum ents o f the federationists? C ould the m ilitary burden on such a w ealthy country as E ngland be taken seriously in com parison to the burden on C anada o f opening a pioneer country? It is n o t wholly surprising th at the governm ents of these years steered by th e star o f im m ediate dom estic needs, avoiding as best they could the rocks of provincial and racial cleavages. D efence policy tended to be based on com prom ise, w ith inevitable technical draw backs - and some surprisingly effective results. C anadian defence forces m ay be divided into m ilitary and naval. In both there w ere im portant links w ith the imperial arm s; but the projects for an im perial defence organization were separate from the uniform ity o f drill, exchange of officers, and other convenient devices w hich were not intended to create a united force. II F ear of A m erican aggression during and after the Civil W ar stim ulated a new interest in the defence forces and was an im­ p o rtan t elem ent in the confederation m ovem ent. But such zeal

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as was tem porarily shown fo r expansion and im provem ent of the forces passed w ith the rem oval of the im m ediate danger. Little was left of the plans and talk of those years. T he fortifica­ tion scheme was dropped altogether and the m oney was spent on the Pacific railway. T he regular arm y - o r “perm anent fo rce” - had been started in 1871, and while it rem ained small, the principle soon becam e firmly established. T he Royal M ilitary College was opened at K ingston in 1876 and provided a m ixed academ ic and m ilitary training of a high standard. Everything, how ever, seemed to com bine against any forw ard m ovem ent in the m ilitia. T he N orth-W est Rebellion o f 1885 had no lasting effects. T he financial depression w hich began in the late seven­ ties, the expenditure on public w orks (especially railw ays), and peaceful relations w ith the U nited States all discouraged m ilitia reform . Even the rem oval of the im perial troops from all points except the naval bases failed to encourage m ilitary preparations. It was w hat an historian of the m ilitia has called “ the dead p eriod E xpenditure was cut alm ost in half; the num bers of the active m ilitia in training fell by a third; and the enthusiasm o f officers and m en waned. T h e V enezuela scare of 1895 and m ore especially the experi­ ence of the South A frican W ar sounded a note o f necessity that brought new life to the m ilitia. A lready there had been some slight signs o f progress. T he perm anent force was reorganized and enlarged; the obsolete Snider rifles w ere partially replaced; governm ent expenditure was m odestly increased; and public interest som ew hat revived It was, how ever, after the South A frican W ar th at the m ain changes occurred. T here w ere not lacking - and never had been lacking - critics of the m ilitia system : officers o f the m ilitia itself, C anadian civilians, and the English officers appointed in com m and in C anada pointed at tim es to weaknesses. T he p ap er strength of the m ilitia was said to be misleading; the period of training too short; equipm ent to be obsolete, incom plete, and insufficient in quantity; the p ay of both perm anent and non-perm anent m ilitia too small. N o one questioned the quality of the personnel, o r their efforts to m ake the best o f the situation, but the handicaps w ere said to be too great. O n the other hand, the opposition to reform was influ­ enced not only by parsim ony but by a disbelief in the necessity of m ilitary preparations on a large scale. A com m ent in the M ontreal H erald in 1902 on L ord D undonald’s proposals for change is not untypical:

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D undonald apparently shares a delusion dear to H utton . H e seem s to think the people of Canada are concerned about being in readiness fo r war, or that if they are not they are to blam e and should be stirred up. A n y m an who thinks that way - and all European soldiers do - fails to grasp the essential distinction between E urope and N o rth A m erica. W ith E urope war is a condition. W ith us it is a theory* T h e point of the Herald's, attack was perhaps sharpened by resentm ent against the prevailing rule under which the officer com m anding the C anadian m ilitia was appointed from the British regular arm y. It w ould be doing less than justice to the individuals w ho held the position not to record th at they made a valuable contribution to the C anadian militia. T hey were able to bring to the w ork training and experience w'ider than a C anadian officer could obtain, and undoubtedly m any o f their criticism s were valid and their recom m endations wise. M any, indeed, of the im provem ents in the m ilitia were due to one or oth er of these officers. It was an arrangem ent, how ever, which was almost bound to lead to trouble sooner o r later. W ith few exceptions, the com m anding officers seem to have established good relations with the C anadian officers, who w elcom ed their experience and w ere as anxious as they for reform . But it was n ot easy for non-C anadians to continue to hold the chief position in the C anadian m ilitia, in a period in which C anadian autonom y and national feeling were growing, w ithout arousing opposition. Especially was this true when the visiting com m anders found it necessary to m ake criticism s publicly. T he practical difficulty th at arose was in the relations between the com m anding officers and the m inisters of militia. T he division of powers was illdefined, and each accused the other of usurping authority. G eneral H utton had a series o f disagreem ents with the m inister o f militia, F. W. (L ater Sir F rederick) Borden. W hen H utton returned to England in 1900 to take p art in the South African W ar the question was bluntly asked in the C anadian H ouse of C om m ons if he had been dismissed because o f friction with the governm ent T o this L aurier replied coldly that the m atter was better not discussed, but nevertheless a debate ensued. M ost of the m em bers who spoke defended H utton, but the point was m ade, by Borden and others, th at it m ight be necessary in the future to appoint Canadians. In the course of his rem arks Borden also denied that there had ever been im proper political influence on the militia. T h at there had been such influence was

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a current charge, and one th at arose in acute form during the period in which L ord D undonald was com m anding officer. D undonald cam e to C anada in 1902 know ing som ething o f the difficulties that had arisen and having been w arned that he might well m eet trouble. H e was a soldier o f considerable experience, both in peace and war, and proved him self to be sincerely anxious for the best interests o f the C anadian militia. O n his m any tours of inspection he found much to criticize in the organization, equipm ent, and training of the militia, and in a num ber of public utterances was not slow in pointing to w eak­ nesses which he believed to exist and changes which he thought should be made. F rom the first he claimed that his efforts were impeded by political interference A p art of his report for 1902 was n ot presented to parliam ent, and in 1904 arose w hat has become know n as “the D undonald incident.” T he rights and wrongs o f the affair m ay still be debated. T o D undonald it was a case o f a m inister insisting on an appointm ent in the arm y for party reasons; to the governm ent it was an attem pt to overrule its suprem e authority D undonald was dismissed; but before he left C anada m ade public his views, w hich, while bringing him some applause and sym pathy, did nothing to ease w hat had become an intolerable situation. O ut of the tenure o f the chief com m and by English officers cam e a paradoxical com bination o f results: the adoption of m any of the reform s w hich they had urged, and the decision against sim ilar appointm ents in the future. Both H utton and D undonald had urged the developm ent o f a self-contained m ilitia in place of w hat the form er described as “a collection o f m ilitary units w ithout cohesion, w ithout staff, and w ithout those m ilitary departm ents by w hich an arm y is moved, fed, or m inistered to in sickness.” T he move tow ard an arm y com plete in all branches began in H u tto n ’s day and continued after it as a principal line o f developm ent Both results were found in the M ilitia A ct of 1904 (4 Edw. V II, c. 2 3 ), the m ost im portant of such acts since confederation. Indeed, as Borden pointed out in introducing the bill into the Com m ons, the existing m ilitia law was practically the sam e as th at before confederation T he new regim e, as defined by the act o r as brought into effect under its permissive clauses, showed traces o f national consciousness. T he form er rule under which imperial officers in the Canadian m ilitia had precedence over Canadians o f equal rank was abolished; and the im perial officer in com m and a t H alifax w a no longer autom atically to take charge of the militia at the

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outbreak of w ar. M ore im portant than either of these was the provision th at any qualified officer in the British Em pire w as to be eligible for the chief com m and, and not only an English officer as form erly. This provision was the answ er to the pre­ vious friction between governm ents and general officers com ­ manding, and was supplem ented by a clause enabling a militia council to be set up. T h e council was said to be follow ing the precedent recently established in E ngland, w here the army council, following the recom m endations of the E sher C om ­ mission, had the secretary o f state for w ar as chairm an, with the m ilitary m em bers as advisers. H enceforw ard the m inister of m ilitia becam e the sole centre o f authority, w ith the chief o f the general staff as the senior officer. T here was no longer any appointm ent com parable to that of the form er com m anders in chief. But the effect in practice, writes Colonel H am ilton, was that “ the m inister saw m ore of the technical men, the soldiers, and heard their case presented; and the influence o f the soldiers, and m ore especially o f the senior soldier, steadily grew. The result o f a step which ostensibly lowered the footing o f the soldier was to increase his influence in th e w orking of the D ep artm ent T he act also provided th at th e perm anent force m ight be raised from one to two thousand; th at the period of annual training for the non-perm anent force m ight be extended to thirty days; and th at the pay o f both branches o f the militia be increased. In the years following 1904 expenditure on the m ilitia was steadily increased from two and a half m illion dollars in 1903-04 to seven and a half in 1911-12. D uring the same period the num ber of m en trained in the active m ilitia rose from thirty-five to fifty thousand. T h e m em oranda of the new m ilitia council in 1905 reflect official views of the new regim e In their m em orandum to the m inister o f m ilitia the m ilitary m em bers of the council pointed o ut that they had not “a clean sheet' on which to draw out their plans, and they have constantly had to com prom ise between w hat was desirable and w hat was attainable.” T heir plans were not am bitious: gradual additions to the cavalry and artillery of the perm anent force, and organization o f the arm y service corps, ordnance corps, and arm y m edical corps. T he finance m em ber o f the council then explained in a m em orandum the estimates fo r 1905-6, showing the increased expenditure in some detail. By 1910 the council was ready with a m ore elaborate rep o rt Som e changes were reported: an inter-departm ental com m ittee fo r co-operation between the departm ents of m ilitia and defence

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and o f naval service; the appointm ent o f staff officers to train candidates for the British staff college; and a m obilization com m ittee at headquarters. But the form al picture draw n by the council looked less im pressive w hen exam ined by soldiers. T he them e o f the rep o rt o f the inspector-general, M ajor-G eneral L ake, was that the reduction of estim ates had seriously im paired the efficiency and developm ent of both perm anent and non­ perm anent m ilitia In the sam e year an outside opinion was given by Sir Jo h n F rench, who, as inspector-general o f the im perial forces, had been invited to inspect the C anadian m ili­ tary forces. His report pays tribute to th e m en and officers available and to som e aspects of their w ork; but the weaknesses he found were m ore conspicuous than the strength. H e took “ability to defend th e land frontiers o f C anada” as the standard by which he form ed his judgm ent, and his conclusions did little to give C anadians any sense of security. T he peace organization he found defective in th at the various arm s of the service were not in correct proportions either in total o r in any one district, n o r did they have opportunities of training together. U nits lacking in integration would have to be throw n together in time of w ar, w hen a fu rth e r difficulty w ould arise from a lack of adequate m obilization plans. F rench m ade som e suggestions for changes in the training o f the perm anent force, but on the w hole w rote w arm ly o f its efficiency. Some alterations, he thought, m ight be m ade in the organization of the staff. W hether the volunteer system w ould m eet C anadian conditions could not, he thought, be decided until it had been given a fair trial, w ith a b etter organization, better knowledge in the higher com m and, and the qualifications for officers and the engagem ents o f the ran k and file in the m ilitia being enforced Asked by the m inister of m ilitia to report on how far and in w hat m anner Sir John F re n ch ’s recom m endations could be im plem ented, M ajorG eneral Lake observed th at on the whole they followed the sam e lines on w hich the m ilitia council had been w orking. “T h ere are,” he w rote, “no proposals contained in Sir John F ren ch ’s report the adoption of w hich would involve any dep ar­ ture in principle from the policy w hich, under your direction, the m ilitia council has pursued since its inception in 1904 . . . the extent to w hich progress in carrying out his recom m enda­ tions can be m ade and the period which m ust elapse before they can becom e effective depends entirely upon how far Parliam ent is prepared to provide for the expenditure necessary Some at least o f the recom m endations m ade by F rench and

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endorsed by L ake were carried into effect. In eastern C anada the militia was organized in peace as it w ould be in war, into divisions each with a com m ander and staff, and each divi­ sional com m ander was to control all the troops within his area. But still the reports of the new inspector-general, a C anadian, G eneral O tter, pointed to continuance o f the old weaknesses: shortage of officers and m en, and inadequate qualifications. The last w ord before 1914 cam e from Sir Ian H am ilton, who inspected the C anadian forces in the sum m er o f 1913. O rganiza­ tion, training, and education he believed had all improved. He found, however, that th e active m ilitia was still short of instructors, and th at units w ere under strength. A bove all he stressed the unreality of the p aper liability for universal military service, and the absence in practice o f any reserve Such, in outline, w ere the m ilitary forces of C anada in the period between the w ithdraw al of the im perial troops and the W ar o f 1914. T hough theoretically based on universal service, the C anadian m ilitia was in reality purely a volunteer force. A part from the sm all perm anent force, the militia suffered from scanty resources and sketchy training - in spite of the zealous efforts of m any of its m em bers. T here was little that was distinctively C anadian about the militia. W hile frequently criticized as following too slowly o r im perfectly the British arm y, it was nevertheless organized and trained on the m ethods of th at arm y. From England cam e its drill, its weapons, and its training. C om m anding officers for m any years cam e from Eng­ land, as did m any of the staff o f the Royal M ilitary College. C anadian officers attended the English staff college. Advice cam e in generous am ounts from English officers in Canada, cither holding positions for a term o r on special inspections. T h e colonial defence com m ittee transm itted its views on C ana­ dian defences to O ttaw a. W hen changes were m ade they consisted in closer approxim ations to British practice: more m odern rifles, organization, m obilization plans, relations be­ tween civil and m ilitary officials concerned in defence. A reading o f either the reports of British experts o r discussions by C ana­ dians gives the impression th at the excellence of the m ilitia was in direct ratio to its likeness to its prototype. In addition to this technical relation o f the m ilitary forces o f the U nited Kingdom and Canada, was another and quite different one, found in the projects fo r concerted plans for im perial defence: organization for co-operative effort tow ard a com m on end.

