A History of Brunei [2 ed.] 070071698X, 9780700716982

Table of contents :
Cover
About the Author
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
Figure
Maps
Plates
Abbreviations
Introduction
Part I From Earliest Times to the Creation of the Sultanate
1 The Earliest Kingdoms
2 Pre-Islamic Brunei
Part II The Rise and Decline of the Brunei Thalassocracy
3 The Early Muslim Sultanate to c.1550
4 A Century of Conflict, c. 1550–c. 1650
5 Stagnation and Decline, c.1650–c.1770
Part III Brunei, the British, and the Brookes, c.1770–1906
6 The Struggle for Survival, c.1770–1870
7 Almost Terminal Decline, 1870–1906
Part IV The Residency, 1906–1959
8 Brunei Preserved: The Residency from Its Establishment to 1941
9 The Japanese Interregnum and the Last Years of the Residency, 1941–1959
Part V From Protected State to Full Independence
10 Rebellion, Malaysia, and Abdication, 1959–1967
11 Reluctant Independence, 1967–1984
12 The First Decade of Independence
13 Brunei to 2001
Glossary
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

A HISTORY OF BRUNEI

A History of Brunei remains the only full-length study of the Brunei Sultanate from the earliest times to the present. It traces the history of the state and its lines of rulers from their pre-Islamic origins to the present. Graham Saunders explores the controversies over events, persons and developments in Brunei's past which are still important issues in defining Brunei's identity and its political and social systems today. The antecedents of the Sultanate, the date of the conversion to Islam, the reigns of the early Sultans, the line of descent, early contacts with the Europeans and the Sultanate's struggle to survive pressures from abroad are all elucidated in this fascinating study. The book also explores Brunei's changing fortunes over the course of the twentieth century, from its apparently inevitable decline towards extinction under pressure from the Brookes of Sarawak and the British North Borneo Company at the turn of the century, to the economic successes of the post-war years which prompted popular desire for democratic and constitutional reform. This transition from dependency to independence while retaining the Sultan's absolute rule, is analysed in detail, and includes an assessment of the years since independence in 1984. This book will appeal to those with an interest in Brunei, Borneo and Malaysia. It will also appeal to readers with more general interests in the history of Southeast Asia, the process of decolonisation, the role of Islam and the role of the small states in the broader strategic, political and economic systems of the ASEAN and Pacific regions.

Graham Saunders is an Honorary Fellow of the University of Hull and an Associate Lecturer in Pacific Studies with the Open University. He taught history in Sarawak and Brunei for almost thirty years, and has published numerous articles on Southeast Asia.

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A History of Brunei

GRAHAM SAUNDERS

I~ ~~~!~;n~~~~urzon London and New York

I SBN9781136873942(ebk)

For Robert Nicholl

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Acknowledgements

IT will be clear to readers that lowe a debt to numerous scholars who have contributed to our knowledge of the history of Brunei. To keep footnotes to a minimum, I have assimilated their research into the narrative, and have listed the works cited or referred to in the Bibliography. lowe a special debt to Robert Nicholl, whom I first met in Sarawak in 1963. We were subsequently, from 1970, Education Officers in Brunei. His erudition, linguistic skills, and correspondence with scholars world-wide enabled him to collect and collate a wide range of source material on Brunei, which he mined assiduously and skilfully for his own writing and which remains a valuable resource for others. As mentor and friend, he stimulated my own interest in the history of Brunei, and to him this book is dedicated. I have acknowledged my debt to other writers on Brunei in the introduction to the Bibliography. This book is the product of many years' residence in Sarawak and Brunei, during which I accumulated information and, I trust, acquired some understanding, to which many people, too numerous to mention, contributed. They bear no responsibility for what I have written and in many cases, no doubt, have forgotten my existence. Nor does any apparent criticism belie the fact that my experience of Brunei was a pleasant one. If it had not been, I would not have remained there so long or been prompted to try to understand its history. Over the years, the staffs of many libraries and museums have been of great assistance, particularly those of the Brunei and Sarawak Museums and the Brynmor Jones Library at the University of Hull. Simon Francis has generously shown me material he has researched in the Public Records Office and has been a mine of information on publications about Brunei. His bibliography of Brunei will be a major asset to scholars. Moving from England to Cyprus, while writing this book, created

Vlll

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

practical problems. Thanks are due to Urban Norstrom for assistance in overcoming the problems created by transferring my work from one word-processing system to another. As always, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my wife, Anne, for her encouragement, support, and patience at a time of great upheaval as we moved house and country, not once, but twice. In many respects, this book is as much hers as mine.

Cyprus

GRAHAM SAUNDERS

December 1993

Note All references to dollars ($) in this book are to the Straits dollar up to 1963 and thereafter to the Brunei dollar, unless otherwise specified.

Contents

Acknowledgements Figure Maps Plates Abbreviations Introduction

Part I From Earliest Times to the Creation of the Sultanate 1 The Earliest Kingdoms 2 Pre-Islamic Brunei

Part II The Rise and Decline of the Brunei Thalassocracy 3 The Early Muslim Sultanate to c.1550 4 A Century of Conflict, c. 1550-c. 1650 5 Stagnation and Decline, c.1650-c.1770

Part III Brunei, the British, and the Brookes, c.1770-1906 6 The Struggle for Survival, c.1770-1870 7 Almost Terminal Decline, 1870-1906

Part IV The Residency, 1906-1959 8 Brunei Preserved: The Residency from Its Establishment to 1941 9 The Japanese Interregnum and the Last Years of the Residency, 1941-1959

vu Xl Xl

xu XlV

xv

1 3

21

33 35

49 62

67 69 87 99 101

121

CONTENTS

x

Part V From Protected State to Full Independence

139

10 Rebellion, Malaysia, and Abdication, 1959-1967 11 Reluctant Independence, 1967-1984 12 The First Decade of Independence 13 Brunei to 2001

141 161 178 192

Glossary Bibliography Index

203 206 213

Figure

1 The Brunei Royal Family Tree

43

Maps

Early South-East Asian Kingdoms, AD 750 2 Territory Lost to Sarawak, 1841-1905 Brunei Brunei in South-East Asia

6

75 228 230

Plates

Between pages 108 and 109

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18

19

Guardian figure at the tomb of Maharaja Kama (Ma-na-jechia-na) ofP'o-ni. The Genealogical Tablet of the sultans of Brunei. Brunei, c.1844. Captain Edward Belcher and James Brooke negotiating at the Brunei Court, October 1844. Admiral Cochrane's capture of the city of Brunei, 1846. Note the use of steamers to tow sailing warships and boats. Admiral Cochrane's negotiations leading to the cession of Labuan, 1846. Signing the treaty for the cession of Labuan, 1846. Ceremony of hoisting the British flag on the island of Labuan. Pengiran Muda Hassim. Pengiran Mumin. Sir James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak and Governor of Labuan. Brunei, the capital of Borneo Proper, 1857. Brunei, 1883. The Sultan's barge, 1887. Sultan Hashim of Brunei receiving Vice-Admiral Sir Nowell Salmon and officers of the British Naval Squadron, March 1888. Edward, Prince of Wales, with Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam II, Brunei, 18 May 1922. The British Residency, 1948. Sultan Sir Ahmad Tajuddin during a session of the State Council, 1948. His younger brother, the future Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, is second from the left. Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III promulgating the Brunei State Constitution, 29 September 1959.

PLATES

20

21 22

Xlll

Prince Hassanal Bolkiah and Prince Mohamed during a visit to the Seria oilfield, 1959. On the left is Dato R. E. Hales, then managing director of British Malayan Petroleum Company. On the right is PengiranJaya Negara Pengiran Abu Bakar. Sultan Sir Hassanal Bolkiah being greeted by his subjects after Hari Raya prayers, c.1979. Brunei Town and Kampong Ayer, 1970.

Abbreviations

ASEAN BBC BBPS BMPC BMA BNDP BNSP BNO BPA BSP BULF

BUP CCO IDB MIP NBB NKKU OIC PBKR PRB RBA RBMR SUPP TNKU UMNO

Association of South-East Asian Nations British Broadcasting Commission British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate British Malayan Petroleum Company British Military Administration Brunei National Democratic Party Brunei National Solidarity Party Brunei National Organization Brunei Peoples Alliance Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Brunei United Labour Front Brunei United Party Clandestine Communist Organization Island Development Bank Melayu Islam Beraja National Bank of Brunei Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara Organization of Islamic Countries Partai Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat Partai Rakyat Brunei Royal Brunei Airlines Royal Brunei Malay Regiment Sarawak United Peoples Party Tentera Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara United Malays National Organization

Introduction

BRUNEI is a small independent sultanate on the north-west coast of the island of Borneo. Its ruler, His Majesty Paduka Seri Baginda Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu'izzaddin Waddaulah, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertua1J. Negara Brunei Darussalam, acknowledged as the twenty-ninth Sultan of his line, is an absolute monarch. He has been named as the richest man in the world. His wealth, and that of the state, comes from oil. That wealth, coupled with Brunei's strategic position, makes it important to other powers and it has been courted since gaining full independence in 1984 by its immediate neighbours in ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) and by greater powers. While little might be known of Brunei itself outside its immediate neighbours, a large number of people in Britain in particular have heard of the Sultan, of his at times flamboyant way of life, and of his wealth. The linking of his name, despite his denials, with the controversial purchase of the House of Fraser and its Harrods store by Mohamed Al-Fayed in 1985, brought him unwelcome publicity, especially when Roland 'Tiny' Rowland expressed his frustration and anger at the deal by launching a long and bitter campaign to publicize the alleged linkage. The independence celebrations in Brunei in February 1984, the ostentatious luxury and grandeur of a palace popularly cited as the largest in the world, the hints of a lifestyle in which he mingled with the likes of Adnan Khashoggi, gambled heavily, and spent lavishly caught the attention of the popular press. In the United States, his purchase of the Beverly Hills Hotel, the extravagant gesture of a cheque for US$500,OOO to feed the destitute of New York, the donation of US$1 million to the United Nations Children's Fund, and the unfortunate involvement to the tune of US$10 million in the Iran-Contra scandal brought him mixed pUblicity. In the United Kingdom, he has made numerous more discreet donations to causes he favours. In recent years, that

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INTRODUCTION

discretion has increased but the Sultan and other members of the royal family still find their activities from time to time in the news, regionally as well as in Britain and the United States. That Brunei has a place in the public consciousness outside its immediate geographical area and diplomatic circles is largely due to the personality of its ruler and his family. In diplomatic, military, financial, and commercial circles, there is consciousness of a different order, for, despite its size, Brunei can exert an influence beyond South-East Asia. Brunei is a tiny place from which to cut a figure on the world scene. It has a common border with the East Malaysian state of Sarawak and is divided into two unequal enclaves by the Sarawak territory of Limbang. It has a total area of 5769 square kilometres, about 70 per cent of it still under tropical rain forest (Brunei Darussalam, 1988). Its coastline to the South China Sea is about 161 kilometres in length. The coastal plain is low and swampy to the south, but hills come close to the sea between Tutong and the capital, Bandar Seri Begawan. The coastal plain rises to hills towards the interior, but the most rugged country is in Temburong, the sparsely populated enclave between the Limbang and Lawas districts of Sarawak. The Limbang River was once the natural hinterland for the capital, and its loss to Sarawak in 1890 has been a niggling resentment ever since. Bandar Seri Begawan itself is on the Brunei River, an impressive tidal waterway which narrows to insignificance a little above the capital and the Sultan's palace. The country is divided into four administrative districts: (a) BruneilMuara, encompassing the capital and its port at the mouth of the Brunei River and having the majority of the population; (b) Tutong, based on the town of that name half-way along the coast and mainly agricultural; (c) Belait, which encompasses the oil towns of Kuala Belait and Seria and has thus the second-largest concentration of population; and (d) Temburong, large, hilly, heavily jungled, and sparsely populated with a small town at Bangar. The country's total population was given at around 227,000, with Malays making up 155,000, Chinese 41,000, other indigenous-Dusuns, !bans, Kedayans-11,500, and expatriates from Europe, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and elsewhere 20,000 (Brunei Darussalam, 1988). (The Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 89, gives the total population of Brunei as 261,000 of whom 68 per cent are indigenous Malays.) The complexity is greater than even these figures suggest because there exist differences in culture, mother tongue, and customs within the Malay community. Further-

INTRODUCTION

XVll

more, among the Malay, Chinese, and other indigenous groups, there are differences, largely stratified by age, between the educated and their parents and between the English-educated and the Malayor Chinese-educated. Half the population is under twenty and education and consequent employment are major concerns for the government. So, also, is the impact of the outside world and of Western culture upon the young. Finally, there are the religious differences. Islam is the national religion and the religion of the Malays, of a large number of converts from other races, and of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and some Indian expatriates. Non-Malay converts to Islam in Brunei generally adopt the social customs and dress of the Malays, so that becoming converted is colloquially known as 'masuk Melayu' or becoming Malay. The Chinese consist of those who follow the traditional Chinese religion, a mixture of Buddhism and Taoism, and those who are Christian, in most cases either Anglican or Roman Catholic. Thus, there is in the capital a Chinese temple, as well as an Anglican church and a Roman Catholic church. The expatriate Filipinos are Roman Catholic. Expatriate Indians or Sri Lankans may be Hindu, Buddhist, or Christian. Thais are mainly Buddhist, but have no temple of their own. Religious observance varies. It is strong amongst the Muslims and the local and Filipino Christians. The Chinese temple is well patronized. There has been a tradition of religious toleration, which shows signs of coming under threat as Malay Muslim Bruneians seek a national identity in which Islam is an important component. Brunei's wealth is based on oil and gas, which overshadow any other source, accounting in 1989 for some 60 per cent of the gross national product (GNP) and 96 per cent of export earnings (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1990 Yearbook, p. 91). More recent figures indicate that the government is succeeding in increasing the contribution from the non-oil sector and that oil and gas products now contribute less than 50 per cent of the GNP. For some years, oil production was held at 150,000 barrels per day to conserve the resource, but was allowed to rise to 180,000 barrels per day in 1992, partly because new resources had been discovered and partly to make up for lower prices (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1993 Yearbook, p. 90). Revenue from oil and gas pays for the welfare state, with all citizens receiving free education (through university for those who qualify), free health care, and various other subsidies and services. Per capita income is placed at US$15,390 but is possibly more.

xviii

INTRODUCTION

There are poor people in Brunei, as well as the unemployed, estimated at about 6 per cent in 1986, but it is difficult to say what these figures mean when most Bruneians are still protected by an extended family system which can shelter idle youth and care for the aged and infirm. Perhaps the best indication of the spread of wealth to the population at large is the number of cars on Brunei's roads-101,000 in 1986. Nevertheless, there are aspects of Brunei life which cause concern. There is nothing much for young adult Bruneians to do. There is little public entertainment, no night-clubs, discos, theatre, or concerts. Eating out is a common activity with a variety of restaurants, cafes, and stalls, but by 10.00 p.m. most Bruneians are at home. The main social events are weddings. Religious functions and Koran readings receive official approval and there are festivals and processions on important days in the Muslim calendar, the annual National Day, and the Sultan's Birthday, events associated with the last going on for weeks. Despite government efforts to improve sporting facilities and to promote a healthy lifestyle, many of the young are attracted to drugs and Western-style pop music is still popular at private parties. There is a conflict of generations and also a conflict as to what makes a national identity in a multicultural world. In Brunei, the government is actively promoting the concept of a Malay Islamic Monarchy which, on a variety of grounds, may be too narrow a base on which to build. Brunei is not alone in the world. It has neighbours with whom its relations have not always been as friendly as they are now. Wealth can incite envy and old rancours can re-emerge. Political stability is a fragile thing, as an upsurge in piracy in north Borneo waters makes clear. Commanding Brunei Bay, with the offshore Malaysian island of Labuan, Brunei possesses strategic potential which has been recognized for centuries. Hence the importance attached to the armed forces, which receive about a quarter of the budget, the maintenance of ties with Britain, and the agreement to station a battalion of Gurkha troops on the oilfield. Hence, also, its special relationship with Singapore, another small state, and its membership of the United Nations, the British Commonwealth, ASEAN, the Islamic Conference, and other international bodies in which Brunei's presence and interests may be made known. Aware of its vulnerability, Brunei welcomes friendly diplomatic contacts, which are given a high profile on Brunei television, partly to bolster the image of the Sultan as ruler and partly to reassure the people that Brunei is an accepted and valued member of the community of nations.

INTRODUCTION

XlX

In the building of a national identity, there is also the creation of a history. One important development over the past thirty or so years has been the revival of ceremonies, customs, and traditions which had been largely forgotten or had fallen into abeyance. The first stimulus was the coronation of the present ruler in August 1968. Various traditional offices of state and their regalia were revived and the coronation, in a new throne room and audience chamber erected for the occasion, was a colourful and impressive spectacle. A Brunei Museum had already been founded in 1965. A Language and Literature Bureau began deciphering inscriptions on tombstones and collecting Brunei writings, music, and dances. Official encouragement of traditional arts and crafts aimed at reviving those that had been lost and saving those that were in decline. A new interest was shown in Brunei's past, fostered by the Brunei Museum which attracted foreign scholars as well as local, by the Language and Literature Bureau, and from 1984 by the History Centre, devoted to developing a Bruneian interpretation of the country's history. As the process developed, a conflict emerged between those who applied Western methods of historiography to materials relating to Brunei's past and those Bruneians who felt that this diminished their heritage and that Bruneian history was unique and capable of interpretation only by scholars accepting a Bruneian historiography. Two styles of history were at variance. Put briefly, the Western-trained historian would seek objectivity and would question the context in which his sources were written and the purposes behind the writing. The Bruneian historian would practise the methodology of the court history of the past, seeking to promote views that bolstered the importance and prestige of Brunei and its rulers in the past and thus increase the country's and its ruler's prestige in the present. The past and its interpretation becomes of great contemporary importance because it supports a particular view of Brunei, its ruler, and its place on the world stage. History is inextricably entwined with the question of Brunei identity. In this book, I will present as far as possible both views. It will be clear where my opinion lies, but an understanding of the Bruneian historian's view of the past is essential if we are to understand what many Bruneians believe to be their history; for what they believe and what is taught in the schools as a consequence will shape their view of the present and of their social and political traditions. All countries have produced national histories which have supported an existing elite, an ideology, and a socio-economic system. No history written is lacking in bias, but we can hope to understand what purpose bias serves and make an attempt to arrive at the truth in at

xx

INTRODUCTION

least the broadest terms. Where there are different and often conflicting accounts, it may be impossible to say with certainty which is correct, but we should try to reach a conclusion based on the sources available. Wherever possible, I will give both sides of a controversial historical statement. The reader can then decide if he or she accepts my judgement or not. It is for this reason that I have entitled this book A History of Brunei and not THE History of Brunei. Much more research is required before a definitive history can be written.

PART I From Earliest Times to the Creation of the Sultanate

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1 The Earliest Kingdoms

origins of the present state of Brunei are lost in the mists of time and legend. It is not known when a kingdom which might be linked with present-day Brunei first appeared on the north-west coast of Borneo. Nor is it known when the ruler who founded the present dynasty emerged. History suggests tenuous links between kingdoms culminating in a state called P'o-ni by the Chinese, which emerged in the tenth century and from which a more reliable trace may be made. History also suggests a link between the ruling family of an early South-East Asian mainland kingdom known as Funan and the present ruler of Brunei. If the latter were substantiated, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah would belong to one of the oldest dynasties in the world. Brunei myth and legend also suggest a distant preIslamic past for the state, but these stories have been modified since the conversion to Islam so that the founder of the state and the dynasty is identified with the first Muslim ruler and centuries of pre-Islamic history are blotted out. Yet Brunei Malay culture, like Malay culture in Malaysia and Indonesia, has pre-Islamic elements deeply imbedded in it. One needs to consider how the earliest SouthEast Asian states emerged so that reasonable conjectures about how the Brunei state evolved may be made. Our knowledge of early South-East Asia is fragmentary and subject to scholarly speculation and dispute. Not only are local sources sparse and of later date than the events they describe, but they either serve to glorify a dynasty or have acquired the texture of folk-myth and legend. Foreign sources are little better. Although the religions and culture of India profoundly influenced the emerging states of South-East Asia, Indian sources have remarkably little to say about the region. More revealing are the Chinese records, based upon the reports of Chinese envoys to South-East Asia and of South-East Asian embassies to the Chinese court as well as upon compilations prepared by scholars using information obtained by THE

4

A HISTORY OF BRUNEI

merchants and travellers. Here, however, as with the Indian and the later Arabic sources, one faces the problem of transliteration. A place-name may have been heard by a Chinese, transcribed into Chinese characters, and then transcribed again, centuries later, from the Chinese into English. One has only to consider the recent confusion over the transcribing of Chinese into English after the changes introduced during the 1970s, when Pinyin replaced the Wade-Giles system of transliteration and Peking became Beijing, Sian became Xian, and Canton, Guangzhou; or reflect that the names Ong, Wong, Wang, and Hwang, not to mention others, which grace the shop signs on a Malaysian street, may have the same Chinese ideogram. There is also the possibility that in making copies of documents over time, scribes have introduced minor transcription errors. No wonder scholars argue interminably over what places were meant. Confusion is only increased when sailing directions are taken into account, for not only do distances have to be converted from one form of measurement into another, but also measurements of time-all this assuming that the navigators were accurate. How far, exactly, was a day's sailing? Therefore, in addition to place-names, scholars look for geographical details, items of trade, and references to gods, idols, forms of worship, types of dwelling, food, drink, and clothing-anything which might substantiate the choice of a particular location. As we try to locate the early Brunei kingdoms, examples of these problems will come to light. Scholars have reached a consensus on the general outline of early South-East Asian history. There was a general long, slow migration of peoples south from mainland Asia, through the Malay Peninsula and the archipelago. Some branches came from the Indian subcontinent, others through China from central Asia. As people moved in, so others were pushed out or assimilated, while yet others remained in isolated pockets in more inaccessible regions; hence the confused ethnographic map of South-East Asia. By the beginning of the Christian era, a South-East Asian culture had evolved which, despite local variations and the continued existence of older tribal cultures, had common characteristics. One cannot do better here than quote the conclusions of the French scholar George Coedes (1968: 9), who said that these characteristics were with regard to material culture, the cultivation of irrigated rice, domestication of cattle and buffalo, rudimentary use of metals, knowledge of navigation; with regard to the social system, the importance of the role conferred on women and of relations in the maternal line, and an organization resulting from the requirements of irrigated agriculture; with regard to religion,

THE EARLIEST KINGDOMS

5

belief in animism, the worship of ancestors and of the god of the soil, the building of shrines in high places, burial of the dead in jars and dolmens ....

He also mentioned similarities in mythology and linguistics. This culture was influenced greatly by that of India. The coastal peoples of South-East Asia were capable seamen and established trade links with India across the Bay of Bengal. Indian merchants in their tum traded in South-East Asia. As trading links developed and merchant communities became established, influences spread. Hinduism and Buddhism were to exert great influence in the different states that adopted one or the other. Politically, the South-East Asian ruler, himself a merchant king, was attracted to the Indian ideal of the deva-raja, the god-king, which both Hinduism and Buddhism could accommodate and which bolstered the ruler's prestige and authority and made possible the organization of a larger state. At South-East Asian courts, Indian Brahmans found positions as religious and political advisers, Indian merchants acquired positions of confidence, and ambitious Indian princelings could find wives and access to power. Thus began the 'Indianization' of South-East Asia. It was not brought about by a mass movement of peoples, but by the conversion of the ruling classes. At the local level, the old culture continued to survive with some modification, except that the great Hindu epics of the new High Culture percolated to the masses and became the basis for stories and shadow plays. The Ramayana and the Mahabharata continue to hold sway over the imaginations of many in South-East Asia to this day. The first Indianized state of South-East Asia to impinge on history was Funan, centred on the lower Mekong Delta (see Map 1). Although it is called Funan, that name is really the modem Chinese pronunciation of two characters once pronounced 'B'iu-nam' which were attempts to transcribe the title of the ruler. As D. G. E. Hall points out, it is the modem Kluner word phnom, meaning 'mountain', in Old Kluner bnam. Thus the full title in the vernacular was kurnng bnam or 'King of the Mountain', which was equivalent to the Sanskrit sailaraja (Hall, 1964: 24-5). The title has significance, for the mountain referred to was Mount Meru, the home of the gods in Hindu mythology. The Indianized South-East Asian state was based on a concept of Hindu cosmology in which the god-king was at the centre of his kingdom surrounded and served by levels of officials increasing in geometrical progression from four to eight to sixteen to thirty-two and beyond. The king was identified with a god, perhaps Siva or Vishnu. In Buddhist regions, he might be identified

6

A HISTORY OF BRUNEI

MAP 1 Early South-East Asian Kingdoms,

NAN CHAO ",Pagan

F'{U

Sailendra

Kingdom China Chenla

Champa

0 I

200 i

Zvli!es

400 I

AD

750

THE EARLIEST KINGDOMS

7

with a Bodhisattva, one who has achieved enlightenment. In both cases, the temporal authority of the king was buttressed by the belief that he was a god or was godlike. Loyalty, obedience, and service became acts of worship. The great temples at Angkor, at Pagan, and the Borobudur in central Java express this concept in architectural terms. The concept was expressed in spatial terms in the design of cities, with the king's apartments lying at the centre of widening circles of palace, city, state, empire, and universe. The organizational structures of government reflected this concentration upon the centre and upon the person of the king. Of course, the hierarchical concept was not unknown to the West, and the European concept of the divine right of kings has parallels with the god-king. Nor was there uniformity throughout South-East Asia and over periods of time. However, the idea of a ruler's sacredness if not divinity survived the coming of Islam to influence the Malay Sultanates of the Malay Peninsula and island South-East Asia, included among which was Brunei. Funan was founded, so legend has it, by a prince named Kaundinya, who, following a dream, voyaged to Funan from either India or the Malay Peninsula. In a Chinese version, the queen of that country, 'Willow Leaf', attempted to seize his vessel, was defeated, and married him. In another version, Kaundinya was a Brahman and married a daughter of the King of the Nagas. The Naga serpent was the traditional Hindu god of the soil. Whatever the true facts, Indian influence was introduced into the court of Funan and a line of kings descended from the union of the foreigner and the indigenous princess. This was in about the first century AD. In the succeeding century, Funan extended its territories and in AD 243 sent its first embassy to China. At its greatest extent, Funan encompassed much of what is now Cambodia, southern Thailand and the northern part of the Malay Peninsula. Its capital, Vyadhapura (City of Hunters), was some 192 kilometres up the Mekong River and its port, Go-Oc-Eo, was a large metropolis on the Mekong Delta facing the Gulf of Thailand. The site has been excavated and shows trading contacts with China, Malaya, Indonesia, India, ancient Persia (now Iran), and even the Mediterranean. By the end of the second century AD, other Indianized states had emerged. Some, like those on the Malay Peninsula, had become vassals of Funan, but on the coast of central Vietnam, the kingdom of Champa maintained its independence. Like the Funanese, the Chams were a MalayoPolynesian people. North of Funan was the Khmer kingdom of Chenla. All of these states made contact with China.

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Funan reached a peak of power and influence under Kaundinya Jayavarrnan, who reigned from about AD 480 to AD 514. In AD 503, an imperial order of the Emperor of China highly praised Jayavarman and bestowed upon him the title of 'General of the Pacified South' (Coedes, 1968: 59, quoting Pelliot). However, Jayavarrnan's death ushered in a dynastic dispute which ended with the dismemberment of Funan and the emergence of Chenla as its successor. It is not necessary to go into details here. Briefly, one Bhavavarrnan, related to the Funanese royal family, had married a princess of Chenla and had become King of Chenla. Coedes believes that on the death of Rudravarrnan (the last King of Funan, who had been a usurper), Bhavavarrnan, a grandson of Rudravarrnan, intervened to prevent the legitimate line regaining the throne. Chenla conquered the northern part of Funan, which lingered on in the south until its final conquest by the Khmer king Isanavarrnan at the beginning of the seventh century AD. Funan passed from history, but its influence did not. As the first powerful kingdom in the region, it had acquired an aura similar to that of ancient Greece or Rome in the West. Later rulers of kingdoms legitimized their power and burnished their prestige by proclaiming links with Funan. The Khmer kings of Angkor regarded themselves as successors to Funan and adopted the cults of the Naga princess and the sacred mountain. The Sailendra dynasty of Java in the eighth century consciously adopted the title 'King of the Mountain', and, as will be seen, there is a claim made for Brunei that its ruling dynasty is descended from the Funanese royal family. Funan had been conquered by Chenla, which soon divided into a northern Land Chenla and a southern Water Chenla, a country of coastal plains and waterways, the old centre of Funan. Meanwhile, the Chams had extended their control further south in the eastern part of the Mekong Delta, and the territories on the Malay Peninsula, including the important trans-peninsular state of Langkasuka, had reasserted their independence. Water Chenla was further fragmented and at least part of it fell under the control of the Sailendra dynasty of Java. That this occurred supports the view that the Sailendras were descended from Funanese royalty who had escaped to Java. Their interest in Water Chenla might well have been an attempt to regain their inheritance. The connection did not last long, however, and in about AD 800 a united Khmer kingdom was created by Jayavarrnan II, who drove out the Sailendras and imposed Khmer control over the former Funanese states on the Gulf of Thailand and the Malay Peninsula. Jayavarman II then turned inland and extended his control as far as the great inland lake, the

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TonIe Sap, and the environs of Angkor. His successors continued his conquests and began building the cities and temples associated with their civilization. Indravarman I, who succeeded in AD 877, undertook the first irrigation works and built the Bakong, the first Khmer stone pyramid temple. Over the following centuries, a succession of kings-Hindu like Suryavarman II (1113-50), builder of Angkor Wat, and later Buddhist, like Jayavarman VII (1181-c.1215), builder of the city of Angkor Thorn and the Bayon templeproclaimed their godhead in stone. They fought against the rival powers of the day, the Chams of Champa and the T'ai, advancing relentlessly from the north. At last, weakened by extravagant expenditure and continuous warfare, with the people turning to a new and gentler form of Buddhism which had no need for god-kings, Angkor succumbed to the T'ai in 1431. A new Khmer capital was eventually established at Phnom Penh in 1434. The T'ai were a people who had migrated out of southern China and had established a series of states starting with Nan Chao in today's Yunnan province of China in the seventh century AD. Nan Chao extended its influence into much of Burma and into northern Vietnam. In 1253, however, it was conquered by the Mongols. Smaller T'ai states had been established by this time in what is now northern Thailand. The most important of these were Sukhothai, which under King Rama Khamhaeng (c. 1283-c.131 7) extended power further to the south, as far as the Malay Peninsula, and Ayutthaya, which was founded by Rama Tibodi in the midfourteenth century and which eventually conquered Sukhothai and occupied Angkor in 1431. Under King Trailok (1448-88), Ayutthaya developed a centralized administration much more effective than that of its neighbours which survived until the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, in the Malay Peninsula and the archipelago, kingdoms and empires also rose and fell. The mainland kingdoms had been largely interior states based on the irrigated cultivation of rice. There was trade with the outside world and states like Funan, Langkasuka, and Champa developed maritime trade, as did Ayutthaya, but the economic base of the mainland states was agriculture. On the Malay Peninsula and in the archipelago, agricultural economies like those on the mainland developed in central Java, but the majority of states elsewhere were coastal with their economies largely dependent on maritime trade. This survey will concentrate only on the largest and most influential, amongst them two powerful Javanese states which each developed from an agricultural economy to command maritime empires. The essence of power in a maritime state is control of the sea and

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of the trade which plies upon it. A glance at a map of South-East Asia (see the back endpaper map) shows clearly that the Malay Peninsula and the islands of Indonesia divide the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean on the west from the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea on the east. By the beginning of the Christian era, maritime trade had developed between India and South-East Asia and China and South-East Asia, as well as within the island world of the archipelago itself. Trade was carried in Indian, Chinese, and Indonesian shipping, the last bringing goods to favoured ports from the extremities of the archipelago as well as participating with Indian and Chinese traders in the trade with their home ports. Another feature of the trade was dictated by the prevailing winds, the monsoons. The North-east Monsoon, blowing from November to April, favoured ships sailing from China to the archipelago and from the archipelago to India. The South-west Monsoon, from May to October, favoured shipping sailing from India to the archipelago and from the archipelago to China. Two consequences emerged. The first was that it was possible to make a return journey within the year from China and India to the archipelago if one exchanged cargoes at a port in the archipelago. Similarly, archipelago shipping could travel to and from such a port to either India or China by using one monsoon on the outward voyage and returning on the other. There was no incentive to travel the distance between India and China in the one ship for that meant waiting in the archipelago for the monsoon to change anyway. The second consequence was that certain shores were more protected than others from the prevailing monsoon. In particular, the east coast of the Malay Peninsula received the full force of the North-east Monsoon and the southern coast of Java and the west coast of Sumatra that of the South-west Monsoon. The most protected ports were to be found on the north coast of Java, the east coast of Sumatra, the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, and the south and east coasts of Borneo. The Java Sea was protected from the main force of the monsoons, as was the western side of the Philippines. The north-west coast of Borneo was exposed, but particular sites on it were protected, as will be shown below. It is also clear from the map that ships travelling from east to west and vice versa, or desiring to reach ports on the coasts most protected from the monsoons, had restricted passage. On the east was the relatively broad approach between Vietnam and Borneo, but on the west there were the narrow Strait of Malacca and the narrower Sunda Strait. A power which controlled either or both of

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these was in a position to control the maritime trade of the region. This fact was soon understood by the rulers of states on Java, Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula. Indeed, Funan had shown the way here as in other things, for at its height it had controlled the eastern approaches by its command of the Gulf of Thailand from its port at Go-Oc-Eo and the approaches to the Strait of Malacca by its control of Langkasuka and the northern Malay Peninsula. In Funan's case, this resulted in the transhipment of goods over the narrow part of the peninsula using the river system and porterage. The first great maritime empire to arise in the archipelago was that of Srivijaya in the sixth century AD. Its capital was near presentday Palembang on the east coast of Sumatra. It was a Buddhist kingdom. In AD 671, the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim I-tsing said that there were 1,000 Buddhist monks there and on his return from India in AD 675, he stayed for ten years at Srivijaya studying and translating Buddhist scriptures. By the eighth century AD, Srivijaya had conquered the coastal states of east Sumatra and the states of the Malay Peninsula, thus giving it firm control of the Malacca Strait. It also controlled both sides of the Sunda Strait. All shipping was compelled to call at Srivijaya, which thrived on the trade and the charges and levies it could impose. Unlike the mainland states, Srivijaya left no magnificent remains. This was partly because of the lack of readily accessible building stone in the marshy coastal flats and the consequent reliance on wood as a structural material. It may also point to the lack of a large peasant population which could be recruited for forced labour on a seasonal basis. Palembang's wealth was based on trade and its empire was far-flung, consisting of the command of ports and coastal city-states either coerced or persuaded into allegiance. In between the coastal cities and their immediate hinterland would be long stretches of coast fringed with mangrove and nipa swamps. Only where rivers penetrated the interior was it possible for internal trade to develop and a riverine port to arise. In many respects, Srivijaya was not well placed, being some 120 kilometres up the winding Palembang River beyond the swampy coastal fringe (Wheatley, 1966: 293). But at some point its rulers gained the allegiance of the orang laut or men of the sea, skilful seafarers of the islands south of the Malay Peninsula and off Sumatra's east coast, nomadic and semi-nomadic sea gypsies, many of whom spent their lives on their boats and knew the seas they roamed almost instinctively. Fierce, lawless, and piratical, they came under the influence of Malay chiefs who were able to provide a more sophisticated

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leadership, whether in piracy or the peaceful exploitation of the sea's resources and trade. In practice, there were opportunities for both as piracy could be legitimized as warfare in the service of one's overlord. The Srivijayan rulers extended their influence by similar means, and as petty chiefs came under their allegiance, so did their sea power grow. Srivijaya was a thalassocracy, a trading empire commanding the sea as did that of Athens which has given us the political term. Power was measured not in huge land armies and gangs of peasants labouring on magnificent temple mountains, but in the number of ships that could be put to sea. These 'wooden walls' were manned by the orang laut and supplemented by similar fleets constructed by vassal states brought under the hegemony of Srivijaya. An inscription at Ligor shows that as early as AD 775 Srivijaya had established a presence in the north of the Malay Peninsula. At points on the Malayan and Sumatran coasts of the Malacca Strait and in the islands and on the north coast of Java, Srivijaya established its suzerainty over port city-states, their rulers providing naval forces and paying tribute, channelling wealth from trade into the coffers of Srivijaya, but necessarily keeping a share for themselves. This was not a territorial empire as in the case of the mainland empires: it was a network of vassal states over which the rulers of Srivijaya exercised suzerainty based on conquest, marriage alliances, and the distribution of rewards. Being at the heart of it, the rulers of Srivijaya accumulated immense wealth which became legendary. Given the apparently tenuous nature of Srivijaya's empire, it is perhaps surprising that it lasted so long-for six centuries. This longevity and continuity left a legacy which influenced the Malay states which followed it. Part of its strength lay in its relationship with China, which required it to send regular tribute missions, thus gaining Chinese recognition and the continuance of trade. Acknowledging Chinese suzerainty provided it with protection from any of its vassals breaking away and establishing an independent relationship with China. Secondly, by controlling the orang laut, Srivijaya made the seas safe from piracy and could direct trade to its own port. Thirdly, it developed an efficient administration whereby merchants were content to pay levies and dues in return for efficient harbour and port facilities and a centre from which to handle their business. Srivijaya was also a centre of culture, scholarship, and learning, exerting the attraction of a metropolitan centre for those within its circle of influence. Fourthly, its suzerainty must have been light enough for its vassals to realize that their prosperity and self-

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interest were best served by remaining within the Srivijayan system. Finally, there was the weight of Indian tradition associated with the deva-raja or god-king. There is a lack of physical evidence for the glorification of the ruler in Srivijaya, but the Sanskrit concept of derhaka or treason against the ruler was strongly present in inscriptions. This went beyond the modern concept of treason: it evoked a curse upon the perpetrator and was equivalent to an act of sacrilege. It was to affect profoundly Malay concepts of fidelity and loyalty right up to modern times and was clearly instrumental in binding vassal to overlord. Srivijaya did not have an untroubled existence and did not stand alone in island South-East Asia. It reached its greatest power after AD 800, when the royal line received an infusion of Sailendra blood, linking it to Funan. There had been states in Java before the fall of Funan. They appear to have been Hindu, one of the most important being Mataram in central Java. In the middle of the eighth century AD, a Buddhist kingdom emerged, ruled by the Sailendra dynasty, the 'Kings of the Mountain', a title with echoes of Funan. They were responsible for building the Borobudur, the huge stone-clad stupa in central Java which is the main monument to their existence. Very little is known about them, but it is speculated that they came from Funan. This would explain their involvement in Water Chenla. Their supremacy in central Java, however, was short-lived. A Hindu dynasty acquired power when King Samaratunga died in about AD 832. His son, Balabutra, attempted to regain the throne, was defeated finally in AD 856, escaped to Sumatra, married a Srivijayan princess, and eventually became ruler of Srivijaya. It is this Sailendra dynasty of Srivijaya which ruled until its eventual collapse. Srivijaya suffered a challenge in the 990s from King Dharrnavamsu of east Java, who for a time controlled the Sunda Strait. He was killed in a Srivijayan counter-attack upon his capital in 1006 and Srivijaya established its maritime ascendancy once more. In 1025, the Chola kingdom of southern India launched a massive raid on Srivijaya's coastal possessions in the Malacca Strait, possibly because of resentment at the latter's control of trade. However, Chola could not expect to retain and govern regions so far from its homeland and withdrew, and Srivijaya soon recovered, although some of its glory had faded. Two hundred years later, however, the Chinese Inspector of Foreign Trade at Canton, Chau Ju-kua, reported that it still controlled the Malacca and Sunda straits and fifteen vassal states.

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By the end of the thirteenth century, however, Srivijaya was waning, challenged in the northern Malay Peninsula by the rising power of Sukhothai and in the south by the new Javanese kingdom of Majapahit. Majapahit's glory was short-lived but had its influence upon Brunei, which in 1365 was listed as a dependency. The story begins with the reign of a king in east Java called Kertanagara, who in 1292 refused to send tribute to Kublai Khan, the Mongol Emperor of China. By the time the Chinese sent an expedition to punish his effrontery, he had been killed in a revolt. The Chinese helped his son-in-law Vijaya crush the revolt and gain the throne. Vijaya then turned on the Chinese, defeated them, and established a new capital at Majapahit. Under Vijaya's son, Jayanagara, Majapahit began to expand. There were still internal disputes and Jayanagara was temporarily overthrown. He regained his throne with the assistance of a young officer among his bodyguards, Gajah Mada, who thus began his rise to prominence. In 1330, in the succeeding reign of Queen Tribhuvana, Gajah Mada was appointed Prime Minister. He established a centralized administration bearing some similarity to that established later by King Trailok in Ayutthaya and began a policy of conquest which continued until his death in 1364 during the reign of Hayam Wuruk. At its height, Majapahit controlled the Sunda and Malacca straits and established its influence over the coastal states of east, south, and north-west Borneo as far as Brunei Bay. It had reduced the power of Srivijaya and had won to its service the orang laut of the islands south of Singapore. However, it did not long outlast Hayam Wuruk's death in 1389. Ayutthaya expanded its power into the Malay Peninsula and Islam made inroads in north Sumatra and in the trading ports of the archipelago, undermining allegiance to the Hindu rulers of Majapahit. Majapahit itself was beset by succession disputes and civil war. Very rapidly, its vassal states broke away and as the fifteenth century progressed, Majapahit became one of a number of small Javanese states. Such then was the milieu from which the predecessors of Brunei emerged on the coast of north-west Borneo. In order to trace the origin of Brunei, it is necessary to return to a time for which no firm historical evidence exists and scholarly speculation throws up conflicting hypotheses. The older the sources, the less certainly can place-names be identified. Thus attempts have been made to place on the northwest coast of Borneo a state called Pu-lo-chung by the Chinese, mentioned in the third century AD, another called Ye-po-ti, visited

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by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Fa-hsien in AD 414, and P'o-li, first mentioned by the Chinese in the sixth century AD. P'o-li continues to be mentioned in Chinese sources until AD 692 when it passes from all knowledge. It appears to have occupied part of the First Division of Sarawak and to have extended into west Kalimantan. The iron-working activity of the Sarawak Delta cannot be definitely linked with P'o-li because the dating is disputed, the earliest date being either AD 615 or AD 900 (Treloar, 1978: 125). It is possible to speculate that P'o-li was founded by refugees from Funan who, at some point after AD 692, abandoned or were forced out of that site and re-established themselves on Brunei Bay (Nicholl, n.d.: 9). Robert Nicholl, for some years Honorary Curator of History at the Brunei Museum, an indefatigable scholar with a command of many languages, has made a special study of modern Brunei's antecedents and has combed the scholarly literature in the process. As has been mentioned, the problem lies in ascertaining what places are mentioned in the Chinese and Arabic texts and determining where they were situated. Certain features may help us determine which names in the ancient texts refer to Brunei. Among these are Mount Kinabalu, at 4101 metres, the highest mountain in SouthEast Asia and dearly visible from the sea, rising steeply in a great massif from the coastal plain, an unmistakable landmark for mariners. Another geographical feature is Brunei Bay, the only such bay on the north-west coast of Borneo, off which lie the island of Labuan and its smaller islands. The bay also has a tidal peculiarity. Whereas on the Borneo coast north-east of Tanjong Sirik there is only one tide a day apart from neaps, within Brunei Bay there are two, sometimes more (Nicholl, 1980a: 222). Another feature is the prevalence of gold in ancient times and, more importantly, of high-quality camphor, much prized by Chinese and Arabs alike. The camphor is a crystalline camphor obtained from the Dryobalanops aromatica, a tree which grows in Sumatra, Malaya, and Borneo Only in the Baros region of Sumatra and in Borneo north of, and including, the Baram Basin, is the tree subject to a disease which produces camphor crystals in its hollow trunk. From earliest times, the Borneo camphor was much more highly rated than that from Sumatra and fetched a much higher price (Nicholl, 1980a: 220). A feature of Brunei is the size of its 'Kampong Ayer' or water village, with the houses built on stilts over the shallow waters. Water villages were not uncommon, but nowhere else were they so extensive or so identified with the state. Until very recently, most of

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Brunei's population resided over the water and one may hazard a guess that any reference in ancient texts to such a city refers to Brunei. Finally, if other place-names can be located with any certainty, then it may be possible to locate early Brunei from them by following sailing directions, including direction, distance, and time taken, in the early records. It is by such means that Nicholl elucidates a part of an ancient text collected in the middle of the thirteenth century by the Arab scholar, Ibn Sa'id, in his Bast al-Ard. It reads: [The Khmers1 lived with the Chinese in the eastern regions of the earth. Discord having broken out amongst them, the Chinese chased them towards the islands, and they remained there a certain time. The name of the king was Kamrun. Following this, discord broke out amongst them when they were in the islands, of which we shall speak later. Then those who did not form part of the Royal Family went away to the great island [Madagascar], and their Sultan dwelt in the city of Komorriya. (Quoted by Nicholl, 1980a: 219.) A passage like this raises many difficulties for it contains acknowledged errors. The Chinese did not drive out the Khmers: the Khmers drove out the Funanese. Madagascar was not settled by Funanese but by much earlier immigrants. However, it is possible to substitute Funanese for those driven into exile and to suggest that the great island might have been Java, where the Sailendra dynasty was established at this time. Kamrun appears in other texts, where it is associated with the Mountain of Camphor, possibly Kinabalu. As for the identification of Kamrun with the name or title of the king, could not Kamrun be an Arabic form of kurung, part of the title kurung bnam, meaning 'King of the Mountain', or Sailendra, the hereditary title of the kings of Funan? If so, where exactly did the refugee Funanese settle? Again, it is necessary to search the literature. The clue that Nicholl lights upon is from the T'ang Shu as quoted in the T'ai p'ing yu Zan translated by Professor Hsu Yun-ts'iao: 'Chin-li-p'i-shih lies about 40,000 Ii [1 Ii is equal to 0.54 kilometre] to the south-west of the capital. From there to Chih Wu Kuo is 2,000 ii, to the west Ch'ih T'u Kuo is 3,000 Ii distant. To the south P'o-li Kuo is 3,000 Ii distant, and Liu Chu Kuo is also 3,000 Ii.' (Nicholl, 1980a: 221.) Professor Hsu Yun-ts'iao has identified Ch'ih T'u with Singora (Songkhla) in southern Thailand. Braddell (1980) has placed P'o-li in the gold-rich region of west Kalimantan and the First Division of Sarawak. Thus, says Nicholl, Chin-li-p'i-shih being north of this

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region and east of Songkhla would be on the north-west coast of Borneo. Chin-li-p'i-shih is regarded by P. Pelliot and G. Ferrand (see Nicholl, 1980a) as a variant of the Chinese rendering of Srivijaya and is itself the Chinese rendering of Vijayapura. Vijayapura and Srivijaya mean the same thing as the root 'vijaya' means victory and the terms are interchangeable in the literature. Many towns bore the name in ancient times and other descriptions indicate that the Vijayapura on north-west Borneo has not been confused with the city on Sumatra. The Arab Captain Buzurg ibn Shahriyar of Ramhormuz in his Ajaib ai-Hind described the Sumatran Srivijaya, but he also described another-in Arabic, Sribuza-which was built of houses floating on a great bay where the tide was felt twice a day. Nicholl concludes that this city was based on Brunei Bay. What is the connection with Funan? The extract from the T'ang Shu quoted above concludes with the statement that the customs and products of Chin-li-p'i-shih (the Borneo Srivijaya) are the same as those of Chenla (Nicholl, 1980a: 221). These customs included exposed burial reported by the Chinese in Funan and as late as the thirteenth century in P'o-ni, the immediate predecessor to modem Brunei (Nicholl, n.d.: 10). The above very brief account has been confusing enough. However, it is possible to argue from such evidence that when the Empire of Funan finally collapsed under the impact of the Khmer advance, the Sailendra family and its entourage fled to Borneo, probably some time in the 680s, where they settled on the shores of Brunei Bay at the mouth of the Lawas river. Here they built their new capital Srivijaya, which in due course became known as Burni and was rendered into Chinese as P'o-ni or Fo-ni. (Nicholl, 1980a: 222.)

This hypothesis receives some support from indigenous Brunei sources. These sources are of unknown antiquity and only a few have been committed to writing in recent times. There are different versions of some of the legends and scholars are aware that there are more than outsiders have had related to them. It is essentially an oral tradition and thus there have been accretions over the years so that events have been altered or displaced in time and strange paradoxes occur. For example, the Dutch introduced tobacco about 1600, but its use is attributed to a time much earlier. Moreover, the purpose of these legends is not to tell what really happened, but to impart a moral, to explain origins, and to glorify the ruling line. They may be compared to the legends of King Arthur in English folklore, to Norse sagas, and to early chronicles. They create an

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acceptable past, establish a racial and national identity, enrich the imagination and culture, provide a nationl iconography and a fabric for common discourse, and place the present in a line of continuity by reinforcing social, political, and ethical values. Nevertheless, as with the stories of King Arthur, an element of historical fact may be discerned, expressed in a symbolic way. As the stories approach more recent times, historical elements become more common and actual events are depicted. The most important legends in Brunei are those associated with Alak Betatar whose exploits and those of his brothers (one of whom is Awang Semaun) are the subject of the Shaer Awang Semaun, the Brunei foundation myth. There are many versions, including some from Sarawak and Sabah. In 1970, D. E. Brown wrote a composite summary of those he had heard in Brunei. In this version, an egg descended from Kayangan, the heaven of the old MalayoIndonesian gods, and landed in the upper Limbang River near Brunei. From this egg emerged a young man known as Sultan Dewa Emas Kayangan who married a Murut woman from the Limbang. When she was three months' pregnant, she developed a longing for exotic foods. Her husband borrowed his father-in-law's spear and went hunting, wounding a wild ox which fled with the spear stuck in it. The young man followed the wounded animal to retrieve the spear but, before doing so, left a note and a ring for his wife. The young man's search took him to another river, where he again married. When this wife was pregnant, he left her, again with a ring and a note, and travelled on to another river where the pattern was repeated. In all, he married fourteen women at different places around Brunei Bay. The offspring of these unions were all males who, as they grew up, were ashamed of having no father. The first-born decided to trace his father and set out with the ring and the note left with his mother. Eventually he came to the river where lived the second-born, who had a ring and a note similar to those of the first. The two brothers travelled on together to find their father and eventually the fourteen brothers were united with each other and with their father. They stayed for a time with their father in Kayangan and then returned to earth. They chose Alak Betatar as their leader because of his intelligence and good looks, although he was not the eldest. Awang Semaun (the youngest), Jerambak, and Demang excelled as war leaders. With forces drawn from the peoples around Brunei Bay, the brothers conquered all or most of coastal Borneo and some of the islands to the south and east. They

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created many of the geographical features of Brunei, chose the site of Brunei's capital, established many of Brunei's customs and social characteristics, and eventually converted to Islam, Alak Betatar becoming the first Muslim ruler as Sultan Muhammad. (D. E. Brown, 1970: 134-5.) The arrival of Islam in Brunei will be discussed in Chapter 3. By making Alak Betatar the first Muslim ruler as well as the founder of the original Brunei state, we have a case of 'telescoping' time common in Malay annals in general. What is interesting in the Awang Semaun myth is the derivation of Brunei's founders from a union with a heavenly figure, a god, and the indigenous inhabitants. Brunei's founders are thus of divine origin but they are also bumiputera, sons of the soil. Their actions legitimize Brunei's social hierarchy, validate many of its customs, and identify the founding line with the very geography of the landscape. In the versions now extant, Alak Betatar as Sultan Muhammad becomes founder of the royal line culminating in Sultan Hassanal, thus underpinning his authority and his claim to represent in his person the embodiment of Brunei identity. The story of Alak Betatar appears in the legends of other people around Brunei Bay and further afield. The indigenous people of ulu Belait, that is the people of the upper Belait River, who call themselves Orang Bukit although designated Dusuns by others, have an Alak Betatar legend which identifies the hero as one of themselves. The Bisayas of the Limbang River have a version which traces Alak Betatar back to a Javanese king, while the Melanau legend of their great folk-hero Tugau has him defeated by Alak Betatar and the Melanau lands made a dependency of Brunei. Out of all this, one fundamental fact emerges: that a group of people arrived in Brunei Bay, conquered the existing inhabitants, and established a new state, which then extended its power along the coast. This is the abiding folk memory which generated the legend. Where did these people come from? The attribution of divine origin probably derives from their higher culture and the material evidence of it. These were no 'boat people', destitute and powerless. It is likely that they were a relatively large and well-equipped force, which they would be if princes had set forth with their retainers and followers and their portable goods. With a coherent social organization, a chain of command, and a combination of gifts and force, they would soon subjugate or win over the local inhabitants amongst whom they had landed, like beings from another planet. They must have acquired a reputation for invincibility which attracted others to their

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cause as success bred success. Could they have come from Funan? Reference to the map of South-East Asia shows that the north-west coast of Borneo is accessible enough to seafarers from southern Vietnam or Cambodia, especially if it is remembered that Funan was a maritime trading state. Whether they came from Funan direct, or via P'o-li (if it was on the Sarawak coast) is to a large extent irrelevant. The process of migration from Funan may well have begun with the Khmer conquest of the northern part of that state, the area which became Land Chenla in the middle of the sixth century AD, but the main dispersal of the royal family would have been after the final conquest at the beginning of the seventh. The important factor is that the link with Funan has entered the Brunei history books. It is at least as viable a fact of history as King Alfred and the cakes or the legendary towers of Camelot.