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III Im perial defence, as has already been suggested, was not a single but a m ultiple problem , involving the defence of C anada, o f near-by British territories, of far-distant colonies, and of im perial pow er as a whole. T he protection of C anada itself was intended, after confederation, to be prim arily a C anadian re­ sponsibility, with the understanding that in case of attack G reat Britain would render assistance as she was able. T he m ajor part o f the imperial troops had been w ithdraw n by 1871, though a garrison was left at H alifax.T he m ilitary history of both H alifax and Esquim alt is o f peculiar interest in that they alone played a dual role: as conveniently-situated ports for the British navy, which happened to be situated in C anada; and as strategic posi­ tions through w hich C anada might be invaded. T he C anadian point o f view, both in the governm ent and am ongst the public, was that the cost of m aintenance should be shared; but the actual division was not so easily reached. W hen the w orld seemed peaceful Canadians tended to take the attitude that these bases were a British concern: when any threat loomed they em pha­ sized the necessity o f British naval and m ilitary forces being represented on both coasts. Because of this shifting atm osphere, and because of the impossibility of defining the relative values received by the U nited K ingdom and the dom inion, the negotia­ tions over the allocation of cost were protracted. Soon after British Colum bia joined the federation her governm ent pressed for the graving dock at Esquim alt, for which the dom inion had prom ised in the term s of union to guarantee the interest on a loan. Correspondence then ensued between the provincial, federal, and im perial governm ents. T he last agreed to contribute £ 3 0 ,0 0 0 on condition that the dock should be suitable in dim ension and character, and that His M ajesty’s ships have preferential treatm ent there fo r fifteen years. T he dom inion governm ent, for its part, offered a grant of £ 5 0 ,0 0 0 in lieu of its guarantee in the term s of union But in spite o f these early offers there rem ained some disagreem ent, and contracts were not aw arded until 1890.18 T he m aintenance of the defensive w orks and a garrison at Esquim alt was a m ore vital question which took even longer to settle. H ere again the pressure cam e from British Columbia, through the provincial governm ent and m em bers of parliam ent, b ut the arrangem ents were to be m ade between the governments o f the U nited K ingdom and Canada. T he Russian scares of

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1877-1885 drew attention to the weak state o f defences on the Pacific coast, and tem porary m easures were taken to strengthen Esquim alt. Several years w ere then passed in correspondence between the C anadian and British governm ents, with proposals and counter-proposals as to how the responsibility for defence m ight be shared. It was not until 1893 th at an agreem ent was reached under w hich the dom inion governm ent was to pay part of the cost o f construction and the m aintenance of the buildings and defence w orks, to pay for a detachm ent of Royal M arine A rtillery, and to supply some troops to supplem ent the garrison. This, with m odifications, continued to be the basis on which E squim alt was m aintained. N o such controversy took place over H alifax, presum ably because the British governm ent regarded it as a m ore im portant naval base. It was suggested, however, that C anadian troops in the neighbourhood would be available in case of need. A step tow ard a share in the defence of H alifax was taken during the South A frican W ar, w hen a battalion was provided to relieve the British troops there fo r service elsewhere. A fuller responsibility for the defence of both ports was first suggested by the C anadian representatives at the colonial con­ ference o f 1902 in an offer to garrison both H alifax and E squim alt and was form ally renewed early in 1905. T he offer was gratefully accepted, w ith the suggestion that the change m ight be m ade gradually, C anada in the m eanw hile defraying the cost o f such im perial troops as tem porarily rem ained T he proposal was accepted substantially as it was m ade, and in 1906 the last o f the im perial troops left H alifax and Esquim alt. A t the beginning of 1907 the C anadian governm ent also took over the H alifax dockyard, though privileges for the royal navy were reserved. T he changed position at the two ports coincided with the adoption o f a new policy by the adm iralty under w hich a local squadron was no longer to be stationed at either, but an equal o r greater degree of security prom ised from the larger units in which the ships w ere thereafter to operate. T o m any C anadians, on the A tlantic and Pacific coasts alike, even one ship that could be seen was a m ore real protection than m any th at were far away. Feelings were mixed over the changes of 1905. Protests against the British abandonm ent of the stations w ere accom panied by expressions of satisfaction that C anada was accepting a greater proportion of the burden of defence T h e buildings and other property at H alifax were form ally transferred to the C anadian governm ent in 1910, and those at E squim alt in 1911, subject to their being m aintained in a state

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of efficiency, to a supply of fuel being kept, and other facilities being provided for the royal navy. Excitem ent over the new policies for H alifax and Esquim alt arose not only from the im portance of these two ports but because the decisions respecting them w ere related to the wider issues of im perial defence, then receiving a growing am oun t of public attention. N o aspect of defence was as obviously a C ana­ dian interest as th a t o f the keys to h er eastern and western coasts, b u t there were other problem s th at had to be faced, and on w hich some decisions had to be made. T he story o f th e plans discussed in tim e of peace fo r co-operative im perial defence m ay be traced through the meetings of the colonial and imperial conferences. R eferring to the program m e of the first session in 1887 the colonial secretary w rote that “in the opinion o f H er M ajesty’s governm ent the question w hich is a t once urgent and capable o f useful consideration is th at of organization fo r m ili­ ta ry defence In the opening speech L ord Salisbury disclaimed any idea that “ this proposal fo r Im perial defence is a m ere contrivance on our p art to lighten ou r burden, o r that it results from any indolence o r selfishness o f ours,” b u t w ent on to say, in an apparent non sequitur, th at “we desire th a t all should take th eir fair and legitim ate p art in a task o f w hich all ought to be p ro u d N early half the w orking tim e o f the conference was devoted to considerations of defence, m ainly on naval problem s o f the Pacific, and the possible action to be taken by the A us­ tralian colonies. T he C anadian p art in the discussions was m eagre and negative. Sir A lexander Cam pbell m ade w hat were to becom e regulation references to the Intercolonial and C an a­ dian Pacific railways as contributions to defence, and virtually denied that the British navy was greater because of any respon­ sibility fo r th e defence o f C anada T en years elapsed before the next general discussion of defence (fo r it w as not taken up at the O ttaw a session o f 1894), and then the pace was soon seen to be quickening. Joseph C ham berlain w ent straight to the point of arguing th at the great m ilitary and naval defences o f G reat Britain w ere necessitated largely by her em pire. W ithout this force behind her Canada w ould be helpless in the face o f disagreem ents w ith Japan, Russia, or the U nited States, and becom e largely a dependent pow er. T h e colonial defence com m ittee, he said, had m ade some im provem ent, but the position in the colonies in regard to defences was still not satisfactory. As positive steps he proposed th at regim ents should tem porarily be exchanged between G reat

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Britain and the colonies, and th at a colonial regim ent thus in E ngland might take part in any m ilitary operations th at occurred. It is evident from the record of the conference that the colonial prem iers m ade no prom ise o f anything m ore than an exam ination o f the proposed interchange. Sir W ilfrid L aurier attended his second colonial conference in 1902 w ithout the South A frican W ar having shaken his inherent nationalism ; in L ondon he faced Joseph C ham berlain, whose im perialism had been fortified by the com m on efforts of that war. From other colonies came representatives w ith no less conflicting policies. In the p rep ara­ tions fo r the agenda, defence, am ongst other subjects, was suggested by the colonial secretary. In reply M into was obliged to report that his m inisters did not consider that “ in the varying conditions o f the Colonies there can be any scheme of defence applicable to all Taxed by the leader o f the opposition with returning a discourteous reply, L aurier denied any such inten­ tion, b ut repeated th at no useful purpose could be served by discussion o f defence. T he governm ent would, he said, be ready to discuss the defence of C anada, but som ething other than that was intended by a school in England and C anada “which wants to bring C anada into the vortex o f m ilitarism which is the curse and the blight of E urope D efence, how ever, appeared on the agenda; and indeed the conference w ould have been entirely unrealistic if th at had been excluded. In his opening speech C ham berlain again pointed to the heavy burden of defence borne by Britain - a burden which was largely due to the existence of the colonies. But the colonies were no longer young and poor: they w ere rich enough to offer tem ptation to aggression and strong enough to assum e a share o f their own defence To introduce the subject o f naval defence the first lord o f th e adm iralty spoke on the position of sea-power and m ade in particular two points: that the task o f the navy was n ot literally defence of certain places, but o f destroying the enem y fleet; and th at the m aritim e spirit of the em pire and the sense of personal interest should be aroused by having m ore colonials in the navy. H e had, he said, consulted the prem iers, all of w hom had offered m oney grants except L aurier, who had said that he was not able to m ake a sim ilar offer, but th at his governm ent was contem plating the establishm ent of a local naval force. Figures were produced showing the per capita naval expenditure (C anada being n il), and a d raft agreem ent on naval plans was m ade between the U nited K ingdom , A ustralia, and N ew Zealand; but the C anadian representatives rem ained aloof.

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On m ilitary policy m ore definite plans w ere p u t forw ard. T he secretary of state fo r w ar advocated a highly trained, if small, force in each colony to be held in readiness for im perial service. T o this the representatives o f both A ustralia and C anada ob­ jected on the ground that it would be a derogation of the principles of self-governm ent. A parallel plan by N ew Zealand for an im perial reserve force appeared w ith the approval of the colonial defence com m ittee; the com m ittee also sponsored a p ap er by L ieutenant-Colonel A ltham , assistant quarterm astergeneral at the w ar office, which proposed that specified troops in each colony (3,000 in C anada) should be ready to supple­ m ent the British arm y in case o f need. T he C anadian policy was sum m ed up in a m em orandum (printed as appendix vi to the rep o rt) draw n up by the C anadian m inisters regretting their inability to assent to suggestions o f either the adm iralty o r the w ar office. T heir objections arose, they said, “ not so m uch from the expense involved, as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposals w ould entail an im portant departure from the p rin ­ ciple o f colonial self-governm ent.” They recognized th at C anada should take over m ore of th e burden o f “self-defence,” and held that while the C anadian m ilitia had defects it was being im proved. On the naval side they contem plated a naval reserve. In any defence schemes they wished to co-operate w ith the im perial authorities, so far as that was com patible with selfgovernm ent. Im plicitly the m em orandum gave the impression th at C anada should be increasingly responsible for her own defence; but it avoided any reference to activities outside Canada. A t the colonial conference of 1907 the C anadian policy in regard to defence was substantially unchanged: no com m it­ m ents, no contributions to British naval o r land forces, and no outside control over any part of the C anadian forces. But w hatever the reason - w hether it was th at the atm osphere was better, o r th at the British governm ent had learned wisdom —the conference proceeded m ore sm oothly tow ard positive results. Progress, how ever, was least m arked in regard to naval defence. L ord T w eedm outh, first lord of the adm iralty, adm itted British responsibility for naval defence. Colonial aid would be wel­ com ed in any one of several form s, so long as consistent with control o f strategy and unity o f com m and T he C anadian reply was m ade by the m inister o f m arine and fisheries, L. P. Brodeur. T he C anadian position, he said, was different from th at of the other colonies and should be treated as such. H e objected to a

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docum ent show ing th at C anada had spent nothing on naval defence, citing the fisheries protection service, the naval militia, wireless stations, the hydrographic survey, and assum ption of the dockyards a t H alifax and Esquim alt. C anada was o f one m ind, he said, on the proposal to contribute directly to the British navy. A resolution m oved by one o f the representatives o f C ape Colony in favour of the principle of colonial contribu­ tions in som e form to the British navy was directly opposed by L aurier and w ithdraw n. It w as on m ilitary defence th at the conference reached positive agreem ent. L ord H aldane, secretary of state for war, explained how the general staff had grow n out of the recom m endations o f the E sher com m ittee of 1904, and suggested that the sam e principle might be applied to the em pire, to m eet w hat he described as “ the desirability o f a certain broad plan o f m ilitary organisation.” Sir Frederick Borden, after ascertaining that there was no idea o f creating a body with authority in C anada, accepted in principle one with advisory functions, and in which there should be interchange of officers with the general staff of C anada. T he proposal was then em bodied in a general resolution and accepted by all the m em bers of the conference. It was on these lines th a t im perial m ilitary defence was to develop from then on. “T he elaborate plans fo r pre-arranged contingents,” concludes Colonel H am ilton, “thus dropped to a proposal for an Im perial general staff. T his m eant m ore than the civilian reader m ight suspect, for it carried the idea of establishing in the E m pire com m on types o f organization, co-ordinated plans fo r action, a com m on way of thinking on m ilitary problem s, a com m on doctrine o f w ar It w as fully understood, and definitely stated over and over again, that no prom ise or guarantee was m ade by the dom inions to provide contingents, and th at there was no suprem e m ilitary authority in C anada save that of its governm ent. O n the other hand, the Canadian governm ent willingly entered into the plan fo r uni­ form ity of education and organization, and for com m on discus­ sion o f m ilitary problem s. Follow ing the general agreem ent at the conference of 1907 a m em orandum w as draw n up by the general staff and circulated to the dom inions at the end of 1908.31 F urth er progress along the sam e lines was m ade at the subsidiary conference o f 1909 (a form o f additional conference provided for under resolution o f the colonial conference of 1907, and called because of the im m ediacy o f the G erm an naval ch allen g e). T he m ilitary experts m et together under the chair­

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m anship o f the chief o f the im perial general staff and exam ined a m em orandum subm itted by him of “Proposals for so organiz­ ing the m ilitary forces of the em pire as to ensure their effective co-operation in the event o f w ar R ecom m endations were m ade by the experts designed to im plem ent the general objectives o f uniform ity of training, equipm ent, and organization, for the relations o f general staff officers in the dom inion and the U nited K ingdom , and fo r the education o f officers. These recom m enda­ tions were then accepted by the full conference and the com m ittee of im perial defence. “T he result,” M r. A squith told the H ouse of C om m ons, “is a plan for so organizing the forces o f the Crow n w herever they are that, while preserving the com plete autonom y of each D om inion, should the D om inions desire to assist in the defence o f the E m pire in a real em ergency, their forces could be rapidly com bined into one homogeneous Im perial A rm y.” W hen the conference again m et in 1911, under its new title o f “ im perial conference,” progress was reported on the plans generally accepted in 19 07.33 T he im perial general staff, al­ though only two years old, was said to have m ade progress, and a C anadian section to be in process of form ation. It was reported th at officers of the C anadian perm anent force w ere undergoing the sam e exam inations for prom otion as those in the British regular arm y. T he arm y council expressed its willingness that the inspector-general should inspect overseas forces a t the request o f a dom inion W hile these and other aspects of reorganization were going forw ard, an attem pt was m ade to change the principles then being followed by a revived plan for central political control over the defence forces of all parts of the em pire. A lthough other aspects of defence were brought before the com m ittee o f im perial defence ra th e r than the im­ perial conference, Sir Joseph W ard’s project for an imperial parliam ent o r council for im perial defence came, as a previous resolution, before the conference F rom the first of the discus­ sion W ard ’s plan evoked little sym pathy from any of the representatives of other p arts o f the em pire, and frank opposi­ tion from most. In the course o f being questioned, W ard adm itted that his parliam ent w ould have authority to com pel the dom inions to m ake contributions to an im perial navy - an idea w hich was s.o far rem oved from practical politics as to be hopeless of achievem ent. W ith this m otion w ithdraw n, the discussions o f defence proceeded in the com m ittee of imperial defence and at the w ar office and adm iralty.