2 Pre-Islamic Brunei

IT has been seen that trading ports developed on the coast of northwest Borneo early in the Christian era. No permanent remains have been discovered, no ruins of temples or palaces such as are common in mainland South-East Asia. Like Srivijaya, the Bornean coastal states were in areas with no ready access to building stone. Their cities were of wood and once abandoned were soon destroyed by the climate and the encroachment of the jungle. In the Sarawak River delta, pottery has survived and evidence of iron working, showing that an important trading settlement existed there, which may have been the P'o-li of the Chinese records. Likewise, elsewhere on the coast, the main evidence of settlement is the accumulation of pottery sherds and occasional objects of metal or stone. It is very likely that remains of settlements as yet unknown exist buried under the alluvial deposits now inland from the coast. The Bornean rivers have carried silt into the shallow waters of the South China Sea for centuries, thus extending the coast seawards in some places at the rate of more than 10 metres a year Gackson, 1968: 22). It is possible that the site of early P'o-ni, for example, is buried under several metres of deposit, a considerable distance from the present coast, while in these expanding river deltas, the courses of the distributaries of the main rivers are constantly shifting and changing. Whatever clues the swamp jungles of lowland Borneo hold may be a long time in coming to light. If the predecessor of modern Brunei was the Vijayapura mentioned in Chapter 1, it has left no tangible remains, but some idea of it can be derived from Chinese and Arabic sources. It exported camphor of high quality, along with low assay gold, gaharu wood, cowries, rattans, hornbill, bezoar stones, the feathers of exotic birds, and other items of jungle produce. In particular, camphor and cowries were the two products which distinguished early Brunei from other ports, for they came in quantity only from the northwest coast of Borneo. When writers mention camphor and cowries,

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there is a better than even chance they are writing of early Brunei. These products did not come from the immediate hinterland of the port city itself. The Brunei empire, whatever its name, was a thalassocracy. It controlled trade, not territory. A Brunei pengiran or noble, stationed at or near the mouth of some river, attracted the independent peoples of the interior to exchange those goods he desired for export for Indian cottons, Venetian beads, Chinese jars, and other items they could be persuaded to covet. A mutually advantageous relationship was fostered, but Bruneian rule could not be said to exist in the interior. At most it extended to the hinterland of Brunei Bay and isolated trading centres and their immediate hinterlands. It was held together by control of the sea, which meant control of those who had the skills to navigate and to man trading and fighting vessels. These were the orang laut who, under the command of Brunei pengiran, controlled the sea lanes and channelled trade into Brunei's ports. This relationship between the Brunei ruling class and the orang laut can be seen at work in the description of attacks upon Vietnam in AD 767 and Champa in AD 774 and AD 787. That of AD 767 was defeated, that of AD 774 resulted in pursuit and a sea battle, while that of AD 787 was destructive to the Chams. The latter described their attackers as cannibals and dark, almost black, which does not square with an attack by Brunei Malays. However, head-hunting and cannibalism are often attributed together in the literature and the orang laut, from prolonged exposure to the sun on the open sea, were far darker than their contemporaries of other races. It is possible that the attacks upon coastal Vietnam and Champa here were by a force led by Brunei pengiran and composed of native Borneans who took heads in battle and of orang laut who manned the ships. If the Bruneian leadership came originally from Funan, there would be nothing remarkable about their attacking mainland successor states (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 25). Later evidence of such a combination at least makes this conclusion feasible. It is also probable that the earliest trading states on the coast of north-west Borneo operated on similar lines. The likes of Ye-po-ti and P' o-li have been mentioned and it is not surprising, given the development of trade across the Bay of Bengal and onwards from India to the Middle East, East Mrica, and the eastern Mediterranean, that echoes of these states should appear in Western writings. The great Geography of Ptolemy drew on a wide range of sources and has been accused of containing much that is mythological or of doubtful veracity, but even these may conceal a truth. Thus, Ptolemy's Iabadiou (usually translated as Island of Barley and

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23

which scholars generally agree is the Yava-dvipa of the Hindu classic, the Ramayana) may point to Borneo. In Ptolemy's day, Beta or 'B' was pronounced 'V'. Coedes (1968) placed it in Java, Braddell (1980: 249-50) in Borneo because Iabadiou was reputedly rich in minerals and gold, which was true of Borneo but not of Java. Nicholl (1986: 42), tracing toponyms through various transitions, finds reasons for suggesting that it may have been in modern Sarawak and that, as the Bidayuh word 'Java' means light, Iabadiou may mean 'Island of Light', for, certainly, no barley grows in these climes. Similarly, Ptolemy's Island of Satryes whose inhabitants had tails produced a canard about Borneo repeated often since. A possible explanation for this is that the chawat or loin-cloth worn by the Dayaks of the interior is so tied that from a distance the knot at the back can look like a short tail (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 3). These and other accounts collected by Nicholl in his unpublished 'Sources for the History of Brunei' may be variously interpreted, but references to camphor and to a mountain of great size, in some cases associated with naga or dragons, all point to a location on the north-west coast of Borneo. In the case of Ye-po-ti, visited by the Chinese Buddhist monk Fa-hsien in AD 413, it may have been, as Nicholl (1990: Vol. I, 11) suggests, at Santubong in Sarawak. It was, wrote Fa-hsien, a place where various forms of error and Brahmanism flourished and Buddhism was not worth speaking of. If this was the She-P'o reported on by the monk Huei-kiau in AD 519, it had by AD 424 been converted to Buddhism by the monk Gunavarman, and rock inscriptions of Buddhist texts at Batu Pahat on the Sungai Teharik in west Kalimantan may derive from this time, suggesting that the influence of this state extended over what is now south-west Sarawak and north-west Kalimantan (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 12). These rather vague and undefined reports of trading states and kingdoms are unsatisfactory. There is no feel for the life or the people in these precursors of Brunei. With the appearance of P'o-li, this begins to change. The Liang Shu describes P'o-li's climate as 'warm, just as the summer in China; rice ripens twice a year and plants and trees are very luxuriant. The sea produces spotted conches and cowries.' The people wear cotton sarongs while the king wears silk and a golden hat more than a foot high adorned with precious stones. 'He carries a sword inlaid with gold and sits on a golden throne, with his feet on a silver foot-stool.' He travels in a carriage drawn by an elephant. The king's family name is Kaundinya, with its echo of Funan. Here is clearly a prosperous kingdom, of which more is learned in the Chiu T'ang Shu and the Hsin

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T'ang Shu, which describe the kingdom in AD 630. Because of the references to gold, pearls, the discus knife once used in Borneo, the making of offerings by floating them on water as the Melanaus of Sarawak do to this day, Nicholl (1990: Vol. I, 17) agrees with Braddell in placing P'o-li in north-west Borneo. P'o-li sent its last embassy to China in AD 630 and after AD 692 is mentioned no more in the Chinese records. Thereafter, there is mention of Shih-li-fo-Shih, from which regular embassies arrive in China, and in Arabic sources of Sribuza: both of which can be transliterations of Srivijaya. As seen in Chapter 1, this name could refer to Srivijaya Palembang, but where it is linked with the Mountain of Camphor and a floating city, it may be assumed to be the Srivijaya on Brunei Bay. That P'o-li had been eclipsed suggests that it had been incorporated into the trading empire of this new Bruneian kingdom. Its influence spread northwards as well, trading camphor from Tawaran, which Nicholl places as Tuaran, and extending into the Philippines. This first thalassocracy was short-lived, however, for it came up against the more powerful thalassocracy of Srivijaya Palembang. Writing in AD 903, an Arab, Ibn Rosteh, listed Tawaran, from which came camphor, as one of the possessions of the Maharaja of Javaga or Srivijaya. He went on to say that camphor appeared in this island in AH 220 (AD 835), which suggests that Tawaran came under the Maharaja's control then and implies that Brunei was also part of his possessions (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 27). It was to remain so until the end of the tenth century and during that time had no direct contact with China. The fleets of Srivijaya directed all trade to Palembang. It was from there that Arab and Chinese and other merchants would obtain the products they desired, including Borneo's camphor. This subservience is emphasized by that Captain Buzurg whose description of Sribuza's floating city was mentioned earlier. The Captain listed Sribuza as a dependency of the Maharaja in AD 954 and in his story of the Angry Jew reveals how tightly trade and shipping were controlled. The Jew in question was a merchant wishing to travel from Oman to China. Taking into account known port dues at other entrepots, he might have reasonably expected to pay 6 dinars to depart from Sribuza (Brunei). To his horror and anger, he was faced with an extortionate charge of 20,000 dinars, which would suggest that it was a bribe to the shahbandar (harbour master) for permission to break the prohibition on direct trade with China (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 38; see also Nicholl, 1980a: 39). How complete this trade embargo had been was shown in AD 977 when

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contact with China was resumed. A tribute of camphor was sent to the Emperor of China by the King of P' o-ni. It was conveyed by a Muslim merchant whom the Chinese record as Pu-Iu-hsia, Pu being a common prefix for Muslim names in Chinese. Nicholl transcribes this as Feroz Shah, but the point is that the route to China was not known by native Bruneian navigators and the embassy had to be entrusted to a foreign merchant. That the embassy was sent indicates that word had reached Brunei that war had broken out between Srivijaya in Sumatra and the Javanese. This war kept the Sumatran fleet occupied and enabled the distant tributaries of the Srivijayan thalassocracy to regain their freedom of action. The use of a new name in the Chinese records is further evidence of the prolonged break in contact while Srivijaya dominated the South China Sea. The independence of Brunei is confirmed in an Arab source dated C.AD 987 (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 58). In C.AD 980, the Chinese Yueh Shih remarked that the name P'o-ni had not been known before, but that many states had changed their names, presumably to mark their new freedom. However, according to Pelliot (see D. E. Brown, 1970: 132), P'o-ni had already appeared in the Man Shu of Tan Ch'o written in about AD 860. Whatever the case, there is now a more definite link to modern Brunei, for the name P'o-ni remained in use by the Chinese until replaced by Bun-Iai in the seventeenth century. Indeed, the Chinese characters used for P'o and for Fo (it sometimes appeared as Fo-ni) were used for the first syllable in 'Buddha'. Thus the sound in each case was pronounced Bu-ni and changed later to Brunei and was applied to the whole island of Borneo (Nicholl, 1984a: 4). In the tenth century, P'o-ni began to expand its influence. It re-established its links with the orang laut and soon its vessels were ranging along the Borneo coast and into the waters of the Philippines and Sulu. The Chinese reported a tribute-bearing mission of 1082 from a king they named Sri Ma-dja. The eminent scholar Groenveldt read this as Sri Maharaja. The ruler of P'o-ni had taken the title of the ruler of Srivijaya, a sure indication that he ruled a thalassocracy which aspired to rival that of Sumatra (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 63). The Brunei thalassocracy features in Arabic writing of this time. Abu Abdullah ibn-Muhammad al-Idrisi in his Book of Delights for Those W'ho Desire to Travel Round the World, written in about 1154, drew on information from merchants and seamen to describe the Islands of Muja, Suma, and Mayd, which can be identified with north-west Sabah, Brunei Bay, and Luzon respectively. Arab writers

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used 'island' loosely for any place reached by sea, and, indeed, trading ports in much of the archipelago were like islands separated from each other by stretches of jungle and accessible to each other only by sea. References to monsoons, civet musks, horses (found in Sabah), dress, ornament, the dark-skinned orang laut and, above all, to camphor help place these references. Other Arab writers made similar references, and their claims are given weight by similar descriptions in Chinese sources. One of the most important of these is that by Chau Ju-kua, Inspector of Foreign Trade in the Province of Fukien, in his Chu-fan-chi [Record of Foreign Nations], written in 1225. Chau was in a position to learn about the states that traded with China. He mentioned the wealth of P'o-ni, its camphor, its large fleet, and a form of pearl worship which caused Nicholl (1990: Vol. I, 71-2) to speculate that the main religion ofP'o-ni at this time was Taoism. That Brunei's influence embraced the Philippines and Sulu was also suggested, for Sulu was the principal source of pearls and Ma-i (the Arab Mayd) was clearly a well-ordered place with an established hierarchical society, yet it did not send tribute to China; the reason was that it was a dependency of Brunei, the Manila nobility being related to the Brunei royal family (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 73). Relations between P'o-ni and China were not always peaceful. Nicholl speculates that as early as the ninth century AD there may have been a Chinese military occupation of part of northern Borneo to control the trade in camphor. It could not have been long-lived. More feasible is conflict with China under the Mongol or Yuan dynasty, for China under the Mongols was an aggressive power and in 1293 launched the attack upon Java, mentioned in Chapter 1. This was the only Chinese attack upon Java, yet Marco Polo, who left China in 1292, wrote of the Great Khan that he had made several attacks upon Java the Great to no avail. Scholars have argued about 'Java the Great', but it is clear that it was not Java as we know it, and was the name applied in European writing to Borneo until the beginning of the sixteenth century. If the Chinese and Mongol forces had been defeated by Javanese forces, court poets would have proclaimed the Javanese victory. As it is, there is no evidence of other than the one attack on Java. Chau Ju-kua mentioned the fleet of over 100 war vessels which P'o-ni commanded. The supremacy of this fleet would account for the Chinese failures: a possibility linked with storms off a coast with few safe harbours or anchorages. Marco Polo's account also mentioned an island called Lochac (variously spelled) from which was exported gold, brazil wood, and the cowries used as currency in south-west China. This place, too, had foiled

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27

the Great Khan's attempts to attack it. The cowries suggest that this, too, was Brunei and that Marco Polo had confused two separate sources of information; or perhaps the two places were part of the thalassocracy of P'o-ni. Whatever the case, Odoric of Pordenone, describing his visit to Java the Great in 1323, also referred to its defeat of the Great Khan. There is evidence, therefore, of a powerful maritime kingdom on the north-west coast of Borneo (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 82-3). This kingdom was also rich. Odoric described an audience hall tiled with gold and silver tiles, the ceiling of gold and walls decorated with majestic figures with haloes about their heads. The latter were Taoist images and the presence of so much gold ruled out Java the Great being on modern Java. Ma Huan, who visited Majapahit in 1410 at the end of its century of glory, found a wooden palace and very little gold (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 84). It is worth bearing in mind that this ostentatious display was associated with the ruler. His subjects, like those of all subjects in South-East Asia, would have lived in modest dwellings of wood and thatch and matting. The ruler of a powerful thalassocracy commanding a wide area of trade and with access to the gold-bearing regions of Borneo could have afforded ostentation in his own quarters. A few years later, the Chinese merchant Wang Ta-yuan, who may have visited Brunei in about 1330, recorded that the people were lavish in their habits and that they were good accountants, a tribute to the commercial class of this port city. He referred to a mountain he called the Lung Shan or Dragon Mountain (Kinabalu is associated with dragons) and to a fine broad plateau which, if it is the Keningau Plateau, would place the city on the Lawas River, the mouth of which would have been further inland from its present position (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 88). The famous traveller Sheik Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Batuta of Morocco visited in about 1346 the port of Kaylukari in the Land of Tawalisi. Ibn Batuta often exaggerated to embellish a story, but basically his account of his travels is based on facts which can be checked. Yet many commentators feel that in Tawalisi he entered fantasyland, for there, in a country whose king possessed many ships and made war successfully upon the Chinese, he met a princess, Urduja, who rode and fought like an Amazon and greeted him in Turkish. Yet, an argument can be presented which supports the contention that Kaylukari lay on the coast of Sabah, whose Bajau horsemen are famous to this day. The Mongols employed Turkishspeaking warriors and it is not impossible to imagine survivors from a defeated Mongol/Chinese attack or from a fleet driven before a typhoon, ending up on the Borneo coast, with their horses. Nor is it

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impossible that a king's daughter may have learned Turkish and Bajaus become horsemen (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 95; see also Nicholl, 1978: 39). Ibn Batuta said of the kingdom of Tawalisi: 'It is very extensive, and the Sovereign is equal to the King of China. He possesses numerous junks, with which he makes war on the Chinese, until they consent to sue for peace, and grant him certain concessions.' That the King of P'o-ni could maintain a proud independence depended on the fleet which kept open the arteries of trade. If it weakened, was defeated in battle, or destroyed in a storm, or if it became disenchanted and transferred its loyalty, the power of P'o-ni could be broken almost overnight. And this is, apparently, what happened; for the next we hear of Brunei is as a dependency of the empire of Majapahit, paying an annual tribute of 40 kati (1 kati is equivalent to 605 grams) of camphor to its Javanese overlord. In the Negara-Kertagama, the great court poem of the monk Prapanca written in 1365, Brunei appears as Burungeng, just one of a number of Majapahit vassals on Borneo. What had happened? Nicholl argues that the P'o-ni fleet could not have been defeated by Majapahit, for Prapanca would have recorded such an exploit. He suggests that the plague, the Black Death, which ravaged China in the fourteenth century and spread to Vietnam and Thailand, also reached P'o-ni. Unable to man its fleet at former levels, P'o-ni and its dependencies lay open to the expanding power of Majapahit (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 97). Other possibilities are the mass defection of the orang laut because of dissatisfaction with their treatment by the ruling class, and overextension of the empire's resources. Whatever the causes, P'o-ni reached its nadir in 1369 when it was sacked and looted by its former vassals, the Suluks. A Majapahit fleet came to Brunei's rescue, but the raiders carried off vast booty, including the two precious pearls mentioned by Chau Ju-kua as objects of worship (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 98; see also Nicholl, 1980a: 229). When a Chinese embassy reached P'o-ni in 1371, it found little more than a poor fishing village. These same envoys had been accredited to the rulers of Majapahit and P'o-ni as to two equal states, again indicating how rapid P'o-ni's eclipse had been. The Chinese envoys' description of P'o-ni emphasized its poverty: The country of P'o-ni is hot and torrid with frequent storms. The town has no outer wall, and its defence is effected by a fence of tree poles. The Residence of the king has upper storeys, the roofs of which are covered

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with pei-to [nipa palm?] leaves. The king ties his hair in a knot, wears a piece of coloured cloth round his waist, and goes barefooted. He has no horse or sedan chair and goes about on foot. There are less than three thousand households in the town, and the people are mostly fishermen. The men have their hair cut straight across the foreheads. The women wear short blouses that cover only their breasts and backs, with pieces of coloured cloth tied around their waists. They go barefooted and wear their hair loose .... They have no proper dishes and cups, and eat out of vessels made of pei-to leaves woven together, which they throwaway after the meal. They also have no pens or paper, and write by engraving with knives on pei-to leaves. They worship their god with ardour, and the thirteenth of the fifth month is their main festival. On that day many religious activities take place. For feasting, they eat goats, pigs, chicken and geese, and make merry by beating drums and cymbals. (C.C. Brown, 1972: 221.)

The absence of pottery and chinaware is significant for these were among the principal items of Chinese trade with South-East Asia. One gains an impression of the completeness of the Suluk sack. The Mongol regime in China had been overthrown in 1368 and the envoys represented the effort by Hung-wu, the first Emperor of the Ming dynasty, to re-establish tributary relations which had been disrupted. Fearful of Majapahit reaction, Ma-ha-mo-sha, the King of P'o-ni, sent, with some reluctance, a tribute mission with the returning Chinese envoys. His name has caused some writers to suggest that he is Muhammad Shah, first Muslim ruler of Brunei, but the mention of pigs among the animals eaten on feast days makes this most unlikely and the name is probably the Chinese transliteration of a title. The P'o-ni envoy who headed the tribute mission that returned with the Chinese envoys to China was named I-szu-ma-i, which is generally accepted as Ismail. However, it is likely that P'o-ni, in its impoverished state and still subject to Majapahit, employed a Muslim merchant as an envoy. This renewed contact with China was not immediately followed up. P'o-ni remained a dependency of Majapahit until that state weakened after the death of Hayam Wuruk in 1398. Moreover, Emperor Hung-wu did not follow up his early attempt to revive the tribute system. That was left to Emperor Yung-lo, who ascended the throne in 1403 and immediately dispatched envoys to various countries to invite them to pay tribute. P'o-ni did not wait for an invitation. Its ruler, Ma-na-je-chia-na, which may be the Chinese rendering of Maharaja Kama, sent a mission to China in 1405. It was well received and the Emperor sent officials to P'o-ni to invest Ma-na-je-chia-na as king and to give him an official seal and various

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gifts. In gratitude, Ma-na-je-chia-na sent another mlSSlOn which arrived in China in January 1407, and then, in August 1408, he personally led a mission which included his wife and young son, his brothers, other relatives, and officials, totalling over 150 persons in all. He was received with great honour but, tragically, died at Nanking at the age of twenty-eight. He was buried with full ceremonies in a tomb outside Nanking that was rediscovered in 1958. His fouryear-old son, Hsia-wang (possibly a Chinese rendering of Suri Wangsa), was installed as king by the Emperor and Ma-na-je-chiana's three younger brothers were given titles so that they might assist him in the government. Hsia-wang received gifts of caps, suits, belts, saddles, various vessels and other regalia, gold, silver, brocades, and cash, while members of his entourage received gifts according to their rank. The young king was also given a stone tablet to be placed on P'o-ni's state mountain, an honour given only to four countries: Japan, Malacca, P'o-ni, and Cochin. The mountain was to be known as the Mountain of Lasting Tranquillity Preserving the State, and Brunei thereafter was known to the Chinese as the Country of Lasting Tranquillity. In Arabic, after the conversion of Brunei to Islam, this became Darussalam, Abode of Peace, the title the state bears to this day. The Ming Emperor's stone was in the nature of a boundary marker for it was to be placed on the mountain behind the capital of P'o-ni. If ever located, it would solve for ever the controversy as to where that capital was sited. It was hardly at Kota Batu on the Brunei River. Although there is evidence of settlement there from an early date, the Kota Batu ridge is not high and behind it and a low range of hills lies the sea. Nicholl has adduced reasons for siting it on the Lawas River, with the mountain wall of the Ruan Sepakoi rising 1300 metres behind it. If the stone was placed there, its inscription would be meant to be read, and so it would have been placed on the route by which travellers still cross from the interior to the coast. Perhaps it still lies buried beneath the debris of the jungle, just as the remains of the capital of P'o-ni may lie in the mud of the Lawas Delta (Nicholl, 1980b: 28-31; see also Nicholl, 1984b and C. C. Brown, 1972 and 1974a). King Hsia-wang also received from Emperor Yung-Io permission to cease sending tribute to Majapahit, thus obtaining recognition of P'o-ni's independence from Java. Over the following years, P'o-ni assiduously sent embassies to China, including one in 1412 headed by Hsia-wang accompanied by his mother. Over the same period, those states which had previously been under P'o-ni but which had assumed their independence during P'o-ni's eclipse and had sent

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tribute-bearing missions to China on their own behalf, now gradually ceased to do do. The last mission from Luzon arrived in 1410; the last from Sulu in 1424. Their cessation indicated that they had again come under P'o-ni's control. Pigafetta, who visited Brunei a century later, told the story of how the ruler married the daughter of the King of Sulu. Learning that her father had two great pearls, he went to Sulu with fifty prahus, captured the king and his two sons, and released them only on the surrender of the pearls. Were these the pearls stolen from P'o-ni in the Suluk sack of 1369? Whatever the case, the pearls were in Brunei when Pigafetta visited in 1521. Sulu was ruled by Brunei viceroys or adipati and the old P'o-ni thalassocracy had been revived. The Malaccan mid-fifteenth-century epic, the Hikayat Hang Tuah, said that the adipati of Sulu was a son of the ruler of Brunei, and it is probable that the post was generally held by Brunei royalty. By 1521, when Pifagetta arrived, the Brunei empire extended to Laoe in the Kapuas Delta. Laoe had attempted to transfer its allegiance to Java and was sacked by a Brunei expedition for its temerity. The extent of Brunei power is illustrated by Pigafetta's statement that this punitive expedition was led by a son of the ruler of Luzon (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. I, 114, 117; see also Nicholl, 1980a: 230). The fifteenth century, which saw the revival of the Brunei thalassocracy, was a time of momentous change in South-East Asia. Like all changes, it cannot be placed within the neat confines of a century, for its beginnings go back further and its consequences are still with us. Nevertheless, two significant events occurred. The first was widespread conversion to Islam in island South-East Asia and the Malay Peninsula. The second was the opening of a sea route between Europe and India which, in the first years of the sixteenth century, brought European power to the gates of South-East Asia. The days of South-East Asian thalassocracies were numbered.

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PART II

The Rise and Decline of the Brunei Thalassocracy

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3 The Early Muslim Sultanate to c.1550

THE date at which Brunei accepted Islam as its official religion and became a Muslim sultanate is a controversial issue which impinges upon Brunei's status in the world today, upon the self-image and identity of the Bruneian people, and upon the fundamental purpose of history as a discipline. Whether Brunei can trace its antecedents back to Funan is an open question, because the evidence is sparse and its interpretation problematical. At most, the contention can bolster the prestige of the ruling dynasty, but the links are too tenuous to be pursued too seriously. With Islam, however, one confronts a facet of Brunei's history which is of great contemporary importance. In Islamic South-East Asia, a small state like Brunei could acquire immense prestige if it could be shown that Islam took firm root there first and that the Brunei royal family represented the longest Muslim line of descent in the region. Islam entered South-East Asia very early. The presence of Muslim traders by the ninth century AD has been noted. Muslims reached China overland through central Asia and by sea, so that by the fourteenth century there were substantial Muslim communities in the port cities of southern China. The Ming dynasty was sympathetic to Islam and Muslims were employed on the maritime expeditions sent out by Emperor Yung-Io at the beginning of the fifteenth century. The Ming court had specific regulations for the treatment of Muslim delegations and embassies which included the provision of a pork-free diet (c. C. Brown, 1974b: 230). Chinese Muslim merchants traded in South-East Asia, as did Arab and Indian Muslims. The presence of Muslim tombstones indicates that Muslims were active in Brunei certainly by the thirteenth century. As with all inscriptions exposed to weathering, the tombstones are not easy to decipher. That of a daughter of one Sultan Abdul Majid ... Ibni Muhammad Shah was believed at one time to date from AH 440 (1084), but later study has revealed this to be a misreading; and

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there can be no certainty that the princess was the daughter of a Brunei sultan, the name Abdul Majid not appearing in the accepted lists. There is no doubt about the tomb of a Chinese Muslim, P'u-kung dated 1264 (Franke and Ch'en, 1973), and there are several Muslim tombs from the fifteenth century. These tombstones prove only the presence of Muslims: they do not prove that Brunei was at that time a Muslim state. One of these, dated AH 821 (1418-19), is lotus-shaped and has on its obverse a Sanskrit inscription in what may be the sole surviving example of the ancient Brunei script (Shariffuddin and Nicholl, 1975). This stone is the only such remain from pre-Islamic Brunei, unless excavations undertaken at Kota Batu in late 1990, which revealed a large stone platform and pillar bases, belong to this time. The problem is that the inscribed stone mentioned above may have arrived in Brunei from elsewhere, perhaps as ballast. On the other hand, a recent study of a gravestone from a cemetery near the centre of Bandar Seri Begawan has concluded that the stone was engraved in Quanzhou, China, for a Brunei sultan, in about AH 700 (1301). The inscription is in Arabic and in translation reads, 'This tomb belongs to the late martyr Sultan, a learned and just man protected and made victorious [by Allah]. He was called Maharaja Bruni.' No personal name or date appears on the stone, but Chen Da-sheng, who has made a study of Muslim gravestones from Quanzhou, is convinced of its provenance and date, and attributes also to Quanzhou the tomb of the Chinese Muslim P'u-kung, mentioned above (Chen, 1992). The gravestone suggests that a Muslim ruler ruled Brunei (P'o-ni) at a date earlier than even the Brunei Genealogical Tablet allows for. Was this person perhaps a Chinese Muslim who had acquired power? Was he the founder or member of a short-lived dynasty which reverted to the old religion or was overthrown? The evidence in the next paragraph seems to suggest that if a Muslim dynasty did rule, it did not last; and this may account for the absence of earlier sultans from the Genealogical Tablet. In recent years, an attempt has been made by some Brunei scholars to push the conversion of the ruling family back to the fourteenth century. They quote as evidence the name of the ruler of P'o-ni in 1371, given by the Chinese as Ma-ha-mo-sha, which the scholar Pelliot suggested might be a Chinese rendering of Muhammad Shah (Nicholl, 1989: 178). That the people reputedly consumed pork at their feasts renders this unlikely (c. c. Brown, 1972: 221). Admittedly, the P'o-ni embassy to China was led by one the

THE EARLY MUSLIM SULTANATE

37

Chinese named as I-szu-ma-i, which has been rendered as Ismail, and the memorial it presented to the Emperor was written in a script which was similar to Arabic (c. C. Brown, 1972: 229 fn. 21). This would indicate the presence of Muslims at the court. On the other hand, P'o-ni ruler Ma-na-je-chia-na, who died in China in 1408, was not treated as a Muslim by the Chinese authorities. His delegation did not receive the special food ration which excluded pork, nor was he given a Muslim burial (C. C. Brown, 1974a: 227). There is no doubt that the Ming authorities were aware of the requirements and obligations of Islam and that they employed Muslim officials to look after their co-religionists. The embassy led by Ma-na-je-chia-na's successor also did not receive the special rations; but some of P'o-ni's lesser embassies did, suggesting that they were led by Muslims, either members of the Brunei elite or people employed by them (c. C. Brown, 1974b: 230-1). The employment of outsiders for special missions or in positions at the court was common in South-East Asia. A ruler often felt safer with men dependent on him for their position than with possible rivals or usurpers from his own people. A European reader has only to think of the courts of Europe during late medieval and Renaissance times. The presence of Muslims in positions of trust in P'o-ni had as little relevance to the religious proclivities of the ruler as the employment of Christians by King Narai of Siam in the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that during the fifteenth century Islam increased its influence. A Muslim ruler may have become established in Perlak in north Sumatra as early as the ninth century AD, but Islam only spread as the Hindu/Buddhist empires weakened. Marco Polo reported that in 1292 Perlak was Muslim and had absorbed neighbouring Pasai. In the important spice islands of the Moluccas, a Muslim dynasty was established in about 1250. Muslim trading communities existed in other ports of the region, but it was only in the fifteenth century that Islam triumphed in Malacca, which developed a prosperous and powerful trading empire at the expense of Buddhist Ayutthaya and declining Majapahit. By conquest, marriages and conversion, Malacca, firmly Muslim from 1436, brought under its control the states of the Malay Peninsula and east Sumatra. Islam spread along the trade routes, reinforcing the Muslim presence already noticeable in the trading ports, and attracting rulers who wished to assert their independence from Majapahit and to ally or improve relations with Malacca. It now seems clear that a large Muslim minority would usually have existed for some time before a ruler was converted and

38

A HISTORY OF BRUNEI

a state officially became Muslim. This appears to have been the case in Brunei. The authority of the ruler in Brunei rested on the traditional religion, but at some point the balance was tipped in favour of Islam. The question is, when? The only documentary evidence for the conversion comes from Portuguese sources. The Portuguese entered South-East Asia to acquire control of the spice trade. They established their headquarters at Goa in India in 1510 and captured Malacca in 151l. At the end of that year, they sent a small fleet to the Moluccas, the source of nutmeg and cloves. Under Monso d' Albuquerque, the Viceroy at Goa, the Portuguese established fortified trading centres to control the trade in spices, relying, like the Asian thalassocracies before them, upon their control of the sea. The Portuguese in Malacca were assiduous in reporting to their superiors in Goa and Lisbon what they learned of the states they traded with. Once the immediate shock of Malacca's capture had worn off, trade resumed, and in January 1514, three trading junks from Brunei entered Malacca's port. On 6 January 1514, Rui de Brito Patalim, Captain-General of Malacca, informed D' Albuquerque in Goa that one of these junks belonged to the Temenggong of Malacca, who was from Brunei, indicating an important link between Brunei and Malacca. The Bruneians traded camphor and other Borneo items for cloth from Gujerat and other merchandise. In his letter of the same date written to King Manoel I of Portugal, De Brito added of Brunei: 'The King is a pagan, but the merchants are Moors.' (Nicholl, 1975: 4.) Like the Spanish, the Portuguese, from years of fighting the Muslims of north Mrica, called all Muslims Moors. They had a vested interest in ascertaining the religious affiliation of those they dealt with. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of De Brito's statement, for he clearly had conversation with the merchants from Brunei. It is in any case supported by Tome Pires, Supervisor of the Spice Trade in Malacca from 1512 to 1515 and author of the Summa Oriental, an encyclopaedia of South-East Asian trade. It was Pires's job to obtain information. Like the Arabs, he wrote of Borneo as a group of islands, for that is how it appeared from his end of the trade routes, each port a separate destination or 'island'. Of these, he wrote that they 'are almost all inhabited by heathen, only the chief one is inhabited by Moors; it is not very long since that the King became a Moor.' (Nicholl, 1975: 4.) In other words, some time between January 1514 and December 1515, the King or Maharaja of Brunei embraced Islam and became the first sultan, Sultan Muhammad.

THE EARLY MUSLIM SULTANATE

39

That the conversion of the ruler took place at this time is supported in a negative fashion by the Chinese writer Huang Sheng-ts'eng, who wrote of P'o-ni in 1520 that it was Buddhist (Nicholl, 1980b: 34-5); that is, the conversion was so recent that knowledge of it had not reached Huang at the time of writing-an unlikely state of affairs if the conversion had taken place a century or more before. The Brunei sources for the conversion to Islam are the Silsilah Raja-raja Bernnai, or Books of Succession, of which three versions have been published, one by Sir Hugh Low in 1880 and a comparison of two Malay texts by Amin Sweeney in 1968. Also, P. M. Shariffuddin and Abdul Latif bin Haji Ibrahim (1974) have critically examined Low's transcription of the Batu Tarsilah or Genealogical Tablet, which stands at the Royal Mausoleum in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. Other versions of the Silsilah exist and all are of recent provenance, dating from about 1735. The Genealogical Tablet dates from 1807. Variations occur between these sources. Some omit sultans who are regarded as usurpers. Nevertheless, a generally accepted list has been published, but dating the early sultans remains a problem, particularly as there is a difference of over a century in the principal rival claims for the date of conversion. The Silsilah list the Muslim rulers. They accept that the first sultan was Alak Betatar, who took the title Sultan and the name Muhammad on becoming a Muslim. Alak Betatar, as has been seen, is the founding hero of the Shaer Awang Semaun and predates Islam by centuries, but by making him also the first Muslim ruler, time is telescoped and the embarrassing non-Muslim centuries are erased. The Silsilah agree with the Shaer Awang Semaun that Sultan Muhammad married into the royal family of Johore. In the Shaer, some of Alak Betatar's brothers kidnapped the daughter of the Sultan of Johore, who dispatched a bird (burong pingaz) in search of her. She was found already married to Alak Betatar, but told the bird that she was happy to be married to a descendant of the gods, who was thus of one family with her father. Persuaded by her happiness and by the fame and glory of Brunei, the Johore Sultan journeyed to Brunei and formally installed Alak Betatar as Sultan and his brothers in the offices of state which became traditional to Brunei, and presented the new Sultan with the royal regalia. In the Silsilah, Alak Betatar, more prosaically, travelled himself to Johore to be installed as Sultan, his brother, Pateh Berbai, being installed at the same time as Pengiran Bendahara Seri Maharaja. The Silsilah also claim that items of regalia came from Johore, but other items

40

A HISTORY OF BRUNEI

were claimed to be from Java, Sumatra, China, and Arabia, all places of great prestige. Immigrants came from these places as well (D. E. Brown, 1970: 136). The second sultan was Sultan Ahmad, variously a Chinese or married to a Chinese. In the first case, he was from Kinabatangan on the north-east coast of Borneo: the legendary Ong Sum Ping, who reputedly stole from the dragon atop Mount Kinabalu the precious gem it guarded, before fetching up in Brunei, where he married a daughter of Sultan Muhammad and inherited the throne. In the second case, he was Pateh Berbai, the eldest of the fourteen brothers, installed as Bendahara by the Sultan of Johore, who now married the daughter or sister of Ong Sum Ping, who was himself related to the Chinese royal line. In either case, a Chinese admixture is acknowledged. The third sultan was an Arab, Sharif Ali, from Taif, a descendant of Prophet Muhammad. He married a daughter of Sultan Ahmad and is remembered as Sultan Berkhat (the Blessed), who introduced a rigorous adherence to Islam and is credited with building the first mosque and beginning the construction of a causeway at the mouth of the Brunei River, designed to force shipping into one easily defended channel. Of his son, Sultan Sulaiman, little is known except that, presumably, he continued his father's policies. The fifth sultan, Bolkiah, has entered Brunei legend as Nakhoda Ragam, the Singing Admiral (although nakhoda is more correctly a merchant adventurer), whose reign saw the expansion of Brunei to its greatest extent: the re-establishment for the third time of that thalassocracy which embraced the trading ports of Borneo, Sulu, and the Philippines. Many exploits are told of Sultan Bolkiah-what is allegedly his tomb is preserved at Kota Batu, the site of the old Brunei capital on the Brunei River, and the ruling family has taken the name Bolkiah as its family name. Under him, Brunei is said to have reached its apogee. Bolkiah was a figure of adventure and romance, a great warrior, an exponent of the arts, blessed with a beautiful consort and believed to have died a mysterious and romantic death. Returning from Sulu, he was pricked by a poisoned pin. Fearing the effect upon the crew, his consort kept his death a secret until the ship reached Brunei, whereupon she committed suicide over his body. Later rulers could only be prosaic. Bolkiah's son became Sultan Abdul Kahar, whose death was recorded by the Spaniards in 1578. His son and successor was Sultan Saiful Rijal, the first Brunei sultan to be mentioned by name in non-Brunei sources. What do the Shaer Awang Semaun and the Silsilah tell us about

THE EARLY MUSLIM SULTANATE

41

the early sultanate and its rulers? First, it must be remembered that these are not historical records intending to present a factually accurate account. Until written down, they were oral traditions and were altered in transmission to suit their audience and the purposes of those who possessed them. Thus there are discrepancies in the lists of sultans and evidence that some names have been omitted and others added. Certainly, no dates can be assigned to the reigns of the first six sultans except in the most tentative fashion. However, the purpose of the Silsilah was not to provide an accurately dated list of kings. Its basic purpose was to validate and legitimatize the right to rule of the line upon the throne. One can see this in the links with the Alak Betatar story and with Johore, China, Sumatra, Java, and Arabia. What the various versions provide are connections. The ruling family is connected through Alak Betatar with the heaven of Hindu cosmology, for Alak Betatar's father was Sultan Dewa Emas Kayangan (the term 'Sultan' is anachronistic). It is also connected with the indigenous people of Brunei Bay through the mothers of the fourteen brothers. Thus the dynasty is rooted in the soil, a mixing of the divine and the common which raises it above the latter but links it with the bumiputera, the sons of the soil, the indigenous people. The connection with Johore links the royal family of Brunei with the Sultanate of Malacca, its powerful predecessor on the Malay Peninsula, whose rulers also claimed divine descent (and descent from Alexander the Great). The royal regalia has mystic and sacred properties made potent by this connection. Items of regalia come also from Java, seat of the mighty Majapahit empire; from Sumatra, the seat of Srivijaya; from China, the seat of imperial authority in east Asia; and from Arabia, the home of Prophet Muhammad. The marriage connections with Johore, with a Chinese nobleman, and with a descendant of the Prophet provide further power and legitimacy as all these influences run in the blood of the royal line. All this is strengthened by beliefs and practices associated with the pre-Islamic concepts of kingship reinforcing the sacredness of the ruler and the awe and reverence which subjects should feel. These aspects are reflected in the ceremonies of the coronation and the installation of the Sultan as the Yang Di-Pertuan, He Who is Lord. They are reflected too in the Malay concepts of daulat and derhaka, the former referring to the Sultan's right to sovereignty and the privileges that go with it, the latter to obedience and submission; a subject who was disobedient was said to have committed derhaka. Thus the Shaer and the Silsilah should be seen as political and moral treatises rather than as historical documents from which one

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A HISTORY OF BRUNEI

might learn facts. Their primary purpose was to buttress the ruler and the prevailing system of government and society. They serve the same function today. The Pusat Sejarah Brunei or Brunei History Centre has attempted to reconcile the various genealogies while pushing the conversion of the ruler back as far as possible (Nicholl, 1989: 178 ff.; see Figure 1). Thus the regnal dates for Sultan Muhammad are given as 1363-1402. His marriage to a princess of Johore is explained by attributing the name 'Johore' to ancient Temasik, based on Singapore and occupying the territory of what was known as Johore when this version of the Silsilah was committed to writing. Sultan Muhammad is attributed with a son, who reigned as Sultan Abdul Majid from 1402 to 1408. This name does not appear in the Silsilah and is included to incorporate the name Abdul Majid on a tombstone, the date of which was first considered earlier than is now the case, and also to account for Maharaja Kama, who died in China in 1408. However, the family tree, as it may be called, does not have a place for Hsia-wang, Maharaja Kama's son, recognized as ruler by the Chinese. Instead, it reverts to the order of the Silsilah and to Sultan Ahmad, described as Sultan Muhammad's brother, who married the Puteri Kinabatangan, Ong Sum Ping's sister, and whose reign is dated 1408-26. Sultan Sharif Ali is said to have reigned from 1426 to 1432. This last date is based on a tombstone once thought to have been his, but a later reading shows it to be that of one Asueri. Moreover, as Nicholl (1989: 182) has pointed out, surely the ruler who firmly established Islam and who was a descendant of the Prophet would have been honoured with an elaborate tomb. In fact, such a tomb erected in memory of Sultan Sharif Ali existed in Sulu and was a place of veneration and pilgrimage until destroyed by the Spaniards in 1628. Sulu was a dependency of Brunei and it appears likely that Sharif Ali, having established his faith on a firm basis in Brunei, did so also in Sulu, which was ruled by a Brunei adipati. If he died and was buried there, then his tomb would have been as elaborate and as venerated as that which the Spaniards destroyed. Sultan Sulaiman is given the dates 1432-85, a long reign for one of whom so little is known. Bolkiah's reign is also long, from 1485 to 1524. Despite his association with the exploits of Nakhoda Ragam, the Silsilah say remarkably little about him except that he conquered Sulu and Seluang or Seludong, which is probably the Serudong River in eastern Sabah. The tomb at Kota Batu venerated as his is of seventeenth-century Javanese workmanship, and the steles at

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THE EARLY MUSLIM SULTANATE

FIGURE 1 The Brunei Royal Family Tree Awang Semaun

9

(1) Sultan Muhammad x Puteri Johor (Temasik) (1363-1402)

p , u m Ping x Puteri Ratna Dewi (2) Sultan Ahmad x Puteri Kinabatangan

(1408-26)

Sultan Abdul Majid (1402-8)

I (3) Sultan Sharif Ali x Puteri Ratna Kesuma (Dari Tail) (1426-32)

I

(4) Sultan Sulaiman (1432-85)

I

(5) Sultan Bolkiah (1485-1524)

I

(6) Sultan Abdul Kahar (1524-35)

I

(7) Sultan Saiful Rijal (1535-81)

I

Pengiran Bendahara Pengiran Muhammad x Raja Dungu

(9) Sultan Muhammad Hasan

I

(13) Sultan Abdul Hakkul Mubin (1661-73)

I

I

I

I

(10) Sultan Abdul Jalilul Akbar (1597-1659) (14) Sultan Muhyiddin (1673-90)

Pengiran Besar Abdul

(15) Sultan Nasruddin (1690-1710)

(8) Sultan Shah Brunei (1581-2)

(1582-97)

I

(12) Sultan Haji Muhammad Ali (1660-1)

I (11) Sultan Abdul Jalilul Jabbar (1659-60)

I

Pengiran Di-Gadong Shah Mubin

(16) Sultan Husin Kamaluddin

(1710-30) (1737-40)

I (17) Sultan Muhammad Aliuddin (1730-7)

I

(18) Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin I (1740-95)

I

I

(21) Sultan Muhammad Kanzu Alam (1807-26)

I

(22) Sultan Muhammad A1am (1826-8)

(19) Sultan Muhammad Tajuddin (1795-1804) (1804-7)

. I

PengJran Shahbandar Pengiran Anak Abdul Wahab

I

(20) Sultan Muhammad Jamalul A1am I (1804)

I

(23) Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin II (1828-52)

(24) Sultan Abdul Mumin (1852-85)

I

(25) Sultan Hashim Jalilul A1am Aqamaddin (1885-1906)

I

(26) Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam II (1906-24)

I

(27) Sultan Abmad Tajuddin (1924-50)

I

I

(28) Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III

(1950-67)

I (29) SULTAN HASSANAI" BOLKIAH (1967- )

Source: Pusat Sejarah Brunei, 1986. Note: Many dates are still in dispute and this list has undergone subsequent alteration.

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A HISTORY OF BRUNEI

either end commemorate respectively Sultans Muhammad Ali and Abdul Mubin, who both ruled in the seventeenth century. The slab between the two steles, which bears Bolkiah's name and the date ninth Ramadan AH 930 (17 July 1524), is of different and cruder workmanship and was possibly placed there in modem times to support Hugh Low's contention that Bolkiah was ruling when Pigafetta visited Brunei in 1521. The Sultan portrayed by Pigafettacorpulent, remote, and backed by his women-hardly fits with the popular Bruneian image of Sultan Bolkiah. There is no independent record of Bolkiah's alleged exploits and it is possible that they could be those of an earlier folk-hero known as Nakhoda Ragam which have adhered to Bolkiah's name. Bolkiah's successor, Sultan Abdul Kahar, is given the regnal dates 1524-35, but the Spaniards record his death (he is called the old Sultan) in 1578, noting that he was co-ruler with his son, Sultan Saiful Rijal, who was ruling at the time of the Spanish attack in that year. The author of the document known as the 'Boxer Codex' says that Saiful Rijal was fifty-nine in 1579 (Carroll, 1982: 16). The above illustrates two things. First, there are no firm regnal dates for the first seven sultans of Brunei. Secondly, the family tree published by the Pusat Sejarah Brunei in 1986 is an attempt to push the origins of the Muslim sultanate as far back as possible into the fourteenth century. It thus serves a historiographical purpose similar to that of the Silsilah and the Shaer Awang Semaun. What external evidence there is indicates that Islam became the religion of the Sultan and hence of the state in about 1414-15, and that the first six sultans must be fitted into a time span from that date to 1578, which is the first specific date for a named sultan. Portuguese sources suggest that Sultan Muhammad converted to Islam in 1514-15. Pigafetta's account suggests a certain laxity in observance of the strict tenets of Islam, for the Portuguese were greeted with arak (spirit made from distilled rice wine), and it is tempting to think that the ruler might have been Sultan Ahmad. Moreover, the city visited by Pigafetta was waging war with a pagan city on Brunei Bay, possibly the earlier site of P'o-ni now in conflict with its Muslim successor. This would accord with the experience of Vasco Laurenco visiting Brunei in 1526 and bearing gifts which included a large tapestry depicting the marriage of Henry VII of England to Catherine of Aragon. Fearing sorcery and that the figures would come to life and harm him, the Sultan ordered that the Portuguese be slain. With great difficulty, the Brunei nobles calmed him down and the tapestry was burned before his eyes by Afonso

THE EARLY MUSLIM SULTANATE

45

Pires, a Portuguese merchant in his employ (Nicholl, 1975: 22-3). This extraordinary response, not shared by the Brunei pengiran, could have been that of a devout Muslim from the heartland of Islam confronted by the forbidden depiction of the human form. Perhaps this was Sultan Sharif Ali, who eradicated that laxity in Muslim observance noted earlier and established Islam firmly in Brunei. There are routine references to Brunei in Portuguese accounts thereafter, but nothing that can help identify a particular sultan, not even a reference to Sultan Bolkiah and his exploits, until the Spanish accounts relating to their attack on Brunei in 1578. The comments made in this paragraph are also conjecture based on fragmentary evidence. What is clear, however, is that by the early sixteenth century, Brunei was a Muslim state and this gave a new dimension to the Brunei thalassocracy which now faced the intrusion of the Portuguese and the Spanish. Indeed, the flight to Brunei of Muslim merchants after Malacca's capture by the Portuguese might well have given the final push that tipped the balance in favour of Islam. This thalassocracy stretched from Manila and Sulu in the north to near Banjermasin in the south. As with its predecessors, it was a trading empire based on control of the sea. The old Arab writers were correct in referring to ports as 'islands', for in an economic sense.that is what they were-islands of economic activity surrounded by seas of water on the one hand and 'seas' of swamp, jungle, and mountain on the other. Into these ports flowed the produce of the interior-the camphor, aromatic woods, hornbill, rhinoceros horn and bezoar stones beloved of Chinese apothecaries, rattans, gold, colourful birds' feathers, birds nests, gum, and wax-and of the sea-pearls, mother-of-pearl, heche-derner, cowrie shells, and turtle shell. There was also the trade in slaves, taken in raids, sold, or exchanged; a trade long established and sanctioned by custom and tradition, and upon which some economies depended for labour; a capricious trade by which a man might suffer the horrors of the galley or rise to wealth and eminence in the service of his purchaser. Into these ports, to exchange for these products, came the ironware, brassware, and silverware, the textiles of India, the silks, brocades, and ceramics of China; even glass beads and other objects from the Mediterranean. Most important to the archaeologist and the historian have been the ceramics, for they provide a calendar, because they can be dated, and a trace, for they are imperishable and wash up in even the remotest recesses of the interior, marking the high-water level of trade.

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A HISTORY OF BRUNEI

Brunei directed this trade into ports it controlled in Borneo, Sulu, and what became the Philippines. At the mouth of principal rivers, a Brunei pengiran, or a local chief appointed by such, would control and tax the trade. In larger centres, as developed at Manila and in Sulu, a Brunei nobility would form the core social, commercial, and political hierarchy. Much trade was directed to Brunei itself, but Manila and Sulu enjoyed a share of their own. These nobles were traders or had merchants dependent on them, and their junks and galleys were of considerable size. Brunei nakhoda sailed widely, visiting all parts of the Philippines, Sulu, and Mindanao, the Borneo coast, Malacca, Siam, and Indo-China, as well as China and possibly India. When the Spanish captured Brunei in 1578, it had the cosmopolitan population of a port city, with people from China, Cochin-China, Cambodia, Siam, Patani, Pahang, Java, Sumatra, Aceh, the Moluccas, Celebes (Sulawesi), and Mindanao. A significant omission was Johore, but possibly Brunei's close ties with the Portuguese at the time ruled out direct trade with Johore. The trade produced considerable wealth. Writing in about 1586, one Spaniard described the city of Brunei as it had been in 1578: The city was very large and rich, and was built over a very broad and deep river and had the appearance of another Venice. The buildings were of wood, but the houses were excellently constructed, many of them being constructed of stone work and gilded, especially the king's palaces, which were of huge size. That city contained a very sumptuous mosque, a very large and interesting building, quite carved with half relief and gilded. (Quoted in Nicholl, 1975: 54.)

The sultanate adapted the system of government already in force in much the same way as had Malacca a century or so earlier. The Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan had to be descended from a previous sultan, but was not always the eldest son. He could be a brother, a younger son, or another male relative. His selection was approved by a council of the high nobility and officials, and it was the ceremonial of his coronation and installation which provided him with complete authority. (See D. E. Brown, 1970: Chap. IX for a full discussion of traditional Brunei government.) The Sultan was the pinnacle of a pyramid of officials. Brunei tradition claims that there were at first two officials of the highest rank, the Pengiran Bendahara and the Pengiran Temenggong, and that the other two officials of this rank, the Pengiran Di-Gadong and the Pengiran Pemancha, were added later by Sultan Muhammad Hasan, who reigned at the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the

THE EARLY MUSLIM SULTANATE

47

seventeenth century; it is possible that this was a revival of an older practice as the existence of a hierarchy in multiples of four is common in South-East Asia and was adopted by the Malacca Sultanate. In Brunei, these four top officials were nobles and were called wazir. Officials of the second rank, called cheteria, were also nobles and were divided into four subgroups of four, eight, sixteen, and thirtytwo members. Below these were the menteri and below them again officials such as the hulubalang and the pegawai. It is doubtful whether all positions were ever filled, except perhaps at the height of Brunei's power. At times in the country's history, their ranks and functions were virtually forgotten, and many have only been recalled to life in very recent times as a product of Brunei's search for a distinctive identity. An official of great importance would have been the shahbandar, who was in control of the port and in charge of foreign traders. Traditionally, he was of the second rank and no doubt had his own hierarchy of officials responsible for the functioning of the port and its markets. The administration of the empire was based on the control of people rather than of territory, although people were naturally living in particular districts which could be defined. These districts and their populations were governed in three ways. Those known as kerajaan were controlled and taxed directly by the Sultan and officials acting on his behalf. Those known as kuripan were the appanages of particular official positions whose holders taxed them for the duration of their term of office. Kuripan passed to an official's successor in that office. Tulin were the private possession of a particular noble, were administered and taxed by him, and passed from father to son. These rights were usually in the district, but could be in people, so that if a population moved, the tulin rights moved with them. These different forms of administrative control weakened the authority of the Sultan in that persons holding kuripan or tulin rights could become quite powerful. For this reason, offices were often left vacant, because the kuripan appertaining to them reverted to the Sultan when an office became vacant CD. E. Brown, 1970: Chap. VIII). This administrative system was based on a hierarchical society, headed by the Sultan and the royal family. Those closely related to the royal family, the core nobility, were, and are, the raja-raja bertara, the lesser nobility being the pengiran kebanyakan. The highest ranking non-nobles or aristocrats were the awang-awang, and 'Awang' is a a term of respect now generally applied to all males as 'Mr' is in English (the equivalent female term is 'Dayang'). The

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majority of commoners were the rakyat. These ranks applied to the Bruneians themselves, but there were also slaves, some of whom were debtors enslaved to their creditors, while others had been purchased or captured. Finally, wherever Brunei's authority ran, there were the subject peoples, whose allegiance was in most cases to their immediate overlord rather than to a rather remote sultan. It was a society and a political system suited to a trading empire dependent on the control of the collection and distribution of goods throughout the trading network represented by its ports, but it was capable of being broken at any weak point. In the middle and latter part of the sixteenth century, Brunei was a formidable Muslim power, its missionaries being active in the Philippines, Sulu, and Champa, in what is now southern Vietnam. This missionary activity extended only as far as Brunei's power could be exerted. Thus, as the Spanish noted, the Sultan of Brunei was ruler of the sea ports and rivers of Borneo, 'where he has settlements of Moros [Muslims]. The natives of the island, however, are heathen as are all the other peoples of the Philippines.' (Quoted in Nicholl, 1975: 54.) No evidence better illustrates the nature of Brunei's government of its empire which consisted of ports and pockets of influence separated by large tracts of ungoverned territory and linked only by sea and river. These port cities and enclaves became Muslim, but the territories between them remained pagan. Thus, the conversion of peoples within even the narrow confines of modern Brunei was only begun in the Belait and Tutong districts as late as the nineteenth century (Pameran Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Brunei, 1979). Before then, these places had been of too little importance commercially or politically. In the sixteenth century, however, Brunei's influence extended along the trade routes and Muslim missionaries followed. However, Brunei's empire and its faith came into conflict with new forces which had entered the region. Brunei might have expected to have succeeded Malacca as the major Malay trading power. It was Brunei's misfortune that European Christian powers arrived to challenge it at the moment when it appeared poised to enter upon a period of greatness.

4

A Century of Conflict, c.1550-c.1650

THE Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511 and in 1522 established forts on the islands of Ternate and Tidore in the Moluccas, from whence came the nutmeg and cloves they coveted. Portugal's attempt to dominate the spice trade did not go unchallenged. Their hold on Malacca was threatened by Johore, from where the Malac can royal family launched attacks in order to regain their former capital. Meanwhile, Aceh, in north Sumatra, attempted to dominate the Strait of Malacca and its trade, coming into conflict with both Johore and the Portuguese in a triangular contest which lasted throughout the sixteenth century, and culminated in Acehnese domination of the Malay Peninsula and the Sumatran coast during the reign of Iskandar Muda (1607-36), with only Portuguese Malacca holding out. Faced with these and other conflicts, and with limited resources, the Portuguese relied on the strength of their forts and their superiority at sea. They had no wish to add Brunei to their list of enemies, nor did Brunei allow old allegiances to disrupt for any length of time its trade with Malacca, so that as early as 1518, Afonso Lopes da Costa commented on Brunei's loyalty to the Portuguese in the conflict with Johore (Nicholl, 1975: 8). As it happened, the first Europeans to visit Brunei were the remnants of Magellan's Spanish-backed expedition in 1521. Magellan himself had been slain on the island of Cebu in the Philippines, but his flagship, the Victoria, reached Brunei in July 1521. The chronicler of the voyage, the Italian Antonio Pigafetta, was greatly impressed with what he saw. The Victoria anchored at Muara and the delegation from it was taken upriver to the town, where it was lodged and fed in lUxury and conveyed on elephants to an audience with the ruler, whom Pigafetta names by his title as Rajah Siripada. They ascended a stairway to a large audience hall where several hundred nobles and armed men were in attendance, seated on a

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carpet. The Sultan, a corpulent man about forty years old, was in a smaller chamber with one of his young sons, chewing betel and with his women behind him. Communication with the Sultan was through a series of officials, the last of whom spoke through a speaking tube to an official in the inner chamber, who conveyed the message to the Sultan. Gifts were exchanged and the Spanish delegation was escorted back to their ship, Pigafetta having time to notice in front of the Sultan's palace a large brick wall with towers like a fort, in which were mounted fifty-six bronze cannons and six iron ones. Capturing some Brunei war junks which approached them, the Spaniards learned that they were part of a fleet under the command of a son of the ruler of Luzon, returning from re-establishing Brunei control over Lawe, a dependency in southern Borneo which had attempted to switch allegiance to the Javanese kingdom of Japara. They also noted the existence of a pagan city on Brunei Bay (Nicholl, 1975: 8-18). The appearance of the Spanish alarmed the Portuguese, who felt that their monopoly of the spice trade might be threatened. A second of Magellan's vessels, the Trinidad, reached the Moluccas, where the Portuguese captured it. Its voyage indicated that there was a route to the Moluccas other than through the Java Sea, which the Portuguese had hitherto used. This route was explored for the Portuguese by Simon de Breu in 1523, but the first voyage to the Moluccas from Malacca by the new route was not made until 1527, by Jorge de Meneses, on his way to take up the governorship there (Nicholl, 1975: 22). By then, visits to Brunei had been made by Antonio de Pina in 1523 and, in 1526, by Vasco Laurenco, whose present of a tapestry had so alarmed the Sultan. Private Portuguese traders were already trading with Brunei, as is proved by the presence of Monso Pires, who placated the Sultan by burning the tapestry. This incident did not mar a relationship which benefited both parties, giving Brunei access to the trading mart of Malacca, and the Portuguese a safe haven if required on the voyage to the Moluccas. It is clear from the account of Goncalo Pereira, who visited Brunei in 1530, that Portugal valued trade with Brunei's empire as a whole, for he made a point of explaining that in places such as Tanjapura and Lave (Lawe) in the Kapuas Delta, Modura, and Cerava (Sarawak), there were many rich merchants who traded with Malacca, Sumatra, and Siam (Nicholl, 1975: 25). In 1534, a Portuguese, Tristao de Ataide, informed King Joao III of the difficulty he had in finding pilots in Malacca to take him to his new appointment as Governor of the Moluccas via Brunei (Nicholl, 1975: 27), but this was an exception. Portuguese vessels were regu-

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larly plying the route by the 1530s. De Ataide was to be responsible for a worsening of relations between Brunei and the Portuguese; he launched a campaign against the Muslims in the Moluccas which greatly offended the Sultan of Brunei and caused Antonio Galvao to cut short his stay in 1536 when he was not well received (Nicholl, 1975: 28). The Portuguese were well aware of the extent of Brunei's influence. When Aceh attacked Aru in 1540, Bruneians were listed, along with Turks, Abbyssinians, Malabaris, and Gujeratis, among the 4,000 fighting men from other countries serving in Aceh's forces (Nicholl, 1975: 28). The Portuguese found merchants from Brunei trading at Ligor and Siam, and in 1542 reported the assassination of the Sultan of Pahang by one Coju Geimal (Khoja Zainal), Ambassador of the King of Borneo, who had discovered the Sultan's adultery with his wife. In 1546, Brunei warships fought on the side of Japara in a war in Java, a temporary reconciliation with a power with whom Brunei itself had contested territory in southern Borneo (Nicholl, 1975: 30). The Portuguese were missionaries as well as traders. In their ships travelled Franciscan and Jesuit missionaries, who sought to extend the kingdom of Christ even as their fellows extended the kingdom of Jaoa III. The two arms of the Portuguese effort did not always work together. Jesuit missionaries complained that Muslim missionaries, sometimes disguised as merchants, were also carried on Portuguese vessels. Muslim missionaries from Brunei were particularly active in the Philippines, so much so that the Spanish believed that if their own arrival in the region had been delayed much longer, Islam would have become firmly established. As it was, it was too firmly rooted in Sulu and Mindanao to be eradicated. These missionaries were not necessarily Bruneians, many being from Arabia, Egypt, north Africa, and Constantinople. Nevertheless, Brunei showed a tolerance towards Portuguese missionaries, allowing them to land. The Jesuit Fathers, Araujo and Veiga, for instance, wintered in Brunei when their vessel was delayed by storms (Nicholl, 1975: 33). On the whole, the Portuguese placed trade before religion, and were quite prepared to ally with Muslim states to protect their commercial interests-allying with Ternate in the Moluccas to protect their access to cloves, and with Johore in Malaya to fight off the attacks of Aceh. They could hardly have held on to their overextended empire otherwise. They behaved very much like a regional power, and the extension of Christianity, despite the activities of missionaries, was of secondary importance.

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The Spaniards, fresh from their conquests in the Americas, were a different proposition. Their search for wealth and trade went hand in hand with missionary zeal. Once they had discovered the WestEast sailing route across the Pacific in 1565, thus linking Manila to their empire in Mexico, they could expand their position in the Philippines with confidence. Under Don Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the Spanish had established their headquarters on Cebu, but this proved untenable; it was too far south and within range of the Portuguese, who regarded their fellow Catholics as interlopers. The Portuguese practised chicanery and deceit, arousing native opposition to the Spanish by themselves raiding coastal settlements while pretending to be Spaniards. Thus was Bohol ravaged in 1563. When a small party of Spaniards was sent by De Legazpi to make contact with a Brunei trading junk off Bohol in 1565, it was fired upon, and an engagement ensued which the reinforced Spaniards won. On board the junk was an agent of the Sultan of Brunei. The nakhoda of the Brunei vessel carrying iron and tin, porcelain, copper gongs, benzoin, India cloth, tempered iron, pans, spearheads, knives, and other goods to trade for gold, slaves, and cowries revealed the extent of Brunei's trade with the Philippines (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. II, 45). In 1570, the Portuguese expelled the Spanish from Cebu. Briefly finding refuge on Panay, De Legazpi realized that the key to control of the Philippines was Manila, the commercial centre of Luzon and governed by a Brunei aristocracy. The nominal ruler of Manila in 1570 was Raja Matanda of Tonto, that 'son of the King of Luzon' captured by Magellan's expedition in Brunei in 1521 on his return from enforcing Brunei suzerainty over Lawe in southern Borneo. Some fifty years on, he was an aged man and the effective ruler was Raja Sulaiman, who was married to a daughter of Sultan Abdul Kahar of Brunei. A third important member of the Manila ruling elite was Raja Lacondala, a Spanish corruption of a Tagalog name and title, Lakan Dula. All were of Brunei royal blood, but Sulaiman was at odds with the other two. Moreover, although wealthy and affluent, this Brunei elite had no coercive power over Filipino society. The relationship between the Brunei elite and Filipino society was economic, and had not been translated into effective political control (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. II, 47). De Legazpi was able to exploit both the division between the Brunei nobility and the Filipino majority and that within the Brunei elite itself. Raja Sulaiman had received some warning of what to

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expect, when, in 1569, there was a chance encounter off Cebu between twenty Brunei and Sulu vessels and nine Spanish, in which four Brunei vessels were captured. Thus, an attempt by De Legazpi's Commander-in Chief, Martin de Goiti, to reconnoitre Manila and its approaches in May 1570 was met by resistance. A full-scale engagement ensued, during which Raja Sulaiman's house was burned and his hatred towards the Spanish hardened. Nevertheless, he continued to underestimate the threat and did not calIon the assistance of either the Portuguese or Brunei. The former were, in any case, preoccupied with subduing opposition to them in Ternate, but the latter may well have responded and tipped the scales against Spain. The second Spanish attack came in June 1571. In the opening naval engagement, the Spanish held back, allowing their arquebuses, which outranged the bows and arrows of the Brunei-Filipino force, to do their deadly work until the latter broke and fled. There was little co-operation among the defending forces and only Raja Sulaiman was strong in his opposition to the Spanish. Raja Lakan Dula surrendered Manila to the Spanish. De Legazpi immediately set up a government and, on 19 June 1571, Manila became the Spanish capital in the Philippines. De Legazpi died in August 1572 (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. II, 49). The loss of Manila was a serious blow to Brunei power. In 1572, Brunei collected a large fleet to send against Manila, but severe storms prevented it setting out. For their part, the Spanish sent vessels to reconnoitre the Borneo coast and to capture Bruneians who might provide information about Brunei's intentions. In 1573, a projected Brunei expedition against Manila, to be led by two of the Sultan's sons, was stopped by more cautious counsel from those Brunei nobles in Manila who believed that more might be gained from friendship with Spain. The Spanish responded by sending an embassy to Brunei, inviting the Sultan to become a friend and a vassal of the King of Spain and to reopen trade. In the words of Andreas Cauchela and Salvador de Adave, writing from Manila to Philip II in July 1574, 'It will be a great benefit for us who live here to have that king as our friend.' (Nicholl, 1975: 34.) Brunei's response was to prepare another expedition against Manila, which was to coincide with a rising against the Spanish organized by Raja Sulaiman and Raja Lakan Dula. A fleet of 100 vessels carrying 50 men apiece and another 100 carrying 30 men each, and commanded by a son of the Sultan, set sail. However, either fearing in its absence a Spanish attack upon an

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undefended Brunei, or because of illness in the fleet, the prince turned back. As it happened, the Chinese pirate Limahon attacked Manila in December with 62 large ships and 3,000 men. If a Brunei attack had coincided, the Spanish position would have been desperate. As it was, the Spanish quelled the Manila uprising after negotiations with Raja Lakan Dula, who then assisted them against Limahon (Lim Ah-on or Lim Ah-hon). Lakan Dula eventually became a Christian, taking the name Carlos. He died in 1575, but his descendants were thereafter exempted from taxation for their loyalty to Spain. Raja Sulaiman, who maintained his opposition to the Spanish, died soon after. Brunei had missed its opportunity in 1574, but the Spanish, beset as they were, proposed negotiations in 1575, uncomfortably aware that Manila was unprotected while their troops besieged Limahon in his stronghold at Pangasinan (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. II, 53). At this time of crisis, Francisco de Sande arrived as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish in Manila. De Sande was a distinguished lawyer who had risen to be a Councillor in the Royal Audienca of New Spain in Mexico. His legal training caused him to record with great precision and completeness all his actions, duly signed and witnessed. One of his principal concerns was to settle matters with Brunei-by peaceful means if possible, by force if necessary. As his demands were guaranteed to be unacceptable to Brunei, war was virtually inevitable. De Sande regarded Brunei as a threat to the Spanish presence, claiming, with some exaggeration, that 'the whole archipelago would very willingly render obeisance and pay tribute to him [the Sultan], if we were not here. The Moros of Borneo preach the doctrine of Mahoma, converting all the Moros of the islands.' (Nicholl, 1975: 35.) In preparation for his projected expedition against Brunei, De Sande sent, in 1576, Captain Estevan Rodriguez de Figueroa to Borneo to take possession for the King of Spain. This provided the justification for his later actions, which his legal mind required. De Figueroa probably landed on the coast north of Brunei Bay, and no doubt also reconnoitred for the expedition being planned. This arrived off the coast of Brunei on 13 April 1578, De Sande in his record of that day describing Borneo as 'one of the Filipinos islands belonging to his Majesty' the King of Spain. The entrance to the Brunei River was blocked by the Brunei fleet. De Sande presented his demands: that the Sultan admit 'preachers of the Holy Gospel' to preach 'in all security' and permit his people to convert to Christianity without any ill befalling them; that all

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Muslim missionary activity in the Philippines and Borneo cease, 'inasmuch as the religion of Mahoma is a false and evil law, and the religion of Christianity alone is true, holy and good'; and that the Sultan forbid his people 'from asking tribute in those islands, inasmuch as I collect tribute in them, as in the right of the king, my sovereign'. Not surprisingly, the Sultan ignored these demands and prepared to resist (Nicholl, 1975: 38; see also pp. 35-51 for Spanish documents relating to this expedition). Ruling Brunei at the time was Sultan Abdul Kahar and his son Saiful Rijal. The latter appears to have exercised power and was the one the Spaniards addressed as 'Sultan Lixar'. He treated the Spanish demands with contempt, executing one of the bearers of De Sande's ultimatum and imprisoning the other and the six Filipino Muslims who had manned their boat. The Spaniards had been waiting out at sea. In the early afternoon of 14 April, when their embassy had not returned and there were indications of Brunei hostility, they forced their way into the anchorage at Muara, the Bruneians fleeing upriver with some of the Spanish in pursuit. Among the Brunei notables defeated in this engagement were Pengiran Seri Lela, an uncle of the Sultan, the Temenggong (the Sultan's brother), and the Bendahara, his nephew. On 16 April, De Sande proceeded upriver. The Sultan and his people had fled inland and the Spaniards occupied the city without further resistance. Some 170 pieces of artillery were captured, some of them from the river into which the Bruneians had thrown them and some of Portuguese manufacture. Twenty-seven Brunei ships and galleys were taken. Other arms were also seized and the mosque was looted. On 20 April, De Sande ceremoniously took possession of Brunei, marching with his troops in battle array through houses belonging to the Sultan and through sections of the town, cutting branches from trees, entering the mosque and establishing his quarters in a large house; all this symbolized his taking possession in the name of the King of Spain. He ordered the construction of a fort and various buildings so that a Spanish presence could be made permanent. The Spanish were in possession of the city, but Sultan Saiful Rijal remained up-country with most of his people. Over the weeks some of the population trickled back, including Pengirans Maharaja di Raja and Seri Lela, with whom the Spaniards hoped to negotiate. However, illness-probably dysentery or cholera-struck the Spanish camp, although Spanish and Brunei sources also suggest that the water-supply might have been poisoned. The Spanish were so

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weakened that they abandoned their settlement and returned to Manila. Before doing so, they burned the mosque, a high structure with a five-tiered roof. They took with them Pengiran Seri Lela's daughter. The capture of the city had a great impact upon the Bruneians. The old Sultan, Abdul Kahar, had fled to the the Baram River and died there in July or August 1578. In October, Sultan Saiful Rijal sent out an expedition under the Maharaja di Raja which sailed towards the Sarawak River in order to find a suitable site for a new settlement; in the end this was not necessary. Pengiran Seri Lela died in August or September 1578, probably from dysentery or cholera, although there was suspicion that he was poisoned by order of the Sultan for collaborating with the Spaniards. Saiful Rijal returned to his capital. He began rebuilding the fortifications and the mosque. He had sent to Siam for artillery to replace that lost to the Spaniards, and had still some 200 pieces as well as most of his fleet. Although outgunned by the Spaniards, Brunei was still a formidable power. The following year, De Sande sent another expedition under the command of Don Juan de Arce. He was instructed to make contact with Pengirans Maharaja di Raja and Seri Lela, whom the Spaniards had left in charge of the city, and to ascertain the whereabouts of the Sultan. De Arce found the Sultan firmly in control and no more inclined to accept the Spanish demands than he had been the previous year. This time, in addition to acknowledging his subjection to the King of Spain and paying tribute, he was to agree to supply labour, which, admittedly, would be paid, should the Spanish decide to establish a settlement in Borneo. Saiful Rijal returned a brief reply expressing a desire for friendship and, on receiving the Spanish demands, proposed on 23 March a meeting on the island of Muara, where he and De Arce would land with five or ten unarmed men apiece. De Arce assented, but receiving no response after two days, reconnoitred the entrance to the Brunei River, encountering hostility from Brunei vessels. Bound by his instructions not to provoke an attack and unwilling to force a passage of the river, De Arce withdrew. He also abandoned the second part of his mission, which was to inspect the Baram River as a possible site for a Spanish settlement, arguing that with the monsoon not yet over it would be dangerous to take galleys on to the exposed coast, and that in any case, any settlement should be at Brunei where the Spaniards could keep the Sultan and his people under control. Somewhat ignominiously,

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the Spanish returned to Manila, no part of their mission accomplished (Nicholl, 1975: 60-76). This, then, is the story from Spanish sources, both De Sande and De Arce being meticulous in recording and having witnessed each decision they made and each piece of evidence they collected from informants, covering themselves against criticism like the good civil servants they were. In brief, the Spanish captured Brunei, laid claim to it for Spain, burned the mosque, and retired when illness weakened their force. The Bruneians, outgunned in the battle of Muara, retreated upriver, abandoning the capital and retiring into the interior out of reach of the Spanish. Some Bruneians, including Pengirans Maharaja di Raja and Seri Lela, returned and collaborated with the Spanish and the daughter of Seri Lela married the Christian Tagalog, Don Augustine de Legazpi of Tondo. The second expedition made no attempt to force a passage of the river and returned to Manila, having accomplished nothing. The Brunei accounts are spectacularly different and the 'Castillian War' has entered Bruneian consciousness as a heroic episode in the country's past. In this version, while the Bruneians were defeated at the Battle of Muara and the city occupied, the Spaniards were eventually driven out by Bendahara Sakam and a thousand warriors (Mohd. Jamil, 1975). Bendahara Sakam is in some respects an unlikely folk-hero. He is said to have abducted the daughter of a Pengiran Seri Ratna from her wedding to the son of Pengiran Seri Lela. Exiled and in disgrace, he nevertheless returned and saved Brunei from the Spaniards. Furthermore, during the final battle, Sultan Abdul Kahar is said to have appeared on horseback to inspire the Brunei forces. Both stories are legends. No Bendahara Sakam drove the Spaniards from Brunei. The Spaniards lost no men in the fighting, although seventeen died of dysentery in Brunei and six on the return voyage to Manila, during which a number of Filipinos also died. The Spanish recorded only one horse in Brunei. Possibly the story of Abdul Kahar's appearance was inspired by the flag of Santiago flown from the Spanish flagship, which showed the saint mounted on horseback. The image appears to have entered Brunei folklore, an equivalent to the Angel which allegedly appeared over the British army fighting at Mons in 1914. Bendahara Sakam may well represent a folk-hero who became attached to the Brunei recollection of the Spanish attack, but there is no reference to him in the Spanish accounts. The Spanish were remarkably honest in recording their defeats and failures as well as their successes, and

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there is no apparent reason why they should have attributed their departure from Brunei to illness if they had in fact been driven out. Nor is it likely that such an event would have remained concealed during the enquiries which were later held into De Sande's conduct (Mohd. Jamil, 1975; Nicholl, 1975). In August 1578, a Portuguese galleon and a galley called at Brunei on their way to the Moluccas from Malacca. Sultan Saiful Rijal asked them to stay. The Portuguese were not interested in becoming involved in the conflict between Brunei and Spain, and pleaded the necessity of continuing their voyage. Also, they said, the Spanish were their brothers, whom they would not fight. Their ships were in bad shape and the galley was wrecked near Cavite after they left Brunei (Nicholl, 1975: 57-8). De Sande had hoped to deal a blow at Islam by his conquest of Brunei. In his instructions to Captain Gabriel de Rivera, sent to Mindanao in January 1579, he ordered the burning of mosques, adding; 'You shall tell the said natives that I will send Christian fathers there, who will instruct them; that already the mosque of Borney is burned, and that there are now no more Bornean preachers.' (Nicholl, 1975: 59.) This Spanish antagonism to the preaching of Islam was reflected in Brunei antagonism to the preaching of Christianity, especially when pursued with the arrogance with which some Spaniards were endowed. Thus, in 1587, occurred the death of Father Francisco de Santa Maria. Father Francisco was one of two Franciscan priests who landed in Brunei with some other Spaniards from a Portuguese ship, having missed the annual Acapulco galleon which would have taken them home from Manila via Mexico. Brunei and Spain were at peace and the ship stopped at Muara because of the monsoon. The Spaniards were well received and the two Franciscans built a temporary chapel, which interested the local populace. Father Francisco preached to them, using his companion, Father Miguel, as an interpreter, but his sermons angered his Muslim hearers, who harassed the Fathers when at prayer. Father Francisco appealed to the Sultan and obtained an audience. Received kindly, he proceeded to expound on the virtues of Christianity, making remarks disparaging Prophet Muhammad which outraged the Sultan, who nevertheless concealed his feelings. The following day, armed men approached the chapel. Father Francisco, who sent Father Miguel to warn the other Spaniards, was killed while he knelt at the altar, his head cut off. Other Spaniards were killed before the Portuguese were able to intervene. The Sultan expressed regret and ordered

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that Father Francisco's head be returned and his body decently buried, but the Portuguese captain decided to take to sea with the remaining Spaniards (Nicholl, 1975: 77). De Sande concluded his term as Governor of the Philippines in 1580. His aggressive policies had not achieved the suppression of Brunei or of its influence, and there were doubts among his successors as to the wisdom of his proceedings. In 1586, the Manila Council condemned the expedition of 1578 as unjust and unprovoked, and ordered that the galleys and artillery pieces taken from Brunei should be returned or that compensation should be paid. As one might expect, neither was carried out, but the decision reflected the general desire of the Spanish authorities to establish peaceful relations with Brunei. The problem was that they still expected these to be on terms of Brunei vassalage to Spain and the cessation of Muslim missionary activity in the southern Philippines (Nicholl, 1990: Vol. II, 108 and 109). The Brunei response was a last effort by the old Brunei aristocracy in Manila and Tondo to overthrow the Spanish with assistance from Brunei, Jolo, and Sulu, and also from Japan. This latter development was the work of De Legazpi, the Tagalog Christian nephew of Raja Lakan Dulu and son-in-law of Pengiran Seri Lela of Brunei. De Legazpi had sought and obtained the promise of assistance from a Japanese Christian who traded with Manila. Other members of the old Brunei Manila elite were brought into the plot. With so many involved, however, it was practically inevitable that the Spanish would get word of the conspiracy. Seven conspirators, including De Legazpi, were executed, others were exiled to Mexico and the influence of the old Brunei elite in Manila was extinguished. Thereafter, relations between Brunei and the Spanish settled down, despite continued Brunei missionary activity in the southern Philippines, and in 1588 the Brunei Sultan, possibly Sultan Shah Brunei, addressed a letter of friendship to Governor Don Francisco Tello. Relations thereafter remained distant, but there were no overt acts of hostility. It was not until 1685 that peace was properly achieved, based on mutual recognition of sovereignty. By then, Brunei had been much reduced in influence, having lost the islands known as the Calamiones, between Mindanao and Brunei, in 1624, and also Sulu which had broken away. Meanwhile, another European power, the Dutch, had appeared on the scene. On 26 December 1600, Admiral Olivier van Noort sailed into Brunei Bay. His first contacts with local fishermen were friendly and the Dutch found several Chinese merchants trading

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there. One of these, a merchant from Patani, perhaps fearing Dutch competition, devised a scheme whereby Brunei prahus might approach and overpower the Dutch vessels. Forewarned by other Chinese, Van Noort frustrated the plan and, after a tense visit, sailed away on 5 January 1601. The Dutch did not return, Brunei being too distant from their main field of activity based on Java, although for a period in the seventeenth century, Brunei entertained hopes that the Dutch might become a counterweight to the Spanish in the Sulu Sea. The Dutch arrived in South-East Asia as enemies of Spain and determined to control the trade in spices. This brought them into conflict with the Portuguese, at this time under the rule of Spain. The Dutch eventually captured Malacca from the Portuguese in 1641. They also made several attacks upon Manila. Although these were unsuccessful, they distracted Spanish attention from Brunei. By the time Spain and the Netherlands made a general peace in 1648, the main European threat to Brunei had receded. In the meantime, Brunei had experienced a brief revival of power under Sultan Muhammad Hasan. The Brunei chronology gives his regnal dates as 1582-97, but Nicholl (1989: 186-7) argues cogently for a period from about 1601-17, pointing out that the Silsilah attest to Hasan's admiration for Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh, who reigned from 1607 to 1636. Hasan brought back under Brunei suzerainty Sulu, which the Spanish under De Figueroa had conquered in 1578, forcing the Brunei adipati, Raja Iro or Ilo, a brotherin-law of Sultan Saiful Rijal, to surrender and to return to Brunei. However, at some time early in the seventeenth century, Brunei regained control of Sulu, for in 1614 Admiral Laurens Reaal met the young 'King' of Sulu, Raja Bongsu, son of Sultan Hasan and grandson of Raja Iro, who was not the king but the Brunei adipati (Nicholl, 1991: 25). Sultan Hasan also regained territory lost in the south, where Sambas had fallen to the north Javanese state of Japara in 1590. Hasan sent his second son, Raja Tengah, as adipati; but renewed warfare between Aceh and Johore on the one hand and the presence of the Dutch in Java on the other provided temptations to those who wished to throw off Brunei rule. Raja Tengah himself revolted against the Brunei connection and in 1606 called in the Dutch, which was to have disastrous consequences in 1612. His action may have been prompted in some part by a conspiracy in Brunei against the Sultan, which resulted in the execution of Hasan's father-in-law and several leading members of the nobility. In 1609, perhaps as a consequence of this and perhaps exploiting the opportunities presented

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by the Aceh-Johore conflict, Brunei officials from Mukah to Sambas revolted and proclaimed their allegiance to Johore. Hasan supported his hero, Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh, in the struggle. When Johore was defeated by Aceh in 1615, the rebellious pengiran could expect no support from Johore and Brunei power was restored, except in Sambas (Nicholl, 1989: 186-7). Hasan was in many respects an enlightened ruler, with a broader interest in the world and an interest in theological debate. He impressed the Jesuit, Father Antonio Pereira, who was resident in Brunei for some months when caught by the monsoons, with both his tolerance and his knowledge. Neither Hasan nor his successors, however, could prevent the erosion of Brunei influence on the peripheries of its empire, threatened after 1641 by the Dutch in Malacca as well as Java and after 1648 by the Spanish, now freed from the threat from the Dutch following the peace of 1648.

5 Stagnation and Decline, c. 1650-c. 1770

IN the last chapter, little attention was paid to the names of reigning sultans, other than Sultans Abdul Kahar and Saiful Rijal in connection with the Spanish attack on Brunei in 1578 and Sultan Muhammad Hasan in relation to events in the early seventeenth century. In this chapter, it is necessary to consider again the problem of the list of Brunei kings, for the seventeenth century was a time of internal political strife which was reflected in a weakening of Brunei's hold of what remained of its empire. The Brunei family tree published in 1986 has Sultan Saiful Rijal reigning unti11581, but the author of the 'Boxer Codex' saw him in 1589 and gave his age as fifty-eight then. His successor was his son, Sultan Shah Brunei, followed by Sultan Muhammad Hasan, who probably reigned at the beginning of the seventeenth century. There is a suggestion, based on information obtained by Olivier van Noort, that in 1600 Hasan was regent for his nephew, who may have been the infant son of Sultan Shah Brunei; but no mention of this appears in the Silsilah or other sources, other than a mention of a certain Rajacapor (Raja Ghafur) as ruler of Brunei in 1600 by the Portuguese Emanuel Godhino de Eredia. Sultan Hasan is mentioned by one contributor to one version of the Silsilah as the greatest of all Brunei sultans. Certainly, his reign was the last high point in Brunei fortunes before the mid-twentieth century (Nicholl, 1989: 186-7). Sultan Hasan was succeeded by his son Sultan Abdul Jalilul Akbar, known to posterity as Marhum Tuha, indicating that he was old and respected. On his death, there was a disputed succession and civil war between his eldest son, Raja Besar Abdul, who may have reigned for a short time, although unacknowledged in the Silsilah, and his second son, Raja Tengah. The latter brought about the death of the former and reigned as Sultan Abdul Jalilul Jabbar. No dates are given for these events in the Silsilah, but there are indications in the history of Sulu at this time.

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The Spaniards had captured Sulu in 1578 and the Brunei adipati, Raja Iro, had fled to Brunei. Brunei had regained Sulu in the reign of Sultan Hasan and Raja Bongsu, a grandson of Raja Iro, was appointed adipati with Dato Aceh, a renowned Brunei warrior, as his adviser. These two sought Dutch assistance against the Spanish and fought valiantly, but ultimately unsuccessfully, to prevent reconquest by the Spaniards. A treaty was eventually signed in 1646. It was unacceptable to Datu Aceh, who escaped from the Spaniards and returned to Brunei. Raja Bongsu eventually retired in about 1650. In 1637, before the final conflict between Sulu and the Spanish, Raja Bongsu had agreed to attend negotiations at Zamboanga with Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera y Mendoza, the Spanish Commander-in-Chief. At the last minute, Raja Bongsu declined to attend because 'he was expecting a fleet, with which the King of Bomey was coming to make war upon him'. This suggests that Raja Bongsu had intervened in the civil war in Brunei on the side of his elder nephew, Raja Besar. With the latter's death, Raja Tengah succeeded as Sultan Abdul Jalilul Jabbar and the proposed attack on Raja Bongsu was unnecessary. Nevertheless, Raja Bongsu could have had no love for the new Sultan, who had threatened him with an attack at a time when he was beset by the Spanish. Yet, in 1642, Raja Bongsu arrived in Brunei to seek help against the Spaniards, which suggests that Sultan Abdul Jalilul Jabbar was dead and had been succeeded by Raja Bongsu's half-brother, Sultan Haji Muhammad Ali. (For the career of Raja Bongsu, see Nicholl, 1991.) The period that follows is acknowledged in the Brunei texts as one of civil strife, resulting in a weakening of Brunei's control over its dependencies and the breaking away of Sulu. In 1661 (AH 1072), the first date recorded in any Brunei source, as D. E. Brown (1970: 144) has pointed out, Sultan Muhammad Ali was murdered by the Pengiran Bendahara. Muhammad Ali's son had killed the son of the Pengiran Bendahara, who entered the palace seeking revenge, killed the Sultan, and proclaimed himself Sultan Abdul Mubin. To placate his predecessor's family, he appointed a nephew of Muhammad Ali as the new Pengiran Bendahara. The latter bided his time, but his supporters urged him to avenge his uncle and seize the throne. For greater security, Sultan Abdul Mubin moved to Pulau Chermin, an island at the mouth of the Brunei River. The Bendahara remained in the old capital and proclaimed himself Sultan Muhyiddin. For several years, a desultory war was waged between the two rival sultans. Eventually, the balance tipped in

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favour of the upriver Sultan. Some accounts say that forces from Sulu were called in and participated in the attack which defeated and killed Sultan Abdul Mubin. Other accounts say that they arrived too late. Before the final assault, Abdul Mubin is said to have fired the crown from a cannon out to sea, whence it was never recovered. Whether Sulu took part in the fighting or not, it laid claim to part of northern Borneo, acting as an independent power with its ruler no longer an adipati of Brunei but claiming the title of Sultan of Sulu. Brunei's one-time dependency had become a serious rival. The Brunei accounts date this civil war from 1661 to 1673, but external evidence would place it earlier. It has been suggested above that Raja Bongsu's visit to Brunei in 1642 implies that Sultan Abdul Jalilul Jabbar had died and had been succeeded by Sultan Muhammad Ali. In 1647, the Dutch and Brunei undertook a joint expedition against the Spanish, which suggests a state of normalcy in Brunei. However, there was no communication between Batavia and Brunei between 1648 and 1654, when a request for assistance was received from Paduka Seri Ilmu Alam, who could have been either of the contestants. However, in 1645, another embassy from Brunei announced the victory of the Sultan of Brunei over his enemies at a place called Solodon, which could be Serudong, a territory inherited by Sultan Abdul Mubin from his mother, which may have seen the last stand of his supporters against Sultan Muhyiddin (Nicholl, 1989: 189). Sultan Muhyiddin appears to have been a strong ruler and to have restored Brunei rule over Sambas and areas further south. However, by 1673, the Dutch were reporting a deterioration of their relations with Brunei, with merchants being detained and the Brunei nobility not paying their debts, indications that weak government had returned. The Brunei sources name two sultans of whom little is known, Nasruddin and Husin Kamaluddin, who followed upon Sultan Muhyiddin. That their rule may have been weak is supported by the reports of the Spanish, who in 1682 were negotiating a treaty with the then Sultan, Muhammad Aliuddin, whose name appears in full on the draft treaty as Sultan Mahamat Alaodin Rey de la isla de Borney. The treaty, which was ratified in a grand ceremony in Brunei in 1685, committed the Spaniards to sending Chinese merchants from Manila to settle in Brunei, an indication that Brunei must have passed through a period of anarchy and misgovernment sufficient to drive Chinese merchants away. The Bruneians, for their part, undertook to curb the Bajaus,

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also known as the Samal Laut, who were raiding the Philippines, another indication that Brunei authority had faded on the northern coast and had to be re-established. This treaty clearly has Sultan Muhammad Aliuddin reigning some fifty years after the years 1730-7 allotted him in the family tree of 1986. The Spanish accounts also provide a suggestion as to what happened after Sultan Muhammad Aliuddin's death. The Spaniards in 1685 were favourably impressed by the Pengiran Bendahara as an able and energetic man. Sultan Muhammad Aliuddin had no legitimate heir and the Bendahara was the heir apparent, 'although a bastard son of the King, confident in the affection that the old King showers in him, aspires to appropriate the crown to himself by violence'. In June 1690, Don Alonzo de Abella-fuertes, Acting Governor of the Philippines, informed King Charles II of Spain that 'the King of Borney, with whom we recently established peace treaties in 1688, is dead' (Nicholl, 1989: 191). The different versions of the Silsilah and the Batu Tarsilah assert that Sultan Muhammad Aliuddun was succeeded by his son, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin I. The Spanish reports, however, state that Muhammad Aliuddin had no legitimate son. Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin was reported by the Englishman Alexander Dalrymple to be reigning in 1762 and he died, according to the date on his tomb in Brunei, in July 1795. There is a huge gap in the official record, which can be explained if one accepts that the illegitimate son of Sultan Muhammad Aliuddin did, as the Spanish said he might, seize power on that sultan's death, killing or otherwise excluding the Bendahara. If Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin represents a return to the Bendahara's line of descent, then the intervening sultans might well have been erased from the record as usurpers (Nicholl, 1989: 92). This happened, for example, to Sultan Abdul Mubin, also a usurper, who is omitted from the first list of sultans in the first of the Silsilah transcribed and edited by Amin Sweeney, and also from the list on the Batu Tarsilah carved in 1807. To the compilers of those lists, he was a usurper. The same fate may have happened to the successor to Sultan Muhammad Aliuddin if he happened to be the illegitimate son mentioned by the Spaniards and had usurped the throne; he and any successors of his line, being considered as usurpers, were hence omitted from the list of legitimate rulers. Something certainly happened over the intervening years. Dalrymple, writing in 1768, noted that for years Brunei had been in a state of civil war and that the Bugis had considerable influence there. It is quite possible that a usurper had called on the Bugis for

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assistance, as happened during the same century in Johore, and that the Bugis maintained the usurper on the throne against prolonged opposition. Unfortunately, sources for this period are scanty. The Dutch were concentrating on their Javanese possessions, the Spice Islands, and the Malay Peninsula; the Spanish were preoccupied with the Philippines and Sulu; and China after 1644 was undergoing a change of dynasty, with the Qing (Ching) or Manchu dynasty preoccupied with ending Ming resistance in the south of the country and, with its central Asian precedents, less interested in South-East Asia than its predecessor. That Brunei was in turmoil at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century would have contributed to this dearth of information, for presumably its contacts and trade with the outside world were affected. It is only with the entry of the British into the region at the end of the eighteenth century that information about Brunei is again obtainable from outside sources.

PART III Brunei, the British, and the Brookes, c.1770-1906

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6

The Struggle for Survival, c.1770-1870

THE British had entered South-East Asia along with the Dutch, and the Honourable East India Company received its charter from Queen Elizabeth Ion 30 December 1600. The East India Company, however, lacked that close government support enjoyed by their Dutch rivals, and withdrew from the contest for control of the spice trade after a defeat in a sea battle off Batavia in 1619 and an attack upon their trading factory at Amboina in 1623. Thereafter, the British concentrated upon developing their trade with India. By the middle of the eighteenth century, they had acquired territory in the hinterlands of their main trading centres at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta and were poised for the final round of conflict which would eliminate the French as rivals in India. They had opened trade with China through Canton and were again interested in the opportunities offered by the trade of the archipelago. Not ready to challenge directly the Dutch in Java or the Spanish in the Philippines, their merchants, particularly those operating out of Madras, developed contacts with Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. Another region not under any form of European domination was north-west Borneo. Here, the interests of the British coincided with the Brunei desire to seek an ally against the depredations of their main rival in north Borneo, Sulu, which contested with Brunei control of the northern coasts of what is now Sabah, an area disputed between them since the Sulu intervention in the Brunei civil war of the midseventeenth century. The new British interest in north Borneo stemmed from its capture of Manila in 1762, during the Seven Years' War. The British had no long-term interest in retaining Manila and returned it to Spain in 1764. However, Alexander Dalrymple, the East India Company's Deputy Secretary at Fort St George, Madras, had already realized the potential importance of north Borneo. In 1759, he had been sent by Lord Pigot, the East India Company Governor at

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Madras, to open trade with Sulu and to explore a new route to China, discovered two years previously, in case the Strait of Malacca should be closed by war. Dalrymple made a treaty of alliance and commerce with Sulu in January 1761. He was sent again to Sulu in 1762, making agreements with the chiefs of Tempasuk and Abai, on the north Borneo coast, on the way. This suggests that these areas owed allegiance to neither Sulu nor Brunei. At Sulu, Dalrymple obtained the cession of the island of Balambangan, and in January 1763 he took possession on behalf of the Company. Later that year, he visited Sulu a third time and obtained the cession, ratified in 1764, of Sulu's dependencies in north Borneo. Dalrymple argued that Balambangan could become a centre of trade with China, India, and the archipelago, diverting trade from Manila and Batavia. By the time the Directors of the East India Company approved a settlement, Dalrymple had left its service. The man who was placed in charge of the Company's trading factory on Balambangan was John Herbert, whose experience at Bencoolen on Sumatra had not prepared him for the responsibility he now faced. Balambangan was a small, barren island, some 22 kilometres in length. In February 1775, it was overrun by Sulus led by Dato Teteng, who had quarrelled with Herbert. Neither the Sultan of Sulu nor the Spanish regretted the destruction of a trading post which, if successful, would have threatened their own interests. The British sought refuge in Brunei, whose Sultan had already responded favourably to an approach made by Herbert in June 1774 by offering the Company a site for a settlement in his territories. Herbert had sent John Jesse to make a treaty in which the Company's protection was promised in return for a monopoly of the pepper cultivated in Brunei. Brunei's motive was to acquire protection against Sulu and it offered Herbert a site on Labuan, which he began developing after his flight from Balambangan. However, the Directors of the Company had decided that no new site should be settled if Balambangan failed, and the Labuan settlement was abandoned in November 1775, although Jesse remained in Brunei into 1776 (Tarling, 1971: 10-16). Although it had lost control over much of north Borneo to Sulu, Brunei in 1776 was still a commercial centre of some importance. Pepper was grown along the Brunei River by Chinese who supplied the junk trade. The navigator Thomas Forrest, who visited Brunei in 1776, described the town of Brunei, some 16 kilometres upriver from Pulau Chermin, and the houses built on posts over the river.

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On the right, going up, the houses extend about half a mile backwards, with channels like lanes, between the rows ... perpendicular and parallel to the main river. And here lie moored, head and stem, the China junks-four or five of which come annually from Amoy, of five or six hundred tons burden .... Some of the houses on the right side of the water are two storeys high, which I never saw in any other Malay country, with stages or wharfs before them, for the convenience of trade .... Considerable is the commerce between China and Borneo, somewhat like the trade from Europe to America. Seven junks were at Borneo in 1775. They carry to China great quantities of black wood, which is worked up there into furniture .... At Borneo Town, the Chinese sometimes build junks, which they load with the rough produce of the island Borneo and send thence to China. (Forrest, [1780] (1969): 378-85.)