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F ro m 1911 until 1914 the organization o f im perial defence lay, in the main, in two bodies: the im perial general staff and the com m ittee o f imperial defence. Both w ere advisory bodies, and both contained representatives of the dom inions. T he latter had no fixed m em bership, but dom inion representatives might attend, as full m em bers, as the occasion required. T hat the com m ittee was also used in 1911 as the body in which foreign policy was discussed has been seen as having dangerous impli­ cations for dom inion autonom y T he fact was, however, that c o o p e ra tio n in foreign policy was not keeping pace with co-operation in m ilitary policy: in other words, the control over the developm ent o f situations in which the m ilitary plans might be called into play was virtually left by the dominions (so cautious about m ilitary control) to the British foreign office. T he risk this involved was preferred, by C anada at least, to the m ore ap parent risk involved in consultation and responsibility.

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IV In the last qu arter of the nineteenth century wars and rum ours o f w ars gave reality to the m ilitary policy o f C anada in respect of both local and im perial defence. F ear of Russian attack, which had long been dorm ant, revived with the critical inter­ national situation in the near east in the years after 1877. Between the C rim ean and the Japanese wars the strength of Russia was com m only over-estim ated; and when the invasion of T urkey threatened an A nglo-Russian w ar m any Canadians found cause fo r alarm , not merely in the danger to the U nited K ing­ dom but also in threats to their own shipping and coasts. A nd in the sam e period, while fear o f A m erican aggression had m ateri­ ally abated, good relations with the U nited States were not taken fo r granted. O ne T oronto editor conjured up unpleasant visions of difficulties w ith both Russia and the U nited States. . . . we regard as absolutely fallacious the idea entertained in so m e quarters that there is anything in the Treaty o f Paris [of 1856] which will prevent Russia fro m issuing com m issions to vessels intended to prey upon the com m ercial m arine o f England and her colonies in case o f war, and if the Canadian G overnm ent is hugging itself on a contrary notion and so neglecting to provide fo r possible contingencies, we fear they, and all people here who hold them , are destined to a rough awakening . . . any Power can at any tim e issue com m issions to

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any vessel it pleases, and convert it into an addendum to its own belligerent navy. M oreover, it is quite on the cards that co m ­ plications m ay arise between Great Britain and the U nited States in connection with this delicate point, and it will not do fo r us in Canada to be slum bering in a fo o l’s paradise. . . . While Canada in fact has nothing w hatever to gain, as a colony, by war between Russia and England, it has a very great deal to lose, and hostilities are sure to subject us as a colonial depend­ ency to constant alarms and risks. This is a point which we fear is not y e t realized by our people. . .

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A few clays later the M ail pointed to the danger o f hostilities in the N orth Pacific. In fact the governm ent was not slum bering, b ut had already discussed the defenceless condition of the A tlan­ tic coast, and appealed to Britain for a fleet o f fast cruisers W hen the dispatch reached the adm iralty the reply was that the m atter had long been under consideration; that the A m erican Civil W ar had shown w hat dam age could be done by a single fast cruiser; and th at a considerable expenditure w ould be required to afford any adequate protection. “Looking,” the adm iralty reply continued, “at the very large m ercantile m arine possessed by the D om inion, it is only reasonable to assum e that the C anadian governm ent will avail themselves of their resources for the protection o f C anadian ports and shipping,” but sug­ gested aid by the loan of guns A lready the governm ent had authorized the expenditure o f $ “ in view of the precau­ tionary m easures now being taken for defensive purposes but apparently did not respond to the larger suggestion. A ppre­ hension continued for some tim e. In 1879 reports were circulated that a Russian steam er from the Baltic was off the coast of M aine, and was laden with guns and seamen to supply com nierce-raiders. In 1883 the Senate discussed the defenceless condition of the Pacific coast. W. J. M acdonald, who brought up the question, spoke of the com parative nearness of Russian naval bases, the possibility o f an Indian uprising in case of war, and the need for m ore protection by the royal navy In 1885 a sim ilar concern for the A tlantic coast was expressed by the Saint John Telegraph in a suggestion that a Russian w arship m ight quite possibly com e into th at h arb o u r Before the Russian danger had ceased to stir C anadian feel­ ings the affairs of Egypt brought on a new and different type of m ilitary question. W hen W olseley was organizing an expedition in 1884 to relieve G ordon, cut off at K hartoum , he cabled a

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request for voyageurs, like those who had gone w ith him to the R ed River in 1870, as steersm en for the N ile boats. A party num bering 386 all ranks was sent, m ade up in part of Indians and in p art o f lum berm en (fo r the voyageurs had all but disappeared T he expedition reached K hartoum too late, and as the situation in the Sudan becam e increasingly grave, N ew South W ales offered a contingent. Should C anada take sim ilar action? Individual C anadians prom ptly offered to raise regi­ m ents, and there were suggestions that the governm ent should send a contingent. F rom L ondon T upper cabled th at Canada should send and pay for troops. “T he cost,” he w rote later, “would not be m uch and C anada cannot in my judgm ent afford to do less after w hat New South W ales has done. It will be repaid to the country in m any ways and carry out the expectations raised by your speeches h e r e .. . T he W eek o f T oronto rather sur­ prisingly called for sending substantial aid A m ore general attitude, however, was that expressed by the M a il and the Globe o f T oronto and the Saint John D aily Telegraph.**.Britain, the argum ent ran, w as not in danger. Filial loyalty might properly inspire individual offers o f service, but only a m ajor crisis should lead the dom inion to m ake an official effort, at her own expense. A sim ilar but m ore vigorous opinion was expressed in the M anitoba Free Press, which com m ented that “ all the talk we have heard about C anada’s fighting the battles of England is very silly and quite likely to be h u rtfu l In this particular case the m atter was decided by the outbreak o f the N orth-W est Rebellion which required th at all available C anadian troops should rem ain in Canada. It was w orthy o f note that in this, unlike the first Riel rebellion, im perial troops were not needed. T en years later the V enezuela controversy caused m ore than a ripple in C anada, and had an interest in that it again involved the possibility - though perhaps a rem ote one - o f defence against the U nited States. This also m arked the last occasion on which considerable preparations were m ade as defence against the U nited States. But much the m ost im portant m ilitary event fo r C anada between the period of the Civil W ar and Fenian raids and the W ar of 1914 was the South A frican W ar. T he decision to be m ade by the C anadian governm ent was n ot an easy one, since the struggle with the Boers m ight be interpreted either as an episode in British im perial developm ent or as a crisis of dimensions sufficient to threaten the power and prestige o f the em pire o f w hich C anada was part. It was an imperial question m idw ay between the Sudan expeditions and the W ar of

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1914. In C anada, too, it m ight take the appearance o f the repression o f one ethnic group by another, and so touch a delicate nerve. In the sum m er of 1899, as the situation in South A frica becam e m ore acute, several British colonies m ade offers of m ilitary aid in the event of hostilities, and in C anada there were some suggestions th a t their exam ple should be followed. Both p arliam ent and public, how ever, w ere slow in reaching that conclusion. On July 31 the prim e m inister introduced a resolu­ tion into the H ouse o f C om m ons expressing sym pathy with the British governm ent in its attem pt to secure equal rights fo r British subjects in the Transvaal. W hether o r not this could be taken as an endorsem ent of British policy, it was not enough to satisfy the growing dem and fo r m ore tangible aid. J. S. W illison, then editor o f the G lobe, bluntly told L au rier th at he would have to send troops o r go out of office, a conclusion w ith which L aurier was reluctantly forced to agree before long A t the beginning o f O ctober events m oved rapidly. O n the third Joseph C ham berlain, the colonial secretary, who fo r three m onths had been angling for official prom ises o f aid, cabled an acknow ledg­ m ent o f private “offers to serve in South A frica” and described the m eans by w hich they could be carried o u t On the same day L aurier had given an interview in w hich he said that while C anadian forces m ight be sent abroad in defence o f C anada, the South A frican situation did n ot create any such menace. F o r this reason, and because parliam ent (w hich was not sitting) would have to grant the money, no troops had been offered. It has som etim es been said th at L aurier’s hand was forced by C ham ­ b erlain’s cable: it is m ore probable th at it was forced by the pressure of public opinion. C ertainly he was in an uncom fortable position. Personally reluctant to take any action, not believing that the South A frican affair w ould assum e large proportions, and pressed in his own province not to intervene, he found him self obliged either to do so, o r to allow the opposition free play w ith public sentim ent in m ost of English-speaking C anada. O nce the decision was m ade no constitutional difficulty was allowed to stand in the way. A n ingeniously w orded privy council rep o rt o f O ctober 14 show ed the hope o f the cabinet th at it was possible to accept a very lim ited liability. A fter quoting C ham berlain’s dispatch, the rep o rt states that,

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T h e Prim e M inister in view o f the w ell-know n desire o f a great m any Canadians who are ready to take service under such

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conditions, is o f opinion that the m oderate expenditure which would thus be involved fo r the equipm ent and transportation o f such volunteers m ay readily be undertaken by the governm ent o f Canada without sum m oning parliament, especially as such an expenditure under such circum stances cannot be regarded as a departure fro m the well know n principles o f constitutional governm ent and colonial practice, nor construed as a precedent fo r fu tu re action

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O n O ctober 30, within a day o f the last date set by Cham berlain, a battalion of over a thousand men sailed from Canada. As they had originally proposed, the British governm ent were to bear all expenses other than the differential between Canadian and British rates of pay from the tim e the troops landed, but one change w as m ade in that the C anadians were to be kept as a separate unit. O n N ovem ber 2, after news of reverses, the C anadian governm ent cabled an offer of another contingent, which, however, was not accepted until the situation had grown even worse in D ecem ber. Thus, when parliam ent m et in F ebruary 1900 the C anadian governm ent had, on its own authority, sent two contingents to a w ar th at had already show n itself to be the m ost serious in which G reat Britain had been engaged for half a century. The debates in both H ouses w ere prolonged and at times impressive. W hile the governm ent enjoyed an alm ost unanim ous support on m ain principles, criticism was not lacking. Some there were who held that m ore rapid and m ore generous aid should have been rendered, and in particular that C anada should have borne all expenses. O thers objected to any participation. Even the breezy language of the privy council report could not disguise the fact that the governm ent had acted w ithout sanction of parliam ent, but the great m ajority agreed that, under the cir­ cum stances, this was justifiable. T here w ere long discussions of the causes o f the war, of the im portance o f South A frica to G reat Britain, and o f the interest which C anada had in the struggle. T he general tenor of the debate was that British policy had been neither unreasonable nor aggressive; but a vocal m inority, led by Bourassa, condem ned the policy and the action of C anada in supporting it. T he em phasis constantly laid on the position of Q uebec revealed both the existence of an anti-war party there and the apprehension in the other provinces that that party might be dangerously strong. C onstant protests w ere made that Q uebec was “loyal,” but it was also apparent that the most

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critical speeches cam e from m em bers for Q uebec constituencies. O ne fu rth e r test of the governm ent’s policy cam e in the general election of 1900, an election largely fought on th at policy, and in w hich an elem ent o f bitterness was all too apparent. T he results o f the polling were som ew hat striking: in O ntario the governm ent lost fourteen seats, and in Quebec it gained all but seven. It was easily apparent, therefore, that there had been no serious revolt in Q uebec against L aurier; while the vote in O ntario m ust be explained not by any opposition to the w ar but, in p art, by dissatisfaction at such cautious participation. T h e C anadian contribution to the w ar w as not inconsider­ able. T h e forces sent overseas consisted, first, o f the second (special service) battalion o f the Royal C anadian Regim ent at a strength o f 1,150 officers and m en, under the com m and of a C anadian, L ieutenant-Colonel O tter. T he second contingent, recruited at the end of 1899, included the Royal C anadian D ragoons (tw o sq u ad ro n s), draw n largely from the perm anent force, the C anadian M ounted Rifles (tw o sq uadrons), recruited in p art from the N orth W est M ounted Police, and three batteries of Royal C anadian A rtillery, also recruited in p art from the perm anent force. In addition to the two first C anadian con­ tingents were troops later raised in C anada, but not directly by the C anadian governm ent. These included L ord S lrathcona’s H orse, o f three squadrons, the expenses o f w hich were m et by L ord Strathcona; twelve squadrons o f the South A frican co n ­ stabulary; the 2nd C anadian M ounted Rifles; the 10th C anadian Field H ospital; and the 3rd, 4 th, 5th, and th C anadian M ounted Rifles (these last arriving after the conclusion o f p eace). In all 7,300 m en w ent to South A frica In C anada the 3rd Battalion, R oyal C anadian R egim ent, was raised to relieve the imperial garrison at H alifax. Citizens contributed to the Red Cross and P atriotic F u n d organizations in C anada, and to provide insur­ ance and other funds fo r the troops. Owing to the short term of enlistm ent parts o f the forces returned to C anada before the end o f hostilities, no r w ere the reinforcem ents adequate to keep the units up to strength. A p art from these weaknesses the C anadian troops played an active and efficient p art in the war. T hough lacking in training and experience on arrival in South A frica, they perform ed their duties satisfactorily, and at tim es with conspicuous success W hile C anadians had thus played an active part in the war, th eir governm ent had had no influence on the circum stances w hich led to its outbreak o r on the m ethods by which it was

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conducted. It rem ained to be seen w hether the C anadian govern­ m ent would exercise, o r wish to exercise, any control over the term s on w hich peace was to be m ade. O n several occasions the criticism was m ade in parliam ent th at C anada h ad gone into a w ar fo r which she was in no way responsible, and the sim ilar objection was raised against a purely English peace. In 1900 and 1901 Bourassa asked in the H ouse of C om m ons w hether the governm ent had been consulted on the conditions o f peace, or intended to offer any opinion; and on both occasions the prim e m inister explicitly replied in the negative In 1902 John C harlton moved a cautious resolution asking for a m agnanim ous treatm ent o f the Boers. In the debate th at followed m ost o f the speakers agreed with the prim e m inister th at the C anadian parliam ent had a right to express such opinions, b u t th at to intervene w hen peace w as actually un d er discussion might prolong, rather than shorten, the w ar. O ther m em bers said that C anada had already been too free in expressing opinions The m otion was w ithdraw n; and the C anadian participation in the South A frican W ar continued to be confined to its m ilitary aspect.

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V N aval defence was no less im portant to C anada than land defence, afte r confederation as before it; but so long as the British navy m aintained unquestioned suprem acy on the seas C anadians could and did expect th a t their coasts w ould be protected by that great force w ithout their contributing ships themselves. F o r th at reason there was in the dom inion no pres­ sure to form ulate a naval policy until, in the tw entieth century, the dom inant position held since T rafalgar began to be th reat­ ened by G erm any. Even then the C anadian governm ent and parliam ent moved slowly to m eet the new circum stances. T h ro u g h the colonial conference of 1907 the C anadian attitude was alm ost w holly negative, being sim ply a refusal to m ake contributions to the British navy. In the following years, how­ ever, the vague suggestions o f a C anadian navy began to harden into a positive policy. T here had long been differing views in C an ad a on naval defence. O ne school o f thought concurred with the view, presented at earlier colonial conferences, that the English burden of naval defence was m aterially increased by the existence o f the colonies; and th at the latter should consequently take steps to share that burden. A nother held th at British naval

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pow er was designed fo r defence o f world-wide trade and was as large as it was because of a British conviction th at sea-power, fo r an island dependent on sea-com m unication for its prosperity and very life, m ust be unquestioned. T hose who held the form er view suggested either a direct contribution o f money o r ships to the British navy (the plan m ost acceptable to the adm iralty ), o r a C anadian navy acting, when occasion required, in concert with the royal navy. Occasionally, as at the tim e o f the Russian scares, the people o f both coasts at least w ere conscious o f the need of naval protection, but otherw ise the obviously superior pow er o f the British navy prevented any feeling of necessity. It was only in 1909 when the G erm an construction obviously began to threaten British suprem acy that the C anadian people were aroused to a desire for action. T here were, it is true, some w ho claim ed th a t the danger was unduly, and even im properly, m agnified; there were also those who continued to believe that naval defence was a British, and not a C anadian, responsibility. T h e effective m ajority, however, accepted the proposition that the threat was real, and that C anada m ust lend aid to com bat it. In w hat form th at aid was to be rendered rem ained a m atter of disagreem ent. T h e first substantive discussion o f the naval question in parliam ent showed a rem arkable unanim ity o f opinion On M arch 29, 1909, a prom inent Conservative, G. E. Foster, intro­ duced a resolution which, in general term s, expressed the responsibility o f C anada fo r a share in the defence of h er coasts. In an explanatory speech he said th at there were two ways of assuming this responsibility. O ne was by the contribution of m oney to the adm iralty. T o this he saw objec­ tions, and would prefer the creation o f a C anadian naval force. L aurier im m ediately expressed his agreem ent in principle, but suggested that the resolution relate only to the form ation o f a C anadian naval service. Borden intervened to propose that, while this was the proper course, the possibility of a contribu­ tion in case of em ergency should not be excluded. A fter further am endm ents a resolution was passed unanim ously. It recognized “the duty of the people of C anada, as they increase in numbers and w ealth, to assum e in large m easure the responsibilities of national defence,” stated that the paym ent “of regular and periodical contributions” would not be the best course, and approved expenditure for a C anadian naval service, recognizing that “the naval suprem acy o f B ritain is essential to the security

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of com m erce, the safety o f the em pire and the peace o f the w orld.” T h e scene then tem porarily shifted to London. A t about the sam e time as the C anadian resolution the governm ents of New Zealand and A ustralia had offered battleships. T he British gov­ ernm ent, in view of the actions of the three dom inions, and of its understanding that th e C anadian governm ent intended to send its m inister of m ilitia and defence to England fo r consulta­ tions, proposed the holding o f a subsidiary defence conference, as provided for by the colonial conference of 1907.50 W hen the conference duly m et at the end of July the adm iralty subm itied a m em orandum expressing its preference for a single navy, but agreeing that the conditions in some o f the dom inions led them to prefer local naval forces. F or those th at followed this policy it was recom m ended that a distinct fleet unit should be the aim. Such a unit should include one arm oured and three unarm oured cruisers, six destroyers, three subm arines, and the necessary auxiliaries. “T he estim ated first cost o f building and arm ing such a com plete fleet unit would be approxim ately £ 3 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 , and the cost of m aintenance, including upkeep of vessels, pay, and interest and sinking fund, at British rates, approxim ately £ 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 per annum .” T o these sum s should be added the pay o f persons in the auxiliary services, and of those in training, sick, and in reserve. Ship-building and repairing establishm ents would be required, training schools, and sources of stores. W hile a dom inion w ould thus provide its own navy com plete, there should be uniform ity in equipm ent, training, and discipline. It was understood that in time o f w ar the local naval forces should com e under the general direction o f the adm iralty. In the discussions that followed (of w hich only a sum m ary was printed) between the British and C anadian representatives, a m uch less am bitious program m e was considered. G iven C anada’s double seaboard, a fleet u nit was recognized as unsuitable, and the adm iralty, on ascertaining that C anada asked for two plans for naval forces involving a cost o f £ 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 or £ 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 annu­ ally, suggested lo u r cruisers and six destroyers or three cruisers and four destroyers. D uring the period of construction and training the adm iralty was prepared to lend two cruisers, and also volunteers from the royal navy to be paid by the Canadian governm ent. T he address from the throne in N ovem ber 1909 forecast a C anadian navy, and January 1910 L aurier introduced the N aval Service Bill providing for a departm ent o f the naval

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service, a naval reserve force, a naval volunteer force, and a naval college. In case of em ergency all o r p art of the navy could be placed at the service of the royal navy. T he prim e m inister explained that o f the two program m es drafted by the adm iralty at his request the governm ent would choose the larger one, providing eleven ships at a cost of $3 m illion. It soon became apparent, as had been indicated in the previous m onths, that unanim ity was at an end. T he Conservatives, though otherwise disunited, were opposed to the bill. T he official position of the party, as expressed by Borden, was that the electors should be consulted and that the plan was faulty in th at no provision was m ade to m eet the im m ediate em ergency. T he proper m ethod for doing so, he said, was to provide the royal navy w ith two dreadnoughts. F . D. M onk, leader of the Conservative party in Quebec, argued against either a C anadian navy or a contribu­ tion to the British one. T he governm ent’s plan w ould tie Canada to the foreign policy of Britain, in w hich she had no voice, and create a com m itm ent to fight in any British w ar. T here should, he said, be a plebiscite. In a speech outside the H ouse, H enri Bourassa continued to flay the whole policy. T here was no G erm an m enace; there was no threat to C anada; there was no prospect of Britain consulting C anada on foreign policy; there should be a plebiscite. In spite o f these and other criticisms the am endm ents w ere defeated and the bill passed by a com fortable m ajority. T h e first steps to im plem ent the act cam e quickly enough. A minister, deputy-m inister, and director o f naval services were appointed and a naval college established at H alifax. Tw o old cruisers were bought from the U nited K ingdom . T he N iobe was a very large and heavily-arm ed vessel and the R ainbow smaller. It was an encouraging beginning, m arked by flags, salutes, and speeches - and it was also virtually th e end. N io b e struck a rock off Cape Sable and was not repaired until the end of 1912. R ainbow , after som e cruises up and down the west coast, rested in Esquim alt fo r h arb o u r training. T enders were called for con­ struction of fu rth er ships in C anada but no contracts had been aw arded before the fall o f the Liberal governm ent. M eanw hile there w ere discussions of naval policy at the im­ perial conference o f 1911. Representatives of the adm iralty and o f A ustralia and C anada reached an agreem ent set forth in a m em orandum T he naval forces of the two dom inions w ere to be u n d er the control of their respective governm ents, but train­ ing and discipline were to be generally uniform , with those o f the

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fleet of the U nited K ingdom , and officers and m en m ight be interchanged. T he C anadian and A ustralian navies were to have their own naval stations, the limits of w hich were defined. “In time of war, w hen the naval service of a D om inion, o r any part thereof, has been p u t at the disposal of the Im perial governm ent by the D om inion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of the British fleet, and will rem ain under the control of the British A dm iralty during the continuance o f the w ar.” T he election o f 1911 stopped the further progress of the plans of 1910. O utside Quebec the dom inating issue in the elec­ tion was the reciprocity project, but in that province the issue was naval policy. Borden continued, in public statem ents, to describe the L iberals’ navy as expensive and useless, as a “politi­ cal m akeshift.” Significantly for his later policy he added that “responsibility for Em pire defence clearly involves som e voice in Em pire policy. C anada’s perm anent and effective co-operation in naval defence can only be accom plished by proposals which take account of this consideration and any such proposals should be subm itted to the people for their approval.” The nationalist point o f view in Quebec, as expressed by M onk and Bourassa, claim ed th at the Liberal policy would lead C anada into B ritain’s imperialist w ars and was not required for the defence of Canada. A s a result o f the vote the governm ent lost seriously in Q uebec and overwhelmingly in O ntario. W hen the Conservatives cam e into office in 1911 the N aval Service A ct stayed on the statute book but no contracts for additional ships w ere aw arded and the sm all force th at had been built up continued to disintegrate. On being questioned in the H ouse the m inister said th at a new policy w ould be brought forw ard; meanwhile no substantive change would be m ade. In June 1912 Borden w ent to E ngland, accom panied by three other m inisters and expert advisers, and there a series o f con­ versations was held with A squith, other cabinet ministers, offi­ cials of the adm iralty, and the com m ittee of im perial defence. T h ere were discussions of the international situation, the G er­ m an naval program m e, the action which C anada m ight take, and how the dom inions could have a voice in im perial foreign policy. T he first lord of the adm iralty, W inston C hurchill, stressed the need for an em ergency contribution to the royal navy. In D ecem ber 1912 Borden introduced the N aval Aid Bill into the H ouse of Com m ons. Starting from the point of view of developm ents w ithin the em pire, he said th at the problem was to

D E F E N C E - 253

reconcile co-operation w ith dom inion autonom y. It was fully understood th at sharing naval defence m ust be accom panied by sharing control o f foreign policy. T he naval suprem acy of the em pire was threatened, and for this reason there should be an im m ediate contribution o f the cost of three dreadnoughts ($35 m illion). C anadians could serve on these ships, which would necessarily be constructed in England; and the ships could later be recalled to form p art o f a C anadian u nit o f the royal navy. T he Conservative policy was to have even less success than the Liberal one. T he opposition argued th at the navy should be a C anadian one, though larger than they themselves had planned in 1910, and L au rier moved an am endm ent in th at sense. It was argued that there was no real em ergency, and that the Conserva­ tive policy endangered dom inion autonom y. R epresentation on the com m ittee of im perial defence (w hich the governm ent had accepted as a first step) w ould not be an effective way o f influ­ encing im perial foreign policy. Britain was richer than Canada. Only a C anadian navy would defend the C anadian coasts. In spite o f the loss o f M onk, who had resigned from the cabinet, the governm ent had am ple votes to pass the bill. T he opposition, how ever, adopted w hat was claim ed to be a policy of obstruc­ tion and the debate w ent on for week after week. F inally the governm ent introduced closure and the bill was passed through the C om m ons in M ay. T he Senate (which still had a Liberal m ajority) took, how ever, the unusual course of defeating the bill afte r advancing argum ents already fam iliar. T he question, said the Senate m ajority, should be “subm itted to the judgm ent o f the country.” A virtual stalem ate had been reached, partly because of sin­ cere differences of opinion and partly from party m anoeuvring. T h e governm ent was unwilling to renew a debate which could only have the sam e ending as before, and equally unwilling to reverse its policy by sponsoring the L iberal plan for a C anadian navy. N ot only was no progress m ade along either o f the two paths proposed by the parties, but even the naval force already acquired was not m aintained in a state o f efficiency. T he person­ nel was allowed to dwindle and the two cruisers were tem pora­ rily o ut of commission. C anada was thus left with no naval policy and alm ost no navy. Y et the danger which had brought the issue to a head was as real as the m ost pessimistic had described it. T he G erm an navy was a fact, and the policy which had brought it into being was soon to be translated into fact in the W ar of 1914.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