When Forrest's vessel needed repairs after running aground on its way downriver, it is perhaps significant that the workmen employed were Bugis. At any rate, Brunei was a commercially active and cosmopolitan city in 1776. Nevertheless, it felt insecure and welcomed the British as a possible counterweight to Sulu. The British, as Dalrymple's scheme for Balambangan indicates, were also beginning to consider the possibility of acquiring a commercial centre in a region outside the sphere of influence of Spain and Holland. The Company was still attracted to Balambangan, not least because of the rights Dalrymple had acquired there and which had not been formally renounced. Thus, in 1803, Robert Farquhar was sent to re-establish the settlement on Balambangan and to resume relations with Sulu and Brunei. He found the two powers at war, though it was a desultory affair. Once more Brunei made overtures to the British, but these were not pursued and in 1805, with war against Napoleon's France renewed in Europe, the British settlement was again withdrawn from Balambangan and Brunei's offer of Labuan rejected. This British interest in Balambangan spanned a period when Brunei underwent another dynastic upheaval. Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin I died in 1795, but he had abdicated in favour of his elder son, who became Sultan Muhammad Tajuddin in about 1780. In about 1793, Sultan Muhammad Tajuddin abdicated in favour of his son, Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam, who died about a year later, leaving an infant son. Sultan Muhammad Tajuddin resumed the throne and died in 1807. He was succeeded by his younger halfbrother, Muhammad Kanzul Alam, but much of the real power lay

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with the latter's son, Pengiran Muda Muhammad Alam, also known as Raja Api ('Api' means 'fire' and the sobriquet indicates his temperament). Meanwhile, Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam's infant son had grown up and his mother, Raja Nur Alam, who was a daughter of Muhammad Kanzul Alam and hence a sister of Raja Api, had been able to exert enough influence to prevent the full installation of her father, Muhammad Kanzul Alam, as Yang DiPertuan Brunei. On Muhammad Kanzul Alam's death, she resisted as vehemently any attempt by Raja Api to assume power. He may have become Sultan for a brief period, and appears in the family tree of 1986 as Sultan Muhammad Alam, reigning from 1826 to 1828. D. E. Brown (1970), referring to Low (1880) and James Brooke (Mundy, 1848: I, 183-8), places Raja Api's death in or about 1824, which changes in Brunei's policy below seem to support. Whatever the case, Raja Api had a reputation for cruelty and was not popular. His sister, Raja Nur Alam, and the supporters of the claims of her son rose against him and he was executed on Pulau Chermin by strangulation. The young man who had ascended the throne as Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin II owed his position to the ambition and political skills of his mother, rather than to any qualities of his own; for by all accounts he was an unprepossessing figure, with a second thumb on his right hand and a dull mind. Some Western commentators write of him as an idiot, but more probably he was merely not very intelligent and thus the victim of intrigues and the tool of his advisers, whoever they happened to be at any given time. His weakness and the continuation of the divisions in the Brunei ruling elite meant that he was never properly installed as the Yang Di-Pertuan and thus remained a kind of 'acting' sultan. Similarly, other ranking positions could not be fully solemnized. The Pengiran Bendahara in the 1830s was Pengiran Muda Hassim, a brother of Raja Api. He had been pardoned, and in an attempt at reconciliation had apparently been appointed Bendahara, but was never properly installed. The overall effect was to weaken the government of Brunei, in that the nominal leadership lacked the moral and traditional authority which the ceremonies associated with the full coronation and installation bestowed. Rivals were less likely to be restrained by the aura which normally surrounded the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan, and over-mighty subjects could not be easily overawed by a ruler who lacked the personality and character to command respect. In these circumstances, Pengiran Muda Hassim appears to have been

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the real power in Brunei, until he left it to settle a revolt in the province of Sarawak in 1837. In 1819, towards the end of the reign of Sultan Muhammad Kanzul Alam, Thomas Stamford Raffles had founded Singapore. Raffles's free trade policy quickly made it a new focus for the area's trade and a rival to Batavia and Dutch-controlled Malacca. The Dutch at first opposed the British settlement at Singapore, but finally saw the opportunity to reach agreement with the British to define their respective spheres of influence. In order to strengthen their claims on Borneo, the Dutch attempted to establish relations with Brunei, first through the good offices of the Sultan of Sambas in 1822 and then by sending a Javanese envoy in 1823. These efforts came to nought. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 nevertheless tidied up the map of the region as far as the British and Dutch were concerned. The British surrendered their trading post at Bencoolen and other interests in Sumatra and retained Singapore. The Dutch surrendered Malacca and retained Riau, south of Singapore. The Dutch then became preoccupied by the revolt against them in Java, known as the Java War. Under Sultan Muhammad Kanzul Alam, Brunei had followed a policy of isolation, having nothing to do with the European powers. On his death and the execution of Raja Api, this policy changed and Brunei responded to the lure of Singapore. In 1824, 119 prahus from Brunei arrived at Singapore, carrying black pepper, camphor, beche-de-mer, and antimony. The Sultan also sent a diplomatic mission. Antimony was a new product mined in the Sarawak district. In order to exploit it and the mining of gold in the same area, and also to forestall any attempt by Sambas to extend its influence, Brunei reasserted its control there. In 1827, Pengiran Indera Makota Shahbandar Muhammad Salleh was sent as governor. However, the Sarawak Malay elite resented Brunei's interference and Makota's exploitation of the antimony mines and began a desultory revolt against Bruneian rule. Tradescant Lay, an English missionary on the American ship Himmaleh, which visited Brunei in 1837, remarked that Brunei harboured pirates but that Pengiran Muda Hassim, who was about to depart on a tour of Brunei's dominions in order to bring them more closely together, was a man to be supported. Indeed, Hassim was turning towards that earlier policy of seeking friendly relations with the British as a counterweight to the Spanish and Sulu to Brunei's north and of Sambas to the south. Thus he was in Sarawak in

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1839 when James Brooke, a British adventurer, sought him out, bearing messages of gratitude from the Governor of Singapore and the British mercantile community there for his humane treatment of the crew from a British ship wrecked off the Borneo coast. James Brooke enjoyed a pleasant sojourn in Sarawak and was favourably impressed by Pengiran Muda Hassim and Pengiran Indera Makota. The latter was related to the royal family of Sambas. He was handsome, intelligent, and relatively well educated, and had spent some years of his youth in Java. Brooke returned to Singapore and sailed to the Celebes before calling in at Sarawak again in 1840. The revolt still persisted and this time Pengiran Muda Hassim sought Brooke's assistance, for he wished to return to Brunei where his political rivals had improved their position. In particular, Pengiran Yusof, a son of Sultan Muhammad Tajuddin and brother of Sultan Jamalul Alam, had become the chief adviser to the Sultan and may have become the acting Bendahara. Hassim, who had a claim to the throne if the Sultan had no heir by a noble wife, needed to return to Brunei to protect his interests there and called on Brooke for assistance against the rebellion. Brooke laid down conditions which made him Governor of Sarawak. The rebellion was ended, but Brooke insisted that Pengiran Muda Hassim pardon the Sarawak leaders who had fomented it, thus winning their gratitude and support. Once the rebellion was over, Hassim began to doubt the wisdom of his concessions to Brooke, doubts which were fanned by Pengiran Makota who had been deprived of the governorship in favour of Brooke. Brooke finally lost patience with Hassim's vacillation and delay and with Makota's plotting against him, and on 24 September 1841, he loaded the guns of his schooner, Royalist, trained them on Hassim's audience chamber, and went ashore with an armed detachment to negotiate. Hassim had little choice but to give way and place the blame for delay upon Makota, who, in Brooke's eyes, had become a scheming, cunning, untrustworthy enemy. Officially proclaimed Governor and Rajah of Sarawak, Brooke issued his first laws and in July 1842 had his appointment confirmed by Sultan Omar Ali. Brunei's history had taken a new tum: for the rest of the century, and beyond, it was inextricably linked to the ambitions and machinations of the Brookes of Sarawak (see Map 2). (For the Brookes' relations with Brunei, see Runciman, 1960 and Tarling, 1971.) James Brooke hoped to bring about the reform of Brunei and its government through the agency of Pengiran Muda Hassim and his brother Badruddin, whom he regarded as enlightened. In other words, they would accept Brooke's advice. In October 1843, he

1905

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1884

1882

1861

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South Ch£na Sea

KALIMANTAN

NORTH BORNEO

\.Jl

---l

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returned Hassim and Badruddin to Brunei. He had with him Captain Belcher and HMS Samarang and the East India Company steamer Phlegethon. A show of hostility from Brunei forts at the mouth of the river provided an excuse to threaten force. The final negotiations, conducted under the guns of the Phlegethon, which anchored in the river off the Sultan's audience chamber, saw Pengiran Yusof dismissed from the position he had gained and Pengiran Muda Hassim installed in his place. The Sultan promised to suppress piracy in his dominions and offered Labuan, a large coal-bearing island off Brunei Bay, to the British Crown (Saunders, 1969). James Brooke had achieved his aim of creating a pro-British government in Brunei, and Pengiran Muda Hassim was in a position to further his eventual claim to the throne. However, those who had been displaced represented important interests in Brunei. Brooke tended to call them the piratical faction. In this, there was some truth, in that their policies were inimical to those of Brooke and they included under the category of trade the exchange of goods acquired by piratical means; but their main fault in Brooke's eyes was to oppose his interests. Brooke had, in fact, intervened in a Brunei dynastic quarrel which had little to do with piracy. By supporting Pengiran Muda Hassim, he earned the enmity of Hassim's rivals. The British Government did not respond to James Brooke's appeal that Labuan be occupied and thus provide protection to Hassim's faction. Within Brunei, Pengiran Yusof attempted to regain his position, and maintained his contacts with Sulu and with Sharif Usman on Marudu Bay, who was involved in slave trading. In August 1845, Admiral Sir Thomas Cochrane arrived at Brunei with a squadron of eight ships to seek the release of two Lascar seamen detained there. Pengiran Badruddin accused Pengiran Yusof of involvement with the slave trade and of holding the sailors. Yusof refused to attend a meeting with Cochrane, who ordered a shot to be fired through the roof of his house. Yusof rashly returned the fire before making his escape. Cochrane sailed away to destroy the base of the piratical Sharif Usman on Marudu Bay. Shortly after this, Yusof tried to regain his position in Brunei by force. He was defeated by Pengiran Badruddin and fled to his lands in Kimanis, where he was executed by order of the Sultan and Hassim. Hassim and the pro-British faction appeared to have won, but there was still deep-seated resentment against them, which Hassim's arrogant behaviour only increased. Moreover, the suppression of piracy by

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the British reduced the income of the Sultan and those nobles associated with it. Sultan Omar Ali had acknowledged as his son Hashim Jalilul, who had married the daughter of Pengiran Yusof and who had come under the influence of an adventurer named Haji Samano Haji Saman played upon the Sultan's fear that Hassim, who had been nominated his successor, was preparing to usurp the throne. At the end of 1845, the Sultan ordered the assassination of Hassim, Badruddin, and their kinsmen. Defending his house, Badruddin blew himself up, with his sister and one of his wives, rather than surrender. Hassim was wounded, escaped across the river, and parleyed unavailingly for his life. His attempt to blow himself up failed and eventually he shot himself with a pistol. One of Pengiran Badruddin's slaves, Japar, escaped with a message for James Brooke. He intercepted HMS Hazard when it entered Brunei Bay in April and was taken to Sarawak with his news. Brooke organized an expedition to avenge Hassim's death. The steamer Phlegethon arrived from Singapore, and in June Admiral Cochrane appeared with seven ships. On 6 July, the squadron anchored at Muara. In a letter to Admiral Cochrane, Sultan Omar Ali attempted to evade the issue by complaining of the discourtesy of HMS Hazard in not ascending the river on its previous visit. He invited the Admiral to ascend to the capital with two boats. Cochrane was not to be taken in by so transparent a ruse and on 8 July the Phlegethon and the warships and boats of the squadron moved up the river. They were fired upon from every bend and the steamer was slightly damaged. When they reached the city, the Sultan and much of the population had fled. Among those who remained was Pengiran Muhammad, a brother of Pengiran Muda Hassim, who had survived the massacre, although badly wounded. Another noble who stayed was Pengiran Mumin, who had been an opponent of Hassim but who equally disapproved of the new regime. The British destroyed the forts and invited the populace to return, promising that no harm would come to them. Most did so, but the Sultan remained in hiding and an expedition into the interior failed to find him. The main expedition sailed away to destroy pirate bases in north Borneo, leaving James Brooke at Brunei with the Phlegethon, the Hazard, and the Iris under Captain G. Rodney Mundy. On hearing that Haji Saman was living near Kimanis, they destroyed his house, but the Haji escaped. On his return to Brunei from this expedition, Brooke induced the Sultan to return to the capital, where he abjectly did penance at the graves of his murdered uncles, wrote a letter of

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apology to Queen Victoria, confirmed Brooke in his possession of Sarawak, without paying tribute, and bestowed upon him mining rights throughout his dominions. He also offered once more the island of Labuan, and this time it was accepted by the British Government. Brooke left Pengiran Mumin in charge in Brunei, Pengiran Muhammad having been unnerved by his experiences. Captain Mundy of HMS Iris made frequent visits to Brunei to keep the Sultan in line until the British Government's decision regarding Labuan came through. On 18 December, Mundy, after a judicious display of force, signed a treaty with the Sultan, confirming the cession of Labuan and giving the British permission to suppress piracy along the Borneo coast. On 24 December, he carried Pengiran Mumin to Labuan to witness that island's accession to the British Crown. These events and agreements were subsumed in a new treaty between Britain and Brunei, negotiated by Brooke as Commissioner and Consul-General to the Sultan and Independent Chiefs of Borneo, in May 1847. The treaty was largely concerned with securing British control of trade in the Sultan's dominions and included clauses relating to free trade and to free access to Brunei ports by British vessels. It also forbade the Sultan to make 'any cession of an island or of any settlement on the mainland in any part of his dominions to any other nation, or to the subjects or citizens thereof, without the consent of Her Britannic Majesty'. As Graham Irwin (1965: 125) rightly points out, if Brooke 'had been able to foresee the trouble and irritation this seemingly innocuous article would later cause Sarawak, he might not have been so ready to obtain the Sultan's signature to it', for, wittingly or unwittingly, Brunei had acquired a certain degree of protection against the ambitions of Brooke himself, and of his successor. By these events, Brunei had lost its independence of action. James Brooke now ruled the territory originally bestowed upon him as an independent prince, paying no tribute to Brunei. He had already shown in 1843-4, when his fiefdom was threatened by semiindependent part-Arab sharif (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) operating out of nominally Brunei territory and deploying Than irregular forces, that he was no respecter of borders and could call upon the assistance of the Royal Navy in the suppression of those whom he labelled pirates. Iban raiding gave him some justification for his actions, but Pengiran Indera Makota, resentful at his displacement by Brooke, had links with these sharif and Brooke's motives were largely political: to remove centres of power which could rival and threaten his own. Brooke's territory, however, was far

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to the south. More important was the British possession of Labuan, which commanded the entrance to Brunei Bay and effectively controlled Brunei's access to the wider world. Brooke became the first governor, although his main interest remained Sarawak. Labuan did not flourish as a settlement, as a trading post, or as a naval base, but the British presence was a dominant factor in Brunei affairs thereafter. Fortunately for Brunei, Brooke fell out of favour and in 1853 resigned his governorship. Although his successors at Labuan were not always sympathetic to Brunei, as representatives of the British Government, they were constrained by British policy, which was not at this time expansionist, and tended to be suspicious of the Brookes. Brunei thus acquired some flexibility by playing one off against the other, the main problem being that the Brookes, themselves British, could not be abandoned by the British Government, which eventually recognized the independence of Sarawak in 1863. Brunei's international status was thus circumscribed by the treaty of 1847, by which it could not make concessions to other nations similar to those it had made to the British, without British Government consent. Not that there was much opportunity to seek friends abroad. The Spanish and the Dutch respected the British sphere of influence, which fell conveniently enough between their own. The only other power on the horizon was the United States. In 1845, the USS Constitution had called at Brunei with an offer of protection and a commercial treaty in return for coal mining rights in the Sultanate. Pengiran Muda Hassim had used this visit to put pressure on James Brooke to conclude a British treaty with Brunei. 'If the British Government are unwilling to afford us assistance,' he informed Brooke, 'we must beg our friend to move that the existing arrangements be cancelled, so that we may be in a situation to solicit aid in another quarter.' (Quoted in Irwin, 1965: 110.) Hassim prevented Sultan Omar Ali responding to the American overture, but Brunei lost his diplomatic skills with his death and the arrangements that the British and Brooke finally imposed rendered such diplomacy impossible. When Joseph Balestier, the United States diplomatic agent, attempted in 1850 to negotiate with Brunei, he acquired a commercial treaty only, and little came of this. The United States Government had no definite policy for Asia and the Pacific, and the Civil War distracted American attention in the 1860s. Brunei was reduced to playing off one set of British interests against the other. In 1851, it had some success when Sultan Omar Ali fed information regarding Brooke's actions in the rivers of the Batang Lupar Basin to Henry Wise of the Eastern Archipelago Company and to Robert

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Bums, an adventurer to whom had been denied concessions to mine in the Bintulu district because of Brooke's opposition as Britain's agent in Borneo. Each man had his quarrel with Brooke and passed criticism of him to the British Government. In 1852, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin died. The events of the previous years had reduced the possible successors from both factions. Pengiran Muda Muhammad had returned to Brunei from Sarawak in 1849, but neither he nor the late Pengiran Muda Hassim's sons, who had remained in Sarawak, had the necessary support in Brunei. Nor did James Brooke urge their claim. The succession went to Pengiran Mumin. Pengiran Muda Muhammad was made Pengiran Bendahara, thus satisfying the claims of the slain Pengiran Muda Hassim's line. Hassim's sons were given no position, but Pengiran Hashim Jalilul, also known as Pengiran Anak Hashim, was installed as Pengiran Temenggong. Hashim was still a young man, reputedly the son of Omar Ali Saifuddin II by a concubine, although Brooke sources cast doubt on this. That his claim was recognized in Brunei probably gives the lie to the Brooke version. Pengiran Anak Hashim's elder brother was appointed Pengiran Pemancha. Thus the rival factions were represented in the ruling elite and Sultan Mumin, connected by blood or marriage to all, sat uneasily upon the throne (Runciman, 1960: 110; D. E. Brown, 1970: 152; Tarling, 1971: 82). Pengiran Mumin was relatively powerless because of his need to satisfy all factions and was thus dependent upon the good will of James Brooke. The arrangement was neatly sealed in Brooke's favour, in August 1853, by the surrender by Mumin to Brooke of the Batang Lupar and Lower Rajang rivers, with their Iban population. Brooke had already waged war along these rivers with Sultan Omar Ali's consent and had before the transfer placed his first forts on their lower reaches to control the movement of the Thans. Mumin, in return for a fixed payment of $1,500 a year and half of any surplus revenue, surrendered territory from which he had derived no benefit and obtained a valuable adjunct to his income which improved his position vis-a-vis his powerful subjects. Brooke hoped that with the installation of Mumin as Sultan he would continue to influence the government of Brunei in the direction he desired. This diplomatic success was followed, for James Brooke, by the Commission of Inquiry into his actions against Than 'piracy' with the support of the Royal Navy. The Commission also considered whether his position as Governor of Labuan was consistent with his

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role as Rajah of Sarawak. Brooke was exonerated in the first instance, but the Royal Navy no longer appeared at his summons, and his resignation of the governorship of Labuan lowered his prestige and allowed to emerge in Labuan a rival representative of British interest to whom Brunei could appeal. In 1853, Brooke suffered a severe attack of smallpox which left him disfigured and rendered him more irritable, impatient, and inclined to resent opposition. He was increasingly taken up with the future status of Sarawak and his regime was shaken by an attack upon his capital, Kuching, by Chinese gold-miners from Bau in February 1857, and by attempts by Sarawak and Brunei Malay opponents to unseat him. The Chinese were defeated and the Malay plots were discovered and prevented with the assistance of the loyal Sarawak Malay leadership, the Dutch in Kalimantan, and the energy and decisive actions of the Rajah's nephews, John Brooke Brooke and Charles Johnson (later Charles Brooke). However, the schemes represented attempts by members of the Brunei elite to regain positions of inft.uence they had lost because of the Brooke presence. In particular, the Brookes distrusted Sharif Musahor, the Brunei Governor at Sarikei until it had been transferred to Brooke rule in 1853. Musahor had remained in office under the Brookes until he was dismissed in 1855 for intervening against the Brookes in a dispute at Mukah. However, he had been reinstated at Sarikei in 1857 under an amnesty granted after the defeat of the Chinese attack on Kuching. In 1859, the Sarawak fort at Kanowit, on the Rajang River, was attacked by Kanowit Dayaks and Charles Fox and Henry Steele, the two Brooke officers there, were killed. The Brookes suspected that Sharif Musahor might have instigated the murders, but he acted swiftly to execute some Malays implicated in the attack and assisted the Brooke forces seeking the murderers, thus clearing himself of suspicion (Saunders, 1991). Charles Johnson, however, was not convinced. In January 1860, an exiled Sarawak Malay leader, Dato Haji Gapor, and a Malay called Tunjang, who impersonated the Pengiran Temenggong of Brunei, Pengiran Anak Hashim, planned to enter Sarawak from Dutch territory and to overthrow the Brooke regime. The plot was uncovered, and the Dutch authorities arrested Dato Haji Gapor and Tunjang. Their confessions implicated Sharif Musahor, who had meanwhile joined Charles Johnson's expedition against the principal Sarawak conspirator, Bandar Kassim of Sadong. Convinced that Musahor was involved in the plot and was not to be trusted, Charles Johnson fired upon his boats. Musahor escaped in the melt~e and ft.ed to Sarikei. A

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Sarawak force sent against him got out of hand and burned Sarikei and the houses of the Igan people to whom Musahor had fled. Musahor escaped once more and sought refuge in Mukah, in Brunei territory, where he was welcomed by the Governor, Pengiran Dipa. These events indicate that Musahor still retained considerable authority and support in the districts he had once administered. Whether he actively conspired against the Brookes when he returned to Sarikei in 1857 will probably never be known. The Brookes certainly believed that he had and were certainly aware that he had every reason to resent their presence, as had Pengiran Indera Makota when supplanted in Sarawak by James Brooke. In particular, Charles Johnson did not trust him, perceived him as a threat, and was willing to believe that he was implicated in the Malay Plot of 1859-60. Being the man he was, Charles Johnson acted on his suspicions and made of Musahor the enemy that he had looked for. Mukah was economically of great importance to Sarawak by 1860, being the centre of the sago trade, which was dominated by Sarawak merchants. This dominance was resented by the Brunei merchants they had displaced and economic rivalry added bite to the political rivalry. James Brooke had attempted to reduce Pengiran Makota's influence in the sago districts in 1855, finally achieved by the latter's death in 1858. However, new dissensions replaced the old. Pengiran Dipa was an appointee of Sultan Mumin. In about 1854, Pengiran Dipa's father had been killed by Pengiran Matusin, the culmination of a long family dispute. Matusin had fled to Sarawak, but had later returned to Mukah where the two factions uneasily coexisted. In 1857, Brooke, with the consent of Sultan Mumin, had attempted a reconciliation. In the dispute, the Brookes had come to favour Matusin who, because he was out of power in Mukah, was prepared to offer favourable trading terms to Sarawak traders if he obtained office. To Charles Johnson and his elder brother John Brooke Brooke, Pengiran Dipa's reception of Sharif Musahor and his closure of Mukah to Sarawak traders was an opportune moment to secure his replacement with the more pliant Pengiran Matusin. When James Brooke's resignation of his official appointments under the Crown became effective in 1855, his friend Spenser St John was appointed British Consul-General to the native states of Borneo. Stjohn had first arrived in Borneo in 1848 as the Rajah's personal secretary and as Consul-General had the Rajah's interests at heart as much as those of Britain. In 1860, however, St John was on leave. The Governor of Labuan, the Honourable G. W. Edwardes, acted as Consul-General during his absence. Edwardes was more

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sympathetic to Brunei than to the Brookes, partly because the trade of Labuan depended on the prosperity of Brunei and could be threatened by an increase in Sarawak's influence which would divert more trade to Kuching. Edwardes accepted Musahor's version of events and, when the Brooke nephews attempted to open Mukah to Sarawak trade by force, voyaged on the East India Company ship Victoria to Mukah and threatened hostilities if the Brookes did not desist from their attack. The Sarawak force, which was poised to take the town, had to sail away, and Musahor and Pengiran Dipa were left in charge. The port remained dosed, the sago trade ceased, and Brooke's friends in London, induding St John, worked mightily to have Edwardes's action repudiated by the British Government. In this, they succeeded and the Rajah travelled out to Borneo accompanied by St John. He negotiated with Sultan Mumin an agreement which, in August 1861, ceded the coast and rivers as far north as Kidurong Point, a little north of Bintulu, to Sarawak, in return for an annual payment of $4,500. St John had already secured Royal Navy assistance and had occupied Mukah. Pengiran Dipa was sent to Brunei, Sharif Musahor to Singapore, where he lived until his death in 1890. The sago trade revived, to the advantage of Sarawak and not to that of Brunei, which had lost another valuable part of its territories. Once again, the ambitions of the Brookes had been assisted by the factionalism and disunity within the Brunei ruling elite. The Brunei authorities had tried to play the British card, and with Governor Edwardes they were initially successful, but as long as St John remained Consul-General they could not expect similar success. They could, however, look elsewhere for assistance. In 1865, they thought they had found it, in the person of Charles Lee Moses, United States Consul at Brunei. Nothing illustrates the weakness of Brunei as a power better than this remarkable episode of the 'Yankee Consul'. The commercial treaty which Brunei had signed in 1850 with Joseph Balestier had provided for the appointment of an American Consul. In July 1864, on the advice of his Secretary of State, William Seward, President Lincoln appointed Moses. Moses arrived in Brunei on a British ship in July 1865 and was immediately welcomed by Sultan Mumin, who saw two advantages in his arrival. One was economic, in that Moses could be made to pay for any concessions he received. The second was diplomatic. The United States might provide protection against the expansion of Sarawak, which the British appeared reluctant to prevent. These aims were complementary in that it might be assumed that Moses would press Brunei's case with his government if he had economic interests of his own to protect. The economic

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advantages for the Sultan were considerable. The China Steamship and Labuan Coal Company was in arrears of payment for its mining lease at Muara and appeals to the British Government to enforce payment had had no effect. The Sultan was short of money. He thus granted to Moses for a period of ten years a concession over a large part of northern Borneo for a payment of $4,200 a year for himself and $4,000 a year for Pengiran Temenggong Anak Hashim, who had rights over much of the territory. Moses also sought the transfer to him of the mining rights at Muara, but to this Sultan Mumin would not agree. Nevertheless, the Sultan was impressed enough by Moses to have a consulate built for him. Moses was not himself interested in developing this concession, but hastened to Hong Kong, where in November 1865 he transferred his rights to an American merchant, Joseph W. Torrey, who, with his associate, Thomas B. Harris, and the backing of Chinese merchants in Hong Kong, formed the American Trading Company of Borneo. Torrey visited Borneo to have the transfer confirmed by the Sultan, who appointed him 'supreme ruler and governor', with the title of Rajah of Ambong and Marudu with 'all other powers and rights usually exercised by and belonging to sovereign rulers'. These rights were transferrable to his successors in the Company on the event of Torrey'S death. The territories thus ceded were those disputed with Sulu and from which Brunei received little or no revenue. The British watched this venture with some alarm, but their fears were groundless. Torrey returned to Hong Kong to raise capital and support and a settlement called Ellana was established on Kimanis Bay. Sugar-cane, tobacco, and rice were planted, and some trade was conducted along the coast, but Harris, who had been appointed Chief Secretary, died of fever in May 1866, insufficient capital was raised to pay regular wages to the labour force, and the Chinese financial backers lost confidence. The settlement was withdrawn in November 1866. Sultan Mumin had gained nothing. Torrey apparently paid nothing to Moses for the transfer of his rights and Moses asked the Sultan to withdraw his grant to Torrey and attempted to find backers for a new company. A group of Germans from Macao actually sailed to Brunei to investigate the feasibility of a gold-mining venture. Their ship ran aground at the mouth of the Brunei River; they were unimpressed with what they saw of the Kimanis Bay venture and returned to Macao. Moses was now persona non grata with the Sultan, who had received no money and felt deceived. In an act of desperation, he burned down his consulate, fabricating the story that it had been attacked by Malays and that he had leaped

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from the blazing building, revolver in hand, to escape across river to the British consulate. He then demanded compensation from the Brunei Government. The Sultan complained of Moses to the Admiral of the American Asiatic squadron, who had visited Brunei to investigate the incident, and also appealed in a letter to President Johnson that the United States send a good consul to Brunei. Moses was suspended and his successor, O. F. Bradford, restored amicable relations. However, despite British alarm, the United States had no particular interest in Brunei and withdrew its consulate in March 1868. Moses had been, as Governor Callaghan of Labuan had said, a boastful and swaggering Yankee adventurer, threatening and ingratiating in turns, who had held out to the Sultan extravagant hopes of United States support. Moses's main interest was to make money but in this he failed. He drowned while returning to the United States in 1867 (Tarling, 1971: 169-82; Keith, 1980). Moses's activities had awakened the British authorities in Borneo, and the British Government, to the unstable and inconclusive nature of their position in northern Borneo, based as it was upon the 1847 treaty with a weak and declining Brunei, the possession of the small, unprosperous offshore island of Labuan, and the unpredictable Brooke kingdom of Sarawak, which in 1868 had a new Rajah in Charles Brooke. For the time being, the British position was secure enough with the removal of the American colony, but the Dutch were tightening their control over southern Borneo and the Spanish were renewing their pressure on Sulu and on the territories that Sulu laid claim to in northern Borneo. Even the Italians, in 1870, showed interest in Gaya Bay, as a site for a penal settlement. The north-west coast of Borneo had strategic importance to Britain in that it protected the flank of the sea-route to China. The situation was one which threatened Brunei, but it also offered opportunities for diplomatic manoeuvring. The Moses incident had shown how dangerous such diplomacy could be, Sultan Mumin and Pengiran Anak Hashim having risked British ire and obtained neither economic rewards nor the protection of another foreign power. However, with Charles Brooke now Rajah of Sarawak, protection was more necessary than ever, and only the British were in a position to provide it. In 1868, before he became Rajah of Sarawak, Charles Brooke attempted to acquire the Baram River from Brunei, claiming that it was out of Brunei control, that the Sultan received little or no revenue from it and that Sarawak trade suffered. Sultan Mumin rejected the offer. To place pressure on him and to punish him for

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an alleged mark of disrespect, Charles Brooke withheld a third of the annual cession monies payable to Brunei under earlier treaties. Sultan Mumin, referring to the 1847 treaty with Britain, appealed to Governor Pope-Hennessy of Labuan, who offered to arbitrate in what Charles Brooke angrily declared was a matter between Sarawak and Brunei alone. The British Foreign Office supported PopeHennessy and forbade any transfer of Brunei territory (Tarling, 1971: 208-9). Sultan Mumin's resistance to Charles Brooke stemmed partly from animosity awakened by the Mukah incident. It took the new Rajah by surpise in that he believed that the Sultan was in such desperate financial straits that he would be tempted by the guaranteed income provided by cession money. To understand this, Brunei's economic position at this time should be considered. Kuching in Sarawak had become a trading port, drawing to it the trade of those territories as far north as Kidurong Point which it had acquired. Labuan, although not thriving, attracted other trade which might otherwise have gone to Brunei, and Sulu dominated the trade further north. Brunei was reduced to serving a very small hinterland, commercial activity was small, and the nobility relied largely on the taxes they could levy in the territories they held as tulin or, in their official capacities, as kuripan. These had been reduced as Brunei's territory shrank, as had the Sultan's income from the lands he held as kerajaan. This increasingly impoverished nobility levied taxes on an ever smaller population, thus driving them to evasion and revolt. Unable to enforce their rights, they leased them out to Chinese entrepeneurs, mainly based in Labuan, who collected what they could and, after taking their profit, paid the nobility. The Sultan and nobles who had monopoly rights over the products and/or trade of districts used them as collateral for loans from these same Chinese, so that as the century progressed, the Brunei elite fell further into debt, further into dependence, and further into need for more loans to satisfy their retainers and to maintain some semblance of state. Visitors to Brunei from the 1870s on remarked repeatedly upon the poverty of this now ramshackle state; something not found even as late as the 1840s. In these conditions, faced by an aggressive Charles Brooke to the south, Sultan Mumin and Pengiran Anak Hashim sought the political protection of Britain and whatever economic advantages might accrue from their largely nominal claims to territory to the north of Brunei Bay, for which Moses had offered so much and from which they had as yet acquired nothing.

7 Almost Terminal Decline, 1870-1906

THE 1870s saw the beginnings of a new period of British expansion on the Malay Peninsula. In the same decade, the Dutch increased their influence in Borneo and the Spanish moved against Sulu. The British Government did not wish to expand its own territory in Borneo beyond Labuan, but events forced its hand. In Hong Kong, Joseph Torrey interested Baron von Overbeck, the Austro-Hungarian Consul there, in purchasing the rights in Borneo of the American Trading Company. Overbeck created enough interest in the scheme for an Austro-Hungarian warship to be sent to Labuan in 1875 to investigate the situation. In January 1875, Overbeck purchased Torrey's rights and in June visited Brunei to make sure that the concessions were valid. The Austro-Hungarian Government proceeded no further with the scheme and Overbeck, who had at one time been local manager of the opium firm of Dent and Company, went into partnership with Alfred Dent, the son of his previous employer. Dent supplied the financial backing and Overbeck returned to Brunei and on 29 December 1877 obtained from Sultan Mumin and Pengiran Temenggong Anak Hashim a new concession granting him and Dent all the territories from Kimanis Bay on the west to the Sebuko River on the east of northern Borneo. Overbeck himself received the title of Maharajah of Sabah and Rajah of Gaya and Sandakan with 'all the powers and rights usually exercised by and belonging to sovereign rulers'. For this, the Sultan was to receive an annual payment of $12,000 and the Temenggong, one of $3,000. This amounted to a transfer of sovereignty, but Overbeck was aware that Sulu claimed the same area. On 22 January 1878, he obtained from the Sultan of Sulu a similar transfer of sovereignty for an annual payment of $5,000. Failing to interest his government, Overbeck sold his rights to Dent and his associates in London. The new owners of North Borneo established an administrative

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presence hastily; none too soon. In July, the Spanish acquired sovereignty over Sulu and in September a Spanish warship steamed into Sandakan harbour to enforce it. W. B. Pryer, the Resident at Sandakan, stood his ground, and the Spanish commander sailed away. In March 1885, the Spanish Government eventually recognized the British presence in North Borneo in return for British recognition of their sovereignty over Sulu. By then, Dent and his supporters had formed the British North Borneo Provisional Association in 1881 and had acquired a Royal Charter on 1 November the same year. Thereafter, the company was known as the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company. Dutch objections were overruled and the boundary between the Company's and Dutch territory was defined over the following years, final agreement being reached in 1912. The Charter placed restrictions upon the Company's sovereignty. It was, for instance, to remain British in character and domicile and its foreign relations were subject to British control. There were also clauses intended to protect the native population from exploitation. The British Government had thus accepted an overreaching responsibility for North Borneo. Over the following years, the Company established its authority over its territories, meeting some resistance in the process, and bought out the rights of Brunei pengiran to enclaves of territory not included in the original grant. After his failure in 1868, Rajah Charles Brooke continued to attempt to extend his control into the Baram River. The upper Baram peoples had defied the Sultan since 1870, when they repelled a Brunei expedition sent against them. Charles Brooke, without seeking permission from the Sultan, travelled up the Baram in 1872 in his own yacht, with his wife, the Ranee Margaret, on board as a sign of his peaceful intentions. Sultan Mumin ordered the Kayans not to receive him, but his agents were ignored and the Rajah was welcomed. Charles Brooke decided to encourage Sarawak traders to enter the Baram, but in the following year, some Sarawak subjects were murdered by Kayans. Sultan Mumin acceded to the Rajah's request to fine those guilty, but the Brunei officials did not venture upriver and fined peaceable downriver tribes instead. These and other exactions increased hostility to Brunei on the Baram and in 1874, Charles Brooke again sought to have the territory transferred to Sarawak. Sultan Mumin might have had little choice but to agree. However, Governor Bulwer of Labuan believed that British interests were best served by protecting Brunei from further loss of territory. When the Rajah suggested that Brunei be placed under British protection or, failing that, under the protection of Sarawak, the

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Foreign Office in London dismissed the idea. In 1876, Charles Brooke again requested that he be allowed to annex the Baram; again, the British Government refused. However, Governor Ussher, who succeeded Bulwer in 1875, was more inclined to favour Charles Brooke. After a visit to Sarawak in 1877, he believed that the Rajah genuinely wished to extend good government into the Baram. However, the British Government was disinclined to act against the wishes of Sultan Mumin and suspected that Charles Brooke had ambitions which went beyond the Baram. Moreover, there was confusion in the Foreign and Colonial Offices as to Charles Brooke's exact relationship vis-a-vis Brunei. Was he a British subject, a ruler of an independent state, or a vassal of the Sultan? A clear decision either way might have opened up Brunei to Sarawak expansion, for it was doubtful if Britain could intervene in a dispute between two independent foreign states or between the Sultan and an overpowerful vassal. If Charles Brooke was a British subject, was there any requirement under the 1847 treaty that he obtain British permission for any annexation of Brunei territory? In practice, Charles Brooke acted as though he was thus restrained. However, once the British Government recognized the claims of the British North Borneo Company in the north, it could hardly continue to oppose Charles Brooke's claims to the Baram. Sultan Mumin remained reluctant to let it go, but the new ConsulGeneral in Labuan, Peter Leys, indicated that he could not expect continued British support. Moreover, Charles Brooke was deducting from the annual cession monies paid to Brunei the amount of debts owed by Brunei subjects to Sarawak traders, thus reducing the payments by about one-third. Unable to enforce the payment of these debts, the Sultan was faced with the prospect of reduced revenue indefinitely. The transfer was effected in January 1882, the Sultan receiving an annual payment of $3,000 and Pengiran Temenggong Anak Hashim, $2,000 a year (Tarling, 1971; 257-83; Crisswell, 1978: 159-61). N ow ensued a race between the Chartered Company and the Sarawak Government to acquire what remained of Brunei, with private individuals also getting in on the act. In 1882, for example, W. C. Cowie, one-time blockade breaker and gunrunner to Sulu in defiance of the Spanish, acquired from Sultan Mumin a lease on the mineral rights to Muara, the coal-rich peninsula at the mouth of the Brunei River. This area had been leased by Labuan coal companies but never developed. In the following year, the Sultan leased 2.4 kilometres of coastline north of Bnmei Bay to a Chinese,

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Lee Cheng Lan, who acquired governing authority. In 1883, also, A. H. Everett, a former employee of the North Borneo Company and since 1881 Rajah Charles Brooke's agent in Brunei, acquired the mineral rights, and in 1884 the revenue rights, of the Pandas an River. The Company, suspecting that Everett was in collusion with Sarawak, hastened to acquire rights over Putatan in 1885 and sought to buy up the tulin rights held by Brunei peng£ran in enclaves not acquired in the original cession. As Sir Rutherford Alcock, Chairman of the Company, informed Alfred Dent in 1883, the Company was 'eager to get a foothold in Brunei before the death of the present Sultan' (quoted by Wright, 1970: 185). Indeed, Alcock desired that the Company should acquire all five rivers entering Brunei Bay. In 1884, assisted by the appointment of its Governor in North Borneo, William H. Treacher, as temporary Acting Governor of Labuan and Consul-General, the Company acquired the Padas for an annual payment of $3,000. By this time, Sultan Abdul Mumin was in his dotage and his official chop or seal was held by the Pengiran DiGadong Matassan (previously known as Pengiran Anak Tengah), his younger nephew. The elder nephew, Pengiran Anak Besar, had been made Bendahara. These two used the Sultan's chop to cede the Padas without the knowledge of Pengiran Temenggong Anak Hashim. They obtained five years cession money in advance, an additional payment of $2,500, and twenty-four rifles for protection against the people of the Limbang. Not only was there a race between the North Borneo Company and Sarawak for territory, but there was also competition among the Brunei wazir and peng£ran for the proceeds of this sale of territory. The most important river flowing into Brunei Bay, and the one closest to the Brunei River itself, was the Limbang. This was largely held by Pengiran Temenggong Anak Hashim, whose exactions resulted in increasing dissatisfaction. By August 1884, the Limbang district was in revolt. Agents of the Temenggong were killed and the inhabitants of the Limbang raided to the outskirts of the capital. This situation had brought Treacher to Brunei to negotiate a settlement as Consul-General, and had also enabled him to negotiate the transfer of the Padas as a representative of the Company. In November, F. O. Maxwell, the senior Sarawak official administering the Government during the Rajah's absence in England, arrived in Brunei to pay the cession money due, and to seek compensation for the deaths of Sarawak subjects at the hands of Muruts on the Trusan River. Threatening to withhold two years' cession money if his demands were not met, he persuaded Pengiran Temenggong Anak Hashim to cede the Trusan and the Limbang to

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Sarawak. Hashim had received nothing from the cession of the Padas and was willing to receive $4,500 for his tulin rights on the Trusan and $5,000 a year for the rights on the Limbang he held as Temenggong. This time, the deeds bore the chops of the Temenggong and the Bendahara, but not of either the Di-Gadong or the Sultan. Charles Brooke returned from England and occupied the Trusan, he and the Temenggong arguing that as it was the private territory of the latter its cession did not need the Sultan's consent. At this point, on 29 May 1885, Sultan Abdul Mumin died at the venerable age of 100 and was succeeded by Anak Hashim, whom he had named as Raja Muda in 1881. Immediately, a remarkable change took place. In February 1885, shortly before his death, Sultan Abdul Mumin, alarmed at the prospect that Brunei would eventually be entirely taken over, persuaded the pengiran to join him in swearing a sacred oath or amanah not to alienate any more territory. As Sultan, Hashim honoured this oath, although severely compromised by his own actions when he was Temenggong. Thus, he rejected an offer of $14,500 a year made by Charles Brooke for all of Brunei's remaining territory exclusive of the Brunei River and the capital itself. However, he assented to the Trusan lease and accepted $40,000 from Charles Brooke as ten years' advance payment. He also bargained with the Company for an increase in cession money for the Padas-Klias lease, consenting to it finally in 1887. It is not surprising that the Company, Charles Brooke, and the British Government retained the impression that he refused to cede the Limbang only because the price was not right, his appeals to the amanah notwithstanding. Yet the Trusan and Padas cessions had been agreed to in principle before he had become Sultan. The Limbang was a different matter. As Sultan, he hoped to bring it again under his control, and the revenues would enable him to maintain himself against the Bendahara and Di-Gadong, who had inherited Abdul Mumin's wealth and accepted Hashim as Sultan with reluctance. Moreover, the Limbang was Brunei's true hinterland. Its loss would render the amanah of 1885 a hollow sham. With stubbornness and a wily appreciation of the diplomatic opportunities which now came into play, Sultan Hashim procrastinated, buying time during which the British Government, the ultimate arbiter of Brunei's fate, might be persuaded to preserve it from extinction at the hands of its rapacious neighbours. In 1885, however, the British Government, advised by its ConsulGeneral, Peter Leys, was considering the virtual partition of Brunei between the Company and Sarawak, the Sultan retaining only the

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capital and the Brunei River. The British Government was anxious to prevent a situation developing in which the Germans or the French might intervene, not perhaps as unreasonable a fear in the age of the New Imperialism as it now appears. Moreover, under the treaty of 1847, Britain had to approve all cessions of territory. It acceded to the cessions of the Padas-Klian and Lawas, but Hashim in 1887 appealed in a letter to Queen Victoria not to allow the cession of more territory. The British Government, in the meantime, had sent Sir Frederick Weld, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, to investigate the situation in Brunei. Weld was sympathetic to Sultan Hashim's case and recommended the solution that had been applied to Malay states on the Malay Peninsula: a protectorate, and the appointment of a British Resident to assist the Sultan in administering his territories. Hashim welcomed the proposal for a protectorate, but was less enthusiastic about accepting a Resident. The British Government considered a Resident too expensive, but accepted the proposal for a protectorate. On 17 September 1888, the Protectorate Agreement with Brunei was signed. The Agreement gave the British Government no right to interfere with the internal administration of Brunei. Similar agreements were made with Sarawak and British North Borneo. Both were thus recognized as independent states. The Agreement prohibited Brunei from ceding or alienating territory to any 'foreign state, or the subjects or citizens thereof, without the consent of Her Majesty's Government'. There had been a similar clause in the treaty of 1847. It remained to be seen whether Britain would be any more sparing with its consent than it had been in the past when Brunei had signed its inheritance away, albeit under some pressure. Would Brunei do so again? The pressures, financial and political, still remained. It was largely owing to Sultan Hashim that it did not. The Protectorate Agreement proved an almost immediate disappointment to Brunei. Sultan Hashim continued to resist efforts to have him cede the Limbang, but the attitude persisted in the British Foreign Office that it was inevitable that Brunei would be dismembered. Sultan Hashim had not been able to reassert his control. Nevertheless, he granted commercial leases to investors wishing to acquire land for planting tobacco, entering on a short-lived boom, realizing that their activities would provide a source of revenue and that their presence would impede Sarawak's attempts to acquire the territory. Charles Brooke protested that these concessions were either granted for too little or for too much and that in any case they would bring trouble; but they clearly complicated matters for Sara-

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wak if the policy continued. Moreover, with the Limbang now potentially profitable, Sultan Hashim and the Di-Gadong, who had rights there and who had previously supported cession to Sarawak, prepared to mount a joint expedition to assert Brunei control. At this juncture, on 17 March 1890, Charles Brooke occupied the Limbang, claiming that the chiefs there had raised the Sarawak flag and wished to be under Sarawak rule. The British Government disapproved of his means but approved of his end. British officials believed that the Limbang would not readily submit to the reimposition of Brunei rule and that the region would be better under Sarawak. This view was supported by the British Consul, Trevenan, who reported that thirteen of the fifteen Limbang chiefs consulted favoured Sarawak rule. Sultan Hashim contended that Trevenan was drunk when the vote was taken and that the voting was the other way around. Moreover, the headmen represented only the Bisayas of the district and not the other races, and Charles Brooke's officers had been present (Stubbs, 1968: 101-2). To all concerned, it appeared that it was only a matter of fixing the right price in order to win the Sultan's consent. Rajah Charles Brooke settled upon the sum of $6,000 a year, which he would put aside for a period of two years, or until the Sultan agreed to the cession. Sultan Hashim steadfastly refused, even though the DiGadong, the Bendahara, and other pengiran with rights in the Limbang were prepared to accept. Hashim was by now aware that the loss of the Limbang would lead to the loss of further territory: that if a stand were not made there, it could be made nowhere else. The Rajah believed that his refusal was based on a determination to deny the other wazir shares in the cession money that would be greater than his. The British Government, for its part, was unaware that, with the Limbang in Sarawak hands, Brunei's remaining territory was divided into two parts. The British Government put pressure on the Sultan, but also persuaded Sarawak to extend its deadline for paying the cession money. When the final extension passed in August 1895, the Foreign Office declared the matter closed. The Rajah expended the cession money so far put aside on the development of the Limbang. Sultan Hashim never accepted the fait accompli, and neither did his successors. The Sarawak Government also felt pangs of conscience from time to time, and as late as 1945 proposed a payment to Brunei for the Limbang. In 1890, an issue was created in the Limbang which has refused to go away ever since. Meanwhile, the disintegration of Brunei proceeded. With no

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cession money for the Limbang, and the revenues from there closed off to them, the Brunei ruling elite was reduced to even worse financial straits. The state itself suffered as the Limbang's trade was redirected to Kuching, particularly the sago trade. Where there had been four sago factories in Brunei town, by 1904 there were none. The Brunei nobility, in debt to Chinese traders and money-lenders, had mortgaged their revenues from cession monies and other sources for years ahead, often squandering the proceeds as fast as they received them in a desperate effort to maintain their retainers and keep up appearances. Those with rights still unsold increased their demands upon the people they controlled and drove them to resistance. Rajah Charles Brooke of Sarawak was only too ready to exploit evidence of discontent. In 1899, Sultan Hashim's grandson married the daughter of Pengiran Bendahara Anak Besar. This marriage was an attempt to reconcile the two opposing factions within the Brunei ruling elite and festivities were extended over three years. To pay for the celebrations, the authorities imposed heavy taxes, which provoked resistance in the Tutong and Belait districts, and tax collectors for the Bendahara were murdered in the Belait. The relatives of the tax collectors, men from the ward of Burong Pingai in Brunei Town, unable to obtain redress from Sultan Hashim, raised the Sarawak flag at Burong Pingai, and some 150 people from the ward crossed into Sarawak territory from Belait. The Sarawak authorities, with difficulty, prevented a clash between the Belait people who had entered Sarawak and the Burong Pingais. Meanwhile, the headman in Tutong, Dato di Gadong (not to be confused with the Pengiran Di-Gadong), appealed to be placed under Sarawak control. The situation remained fairly calm during 1900, but flared up again in 1901, when the Dato di Gadong again revolted, disturbances spreading to the Belait in JUly. The events are obscure, in that Brooke sources are notoriously anti-Brunei at this time, seeking to substantiate allegations of deep unrest and a genuine desire by the people for Sarawak rule, while G. Hewett, the British Consul, was equally notoriously pro-Brooke. Nevertheless, that there was unrest cannot be doubted, nor that people evading taxes or punishment for resistance and non-payment fled into Sarawak territory. Towards the end of 1901, Dato Bakong, a major leader of the Belait resistance, surrendered to the Pengiran Pemancha Muhammad Salleh, to whom the Pengiran Bendahara Anak Besar had transferred his rights in the district. Other Belait chiefs followed. In the Tutong district, where the Sultan's son, Pengiran Tajuddin, had been acting

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against the tax evaders, an amnesty was offered to all who agreed to pay an indemnity. Most accepted, although some moved into the Limbang district to join others from Tutong who had fled there during the disturbances. Dato di Gadong was excluded from the amnesty, as was another leading rebel, Dato Kalam of Limau Manis, some 16 kilometres from the capital, who had joined forces with Dato di Gadong and who even the Sarawak authorities labelled a buffalo thief. Both men found refuge in Sarawak, but the Dato di Gadong, himself accused of multiple murder, unwisely crossed into Tutong, where he was killed by order of the Sultan in about July 1902. Dato Kalam could not give up his propensity for buffalo thieving and was eventually sentenced to three years' imprisonment in Kuching. By this time, the Sultan's authority, such as it was, had been restored in Tutong and Belait. Families who had fled began to trickle back from Sarawak territory. When Malcolm McArthur, British Acting Consul, visited the Belait and Tutong districts in 1904, he found them more prosperous than he had expected. The Belait chiefs had little complaint against the Pemancha, other than that he took more than his fair share of the poll tax. In Tutong, Sultan Hashim was more extortionate, but even he was only just beginning to collect the indemnity imposed in 1901, and McArthur concluded that reports of his extortion, although undoubtedly based on fact, had been exaggerated (McArthur, 1987: 14-20,83-6). There is no doubt that Rajah Charles Brooke dabbled in these troubled waters. Whether he had wanted it or not, Sarawak offered an alternative to Brunei rule of which the discontented in Brunei took advantage. The Sarawak poll tax was only $2.00 a head and was fairly collected. Moreover, these territories must not be thought of as having borders in the modern sense. Families had relatives on either side; movement over these imaginary lines was frequent-as it still is. Not too much credence should be placed upon claims by one side or the other that this movement reflected more than passing discontent with the other's rule. Sarawak was a place of refuge for malcontents, who often returned to their homes when the heat was off. After all, the authority of the Sultan or Pengiran Pemancha was intermittent at the best. If Sarawak had acquired these territories, the people would have submitted to Sarawak rule; but Charles Brooke, Consul Hewett, and the supporters of Sarawak greatly exaggerated both the discontent in Tutong and Belait and the desire of the peoples of these districts for annexation by Sarawak. The British Government was naturally concerned that disturbances in Brunei might attract the attention of foreign powers anxious

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to acquire a foothold in the region. If the British did not act as the paramount power to settle matters, then others might. It was decided that Sir Frank Swettenham, High Commissioner to the Malay States and Governor of Singapore, should travel to Brunei in April 1902 to determine what action should be taken for the government of Brunei after Sultan Hashim's death. Before this visit could take place, Consul Hewett urged that the disturbances in Brunei could only be settled permanently if the districts came under the control of Sarawak. He suggested ingenuously that Rajah Charles Brooke might be persuaded to make an offer which the financially harassed Sultan would accept. The Rajah needed no prompting and offered annual cession money of $3,000 for the Tutong and Belait rivers, with an additional $1,000 if Brooketon, the coal-mining district at Muara, were included. Negotiations were conducted by Hewett and by June 1902, the Rajah's offer had been extended to include all of Brunei, including the capital; the Sultan and the remaining two wazir were to retain their honours and titles and receive annual pensions: the Sultan, $12,000, and the Pengiran Bendahara and the Pengiran Pemancha, $6,000 each, half of these amounts being paid to their descendants after their deaths (Ranjit Singh, 1984: 94; McArthur, 1987: 21-2). Despite these offers, Sultan Hashim remained adamant in refusing to cede further Brunei territory. He had already enlisted the support of E. W. Birch, the Governor of British North Borneo, who had been seconded from the Malayan Service and who wrote to Sir Frank Swettenham proposing that the Residential System operating in Malaya might be applied to Brunei. Hashim had also brought forward the Limbang case as requiring solution before any other matters. He now rejected these new proposals as a breach of the 1888 Protectorate Agreement, which guaranteed the continued existence of Brunei, and wrote to King Edward VII complaining of Hewett's partiality to Sarawak and requesting his recall. The British Government could not act on the basis of such a letter alone, but accusations in the Straits Times that the Government intended to hand Brunei over to Sarawak, the presence of oil in Brunei, reported by Hewett in 1903, and suggestions that the Sultan was considering looking elsewhere for protection, caused the British Government to warn Hashim not to communicate with foreign powers and to recall Hewett pending a full enquiry into the situation in Brunei; Rajah Charles Brooke having indicated to the Foreign Office that Sarawak's revenues would not bear any increase in the offer he had already made for the country (Ranjit Singh, 1984: 95-6; McArthur, 1987: 22).

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At this point, Brunei teetered on the brink of oblivion. The British Foreign Office inclined to the view that the country was destined to be taken over by Sarawak. The only obstacle appeared to be the intransigence of Sultan Hashim, and the cynical view was that he held out in order to obtain a better price. The British Government was reluctant to force him to cede his remaining territories to Sarawak, given the promise implied by the Protectorate Agreement of 1888 that Brunei would be preserved; but a decision on his part to accede to Sarawak's demands would have been approved. The dispatch of a British official to investigate the situation in Brunei was preliminary to action. Brunei's future depended very largely on what he would recommend.

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PART IV The Residency, 1906-1959

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8 Brunei Preserved: The Residency from Its Establishment to 1941

THE man chosen to enquire into the situation in Brunei was Malcolm Stewart Hannibal McArthur, an official in the Malayan Civil Service, who was appointed Acting Consul in April 1904 and arrived in Brunei with three Malay assistants on 3 May. He remained until 10 November 1904, three months longer than intended, partly because his duties as Consul proved more exacting than anticipated, partly because his investigations and the travel involved took up more time than envisaged, and partly because Brunei suffered a devastating smallpox epidemic which decimated the population. In the second week of July, there were some sixty deaths a day in the capital. McArthur won respect for his attempts to encourage the people and to assuage their fear. Medical assistance was sent from Singapore at the end of July, by which time the epidemic was running its course. Incidentally, Pengiran Tajuddin, the Sultan's son-in-law, denigrated by Sarawak supporters, acted in an exemplary fashion, organizing the vaccination of the people of the Tutong district (Horton, 1984b: 94). McArthur found little to praise in Brunei, and his comments on the ruling elite echo those of commentators supportive of Sarawak's claims; but he also acquired an understanding of how the elite operated and expressed sympathy for the predicament of the ageing Sultan. McArthur recognized that charges of 'shameful misgovernment' were meaningless. It would, he thought, 'be more accurate, in view of the conditions prevailing, to say that there is no government in the usual acceptance of the term-only ownership. The Sultan has no real power except over his own districts and people.' (McArthur, 1987: 126). From this all else flowed. Sultan Hashim was also eighty, old and frail and not fully recovered from the shock of falling through the rotten flooring of his palace the previous year. Bordering on senility, he nevertheless impressed McArthur with his

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dignified and courteous bearing which led one 'to forget the squalor of his surroundings' (McArthur, 1987: 131). He was ignorant of the outside world, but proud of his lineage, although unable to maintain the state befitting his resounding titles. Large sums had passed through his hands, but had been squandered, largely by his followers, for Hashim himself was in penury, his palace a 'collection of ruinous hovels', his clothes 'poor and threadbare', and the furniture of his house 'sordid and mean'. He maintained a household of 172 persons in 1904 and was dismissing retainers whom he could no longer support. He was deeply in debt, probably, according to McArthur, needing $1,500 a month to keep up his existing establishment. No one had any idea how much he actually spent and he was living on advances from his creditors, which were increasingly difficult to obtain as he had less to offer as security. A recent loan of $10,000 from Rajah Charles Brooke had eased his situation slightly. Nevertheless, McArthur recognized Sultan Hashim's integrity in one thing: his determination to cede no more territory, particularly to cede nothing more to Sarawak. Rather than that he would accept, McArthur believed, a larger measure of British protection, with the Sultan in nominal control (McArthur, 1987: 133-4, 171-2). McArthur was unable to form such a personal view of the two surviving wazir, the Pengiran Bendahara and the Pengiran Pemancha, both of whom were in ill health. What he did see of them and what information he otherwise obtained did not impress him. Of the Bendahara, it was 'difficult to find anything complimentary to say'. He appeared to be 'greedy, cunning, unscrupulous and cruel' and devoid of personal dignity. He had sold or mortgaged all his personal property, was scheming to sell his own already heavily mortgaged territories to the British, Sarawak, and North Borneo governments, and had offered to sell all the remaining territories of Brunei to the British Government for $15,000, claiming to have the Sultan's approval. McArthur soon ascertained that the Sultan had done no more than approve an effort to obtain a loan; the rest had been the scheme of the Bendahara alone, and McArthur accused him of disloyalty. The Pemancha took no interest in the affairs of state but was a 'moderately fair ruler of the Belait district', which he left largely in the hands of the local headmen. Less penurious than the other pengiran, his manners and bearing were pleasant and he created a favourable impression which belied his reputation for 'chicanery and dishonesty'. His main aim was 'the begging, stealing or borrowing of money', but he was 'apparently as inefficient in these pursuits as in others'.