Origins o f the C anadian Society (PP. 1-22) 1. F o r the influence o f N ew England o n N o v a Scotia see J. B. B rebner, N ew E n g lan d ’s O utpost: A cad ia B efore the C onquest o f C anada (N ew Y o rk , 1927), and T he N e u tra l Y ankees o f N ova S cotia: A M arg in al C olony during the R evolutionary Years (New Y o rk , 1 9 3 7 )C arleton L ib rary N o. 45; also M . L. H ansen, T he M ingling o f the C anadian a n d A m erican Peoples (N ew H aven a n d T o ro n to , 1940). 2. W . P. M . K ennedy (e d .), S tatu tes, Treaties a n d D ocum ents o f tht C anadian C o nstitution, 1 7 1 3 -1 9 2 9 (T o ro n to , 1930), p. 171. 3. M . Sm ith, A G eographical View o f the B ritish Possessions in N o rth A m erica (B altim ore, 1814), p. 51. 4. S t . Jo h n N ew B runsw icker, Ju ly 15, 1842. 5. F o r a full study o f this subject see H ansen, M ingling o f the C anadian a n d A m erican P eoples, chap. vi. 6. The G leaner (M ira m ic h i), D ec. 30, 1850. 7. La M in e n e (M o n tre a l), F eb . 6, 1853. 8. Sir R obert F alco n er, “ Scottish Influence in the H ig h er E d u cation of C an a d a " ( Proceedings an d T ransactions o f the R oyal Society of C an ad a, 1927), “ E nglish Influence on the H igher E d u catio n of C an a d a ” (ib id ., 1928), “ A m erican Influence o n the H igher E ducation o f C an a d a ” (ib id ., 1930). 9. R . M . Saunders, “ T h e C u ltu ra l D evelopm ent o f N ew F ran c e B efore 1760” (E ssay s in C anadian H isto ry , ed. by R. Flenley, T o ro n to , 1939), p. 329. 10. G eorges V attier, Essai su r la m entality canadienne-fransalse (P aris, 1928), p. 133. 11. L om e Pierce, “ E nglish C an ad ian L iteratu re ” (T h e R oyal Society of C an ad a: Fifty Y ears R etro sp ect, T o ro n to , 1932), p. 57. 12. N ew ton M acTavish, T he F in e A rts in C an a d a (T oronto, 1925), p. 9 fj. 13. O n the P ro testa n t churches see G . W . B row n, “ T he E arly M ethodist C hurch and the C an ad ian P o in t o f View” (R ep o rt o f the C anadian H isto rical A ssociation, 1938), and “ T h e F o rm ativ e P eriod o f the C an ad ian P ro testan t C h u rch es" (E ssays in C anadian H isto ry , cd. by R. F len ley ). 14. L a M inerve, M arch 30, 1848. 15. Ib id ., M ay 18, 1848. 16. L e P ay s (M o n tre a l), A p ril 12, 1856. 17. Ib id ., M arch 23, 1858. 18. M ackenzie’s W eekly M essage (T o ro n to ), O ct. 22, 1859. 19. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, Series G , vol. 148, p. 142. 20. L a M inerve, D ec. 12, 1851. 21. M ackenzie's W eekly M essage, N ov. 20, 1857. 22. B ritish C olonist (T o ro n to ), O ct. 29, 1857.

256 - A H I S T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 23. L a M inerve, Feb. 26, 1846. 24. The G leaner, M ay 6, 1850. 25. The N ovascolian (H a lifa x ), A ug. 5, 1861. 26. The P ilo t, quoted in Q uebec G azette, M arch 18, 1846. 27. B ritish C olonist, A pril 3, 1858. 28. Ib id ., A p ril 14, 1841.

CHAPTER 2

D iplom acy and W ar (pp. 23-46) 1. F o r N o v a S cotia an d C an a d a d uring the A m erican revolution see, in ter a lia , J . B. B rebner, T he N e u tra l Y ankees o f N o v a S cotia: A M arg in al C olony d uring the R evolutionary Y ears (N ew Y o rk , 1937); G . M . W rong, C an ad a a n d the A m erican R evolution: T he D isruption o f the F irs t B ritish Em pire (N ew Y o rk , 1935); Ju stin H . Sm ith, Our Struggle f o r the F o u rteen th Colony: C an a d a during the A m erican R evolution (2 vols., N ew Y o rk , 1907). 2. F u ll acco u n t o f the p eace negotiations will be found in S. F . Bemis, "C a n a d a and th e Peace S ettlem ent o f 1782-3” ( C anadian H istorical Review, X IV , Sept. 1933), an d The D iplom acy o f the A m erican R evolution (N ew Y o rk , 1935); A . L. B u rt, The U nited States, G reat B ritain a n d B ritish N o rth A m erica fro m the R evolution to the Establishm ent o f P eace a fte r the W ar o f 1 8 1 2 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940). 3. Texts o f th e ordinances a re in the R ep o rt o f the W ork o f the Public A rchives fo r the Y ears 1 9 1 4 a n d 1 9 1 5 (O ttaw a, 1916). C orrespond­ ence relating to the ordinances is in A H istory o f the O rganization, D evelopm ent an d S e n ic e s o f the M ilitary an d N a v al F o rce s of C an a d a fro m the Peace o f P a ris in 1 7 6 3 , to th e Present Tim e, edited by the H isto rical Section o f the G eneral Staff (3 vols., n.p ., n .d .). F o r the history o f the m ilitia see C. F . H am ilto n , “ T h e C anadian M ilitia” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V , 1927-8); E. J. C ham bers, T he C an ad ian M ilitia: A H isto ry o f the O rigin an d D evelopm ent of the F o rce (M o n treal, 1907); J . P. E dw ards, “T he M ilitia o f N ova Scotia, 1749-1867” ( C ollections o f the N o v a S co tia H isto rical Society, X V II, 1913); B enjam in Suite, H isto ire d e la M ilice canadienne-franCaise, 1 7 6 0 -1 8 9 7 (M o n treal, 1897). G . F . G . Stanley, C anada's Soldiers (T o ro n to , 1960) is a useful sk etch o f the whole period. 4. O f tw o recent books co n tain in g discussions o f the W ar o f 1812 that by J . W . P ra tt, E xpansionists o f 1 8 1 2 (N ew Y ork, 1925), em phasizes A m erican expansionism ; w hile A . L. B u rt, in The U nited States, G reat B ritain a n d B ritish N o rth A m erica argues th a t th e m aritim e disputes w ere th e chief causes. 5. T here is a considerable lite ra tu re o n th e W ar o f 1812. A good general acco u n t is C. P. Lucas, T he C anadian W ar o f 181 2 (O xford, 1906). A . T. M ah a n ’s classic, Sea P o w er in its R elation to the W ar of 1 8 1 2 (2 vols., B oston, 1905), in terp rets the su b ject widely. 6. F o r the negotiations an d term s o f settlem ent see B urt, T he U nited S tates, G re a t B ritain an d B ritish N o rth A m erica.

N O T E S - 257 7. F o r the la te r history o f the fisheries disputes see below , p p . 139-43. 8. G eorge W . Spragge (e d .) , The Jo h n Strachan L e tte r B ook, 1 8 1 2 -1 8 3 4 (T o ro n to , 1946), S trach an to C olonel H arv ey , F eb ., 1815. 9. T h e rep o rt o f the com m ission, w ith the exception o f a n article (52) on the vulnerable p o in ts o f the U nited States, was lithographed under the title Copy o j a R ep o rt to H is G race the D u k e o f W ellington M aste r G en eral o f H is M ajesty’s O rdnance etc. relative to H is M ajesty’s N o rth A m erican Provinces by a C om m ission o j which M . G eneral S ir Jam es C arm ichael Sm yth w as P resident, Lieut. Colonel S ir G eorge H o ste, C ap tain H a rris m em bers (1 8 2 5 ). A sum m ary o f the conclusions is in S ir Jam es C arm ichael-Sm yth’s Precis o f the W ars in C an ad a, edited by his son, Sir Jam es C arm ichael (L ondon, 1862). 10. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, Series G , vol. 109, p. 458; vol. 116, p. 139; vol. 121, p p . 210, 217, 295; vol. 122, p. 458. See also J . M. C allah an , The N eutrality o f the A m erican L ak es a n d A nglo-A m erican R elations (Jo h n s H opkins Studies in H isto rical a n d P o litical Science, Scries X V I, nos. 1-4, B altim ore, 1898). 11. Series G , vol. 122, p. 99, Stanley to M etcalfe, Sept. 16, 1845. 12. Series G , vol. 108, p. 108, F o x to P alm erston, Jan . 10, 1841. 13. Series G , vol. 110, p. 451, Stanley to Sydenham , Sept. 10, 1841. 14. A full acco u n t o f these events is in A. B. C orey, The Crisis o f 18301 8 4 2 in C anadian-A m erican R elations (N ew H aven an d T o ro n to , 1941). 15. See J . H . Latanfi, A H isto ry o f A m erican Fo reig n Policy (N ew Y ork, 1934). 16. Q uebec G azette, A pril 28, 1845. 17. M ackenzie's W eekly M essage (T o ro n to ), A pril 7, 1854. 18. L a M inerve (M o n tre a l), M ay 6, 1854. 19. Series G , vol. 122, p. 99, Stanley to M etcalfe, Sept. 16, 1845. O n the w ithdraw al o f troops see C. P. Stacey, C an a d a a n d the B ritish A rm y, 1 8 4 6 -1 8 7 1 ; A Study in the P ractice o f R esponsible G overnm ent (L on­ don, 1936; T o ro n to , re p r., 1963), and C. F . H am ilto n , “T h e C anadian M ilitia” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V I, 1928-9). 20. A . G . D oughty (e d .), The E lgin-G rey P a p e rs, 1 8 4 6 -1 8 5 2 (4 vols., O ttaw a, 1937), I, 267. 21. G . T. D enison, Soldiering in C an ad a: R ecollections a n d Experiences (T o ro n to , 1900), p. 30. 22. T he N ovascotian (H a lifa x ), Ju n e 14, 1858. 23. Series G , vol. 143, p. 200, N ew castle to Elgin, M arch 31, 1853. 24. M inutes o f the Council o f V ancouver Isla n d , 1 8 5 1 -1 8 6 1 (A rchives of B ritish C olum bia, M em oir n o.-2 ) , Ju ly 12, 1854.

CHAPTER 3

T ransition from M ercantilism (pp. 47-63) 1. L. C. A . K now les, The In d u stria l a n d C om m ercial R evolutions in G re a t B ritain during the N ineteenth C entury (L o n d o n , 1933), p. 295. 2. H . A . Innis (e d .) , Select D ocum ents in C an ad ian E conom ic H istory, 1 4 9 7 -1 7 8 3 (T o ro n to , 1929), p . 212.

258 - A H IS T O R Y O F CANADIAN E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 3. Ibid., p. 210. 4. M ary Q uayle Innis, A n E conom ic H istory o f C an a d a (T oronto, 1935); D . G . C reighton, T he C om m ercial Em pire o f th e S t. Law­ rence, 1 7 6 0 -1 8 5 0 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1937; repr., 1956); H . A. Innis, T he C o d Fisheries: The H istory o f a n In tern atio n al Econom y (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940; rev. ed., 1954); H . A . Innis, The F u r T rad e in C an ad a: A n In tro d u ctio n to C an ad ian E conom ic H istory (N ew H aven, 1930; rev. ed., 1956); A . R. M . Low er, “T h e T ra d e in Square T im ber” ( C ontributions to C anadian Econom ics, V I, 1933); D . A . M acG ibbon, T he C anadian G rain T rad e (T o ro n to , 1932); W . T. E asterb ro o k and H . G . J. A itken, C anadian E conom ic H istory (T o ro n to , 1961). 5. Innis, C od Fisheries, p. 267. 6. B. E. W alk er, A H istory o f B anking in C an a d a (T oronto, 1909), p. 41. 7. H . C. B aker, A L ecture on Life A ssurance (H am ilto n , 1848); P ro ­ spectus, an d F irst a n d Second A n n u al R ep o rts o f the C an a d a Life A ssurance C om pany (H am ilto n , 1849). 8. Jo h n M u rray, Story o f the T elegraph (M o n treal, 1905). 9. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assem bly o f N ova Scotia, 1853. 10. Jo u rn als o f the H o u se o f Assem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, 1853. 11. Tables o f T rad e and N avigation fo r 1 8 5 2 . 12. Sept. 29, 1846, quoted in the Q uebec G azette, O ct. 14. 13. Le Pays (M o n tre a l), Feb. 26, 1856. 14. T he Econom ist, quoted in L a M inerve (M o n tre a l), Sept. 24, 1846. 15. Jo u rn als o f the Legislative A ssem bly o f the Province o f C anada, 1856, appendix 28. 16. E dw ard P o rritt, Sixty Y ears o f P ro tectio n in C an ad a, 1 84 6-19 07 (L ondon, 1908), pp. 198 ff. 17. Province o f C anada, Sessional P apers, 1860, no. 38. 18. M inutes o f the Council o f V ancouver Islan d , 1 8 5 1-1861 (A rchives of British C olum bia, M em oir no. 2 ). 19. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assem bly o f N o v a Scotia, 1860. 20. C. D . A llin and G . M. Jones, A nnexation, P referen tial T rade and R eciprocity (T o ro n to , n .d .). 21. On the negotiation and term s o f the treaty see D . C. M asters, The R eciprocity Treaty of 1 8 5 4 (L ondon, 1937; rep rin ted in the C arleton L ibrary, 1963). 22. B ritish C olonist (T o ro n to ), D ec. 20, 1855. 23. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assem bly o f N ova Scotia, 1860. 24. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f A ssem bly o f N ew B runswick, 1860. 25. Jo u rn als o f the H ouse o f Assembly o f P rin ce E dw ard Islan d , 1860. 26. Province o f C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1860, no. 23. 27. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, Series G , vol. 151, pp. 92, 196. 28. Belveze’s rep o rt is prin ted in Le Pays, Sept. 2, 4, 6, 9, 1856. 29. L. P. T u rco tte, Le C an a d a sous I'union, 1 8 4 1 -1 8 6 7 (Q uebec, 1871), pp. 267-9.

N O T E S - 259 CHAPTER 4

T he P ath to C onfederation (p p . 64-81) 1. F o r (lie relations o f B ritish N o rth A m erica w ith the U nited States during the Civil W ar sec J . W . H olm es, “ B o rd er R elations between C an a d a and the U nited S tates during the A m erican Civil W ar” (un­ published m .a. thesis, U niversity o f T o ro n to , 1933); L. B. Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elations, 1 8 4 9 -1 8 7 4 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1939); M . L. H an sen , The M ingling o j the C an ad ian an d A m erican P eoples (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940; R. W . W inks, C an a d a a n d the U nited S tates in the Civil W ar Y ears (B altim ore, 1960). 2. L a M inerve (M o n tre a l), N ov. 16, 1865. 3. F o r contem porary A m erican opinion see J. P. Sm ith, T he R epublican Expansionists o f the E arly R econstruction E ra (privately pianographed, 1933). 4. C. P. Stacey, C an ad a a n d the British A rm y, 18 4 6 -1 8 7 1 : A Study in The P ractice o f R esponsible G overnm ent (L o n d o n , 1936), p. 118. T he m ilitary position during the Civil W ar is analysed in this w ork. 5. B oth re p o rts a re prin ted in Province o f C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1862, no. 17. 6. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, H ow e P ap ers, H ow e to M ulgravc, N ov. 30, 1861. 7. The M orning Freem an (S ain t J o h n ) , Ju ly 3, 1862. 8. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1867-8, n o . 63, N ew castle to M onck, A ugust 21, 1862. 9. The M orning F ree m a n , A ug. 7, 1862. 10. The C o u rier (S ain t J o h n ), A pril 12, 1862. 11. L e Pays (M o n tre a l), O ct. 11, 1864. 12. T h e second re p o rt is in Jo u rn als o f the H o u se o f Assembly o f N ova S co tia, 1865, appendix 35. 13. W hitby C hronicle, M arch 16, 1865. 14. R ep o rt o f the Com m issioners fro m British N o rth A m erica A ppointed to Inquire in to the T rade o f the W est Indies, M exico an d Brazil (O ttaw a, 1866). 15. L a M inerve, Ju n e 22, 1865. 16. Le C o u rrier d u C an a d a , Sept. 4, 1865. 17. Le Pays, M ay 18, 1865. 18. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, M acd o n ald P a p e rs, G eneral L etters, J. M cW hinnie to M acdonald, M ay 1, 1865. 19. C hester M artin , “ B ritish Policy in C anadian C o nfederation” ( C an a­ dian H isto rical Review, X III, M arch , 1932). 20. T he published debates o f the legislatures o f P rin ce E d w ard Island, N ova Scotia, N ew Brunsw ick, C an ad a, an d B ritish C olum bia have been used fo r the following passages. See also P . B. W aite, The Life an d Times o f C onfederation (T o ro n to , 1962).

260 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S CHAPTER 5

T he O utlook of the D om inion (pp. 82-95) 1. M . H an co ck , “N a tu ra liz atio n in C an a d a ” ( Papers a n d Proceedings o l (he C an ad ian Political Science A ssociation, V I, 1934). 2. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1880, p. 873. 3. H . F . A ngus (e d .) , C an a d a and H e r G re a t N eighbour (T oronto, 1938), p. 89. 4. I. C o nstantine, On the Influence o f A m erican Id eas in the Anglican C hurch in the D iocese o f M o n treal (M o n treal, 1870). 5. F o r a b rief acco u n t o f th e developm ent o f th e dispute see A . B. K eith, Responsible G overnm ent in the D om inions (3 vols., O xford, 1912), p. 1216 ff. 6. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1892, no. 81. 7. T he M ail (T o ro n to ), M ay 4, 1872. 8. L o m e Pierce, W illiam K irby: The P o rtra it o f a Tory Loyalist (T o ro n to , 1929), p. 378. 9. W hitby C hronicle, A ugust 4, 1870. 10. L ’EvSnem ent, quoted in G eorges V attier, E ssai s u r la m entality canadienne-frangaise (P aris, 1928), p. 252. 11. The G lobe (T o ro n to ), Ju ly 25 and 27, 1870. 12. Ib id ., Sept. 28, 1870. 13. B. M . C o rrig an , “ C an a d ia n C ru sad ers” (.Queen's Q uarterly, X L V II, spring, 1940). 14. The G lobe, M ay 16, 1870. 15. O. D . S kelton, L ife a n d L etters o f S ir W ilfrid L a u rier (2 vols., L ondon, 1922; rep rin ted in the C arleto n L ibrary, 1965), I , 30£f. 16. M o n tre al G azette, J a n . 5, 1870.

CHAPTER 6

A V enture in D iplom acy (p p . 96-119) 1. P ublic A rchives o f C an ad a, M acdonald P ap ers, L etter B ook 14, Private. A p ril 14, 1870. 2. L. B. Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elations, 18 4 9 -1 8 7 4 (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1939), p. 200 ff. 3. M acd o n ald P apers, L e tte r B ook 13, Private. J a n . 26, 1870. 4. See above, pp. 42-43. 5. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1869, n o . 61. C artie r and M cD ougall to G overnor G eneral, M ay 20, 1869. 6. T h e docum ents are p rin ted in C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1872, no. 26. 7. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1871, no. 12. M inutes o f C an ad ian Gov­ ernm ent, M arch 23, 1866. 8. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1871, no. 12. 9. C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1885, n o. 101a. M em o, o f Ju ly 4, 1870, by the M inister o f M arine a n d Fisheries. T h is lengthy m em o sets o u t the

N O T E S - 261 C anadian position, a n d the h isto ry o f the fisheries question from th a t p o in t o f view. 10. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1870, no. 11. 11. A U nited S tates suggestion o f F e b ru a ry , 1870. See Shippee, C anadianA m erican R elatio n s, p. 315. 12. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B o o k 14. T o G . W . B rega, A pril 4, 1870. 13. L ucien W olf, L ife o f the F irst M arq u ess o f R ipon (2 vols., London, 1921), I, 239. 14. Ibid. 15. A llan N evins, H am ilton Fish: T he In n e r H isto ry o f the G ra n t A d­ m inistration (N ew Y ork, 1936), p p . 425, 441. 16. T h e text is in C an a d a , Sessional P ap ers, 1872, no. 18. 17. C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1869, n o. 59. Privy Council R eport, June 11, 1869. 18. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1869, no. 61. C artie r and M cD ougall to G o v ern o r G en eral, M ay 20, 1869. 19. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter Book 14. M arch 11, 1870. 20. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter B ook 15. M acd o n ald to Lisgar, F eb. 4, 1871. 21. Ibid. 2 2 . T h e text is in C an a d a , Sessional P ap ers, 1872, n o. 18, p p . 5, 11. 23. N evins, H am ilto n Fish , p. 470. 24. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter B ook 15. M acd o n ald to T u p p er, M arch 21, 1871. 25. F o r detailed accounts o f th e conference see N evins, H am ilton Fish, c hap. xx; Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elatio n s, chap. xv; G oldw in Sm ith, T he T reaty o f W ashington, 1 8 7 1 : A Study in Im p erial H istory (Ith a c a , 1941); D o n ald C reighton, Jo h n A . M acdonald: T he Old C hieftain (T o ro n to , 1955). 26. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L e tte r B o o k 15. M acd o n ald to T u p p er, A p ril 1, 1871. 27. Q uoted in Sm ith, T reaty o f W ashington, p. 70. 28. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L etter B ook 15. M acdonald to Tupper, M arch 21, 1871. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ib id . M acdonald to T u p p er, M arch 29, 1871. 32. T h e aw ard, dated O ctober 21, 1872, w as in fav o u r o f the U nited S tates’ claim. 33. T his a rran g em en t led to the H alifax Com m ission. See below , pp. 139-40. 33a. T h e text o f th e tre a ty is in T reaties a n d A greem ents A ffecting C an a d a in F o rc e Between H is M ajesty an d the U nited S tates of A m erica, with Subsidiary D ocu m en ts, 1 8 1 4 -1 9 2 5 (O ttaw a, 1927). 34. N evins, H am ilto n Fish , p. 490. 35. M acd o n ald P a p e rs, L e tte r B o o k 17. M acd o n ald to Lisgar, J a n . 22, 1872. 36. Shippee, C anadian-A m erican R elations, p . 399. 37. T he G lobe (T o ro n to ), A p ril 18, 1870. 38. Ib id ., A pril 25, 1870. 39. Ib id ., M ay 26, 1870. 40. Q uoted in W hitby C hronicle, Ju n e 9, 1870. 41. B arrie E x am in er, Jan . 21, 1869.

262 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

The G lobe, M arch 25, 1870. L eader (T o ro n to ), Jan . 1, 1870. M acdonald P ap ers, L etter B ook 15. A pril 21, 1871. The G lobe, M ay 19, 1871. W hitby C hronicle, Ju n e 1, 1871. L ead er, M ay 13, 1871. Q uoted in Sm ith, T reaty o f W ashington, p. 140. Q uoted in W hitby C hronicle, Ju n e 8, 1871. C anada, H o u se o j C om m ons D ebates, 1872, pp. 21, 24. Ib id ., pp. 294-345, 346 ff., 431 ff. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B ook 18. Sept. 2, 1872.

CHAPTER 7

T rade, Fisheries, and D iplom acy (pp. 120-144) 1. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1875, no. 51. Privy Council R ep o rt, M arch 26. 2. Public A rchives o f C an ad a, A lexander M ackenzie L e tte r B ooks, III. M ackenzie to D ufferin, F eb . 24, 1874. 3. M ackenzie L etter B ooks, II. M em o, by M ackenzie, M arch 9, 1874. 4. M ackenzie L e tte r B ooks, III. M ackenzie to B row n, M arch 28, 1874. 5. T h e text is printed, together w ith som e official correspondence, in C orrespondence R elating to the N egotiations fo r a R eciprocity Treaty (C m d. 1060, 1874; N o rth A m erica, no. 4 ) . 6. Som e o f his letters fro m W ashington a re in A lexander M ackenzie, The Life an d Speeches o f H o n . G eorge Brow n (T o ro n to , 1882), p. 212 ff. See also D ale C. T hom son, A lex an d er M ackenzie, C lear G rit (T o ro n to , 1960). 7. T h e text is in C orrespondence R elating to N egotiations fo r a Reci­ procity T reaty. 8. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1876, p. 65. 9. Ib id ., p. 129. 10. Ib id ., p. 253. 11. Jo u rn als o f the H o u se o f C om m ons o f the D om inion o f C anada, 1874, appendix 3. 12. S. D . C lark , The C anadian M an u factu rers’ A ssociation: A Study in C ollective B argaining an d P o litical P ressu re (U niversity o f T oronto Studies, H isto ry and E conom ics Series, vol. V II, T o ro n to , 1939), p. 6. 13. C an ad a, D ebates o f the Senate, 1877, p. 248. 14. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1877, p. 165. 15. Ib id ., 1878, p. 854. 16. W . A . M ackintosh, The E conom ic B ackground o f D om inionProvincial R elations (R ep o rt o f the R oyal C om m ission on Dom inionProvincial R elations, 1939, A ppendix 3 ); reprinted in the C arleton Library (1 9 6 4 ), p. 30. 17. C an ad a Y ear B ook, 1939, p. 507. 18. Ib id ., p. 506. 19. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1884, no. 67.

N O T E S - 263 20. F o r th e correspondence concerning treaties w ith Serbia, R oum ania, E cu ad o r, M orocco, E gypt, an d M ontenegro, see C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1883, n o. 89. 21. C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1880, no. 104. 22. Public A rchives o f C anada, M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ Sir A lexander G a lt.” G a lt to M acdonald, D ec. 18, 1878. 23. Ib id ., Dec. 20, 1878. 24. Ib id ., Jan . 1, 1879. 25. Ib id ., Jan . 20, 1879. 26. M. H . Long, “ S ir Jo h n R ose and the In fo rm al Beginnings of the C anadian H igh C om m issioncrship” ( C an ad ian H isto rical Review, X II, M arch , 1931). 27. C anada, Sessional P apers, 1880, no. 105. 28. E .g., by A lexander C am pbell in C an ad a, D ebates o f the Senate, 1874, p. 17. 29. E nclosed in M acd o n ald P a p e rs, “ S ir A lexander G alt.” G a lt to M ac ­ d onald, M arch 11, 1880. Confidential. 30. O . D . Skelton, The L ife an d Times o f S ir A lexander Tilloch G alt (T o ro n to , 1920); rep rin ted in the C arleton Library (1966), p. 271. 31. C an ad a, H ouse o f C om m ons D ebates, 1891, p. 575. 32. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B ook 27. A ug. 15, 1890. W hen m inutes w ere sen t to the colonial secretary, copies w ere forw arded to the high com m issioner. 33.M a c d o n a ld P a p e rs, “ Sir C harles T u p p e r.” T u p p e r to M acdonald, O ct. 31, 1883. 34. Ib id ., T u p p e r to M acdonald, Sept. 11, 1884. 35. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1882, p. 1068 ff. 36. T he text is in B ritish a n d F oreign State P a p e rs, L X X X V , 28. 37. Skelton, S ir A lex an d er Tilloch G alt (1920 e d itio n ), p. 512. 38. F o r the docum ents o n this question see th e B ritish C orrespondence R elative to the N o rth A m erican Fisheries, 1 8 8 4 -1 8 8 6 (U n ited States, n o . 1, 1887); F u rth e r C orrespondence R especting N o rth A m erican Fisheries, 1 8 8 6 -1 8 8 7 (U n ited States, no. 2, 1887); C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1887, no. 16. A full acco u n t o f th e negotiations, from the point o f view o f the A m erican governm ent, is in C. C. T ansill, The Fo reig n Policy o f T hom as F . B ay ard , 1 8 8 5 -1 8 9 7 (N ew Y o rk , 1940). 39. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1888, no. 36C. 40. Ib id ., E. J . Phelps to Salisbury, J a n . 26, 1887. 41. L. B. Shippee, T hom as F ran cis B ayard ( “T h e A m erican Secretaries o f State an d T h eir D iplom acy,” ed. by S. F . Bcm is, V III, N ew Y ork, 1927-8). 42. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1888, no. 36C. 43. M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter Book 24. M acd o n ald to L ansdow ne, Sept. 24, 1887. 44. M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ W ashington T reaty , 1888,” vol. V II. T u p p er to M acdonald, N ov. 24, 1887. 45. E . M . Sau n d ers (e d .) , T he Life a n d L e tte rs o f the R t. H o n . S ir C harles T u p p er (2 vols., L o n d o n , 1916), II, 101. 46. Ib id ., p. 109. 47. M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ W ashington T reaty , 1888,” vol. V II. T u p p er to M acdonald, F eb . 10, 1888. 48. M em orandum by G . E . F o ste r, 1888. Q uoted in P. E. C orbett, The

264 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S S ettlem ent o f C anadian-A m erican D isputes: A C ritical Study of M ethods a n d R esults (N ew H av en a n d T o ro n to , 1937), p. 43. 49. C an ad a, Sessional P a p e rs, 1887, no. 48. 50. M acd o n ald P apers, “ B ering Sea,” vol. I. C. H . T u p p er to M acdonald, F eb . 26, 1890. 51. Ib id ., M arch 3 and 10, 1890. 52. Ib id ., A pril 11, 1890. 53. C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1908, n o . 144. 54. M any aspects o f the relations o f C an a d a an d the U n ited K ingdom a re discussed in D . M . L. F a rr, The C olonial Office a n d C anada, 18 6 7 -1 8 8 7 (T o ro n to , 1955).