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McArthur's opinion of the Brunei pengiran in general was no better. He described them as a class as 'incorrigibly idle and constitutionally dishonest', having leased all their property to Sarawak or North Borneo or 'pawned it beyond the possibility of redemption by themselves to private speculators for cash', being 'too lazy or incompetent to do an honest stroke of work'. More charitably, he might have recognized that this aversion to earning a living was as instilled by tradition in the nobility of Brunei as it had been in much of the nobility of Europe itself. McArthur believed that a minority of this elite expressed a desire for Sarawak rule, the majority for British control. Both groups, he felt, were probably insincere, but all were no doubt intelligent enough to know that Brunei could not remain independent much longer. McArthur's unflattering view of the Brunei ruling class is a serious indictment, coming from a man who at least tried to be objective. Writing at the height of British imperial power, he was no doubt greatly influenced by the standards and beliefs of early Edwardian England. Nevertheless, his language is moderate compared to that emanating from Sarawak sources of about the same time. Moreover, he was less inclined than many to categorize peoples and classes unthinkingly. He defended the Malays as a race against the charges of laziness and dishonesty levelled at them, pointing out that they worked extremely hard at their own avocations, like seafishing, were good labourers in the cutch factory and were remarkably law-abiding, considering there was no police force of any kind. This cutch factory, established on the site of a defunct sago factory by the Island Trading Syndicate in 1900, was the one bright spot in Brunei's economy. The Syndicate had obtained the lease with a down payment to the Sultan of $500, $300 a year rent, and a duty of 5 cents for each pikul (60.5 kilograms) exported. It was the only employer of labour. Cutch is a khaki dye produced from the bark of mangrove and was used in tanning leather and for treating nets and sails, and in the early years most of its production went to the United States. The manager of the factory from 1900 to 1905 was Edmund Roberts, who became an adviser to Sultan Hashim and was given the title of 'Dato' with a seat on the State Council. However, by as early as 1904, the mangrove within easy reach within Brunei territory had been exploited and that used in the factory was coming from territory claimed by Sarawak, which consequently received most of the export duty. McArthur could obtain no reliable figures for Brunei's trade and compiled his own estimates from information he received from the traders themselves, the principal ones being two Chinese, Chua

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Cheng Hee and Cheok Yu. The sources are therefore suspect, but McArthur estimated that total imports were some $236,000 and exports $246,000; the area of the capital accounted for approximately $200,000 of each, Tutong and Belait for the remainder. These he compared with figures for the Brunei River in 1884 (exports, $138,311; imports, $131,054) and 1885 (exports, $65,214; imports, $59,373, the fall in the latter year being attributed to the disturbances in the Limbang). In 1903, the trade of the Limbang, which now bypassed Brunei, was roughly $200,000 for imports and for exports, an indication of the importance of that river traditonally for Brunei. Brunei's meagre trade offered little in the way of revenue from duties, which were theoretically low. However, monopolies on the import of goods had been sold by the Sultan to traders for cash, and these traders had then realized their profits by subletting portions of their monopoly to others. These new importers then bought from the Sultan the right to impose an additional duty, which they collected, sometimes to excess. The end result was to increase greatly the number of stages in a transaction, at each of which profits were taken, so that prices to the ultimate consumer for commodities like salt, sugar, and kerosene were greatly increased. It is not surprising that Brunei represented a miserable appearance to a casual observer. Arthur Keyser, the British Consul (1898-1900) saw 'rows of miserable hovels surrounded by accumulations of floating filth and rubbish. The streets are approached by broken ladders and the flooring or footway consists of a single plank on rotten poles. There is no attempt to improve, clean or repair.' (Quoted in McArthur, 1987: 223 n. 46.) A year later, in 1900, he noted that hundreds of houses were empty and in ruins and that the town was perceptibly disappearing, but this may have been a consequence of the troubles in the Tutong and Belait districts which also affected Brunei Town. Also, the opinion of Keyser and other European observers may have been culturally conditioned. As pointed out by McArthur (1987: 114), who had a longer residence in Brunei, the 'first impression of absolute destitution conveyed by the squalor of the town and the ruinous condition of the houses' might 'more fairly be taken as examples of the casual and shiftless way in which Malays seem to prefer to live'. Moreover, by the time McArthur visited in 1904, the cutch factory was providing some employment and matters may have sightly improved. Even so, the impression of Brunei in 1904 remains one of poverty at all levels with little hope of improvement in the future.

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The problem was compounded by the presence of Rajah Charles Brooke almost in the heart of the capital. In September 1888, Charles Brooke had obtained from W. C. Cowie for £25,000, the coal-mining lease at Brooketon at Muara. The Rajah also operated a coal mine on Pulau Berembang, across the river from Brunei Town itself. He had successfully claimed that this was within the original lease he had acquired from Cowie and had forced out a Singapore merchant, H. A. Crane, who in November 1898 had acquired from Pengiran Jeludin, the Sultan's son-in-law, the right to mine coal there. With Crane removed, the Rajah began mining operations on Berembang by 1901 and it was there that oil seepage was discovered in 1903, but not in workable quantities. Charles Brooke also acquired, in 1903, 3,500 acres (1418 hectares) of land at Kota Batu, 'stretching from the old Consulate site in Brunei [Town] for a distance of perhaps 2t-3 miles [4-5 kilometres] down the left bank of the Brunei River', uninhabited except for one Kedayan hut. The land had been granted by Sultan Mumin in 1867 to Inche Mohammad, originally from Malacca and the British Consular Agent in Brunei, who died in 1890. In 1903 his heirs disposed of the estate by sale in order to divide their inheritance fairly. Consul Hewett arranged for its transfer to Charles Brooke for $6,000 in November 1903. Sultan Hashim protested, unavailingly, that the sale was not legal under the terms of the original lease. Its possession, and that of Buang Tawar on Pulau Berembang, gave Charles Brooke control of both banks of the main river which, with his lease at Muara, gave him a stranglehold on Brunei. In Muara, he was already exercising the rights of government and on Pulau Berembang, was constructing a wharf and a bungalow, suspiciously like a fort, which the Sarawak Resident at Limbang, A. B. Ward, had orders to occupy with Sarawak Rangers should the transfer of the rump of Brunei to Sarawak ever be approved (Ward, 1966: 98). Charles Brooke had decided that Buang Tawar would become the administrative and commercial centre of Brunei if he obtained control. These leases in Brunei were obtained by him in his private capacity but were administered as extensions of Sarawak territory, and the losses incurred by the mining operations at Brooketon and Buang Tawar were borne by the Sarawak Treasury. As McArthur (1987: 108) pointed out, there were times when Charles Brooke made little distinction between his private rights as a British subject in Brunei and his public rights as the Sovereign of a neighbouring state. It is little wonder that the Brunei authorities were unable to differentiate either, and that they viewed his encroachments upon the outskirts of

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the capital as a direct threat to their continued existence, as indeed it was. McArthur's report undoubtedly saved Brunei from extinction. Sultan Hashim was nearing the end of his life, and there was little guarantee that his successor would withstand the pressure to cede the rest of the country. There were actually two reports. The first, Notes on a Visit to the Rivers Belait and Tutong, dated 14 July 1904, dealt with the late disturbances and the existing situation there. The main Report on Brunei in 1904 was dated 5 December 1904. Although constrained by his instructions not to reveal the purpose of his mission to the Brunei authorities, McArthur and his three Malay colleagues appear to have arrived at a remarkably full and relatively unprejudiced understanding of the situation in Brunei. McArthur sought in any arrangement for the future of Brunei 'the maximum of justice to the oppressed with the minimum of interference with the rights and susceptibilities of those in power'. Sarawak or British North Borneo control did not meet the latter requirement and he dismissed the view that the Sultan and his chiefs would agree to anything for money. In many instances this has, unfortunately, proved true; but it appears that, up to the present at least, they place a higher value on the remnants of their power than the price that others are disposed to offer, and that the future of their country is complicated in their minds and to those of many of their subjects by considerations of sentiment as well. In any case, McArthur did not believe that the administration of North Borneo had been particularly successful and he did not really think this an option. His previously held high opinion of Sarawak and its Government had been modified during his stay in Brunei, and he recognized that Sarawak was a personal despotism which would shortly pass into the untried hands of the Rajah's son. To pass Brunei over to Sarawak was the solution most disagreeable to the Bruneians and contrary to the intentions of the Protectorate Agreement of 1888, which Brunei had signed in order to acquire protection from Sarawak, a protection they had scarcely received. McArthur had received intimations from the Sultan and others that an extension of British protection would be preferable to the loss of identity which would follow absorption by Sarawak or North Borneo. He recognized its initial expense to the British Government, but argued that under an efficient administration the country would pay for itself, especially if his suggestion were acted upon, that Labuan, neglected under the administration of the North

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Borneo Company, be resumed by the Crown and amalgamated with Brunei. Reading between the lines of McArthur's report, it is clear that Sultan Hashim and his wazir were aware of the purpose of his mission. They questioned his Malay companions about the Residential System in Pahang and the status of the ruler and Malay officials there, and their intimations to McArthur were perhaps attempts to indicate that they would accept such a solution in Brunei. McArthur's report was designed to lead his readers to the same conclusion. Indeed, giving the task to an official of the Straits Settlements Civil Service almost guaranteed such a conclusion. The Residential System had been operating in Malaya since 1874 and was regarded as a success. The states under British protection, despite some initial opposition from recalcitrant Malays, had prospered and were at peace. If a British Resident were appointed to Brunei, surely the same conseqences would ensue. This had not, however, been self-evident to Consuls Trevenan (1890-8) and Keyser (18981900), both of whom favoured the Sarawak option, as did Sir John Anderson, the High Commissioner in Singapore, and the majority of officials in the Foreign Office. McArthur's report changed that. His evidence of Brunei hostility to Sir Charles Brooke removed the Sarawak option from the agenda. The British Government agreed with McArthur that the only honourable course was to appoint a British Resident. Sultan Hashim had written in November 1904 to Sir John Anderson expressing his admiration of McArthur and requesting that he be sent back to Brunei, 'because I have exceeding great liking for him on account of his discretion, courtesy and gentle disposition' (quoted in Horton, 1988: 6). It was not surprising, therefore, that McArthur was again appointed Acting Consul and sent to Brunei in November 1905 with a more senior colleague, D. G. Campbell, to negotiate an agreement. Sultan Hashim and his wazir affixed their seals on 3 December 1905 and Sir John Anderson signed on behalf of the British Government on 2 January 1906. Under the new treaty, Sultan Hashim agreed to receive a British officer, to be styled Resident, whose advice had to be taken and acted upon on all matters other than those affecting the Muslim religion. The British Government undertook to ensure the 'due succession' to the Brunei throne, thus guaranteeing its continuance in the line of Sultan Hashim. The Sultan and the two wazir received annuities for the surrender of their rights: $12,000 annually for the Sultan and $6,000 annually for each wazir. This was the same

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amount offered by the Rajah, as he angrily pointed out; but the British offer would not be halved on the deaths of the present incumbents (as in the Sarawak offer), would possibly increase as Brunei's revenues improved, and would be passed on to their successors, whose official positions were now secured. McArthur was appointed the first Resident and was 'the Agent and Representative of His Britannic Majesty's Government under the High Commissioner for the British Protectorates in Borneo' (quoted in Ranjit Singh, 1984: 107). He was to live in Labuan, which had reverted from the British North Borneo Company to the Crown, but was to visit Brunei regularly. An Assistant-Resident, F. A. S. McClelland, was appointed to live in Brunei. Dato E. Roberts, erstwhile manager of the cutch factory, was appointed joint Brunei-Labuan Head of Public Works, and H. G. Crummey was appointed joint Brunei-Labuan Chief of Police, both officers being based at Labuan. McClelland arrived in Brunei in May 1906. Sultan Hashim had performed his last greatest service for Brunei. In poor health for many years, he began to decline in March 1906. In April, he complained of severe internal pains. In early April, McArthur wrote urging him to settle the succession and was summoned to a private audience, at which he reassured Hashim that the British would maintain his dynasty after his death and received from the Sultan his will, to be read before the State Council. Sultan Hashim named as his successor his eldest legitimate son, Pengiran Muda Muhammad Jamalul Alam, in whose line the succession should descend. As the boy was a minor, the Pengiran Bendahara and the Pengiran Pemancha were named co-regents. The State Council endorsed these decisions unanimously, but the Pengiran Bendahara was disappointed that his own claim to the throne had been passed over and that he was not even sole regent. Sultan Hashim died on 10 May 1906. By the treaty of 1906, he had preserved the nominal independence of Brunei, albeit as a British protectorate with its sovereignty severely curtailed. By his will, he had preserved the succession to the Brunei throne in his line and had, for the next few generations at least, greatly reduced the possibility of a disputed succession. At this juncture, Rajah Charles Brooke appeared in Brunei on his steam yacht/gunboat Zahora and entered into an intrigue with the Bendahara, who resented being passed over for the throne. McArthur had allocated $1,000 for a public funeral for the late Sultan Hashim. Dato Roberts was instructed to pay $500 immediately to the Regents and the rest when he was satisfied that the

Guardian figure at the tomb of Maharaja Kama (Ma-na-je-chia-na) of P'o-ni. (From Nicholl, 1984b)

2 The Genealogical Tablet of the sultans of Brunei. (From Shariffuddin and Abdul Latif, 1974)

3 Brunei, c.l844. (From Marryat, 1848)

4 Captain Edward Belcher and James Brooke negotiating at the Brunei Court, October 1844. (From Marryat, 1848)

5 Admiral Cochrane's capture of the city of Brunei, 1846. Note the use of steamers to tow sailing warships and boats. (From Mundy, 1848)

6 Admiral Cochrane's negotiations leading to the cession of Labuan, 1846. (From Mundy, 1848)

7 Signing the treaty for the cession ofLabuan, 1846. (From Mundy, 1848)

8 Ceremony of hoisting the British flag on the island of Labuan. (From Illustrated London News, 9 October 1847)

11 Sir James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak and Governor of Labuan. (From mustrated

London News, possibly 9 October 1847)

15 Sultan Hashim of Brunei receIVIng Vice-Admiral Sir Nowell Salmon and officers of the British Naval Squadron, March 1888. (From Illustrated London News, 13 October 1888)

17 The British Residency, 1948. (From Watson, 1982)

18 Sultan Sir Ahmad Tajuddin during a session of the State Council, 1948. His younger brother, the future Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, is second from the left. (From 'Pameran Gambar-gambar Bandar Seri Begawan', Muzium Brunei, 1970)

19 Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III promulgating the Brunei State Constitution, 29 September 1959. (From 'Pameran Gambar-gambar Bandar Seri Begawan', Muzium Brunei, 1970)

20 Prince Hassanal Bolkiah and Prince Mohamed during a visit to the Seria oilfield, 1959. On the left is Dato R. E. Hales, then managing director of British Malayan Petroleum Company. On the right is Pengiran Jaya Negara Pengiran Abu Bakar. (From Harper, 1975)

21 Sultan Sir Hassanal Bolkiah being greeted by his subjects after Hari Raya prayers, c.1979. (From 'Pameran Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Brunei', Muzium Brunei, 1979)

22 Brunei Town and Kampong Ayer, 1970. (From 'Pameran Gambar-gambar Bandar Seri Begawan', Muzium Brunei, 1970)

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first payment had been properly spent. Charles Brooke made a further payment of $500 to the Bendahara, ostensibly because the Resident's payments did not allow the obsequies to be properly carried out. McArthur questioned this procedure and the Rajah collected signatures for a petition to accompany a letter of complaint to the British Government by the Bendahara. These documents were forwarded to the British Government by Sir E. Sassoon. McArthur countered each complaint. With that in which the Bendahara stated that he was no longer consulted by the Resident, McArthur conceded there was some truth, as on every occasion on which state matters were discussed, he had had to disagree with the Bendahara's extraordinarily selfish views. McArthur was also able to show that the majority of the twenty-six signatures attached to the petition requesting that Brunei be placed under Brooke rule belonged to no one of consequence. Sassoon was discredited when it emerged that he believed Brunei was a state on the Malay Peninsula. Charles Brooke petitioned again in 1907 to have Brunei incorporated into Sarawak, but once more the British Government stood firm. A petition of the young Sultan and the Brunei pengiran, drawn up under the Bendahara's influence, was submitted in July 1906 to Sir John Anderson, the British High Commissioner. Anderson, on McArthur's recommendation, accepted that cases involving the Muslim religion should be tried by local religious judges or kadi, but the definition of what constituted Muslim religious law was kept narrow. He agreed also that the Brunei flag should fly over government offices. However, he rejected the requests that warrants should not be issued against 'persons of standing' without consultation with the Sultan and his Council; that the Government should help to recover runaway slaves; and that the customs and laws in force in Brunei should be kept inviolate and unaltered for ever. The treaty of 1906, unlike the similar treaties with the Malay States of the peninsula, had not excluded questions affecting Malay custom from the Resident's jurisdiction as it had matters touching Islam; and Sir John Anderson denied that he had made any promise to the contrary on his visit to Brunei. Meanwhile, McArthur had begun reforming Brunei's administration. In his report, he had described the lack of government in any Western sense of the term. With no public expenditure and with a disreputable ruling class scrambling for cash advances from foreign Governments or private speculators, seizing all they dare from their luckless subjects, and valuing their position solely as

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a means of self-indulgence and extravagance, to talk of a Government seems ridiculous. There are no salaried officers-unless the Pengirans Bendahara and Pemancha can be so described-no forces, no police, no public institutions, no coinage, no roads, no public buildings--except a wooden mosque, and-most crying need of all-no gaol. There is a semblance of a Judicature, but little justice. (McArthur, 1987: 227-8.)

The first task was to sort out the country's finances. The kerajaan and kuripan rights of the Sultan and the two wazir had been surrendered at the time of the 1906 treaty. However, no effective system of revenue collection could be introduced until individual tulin rights and trade monopolies were settled. The task was made more difficult because during Sultan Hashim's last illness his seal had been taken from him and affixed illegally to documents which the Sultan never saw. McArthur was faced with ascertaining which claims were genuine and which were forgeries. Work on this began in earnest in 1907, but progress was slow. The Assistant-Resident in 1910, W. H. Lee Warner, found some 105 main claims and 500 subclaims still outstanding, which he settled during his two-year term. Generally, the rights were taken over by the Government in return for a fixed annual allowance called a political pension, and the owners received title to their land. Some owners took their compensation outright in a fixed sum. During the period 1906-9, a little over $7,000 was paid to redeem tulin rights. Figures are not available for the 1910-11 period, but in 1915, $5,141 was listed under political pensions, rising to $7,709 in 1920 before falling to $4,064 in 1925 (McArthur, 1987: 55; see also the Introduction by A. V. M. Horton). More important were the rights to collect import and export duties and the monopolies of trade in certain articles, the more valuable of which had been leased to Chua Cheng Hee and Cheok Yu. This at least made the Government's task easier. The Government acquired a loan of $200,000 from the Federated Malay States in order to buyout the various monopolies, the monopolists being offered their original purchase money less an amount proportional to the number of years they had already held the monopoly. Most monopolies affecting the capital were redeemed in 1906. The remainder, including those for the outlying districts, were redeemed in 1907. Altogether, $72,009 was paid. The Rajah of Sarawak, however, was able to retain his considerable rights in the Muara Damit district. Finally, cession monies paid by Sarawak and North Borneo had also been mortgaged for years ahead and had to be redeemed. This necessitated further loans from the Federated Malay States which by 1914 totalled $439,750.

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Once monopolies affecting trade had been redeemed, it was possible to introduce a fixed scale of import and export duties. By 1908, these were producing a profit to the Government, and they were to remain the main source of government revenue until the development of the oil industry. At the same time, retail prices began to fall. The main sources of revenue in the first years of the Residency were from revenue farms. The revenue farms for opium and spirits, for the import of tobacco and for kerosene and matches produced $12,210 in 1906, other customs duties, collected directly, producing a further $7,270. In 1907, the opium, gambling, and tobacco import farms were leased for a period of three years for a rental of $16,800 a year. However, the licensee could not meet his liabilities and in 1908 the agreement was ended and the Government thenceforth continued the farming system only for opium. This itself was replaced after one year by a government monopoly on the import and sale of opium. The price was increased in order to discourage its use, but this had little immediate effect except to increase the Government's revenues. By 1924, revenue from the sale of opium was almost $60,000, some 20 per cent of the Government's revenues. Other often arbitrary impositions of the old Government were removed, except for an annual poll tax paid by non-Malay indigenous men who had not taken up land. McArthur had estimated that this would bring in some $15,000, but in 1909 only $4,246 was collected and the cost and trouble led to its abolition. An important source of revenue in these early years was from postage stamps, issued by the Brunei Post Office established in late 1906. These proved popular with European collectors and provided a quarter of the revenue in 1907. Other income came from the Island Trading Syndicate for the land occupied by their cutch factory and from Rajah Charles for his coal and oil mining rights. The result of McArthur's revenue reforms was that Brunei's total income, which was $28,173 in 1906 (out of which $24,000 went in payments to the Sultan and the two wazir) had risen to $165,082 in 1913. An excess of revenue over expenditure had been attained in 1910. Loan repayment did not commence, however, until 1920. Concurrently with reorganizing the revenue system, McArthur had to establish a system of effective adminstration. The principle of the Residential System was that everything was done in the Sultan's name. Thus the authority and prestige of the Sultan was bolstered and he was acknowledged as the Head of State. In reality, the real power was the Resident. Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam was aged seventeen when he succeeded his father. The Regents, Pengirans Bendahara and Pemancha, were old and rarely attended

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the meetings of the State Council, adapted from pre-Residential days to perform a legislative function. Although the Sultan presided, the Resident's advice had to be taken on all matters other than those pertaining to Islam. The chiefs who were entitled to attend, about ten in all, were illiterate and had neither the knowledge nor experience to contribute to discussion concerning the financial, administrative, and other reforms being introduced. After his first brief show of independence, the Sultan proved amenable to change. He became the titular head of a centralized administration which now replaced the territorial power of the traditional nobility. McArthur had to rely on indigenous headmen who were appointed as government officials. There were six of them in 1907. However, they were illiterate and able to do no more than adjudicate petty civil cases and collect customs duties and the poll tax. A number proved unsuitable, abused their position, and had to be dismissed. Such were the first Malay magistrate appointed to Temburong and the collector of customs at Lirnau Manis. Others, like Pengiran Anak Hashim in Belait, began to build up an honest administration responsible to the new government. A new system of justice providing civil and criminal courts on the lines of those in Malaya was also established in 1906. The police force started with the appointment of a Pathan and a Sikh and grew with the posting of nine more Sikhs when accommodation was available. They performed mainly guard duties. Only ten criminal cases were reported in 1906 and the country continued to be free of serious crime for years afterwards, although it is likely that much of what might be called criminal activity never came to the notice of a police force which was alien to Malay society. The recruitment of Malay police did not greatly alter the situation. In keeping with these first functions of the new Government, the first public works included a police station and gaol, a customs office and wharf, and the new Residency, which was built on land as part of McArthur's scheme to discourage further building in Kampong Ayer. This building, known as the 'Bubongan Dua-Belas' or House of Twelve Roofs, was completed in July 1907 and remained the home of the British representative in Brunei until full independence was acquired in 1984. To create a town, land was cleared behind the Sultan's palace and two short streets with lighting laid out and a canal constructed for small boats. Water was piped from a concrete tank constructed about 1.6 kilometres from the new town. However, the Brunei population showed no enthusiasm for living on land and Kampong Ayer continued to house the bulk of the population until very recent times.

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McArthur was aware that economic development was necessary if revenues were to sustain the administrative reforms and a programme of public works, let alone any introduction of educational and health services. The first step was to make the currency of the Straits Settlements the only legal tender. The coal mines at Brooketon and Buang Tawar employed 300 Malays, but produced little revenue for Brunei. The cutch factory's fortunes fluctuated and with them the employment it offered. Six oil prospecting licences were issued in 1906, but the terrain, climate, and poor communications hindered prospecting. Hopes for a timber industry were also disappointed. Rubber planting began at Labu in Temburong in 1908, but commercial agriculture was delayed until tutin claims were settled in 1911. Coal and cutch remained Brunei's most important exports until the early 1920s, when they were overtaken by rubber. In these early years, also, there was a revival of traditional Brunei craft industries such as brassware, silverware, and weaving, which the Government encouraged. These provided some export revenue until the depression of the 1930s. Nevertheless, Brunei's economic growth was modest, and given the necessity to balance the budget and produce a surplus in order to payoff the loan from the Federated Malay States, the Government had to husband its resources. Development, therefore, was also modest. McArthur failed in his efforts to have the position of Limbang reconsidered, arguing that it was an integral part of Brunei. Realizing that it was unrealistic to expect Rajah Charles Brooke to return the whole district, McArthur suggested that the border be renegotiated and the river itself become the boundary, Brunei regaining the true left bank. The British Government was disinclined to do anything during the lifetime of the Rajah. Nor was McArthur much more successful in regaining administrative control over the Rajah's concessions at Muara, Berembang, and Kota Batu: Charles Brooke was induced to withdraw his Administrator and his police from Muara and to admit Brunei's right to levy duties (although none were levied on the export of coal until 1921, after the mine had become profitable). Basically, the principle was established that the Muara, Berembang, and Kota Batu lands belonged to the Sultanate and that the Rajah held his rights only in his personal capacity. There matters were allowed to rest during his lifetime. When McArthur departed in April 1908, he had changed the history of Brunei. There can be little doubt that his report of 1904 prevented the state being completely incorporated into one or both of its neighbours, probably into Sarawak. His administration as the first Resident began the process of modernization in Brunei. There

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was little visible evidence of this in 1908, but the beginnings were there in the governmental and economic reforms McArthur had persuaded the Sultan-in-Council to introduce. That Brunei survives today as an independent state owes much to McArthur. He is remembered today by a street named after him in the capital. The Residential System depended in Brunei, as it did in Malaya, on the co-operation of the ruler and his nobility, not always easy to acquire. McArthur's successor ran into difficulty with the young Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam, over changes in the Land Code of 1909. The Sultan's allowance was cut and he was threatened with deposition before he agreed. Thereafter, as the older advisers aged, he became more amenable to the British. The Pengiran Pemancha Muhammad Salleh died in 1912 and the Bendahara Anak Besar in 1917. In 1918, Muhammad Jamalul Alam came of age and was installed as Yang Di-Pertuan. He was knighted in 1920 and was regarded as a progressive and enlightened ruler. In 1924, he died, possibly of malaria, at the early age of thirty-five. He was succeeded by his son, Ahmad Tajuddin Akhazul Khairi Wadin, aged eleven. Again, a regency under the two chief wazir was established, and lasted until 1931. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin was still ruling when the Japanese invaded in December 1941. Thus, during the period between 1906 and the Japanese Occupation, there were two prolonged periods when the Sultan was a minor. Although the influence of his wazir must not be underestimated, such a situation abetted the Residents in their role as advisers. By the time Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam died in 1924, Brunei had weathered the early years of reform. Successive Residents and Assistant-Residents and the very few other British officials continued and extended the policies introduced by McArthur. Drawn as they were from the Straits Settlements and Malayan Services, they called on the experience of residential rule in the Malay States of the peninsula. The main constraint was finance. The Residents believed in balanced budgets, and thus progress depended on increasing the revenues of the state. The discovery of exploitable oil guaranteed revenues, but the depression years were still ones of caution, partly because of the depression, partly because the Residents did not wish to push Malay society faster than the ruling elite would accept. Brunei remained a remarkably peaceful and crime-free state and the gaol McArthur had thought so necessary had only fourteen inmates at the end of 1914. The murder ofE. B. Maundrell, the then Resident, in 1916, by one of the Sikh police, hastened the recruit-

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ment of Malay police, and in January 1921 a separate Brunei Police Force was established with thirty-nine members. Its Chief was G. McAfee, who continued in command of the Labuan police. By 1938, the force numbered eighty-five, but policing included manning the fire brigade after 1927 and the telephone exchange (in the 1930s), as well as registering aliens, dogs, and motor vehicles. The economy, upon which any expansion of government services depended, developed only slowly during the 1920s. Brunei lacked the infrastructure that had already been developed in Malaya, there was a shortage of labour, freight charges were high, and goods had to be transhipped at Labuan. The export of coal provided no revenue until 1921, when an export duty was imposed, but the mine closed in 1924. Some hope was placed in rubber, the first seedlings being introduced by a Johore Malay, Haji Muhammad Daud, in 1908. However, the European companies formed to plant rubber were small and undercapitalized. One failed in 1912 and as late as 1924, the three estates in Temburong had only planted 2,000 acres (815 hectares) between them. The first rubber was exported in 1914, but the estates came into production in time to be caught by the depression in rubber prices in the early 1920s. By this time, smallholders had planted more rubber than the estates, although these trees did not produce in quantity until later in the 1920s. The estates had to put off labour to survive and when rubber recovered in the mid-1920s, they had to import labour from India, which in turn was repatriated when the Great Depression struck in the 1930s. Smallholders were affected as well. During the revival in rubber prices in the mid-1920s, much rubber was planted out from the capital along the road towards Tutong. This was coming into production when prices collapsed in the 1930s. One important change was in rice cultivation. Before the Residency was established, very little wet rice was planted in Brunei. The Land Code of 1909 had made it possible for people to acquire land, the Kedayans in particular, who either acquired it individually or as village communities. The Government also persuaded the inhabitants of Kampong Ayer to move to dry land and to take up agriculture, although with little success. Nevertheless, high prices for rice after the First World War aided the Government's efforts to make Brunei less dependent on imported rice; but in the interwar years production rarely met one-third of the country's requirements and at times slipped to one-sixth. Nevertheless, there was slow economic growth and from 1910, except for the years 1914 and 1921, revenue exceeded expenditure.

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In 1927, when rubber prices were high, it reached $440,870, a figure not exceeded until oil was exploited. Customs receipts, mainly on imports, provided the bulk of this, with the opium farm second. The latter was recognized to be a declining item of revenue, however, as the intention was to discourage the use of opium in accordance with the policy of the League of Nations. Therefore, a portion of the revenue from the opium farm was placed in an Opium Revenue Replacement Fund against that day when that source should cease. At the same time, Brunei was still indebted to the Federated Malay States to the tune of $413,000 in 1928, and was paying it off at $6,000 a year. The caution these examples reveal characterized the Residential Government during the interwar years, which was in any case merely an extension of the financial caution of British colonial administrations elsewhere. Until 1921, Brunei was linked administratively with the Crown Colony of Labuan. The Residents spent much of their time in Labuan, which was considered more healthy and had more facilities, leaving the Assistant-Resident to represent them in Brunei. Between May 1906 and January 1913, the Assistant-Resident resided in Brunei Town. The post was abolished in 1914 and was revived in January 1931, when the AssistantResident was appointed to Kuala Belait. In the early years, other officials were shared with Labuan and when special expertise was required, assistance was obtained from Malaya; as when the first topographical survey of Brunei was conducted between 1934 and 1938. The Government's financial caution continued even when Brunei entered upon an era of prosperity upon the discovery of oil. There was evidence of oil in Brunei before 1906. An oil seepage had been recorded at Miri in Sarawak in 1895 and oil was reported on Pulau Berembang across the river from Brunei Town in 1903, although the latter was not a commercial proposition and only hindered coal mining. Oil prospecting was encouraged by the Government from 1907, but the companies concerned lacked sufficient capital to maintain the search in difficult terrain in areas remote from any facilities. In 1923, the British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate (BBPS) transferred its lease to the British Malayan Petroleum Company (BMPC), a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, for a payment of one shilling a ton for any oil discovered. This turned out to be a very profitable deal for BBPS, for on 5 April 1929 oil was found at Seria, although none was exported until 1932, when the market for oil had improved. By 1935, Brunei was the third largest oil producer in the British Commonwealth, the refined product being of the highest quality and supplying aviation spirit to the Royal Air Force (see the quotation in Horton, 1984a: 27).

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The revenues from oil lessened the impact of the Great Depression upon Brunei and enabled the country's debt to be paid off by 1936. Even so, the Government showed restraint. The size of the field was unknown and there was no guarantee that it would keep producing for any long time. The Government decided that ordinary expenditure should continue to be met out of ordinary revenues. Revenues from oil were invested against the day when oil should run out. These revenues were modest because the Government had fixed the royalty payable by BMPC at two shillings a ton, with an option to take 10 per cent in kind. This figure reflected the situation in 1923, when the prospects of finding oil were regarded with pessimism and the main aim was to encourage exploration. BMPC invested some $8,000,000 in the Seria field, at a time when the annual revenues of the Brunei Government were less than $500,000. BMPC needed a return on that investment. It was not until after the Japanese Occupation that the royalties were renegotiated. Meanwhile, Brunei's revenues rose so that in 1940 its annual revenue was $1,500,000. Even though royalties from oil were diverted into an investment fund, the development of the oilfield stimulated the economy generally, thus producing an increase in revenue from other sources. The Government appointed an Assistant-Resident to Kuala Belait in 1931 to supervise the growth of the oilfield. In 1936, the Resident received a Secretary, Awang Ibrahim bin Muhammad Jahfar, originally from Labuan, who had risen through the new government service to be District Officer of the Brunei Muara District. A State Medical Officer was appointed in 1929 and Forestry and Agricultural Departments were established in the 1930s. Agricultural stations were set up to encourage the adoption of new crops and farming methods, but the farming sector remained small. Some pepper was being exported by 1940 and the Rubber Restriction Scheme introduced in 1934 had revived rubber prices while preventing new planting, so that smallholders continued to receive a small cash income. Public works remained modest. New stretches of road were built, but Brunei had only a little over 160 kilometres of road in 1939, about a third of them maintained by the oil company. Prisoners were used as labour on public works and often regarded themselves as public employees rather than criminals. A wireless telegraph station opened in Brunei Town in 1921. First operated by a European, after 1928 it was run by Pengiran Muhammad as State Wireless Officer. The first dam was built at Tasek, near the capital, in 1926 to provide a piped water-supply to part of the capital, which

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also received electricity after 1935. Municipal matters became the responsibility of Sanitary Boards, created in Brunei Town in 1921 and in Seria and Kuala Belait in 1929. In 1931, government headmen or penghulu were appointed in settled rice-growing rural areas, with powers similar to those of the traditional headmen in the wards of Kampong Ayer. Educational and medical services were also modest. The Government assumed responsibility only for Malay education. The first Malay primary school opened in Brunei Town in about 1912. There were still only four such schools by 1928, but by 1941 there were twenty-four, with 1,746 pupils and 68 teachers, only 12 of whom had received training, in Malaya. The Chinese community had founded five schools, and two schools had been established by the Catholic Mill Hill Mission. There was no secondary education, although a few scholarships were awarded to schools in Labuan and Malaya. Education was under the supervision of the AssistantResident, and those who obtained an education in Malay or English found entry into the government service. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin sent his children to the Catholic School in Brunei Town, a fair indication of its superiority, despite its limitations. Compulsory education was introduced in 1929 for Malay boys aged seven to fourteen who lived within 3.2 kilometres of a government school providing free education, but education was generally underrated by the people until the 1950s (Horton, 1984a: 24, 30-1). In September 1929, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin opened a thirtybed government hospital in Brunei Town. Until then there had been no government doctor or hospital in Brunei, the Minister of Posts, Leong Ah Ng, being also Chief Dresser. Serious cases were sent to Labuan. Since the mid-1920s, all estates had to provide a hospital and a dresser for their employees. A travelling dispensary service provided basic medicine to the rural areas. This was improved over the years and made possible vaccination programmes which prevented a recurrence of the smallpox epidemic of 1904. Malaria was controlled in the towns, but tuberculosis remained prevalent. A major concern was the failure to reduce infant mortality, 20 per cent of infants dying in their first year as late as 1938. Women relied on traditional midwives and no one offered for modern midwifery training. When the Treasurer, who was Chinese, allowed his two daughters to be trained in Singapore, it was regarded as a breakthrough. At the other end of the state from Brunei Town, another power arose during the 1930s. Oil had been discovered in the remotest

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district from the capital. The Belait district had a population of 1,126, according to the 1911 Census. Its products were rattans, rice, sago, and jelutong (a gum derived from a tree), but there was little trade because the Belait River was closed by the monsoon for six months of the year. Communication with the capital was by sea and via Labuan. No government official was appointed to Belait under the Residency until September 1907, when Pengiran Anak Hashim bin Pengiran Shahbandar was appointed. He remained as District Officer until about 1921. Not until 1931, in response to the discovery of oil, was a European Assistant-Resident appointed to the district. Even then, communications with Brunei Town were difficult and the Government was poor. The BMPC, on the other hand, had sufficient capital not only to exploit the field it had discovered, but to provide wharves, roads, a light railway, housing, recreational facilities, medical and educational services-all that was required to service the immigrant population of Europeans, Chinese, and Indians associated with the oilfield. By 1938, the population of Kuala Belait had grown to 5,000 and the BMPC was the largest employer of labour, employing 1,185 out of a total of 2,265 wage-earners recorded. In the Belait district, the Government was very much a junior partner. By 1938, the oilfield was producing some 84 per cent of the state's exports by value, adding greatly to the coffers of the state, royalties from oil providing about half the government revenue. However, the two ends of the country had developed in their separate ways and had little in common. Indeed, the oilfield community in Brunei had closer contact with the oilfield community over the border in Sarawak, to where the oil was piped for refining. To reach Brunei Town by land, it was still necessary to travel along the beach between Kuala Belait and Tutong, from where there was a road. The Residency had transformed Brunei by 1941, not so much in material terms, although that was evident, but in providing a new sense of hope and an awareness that progress was possible. The Residency could only have operated with the goodwill and consent of the governed, for the British presence was small. In 1941, there were only seven British officials: the Resident, the AssistantResident, the Chief of Police, the State Engineer, and the Heads of the Medical, Forestry, and Agriculture Departments. The Treasurer was Chinese. Other departments were headed by Malays. If particular expertise was required, it was obtainable from Malaya. There was no hostility to the British presence. One ex-Resident marvelled in retrospect

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at the patience and courtesy with which the proud aristocracy of Brunei accepted the shocks which we young officers must have administered to their sense of fitness .... But accept they did, not with the resignation of despair but with unfailing goodwill and appreciation that our activities, crude though they might seem, were inspired by a genuine wish to help and serve their state. (Cator, 1939: 744.)

Their acceptance was made easier by the increased personal revenues they began to enjoy. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's allowance was raised by $500 a month in 1934 and by the same amount in 1938, doubling that awarded to Sultan Hashim in 1906. The retention of the monarchy undoubtedly enabled the Bruneian people, particularly those of the capital, to accept the changes and to identify them with the traditional elite. That the changes were in the name of the Sultan identified him and them with the new order. Indeed, loyalty to the Sultan was if anything intensified as he remained the central stable point. G. E. Cator, who was Resident from May 1916 to March 1921, has graphically described the coronation of Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam II when he reached his majority in 1918, confessing that it was 'impossible for even the most stolid Englishman not to be moved by the passion of loyalty evoked' (Cator, 1939: 742). The shade of Sultan Hashim must have approved, for the tumult signified all he had tenaciously worked for: the continued existence of his state and of his royal line. Finally, by the 1930s, Sarawak had given up its claims. Rajah Charles Brooke had died in 1917. His successor, Rajah Vyner Brooke, surrendered Sarawak's revenue rights in Muara after the closure of the Brooketon mine in 1924, although Sarawak received compensation. The Rajah's land rights in Muara, Pulau Berembang, and Kota Batu were transferred to Brunei in 1931-2. The Sultan's writ now ran throughout his dominions, even though the BMPC was allowed in practice considerable latitude on the oilfield, but this was largely a matter of convenience. Sarawak made no concessions regarding the Limbang. Ironically, in 1917-18, the Colonial Office had suggested the transfer of the Belait and Tutong districts to Sarawak in return for the Limbang. Sarawak rejected the proposal, and thus lost the chance to acquire the main oilproducing region. Nevertheless, Brunei still hankered after the Limbang, and from time to time the issue was to re-emerge.

9 The Japanese Interregnum and the Last Years of the Residency,

1941-1959

THE outbreak of war in Europe had increased Brunei's importance and prosperity. Its oil was an important British imperial resource and the increased demand for khaki dye benefited the cutch industry. However, the likelihood of hostilities with Japan made little impression in Brunei until late in 1941, despite contingency arrangements prepared by the British Government. These did not include the defence of Brunei, whatever might have been implied by the Residency Agreement. The main British effort was concentrated upon Malaya and Singapore. However, plans were made to deny the oilfields to the enemy. After the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and on Kota Bharu in Malaya, installations and equipment were destroyed, as was the refinery at Lutong in Sarawak. On 16 December 1941, 10,000 troops of the Japanese Kawaguchi Detachment arrived at Kuala Belait and within six days had occupied the country. There was no resistance. The Resident, E. E. Pengilly, declined a Japanese proposal that he should continue in office under their direction, and with the other Europeans from Brunei was interned in the Batu Lintang camp in Kuching. The Sultan and the Brunei ruling class had no choice but to co-operate with their new masters. Awang (later Pehin Dato) Ibrahim bin Muhammad Jahfar, Secretary to the Resident, courageously made a point of approaching the British officials paraded by the Japanese to shake them each by the hand and wish them well. Yet he accepted appointment as Chief Administrative Officer or State Secretary under the Japanese Governor who took the place of the Resident (Horton, 1984a: 35 ff.) The Japanese reorganized their conquests in Borneo into five 'prefectures'. The Brunei 'prefecture' included Baram, Labuan,

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Lawas, and Limbang. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin retained his throne and had bestowed upon him a pension and several Japanese honours. He had little to do with the Japanese regime. Malay Government officers stayed at their posts and provided as effective an administration as they could. Unlike their counterparts in Sarawak and North Borneo, they suffered no reductions in salary (Colonial Office file, CO 10301287). Many Asian personnel continued working on the oilfield. Others retired into the interior where they supported themselves by farming. Throughout Borneo, the Japanese kept to the coastal and riverine settlements, sending only infrequent patrols into the interior. What had been British Borneo, renamed Kalimantan Utara, was under the overall control of the Japanese 37th Army, whose headquarters were first at Kuching and then at Sapong Estate in south-west Sabah. The Japanese aim was to make the area they governed self-supporting in food, and to increase the production of oil, coal, and other minerals useful to the Japanese war effort. They drilled sixteen new wells on the Miri-Seria oilfield and by the end of the war had restored production to half its pre-war level. There was some mining of coal at Muara and Subok and the dye industry was developed. As elsewhere, the Japanese created organizations to mobilize the people, such as community councils and a women's organization known as the kaum ibu. Some people were sent abroad for training; among them were Sheikh Azahari, leader of the post-war Partai Rakyat Brunei, who was sent to Indonesia, and Pengiran Yusuf, later a government minister, who was sent to Japan. Attempts were made to inculcate anti-European feeling, and Japanese was taught in schools towards the end of the war, while government officers were required to attend night classes in Japanese. The Japanese Occupation was comparatively benign in Brunei. Unlike their counterparts in Singapore and Malaya, the Chinese had not been overtly anti-Japanese before the war because political expression in the Sultanate was virtually unknown. Chinese left the town in large numbers and took up land out of harm's way, as did many Malays. Japanese behaviour was considered harsh by a people accustomed to the gentle courtesy of Malay life, and the slapping and the prodding with rifle butts in which the Japanese soldiery indulged as a matter of course were greatly resented. As the war turned against the Japanese, the benevolent Governor of the early Occupation years was replaced and Japanese rule became much harsher. The Kempeitai (Japanese Military Police) was greatly feared, and as late as the 1970s a certain house was still regarded as

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haunted because the site was associated with the Kempeitai. Some leading Malays were suspected of being British agents and were tortured, and in early 1945 there were some executions. Life became harder in other ways. From 1943, allied attacks on Japanese shipping brought trade to a standstill. Japanese 'banana money' became virtually worthless. Stocks of medicine, food, and clothing were not replenished and by 1945 there were serious shortages, people making do with whatever their ingenuity could provide; for example, making cloth from bark in the traditional fashion. The population of the town dwindled as more people escaped to the countryside to grow food or to escape the attentions of an increasingly oppressive and unpredictable Japanese soldiery. As the allied advance came closer, the Japanese developed Labuan and Brunei Bay as a naval base, one leg of a triangle comprising Singapore, Saigon, and Labuan. Convoy escorts were based at Labuan, and the bay became the rendezvous point for the Japanese fleet before it made its final sally towards the Philippines and destruction. Thereafter, allied bombing rendered Labuan untenable by shipping and the allied invasion was awaited by a Japanese army which was increasingly demoralized. The allied campaign to reconquer Borneo was entitled 'Operation Oboe' and was seen as a preliminary to 'Operation Zipper', the projected invasion of Malaya. That segment aimed at Brunei and Labuan was codenamed 'Oboe Six'. On 10 June 1945, elements of the Australian 9th Division, supported by American air and naval units, landed on Labuan and at Muara and Brunei Bluff. While there was some determined resistance on Labuan, the Japanese in Brunei did not fight with the tenacity that had been expected and Brunei Town, deserted by its inhabitants, was captured within three days. The Japanese withdrew into the interior, where they were intercepted by indigenous guerrilla forces organized by allied officers. Some 2,530 Japanese were killed or captured for the loss of 79 Australians and an unknown number of guerrillas. The British Military Administration (BMA), which was established in June 1945, was staffed largely by Australians. Its tasks were to provide supplies and relief to the population suffering from deprivation and disease, and to establish a basic administration until the transfer to civilian rule. This was delayed until July 1946 because of uncertainty about the future of Sarawak and British North Borneo. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Brigadier Macaskie, was British and had differences with the Australian Military Authorities, who refused to delegate responsibility to him, many Austr'llians

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believing that post-war responsibility for the Borneo states should pass to Australia, whose troops had liberated them from the Japanese. The situation eased when the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945 ended Japanese resistance elsewhere in British Borneo, and when the Australians were relieved by Indian troops from Admiral Lord Mountbatten's South-East Asia Command in January 1946. By this time, the main destruction of war had been cleaned up. The Japanese had fired the oil wells, which continued to burn until September 1945. Kampong Ayer had been spared, but buildings on land in the capital and in other towns had been flattened by allied bombing prior to the landings. There were problems with food supplies and distribution because of lack of shipping and damaged roads. Moreover, military activities had disrupted the rice harvest and that of the following year was badly affected by drought. This delay in restoring prosperity led to a strike in mid-1946 by Chinese artisans on the oilfield, which was settled with the assistance of a Labour Adviser from Malaya. The BMA did not feel empowered to undertake too much in the way of reconstruction, preferring to leave any decisions about largescale expenditure to its successor. It engaged administrative staff, created a new police force, and encouraged life to return to normal. By the end of 1945, eighteen Malay schools had reopened. There was a period of difficulty and uncertainty for Malay officers who had worked with the Japanese, but common sense prevailed and there was no witch hunt. In June 1946, on the anniversary of his country's liberation from the Japanese, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin dutifully sent his loyal greetings to King George VI. When the Residential System was restored on 6 September 1946, he pledged his and his people's loyalty to the British Crown and his full cooperation with the new Resident, W.]. Peel. On the surface, all was as it had been, but in reality the war and the Japanese Occupation had brought about considerable change and there was no going back to those halcyon days before the war when Brunei had enjoyed modest prosperity and unhurried progress as a semi-colonial backwater. The returning British had plans for Brunei, as for the other Borneo territories. The Colonial Office had been critical of the Brooke Raj and of the North Borneo Company before the war, believing them to be anachronistic relics of a bygone age, lacking the will and the resources to provide social, economic, and political progress. They certainly lacked the resources for post-war reconstruction. The British Government was also looking ahead to eventual

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independence for these territories under indigenous governments. This implied a period of political tutelage so that they could practise the Westminster style of government, create a sense of national unity and of common citizenship among the different races, and develop greater co-operation between the Borneo territories. Even at this stage, there was consideration of an eventual federation or union embracing the British Borneo territories and Malaya. Another suggestion in 1943 was that North Borneo might revert to Brunei, but this was rejected because it was felt that Brunei royalty had not demonstrated the qualities which would justify such an extension of their territory. Brigadier Macaskie, who had been for many years in the service of the North Borneo Company, rising to Chief Justice and Deputy-Governor (1934-45), floated the idea again in 1944, arguing that it would make the Sultan amenable to a new treaty and that Brunei's oil wealth could be used for the benefit of a larger population. Again the proposal was dropped. In some quarters, there was a feeling that all three Borneo territories should become Crown Colonies, at least one Foreign Office memo referring to the Sultan of Brunei as a quisling (FO 371146324). Sir Harold MacMichael, sent to renegotiate treaties with the rulers of the Malay States, was unable to visit Brunei. No treaty could be negotiated with Brunei until South-East Asia Command took over responsibility for Borneo from the Australian Military. By the time this occurred in January 1946, Sir Harold MacMichael had been recalled. The Colonial Office decided that a renegotiation of the Brunei treaty could wait until a decision was made about the possible union of Brunei with the other Borneo territories. This caution was reinforced by the uproar in Malaya that resulted from MacMichael's methods of persuasion employed upon the rulers there, and by the consequent Malay opposition to the Malayan Union, the scheme proposed for Malaya. Moreover, Brunei's oil wealth, safely in the sterling area, assumed greater importance to a British Government undergoing a dollar crisis. The Right Honourable Malcolm MacDonald, who had been appointed GovernorGeneral of British territories in South-East Asia, based in Singapore, concluded in December 1947 that it would be unwise to take any step that might arouse opposition in Brunei. He considered Brunei too small to stand alone and recommended that it should be associated with Sarawak for administrative purposes, being surrounded by Sarawak territory. Brunei's status remained unaltered, except that the Governor of Sarawak, which was now a British Colony, became High Commissioner for Brunei, and British

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departmental heads in Brunei were now seconded from the Sarawak Service rather than from the peninsula. E. E. F. Pretty, formerly of the Malayan Civil Service and Resident in Brunei between 1923 and 1928, was called out of retirement in August 1948 to return to Brunei as Resident to win the Sultan's acceptance of the change. Events in Sarawak, where there was Malay opposition to cession to the British Crown and the Governor, Duncan Stewart, was assassinated in December 1949, showed how the post-war changes could arouse opposition. Stewart's successor, Sir Anthony Abell, who was also High Commissioner to Brunei, made clear that Brunei should develop as a Malay Muslim Sultanate and that independence was the ultimate aim (Borneo Bulletin, 13 July 1957; Horton, 1984a: 43). Once the Residency was restored, plans were drawn up for reconstruction. A Town Plan for the capital was approved in 1947, one for Kuala Belait in 1949, and that for Seria in 1950. Government had to compete with the BMPC for construction materials and labour, the latter being able to pay higher wages. In the long run, this did not matter greatly as oil production soon exceeded prewar levels and by the 1950s Brunei was the largest producer in the Commonwealth, confirming its importance as a dollar earner. The oil was still sent to Lutong in Sarawak for refining, which some Bruneians resented because it entailed a loss of revenue to the state, but changes in the royalty and tax agreements between BMPC and the Government meant that revenues from oil greatly increased overall. In 1950, the royalty paid to the Government was revised and a 20 per cent tax on profits was introduced, increased to 30 per cent in 1953. This tax applied to all income (except personal income), not just to the BMPC, but in the nature of things, the oil company provided the large bulk of it. The cutch factory closed in 1952 and the Island Trading Company went into liquidation in 1957. Rubber enjoyed a boom during the Korean War in the early 1950s, but in all years to 1959 oil supplied some 90 per cent of the state's revenues, exports rising to over 5 million tons worth almost $290 million in 1955. Total government revenue was just under $130 million in 1959. It had been less than $1 million in 1946. This revenue made possible the rebuilding of Brunei Town, culminating in the construction of the great Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque, completed in 1958. It also made possible the First Brunei Development Plan of 1953-8. The transformation of Brunei that now took place is associated in Bruneian minds with the reign of Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, father of the present Sultan. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin died in Singa-