CHAPTER 8

C anada, the Em pire, and the U nited States (pp. 145-169) 1. F o r a n analysis o f the n a tu re and the literatu re o f B ritish im perial interests o f this period see \V. L. Langer, D iplom acy o f Im perialism , 1 8 9 0 -1 9 0 2 (2 vols., N ew Y o rk , 1935), I, ch ap . in. 2. J. S. W illison, S ir IVilfrid L au rier a n d the L ib eral P arty : A Political H isto ry (2 vols., T o ro n to , 1903), II, 120. See in general R. C. Brow n, C an a d a ’s N a tio n a l Policy, 1 8 8 3 -1 9 0 0 : A S tudy in C anadian-A m erican R elations (P rin ceto n , 1964). 3. T he G lobe (T o ro n to ), M arch 2, 1887. 4. Ib id ., A pril 5, 1887. 5. M an ito b a F ree P ress, Sept. 5, 1887. 6. Jam es Y oung, O ur N a tio n a l F u tu re (T o ro n to , 1888). 7. W illison, S ir IVilfrid L a u rier, I I , 141. 8. Ib id ., II, 138. 9. See above, pp. 141-42. 10. P ublic A rchives o f C an ad a, M acd o n ald P ap ers, L etter B o ok 24. M acdonald to T up p er, Jan . 15, 1888. 11. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1888, p . 144 ff. 12. The G lobe, A pril 18, 1887. 13. M an ito b a F re e P ress, O ct. 27, 1887. 14. M orning H e ra ld (H a lifa x ), Jan . 27, 1885. 15. Evening M ail (H a lifa x ), O ct. 22 and N ov. 12, 1885. 16. M orning H e ra ld , J a n . 20 a n d M ay 1, 1885. 17. R epresentative opinions m ay be found as follow s: p r o - G . T . D eni­ son, T he Struggle fo r Im p erial U nity: R ecollections a n d Experiences (L o n d o n , 1909); G . R . P a rk in , Im p erial F ed eratio n (L o n d o n , 1892); G . M . G ra n t, Im p erial Fed eratio n (W innipeg, 1890). c o n t r a - G old­ w in Sm ith, C an ad a an d the C anadian Q uestion (L ondon an d T oronto, 1891); and w ritings o f J . S. E w art a n d H en ri B ourassa. p r o an d CON - S. C. C heng, Schem es fo r th e F ed eratio n o f the B ritish Em pire (N ew Y o rk , 1931). 18. D enison, Struggle fo r Im p erial U nity, p p . 79, 85. 19. C anada, D eb ates o f the S en ate, 1890, p. 256 ff. 20. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1888, p. 1069 ff.

N O T ES - 265 The G lobe, Jan . 23, 1885. T he M ail (T o ro n to ), M arch 15, 22, A pril 6, 1887. M an ito b a F ree P ress, Jan . 16, 23, F eb . 3, 1887. Ib id ., Feb. 3, 1887. M orning H e ra ld , M ay 12, 1885. Evening M ail, Ju n e 11, Sept. 22, 1887. J. L. G arvin, The L ife o j Jo sep h C ham berlain (3 vols., London, 1934), III, 179. 28. W illison, S ir W ilfrid L au rier, I I , 287. 29. G . W . Ross, P referen tial T rade with G re a t B ritain an d R eciprocity with the U nited States (T o ro n to , 1897). 30. F o r a detailed study o f the conferences fro m 1887 to 1907 see R ichard Jeb b , T he Im p erial Conference: A H isto ry an d S tudy (2 vols., L ondon, 1911). 31. Proceedings o f a C onference betw een the Secretary o f S ta te fo r the C olonies a n d the P rem iers o f the Self-governing C olonies a t the C olonial Office, L on d o n , Ju n e an d Ju ly 1 8 9 7 (C d. 8596). 32. See below, ch ap ters 10 and 11. 33. F o r an acco u n t o f this m ovem ent, see H e n ri B ourassa, Q ue devonsnou s cl /’ A ngleterre? (M o n treal, 1915). 34. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1902, pp. 108-9. 35. P ap ers R elating to a C onference betw een the Secretary o f S ta te for the Colonies a n d the P rim e M inisters o f Self-governing C olonies; Ju n e to A ugust, 1 9 0 2 (C d . 1299). 36. F o r fu rth er C an ad ian com m ents see C anadian A n n u a l Review, 1903, p. 306 IJ.-, 1904, p. 390 ff.; 1905, p. 448 ff. 37. E d w ard P o rritt, Sixty Years o f P ro tectio n in C an ad a, 1 8 4 6-190 7 (L o n d o n , 1908). 38. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1903, p. 382. 39. F o r an analysis o f the A m erican position, as well as o th er aspects of the subject, see L. E . E llis, R eciprocity, 1 9 1 1 (N ew H aven and T oro n to , 1939). 40. T h e trip is described w ith docum ents in E d w ard P o rritt, T he R evolt in C an ad a ag ain st the N ew Feudalism : Tariff H istory from the R evi­ sion o f 1 9 0 7 to th e U prising o f the W est in 1 9 1 0 (L o n d o n , 1911), c hap. xii. 41. See below, p. 252. 42. Full analyses o f public opinion and the p arliam en tary debates a rc in the C anadian A n n u a l R eview , 1911, and in E llis, R eciprocity, 1 9 1 1 . 43. H enry B orden (e d .) , R o b ert L a ird B orden: H is M em oirs (2 vol3., T o ro n to , 1938), I, 327.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

CHAPTER 9

Effects o f E xternal Forces on the C anadian C om m unity (pp. 170-198) 1. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1871, n o. 54. 2. See above, p . 112. 3. C an ad a. Sessional P a p e rs, 1876, III.

266 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 4. Ib id ., and C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1879, n o. 64. 5. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1892, no. 99. 6. J. M. C allah an , A m erican Foreign Policy in C an ad ian R elations (N ew Y o rk , 1937), p. 423 ff. 7. G . P. deT. G lazebrook, A H istory o j T ran sp o rtatio n in C an a d a (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1938), and rep rin ted in the C arleton L ib rary in tw o volum es (1 9 64), II, 108 ff. 8. A detailed study o f this developm ent is in W . J. W ilgus, T he Railway In terrelatio n s o j th e U nited S tates a n d C an a d a (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1937). 9. See, fo r exam ple, C allah an , A m erican F oreign Policy, p. 394 ff. 10. F o r the history o f ocean shipping in relatio n to C an a d a see A dam S h o rtt and A . G . D oughty (e d s .), C an a d a an d Its Provinces (23 vols., T o ro n to , 1914), X , 589 ff. 11. N o rm a C laire T ay lo r, “T h e E conom ic D evelopm ent o f C anada’s M erch an t M arine” (u npublished m .a . thesis, U niversity o f T oronto, 1924, p. 25. 12. H . L. D ray to n , O cean F reight R ates (D e p a rtm e n t o f T rad e and C om m erce, O ttaw a, 1913). 13. F o r a n o u tlin e of the history o f the C an ad ian po st office since 1867, see S h o rtt and D oughty (e d s .), C an ad a a n d its Provinces, V II. 14. H . M arshall, F . A . S o u th ard , and K . W . T aylor, C anadian-A m erican In d u stry : A Study in In tern atio n al Investm ent (N ew H av en and T o ro n to , 1936), p. 125. 15. L. J . B urpee, Sand/ord Flem ing, Em pire B uilder (L o n d on and T o ro n to , 1915), p. 154 ff. 16. R oland W ilson, “ M igration M ovem ents in C anada, 1868-1925” ( C anadian H isto rical R eview , X III, Ju n e 1932). C f. A . R. M . Low er, “ T h e G ro w th o f C an a d a ’s P opulation in R ecent Y ears” ( C anadian H isto rical Review , X III, D ecem ber 1932). 17. W . A . C arro th ers, E m ig ratio n fro m the B ritish Isles, w ith Special R eference to the D evelopm ent o j the Overseas D om inions (L ondon, 1929), p. 253. 18. S. C . Jo h n so n , A H isto ry o f E m igration fro m the U nited K ingdom to N o rth A m erica, 1 7 6 3 -1 9 1 2 (L o n d o n , 1913), p. 80 ff. 19. J. W . D afoe, Clifford S ifton in R elation to H is Tim es (T oronto, 1931), p. 137 ff. 20. F o r th e relatio n o f railw ays to settlem ent see W . A . M ackintosh, P rairie Settlem ent: T he G eographical S etting (T o ro n to , 1934), chap. in .

21. F o r the principles an d practice o f land g ran ts see C h ester M artin, "D o m in io n L a n d s" Policy (T o ro n to , 1938). 22. F o r a detailed study see J . B. H edges, B uilding the C anadian West: The L and a n d C olonization Policies o f the C anadian Pacific Railway (N ew Y o rk , 1939). 23. D afoe, Clifford Sifton, p. 141. 24. L. G . R eynolds, T he B ritish Im m igrant: H is Social an d Econom ic A djustm ent in C an ad a (T o ro n to , 1935). 25. A . G . S treet, F a rm e r's G lory (L o n d o n , 1932). 26. C arro th ers, Em igration fro m the B ritish Isles, p. 247. 27. C. H . Y oung, The U krainian C anadians: A S tudy in A ssim ilation (T o ro n to , 1931), p. 76. 28. A . M aude, A Pecu liar People: T he D o u k h o b o rs (N ew Y o rk , 1904), p. 232.

N O T E S - 267 29. A full acco u n t o f the D o u k h o b o rs is in J . F . C. W right, Slava B ohu: T he Story o f the D o u k h o b o rs (N ew Y o rk , 1940). 30. R. E ngland, The C olonization o f W estern C an ad a: A Study o f C on­ tem porary L an d Settlem ent, 1 8 9 6 -1 9 3 4 (L o n d o n , 1936), p. 232 ff. 31. E. H . O liver, “ T he S ettlem ent o f Saskatchew an to 1914” ( Proceed­ ings an d T ransactions o f th e R oyal Society o f C an ad a, 1926). 32. F o r detailed studies o f the whole question o f o rien tal im m igration and its results see Cheng T ien-fang, O riental Im m igration in C anada (S hanghai, 1931), and C. J . W oodsw orth, C an ad a an d the O rient: A Study in In te rn a tio n a l R elations (T o ro n to , 1941). T he Japanese C an ad ian s by C. H . Y oung, H . R. Y. R eid, and W . A . C arrothers (T o ro n to , 1938) is m ore concerned with stan d a rd s o f living. 33. R ep o rt o f R oyal C om m ission A pp o in ted to Investigate th e M ethod by which O riental L abourers H av e Been In tro d u ced into C anada, 1908. Q uoted in Cheng T ien-fang, O rien tal Im m igration in C anada, p. 73. 34. Cheng T ien-fang, O riental Im m igration in C an ad a, p. 142 ff. 35. M . L. H ansen, The M ingling o f the C anadian a n d A m erican Peoples (N ew H aven and T o ro n to , 1940), p. 168. 36. A. R. Foley “ F rench-C anadian C ontacts w ith N ew England” (.Con­ ference on E ducation Problem s in C anadian-A m erican R elations, ed. by R. L. M orrow , O rono, M aine, 1939). 37. E. H am on, Les C anadiens-frangais de la N ouvelle A ngleterre (Q ue­ bec, 1891), p. 11. 38 . G . T. P rio r, “ T he F ren ch C an ad ian s in N ew E n g lan d ” (unpublished m .a . thesis, Brow n U niversity, 1932 ) , p. 67 . Cf. H am o n , Les C anadiens-frangais, p. 89 , w ho gives 120 churches o r chapels. 39. A ddlard D esrosiers and P. A . F o u rn et, L a R ace frangaise en A m iriquc (M o n treal, 1911), p. 23. 40. Ib id ., p. 35. 41. H am on, Les C anadiens-frangais, p. 108. 42. D . M . A . M agnan, H istoire de la race frangaise aux E tats-U nis (P aris, 1912), p. 290 ff. 43. F ro m Seventh Census o f C an a d a , 1931, I, 710. C om plete figures will be found there, divided into ru ral and urban. 44. C anadian A n n u a l Review , 1906, p. 294. 45. F o r the history o f lab o u r organization in C an a d a see R. H . C oats, “ L ab o u r M ovem ent in C an a d a ” (S h o rtt and D oughty [eds.], C an ad a a n d its Provinces, I X ) ; H . A . Logan, The H istory o f TradeV nion O rganization in C an ad a (C hicago, 1928); N orm an J. W are and H . A . Logan, L ab o r in C anadian-A m erican R elations (T o ro n to , 1937); and H . A . Innis, " L a b o u r” (E ncyclopedia o f C an ad a, ed. by W . S. W allace, T o ro n to , 1936). 46. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1909, p. 297 ff. 47. Ib id ., 1906, p. 303. 48. Ib id ., 1907, p. 283. 49. F o r the history o f the G ran g e in C an ad a see L. A . W o od, A H istory of F arm ers' M ovem ents in C an a d a (T o ro n to , 1924). 50. R o b ert C halm ers, A H isto ry o f C urrency in the B ritish Colonies (L o n d o n , 1893). 51. Jac o b V iner, C an ad a's B alance o f In tern atio n al Indebtedness, 190019 1 3 (C am bridge, M ass., 1924), p. 139. 52. F o r a full acco u n t see M arshall, S outhard, and T aylor, C anadianA m erican In d u stry .