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pore in June 1950 while en route to London. He had no male heir. A bizarre attempt was made to place upon the throne his only legitimate daughter, Tuanku Ehsan. Back in 1937, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin had persuaded his wazir to sign a document naming Tuanku Ehsan the heir apparent, although the British Resident advised that this was inconsistent with the Brunei law of succession. This provided an opportunity for the machinations of Gerard MacBryan, a brilliant but eccentric man, who was for many years the Private Secretary and confidant of the last Rajah of Sarawak, Sir Charles Vyner Brooke. An inveterate intriguer, MacBryan had at one time courted a daughter of the Rajah and also the daughter of Bertram Brooke, the Rajah's brother. He accepted Islam in 1935, made a pilgrimage to Mecca, and was attracted by the idea of becoming a Muslim Rajah of Sarawak on the death of Vyner Brooke, who had no son. It was this dream of being the power behind the throne which attracted him to Brunei. In 1941, the centenary of Brooke rule, MacBryan persuaded Rajah Vyner Brooke it was an opportune time to settle the long-standing Limbang problem. Travelling on the Rajah's yacht and wearing his Arab garb brought back from Mecca, he negotiated in Brunei with the Sultan and in the Limbang with the pengiran and descendants of Pengiran Muda Hassim. The upshot, apparently approved by the Resident, was that Sarawak paid the Sultan $20,000 for the sovereign rights it had exercised in the Limbang since 1891 and an annual payment of $1,000 was to be paid in perpetuity for the continuation of those rights. Further cash payments totalling $60,000 and annual payments of $6,000 were agreed to certain pengiran for the loss of tulin rights. The descendants of Pengiran Muda Hassim were to receive pensions totalling $4,000 per annum. There was also a wedding present for Pengiran Muda Omar Ali, the Sultan's younger brother. Although the British Government eventually refused to recognize these arrangements and disallowed the payments, MacBryan had won the confidence of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, so that in 1950, when he appeared again in Brunei, he quickly inveigled himself into the Sultan's favour by advocating the rights of Tuanku Ehsan, with references to precedent such as that of Sultan Ahmad, Brunei's second Sultan, being ruler in the name of the daughter of Sultan Muhammad. MacBryan had himself made trustee of the political rights of Tuanku Ehsan, and Ahmad Tajuddin also appointed him his Political Adviser for his proposed visit to England, where he was to have talks with the British Government and with Shell. He was advocating the creation of a Bornean state comprising North

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Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei with himself as Head of State and with MacBryan presumably behind the scenes. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's sudden death thwarted this scheme. Ahmad Tajuddin's younger brother, Omar Ali Saifuddin, was proclaimed Sultan and his claim was upheld by the Colonial Office. MacBryan suffered a nervous breakdown, was certificated, and was deported forcibly from Brunei to Singapore for treatment. He subsequently died in mysterious circumstances and in penury in Hong Kong in 1951. A party in Brunei continued to uphold Tuanku Ehsan's claim to the throne and she, too, was eventually forced to live in exile. A few in Brunei still consider Omar Ali Saifuddin to have been a usurper and hence question the right of the present Sultan to rule. (For MacBryan, see Reece, 1982: 24-36 and 278-9. The details of the 1941 Limbang negotiations are in the Colonial Office file, CO 531/30/53066.) Sultan Omar was born in 1914. There was no expectation that he would succeed to the throne, but his career in the Brunei Government Service fitted him admirably for the role he was to play in the post-war development of Brunei. After his education at the Kuala Kangsar Malay College in Malaya, he returned to Brunei in 1936 as a Cadet Officer in the Forestry Department. At the end of that year, he was transferred to the Legal Department and in 1938 became an Administrative Officer. During the Japanese Occupation, he worked under Awang Ibrahim bin Muhammad Jahfar, the State Secretary, acquiring a knowledge of administrative procedure and of land administration. In July 1947, he was installed as Bendahara and travelled widely in the country districts, meeting people, listening to their views, and submitting reports for consideration by the Sultan's government and the Resident. Sultan Ahmad's death on 4 June 1950 led to the short-lived constitutional crisis connected with Tuanku Ehsan, but Pengiran Bendahara Omar Ali Saifuddin was proclaimed Sultan on 6 June. He was crowned on 31 May 1951. In 1953, he was knighted by the British Crown and was generally known thereafter as Sultan Sir Omar Ali. Sultan Sir Omar Ali recognized from the beginning that the real power lay not with the Resident but in London. He was an Anglophile with a great admiration for Sir Winston Churchill. Nevertheless, he was prepared to go only so far with constitutional reform, realizing that post-war Britain, with its changing status in the world, had perhaps as much need of Brunei as Brunei and he had need of Britain. His first achievement was to negotiate those changes in oil revenues and taxation already mentioned, which provided Brunei

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with the means to acquire the trappings of a modern state. Brunei's development was encouraged by the Sultan, but its implementation depended mainly on foreign expertise. In 1953, the State Council voted $100 million to be spent during the next five years and appointed E. R. Bevington, who had served in Fiji, as Development Commissioner. The First Brunei Development Plan included provisions for Brunei development of an infrastructure, without which commercial investment would not be attracted; thus roads and communications were to be improved, and water and electrical supplies extended. Social provisions included the expansion of education and medical facilities, and non-contributory pensions for the aged and disabled. Plans were again made for resettling the people of Kampong Ayer, local crafts were to be revived, and agriculture was to be improved and diversified. The most pressing need, if Bruneians were to replace expatriates, was education. Since 1946, some progress had been made in building schools, training teachers outside the state, mainly in Sarawak, and preparing textbooks. In 1949, J. Pearce, the first qualified State Education Officer, was appointed and in 1951 the first government English school was opened in the capital. Under the First Brunei Development Plan, the Government aimed to provide free vernacular education for all indigenous children, with the English language taught in the higher classes. Pupils selected by examination would then proceed to English-medium secondary schools. There was provision for technical training at the BMPC school in Seria, and scholarships were available for overseas study. A school feeding scheme and a school health scheme were introduced. Teachers were recruited from overseas until sufficient Bruneians could be trained. Thus a two-tier system of education was introduced, for the vernacular schools, which were Malay in fact, were rudimentary and placed an emphasis on 'traditional' Malay activities, like handicraft and gardening; the basic assumption being that most of the children would remain in the kampong. Given the initial reluctance of parents to send their children, particularly their daughters, to school, this conservative approach was understandable. By 1958, the annual expenditure on education was $4,000,000, there were fifty-two Malay primary schools with 7,164 pupils, and 90 per cent of boys and 37 per cent of girls of school-going age were in school. Girls still lagged behind, but their number was increasing. Three government secondary schools had been built, and a teachers' training college had opened in 1956. There were also eight English-language Mission schools and eight Chinese schools,

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the latter receiving grants which enabled the authorities to keep an eye on them while enabling the schools to attract better teachers and improve their facilities. This implied, however, no intention to integrate the Chinese into the Brunei community. On the medical front, malaria was virtually eliminated, there being only 66 cases in 1959, down from over 3,000 cases reported in 1953. Tuberculosis was being tackled and a hospital had opened in the capital in 1951. A well-equipped 120-bed hospital was provided at Kuala Belait by the oil company, while the government had a dispensary and small hospital there as well. Dispensaries were established in other centres and travelling dispensaries and dressers reached the interior. Perhaps the best measure of the achievement to 1958 is the fall in the death rate from 20 per thousand in 1947 to 11.3 per thousand in 1959. Much of this improvement was due to public sanitation measures, the improvement of drainage, and the provision of a pure water-supply. A water filtration and purification plant was established for the capital in 1954 and by 1957 three-quarters of the houses in Kuala Belait were connected to piped water. In the four main settlements-Brunei Town, Tutong, Seria, and Kuala Belaitsome 90 per cent of houses had electricity and piped water by 1960. Considerable building had taken place in Brunei Town, which, apart from Kampong Ayer, had been largely destroyed at the end of the war. Two-storey shophouses lined the streets of the commercial centre behind the port, and attractive public buildings such as the State Secretariat, the General Post Office, and the Lapau or Audience Chamber were constructed, the whole crowned by the grandeur of the Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque, opened in 1958 in the presence of the crowned heads of Malaya. Brunei Town took on an appearance of solidity and permanence not evident before. These were commendable achievements, but much remained to be done. Brunei still lacked a deep-water port, shipping being restricted to vessels that could negotiate the river to the wharves at Brunei Town. There was a small airport for the capital and an airstrip for oil company use at Seria. There was no road connection between Tutong and Kuala Belait, other than along the beach. A river-clearing scheme was discontinued; encouragement of smallholder rubber replanting had a marginal effect only in the light of later decline in rubber prices; an irrigated rice project at Mulait and experiments in mechanized rice farming proved unproductive; and the revival of traditional crafts roused little enthusiasm among youth disinclined to undertake the long apprenticeship required when

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other opportunities lay open to the educated. Even the schools were criticized. They were overcrowded and understaffed, Malay education appeared to lead nowhere, and there were insufficient places for those wishing to have an English education. It was argued that the children of the elite received the first places in the schools and the majority of scholarships. There was insufficient attention to technical education which would enable Bruneians to qualify for the technical jobs held by expatriates, many of whom were Asian. Moreover, the top positions in the administration and in government services were in the hands of expatriates, causing a growing nationalist movement to argue that Brunei was not being prepared for eventual self-government. The Government could argue that modernization could not be achieved within a mere five years and that the First Brunei Development Plan had achieved a great deal which would bear fruit later. However, the increased pace of development had raised expectations, which were fuelled further by developments in Brunei's British-governed neighbours, Sarawak and North Borneo, where the talk was of eventual independence and self-government and practical steps were being taken to prepare the way for a parliamentary system of representative democracy, in which it was assumed Brunei would eventually share. Events proceeded on several lines. A grass-roots nationalist movement, calling on faint stirrings from before the war, rapidly evolved in the 1950s to create the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) or Brunei People's Party. The British Colonial Office and the British authorities in Sarawak and North Borneo, began preparing those states for self-government, encouraging the rise of political parties and the emergence of political leaders who could be fostered along the right lines. At the same time, discussion of an eventual merger of the Brunei territories, including Brunei, took place. In Brunei itself, Sultan Sir Omar Ali had to contend with these developments, encourage economic growth, and retain his own hold upon political authority, while resisting too hasty a transition from the protectorate status he enjoyed as ruler to the uncertainties of independence and political pluralism. The first stirrings of Bruneian nationalism in the modern political sense may be seen in the Barisan Pemuda Brunei or Brunei Youth Movement founded in 1938 by Pengiran Yusof, Inche Salleh, and Haji Jamil, and to some extent influenced by the formation of similar organizations in the Malay States. The movement revived after the Japanese Occupation and in 1947 submitted a memorandum to Malcolm MacDonald, the Governor-General in Singapore, urging

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progress towards independence with some form of representative government. To further this aim, it proposed that education be improved. This movement then died away, but it represented a latent discontent within Brunei society. In 1952, a group of Malays attempted to form a Brunei Film Production Company, which the Government saw as a political front. Registration was denied and its leaders, in January 1953, organized a demonstration, as a result of which several were imprisoned. Later in the year, a plot to overthrow the Brunei Government was exposed. These activities brought to public attention for the first time Sheikh Ahmad M. Azahari. Partly Arab and partly Malay by descent, Azahari had been born on Labuan in 1929. During the war, he had been sent by the Japanese to study at Bogor in Indonesia. Mter the war, he fought with the Indonesian forces against the returning Dutch and became an admirer of Sukarno. He returned to Singapore in 1950 and entered into business, which took him to Brunei. He settled in Brunei in 1952 and became involved in the early political agitation, being imprisoned for six months as an organizer of the Brunei Film Production Company demonstration. He was an inspiring orator and became the acknowledged leader of those seeking political change in Brunei. Meanwhile, early in 1953, the Sultan himself declared that he desired a Constitution to be drawn up for Brunei. He appointed an Advisory Committee of seven Malays to sound out opinion in Brunei and to investigate the constitutional situation in the Federation of Malaya, which was proceeding towards independence. In August the following year, District Advisory Councils were created, comprising persons nominated by the Sultan, except in the Belait District where three were to be nominated by the Chinese community and three by the oil company. These Councils had the right to air complaints and to make suggestions, which they readily did. They were also empowered to appoint observers to the State Council, Brunei-Muara sending three, Belait two, and Tutong and Temburong one each. In February 1956, the State Council passed the Local Government Enactment, aimed at creating urban and district councils with control over their own budgets and powers greater than those of the existing Municipal and Sanitary Boards. A Commission of Enquiry sought the views of the populace, who rejected the proposal for fear of increased taxation on the one hand and of a decline in the authority of customary officials on the other. This conservatism reportedly disappointed the Sultan, who had seen the Councils as a cautious way forward. But they had also been

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opposed by the PRE, which had emerged in 1956 as the expression of those in Brunei who wanted more far-reaching changes than the Sultan had proposed. The PRB had been formed in February 1956 after Azahari had attended both the inaugural congress of the left-wing Partai Rakyat Malaya and, on 26 December 1955, the General Assembly of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), at which Tunku Abdul Rahman had declared that Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei were welcome to join the Federation of Malaya as member states. Azahari immediately supported the proposal and sought the Malayan Government's assistance in bringing the Borneo territories to independence and merger. On his return to Brunei, Azahari formed the PRB on 22 January 1956. He had given notice of his intention to the Resident, J. O. Gilbert, and had informed the police, so that among the 150 attending the meeting were two officers from the Special Branch. Perhaps for their benefit, Azahari stressed that the new party would not hate the British, but 'would respect them as our teachers, especially if the British Government recognized our basic rights' (Zaini, 1987: 2). The party's application for registration, however, was delayed, first until it had dissociated itself from the Partai Rakyat Malaya and then because of the Sultan's insistence that it operate solely within Brunei and establish no branches in Sarawak or North Borneo. The British officials had been inclined to allow the latter, probably seeing it as furthering the British design for a Borneo Federation. The Sultan, however, was extremely suspicious of any moves towards such an arrangement. In this case, his view prevailed and the PRB was registered in August 1956. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin had agreed only reluctantly in 1948 to British officials from Sarawak becoming advisers in Brunei, and it had taken the Governor of Sarawak, in his new capacity as High Commissioner to Brunei, some trouble to alleviate Brunei fears of Sarawak domination. Sarawak had been looked upon with distrust by the Brunei Government for so long that Brunei suspicion is understandable and a proposal that the police forces of the two states be merged, for example, was rapidly shelved. Sultan Sir Omar Ali was equally suspicious and was determined to maintain Brunei's separate status. British officials, on the other hand, inclined to the view that an eventual federation of the Borneo states made sense. It was a proposal that had been put forward by Sir Cecil Clementi, Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner to the Malay States in 1930. In 1953, it was revived at a conference in

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Kuching on 23 April, attended by the Sultan of Brunei and the Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo and presided over by Malcolm MacDonald. This Inter-Territorial Conference, as it became known, held meetings at intervals from 1953 to 1961 and achieved greater co-ordination of policies and administrative procedures, but the Sultan made it clear from the start that it was not a step towards a federation of the three territories, as the Straits Times had speculated. It was time for constitutional kite-flying and from 1956 Azahari and the PRB set the pace. Azahari was not clear himself what he really wanted and perhaps played upon his confusion to become all things to all men. Thus he was tempted by the idea of a pan-Malay state such as President Sukarno of Indonesia dreamed of, a MelayuRaya embracing all the Malay-Indonesian archipelago. As has been seen, he was briefly attracted by the idea expressed by Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1955 of a federation embracing the Britishdominated territories of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei. In the end, he was more attracted to the idea of a revived Brunei empire, to be achieved by some form of federation with Sarawak and Brunei. This came up against the Sultan's refusal to contemplate any union or federation with another state. In all this, Azahari and the PRB proclaimed their loyalty to the Sultan. They would have received little public support otherwise. By 1957, the PRB boasted a membership of 16,000, which represented about 75 per cent of the adult male population, and demanded a State Council, in which three-quarters of the seats would be elected, a Federation of North Borneo or Kalimantan Utara, and a target date for Merdeka or Independence. Somewhat ironically, in June, it called upon a British legal expert to draft a memorandum expressing the Brunei people's desire for independence, which a delegation of three members took to London to present to the British Government. As expected, this Merdeka Mission achieved nothing practical in that it was referred back to the Sultan, but it attracted publicity for the PRB. The mission had been costly and its failure caused a slump in PRB support. Meanwhile, the Sultan had been courting support himself. No less than Azahari and the PRB, he wanted independence for Brunei, but he believed in a gradualist approach, agreeing with his British advisers that education must be expanded and extended and that more Bruneians should obtain experience in government and administration. The PRB, it was pointed out, had no one in its ranks who had the practical knowledge of running a government department.

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This gradualist approach found favour with conservative nationalists, who were alarmed at the left-wing sentiments of some members of the PRE and the implicit threat to the position of the Brunei elite which democratization carried with it. A series of measures in the 1950s looked forward to the creation of a Malay Islamic Sultanate, measures which had the support of the Malay Teachers' Association and the Muslim religious leaders. In 1954 was founded the State Custom, Religion, and Welfare Office. In 1956, the Muslim religious taxes, the zakat and the jitrah, were introduced, the proceeds being used for charitable purposes. In 1958 and 1959, the State Council attempted to abolish grants to Mission schools, but was overriden by Abell as High Commissioner, who used his Reserve Powers. However, it became a religious issue and in 1959, Abell finally gave way. Over the same period, the Sultan made statements stressing his independence from the British. Brunei was not a colony, he told his people in January 1958. He was their Sultan, responsible for the welfare and prosperity of the state. The officials who assisted him were mostly local-born and those British officials who had been seconded from Sarawak had been appointed only with his approval. In time, they would be replaced with Bruneians. Meanwhile, the progress being made in Brunei was evidence of Britain's goodwill (Borneo Bulletin, 18 January 1958; Horton, 1984a: 58-9). Events were making some constitutional change necessary. On 31 August 1957, the Federation of Malaya obtained full independence. In the same year, the idea of a British Borneo Federation was revived in broadcasts by the Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo. They pointed out the progress already made. The three territories had a common currency and shared a common Judiciary, Geographical Survey, and Civil Aviation Organization. On 7 February 1958, both governors revealed more concrete plans. A central government would control defence, external affairs, internal security, and communications. However, each state would control its own budget, an obvious concession to Brunei, but one which makes it difficult to understand how the federal government would be financed. The Head of State would be a governor-general who would also be High Commissioner to Brunei. Although the proposal found support in North Borneo and Sarawak, there was little here for the Sultan and he rejected it. The PRB, on the other hand, supported it. The Sultan instead moved closer to Malaya. In an interview given to the Straits Times in October 1958, the Sultan declared that most educated Bruneians preferred closer ties with an independent

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Malaya. This followed the opening of the Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque in Brunei Town in September. The occasion was marked by celebrations to which were invited the royalty and political leaders of Malaya. The idea of merger was no doubt raised at this time. The Malayans followed up quickly, seeking and obtaining a $100 million loan, approved by the Brunei State Council on 20 November, Sultan Omar Ali speaking of the close ties between the peoples of the two countries. In July 1959, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or Paramount Ruler of Malaya visited Brunei and the desire for close ties was again expressed. Brunei's reasons were probably twofold. One was a fear that closer union with Sarawak and North Borneo would increase Chinese influence, while the Malays within such a federation would be outnumbered by the combined Chinese and non-Malay indigenous peoples. Moreover, the Sultan was at pains to emphasize that Brunei was not a colony like Sarawak and North Borneo. Closer ties with them would be demeaning, whereas Malaya was an independent and predominantly Malay state, closer links with which would raise Brunei's status internationally. Also, Brunei was apprehensive that its oil revenues might have to be shared with the two poorer states if a federal arrangement were arrived at. For the moment, however, movement towards closer links with Malaya waited upon the new constitutional arrangements which were being negotiated between Brunei and Britain. The Sultan was aware that steps towards constitutional government were necessary in order to satisfy demands in Brunei and to acquire respectability abroad. He preferred that such change should emanate from above rather than be forced from below. In October 1957, partly in response to Malayan independence and partly in reply to the PRB's failed Merdeka Mission to London, Sultan Omar Ali took the initiative. He announced that elections would be held for unofficial members to the district councils. However, these elections were to be held in the 'traditional' manner and there would be no secret ballot and other safeguards. The PRB declared it would not take part and the Sultan decreed an indefinite postponement. Meanwhile, consideration of a new Constitution revived and in 1958, the Sultan announced his intention to proceed to London in March 1959 for talks with the British Government. The PRE was not invited to submit proposals nor was it represented in the delegation, which held talks with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd. Before leaving for London, the Sultan had declared that the new Legislative Council to be created by the Constitution would have a majority of elected members. The Brunei proposals

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presented in London did not include this stipulation. Either the Sultan had had second thoughts or British advice had prevailed. Whatever the case, in the eyes of the PRB, it amounted to a breach of promise. The constitutional proposals put forward by the Brunei delegation were accepted almost unchanged by the British. Consequently, a new treaty was signed known as the 1959 Brunei Agreement, which revoked the 1906 treaty. The British granted internal selfgovernment to Brunei, retaining jurisdiction over defence, external affairs and internal security. The post of Resident was abolished and a new official known as a High Commissioner was to be appointed to advise the Sultan and his government. Thus the ties with Sarawak were formally broken. The Resident, Denis Charles White, became the first High Commissioner. The Sultan promulgated the new Constitution on 19 September 1959. Supreme executive authority was invested in the Sultan. The State Council was replaced with an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The former was the more important and was dominated by the Sultan, who presided. The High Commissioner was a member along with seven ex officio and seven nominated unofficial members. It approved the annual estimates, met only when the Sultan wanted, and considered only matters brought before it by the Sultan, who had to consult it but could ignore its advice by giving written reasons. The Legislative Council consisted of eight ex officio members, six official members nominated by the Sultan, three nominated non-official members and sixteen elected members chosen from the district councils. Elections to the district councils were to be held two years after the promulgation. The Council was to exercise financial control, pass laws, and criticize the actions of the Government. No taxes might be levied or public money spent without the Council's approval. However, the Civil List was to be charged to the Consolidated Fund and could not be debated with the Estimates, thus retaining the Sultan's financial independence. The administration was in the hands of four officials, the Mentri Besar or Chief Minister, the State Secretary, the Attorney-General, and the State Financial Officer. In addition, there were to be a Privy Council, to advise on such matters as the exercise of the Sultan's prerogative of mercy; a Public Service Commission, to advise on appointments; and Religious, Succession, and Regency Councils (Horton, 1984a: 60-1; Ranjit Singh, 1984: 137). This was no victory for parliamentary democracy, but it was a

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victory for the Sultan. The British had granted internal selfgovernment to the Sultan, not to the people. There was no elective majority on the Legislative Council and no direct elections to that Council. Not surprisingly, the PRB strongly criticized it, but decided to await the district council elections promised for two years hence. They trusted in their ability to win such overwhelming support that their own hand would be strengthened. The PRE saw the Constitution as a device to keep the Sultan and the Brunei traditional elite in power. In this they were correct, although it is difficult to say that a single leap from autocratic monarchy to full democracy would have benefited the people. Sir Anthony Abell, as High Commissioner, had no high view of Azahari whom he called in 1957 'an irresponsible opportunist seeking power at all costs' (Colonial office file, CO 1030/464). On the other hand, he and other British officials regarded the ruling elite as incompetent and corrupt, resisting any reduction of their hereditary monopoly of government offices; the rising Malay intellectuals as ambitious and self-seeking in their support of the Sultan; and the Sultan himself as obstinate in refusing to move with the times (Colonel office files, CO 1030/464 and CO 1030/658). The PRB were thus mistaken as regarding the Constitution as a British plot to retain their position in Brunei. The British would have preferred a much more liberal Constitution, which would have had the advantage of being more acceptable to the people and thus more likely to encourage political stability. They were not, however, prepared to put too much pressure on the Sultan, who at least was seen to be making some progress in the right direction. Moreover, despite the terms of the 1906 treaty, in practice no British Resident was in fact insisting that the Sultan surrender his powers other than voluntarily. This was one area where advice remained advice and persuasion rather than force was relied upon. The British had interests in Brunei, including the oilfield, and strategic considerations as Malaya became independent. These were better served, it was felt, by the existing regime, whatever its faults, than they would be by an unpredictable movement such as that headed by Azahari. The Constitution of 1959 represented progress and could well be adapted as time went by and the other Borneo territories continued their more ordered march towards eventual independence.

PART V From Protected State to Full Independence

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10 Rebellion, Malaysia, and Abdication, 1959-1967

THE administrative links with Sarawak had been severed in 1959, but Brunei was still closely involved with its neighbour and with North Borneo to the north. The proposed North Borneo Federation was still in the air, and steps were being taken to introduce constitutional reform leading to self-government. Inevitably, these measures had repercussions in Brunei, where the PRB favoured Brunei's entry into the proposed federation, and the Sultan resolutely opposed it. The third PRB Congress in February 1960 was attended by representatives from the Partai Rakyat Malaya, the Persatuan Islam Malaya, and the Partai Rakyat Singapore, and by Stephen Y ong, Secretary-General of the Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP). Azahari used the occasion to propose that the PRB, the SUPP, and political leaders in North Borneo form a political front to bring about a federation of the th::-':!e territories. Yong greeted the proposal with enthusiasm and it was discussed at the SUPP Delegates Conference in July 1960, which was attended by Azahari, where it was decided to set up a Joint Preparatory Consultative Committee for the National Congress. At the same time, Azahari appealed to Tunku Abdul Rahman that Malaya support a Borneo Federation. Other political leaders in Borneo expressed support for the scheme, which they saw as a step towards creating an independent Kalimantan Utara (Ranjit Singh, 1984: 149 ff.). Nevertheless, there were contradictions. Azahari remained a Brunei nationalist and his concept of a North Borneo Federation saw Brunei playing the leading role. The Federation was to be a revival of the Brunei empire, a concept unlikely to appeal to the nationalist leaders in Sarawak and North Borneo. Ironically, in his expression of this side of Brunei nationalism, Azahari had more in common with the Sultan and the traditional Brunei elite than the

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latter would admit. Like them, he had no intention of merging Brunei identity in some broader federation. However, he saw Brunei playing a leading role in a federation in which constitutional government would have lessened the authority of the Sultan in Brunei while allowing him the role of a figurehead for the new federation. Sultan Omar desired neither. Brunei was to remain a monarchy and Brunei identity was not to be subsumed in some larger entity contaminated by democracy. The Sultan's position was clearer and more logical than that of Azahari, who was never quite able to reconcile his desire to be a mass leader within the broader context of Kalimantan Utara with his position as leader of a Brunei nationalist movement. Not only were these roles mutually contradictory, but neither appealed to nationalist sentiment in Sarawak or North Borneo. Nevertheless, in these early months, no one was really clear about what they wanted, except that there was a general feeling that the Borneo territories should be linked in some way and should obtain independence. Over this same period, the alternative proposal for a broader federation was also under consideration. Like the North Borneo Federation, this concept had been one of those ideas the British had played with, and there had been before the war administrative links between North Borneo and Malaya as officers were seconded to the service of the British North Borneo Company. The appointment of Malcolm MacDonald as High Commissioner implied that British policy was to co-ordinate development in Malaya, Singapore, and the three Borneo territories as much as possible. The close ties established between Malaya and Brunei in 1958 indicated a third possibility: that Brunei might join the Federation of Malaya, something which Tunku Abdul Rahman mentioned to Brunei students in London in June 1960. However, the Tunku showed then, as he showed later, a regrettable ignorance of Borneo and a remarkable lack of sensitivity to Borneo feelings. He assumed that Brunei would want to become a member of the Malayan Federation because it was too small to survive as an independent state economically or politically. Brunei's spokesmen angrily rejected this assumption. Their reaction was probably sharper than it might have been because of resentment felt in Brunei at the presence of Malayan officers seconded to Brunei under the agreements reached in 1958. Officially welcomed, they were resented by many Bruneian officers, who saw them as occupying positions they themselves aspired to. Many of these Malayan officers scarcely concealed their opinion that Brunei was backward, inefficient, and needed a pro-

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longed period of guidance. There were faults on both sides, as Bruneians could be obstructive and uncooperative, provoking Malayan officers to indiscreet expressions of their dislike for life in Brunei and their impatience and contempt for Brunei society and its ways. It was in this atmosphere that Tunku Abdul Rahman put forward his proposal for a wider federation embracing the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, British North Borneo, and Brunei in a speech to the Foreign Correspondents' Association of SouthEast Asia in Singapore on 27 May 1961. The proposal fitted with British preoccupations at the time. In Borneo, the Brunei Sultan's lack of interest in the proposed North Borneo Federation had caused British officials to consider a federation comprising only Sarawak and British North Borneo: an idea regarded with little enthusiasm by British officials and Bornean politicians alike, who doubted its economic viability without access to Brunei's resources. The new proposal for a broader federation to be known as Malaysia appeared to be a way to overcome some of the difficulties. Brunei had developed links with the Federation of Malaya and might be expected to accept membership, while Sarawak and North Borneo, short on known resources, would be viable states within the broader federation. At the same time, it provided a solution to a worsening security situation involving Singapore, where Communist and leftwing political forces were regarded as a threat to the political stability of the island, and hence a threat to British military bases and commercial interests there. Disturbances in Singapore could also threaten the security of the Federation of Malaya, where the State of Emergency declared at the outbreak of the Communist insurgency of 1948 was not officially lifted until 1962. The British Government, therefore, supported the Malaysia proposal, which would also enable it to divest itself of its colonial role in Borneo. The people of the Borneo territories were not so sure. The first reaction from Borneo was still to favour a Borneo Federation which might later join with Malaya and Singapore in a confederation of equal states. The leaders of the Malay party in Sarawak, the Party Negara Sarawak, urged Brunei to take the lead and this sentiment was echoed in British North Borneo, while the SUPP in Sarawak was also in favour of a Borneo Federation first. At this point, on 12 June 1961, Yakim bin Haji Long, a forest officer seconded to Brunei from Malaya, was assaulted by Bruneians who appear to have included PRB members, thus bringing to a head the tensions between the Malay expatriates and the local population. Ten Malayan officers immediately resigned and forty-two Malayan

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teachers asked to be sent home. The PRB issued a pamphlet on 24 June, calling the Malayans colonialists. Certainly, the Tunku, who visited Brunei early in July, underestimated the strength of Bruneian nationalism, and practically discounted it, calling the PRE a bad element. The Tunku's statements in Brunei, Sarawak, and Malaya were almost calculated to arouse opposition, offering equality with the individual states of the Malayan Federation, ignoring the ethnic diversity of Borneo, and saying that it was nonsense for a small state like Brunei 'to talk of independence' (Ranjit Singh, 1984: 159). The PRB was in the forefront of opposition to the Tunku and Malaysia and garnered increased support as a result. It accused the Tunku of colonialism, racism, and self-serving ambition in wanting to be the father of Bornean as of Malayan independence, even though, the PRE contended, Malaya itself was only partly independent in that it relied on Britain for its defence. The PRE's membership grew from 19,000 to 26,000 within a month. Azahari joined Ong Kee Hui of the SUPP and Donald Stephens of North Borneo in condemning the Malaysia proposal as unacceptable to the people of the Borneo territories. Azahari's aims in all this were confused. Partly, he hoped that Brunei would playa leading role in any Borneo Federation, either with the Sultan as Head of State or with himself and the PRE prominent in any political leadership that might emerge. With one part of his mind, he hoped to re-create the old Brunei empire in a modern form. There were obstacles to this, not least the Sultan's unwillingness to be cast in any role chosen by Azahari, either as ruler of the federation or as a constitutional monarch. Partly, Azahari realized that any political ambitions he had would be nullified if Malaysia came into being. Brunei might be able to claim a leading role in a Borneo Federation, but it would be negligible within Malaysia, and his PRB would be no more than an insignificant party in an insignificant state. It could not expect to playa role on the national scene, already occupied by the existing Malayan parties. In any case, the Malayan Government was unsympathetic to the PRB and would act against it even in Brunei if Malaysia were formed. All these factors came together. Azahari's future as a political leader and Brunei's identity as an independent state were both threatened by the Malaysia proposal, whereas within a Borneo Federation they both might be enhanced. Sultan Omar Ali was at first noncommittal, but on 5 December 1961 declared that the Malaysia proposal was very attractive. He

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was influenced partly by those factors that had led him to seek closer links with the Federation of Malaya and partly by the persuasion of the British Government and the leaders of Malaya and Singapore, who argued that Brunei, with a population of some 84,000, could hardly stand alone as an independent state, that its oil wealth would attract an aggressor, and that its best hope of security was within the broader political grouping offered by Malaysia, especially as it was clear that Britain saw in Malaysia an opportunity to withdraw gracefully from its defence commitments in South-East Asia. He would not have known that the Malayans, at a meeting in November 1961 between the British Minister of Defence and Tun Razak, had already scouted the possibility of establishing an advanced naval base in Brunei (DEFE 4/410 Chiefs of Staffs Meetings, 80th, 28 November 1961, 'Greater Malaysia'). Meanwhile, the Malaysia proposal became inextricably entwined with politics in Brunei. Elections had been promised two years after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1959. In September 1960, the Government declared that they would be held in August 1961 and began to prepare a register of voters. This necessitated a Nationality Enactment to determine who would be qualified to vote. In October, proposals were made public by which all members of a recognized indigenous race who were born within Brunei would be deemed subjects of the Sultan. Others could qualify for citizenship if they had been resident for twenty years out of the previous twenty-five and passed a Malay language test. The indigenous races were the Belait, Bisaya, Brunei, Dusun, Kedayan, Murut, and Tutong. Immigrants such as Dayaks from Sarawak, Chinese, Indians, and Indonesians were excluded, as, incidentally, was Azahari himself. The PRB opposed the exclusion of the Dayaks from the list of indigenes and proposed that the residence limit for the others be reduced to ten years out of the previous fifteen. Threatened with an organized protest march, the Government declared it was prepared to consider amendments. With elections in the offing, the PRB began building an alliance with the newly emergent labour movement. Since the war, labour organizations had multiplied. In June 1960, delegates met in Brunei Town to create the Barisan Buroh Bersatu Brunei or the Brunei United Labour Front (BULF). Nominally non-political, its honorary adviser was Azahari; its Secretary-General, Hapidz Laksamana, was a vice-president of the PRB; and many of the most active officials of the member unions were members of the PRB. In June 1961, BULF expressed support for a Borneo Federation and for

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any organization that was fighting for independence, in other words, the PRE. The PRE, for its part, stood up for labour, especially when the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company (BSP), as it was now known, retrenched staff. In March 1961, there was concern about the delay in enacting the Nationality Bill and preparing the elections legislation. In June, the PRB and BULF organized a mass rally and demanded that the Government produce the Nationality Bill, set a date for the elections, introduce a national wages policy, and end unemployment. For the first time, Azahari hinted at political violence. Another mass demonstration in August presented a petition to the British High Commissioner, urging that the British Government advise the Brunei Government to hold elections as soon as possible. The Government's reply was to get the Legislative Council to amend the Constitution in order to postpone the elections until 1962. At the same time, it encouraged the emergence of political parties to rival the PRB. These were the Brunei National Organization (BNO), headed by Abdul Manan bin Mohammed, and the Brunei United Party (BUP), led by Haji Hasbollah. Both supported Malaysia. The PRE had protested at a decision by the British and Malayan governments to set up a commission to obtain the views of the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo but not of Brunei. The reason given was that as Brunei was a sovereign state, the Sultan only need be consulted. The PRE protested in a telegram to the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, but to no avail. The Sultan, however, made concessions, appointing Azahari to the Legislative Council and to a special Brunei-Malaysia Commission in January 1962. The latter was to ascertain the views of the Brunei people. If the Sultan believed that he could thus win over Azahari and that the Brunei people were in favour of Malaysia, he was wrong on both counts. The hearings of the Brunei-Malaysia Commission were public and disclosed strong opposition to Malaysia and support for a Borneo Federation, which the Brunei Government chose to ignore, sending observers to the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee talks in Singapore in February 1962. The Brunei delegates joined those of Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo in signing the Memorandum which approved the Malaysia plan. The Brunei Government refused to publish the report of the BruneiMalaysia Commission, and gave the impression that the Brunei people accepted Malaysia in principle. Azahari made his first appearance as a nominated member of the Legislative Council in April, and proposed a motion asking the Bru-

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nei Government to recognize the historical sovereignty of the Sultan of Brunei over Sarawak and North Borneo. This would hardly have been a diplomatic gesture and the Council rejected it. Azahari promptly resigned, declaring that he could not work as a nationalist under the existing system. He went into self-imposed exile in lohore. Meanwhile, the Legislative Council, by an overwhelming majority of twenty-four votes to four, with one abstention, authorized the Sultan to negotiate with Britain and Malaya on the terms of Brunei's entry into Malaysia. The long-delayed elections in Brunei were eventually held in August 1962. There were direct elections to fifty-five district council seats, after which sixteen representatives would be chosen by and from the district councils to sit in the Legislative Council. The PRE went into the election on a programme which included independence for Brunei by 1963, the rejection of Malaysia, the formation of a Federation of North Borneo, and internal educational, economic, and administrative reforms. The elections were held on 30 and 31 August. The PRB were uncontested in thirty-two seats and won twenty-two of the remaining twenty-three. The other seat went to an independent who later joined the PRB. The pro-Government, pro-Malaysia parties won no seats and few votes. Ninety per cent of the electorate of 6,000 voted. The PRB captured all four district councils and all sixteen elected members of the Legislative Council were PRB members. It was a sweeping mandate for the PRB and a crushing rejection of the Sultan's policies. As a non-citizen, Azahari could not stand as a candidate. He was soon calling for changes in Brunei's 'undemocratic' Constitution so that power would be given to the PRB and he renewed the party's campaign against Malaysia, forming with the opponents of Malaysia in Sarawak and North Borneo the Anti-Malaysia Alliance. Acting on the advice of his British advisers, which in this case accorded with his own wishes, the Sultan postponed the first meeting of the new Legislative Council, while Brunei officials went to Kuala Lumpur to hold a final round of talks with the Malayan Government about entering Malaysia. Meanwhile, Azahari sought the support of the Philippine Government and obtained what he said was an assurance that the Philippines would not pursue its claim to parts of North Borneo if that territory became part of a North Borneo Federation. Indonesia was expressing opposition to the Malaysia scheme, as were Communists, who claimed it to be a neo-colonialist plot by which Malaya would gain the North Borneo territories and Britain would retain its military bases and economic

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interests in the area while appearing to have transferred power. Heartened by this support, Azahari began to talk of fighting the formation of Malaysia. The Brunei Government finally announced that the first meeting of the new Legislative Council would take place on 5 December. The PRB submitted motions to be tabled at the first session. It demanded that the British Government return Sarawak and North Borneo to the sovereignty of the Sultan of Brunei; that the three Borneo territories be federated; and that the British Government keep Brunei out of Malaysia and grant it full independence in 1963. The Speaker of the Legislative Council refused to accept the motions, on the grounds that they involved the governments of Malaya and Britain and had nothing to do with Brunei. Azahari decided that there was no alternative but an armed rising. Preparations for this had been put in hand, and he appears to have believed that there would be widespread support for it in Brunei and in Sarawak and North Borneo, and that sympathy, support, and aid would arrive from Indonesia and the Philippines, whose governments were suspicious of the aims and purposes of the proposed Malaysian Federation. The revolt broke out on the morning of Saturday, 8 December 1962. Azahari was in Manila, as was his deputy, Zaini Haji Ahmad, and it fell to Jasin Affandy, the Secretary-General of the PRB, in his new role as Deputy Prime Minister and General Officer Commanding the Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU) or North Borneo National Army, to proclaim the independence of the Unitary State of North Borneo or Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (NKKU). The ceremony took place at 2.00 a.m. near the village of Sumur near the capital and was witnessed by some 300 members of the TNKU and a handful of TNKU officers and PRE ministers. TNKU leaders had taken military titles, from Brigadier-General and Colonel down. They tried to portray themselves as the army of the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara, which boasted also a complete Cabinet. At the time the proclamation of independence was read, TNKU units throughout Brunei, and in neighbouring districts of Sarawak and Sabah, launched wellplanned attacks on police stations. Outside the capital, only the Panaga Police Station, manned by Malayan Police on secondment to the Seria oilfield area, resisted successfully. The Head of State of Kalimantan Utara was to have the title Sri Mahkota Negara and was to be the Sultan of Brunei and his successors ruling as constitutional monarchs. The plan was that

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TNKU troops would escort Jasin Affandy and the NKKU's Minister of Labour, Hapidz Laksamana, to the Istana (Palace) Darul Hana; here the Sultan would be invited to proceed with them under protective custody to the Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque, where at 8.00 a.m. he would read the Declaration of Independence to the crowd that was expected to have assembled. Immediately after this ceremony, the Sultan, or Sri Mahkota Negara as he would then be, would, with members of the new Government, retire into the interior, while Brigadier Sheikh Osman Sheikh Mahmud, Azahari's brother, would establish his headquarters at Serdang, 4 kilometres from the capital, and prepare to defend the state. At the last moment, Jasin Affandy was replaced with 'Minister of Education', Pengiran Metussin bin Pengiran Haji Lampoh, who went with Hapidz Laksamana to the palace. The NKKU delegation was fired upon by a defending force of Brunei Police under the command of the Commissioner of Police, A. N. Outram, who told them that the Sultan would not meet them and that they should discuss matters with the Chief Minister, Dato Marsal bin Maun. The two NKKU ministers hastened to Dato Marsal's house in time to see his car speeding into Brunei Town. They followed it to the Police Station through the crossfire between police defending the station and their TNKU attackers. Both men were then taken into custody (Zaini, 1987: 32-7). The authorities in Brunei had received warning. With PRB members attending secret meetings and training in the jungle, and with tailors making military-style clothing, there was general knowledge that something was afoot, but the PRB had so infiltrated Brunei Malay society that little hard information reached the Brunei Government. What information was received was not treated seriously. However, on the morning of 7 December, the Resident of Sarawak's Fourth Division, who was based at Miri, was warned that a rebellion was imminent. He informed the Sarawak Government, which alerted the Police Commissioners of Sarawak and North Borneo. In Brunei, Outram took precautions, which frustrated the attack on the Istana and the Chief Minister's residence, but the acting High Commissioner, W. J. Parks, was captured and briefly detained. The Sultan reportedly prepared for the attack by arming himself with a sterling sub-machine-gun, a pistol, and a shotgun. The rebels had taken over the power station, but not the radio and telecommunications stations or the Town Police Station. Nor did they close the airfield, civilians there removing vehicles with which the rebels had blocked the runway to enable an aircraft carrying

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police reinforcements from North Borneo to land about noon. That there was no one centre of revolt confused the authorities, but also made rebel co-ordination difficult. Not all TNKU fighting units were ready, and many of those who participated in the revolt were unclear as to what they had to do. Confused as to their aims and divided in their loyalty to the PRB and to the Sultan, many did nothing, surrendered, or went home when confronted by authority. The failure of the TNKU to seize Sir Omar Ali doomed the rebellion from the beginning. The British already had contingency plans for sending troops to Brunei in the event of disturbance there. Once news of the revolt was received, these were put into effect without waiting for any formal request from the Sultan. On 9 December, Brunei Town was fully secured and the Sultan was brought into the main Police Station with his entourage for twenty-four hours, during which a curfew was enforced and rebel attempts to infiltrate the town were prevented. The Sultan made a broadcast, clearly dissociating himself from the rebels and calling on the people to be loyal to him and his government. This immediately undermined the rebel rank and file, most of whom believed that they had been fighting for the Sultan, and many surrendered. Morale was also weakened by the knowledge that Azahari was not even in Brunei. Many rebels were poorly armed, many not having even shotguns, but their leaders had expected to capture weapons from police stations. Jasin Affandy and his Military Commander, Jais bin Haji Karim, had established their headquarters on Bukit SaWeh, near the capital, intending to keep in touch with their forces by courier, but once fighting started, they were unable to control events. Highlanders and Gurkhas cleared Kuala Belait and Seria on 10 and 11 December. After some sharp clashes, the Seria Police Station was retaken and the hostages held there freed. Within a week the rebellion was effectively over. Some rebels attempted to withdraw inland, where irregular Dayak forces, alerted by the Sarawak authorities, closed the escape routes. British forces also entered areas of Sarawak and North Borneo where the TNKU was active, working on anti-Malaysia feeling. The major action was at Limbang, where a strong force of rebels had taken the police station and held the Resident and his wife prisoner. Limbang was retaken on 12 December. By 20 December, the rebellion was in effect over. In actions in Brunei and Sarawak, 40 rebels had been killed, 1,897 detained, and some 1,500 allowed to return to their homes. The losses to the security forces were seven killed and twenty-eight

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wounded Games and Sheil-Small, 1971: 43). Mopping up operations against those rebels who remained at large took longer. Jasin Affandy with about twenty men sought refuge in the mangrove swamps of Brunei Bay. In April 1963, Azahari's brothers, Sheikh Osman and Sheikh Salleh, eluded security forces and returned to Kampong Bunut, near the capital, where they were separately hidden. In mid-April, they were tracked down. Osman was fatally wounded in an exchange of fire; his brother was captured. Jasin Affandy remained at large until he and his remaining followers were ambushed by a Gurkha patrol on 18 May in the swamp near Kampong Serdang on the north bank of the Brunei River. Two of the rebels were killed and Jasin Affandy himself was wounded. The revolt did not attract the widespread support the PRB leadership had expected. Outside Brunei, it was condemned by the political parties of Sarawak and North Borneo, including the antiMalaysia SUPP. No practical assistance came from Indonesia or the Philippines, although Sukamo's Indonesia was to use the revolt as an example of opposition to the formation of Malaysia. Within Brunei, however, the PRB had mounted a serious challenge which might have achieved greater success with better planning and leadership, especially if they had acquired control over the Sultan. Many rebels showed resilience and courage in defeat and were protected by members of the popUlation, who could have betrayed them to the security forces. Moreover, many PRE members detained after the rebellion stood by their principles and refused to make that submission to the Sultan which would have brought them release. The PRB was a serious political force, but inexperienced and unskilled and led by a leader who deserted his followers at the moment of crisis, arguing that he was raising foreign support for his cause. PRB members had joined the party for a mixture of motives. The poorer expected a greater share in the state's wealth. The Kedayans resented their second-class status within the traditional Brunei social and political structure. Many were impressed by the oratory of Azahari and his simplistic arguments against imperialism and colonialism. Many were inspired by his vision of a regenerated Brunei which would take the lead in a new Bornean state. Azahari had appealed to genuine patriotism and nationalism. These feelings and aspirations did not die with the rebellion. They were there to be called forth again when the circumstances were right. Linked with demands for more democratic political structures, they remained a

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challenge to Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin. The PRB itself retained its identity as a party in exile and continued to find a following in Brunei; but became in reality a pawn in the international game being played over the next several years by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. On 20 December, the Sultan proclaimed a State of Emergency, suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Legislative Council and appointed a fourteen-member Emergency Council comprising four ex officio members, including the British High Commissioner, Sir Denis White, and ten members nominated by himself. The Government was disrupted by the rebellion, many government servants being implicated. The Public Works and the Marine Departments in particular had few local employees left. A major priority was to screen those detained so that where possible they might be returned to public life. The rebels and suspected rebels in the capital were detained in the open on the tennis courts opposite the Police Station for three days; they were then accommodated in the two cinemas and transferred to the Teachers' College premises at Berakas about 6 kilometres from the town. A similar detention centre was established at Seria. Assistance in managing these centres was obtained from Malaya. Meanwhile, a committee began reviewing the cases of those detained. The first 69 detainees were released at the end of January 1963 and by early March, 159 had been released (Ibrahim Ariff, n.d.: 23). In March, a Rehabilitation Centre was established with staff from the British Army Education Corps and the Federation of Malaya Information Services, the first courses beginning in midApril. Detainees other than Brunei citizens or subjects of the Sultan were deported to their countries of origin, which in many cases was Sarawak. Once detainees had undergone a rehabilitation course, which included talks in favour of government policy and against those of the PRB, they were returned to their homes and families if they renounced the PRB and formally swore allegiance to the Sultan. If they had been in government employ, they were reinstated, their period of detention being considered as 'leave without pay'. Those not employed by the Government were registered for employment but, given the lack of employment opportunities in Brunei at the time, these usually returned to their villages. No action was taken against the families of those detained and wives and children continued to receive free education, medical care, and other benefits. The Detention Centre and the Special Branch of the Police, which had the main responsibility for the

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supervision of detainees and their surveillance after their release, were largely run by British and Malayan officers. While this smacked of colonialism, it helped objectivity in the treatment of detainees. Moreover, so widespread had been support for the PRB and so intricate were the family relationships within Brunei society that such external presence was probably the best solution. Some detainees refused to admit wrongdoing or to swear allegiance to the Sultan. Some released detainees were from time to time rearrested for political activity and after a period released. There is no doubt that the Sultan was deeply shocked by the rebellion. It ran counter to all traditional Malay concepts of loyalty and had bordered on sacrilege by threatening the person of the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan himself. Yet, given the intricacies of intermarriage in Brunei society, few families were not touched by contact with the PRE. The Government itself was not immune, for Azahari had been offered a position in the Legislative Council and attempts had been made to encourage him to work with the Government. His unsuccessful business ventures had been heavily subsidized, and even the Sultan may have helped him, in order to rouse British fears of a left-wing take-over (Leake, 1990: 48), while Azahari's suggestion of a broader role for the Sultan within a state of North Borneo may have appealed. The Sultan's refusal to allow the rebel leaders to stand trial may have been motivated by fear of unwelcome disclosures implicating, if not himself, members of his entourage and of the Brunei elite. Nevertheless, his clemency, based largely on his concept of the Malay Islamic Monarchy, reduced resentment within the Malay community. His insistence on submission, however, was also based on his perception of his position as Sultan, and the refusal of some detainees to acknowledge him was taken as a personal affront; some thirty stubborn men languished in detention without trial for over twenty years, and a few longer than that. Zaini Haji Ahmad, who returned to Brunei on expectation of a trial, was detained. Azahari remained in exile, leaving the Philippines for Jakarta where he expected greater support for his continued efforts to create a state of Kalimantan Utara. Not surprisingly, the Brunei rebellion had an effect on the Malaysia negotiations. Despite the prompt response of the British under the existing arrangement, the Sultan had been shaken by events and saw in Malaysia the best hope for his and Brunei's future security. At the end of December, he accepted the concept of Malaysia in principle, and on 1 January 1963 dispatched Dato Setia Pengiran Haji Ali bin Daud, the Deputy Mentri Besar, and Haji

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Jamil for secret preliminary talks with the Malayan Government, which convinced him that Malaysia was sound and attractive. Intergovernmental talks from 5 February to 3 March ended optimistically, but in them lay the seeds of future disagreement. Eager to bring Brunei into Malaysia, the Malayans had unwisely left matters only vaguely defined. The Brunei delegation had again been led by Dato Setia Pengiran Ali, who was advised by Dato Neil Lawson, the Sultan's Legal Adviser. The Sultan was also in Kuala Lumpur and could be consulted. The Malayan delegation was headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, who was assisted by Tan Siew Sin, the Finance Minister. The Bruneians departed believing apparently that Brunei's revenues from its oil wealth and investments would not be affected by entry into Malaysia, but that Brunei would make annual contributions of M$40 million to the federal government. The Malayans had proposed that Brunei's oil wealth would be exempt for ten years after which other arrangements would be made, but this point was not clarified; nor was the statement that, broadly speaking, no new taxation would be imposed on Brunei for the time being. Another issue, the question of royal precedence, was also vaguely dealt with. The Sultan's special position was to be guaranteed by the Constitution of the new state, as was that of the people of Brunei. Brunei was also to be allocated up to ten seats in the Federal Parliament, but, again, the specific number was not announced. Despite this vagueness in detail, both sides, including the Sultan, claimed agreement on all major issues and expressed confidence that Brunei's entry into Malaysia would be announced shortly. Talks in June indicated how far from the truth this all was. The Brunei delegation was led by the Mentri Besar, Dato Setia Marsal bin Maun, and included the Deputy Mentri Besar, the Deputy State Secretary, and the Legal Adviser. The Malayan delegation was led by Tan Siew Sin, assisted by the Minister of the Interior, Dato (Dr) Ismail bin Dato Haji Abdul Rahman, the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, and other officials. The immediate issue was Brunei's oil revenues, the Malayan side insisting that control of Brunei's oil revenues should pass to the federal government after ten years, which Brunei opposed. Malaya also wanted the right to tax immediately any new oil and mineral finds discovered after Brunei joined Malaysia, and to make the Sultan's contribution of $40 million to the federal revenues compulsory rather than voluntary. Finally, the Sultan's ranking amongst the rulers of Malaysia would be the lowest, being based upon the