268 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S CHAPTER 1 0

T he C onduct of H igh Policy: Subjects and M ethods (pp. 199-223) 1. Parliam en tary D eb ates o n the Subject o f the C onfederation of the B ritish N o rth A m erican Provinces (Q uebec, 1865), p. 108. 2. In Section II o f this ch ap ter. 3. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1909, p. 1978. 4. See above, p. 131#. 5. C an ad ian s paid fees for w o rk done by B ritish consuls w hich a t least equalled th e c o st o f the service. T h e first C an ad ian consuls were app o in ted in 1940. 6. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1910, no. 29B. 7. T his p rocedure was la te r changed, leaving only form al action to the B ritish governm ent. See Sum m ary o f Proceedings, Im p erial C onfer­ ence o f 1926, p. 26. 8. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1910, no. 10G. 9. C anadian A n n u al Review, 1910, p. 619. 10. A. G . Dewey, The D om inions an d D iplom acy: The C anadian C on­ tribution (2 vols., L o n d o n and T o ro n to , 1929), I I , 291. 11. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1909-10, p. 853. 12. Ib id ., 1910-11, p. 953. 13. Sir R o b ert L aird B orden, C anadian C onstitu tio n al Studies (T oronto, 1922), p. 128. 14. H . D . H a ll, T he B ritish C om m onw ealth o f N ations: A Study o f its P a st an d F u tu re D evelopm ent (L o n d o n , 1920), p. 96. 15. O f a considerable literatu re on the subject, S. C. C heng, Schem es for the F e d e ra tio n o f the B ritish Em pire (N ew Y o rk , 1931) contains the m ost com prehensive analysis o f all the schem es, and o f the argum ents fo r an d ag ain st them. 16. M inutes o f P roceedings o f the C olonial C onference, 1 9 0 7 (C d . 3523), p. 24 ff. 17. F o r the history o f the com m ission a n d studies o f its organization and op eratio n see C . J . C h ack o , The In tern atio n al Jo in t C om m ission be­ tw een th e U nited S tates o f A m erica an d the D om inion o f C anada (N ew Y o rk , 1932); P a p e rs R elating to the W o rk o f the In ternational Jo in t C om m ission (O ttaw a, 1929); and J . M . C allah an , A m erican Foreign Policy in C anadian R elations (N ew Y o rk , 1937), p. 499 ff. 18. R. A . M acK ay, “ T h e In tern atio n al J o in t C om m ission betw een the U nited States and C an a d a ” ( P ap ers R elating to the W o rk o f the In tern atio n al J o in t C om m ission, O ttaw a, 1929). 19. C anadian A nnual Review , 1903, pp. 388-89. 20. Ib id ., 1905, p. 487 ff. 21. C an a d a , Sessional P a p e rs, 1892, no. 37. 22. J . W . D afoe, Clifford Sifton in R elatio n to H is Tim es (T oronto, 1931), p. 217. 23. C an ad a, Sessional P apers, 1904, no. 46A. 24. See, fo r exam ple, II. L. K eenleyside, C an a d a a n d the U nited States: Som e A spects o f the H istory o f the R epublic a n d the D om inion (N ew Y o rk , 1929), p. 210 ff.\ C allahan, A m erican F oreign Policy in C ana­ d ia n R elations, chap. XIX; L . M . G elber, The Rise o f A nglo-A m erican

N O T E S - 269 Frien d sh ip (L o n d o n and T o ro n to , 1938), chap. vii; D afoe, Clifford Slfton, c h ap . v m ; P. C. Jessu p , E lih u R o o t (2 vols., N ew Y ork, 1938), I I , chap. x ix ; O. D . Skelton, Life a n d L etters o f S ir W ilfrid L a u rier (2 vols., T o ro n to , 1921); rep rin ted in the C arleto n Library (1 9 65), I I , 57 ff. 25. Q uoted in D afo e, Clifford Sifton, p. 236. 26. Printed, w ith th e aw ard, in C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1904, n o. 46A. 27. C an ad ian A n n u a l Review , 1903, p. 365 ff. 28. Q uoted in Skelton, L ife a n d L e tte rs o f L a u rier (C arleto n L ibrary, 1965), I I , 66. 29. C anadian A n n u al Review , 1903, p. 366. 30. See above, p p . 183-85. 31. C .-F. C hang, The A nglo-Japanese A lliance (B altim ore, 1931), p. 86. 32. C an ad ian A n n u a l Review , 1905, p. 421. 33. G . P. G ooch a n d H aro ld Tem perley (e d s .), B ritish D ocum ents on the O rigins o f the W ar, 1 8 9 8 -1 9 1 4 (11 vols., L o n d o n , 1927-1938), V I, 789. 34. Ib id ., V I, 525.

C H A PTE R 11

D efence (pp. 224-253) 1. G . P. G ooch and H aro ld Tem perley (e d s .), B ritish D ocum ents on the O rigins o f the W ar, 1 8 9 8 -1 9 1 4 , V I, 781 2. C. F . H am ilto n , “T h e C an ad ian M ilitia: T h e D e ad P eriod” ( C ana­ dian D efence Q uarterly, V II, 1929-30). 3. H am ilto n , “ T h e C an ad ian M ilitia: T h e Beginning o f R eform ” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V II, 1929-30). 4. Q uoted in C anadian A n n u al Review , 1902, p. 193. 5. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D ebates, 1900, p. 323. 6. T h e E a rl o f D u n donald, M y A rm y Life (L o n d o n , 1926). 7. F o r D u n d o n ald ’s case see M y A rm y L ife, chap. xxvi; fo r the gov­ ernm ent’s see O . D . Skelton Life an d L etters o f S ir W ilfrid L aurier (C arleto n L ibrary, 1965), II, 83. O n this p o in t an d in general see R ich ard A . P reston, C an a d a a n d "Im p eria l D efen ce" (T o ronto, 1967). 8. F o r a sum m ary o f this process see C. P . Stacey, The M ilitary P ro b ­ lem s o f C an ad a: A Survey o f D efence Policies a n d Strategic C ondi­ tio n s P a s t an d Present (T o ro n to , 1940), appendix B. 9. C an ad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1904, p. 205 ff. 10. “T h e C an ad ian M ilitia: T h e C hange in O rganization” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V III, 1930-1, p. 97). 11. C an ad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1905, n o . 130. 12. Ib id ., 1911, no. 35. 13. Ib id . 15. Ib id ., no. 35B. 14. Ib id ., no. 35A. 16. S ir C harles L ucas, The E m p ire a t W ar (L o n d o n and T o ro n to , 1921), I, 235-39.

270 - A H IS T O R Y O F CAN ADIA N E X T E R N A L R E L A T IO N S 17. C an a d a , Sessional P ap ers, 1875, n o . 64. 18. Ib id ., 1890, no. 59G. 19. N o m ention o f this a p p ea rs in the re p o rt o f the conference, b u t in a Privy C ouncil rep o rt o f J a n . 20, 1905, it is said to h av e been “ stated verbally” (.C anada, Sessional P ap ers, 1905, no. 128). 20. Ibid. 21. F o r a sum m ary o f opinion in p arliam en t an d th e press see C anadian A n n u al Review , 1905, p. 461 ff. 22. R ichard Jeb b , T he Im p e rial C onference: A H isto ry a n d Study (2 vols., L ondon, 1911), I, 8. 23. Ib id ., p. 19. 24. Ib id ., p. 55. 25. Proceedings o f a C onference Between the Secretary o f State fo r the C olonies a n d the P rem iers o f the Self-governing C olonies, 1 8 9 7 . (Cd. 8596, 1897). 26. C anadian A n n u al Review, 1902, p. 106. 27. Ib id ., p. 107. 28. Papers R elatin g to a C onference Between the Secretary o f State fo r the C olonies an d the Prim e M inisters o f Self-governing C olonies, 1 9 0 2 . (C d . 1299, 1902). 29. M inutes o f Proceedings o f the. C olonial C onference, 1 9 0 7 . (C d. 3523, 1907). A verbatim reco rd o f th e discussions. 30. “ T he C an ad ian M ilitia: Im p erial O rganization” ( C anadian D efence Q uarterly, V III, 1930-1, p. 2 4 4 ). 31. C orrespondence R elating o t the P roposed Fo rm atio n o f a n Im perial G eneral Staff. (C d. 4475, 1909.) 32. C orrespondence a n d P a p e rs R elating to a C onference w ith R epre­ sentatives o f the Self-governing D om inions on the N av al an d M ilitary D efence o f the E m pire, 1 9 0 9 . (C d . 4948, 1909.) 33. Papers L aid B efore th e Im p erial C onference: N av al a n d M ilitary D efence. (C d. 5746-2, 1911.) 34. Sir Ia n H am ilton inspected the C an ad ian m ilitia in 1913. See above, p. 234. 35. M inutes o f Proceedings o f the Im p erial C onference, 1 9 1 1 . (C d. 5745, 1911.) 36. See, e.g., R ichard Jeb b , T he B ritannic Q uestion: A Survey o f A lter­ natives (L o n d o n , N ew Y o rk , 1913), p. 43 ff.-, A . G . Dewey, The D om inions an d D iplom acy: T he C anadian C ontribution (2 vols., L ondon and T o ro n to , 1929), I, 294 ff. 37. T o ro n to M ail, M ay 7, 1878. 38. P ublic A rchives o f C an a d a , M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ D efence,” vol. II. Privy C ouncil R eport, M ay 4, 1878. 39. Ib id ., A dm iralty to C olonial Office, Ju n e 10, 1878. 40. Ib id ., Privy Council R ep o rt, M ay 22, 1878. 41. C an ad a, D ebates o f th e S en ate, 1883, p. 118 ff. 42. Saint Jo h n T elegraph, M ay 7, 1885. 43. C. P. Stacey, R ecords o f the N ile V oyageurs 1 8 8 4 -1 8 8 5 (T oronto, 1959). 44. M acd o n ald P ap ers, “ S ir C harles T u p p e r.” T u p p er to M acdonald, F eb . 27, 1885. 45. T he W eek (T o ro n to ), F e b . 19, 1885. 46. F eb ru ary and M arch , 1885. 47. M an ito b a F ree P ress, O ct. 24, 1885.

N O T E S - 271 48. S ir Jo h n W illison, R em iniscences, P o litical a n d P erso n al (T o ro n to , 1919), p. 303. 49. C anad a, Sessional P ap ers, 1900, n o. 20. 50. Ib id ., no. 49. 51. H am ilto n , “ T h e C an ad ian M ilitia : T h e S outh A frican W ar” ( C an a­ dian D efence Q uarterly, V II, 1929-30, p p. 537-42). 52. F o r a n acco u n t o f the C an ad ian forces in the w ar see W . S. Evans, T he C anadian C ontingents a n d C an ad ian Im perialism : A S to ry a n d a S tudy (L ondon, 1901). 53. C anad a, H o u se o f C om m ons D eb ates, 1900, p . 6625; 1901, p. 1290. 54. Ib id ., 1902, p. 3316. 55. T h e m ost com plete and w ell-docum ented acco u n t o f the naval ques­ tion in the perio d 1909-1914 is in G . N . T u ck er, T he N av al Service of C an a d a (2 vols., O ttaw a, 1952) I, chaps. 6-9. F o r public a n d p a rlia ­ m entary opinion see the C an ad ian A n n u al Review . F o r contem porary com m ent see also the R ound T ab le, vols. 1-4. T h e positions o f the successive prim e m inisters a re outlined in S kelton, Life a n d L etters o f L au rier an d the B orden M em oirs. 56. F o r the correspondence see C orrespondence an d P ap ers R elating to the C onference with R epresentatives o f the Self-governing D om inions on th e N a v al a n d M ilitary D efence o f the E m pire, 1 9 0 9 . (C d . 4948, 1909.) 57. See P ap ers laid B efore the Im p e rial C onference: N a v al an d M ilitary D efence (C d. 5746-2, 1911).

N O TE ON T H E A U TH O R

A distinguished historian and public servant, G . P. deT. G lazebrook was born in London, O ntario, in 1899. E ducated at the U niversity of T oronto and a t O xford, he joined the D epart­ m ent o f H istory a t the U niversity of T oronto in 1924. D uring the Second W orld W ar he served as a Special A ssistant in the D epartm ent of E xternal Affairs, rejoining the U niversity of T o ronto faculty in 1946. A fter three years’ ser­ vice at the U niversity he returned to O ttaw a to re-enter the D epartm ent o f E xternal Affairs. F ro m 1953 to 1956 he was M inister in the C anadian Em bassy a t W ashington and later becam e an A ssistant U nder-Secretary of State for External Affairs. H e retired from the D epart­ m ent in 1963, to resum e lecturing and w riting at the U niversity o f T oronto. M r. G lazebrook has w ritten m any books on C anadian political and econom ic history. They include Sir Charles Bagot in Canada (1 9 2 9 ); A H istory o j Transportation in Canada (1 9 3 8 ); A H istory o f Canadian E xternal R elations (1 9 5 0 ); A Short H istory o f Canada (1 9 5 0 ); A H istory o f Canadian Political T hought (1 9 6 6 ); and L ife in Ontario: a Social H istory (1 9 6 8 ).

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27.

A HISTORY O F CANADIAN EX TERN A L R EL A T IO N S, V o lu m e I,

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A HISTORY O F CANADIAN EX TERN A L R EL A T IO N S, V o lu m e

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compiled and with an Introduction by John S. Moir W E ST E R N ONTARIO a n d t h e a m e r i c a n f r o n t i e r by Fred Landon, with a new Introduction by the author

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HISTORICAL ESSAYS O N T H E A TLANTIC PRO V IN CES,

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a H ISTORY o f j o u r n a l i s m

3 9 . g r o w t h a n d t h e C a n a d ia n e c o n o m y ,

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T H E CANADIAN M U N IC IP A L S Y S T E M : ESSAYS O N T H E IM P R O V E M E N T O F LOCAL G O V E R N M E N T b y D. C. Rowat

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by John W. Holmes 51.

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1945-1954, edited and with an

,

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p r a ir ie p r o v in c e s ,

the

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T H E CANADIAN E C O N O M Y IN T H E GREAT D EPR ESSIO N

Safarian CANADA’S CHANGING

no rth

,

William C. Wonders

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THE

5 8 . C U L T U R E AND N A T IO N A LITY : ESSAYS BY A. G. BAILEY,

by Alfred Goldsworthy Bailey 59.

c o m m u n it y p e c t iv e ,

by

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Richard Jones, with a new Introduction

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