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date of joining the Council of Rulers. Deadlock ensued and the Sultan warned that unless better terms were offered Brunei might not enter Malaysia until a more opportune moment. Two meetings between the Sultan and Tunku Abdul Rahman made little headway, Brunei conceding only that the question of oil revenues and taxes on new discoveries should be discussed again after ten years of Malaysia. Faced with taking into the Federation the then impecunious states of Sarawak and North Borneo, the Malayan Government was not prepared to concede on Brunei's revenues, which would help finance the development of the other two states. Brunei was not prepared to concede to Malaysia what it had already refused to the proposed North Borneo Federation, especially as Brunei Shell announced at this time that it had discovered new oil reserves near the Seria field. While this made the Malayan Government even more determined that Malaysia should have the right to control these reserves after ten years, and to tax any discoveries after the formation of Malaysia, it also made it clear to Brunei that its oil reserves would last for much longer than had previously been estimated and that it could afford to stand outside Malaysia. The question of the Brunei Sultan's status within the Council of Rulers should Brunei join Malaysia no doubt played a part in Sultan Sir Omar Ali's decision. In its final offer, the Malayan Government said that any decision on this issue would be left to the Council of Rulers. The question was important in that the rulers of the states of the Federation of Malaya became Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaya for a period of five years by rotation based upon seniority. Many of the ruling houses of Malaya were of very recent vintage compared to that of Brunei, and there was reluctance on the Sultan's part to become the junior member; but it was not the sole reason for the breakdown of negotiations, as Tunku Abdul Rahman alleged in July. There were still faint hopes that a compromise could be arrived at, but Malaya made it increasingly difficult. At an emergency Cabinet meeting on 18 and 19 June, the Malayan Cabinet drew up its final terms for Brunei's entry into Malaysia and gave Brunei forty-eight hours in which to reply. The terms offered nothing new and, issued as an ultimatum and combined with a statement by the Tunku that Malaysia would be created on 31 August as planned, with or without Brunei (or Singapore, with whom negotiations were also continuing), only angered the Sultan, who left Kuala Lumpur on 21 June saying that any further negotiations would have to take place in Brunei. He had flown to Kuala Lumpur at the Tunku's

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invitation because he still hoped for a solution, but had been placed in the position of a suppliant and had been insulted by the Malayan Government's delay in passing to him the actual document containing their 'final terms'. This last was a further bit of Malayan bungling, for they had acceded to a request of Lord Selkirk, British Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, that he meet the Sultan. The Malayans had believed that Lord Selkirk might be able to put pressure on the Sultan to accept their terms, perhaps with slight modification, if the document were not officially handed over before such a meeting. The Sultan was in no mood for giving way to any British pressure. He responded by declaring that Brunei would join Malaysia only if it resulted from the voluntary desire of its members agreeing on terms freely negotiated, and if Brunei's special interests were protected. The document containing the 'final terms' was handed to the Brunei Government a week later after the ultimatum had been announced. Brunei rejected the terms, insisting on safeguards for Brunei's oil revenues, local taxation, free education, and other social benefits in existence in Brunei. Nevertheless, the Sultan led a fifteen-man delegation to London for the signing of the Malaysia Agreement, set for 8 July. The Brunei delegation indicated hope that the Malayan Government would change its mind, but insisted that it would negotiate only with the British Government. Brunei did not sign the Malaysia Agreement. Tunku Abdul Rahman blamed the question of precedence, thus trivializing the Brunei position. Brunei insisted that its decision hinged on the question of oil revenues and that in the February negotiations Malaya had promised to leave them untouched indefinitely and to accept an annual voluntary contribution to the federal treasury. Other factors were also at work. The Brunei revolt had been crushed by British troops and British troops were soon involved in combating a rising in Sarawak by the largely Chinese Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) supported by incursions by Indonesian forces raiding across the border. Indonesia was using the Brunei revolt and the CCO rising as evidence to support its contention that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist plot by which Britain would maintain its presence in South-East Asia. British forces were going to be in the region to resist Indonesian 'Confrontation' for some time to come. Brunei was not in the front line after its own rebels had been hunted down, but it offered a base for operations and could obtain a defence agreement with Britain on favourable terms, especially as the Sultan's government could be guaranteed to

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oppose any clandestine communist activity within its own borders. Moreover, the rebellion had revealed a strong anti-Malaysia feeling within Brunei, which the Sultan saw no reason to flout if there was nothing to be gained by it. Entry into Malaysia would have produced pressure for advance towards constitutional government. Malaysia was destined to be a constitutional monarchy and there would have had to be elections for seats in the Federal Parliament. It would have been difficult to prevent pressure for similar constitutional provisions in Brunei. With the PRB defeated, any decision against joining Malaysia was no longer forced upon the Sultan by internal political pressures, and any decision he might make about constitutional arrangements would also be his alone. External pressure would come only from Britain and in the circumstances, with Britain involved in confrontation with Indonesia, it was unlikely that such pressure would be too overt. Confrontation, plus pressure from the Philippines for the recession of territories once held by Sulu in northern Borneo, had caused most political groups in Sarawak and British North Borneo (Sabah) to accept Malaysia as the best guarantee of their security and prosperity. Sarawak and Sabah were able to obtain some guarantees which preserved their separate identities, and elections in June and July produced pro-Malaysian majorities. The activities of the CCO and of Indonesia seriously embarrassed the anti-Malaysia elements, such as the SUPP in Sarawak, and gave the British authorities the opportunity to round up those suspected of too great an identification with the pro-Communist and anti-Malaysia cause. Meanwhile, negotiations between the Malaysian and Singapore governments proceeded with considerable bargaining on both sides. A delay in the original date for Malaysia occurred while a United Nations mission enquired whether elections in the Borneo territories had been fairly conducted and were a fair assessment of the people's attitudes to Malaysia. Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah declared their independence from British rule on 31 August 1963, and at midnight on 16 September, the Federation of Malaysia was declared. The Malaysia that was created did not match that proposed by Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1961. The loss of Brunei's revenues was a severe blow, although that Brunei was not coerced into membership went some way towards undermining claims that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist plot enforced upon the reluctant peoples of northern Borneo by Malaya acting as a British surrogate. For Brunei, the situation had now changed. Although British officials still remained in administrative capacities in Sarawak and Sabah, they did so at the

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behest of elected governments, and Bornean heads of state presided over elected governments headed by native Chief Ministers. Whatever the arguments about the degree of independence actually granted to Sarawak and Sabah within Malaysia, there was no denying the lively political life in both states and the involvement of their peoples in the exercise of power. Such factors could not but be felt in Brunei. Tunku Abdul Rahman never forgave the Sultan for his intransigence and early in 1964 recalled the hundreds of teachers and government officers seconded to Brunei. Although these officers had been resented by many Bruneians, their departure caused inconvenience and confusion, for Brunei did not have the trained and qualified personnel to maintain government services at the level required. New officers and teachers were recruited from the Philippines and Britain. In February, Malaysia decided to terminate the Board of Commissioners of Currency which had issued a common currency for Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo territories, including Brunei, and to replace the Straits dollar with a new currency issued by Bank Negara Malaysia. When approached about joining the new arrangements, Brunei requested that it be given a place on the policy-making body and that the portrait of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia should not appear on the new currency notes. Malaysia rejected both, and in August 1966 Brunei decided to establish its own currency, linked to sterling rather than to gold. By this time, Singapore had ended its brief participation in Malaysia, breaking away in August 1965, and was proposing to issue its own currency as well. Singapore and Brunei were beginning to co-operate on several matters and agreed that the Singapore and Brunei currencies would exchange at par. The departure of Singapore from Malaysia led also to the division of the Malaysian airline into Malaysia Airlines System (MAS) and Singapore International Airlines (SIA). Brunei granted landing rights to SIA but not to MAS. To these differences was added Malaysia's support for the detained rebel leader Zaini Haji Ahmad. Zaini had renounced Azahari after the revolt and had gone from Manila to Hong Kong, from whence the British authorities returned him to Brunei and imprisonment. Efforts by Amnesty International, and through the United Nations and the Commonwealth Relations Office, failed to bring about his release. Zaini offered to surrender his Brunei citizenship if he was allowed to go into exile, and Malaysia offered to take him. This did not endear Malaysia to the Sultan.

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In Brunei itself, political activity revived after the failure of the revolt. The PRB was banned, but the two smaller parties it had defeated in the elections merged to form the Brunei Alliance Party in January 1963, with Haji Hasbollah of the former BUP as president. The name followed that of the Malayan Alliance Party and the Brunei party supported Malaysia, thus identifying itself with the Sultan's policy at the time and distancing itself from the outlawed PRE. The Sultan ignored it, giving it no place in the Borneo delegation sent to negotiate in Kuala Lumpur in February. The Alliance protested, arguing that the people's voice had not been heard and that the Government's attitude smacked of feudalism. Another proMalaysian organization, the Brunei Peoples Alliance (BPA), called for elections in Brunei before Malaysia was formed, but it also was ignored. The Sultan conducted his negotiations with no reference to these parties, divining that they were weak, and determined to make no concessions to demands for constitutional reform. In December 1963, free of any commitment to Malaysia, the Sultan declared that elections would be held within the next two years. He then entered upon negotiations with the British Government, which was more anxious to see constitutional progress than was the Sultan. Both governments ignored the political parties in Brunei-the Sultan because he chose to, the British because they had given up their powers to influence directly developments in Brunei in 1959. Nevertheless, the composition of the Legislative Council that was proposed did mark a slight move forward. There were to be direct elections to ten seats in the twenty-one-member Legislative Council; there would be six ex officio members and five would be nominated by the Sultan. A ministerial form of government was to be introduced, with an Executive Council of six ex officio ministers and four assistant ministers appointed by the Sultan. Under pressure from the British, the Sultan agreed that at some date after the elections the number of elected members of the Legislative Council would be increased to twenty and a fully elected Cabinet would be created. Elections were held in March 1965. The existing political parties were weak, there was a large proportion of independents and seven at least of those elected were former members of the banned PRB, two of them, Pengiran Haji Yusuf bin Pengiran Haji Limbang and Awang Abdul bin O. K. Safar, having served on the former Legislative and Executive Councils as the party's representatives (Zaini, 1987: 52-3). After the new Legislative Council was sworn in, the Sultan left for discussions in London about the composition of the

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new Council of Ministers. He refused to submit to British pressure that elected members be admitted to the Council of Ministers, conceding only that two of the four members appointed to that Council by the Sultan would be drawn from elected members of the Legislative Council. In August 1966, the political parties in Brunei merged to form the Partai Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat (PBKR) or the Brunei People's Independence Party. Led by H. A. Hapidz Laksamana, the former vice-president of the PRE, it adopted methods not seen since the days of the PRE. Criticizing Britain for not wanting to grant Brunei full independence, it sent a memorandum to the British Government, already under pressure from the anti-colonial lobby in the United Nations. The British Government replied that it was ready to grant independence, thus placing responsibility for delay upon the Sultan. A delegation was sent to see the Sultan. Rebuffed, it was welcomed when it visited the British High Commissioner. The Sultan left for London where the British Government made clear its desire to withdraw from Brunei. At this point, rather than break his word to the British on the one hand or make the desired constitutional changes on the other, Sir Omar Ali abdicated on 4 October 1967 in favour of his eldest son, Hassanal Bolkiah. The latter had made no pledge of constitutional rule and in his father's eyes was not bound by his word to introduce constitutional change. Yet the new ruler was young, inexperienced, and dependent on his father's advice. A constitutional and diplomatic crisis had been neatly circumvented, and, as Seri Begawan Sultan, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin remained the power behind the throne. The British Government and the internal political parties paused to take stock of the new situation. In fact, Sultan Sir Omar Ali had bought the time he believed Brunei needed to transform itself into a viable independent state under a benign if autocratic monarchy. The flirtation with democracy was rapidly ended.

11 Reluctant Independence, 1967-1984

THE new Sultan was born on 15 July 1946. At the time there was no expectation that he would succeed to the throne. His uncle, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, was in his early thirties and was expected to produce a male heir. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's untimely death in 1950 and the succession of Sultan Omar Ali changed all that. Educated at first in the palace, the young prince was sent in 1955 to the Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam Malay Primary School in Brunei Town, where he mixed with other Bruneian children. In 1959, he and his younger brother, Mohamed, were sent to the Jalan Gurney School in Kuala Lumpur to be prepared for admission to the Victoria Institution, which they entered in January 1961. The Victoria Institution was regarded as the premier school of Malaya, but the sons of Malay royalty were normally sent to the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar. Prince Hassanal was shy and diffident. An average scholar, he made his mark in the Cadet Corps. Though he mixed with commoners and enjoyed no privileges within the school, he and his brother were, nevertheless, different. They stayed at the Brunei palace in Kuala Lumpur, were driven to school in a limousine, and were discreetly protected by a bodyguard at all times. Moreover, in a ceremony in Brunei on 14 August 1961, Hassanal was proclaimed Crown Prince. Yet the strict, fair English education, in a school where merit and not race or class was the distinguishing feature, was good preparation for responsibility. The dangers such responsibility might bring were brought home to both princes as they flew home for their holidays on 8 December 1962 and their aircraft was diverted to Kuching because of the revolt in Brunei (Chalfont, 1989: 56-68). In 1963, when tensions developed between Malaya and Brunei over the Malaysia issue, the princes were withdrawn from the Victoria Institution, and Hassanal entered Form IV at the Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin College in Brunei Town, before being sent to London

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for tuition to prepare him for entry to the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. In July 1965, he married his cousin, Pengiran Anak Saleha, eldest daughter of the Pengiran Pemancha Haji Muhammad Alam. Whatever Sultan Omar's enlightened views on education for his son, he retained a traditional approach to the royal marriage, which was arranged in order to bind more closely the two powerful families concerned. By January the following year, Hassanal was at Sandhurst. His two years there were tough, but he liked the military life and was disappointed when his father's abdication caused him to be summoned back to Brunei, thus missing the Sovereign's Parade in December. On 5 October 1967, he was installed as the new ruler (Bartholomew, 1989: 11; Chalfont, 1989: 87). This, then, was the young man who, at the age of twenty-one, became Sultan. A fairly ordinary young military officer, somewhat shy, conscientious, with a strong sense of duty and ofrespect for his father. He was not the man in 1967 to rule in his own right while Sir Omar stood behind him. Sir Omar's calculations proved correct. His abdication, the installation of his son, and the ceremonies associated with the coronation in 1968 provided the breathing space required. Thereafter, he could argue that the new Sultan needed time to settle before initiatives for change could be renewed. The coronation on 1 August 1968 provided an occasion for introducing to the people of Brunei and to the outside world the revived glories of the Brunei monarchy. During the 1950s, in the run-up to internal self-government, there had been a revival of interest in Brunei traditions and ceremonial. In 1958, Pengiran Muhammad Yusof bin Pengiran Abdul Rahim wrote a long and systematic account of Brunei traditional offices and their functions, and further research was conducted by the Adat Istiadat, created for the purpose. The coronation in 1968 saw the installation of many new cheteria and the observance of a rich and elaborate ceremonial calling on all that could be learned of Brunei's ancient traditions. Set in the new Lapau (Audience Chamber), it was a national event of great significance and was designed to instil pride, loyalty, and a sense of national unity. The presence of heads of state and distinguished visitors all helped establish the monarchy at the centre of Bruneian national life. The Sultan's procession through the town involved his subjects in the ceremonies; and concert performances, fireworks, regattas, and displays were laid on for and participated in by the masses. The other rallying point was Islam. The construction of the Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque had identified the monarchy

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with Islam. Alongside the mosque was the building housing the Department of Religious Affairs. The Brunei Constitutional Documents of 1965 lay down that the Mentri Besar, Deputy Mentri Besar, and State Secretary must be Muslim Malays of the Shafeite sect. The State Religious Adviser was also an ex officio member of the Council of Ministers. There was no attempt to introduce shariah law, but religious teacher training institutions, an Arabic School, and the encouragement of religious teaching in the government schools and in religious or agama schools all aimed at inducing a strong Muslim faith in the younger generation. A government mosque building programme was providing new mosques and prayer houses (surau) in Muslim villages throughout the state. The coronation was a religious as well as a state occasion with the Sultan at its centre. The installation of a new sultan did not mean any change in policy. If anything, Sir Omar Ali as Seri Begawan Sultan had a freer hand than before. The members of the Council of Ministers remained his appointees, the exceptions being the High Commissioner, appointed by Great Britain, and the Attorney-General and the State Financial Officer, who were appointed jointly by Britain and the Sultan. In effect, however, the Sultan wielded virtually autocratic power, which in these early years meant that the Seri Begawan exercised this power. Sultan Hassanal, dominated by his father, inexperienced in government and not at first particularly interested, turned his attention to more enjoyable diversions. He was an attractive young man, perhaps slightly frustrated with his powerless position, the attendance at tedious ceremonial occasions, the narrow restrictions of life in Brunei. He developed a love for fast cars, he enjoyed flying, and he acquired a playboy reputation. Yet, gradually, he also learned something of the intricacies of power against the day when he should both desire and be able to exercise it. In the meantime, Brunei continued much as before. Overt political activity largely ceased. The State of Emergency was renewed each year, the Constitution remained suspended. In 1971, the Agreement with Britain was amended to give Brunei responsibility for its own internal security. External relations and defence remained the responsibility of Britain. This was followed by a visit to Brunei by Queen Elizabeth in 1972, during which the Sultan received a knighthood, and she opened the Brunei Museum, an impressive new building on the site of the old capital at Kota Batu. Since the ending of the Indonesian Confrontation in 1965, Brunei's relations with its neighbours had been friendly, except for Malaysia. The Tunku and his successor as Prime Minister of Malaysia,

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Tun Razak, could not forgive Brunei's rejection of Malaysia. Malaysia had offered asylum to Zaini Haji Ahmad of the PRE if Brunei agreed to his exile. However, when the cases of Zaini and some other PRB leaders were reviewed, their release was always blocked by the Sultan, or rather the Seri Begawan. Prepared to show clemency to the rank and file, he could not forgive the leaders for their betrayal. In 1973, after seven years in the Berakas Detention Centre, Zaini and seven other inmates escaped to Sarawak, accompanied by the Centre's chief warder, who was a Malaysian. The escape was well planned and Brunei suspected the hand of the Malaysian Special Branch. That they escaped to Limbang added insult to injury. The PRE had been allowed to open an office in Kuala Lumpur and the detainees turned up there and were welcomed. In 1975, Malaysia sponsored a PRB delegation to the United Nations Committee on Decolonization. Their case aroused widespread sympathy. Brunei appeared to many Afro-Asian countries to be an anachronism: undemocratic in a democratic age and a colony in an era of decolonization. The peculiar status of Brunei as a protectorate state with internal sovereignty and a treaty relationship freely entered into with Britain was too sophisticated a concept, or was seen as masking a British desire to retain a strategic military foothold in the region. At the end of 1975, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution, endorsed by Australia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which called on Britain as the administering power to facilitate the holding of free general elections in Brunei in consultation with and under the supervision of the United Nations, 'in accordance with the inalienable right of the people of Brunei to self-determination and independence'. The resolution further called for the lifting of the ban on all political parties and the return of all political exiles to Brunei so that they could participate in the elections (quoted in Zaini, 1987: 69). Britain was embarrassed, the Seri Begawan incensed. Reviving Brunei's claim to the Limbang, he packed a pistol on his hip and drove a launch up the Limbang River, to the horror of the High Commissioner. People in the Lower Limbang signed petitions stating their desire to be part of Brunei. There was undoubted attraction in the idea. Many of them had relations in Brunei, the border had never been a closed one, partly because Brunei refused to recognize it, and conditions were much better in wealthy Brunei booming with oil wealth than in the relatively impoverished Limbang district of Sarawak, so far removed from its capital, Kuching. The Sarawak Government, in its tum outraged, organized anti-

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Brunei demonstrations. Brunei banned the entry of Sarawak Government vehicles and recalled Brunei students who were studying in Malaysia, many of them preparing to sit their final exams. The Malaysian initiative only reinforced the determination of the Sultan and the Seri Begawan to retain the British connection and the defence arrangements that went with it. At this point the Sultan began to appear in a more active role. In 1976, Tun Hussein Onn had become Prime Minister of Malaysia. Not able to reverse his predecessors' policy immediately, he nevertheless disagreed with it. Malaysian policy became more conciliatory from 1977, and the Sultan responded. Since 1976, the Sultan had been an avid polo player, as were members of the numerous Malaysian royalty. Polo diplomacy helped re-establish relations. In 1979, Tun Hussein Onn attended the wedding in Brunei of the Sultan's sister, Princess Nasibah, and thus the rift was closed. In the following year, a friend of the Sultan, the polo-playing Sultan of Pahang, was installed as Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia, providing the occasion for a visit by Sir Hassanal. The 1970s saw rapid material development in Brunei, made possible by the remarkable growth in the price obtained for Brunei's oil as world-wide prices rose, from US$1.21 a barrel of crude in 1970 to just under US$11.00 in 1974, to about US$36.00 a barrel in 1980. Over the same period, Brunei's production increased from 138,000 barrels a day in 1970 to 241,000 barrels a day in 1980. In the same decade, Brunei's resources of natural gas were exploited, the first deliveries from what was then the world's largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) production plant being exported to Japan in 1973. Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan joined the Brunei Government and BSP in this operation by which gas was supplied to three large Japanese utilities under a 20-year contract, which gave Brunei a guaranteed income until 1993. Although crude oil prices fell from their peak during the late 1970s, gas prices rose and by the early 1980s gas was supplying some 40 per cent of Brunei's export income. Gas and oil made up 88 per cent of Brunei's gross national product (GNP) in 1979. Government revenue was B$2.38 billion, exports amounted to B$5.79 billion, of which B$3.93 billion came from petroleum, B$286 million from petroleum products and B$1.48 billion from natural gas. The balance of payments stood at B$4.93 billion in Brunei's favour and foreign reserves were estimated at about B$6 billion. With a population of 212,840, Brunei enjoyed the highest per capita income in Asia (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1981 Yearbook, p. 113). This wealth enabled the country to r.nance the Second and

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Third National Development Plans (1970-9) which laid down the modem infrastructure previously lacking. In 1974, an international airport was completed with facilities to land Jumbo jets and Concorde. The runway was deliberately made longer than that of Kuala Lumpur's new airport. In the following year, Brunei acquired a national airline, Royal Brunei Airlines, with three Boeing 737 aircraft. In 1973, a new port was completed at Muara, at the mouth of the river, and a channel dredged through the Muara spit to allow the entrance of ships up to over 10,000 gross registered tons. The offshore facilities at Seria accommodated tankers up to 300,000 deadweight tons. In 1975, a national colour television service was inaugurated. Interest-free loans were made available for citizens to purchase sets, and the Government provided sets for rural longhouses. Education was extended and a Sixth Form College opened in 1975. Sewage schemes were provided for Bandar Seri Begawan, Kuala Belait, and Tutong, work progressed on improved water supplies based on the Tutong River, and new roads were constructed and many older ones paved. All these projects required foreign labour and foreign technical expertise, so that the number of expatriates increased. In particular the number of British expatriates grew. After the departure of the Malaysians, Brunei recruited through the Crown Agents in London. Brunei policy was to train its own administrators, and young people were sent overseas, mainly to the United Kingdom, for higher education; and officers in government employ were sent on in-service courses to Britain, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand. Nevertheless, replacement was a slow process when the bureaucracy itself was growing to provide the expanded services oil wealth made possible. Brunei's wealth encouraged corruption as contractors sought government contracts and suppliers government orders. In preparation for independence, the Sultan, in early 1982, created an AntiCorruption Bureau to clean up the bureaucracy. P. Rajaratnam, a retired deputy commissioner of police from Singapore, was brought in to head the Bureau. Some minor officials were charged, but the Bureau's investigations against higher officials made little headway. In 1984, Rajaratnam was found drowned at a beach near Muara. Although apparently a suicide, the inquest returned an open verdict, for it was alleged that Rajaratnam had been threatened by senior officials who were under investigation. The incident created momentary ill feeling between Brunei and Singapore. The activities of the Anti-Corruption Bureau virtually ceased (Leake, 1990: 59). A major item of government expenditure was security and

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defence. The Royal Brunei Malay Regiment (RBMR) was founded by Sultan Sir Omar Ali in 1962. As its name implies, most of its recruits were Malays, although men of the approved indigenous races, who are regarded as subjects of the Sultan, were also eligible. At first, the RBMR relied heavily on seconded British officers or officers on contract. The Regiment was built up in the 1960s and acquired a flotilla based at Muara and an air-wing of helicopters, thus giving Brunei the means to protect its offshore oil installations. No expense was spared. The flagship of the flotilla in the early 1970s, the Palawan, was in her time the fastest warship afloat. The flotilla also boasted a troop-carrying hovercraft. Sultan Sir Omar Ali passed his enthusiasm for the armed forces to his son. Rising revenues during the 1970s meant that expense was no object. Older equipment was phased out. New patrol boats were ordered and in 1979 were fitted with French Exocet missiles. A squadron of British-made Scorpion tanks provided extra punch on land. Three American Bell 212 helicopters were purchased in 1979, bringing the air-wing up to 13 helicopters and two fixed-wing aircraft. British Rapier missiles were also purchased as was armoured bridge building equipment. The armed forces also deployed a highly sophisticated and advanced tactical communications system. All this cost money, defence receiving B$373 million, a third of the total budget, in 1979 (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1980 Yearbook, p. 145). Brunei thus had a well-equipped force able to deal with emergencies on the oilfield and to respond to a threat of sabotage or piratical attack from the sea. On land, it could respond to a crossborder incursion or domestic insurrection. Neither eventuality appeared likely. In the latter case, there was also in 1979 a Britishtrained police force which included a para-military Reserve Unit. Moreover, a battalion of British Army Gurkhas was stationed at Seria to protect the oilfield, while in Temburong the Singapore Armed Forces maintained a jungle-training facility. It was unclear by 1979 whom the Sultan and the Seri Begawan might have considered potential enemies, but the recruitment of a Reserve Unit of some 1,000 retired Gurkhas, who performed guard duties at important installations and the royal palaces, indicated that they feared the enemy within as well as that without. Given that the armed forces relied heavily on British officers and on British technical staff to maintain their weaponry and communications systems, it is questionable as to how independent these forces would have been if put to a test. The year 1979 was a turning-point. Sir Omar Ali had continued

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to see in the British connection the best hope for Brunei's continued existence. He argued that Brunei had not surrendered its independence in signing treaties with Britain, but had merely passed over to Britain responsibility for defence and foreign relations. Technically, he was correct, but the point was too subtle for the outside world and Britain was increasingly anxious to end a relationship which was interpreted elsewhere as colonial. The improved relations Brunei now enjoyed with Malaysia removed the one real foreign threat Brunei might have faced, and on 7 January 1979 Britain and Brunei signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, which provided for the return to Brunei of full responsibility for its own affairs in 1983. In 1979, too, Sir Omar Ali's wife died. The Seri Begawan followed her cortege on foot to the Royal Mausoleum in an expression of devotion which moved the people. However, thereafter, his interest in public affairs declined. Always a practising Muslim, he began to attach greater importance to religion in his life. He still attempted to exercise influence behind the throne, but the Sultan himself became more openly the spokesman for Brunei as it emerged on to the world stage. Still somewhat diffident in public, he began to assume the stature of a ruler and to assert himself over his father. In public life, he was the head of state and thus the one to whom visiting dignatories addressed themselves. His father might have been in the background, but at public ceremonies, the Sultan held centre stage. Inevitably, he began to exercise the prerogatives of his position. As his father's generation aged, younger men rose through the Brunei Government hierarchy. Internationally, new leaders emerged in the neighbouring states. The Seri Begawan still commanded respect, but within Brunei and internationally, people began to look more to the Sultan as the run-up to full independence began. The Sultan first expressed himself in his personal life. The playboy image that he had acquired was partly the response of a young man with money but denied responsibility. It grieved his father who, nevertheless, was largely responsible. The popUlation in Brunei knew from hearsay of the Sultan's activities abroad, which the British press began to report; and in Brunei his latest imported sports car, with his bodyguard behind desperately trying to keep in touch, was a common enough sight. The Sultan's polo and flying skills, his interest in fast cars and in weaponry, gave him an attractive, sporting, military image. To the Brunei public, the Seri Begawan as the sage, elder statesman provided a sense of security; the young Sultan, a sense of glamour. Then the Sultan fell in love.

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Mariam binte Abdul Aziz was of a new generation of young Brunei women. Educated at Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin College, she was intelligent, attractive, sociable and lively. The creation of Royal Brunei Airlines in 1975 opened up a new glamorous career for young women as air hostesses, and Mariam was one of the first recruited. In those early years, the Sultan often used the airline's aircraft for official and personal travel and in this way met Mariam, to whom he became attracted. A friendship developed which culminated in their marriage in October 1981. In many ways, the Sultan's life was transformed. Physically, he trimmed down, abandoned the designer stubble he had affected, dressed better, played more active sport, particularly polo, and acquired an air of confidence not previously apparent. He was literally brought out of his shell, and his contacts with people, including his own subjects, became more relaxed. Their relationship soon became an open secret in Brunei and, on the whole, was regarded with tolerance. It was the Sultan's decision to marry Mariam that caused ructions, particularly within the royal family. Islam permits more than one wife, provided both wives are treated equally, but it was not a practice widely observed in Brunei by 1980. The Seri Begawan's marriage had been monogamous and devoted. A second marriage thus cut across what had become regarded as the norm, and many progressive Bruneians, particularly women, saw it as a retrograde step. Moreover, Mariam was a commoner, and this was perhaps the main stumbling block within the family, who had tolerated her to some extent. It also offended conservative Bruneians, who might have accepted a marriage with someone from the Brunei aristocratic elite. Nevertheless, the Sultan was determined to have his way in this, and did so, although the marriage was not publicly celebrated and for some time remained secret. Mariam received the title ofPengiran Isteri. She could never equal in status the Raja Isteri, the Sultan's first wife. For the first few years, she did not appear at state occasions, the Sultan being accompanied by the Raja Isteri, who for her part responded with common sense and determination. Their marriage had been arranged and had been no love match. She had little experience of the outside world, had little education, and had accepted the role of mother and consort and the limitations imposed by custom, protocol, and her own nature. Now she too began to emerge as a positive figure in her own right, taking on more public duties, grooming herself for what had now become a demanding role. The Sultan's marriage had caused a rift in the royal family and

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the Seri Begawan had successfully prevented the public acknowledgement of the Pengiran Isteri in the manner the Sultan would have wished. Nevertheless, the Sultan had won the battle, and as full independence approached, asserted himself in other ways, visiting government departments, meeting the people in the kampongs, and showing a greater interest in events taking place in the state. This was partly an attempt to come to grips with the situation at the grass roots level, and partly to increase his accessibility and popularity. Television also provided a means of giving the Sultan and his schedule greater publicity. With independence looming, the bureaucracy was strengthened. In October 1981, Pehin Dato Haji Abdul Aziz was appointed acting Chief Minister. Western-educated, Aziz was also a born politician, realizing that the Muslim Malay majority made a potential base of support. Whereas many other administrators were pro-Western in their attitudes and values, Aziz supported the claims of Islam to playa fundamental role in defining Bruneian nationalism. Islam had been fostered by the Seri Begawan, but there was a wariness in government circles about linking Islam too closely to the state, a dislike of Islamic fundamentalism, which was seen as potentially dangerous, and a belief that the state should be secular. Nevertheless, the creation of religious schools and a Department of Religious Mfairs provided conditions whereby young men denied an education in English, and hence access to the other branches of the government service, saw their future lying in the extension of the role of Islam in national life. The Sultan, as the final source of religious authority in Brunei, and wishing to bolster his position within the state, could not easily oppose the tightening of laws and regulations, often introduced at the level of municipal and district government, which restricted the sale and consumption of alcohol, the sale of pork, the public performance of Western forms of entertainment; increased observation of Muslim dress codes; and encouraged the stricter interpretation of Muslim codes of conduct. At times, officials overstepped the mark and the Sultan expressed his displeasure, particularly when attempts were made to extend such observance to non-Muslims. However, government officials, who were predominantly Muslim, found it difficult to oppose this trend without being branded 'bad' Muslims. The result was an increasingly Muslim atmosphere within Brunei. The school uniform for girls, to take one example, was based on the Muslim baju kurnng and the headcovering known as tudung. This creeping Islamization was accompanied by debates about

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the role of Malay as the state's national language. In practice, English was widely spoken and was taught in the schools. Those who had attended the English-medium schools, both Mission and government, had acquired an advantage in the job market. Those who attended Malay-medium schools had few prospects outside Malay education and the Religious Affairs Department. During the 1970s, the relative place of English in the curriculum was debated. The quarrel with Malaysia reduced opportunities for the Malayeducated even further by closing off places for higher education. In practice, those who began entering the higher echelons of government in the 1970s were English-educated and wanted an English education for their children. They could, however, be persuaded to restrict its availability to the children of others, so that a self-perpetuating elite might develop, whose children would be able to obtain English education privately and compete successfully for the positions in government and non-government sectors against the Malay-educated. Here, then, was a constituency and a cause by which politics might be fought within the ruling elite, as those who favoured a Malay Muslim entity for Brunei competed for position and influence with those who favoured a broader interpretation of Brunei nationhood and identity. From the Sultan's point of view, there were advantages in this contest, as it provided him with flexibility and the opportunity to intervene at decisive moments. While this competition for advantage could lead to delays and changes of policy which affected aspects of the development plan, it did not prevent the initiation and completion of a large-scale building programme by the end of 1984. A 35,000-seat Hassanal Bolkiah National Stadium, in gestation during the 1970s (when it was to be named after Queen Elizabeth), was rushed to completion. A large modem hospital, named after the Sultan's first wife, replaced that built in the 1950s. A new gas-fired power station was built, public buildings began to rise on the runway of the old airport, and the Kianggeh River in Bandar Seri Begawan was canalized. Private and commercial building increased in a boom atmosphere. Overshadowing all, however, was the construction of the new Istana Narul Iman, a symbol of the new Brunei and of the status of the Sultan. Built on a 121.5-hectare site upriver from the capital, its size, opulence, and cost were a reflection of Brunei's wealth. With about 185 800 square metres of floor-space and almost 2,000 rooms, its cost has been variously estimated as up to over US$650,000,000. In many respects a rushed job, it was ready for the main independence celebrations held in February 1984.

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More important were steps taken by Brunei to reorganize its government bureaucracy and to pass laws in preparation for its entry on to the world stage. The legal system was updated, in many cases changes being based on laws and procedures existing in Malaysia and Singapore, whose legal systems are also a legacy of the British. Brunei extended its territorial waters to 20 kilometres and its fisheries limit to 320 kilometres. A Merchant Shipping Enactment brought Brunei into line with most countries of the British Commonwealth. There was great diplomatic activity as Brunei prepared to alter its relationship with Britain and establish links with its neighbours. Brunei had clung to the British connection on grounds of security. If that relationship was to become less close, Brunei needed assurances of security from its neighbours, in particular from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, who together made up the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). By 1980, the old antagonisms with Malaysia and Indonesia had passed away. In that year, President Suharto of Indonesia proposed that Brunei join ASEAN on becoming independent. The proposal was strongly supported by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and was discussed with the Seri Begawan and the Sultan. In 1981, Sultan Sir Hassanal made his first official visit to Malaysia (his other visits for royal weddings and polo matches had not been state visits) by visiting Sabah, with whose Chief Minister, Datuk Harris Salleh, he had developed business interests and a growing friendship. This may have been intended as a snub to the Sarawak Head of State, Tan Sri Haji Abdul Rahman Yaakub, who had organized anti-Brunei rallies while he was Chief Minister in the mid-1970s. However, these differences were soon erased. Rahman Yaakub visited Brunei several times, Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Musa Hitam visited in 1982, and Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian Prime Minister, did so in 1983 and offered places to Brunei students in Malaysian training institutions. High-level delegations visited the Philippines, whose construction companies and labourers were involved in projects in Brunei, including the new palace, and Thailand, which supplied some 90 per cent of Brunei's rice and also had interests in the Brunei construction boom. Heartening to Brunei was that it was being wooed as much as wooing, as ASEAN sought to maintain stability in the region. By the time independence came, Brunei had exchanged diplomats with all the members of ASEAN. It had also given permission to Australia, the United States, Japan, and South

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Korea to establish diplomatic missions. The British would continue to maintain their High Commission. Brunei also sought entry into the Commonwealth as a full member and into the United Nations, hoping that this widening circle of relationships would provide that recognition and protection which would enable it to survive. Contemporaneously, Brunei negotiated with Britain to retain as much British support as possible. Britain was prepared to afford protection for Brunei under a defence agreement, from which Britain would benefit because of the jungle training and other facilities. However, disagreement arose over the future of the battalion of British Army Gurkhas stationed at Seria and paid for by Brunei. Britain at first intended to withdraw them before full independence was granted, but the Sultan wished to retain them. Britain agreed to let them remain as it enabled it to maintain the battalion on the cheap. However, the Sultan insisted that they should pass under his command on the coming of independence. Britain could not consent to this, and was wary of a situation where British forces might be used to suppress insurgency in Brunei or confront a cross-border incursion without British Government consent. There was also the question of British service personnel on loan to the Sultan's forces. When no agreement was reached, the Sultan expressed his displeasure by forcing the departure of the British High Commissioner, Arthur Watson, in April 1983. When the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC) speculated that Watson had clashed with the Sultan, Radio Television Brunei stopped relaying BBC radio news broadcasts. Finally, in July, Brunei withdrew the management of its huge investment portfolio from the Crown Agents. Brunei had begun diversifying the management of its funds in 1978, and with the departure of the last British Financial Secretary, Pehin Dato John Lee, a strong supporter of the connection with the Crown Agents, a few months before, diversification would have occurred in any case; but the magnitude and timing indicate a political motive. American banks were appointed to manage the Sultanate's funds and to advise the newly created Brunei Investment Agency. This apparently satisfied the Sultan's pride, for the dispute with Britain was quickly ended. Sir Hassanal agreed to the British retaining command of the Gurkhas, to their withdrawal if hostilities broke out with a neighbouring state, and to their being on call for use in Hong Kong should an emergency break out there. A new defence agreement was signed with Britain in September. The Sultan's original demands would have been unacceptable in Britain and in Malaysia, but he got what he really wanted. Since December 1962, the

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Gurkhas had been regarded with awe by Bruneians of all classes for their fighting prowess. Their mere presence, under terms which were not very clear to the general public, was a deterrence. The agreement was to be renewed after five years, and it was extended in 1988 (Leake, 1990: 61-2). The way was clear for full independence to be granted. The British had given up any hope of persuading the Sultan to make any move towards parliamentary democracy, and there was little sign of any strong movement emerging within Brunei. A new Internal Security Enactment in January 1982 regularized the continuation of the State of Emergency in force since 1962 and gave the police even broader powers. What discontent there was remained subdued. The British had failed, also, to persuade the Sultan to make any concessions to the Chinese population, still the backbone of Brunei's commercial life, but still denied citizenship even if resident for more than twenty out of the twenty-five years prior to application. There is no citizenship by right of birth in Brunei, so that all except the children of Chinese who had acquired citizenship had to pass a Malay language test. This was made difficult by the inclusion of questions on flora and fauna which even native Bruneians were hard put to answer. Thus, as independence approached, less than 10 per cent of the Chinese resident in Brunei were citizens. Most were British Protected Persons, but would lose that status. Under the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation of 1979, Brunei agreed that such persons who had permanent resident status in Brunei could remain and would be granted International Certificates of Identity for travel purposes, but they would still be unable in most cases to own land and to enjoy the benefits tendered to citizens. British attempts to have the requirements for citizenship relaxed failed. Many Chinese began to consider emigration. In the nature of things, these were mainly those with skills or capital. The Brunei attitude was based partly on envy of Chinese success and fear that the Chinese would dominate the economy permanendy. There were memories of how Chinese had acquired a stranglehold in preResidency days; a feeling that as non-Malays and non-Muslims they could not be loyal; a fear, incited during Confrontation, that they might be a fifth column for Communism or susceptible to political influence from Malaysia. More particularly, they would find no place in the concept of Brunei statehood that was coming to the fore-that of a Malay Islamic Monarchy. Their high standard of living was attributed to Brunei's prosperity, but their own share in developing that prosperity was played down. In November 1982,

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the Perdana Wazir, Prince Mohamed, informed them that it was their responsibility to help Malay businessmen in return for what Brunei had afforded them. The Chinese were doubtless a community that had kept itself apart and educated its children in Chinese, and through their connections in Brunei and South-East Asia, they had channelled trade and business into their own hands. However, Brunei government policy made no concessions towards them and would perpetuate a situation in which the majority of the Chinese community had no cause to regard Brunei as their homeland or to proffer loyalty to its ruler and government. The Brunei attitude was also partly due to the shock government officials received when the 1981 Census figures were known. The returns showed a population of only 193,000, of whom 22,000 were immigrant workers on temporary residence permits. Of the rest, 39,000 were listed as ethnic Chinese (Asian Wall Street Journal, 29 October 1982, quoted in Leigh, 1983: 20, n. 2). The total population was some 20,000-30,000 less than Brunei officials had estimated, and the Brunei Malay component was also smaller. Other figures published by the United Nations in 1982 reported that only 66 per cent of the population were Brunei nationals, the remainder being composed of permanent residents (10.5 per cent), and temporary residents, transients, and others (23.5 per cent). The impression is of a relatively small majority of ethnic Malays (excluding Kedayans, Dusuns, and other indigenous peoples) of about 55 per cent; hence the reluctance to admit the Chinese to citizenship and the increasing stress on the Malay Muslim identity of Brunei. The period of preparation, negotiation, and diplomacy came to an end at midnight on 31 December 1983, when Brunei assumed full responsibility for its destiny. Mter prayers in the Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque, the royal family joined the 30,000 people gathered on the Haji Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin Park nearby. The Sultan read the proclamation of independence, declaring Negara Brunei Darussalam to be a 'sovereign, democratic and independent Malay Muslim Monarchy'. Sir Omar Ali, like the Sultan in military uniform, led the crowd in the cry of 'Allahhu Akbar', a twenty-onegun salute was fired, and as the hand-beaten Malay hadrah drums rose to a crescendo, the illuminations of the city were switched on and fireworks exploded across the rain-clouded sky. This was in many respects a family affair, shared by the Sultan, his family, and his people. The public celebrations were held over four days beginning on 23 February, which has remained Brunei's

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national day. Representatives from more than forty countries attended, and at the main celebrations the Sultan was flanked by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia and Prince Charles of Britain. The displays and the pledge of loyalty taken by the crowd that packed the National Stadium stressed that the nation would be guided by the twin principles of monarchy and Islam. To mark independence on 31 December, three of the thirty or so political prisoners held in detention were released, but there was no concession to that democracy mentioned in the proclamation. The new government, announced at the same time, was ministerial in form, but royal in essence. The Sultan was Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Internal Affairs (including security) while the Seri Begawan was Minister of Defence responsible for the Brunei Defence Forces, as they were now called, and the Gurkha Reserve Unit. The Perdana Wazir, Prince Mohamed, who had been groomed for the part over the previous years, was Minister of Foreign Affairs and the youngest royal brother, Prince Jefri, was named Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports and Deputy Minister of Finance. Prince Sufri, the third brother, received no Cabinet office. The other members of the Cabinet were Brunei Malays who had gained experience in government prior to independence. Pengiran Bahrin bin Pengiran Haji Abas, previously AttorneyGeneral, became the new Minister of Law and Minister of Communications; Pehin Dato Haji Abdul Aziz was named Minister of Education; and Pehin Dato Abdul Rahman Taib was appointed Minister of Development. The Sultan was now addressed as His Majesty instead of His Highness. His brothers held traditional titles from Brunei's past, bestowed upon them earlier and indicative that the royal family would have a significant role after independence. Prince Mohamed was the Perdana Wazir, Prince Sufri the Pengiran Pemancha, and Prince Jefri the Pengiran Di-Gadong. Commentators found parallels with the Saudi royal family's command of government and it is clear that the Sultan was determined that the country, now known as Negara Brunei Darussalam (Negara indicating its independent status, Darussalam meaning Abode of Peace) would remain under royal control. The Seri Begawan, aged seventy and increasingly ill, could look back on the past years with some satisfaction. The dynasty had been saved, democracy had been kept at bay, Brunei's security had been secured, a discreet British presence still remained, and Brunei was linked in ASEAN with its immediate neighbours and had won

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international recognition of its independent status. He might have differences with his son the Sultan, but he had bought the time the monarchy had needed to reassert its position within Brunei and to acquire for Brunei an independent position in the world. Brunei had been lucky in its oil wealth and lucky in its colonial power, but the Seri Begawan had played his cards with skill.

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The First Decade of Independence

AFTER gaining full independence, Brunei followed policies which were a continuation of those initiated before 1984. Internationally, it sought security by joining international organizations, by seeking powerful friends, and by supporting policies which recognized the independence and rights of small nation states. Internally, royal supremacy was sustained and buttressed by the promulgation of the concept of the Malay Islamic Monarchy, known in Malay as Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB). The steady drift towards a more Islamic society continued. The economy continued to rest on oil and gas and attempts at diversification had little effect. Brunei was admitted as a full member of ASEAN a week after the declaration of full independence. It played an active role within the organization and clearly saw it as a force for stability in the region and a means of encouraging regional co-operation. Within the grouping, Brunei continued to be more closely linked with Singapore, the other small nation in ASEAN. Singapore retained its jungle training facility in Temburong, the Singapore and Brunei currencies remained at par, and the two states shared commercial and strategic interests which were not adversely affected by Brunei's failure to grant citizenship to its own Chinese minority. Relations with Thailand were good, Thailand being a source of rice and of labour. The Philippines was also a source of labour and investment. The relationship suffered a mild set-back when President Marcos was overthrown by 'people power' in 1986 and it was believed that General Fabien Ver, associated with the murder of Benigno Aquino, had channelled funds through Brunei. Normal relations were restored by 1987. In September the same year, Sultan Sir Hassanal, visiting Indonesia for the first time, offered Jakarta a loan of US$100 million on very generous terms. Only with its closest neighbour, Malaysia, did Brunei have any potential problem. The Limbang issue came to the fore in May 1987 amidst reports that

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Brunei had discussed with Malaysian Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the possibility of buying back Limbang. That any such proposal was ever considered was strenuously denied by the Malaysians, but that the issue should have arisen was indicative of its potential for causing dissension. A Brunei geography textbook published in 1986 stated that map boundaries shown for Brunei did not include the regions which rightfully belonged to Negara Brunei Darussalam from the Islamic point of view and which were still being administered by another country-a reference to Limbang (Stewart, 1986: vii). Nevertheless, relations with Malaysia remained friendly, although communication over land with Sarawak was still constrained by the need to use ferries to cross the bordering rivers. Brunei also joined the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). The Sultan attended the United Nations session when Brunei was admitted in September 1984, and in his speech to the world body, supported the United Nations Charter, condemned Israel, and supported the Palestinians' right to a homeland. Support for the Charter and its condemnation of the use of force was a constant theme of Brunei diplomacy, for recognition of these principles protected Brunei's rights as a small nation. Support for the Palestinians was based on a desire to be identified with the Muslim world, and membership of the OIC gave Brunei another circle of friends and supporters. Earlier in 1984, the Sultan had attended the OIC summit in Casablanca, Morocco, and later in the same year, Yassir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, received a warm welcome in Brunei. Brunei's main links with the Muslim world, however, were with the monarchical Arab kingdoms such as Oman, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, all of which were Sunni Muslim states with economies and socio-political systems similar to those of Brunei. There were particularly close links with Oman. Brunei was wary of Islamic fundamentalism and of Shiite Iran. Islam in Brunei supports the conservative status quo, and fundamentalism is seen as challenging the established order. The Sultan and Princes Mohamed and Jefri made the hadj in 1987 and thus identified themselves more closely with the Muslim populace. The Government assists Brunei Muslims to make the pilgrimage and each year over 2,000 do so. The Muslim link is an important one, but closely monitored. Brunei immediately established full diplomatic relations with Britain. That a Conservative Government was in power in London

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in the period leading up to independence had reduced pressure for democratic reform as a prerequisite to independence, and was more favourable to the Sultan in the years after independence than a Labour Government might have been. There were economic and military advantages to Britain in the relationship, illustrated in early 1985 when Brunei foreign reserves were moved to bolster sterling after the Sultan met Margaret Thatcher in January that year (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1986 Yearbook, p. 117). The United States was also attracted by Brunei's strategic position at a time when the long-term future of its bases in the Philippines was in question. The Sultan was equally anxious to broaden his base of support. In September 1984, during his visit to the United Nations, he donated US$1 million to the United Nations Children's Fund and US$500,000 to feed the homeless of New York. The donations brought favourable publicity and disguised the autocratic nature of his rule. A year later, Brunei exchanged ambassadors with the United States. In 1986, the US Secretary of State, Charles Schultz, visited Brunei. A few months later, in September, the Sultan was guest of honour on the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, to which he flew his own aircraft. In between these events, he made a donation of US$10 million to the secret fund established by some US officials to support the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. Brunei insisted that this sum was for humanitarian aid to Central America, which was not banned by the US Congress. However, the money was deposited in the wrong bank account in Switzerland and never reached its destined beneficiaries. The affair was an embarrassment to the US Government and Brunei alike, but Brunei eventually received the donation back, with interest. Brunei's relations with the United States were more wary thereafter (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1988 Yearbook, p. 105). Brunei established relations too with France and West Germany, both of whom had an interest in acquiring construction, defence, and other contracts. More substantial was the link with Australia, where Brunei had a cattle station larger than Brunei itself. Australia also supplied foodstuffs by air freight and Australian companies obtained construction contracts. Given the importance to the Brunei economy of the export of LNG to Japan, the penetration of the Brunei market by Japanese imports, and the investment of Japanese capital, it was natural that a Japanese embassy should be established. Korea also established an embassy because of construction contracts and hopes for others. Bangladesh did so largely to look after imported Bangladeshi labour

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and in the expectation of other contacts and contracts that did not materialize. Pakistan and Oman also maintained embassies in Brunei. Many other countries maintained diplomatic contacts through their embassies or high commissions in Singapore and Malaysia. Brunei itself established diplomatic missions in the five ASEAN countries and in Australia, Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States. The Swiss connection explains to a large extent the interest that so many countries showed in the tiny South-East Asian kingdom. The world beat a path to the Sultan's door because of his and Brunei's wealth. The Sultan and his family were enormously rich. The sobriquet, 'The Richest Man in the World', was based on the assumption, which the Sultan denied, that the wealth of state was, in essence, his to use. His and the royal family's personal wealth had accumulated over the years and all members of the family were engaged in business transactions of some complexity: while some of these involved projects which many wealthy Bruneians took part in-building properties which were then leased or rented at very favourable terms to the Government-other enterprises were more far-flung. The Sultan first began attracting international attention with his purchase of the Holiday Inn in Singapore in 1983. In 1985, he purchased the Dorchester in London, and in 1987, the Beverly Hills Hotel in California. The Sultan's involvement in many property purchases was difficult to trace because of his use of agents, such as the Egyptian, Mohamed AI-Fayed, who was entrusted with power of attorney in certain matters. The purchase by the Fayed brothers of the House of Fraser, owner of Harrods in London, sparked off a controversy fuelled by Roland 'Tiny' Rowland, head of the Lonhro Group, who had aspired to the House of Fraser for some ten years. He suspected that the Fayeds were acting for the Sultan, that their path had been cleared by the Sultan's switch of funds into sterling when the pound was under threat, and that the whole deal was improper. Rowland created adverse publicity for the Sultan, who soon fell out with the Fayeds, but the extent of the Sultan's involvement in the House of Fraser purchases remains unknown. What is clear is that the Sultan was not always well advised during these first ventures into the world of financial wheeling and dealing. He had earlier had unfortunate dealings with Adnan Khashoggi. QAF Holdings, the Singapore-based vehicle for the royal family's business enterprises, also got off to a shaky start because of unwise and misdirected expansion (Leake, 1990: 81-5).

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The royal family were again embarrassed in 1986 by the failure of the National Bank of Brunei (NBB) with which Princes Mohamed and Jefri had been closely associated at different times. Some 70 per cent of the Bank's assets had been held by the family of a Malaysian Chinese financier, Khoo Teck Puat. Investigations begun in 1986 indicated that the large majority of NBB loans had been made to Khoo-related companies against little or no security. Khoo Teck Puat's son, Khoo Ban Hock, was arrested in Brunei, along with the bank's senior manager and two of its internal auditors, while the bank's executive director was extradited from Singapore. After a sensational fraud trial, Khoo Ban Hock, the bank's senior manager, and one auditor were jailed. Eventually, the Khoo family repaid all the money the NBB owed to various creditors, and reimbursed the Brunei Government for losses it had covered (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1989 Yearbook, p. 90; Leake, 1990: 129-30). The Government had already begun to tighten its financial regulations as a result of the 1985 failure of United National Finance, whose chairman, Patrick Chiang Chen Tsong, had had connections with a failed Hong Kong bank. In 1986, the only remaining locally incorporated financial institution in Brunei was the Island Development Bank (IDB). The IDB had been started with a large interest held by Enrique Zobel, a leading Filipino contractor for the construction of the new Istana, and the Bank of the Philippines, while the royal family held the rest. The royal family increased its holding to 60 per cent in 1985, Zobel's Ayala (Holdings) Company held 20 per cent, and Dai !chi Kangyo held the remaining 20 per cent. Zobel retired as chairman in August 1986 and Dato Abdul Rahman of the Finance Ministry took his place. Seven members of the new board were Bruneian and two were from Dai !chi Kangyo. The Fifth National Development Plan (1986-90) proposed that Brunei develop as a regional banking and financial centre, and these moves could be seen not only as responding to weaknesses in the existing system but as preparing the way for such a development. The activities of the Sultan, other members of the royal family, and Brunei's financial regulators could all be seen as examples of the newly independent and rich nation coming to terms with the financial and business world. It bred a certain cynicism, for it must have appeared to the Sultan and his family that every huckster with a sale to make saw them as easy marks. All too often, in personal purchases they paid over the odds for what they received or were tempted into ostentation. The institutions of the state were also approached by salesmen touting everything they might want, and

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the temptation was to buy the latest technology regardless of the cost and the problems of maintaining such systems. Politically, the decade after full independence saw Sultan Sir Hassanal tighten his hold on government. The most significant change occurred with the death on 7 September 1986 of the Seri Begawan, Sir Omar Ali. The Seri Begawan had been unwell for some time. He had suffered from diabetes for several years and towards the end showed signs of approaching senility. The independence ceremonies had inevitably highlighted the position of the Sultan, who had also used the occasion to acknowledge the position of his second wife, Pengiran Isteri Mariam, by appearing with her and the Raja Isteri Saleha in public. In December 1984, Pengiran Isteri Mariam accompanied the Sultan on his state visits to Oman, Egypt, and Jordan and then on to London for Christmas and the New Year. However, the Sultan cut his visit short, returning to Brunei on 28 December when the Seri Begawan summoned him, claiming that he was ill. This assertion of his will emboldened the Seri Begawan, who was increasingly upset by the decline in his own position, his disapproval of the Sultan's lifestyle, his regret at the elevation of the Pengiran Isteri, and the Sultan's neglect of the Raja Isteri. Thus began a bizarre power struggle. The Sultan's eldest son, Pengiran Muda AI-Muhtadee Billah, was generally accepted as heir to the throne, although not officially proclaimed as such. In May 1985, the Seri Begawan publicly showed favour to the eldest son of his favourite daughter, Princess Masna, thus provoking rumours that the succession might be disputed. Perhaps as a counter, the Sultan agreed at the end of May to the registration of a political party, the Brunei National Democratic Party, the first in nearly twenty years. Its leaders were mainly Malay businessmen apparently pledged to seeking improved Malay business involvement. At the same time, the Sultan increased his public appearances and visits, making it clear that he was the ruler and had the interests of the people at heart. The Seri Begawan played upon latent differences in the royal family, making generous gifts to all his sons except the Sultan. Of these, Prince Jefri apparently was closest to the Seri Begawan, while the Perdana Wazir, Prince Mohamed, earned his father's disapproval by attempting to reconcile the two sides. The differences between the Sultan and his father were officially kept private but there were few people in Brunei who did not see the signs. In such a small community, few secrets were kept for long; the rumours multiplied and the public keenly interpreted the smallest

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gestures and movements of the protagonists. They were left in no doubt on 12 July 1985, when the Seri Begawan instructed the mosques to announce that he should be addressed as Sultan and Yang DiPertuan and as Maulana or religious leader. The announcement was made, but Radio Television Brunei (RTB) cut short its broadcasts of the service. The Seri Begawan next sent a statement to RTB to be read over the evening news. The news in English did not carry the reference to him as Yang Di-Pertuan and the Seri Begawan personally went to the station to insist that his statement be read in full in Malay and in English during the Malay news. The Seri Begawan's challenge coincided with the celebration of the Sultan's birthday. On 15 July, the police force took a formal oath of allegiance to the Sultan. The armed forces were the creation of the Seri Begawan and he was Minister of Defence. It was therefore a significant victory for the Sultan when the army also declared its loyalty to him. On 27 August, the Sultan acted independently of the Seri Begawan in pardoning and releasing seven political detainees held since the 1962 revolt. The ceremony was shown on television and was significant in that the Seri Begawan had refused to permit the release of these men, who had rebelled against him. Finally, on 2 October, the Sultan altered the composition of the Council of Succession, making it more amenable to him. There was speculation that the Sultan was clearing the way for the succession of Prince Abdul Azim, his son by the Pengiran Isteri, but this would have been as unacceptable to the other members of the royal family as to the Seri Begawan, and the latter was reassured that Prince AI-Muhtadee Billah would succeed. At this point, the Seri Begawan went to London for a medical check-up and the Sultan consolidated his position in Brunei. The Seri Begawan had made use of the mosques and had attempted to claim a role as religious leader. The Sultan now asserted his own position as Brunei's supreme religious authority. Every year, the Muslims in Brunei celebrate the birthday of Prophet Muhammad by staging a Maulad procession through the capital. In 1985, the procession fell on 25 November. Contrary to the usual practice, the religious authorities decreed that the procession would be divided so that men and women would march separately instead of together as hitherto. The Sultan had not been consulted and, to show his disapproval, refused to take part. A few days later, he asserted his authority again. Pengiran Badaruddin was appointed to head RTB and women announcers were ordered to remove their tudung or head-coverings, which they had donned under the previous director.

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When the Seri Begawan returned from London, relations between him and the Sultan slowly improved. The Sultan presented his father with a helicopter fitted out with sophisticated medical equipment, and was televised kissing the Seri Begawan's hand on his return from an overseas trip. The Seri Begawan responded by declaring that there could be only one Sultan, namely Sultan Hassanal. He also accepted the Pengiran Isteri, appearing alongside her at a banquet held for the visiting King of Jordan. The reconciliation with his father reinforced the Sultan's position within Brunei. Seri Begawan Sir Omar Ali died on 7 September 1986. The Sultan and his brothers performed the burial and the ceremonies of mourning that succeeded it, all of which were televised. The Sultan spoke to his people on television at the end of the forty days of mourning, his grief visible to all. However, in the same speech, he announced his new Cabinet and it was clear that he was now in charge. The Sultan remained Prime Minister and took over the Ministry of Defence with Major-General Ibnu, his former aidede-camp, as his deputy. Pehin Haji Isa, a British-trained lawyer who had been an adviser to the Sultan since 1971, took over the Ministry of Home Affairs from the Sultan and was confirmed as Special Adviser in the Prime Minister's Department. The Perdana Wazir, Prince Mohamed, remained as Foreign Minister while Prince Jefri took full control of the Finance Ministry. Dr Haji Mohammad Zain, a moderate, headed the newly created Ministry of Religious Affairs. Pengiran Bahrin retained the Ministry of Law. In all, the number of ministries was increased to eleven and all received deputy ministers. The Cabinet reflected a balance between the royal family and Western-trained technocrats drawn from noble and commoner backgrounds. There was no concession to democracy. The Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP) registered in May 1985 was not allowed to make any real impact. In September 1985, just before the Party's official launching, the Government announced that government officials and employees were barred from joining; a decision based, ironically, upon regulations governing the civil service formulated by the British in 1956. As membership of the party was to be restricted to Brunei Malays, and the majority of Brunei Malays in employment were in government service, this was a severe blow, especially as other potential members were also effectively warned off and only 100 persons attended the launch. The leaders of the BNDP were its president, Haji Abdul Latif bin Abdul Hamid, and its secretary-general, Haji Abdul Latif bin Chuchu. Perhaps

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encouraged by the release of almost all the remaining detainees, they had unwisely called for democratic reform and the end of Emergency rule. Even more unwisely, they had done so while visiting neighbouring countries where the press published their views. In October 1985, the BNDP vice-president, Mohamad Hatta bin Haji Zainal Abidin, accusing the leaders of acting dictatorially, split from the party with 150 members and formed a new party, the Brunei National Solidarity Party (BNSP), open to all indigenous peoples in Brunei, Muslim or non-Muslim. The party espoused government policies and the official ideology of a Malay Islamic Monarchy, tolerance of other religions, and the protection of Malay businessmen. It roused no excitement among the populace, who subscribed rather to the more radical programme of the BNDP, which claimed more than 4,000 members. The latter's leaders continued to travel abroad and make statements critical of the Sultan and his government which received unwelcome publicity, so that it was no surprise when in January 1988 Haji Abdul Latifbin Chuchu and Haji Latif bin Abdul Hamid were arrested as they were about to travel to Australia and the BNDP was deregistered. The Government accused it of connections with the Pacific Democratic Union and of sending delegations abroad without government permission. In April 1988, Haji Jumaat resigned as chairman and as a member of the BNSP, claiming that the party had acquired only 60 members and was meaningless. The Sultan's experiment with democracy, if that is what it was, had ended. It seemed to indicate that any free political expression would be critical of the status quo. The other aspect of the experiment was the degree of royal involvement. The BNSP had the markings of a potential official royal party, formed to rally support for the Sultan and the existing system if steps were taken towards democracy. On the other hand, that the leaders of the BNDP could afford to travel as extensively as they did roused speculation that they were funded by a member of the royal family. If so, did the experiment in party politics represent submerged differences within the family, or did the episode spring from the differences at the time between the Sultan and Seri Begawan and the Sultan's belief that he might win popular support where his father had failed? The royal government established on the Seri Begawan's death survived. There were ministerial changes, largely the shuffling of posts according to the relative position of what might be called the supporters of the official ideology of the Malay Islamic Monarchy and those who may be called the pragmatists. As the 1990s began,

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the former appeared to be gaining ground. The appointment of Pehin Dato Abdul Aziz to the Ministry of Education and to the post of Vice-Chancellor of the U niversiti Brunei Darussalam placed the control of education in the hands of the former. On the other hand, Pehin Dato Abdul Rahman Taib, a pragmatist and for two years previously the Minister of Education, was transferred to the Ministry of Industry and Primary Resources. Within the departments, the two elements vied for influence. This contest will probably continue with new variations as younger men move through the service to positions of responsibility. In July 1990, on the occasion of his forty-fourth birthday, the Sultan officially enunciated the concept of Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) or Malay Islamic Monarchy. The concept had been implicit in Bruneian thinking for a long time, and in the run-up to full independence was being formulated by those who saw a Brunei national identity as being defined by the attachment of its people to Malay culture, the Muslim religion, and loyalty to the monarchy. The Declaration of Independence read by the Sultan on the night of 31 December 1983 proclaimed Brunei to be a 'sovereign, democratic, and independent Malay Muslim monarchy' [Leake, 1989: 63]. The 'democratic' was soon forgotten, but by 1985, greater emphasis was being given in the schools and colleges to the role of both Islam and monarchy. In October of that year, Universiti Brunei Darussalam opened with 174 students, all strictly enjoined to eschew Western fashion and to adhere to Muslim codes of dress and behaviour (Far Eastern Economic Review 1986 Yearbook: 117; Leake, 1989: 124-5). Following his father's death and his brief toleration of party politics, the Sultan saw in MIB a means of creating a unifying ideology which would bolster his power, blunt the appeal of those calling for a stricter observance of Islam, and develop a sense of purpose in the young. In a hard-hitting speech commemorating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday on 2 October 1990, he declared MIB to be 'God's Will'. The theme was taken up by Pehin Dato Abdul Aziz as Minister of Education, so that courses in MIB were made compulsory in all educational institutions (Far Eastern Economic Review 1991 Yearbook: 82). Over the next couple of years, the MIB concept was refined both as an ideology aimed at shaping the thinking of all Bruneians, particularly the young, and at justifying the role of the Sultan as guardian and protector ofIslamic principles and Malay culture (Far Eastern Economic Review 1993 Yearbook: 89; see also Braighlinn, 1992: 18-23). This concentration on the Malay,

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the traditional, and the Islamic involved the risk of alienating those sectors of the population who were neither Malay nor Muslim. It might be too small a base upon which to build loyalty to the state and to the Sultan, risking the possibility of producing a large minority of second-class citizens and certainly marginalizing the Chinese and the non-Malay indigenous peoples. It also threatened the government's development aims by confining Bruneian minds within the bounds of 'Islamic Knowledge', which can be at odds with scientific and intellectual enquiry, but this might be a price the Government is prepared to pay in order to keep out what it sees as undesirable manifestations of Western culture. Similarly, there is a conflict between the aim to stimulate Brunei's role as a financial centre and the tendency towards Islamic bank-ing practices (Far Eastern Economic Review 1993 Yearbook: 90). Finally, although MIB was promulgated, the level of its acceptance was hard to judge. Bruneians are capable, like most people, of holding contradictory views, paying lip service to MIB for pragmatic reasons. In academic circles, however, the MIB concept made an impact, constraining research and debate on the one hand (see the essays in Abu Bakar, 1992) and provoking critical analysis on the other (Braighlinn, 1992). In August 1992, Sultan Sir Hassanal Bolkiah celebrated twentyfive years upon the throne, opening a new and larger mosque bearing his name to commemorate the event. Ten years after independence, Brunei was an independent state, wealthy from its income from oil, gas, and its investments. The royal government was firmly established and there appeared to be no immediate threat from inside or outside the country. Brunei had woven a web of international relationships-military, political, diplomatic, and economic-and it was not in the interests of its neighbours to upset the balance of power in the region. Within, there was opportunity for employment for the educated in the government service and in the private sector. Women played an important role in both, having made good use of the opportunities offered for education. Ordinary citizens continued to benefit from the services of the welfare state. There were extremes of wealth, but enough prosperity to blunt discontent. In any case, within the Brunei Malay community, custom and religion, fostered by government propaganda and censorship, encouraged acceptance of the status quo. There was concern at one stage that the young were turning to drink, drugs, and undesirable aspects of Western culture, and the emphasis on Islamic values was intended to counter this. The state, for example, officially went 'dry' in 1991. There were

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inevitable irritations and grievances, for Brunei was not sealed off from its neighbours, where politics was of consuming interest and social life more lively. Such places with their greater freedom were an attraction, but also a warning, and most Bruneians returned from sallies into them pleased enough to be back with the certainties they knew. The feelings and sentiments that fired the PRE existed below the surface, but people had learned the futility of antigovernment opposition and on the whole accepted the secure but bland life offered to them. Material goods were readily available; stricter Muslim observance was not onerous to most and welcomed by many; and if life lacked excitement, at least it was safe. The portion of the population that could justifiably feel discriminated against was the Chinese. Chinese citizens rose to high positions, but the Chinese way of life was restricted, with curbs on Chinese education and the observance of Chinese celebrations such as the New Year. The Government argued that all schools should follow a national curriculum, but did not make easier access to citizenship which might cause the Chinese to accept such changes. As a consequence, many of the Chinese with skill and capital began to emigrate. The emphasis on Brunei nationality being defined within the parameters of a Malay Islamic Monarchy precluded non-Malays and non-Muslims from full acceptance. However, while young Brunei Malays continued to prefer government and administrative jobs, the Chinese continued to be needed. Similarly, the expatriate workforce showed no sign of diminishing, for Brunei did not have the population available to man all the services required in and by a modern state. Its aim was to control the high ground with its own people. By retaining its monarchy, Brunei had retained the substance as well as the spirit of traditional Brunei. The Sultan in state was in the presence of hereditary officials bearing traditional titles, wearing colourful and costly court dress, and conducting themselves in a manner reminiscent of the court at the height of its glory. The traditional obeisance, in which the highest of the Sultan's subjects sank to their haunches with hands raised and meeting at the forehead, stemmed from pre-Islamic court ceremonial, when the ruler was a god-king. The ceremonies, the regalia, the hierarchy of officials, their titles and terms of address, the banners, flags, umbrellas, and other royal paraphernalia all symbolized the supremacy of the ruler. The throne room in the new Istana, with its ornate opulence and grandeur, and the neighbouring banqueting hall were designed as a setting for royal display. The Istana itself

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aimed to impress by its size and lavishness, as, in befitting degree, did the palaces of the lesser members of the royal family. The jewellery of the Sultan's wives, the extent of their wardrobes, the collection of cars, aircraft, antiques, and art were as much part of this display as the throne room and the regalia, and to a large extent they were seen by his subjects to be so. The converse, that the ruler must also be accessible, was a tradition introduced from Islam. This occurred when the Sultan made informal visits to kampongs and government departments, or held 'meet the people' sessions. It occurred when he attended Friday prayers at the main mosque and the faithful pressed around him to kiss his hand. It occurred also at Hari Raya, the period ending the fasting month of Ramadan, when the Istana was thrown open to the populace to pay their respects to the Sultan and to members ofthe royal family. The Sultan's birthday, celebrated by arches, illuminations, processions, parades, regattas, baby shows, Koran readings, sports, and games for several weeks throughout the nation, was a celebration exceeding even that of National Day. Throughout the year, television and radio gave prominence to events associated with the Sultan and his family. The Government weekly newspaper, Pelita Brunei, published in Malay, distributed free, and with a production run of 45,000 in 1989, publicized the activities of the Sultan and the royal family, and also inculcated such approved values as loyalty to the Sultan and the monarchy, Islamic virtues, traditional Malay culture, and a sense of national identity. The effects of all this media effort were hard to judge, but the use of modern means of communication to enhance the monarch's image was merely an extension of the traditional forms still to be seen in the state ceremonial. The purpose was to identify the state with the Sultan and vice versa. Brunei entered the twenty-sixth year of Sultan Sir Hassanal's reign seemingly secure internally and internationally. Its independent status was guaranteed by a combination of diplomacy and its membership of regional and international organizations. Internally, much depended upon how the Sultan played the role he had inherited and developed. There were problems and tensions enough for commentators to remark on: one could speculate as to the future when the oil and gas were depleted; or the present Sultan's reign ended; or democratic forces emerged; or Islamic influence increased further; or relations with neighbours altered. A historian could only report that the Brunei monarchy and the Brunei state had survived

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for centuries against at times very great odds. There appeared to be no reason, given a modicum of good fortune and able government, why they should not continue to do so, though perhaps in modified form.

13 Brunei to 2001

During the 1990s Brunei remained politically stable. Nearly all those in ministerial positions at the beginning of the 1990s, remained so in 2001, the most notable exceptions being the departure from the Ministry of Finance of the Sultan's youngest brother, Prince Jefri and, from the Ministry of Justice, ofPg Bahrin Abas. Over the same period, its domestic policies and international policies underwent no major changes. By 2001, however, there was evidence that the country was entering a period of transition. During the 1990s, political activity was practically non-existent, the only registered political organization being the Parti Perpaduan Kebangsaan Brunei (PPKB), or Brunei National Solidarity Party (BNSP), which engaged in a brief flurry of activity in 1995, after being permitted to hold its first national assembly in February and electing Hj Abdul Latif Chuchu as its president. Hj Latif, an exschoolteacher turned businessman, claimed party branches in the main towns, but membership was probably less than 200 (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1996 Yearbook: 93). Citing the Sultan's 1984 independence proclamation that Brunei 'would forever remain as an independent, sovereign and democratic Islamic Malay monarchy', the BNSP called for general elections. Hj Latif travelled to Kuala Lumpur and was interviewed on television. He was quickly reminded that, as a former political detainee, he required permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs before participating in any political activity. Such permission did not materialize, and the BNSP, leaderless and squabbling, faded from view. Still the only legal political party, it re-emerged briefly in September 1999 to protest to the Malaysian ambassador to Brunei, along with other organizations, at remarks allegedly made by a Malaysian deputy minister, which were considered insulting to the Sultan. The Malaysian minister duly apologized, though insisting his words had been misconstrued, and the matter was forgotten.

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It has been suggested that the brief flirtation with democracy in 1995 was to pre-empt external criticism of Brunei's political process (Naima Talib, 1996). The release in 1996 of three political detainees, including, in July, Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, the former deputy leader of the Partai Rakyat Brunei, may support this view (Saunders, 1997: 74). However, it also reflected the government's confidence that 'subversive' activities and feelings were minimal. In August 1999, Muhammed Jasin Affendy bin Abdul Rahman, who had been secretary-general of the PRE, was also released from detention. Originally interned after the abortive rebellion of 1962, he was one of those who had escaped from detention in 1973 and found asylum in Malaysia. Some years later, he voluntarily returned to Brunei and underwent a rehabilitation programme at the J erudong Detention and Rehabilitation Centre. His release indicated the government's confidence that any threat from these ageing revolutionaries had passed. These gestures coincided with indications that some movement might be made towards representative government. In 1996 the Sultan ordered a group headed by the Perdana Wazir, Prince Mohamed, to draft a new constitution. The scandals associated with the Sultan's youngest brother, Prince Jefri, intervened and it was not until August 1999 that Prince Mohamed announced the completion of this constitutional review, including plans for elections, but there was no evidence of haste, nor any marked sign of public interest. In 1999, also, the Government attempted to reform the Consultative Councils which had been created in 1992 in order to provide channels of two-way communication between the government and the people. These were not democratic institutions in any party democracy sense. The Consultative Councils came under a Management Board, the Majlis Perunding Mukim dan Kampong (MPMK), which replaced the Communications Committee formed at independence in 1984. This Management Board was appointed by the Sultan and headed by the Minister of Home Affairs and his deputy as Chairman and Deputy Chairman respectively, and the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs was Secretary. Other members of the board were permanent secretaries of other ministries, the four district officers and four others appointed from among the advisers of the mukim councils. The Sultan appointed titled persons, ministers and deputy ministers to the mukim councils as advisers, while the Chairman of the Management Board appointed prominent figures as advisers to the kampong councils.

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Membership of the consultative councils at the kampong and mukim levels was open to all citizens above 18 years of age. Members of the Kampong Consultative Council were selected through meetings of the residents of the respective kampongs. Some of these members represented the kampong in the Mukim Consultative Council. At the mukim level, school principals and imams within the mukim concerned also became members. However, the system proved cumbersome and bureaucratic and council members acted more like civil servants than representatives of the people, a situation which limited reform was unlikely to change significantly. 1999 also saw reshuffles in the civil service which promoted many younger bureaucrats to the level of permanent secretary, preparing them for future responsibility (Mohamad Yusop, 2000: 93-4). Meanwhile, the Sultan continued his frequent and often unannounced visits to government ministries and departments and to villages and development schemes throughout the state. During these visits he spoke to ordinary people, attended Friday prayers in their mosques and demonstrated a personal interest in their welfare. These visits, reported in the media, associated the Sultan with his government's achievements, demonstrated his concern for his subjects and sustained his popularity. The need to improve channels of communication were given greater weight and urgency by the events associated with the economic troubles of the late 1990s and, in particular, with the activities of the Sultan's youngest brother, Prince J efri. As Minister of Finance, Prince Jefri had enjoyed a playboy image on the world stage and mishandled the state's finances to an alarming extent. The Asian economic crisis exacerbated a situation which had been allowed to develop, partly in the expectation, to some extent justified, that Brunei was cushioned by its income from oil and by its huge financial reserves accumulated over the years. Prince Jefri's personal extravagance attracted the attention of the foreign press from time to time, but it was only in 1997 that the fragility of the financial empire which sustained it was revealed publicly in Brunei, when the Sultan, in February, removed him as Finance Minister and, in April, took over the post himself. However, Prince Jefri still headed the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA), which handled all Brunei's oil revenues, and the Amadeo Development Corporation, which was heavily involved in many of the high profile construction ventures which were transforming Brunei's infrastructure. Allegations of mismanagement and financial problems besetting Amadeo accumulated, until, in April 1998, the Sultan ordered that the corporation

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set its house in order, thus bringing matters into the open and prompting further complaints and allegations of misuse of funds. In July, Amadeo collapsed, unable to pay debts which, a year later, were estimated at $6,000 million dollars, a large proportion of that sum being owed to the BIA. Prince Jefri was removed from both Amadeo and the BIA, and investigations began, headed by Prince Mohamed. When the story first broke, Prince Jefri left the country and, in a gesture, which did not win back lost favour, sold off some of his foreign holdings. He returned briefly to Brunei in October 1998, offering to settle matters constructively and declaring there had been no wrong-doing, but soon left again. For the next year he remained persona non grata in Brunei, while auditors continued their investigation. In July 1999, Amadeo was wound up and, in late February the following year, the government began legal proceedings against Prince Jefri, his son, Prince Hakeem, and some 70 others for alleged misuse of BrA funds. However, the case came rapidly to a halt, although actions against some of his associates continued. The whole episode threatened to bring further embarrassment upon the Royal Family and a compromise was reached. Prince Jefri promised to return all assets he had allegedly taken from the state and the BIA, was placed under house arrest, and began selling off his assets. Others fell with him, including Law Minister and Attorney-General, Pengiran Bahrin Abas, and the solicitor-general and permanent secretary at the Law Ministry, Abas Serudin, who had failed to detect Amadeo's problems. The Sultanate weathered the Asian economic crisis, which started in 1997. Protected by its oil and gas revenues, it moved to help its Asean neighbours, providing economic aid to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia and increasing its investment in the region. However, the Amadeo crisis and the decline in the value of the country's overseas investment portfolio, a fall in value of the Brunei dollar (pegged to the Singapore dollar), against the US dollar by 14 per cent, and a slump in world oil prices of some 40 per cent, all contributed to a fall in the growth rate in 1998 and caused this assistance to be cut back. Although a rise in oil prices again in the latter half of 1999 relieved the pressure, a report in February 2000 by the National Economic Council, created in September 1998 and headed by Prince Mohamad, confirmed that since 1994 the Government had been drawing on foreign reserves to fund a budget deficit averaging some $6,000 a year, about 15 per cent of GNP. The report also noted that population growth of 2.5 per cent a year

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had been double economic growth since 1985, that unemployment had risen by 5.1 per cent and that a quarter of school-Ie avers since 1992 had failed to find jobs (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 2001 Yearbook: 87). The Government could no longer continue to be the main employer. Higher economic growth depended on diversification and the creation of new jobs in the private sector. The Government had argued for years that dependence on oil and gas should be reduced, although it took advantage of rising oil prices to increase production in 2000. This time, there appeared to be a new awareness that diversification must be taken seriously. The excessive expenditure under Prince Jefri's management had left the country with extravagant white elephants, including the J erudong Park Playground and a luxury beach hotel, along with impressive ministry buildings, four-lane highways, shopping complexes and luxury apartment blocks-with more under construction. The region of the capital had been transformed, but the process came to an abrupt halt. The economic downturn, government retrenchment and delays in payment to construction companies, produced a slump in the construction industry, forcing many local contractors out of business and leaving projects uncompleted. The departure of immigrant labour adversely affected retail businesses. Nevertheless, Prince Jefri's legacy was perceived by many Bruneians as a mixed one. There was pride in the material changes and a sense that these might prove of eventual benefit when the economic position improved. Nor were earlier visions for the future lost sight of. Events gave urgency to their implementation. Since 1996, the broader plan was to make Brunei, by 2003, a Service Hub for Trade and Tourism (ShuTT) for the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), conceptualised in 1994. In October 1996, Dato Hj Malai Ali bin Malai Osman, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Development, talked of Brunei as a bridge between the world community and the BIMP-EAGA community (Borneo Bulletin, 8 October 1996). The long discussed proposal to make Brunei a financial centre gained new strength. New emphasis was given to privatising public services, which had already begun; for example, the Muara Container Terminal was operated by a joint-venture company set up by the Singapore Port Authority Corporation and a local company, Archipelago Development Corporation. A multi-million-dollar high-capacity info-communication structure was designed to create a fully-fledged information society. This project integrated Brunei into the world's

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advanced multi-media structures in time for the 20th Southeast Asian games, which Brunei hosted, very successfully, for the first time in 1998, and the APEC 2000 conference held in November 2000. The attitude to tourism changed, reflected in 2000 in the creation of a $200 million government fund for small and mediumscale projects, backed up by an additional $200 million in working capital from banks, with bank loans backed by a 75 per cent government guarantee. Related developments were the declaration of 2001 as Visit Brunei Year with the ambitious aim of attracting one million visitors. This opening to the outside world was to some extent at odds with the pertaining social restrictions on night-life. Nevertheless, the government faced an uphill struggle. Observers have long identified the principal constraints to diversification: 'relatively high local wage and salary trait; a chronic shortage of skilled labour; a preference among Bruneians for public employment due to the large gap between the level of benefits provided by the government and those available from private employment; and an absence of entrepreneurial experience and inclination'. (Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1996 Yearbook: 94). The government attempted to solve these problems for years: by virtually freezing government salaries since 1984; providing training in the relevant skills; and by ordering private companies to provide benefits packages commensurate with those in the public sector. Potential investors were attracted by the absence of personal income, sales, payroll and export taxes and a low corporate tax, from which approved investors could be exempted for eight years. The main constraint remained public attitudes. Thousands of 'guest workers' were repatriated as projects and government funding were cut back, and some six thousand local people were registered as looking for work in 2000. Yet guest workers remained evident even in the service industries. The impetus given to the local economy by APEC 2000 was disappointing and Visit Brunei Year was affected by continued economic difficulties in the region and globally. The government announced a study to prepare a Strategic Plan to increase the involvement of Malays in economic activity, and in its foreign policy included efforts to encourage tourism. Thus, when President Jiang Zemin visited Brunei in November 2000, one of the economic memoranda of understanding arrived at (along with one providing for oil sales and one for reciprocal protection of investments) was the recognition by the Chinese Government of Brunei as an 'official tourism destination', enabling Chinese tourists to visit in greater numbers.

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The State Visit of China's President illustrated the pragmatism of Brunei's foreign policy. It followed visits by the Sultan to China in November 1993 and August 1999. Whereas China was once regarded with suspicion, diplomatic relations between Brunei and China were established in 1991. It was now a potential market for petroleum products and a source of tourists and of investment. For its part, China gained another source of petroleum products. The Sale of Oil Agreement between the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company and the China International United Petroleum Company provided for the sale of ten thousand barrels per day of Champion Export Crude Oil. The State Visit of 17-18 November followed the Eighth APEC Leaders' Summit (15-16 November), which had been preceded by the State Visit of President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea, which was already a market for Brunei oil. The APEC meeting itself, under the chairmanship of the Sultan, brought to Brunei leaders and representatives of 21 Pacific Rim states, including, in addition to the Presidents of China and South Korea, Presidents Clinton of the USA and Putin of Russia. Fringe meetings between the visiting leaders produced important understandings and agreements and a series of preliminary meetings-of senior foreign ministry officials, and of the Women Leaders Network, a Small Business Forum and the APEC Business Advisory Council-all kept Brunei in the international limelight. Visits during the year of other leading figures from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Britain, East Timor and Vietnam, indicated the range of relations the Sultanate maintained. Brunei had diplomatic relations with over 100 countries and maintained as of July 1999, 32 permanent missions abroad. More important was its membership of international and regional groupings, particularly APEC and ASEAN. By successfully hosting the Southeast Asian Games in August 1998 and the APEC Leaders' Summit in November 2000, as well as numerous smaller conferences, Brunei had established itself as a regional centre of some significance and had boosted national pride. Defence priorities also remained unchanged. Brunei's interests were perceived as maintaining defence capability sufficient to patrol and protect its own territorial space against minor incursions or piracy, and to register sufficient resistance to trigger defence arrangements with other powers. The presence of British Gurkhas and of a Singapore training base were other deterrents. Close defence links were maintained with Singapore, Malaysia, Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The British continued to station a battalion of Gurkhas on a rotation basis and annual exercises were

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held with Singapore, Australia and the United States and visits were exchanged with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in 2000. The Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) concept remained the guiding ideology, despite the inherent tensions that it produced in a society which contained a significant non-Malay and non-Muslim minority. The most significant minority remained the Chinese, whose economic and business role remained important. Improved relations with China highlighted their position. Their freedom to express their culture was diminished by regulations restricting the public celebration of Chinese festivals and their lifestyle by restrictions upon the sale of pork and alcohol. Denied easy access to citizenship and its benefits, which may have compensated for such strictures, or, more positively, permitted their relaxation by a state prepared to accommodate diversity, Chinese attitudes were problematic. In a gesture to the Chinese, in August 1999, the Sultan announced a licence to publish a Chinese language newspaper, perhaps indicating an awareness that this community, which comprised 16 per cent of the population needed both recognition and a voice (Far East Economic Review, Asia 2000 Year Book). The promotion of Islam also threatened to marginalize the nonMuslim minorities. Conversions to Islam received media publicity and the Sultan sometimes personally attended Islamization ceremonies. Over 30 years some 10,000 people converted (Horton, 2001: 105). Given the official role of Islam in society, there were enticements to conversion, but no overt pressure. Islam's role in society continued to be reinforced by incremental changes. All Muslim festivals were publicly observed. In 2000, the Maulud processions in the main towns of Bandar Seri Begawan, Kuala Belait, Tutong and Bangar commemorating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad involved some 62,000 marchers, the Sultan and members of the Royal Family leading the 35,000 marchers in the capital. In the same year some 1400 persons made the pilgrimage to Mecca (Haj). Many new mosques were built, the National Quran-Reading Competition was a major event and in November 2000 the Sultan officially opened the permanent campus of the Sultan Hassanah Bolkiah Tahfiz AI-Quran Institute, founded in 1993 to train pupils to memorize the whole Quran and attain the rank of hafiz. By 2000, 22 pupils had achieved this feat (Horton, 2001: 105). Islamic Jatwa on the slaughtering and preparation of meat, promulgated by the Government Mufti between 1962 and 1999, were published. Brunei remained a tolerant Muslim state and the Government was wary of Muslim extremism. A tension was inevitable between the constraints

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imposed by Islamic observance and the desire to attract large numbers of tourists, particularly with competition from the more hedonist attractions of Brunei's East Malaysian neighbours. The stress upon Islam within the MIB concept posed a dilemma for a government wishing to project its support for Islamic culture and identity while holding fundamentalism at bay. The main threat came from within the Muslim educational structures, where teachers and students were inevitably aware of developments in the broader Muslim world and where such issues could prove attractive to young religious students with few prospects in the broader world of employment. It appears to have been with this in mind that in 1999 the Sultan decided to remove religious education from the aegis of the Religious Affairs Ministry and bring it under that of the Ministry of Education. At the same time, the Institute of Islamic Education was transferred from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and became the Sultan Omar Ali Saiffudin Islamic Studies Institute attached to the Universiti Brunei Darussalam. Even prior to this move there had been a policy of replacing foreign religious teachers with Bruneians. Also in 1999, the new vice-chancellor of the university, Professor Dato Mahmud Saedon bin Awang Othman, was an Islamic scholar trained at AI-Azhar University in Egypt. A Bruneian, he had a long academic career in Malaysia and the Malaysian National University and the International Islamic University before returning to Brunei three years before to head the Shariah Department at the Ministry of Religious Affairs. He announced plans aiming at localization and an emphasis on Islam in all university programmes, thus countering any tendency in an institution in which many academic staff were non-Bruneian and non-Muslim, for secular opinions to dominate. The central pillar of MIB was Beraja. The monarchy was central to the concept of statehood. The monarch embodied Brunei Malay culture and the Islamic faith as practised in Brunei. The ceremonial associated with the monarchy was an expression of Brunei culture and of Brunei identity. Thus the Sultan played a public role, which at once placed him above his subjects but also amongst them. The ruler could withdraw into his palace and be aloof; he could appear in ceremonial guise at state functions and he could appear among his subjects, pray with them at Friday prayers, visit them in their villages and homes, descend unannounced upon government departments, hospitals, clinics and schools, walk with them in a religious procession; all with remarkably little security. There appeared little doubt that he was personally popular. During the

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festival of Hari Raya Aidil Fitri in 1999, 57,090 persons were recorded as passing through the Istana Nurul Iman to personally extend their greetings. This identification of the Sultan with the state and its government was evident in the manner in which major government initiatives were promulgated as Titah, pronouncements by the Sultan which carry the force of command. The routine functions of the Ministries may have been carried out by deputies, but his roles as Head of State, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Minister of Finance associated him personally with the main levers of power. Any move towards a democratic parliamentary system and a constitutional monarchy would be a major challenge. This accounted for the cautious approach to constitutional change we have noted. At the same time, the Sultan's eldest son, Prince AI-Muhtadee Billah was being groomed for his eventual succession, having been installed as Crown Prince on 10 August 1998 at the age of24; the ceremonies providing some distraction from the Amadeo crisis. The Prince played an increasingly visible role, meeting foreign dignatories and acting as Deputy Sultan when the Sultan was out of the country. Any constitutional changes would impact upon his future role. Given the national ideology of MIB, one might expect Bahasa or language to have featured as a fourth component. This could be subsumed under Melayu or Malay, but the language issue remained confused. The previous chapter noted that the role of Malay was challenged by the role of English. A study published in 1997 analysed the role oflanguage in independent Brunei in the mid-1990s (Gunn, 1997: 183-191). It concluded that although standardised Bahasa Melayu, as adopted by Malaysia and Indonesia, was the official language, it was challenged in popular use by Melayu Brunei and by English-or at least the regional version of it. Brunei Malays preferred their native tongue in common speech and tended, along with others in the community, to use English as a means of communication across communities and to access the outside world. Islamic society waged an incessant battle against what it perceived as the decadence and immorality of western society and culture. Drug abuse remained one concern, along with the perception that it encouraged crime. On the whole, Brunei was a law-abiding society, but the increase in crime could not be laid at the door only of immigrant labour. Many unemployed Brunei youths were attracted to the youth culture purveyed by global mass media. There was no way in which Brunei could be protected completely, however anodyne the local television. Programmes from Malaysian television

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and radio could be accessed; censorship could achieve only so much when the borders were relatively porous. Some awareness of this and for the need to provide wider access to the outside world, rather than severely restrict it, could be seen in the more open critical comment appearing in the press, augmented in July 1999 by the licensing of News Express, a privately owned English-language newspaper, to compete with the well-established Borneo Bulletin and the Malaylanguage Media Permata. In general, the coverage of the Amadeo collapse and of events in Indonesia and other parts of the world indicated in 1999 a more open attitude. The Government also began to tolerate a broader expression of criticism of its own performance. Letter columns in the press became more critical of perceived shortcomings and grievances. In 1999, the Government set up a Management and Services Department through which people could channel their opinions and views. A weekly television programme was established by the MSD to explain government policies and procedures to the people and attempts were made to revitalize the Consultative Council of Mukim and Village leaders, as described above (Mohammad Yusop, 2000: 94). There was an awareness in government that the concerns of the people should be heard. However, this did not imply any political democratization. In January 1996, Brunei had acquired the status of a 'developed nation' (Horton, 2001: 107). Despite the regional economic crisis and the effects of the Amadeo collapse, Brunei in 2001 could rely for some time to come upon its oil and natural gas revenues and hope to re-establish its reserves and develop other sources of income for its people. It had survived the Asian economic crisis, but that and the Amadeo affair had been a chastening experience. The Government appeared aware that, at the dawn of the new millennium, changes in attitudes were necessary. Events suggested that these would be slow to occur, and whether the will and motivation would be found within the existing structures of state and society remained unclear.

Glossary

adat adipati agama (ugama) amanah arak Awang

awang-awang ayer (modem spelling, air) bahasa bandar baju kurung Batu Tarsilah Bendahara bumiputera chawat cheteria Darussalam Dato daulat Dayang derhaka deva-raja Di-Gadong fitrah gaharu hadrah hikayat hulubalang istana

custom viceroy religion sacred oath spirit made from distilled rice wine traditionally, a title for aristocrats; now a respectful term of address equivalent to the English 'Mr' non-noble aristocracy water language port, city dress for Malay-Muslim women Genealogical Tablet the traditional title for the senior vizier (wazir) son of the soil; indigenous person; native loin-cloth noble officials, ranked below wazir Abode of Peace a title for a non-royal chief; now equivalent to the English 'Sir' the divinity of a ruler; majesty the feminine of Awang; now a respectful term of address for non-noble women disobedience to the Sultan by a subject god-king a traditional title a poll tax for charitable purposes highly prized wood traditional Malay hand-held flat drum, beaten with the hand a story, romance, or personal history military leader; warrior palace of the Sultan

204 istiadat jelutong

Kampong Ayer kadi kaum ibu Kedayan

Kempeitai kerajaan kuripan Lapau Melayu Islam Beraja menteri (mentn) Mentri Besar naga nakhoda Nakhoda Ragam

negara orang taut pegawai

Pehin Pemancha penghulu pengiran Pengiran Bendahara Pengiran Di-Gadong Pengiran Indera Pengiran Isteri pengiran kebanyakan Pengiran Muda

Pengiran Pemancha Pengiran Temenggong Perdana Wazir pikul Raja Isteri

GLOSSARY

ceremony, ceremonial a gum derived from a tree; the basis of chewing gum the water village of the Brunei capital a Muslim judge women's organization; literally, mother's group an agricultural Malay community in the vicinity of the capital; culturally distinct and traditionally of lower status than the Brunei Malays of the Brunei River the Japanese Military Police government; appanage of the Sultan appanage of an official other than the Sultan the Sultan's audience chamber Malay Islamic Monarchy, the official ideology non-noble official Chief Minister dragon; the great serpent of Hindu mythology a trading sea captain or merchant adventurer the Singing Admiral, a title by which Sultan Bolkiah is known ('admiral' is an inflated translation of nakhoda) state; country men of the sea; nomadic or semi-nomadic sea gypsies traditionally, a low official; in modem usage, an official a title given to non-noble officials of high rank a traditional title a government-appointed district headman a noble traditionally, the first-ranking wazir traditionally, the second-ranking wazir a noble title, as in Pengiran Indera Mahkota the title given to Sultan Sir Hassanal Bolkiah's second wife ordinary non-royal nobles the title given to the heir to tlle throne, Sultan Sir Hassanal Bolkiah's eldest son traditionally, the fourth-ranking wazir traditionally, the third-ranking wazir the title of the eldest of the Sultan's younger brothers, making him the senior wazir a measure of weight, equivalent to 60.5 kilograms royal wife; the title of Sultan Sir Hassanal Bolkiah's first wife

GLOSSARY

raja-raja bertara rakyat Resident

Seri Begawan shaer shahbandar sharif Sheikh silsilah surau Temenggong

Tuanku tudung tutin wazlr Yang Di-Pertuan Yang di-Pertuan Agong zakat

205

core nobility; nobles descended from the high traditional officials subject of a ruler; commoners; people the British official appointed to advise the Sultan (1906-59) Seri Begawan Sultan; the retired Sultan a poetic form used for story-telling harbour master a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad a Muslim title chronicle Muslim prayer-house a traditional title dating back to the Malacca Sultanate when it was applied to the official responsible for defence and policing the city the title applied to a noble of royal descent female head-covering hereditary property vizier; the four highest noble officials under the Sultan He Who is Lord; the title of the Brunei Sultan the title of the Malaysian king tithe; religious contribution applied to charitable purposes

Bibliography

THIS bibliography is by no means exhaustive. Sources quoted in the text have been included as a matter of course. Other items have been chosen on two grounds: that I have derived information and ideas from them or that they offer a comprehensive coverage of a period or aspect of Brunei's history. As this is not an academic work, footnotes and references have been kept to a minimum and the general reader is referred to the journals and periodicals mentioned for more detailed study. The journals cited have many more articles on Brunei, while many of the writers cited have produced much more than has been included in this bibliography. This is particularly true of Robert Nicholl, whose collection of Sources on Brunei at the Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull, is an invaluable resource. For the period after 1841, Sarawak historians have much to say about Brunei, and the numerous books concerned with the Brookes of Sarawak contain descriptions of and references to Brunei. Also, from the early nineteenth century on, many visitors to Borneo recorded their impressions and experiences. For the Residency period, A. V. M. Horton has written, other than those cited, innumerable articles for a variety of publications, while D. E. Brown, D. S. Ranjit Singh, and B. A. Hamzah have also contributed in their respective fields, and there is a considerable literature on the formation of Malaysia and on Confrontation. Except for the books by James Bartholomew, Lord Chalfont, and David Leake, one must refer mainly to journals and newspapers and official documents for the reign of the present Sultan. The Borneo Bulletin, for most of its existence, provided a reasonably objective cover of events; the Far Eastern Economic Review (and its invaluable Yearbook) has valuable in-depth studies on Brunei at regular intervals and runs stories whenever events warrant it. Journalists from time to time have swept in and out of Brunei and contributed articles of varying reliability, and scholars produce studies in current affairs and academic journals from time to time. For the events of the last thirty years, I have been able to draw on my own experience, for I arrived in Sarawak soon after the Brunei revolt complicated the run-up to Malaysia and left Brunei early in 1991, during which time I accumulated a store of articles and papers and my own recollections.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Unpublished Documents Public Records Office Colonial Office CO 531/30/53066 CO 537 CO 1022 CO 1030 Foreign Office F0371

Ministry of Defence DEFE 4/410 Chiefs of Staffs Meetings, South, 28 November 1961, Greater Malaysia. Government Publications Brunei Annual Reports Pelita Brunei

Newspapers and Journals Borneo Bulletin Brunei Museum Journal Far Eastern Economic Review Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbooks Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Sarawak Gazette Sarawak Museum Journal

Books and Articles Abu Bakar bin Haji Apong, Haji (ed.) (1992), Sumbangsih UBD: Essays on Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan: Akademi Pengajian Brunei. Allen, Richard (1968), Malaysia, Prospect and Retrospect: The Impact and Aftermath of Colonial Rule, London: Oxford University Press. Baring-Gould, S. and Bampfylde, C. A. (1909), History of Sarawak under Its Two White Rajahs, London: Sotheran. Bartholomew, James (1989), The Richest Man in the World: The Sultan of Brunei, London: Viking. Braddell, Roland (1980), The Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Braighlinn, C. (1992), Ideological Innovation under Monarchy: Aspects of Legitimation Activity in Contemporary Brunei, Amsterdam: VU University Press/Centre of Asian Studies. Brassey, Annie (1889), The Last Voyage, London: Longmans, Green & Co.

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Brown, Carrie C. (1972), 'An Early Account of Brunei by Sung Lien', Brunei Museum Journal, 2(4): 219-3l. - - (1974a), 'Two Ming Texts Concerning King Ma-na-je-chia-na of P'o-ni', Brunei Museum Journal, 3(2): 222-9. - - (1974b), 'Some Ming Regulations on Provisions for Tributary Delegations', Brunei Museum Journal, 3(2): 230-l. Brown, D. E. (1970), Brunei: The Structure and History of a Bornean Malay Sultanate, Monograph of the Brunei Museum Journal, Brunei. Brunei Darussalam, Government of (1988), Brunei Darussalam in Profile, London: Shandwick. Carroll, John S. (1982), 'Berunai in the Boxer Codex', Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, LV(2): 1-25. Cator, G. E. (1939), 'Brunei', Asiatic Review, 35: 736-44. Chalfont, Alun (1989), By God's Will: A Portrait of the Sultan of Brunei, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Chen Da-sheng (1992), 'A Brunei Sultan in the Early 14th Century: Study of an Arabic Gravestone', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 23(1): 1-13. Christie, Jan Wisseman (1985), 'On Po-ni: The Santubong Sites of Sarawak', Sarawak Museum Journal, New Series, XXXIV(55): 77-89. Coedes, G. (1968), The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. Crisswell, Colin N. (1977), 'Pg. Anak Hashim's Role in Brunei Affairs Prior to His Accession to the Throne in 1885', Sarawak Museum Journal (New Series), XXV(46): 41-54. - - (1978), Rajah Charles Brooke: Monarch of All He Surveyed, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Crosbie, A. J. (1981), 'Brunei in Transition', in Southeast Asian Affairs, 1981, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 75-92. Duraman, Ismail and Abdul Amin Hj Hashim, 'Brunei Darussalam: Developing Within Its Own Paradigm' in Southeast Asian Affairs 1998, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Forrest, Thomas [1780] (1969), A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, 1774-1776, 2nd edn., London; reprinted Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Franke, Wolfgang and Ch'en T'ieh-fan (1973), 'A Chinese Tomb Inscription of AD 1264, Discovered Recently in Brunei', Brunei Museum Journal, 3(1): 91-9. Guillemard, F. H. H. (1886), The Cruise of the Marchesa to Kamschatka and New Guinea, with Notices of Formosa, Liu-Kiu, and Various Islands of the Malay Archipelago, 2 vols., London: John Murray. Gunn, Geoffrey C. (1997), Language, Power and Ideology in Brunei Darussalam. Athens, Ohio Center for International Studies. Hall, D. G. E. (1964), A History of South-East Asia, London: Macmillan. Hamzah, B. A. (1991), The Oil Sultanate: Political History of Oil in Brunei Darussalam, Kuala Lumpur: Mawaddah Enterprise.

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Index

ABAI,70 Abas Serudin, 195 Abdul, Raja Besar, 62-3 Abdul Azim, Prince, 184 Abdul Aziz, Pehin Data Haji, 170, 176, 187-8 Abdul Jalilul Akbar, Sultan, 62 Abdul Jalilul Jabbar, Sultan, 62-4 Abdul Kahar, Sultan, 40, 44, 52, 55-7 Abdul Latif bin Abdul Hamid, Haji,186 Abdul Latif bin Chuchu, Haji, 186,192 Abdul Latif bin Haji Ibrahim, 39 Abdul Majid Ibni Muhammad Shah, Sultan, 35, 42 Abdul Manan bin Mohammed, 146 Abdul Mubin, Sultan, 44, 63-5 Abdul Rahman, Tunku, 133-4, 141-4,153,155-8 Abdul Rahman Taib, Pehin Dato, 176, 182, 187 Abdul Rahman Yaakub, Tan Sri Haji, 172 Abdul Razak, Tun, 145, 154, 164 Abell, Sir Anthony, 126, 135, 138 Abu Abdullah ibn-Muhammad alIdrisi, 25 Abu Bakar bin Haji Apong, Haji, 188 Aceh, 49, 51, 60-1 Aceh, Dato, 63

Agriculture, 9, 113, 115, 11 7, 129 Ahmad, Sultan, 40, 42, 44, 127 Ahmad Tajuddin, Sultan, 114, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126-8, 133,161 Airport, 166 Al-Muhtadee Billah, Pengiran Muda, 183-4, 201 AlakBetatar, 18-19,39-41 Alcock, Rutherford, 90 Ali bin Daud, Dato Setia Pengiran Haji,153-4 Ali bin Malai Osman, Dato Haji Malai, 196 Amadeo, 194-5,201-2 American Trading Company, 84, 87 Amnesty International, 158 Anderson, Sir John, 107, 109 Angkor, 7-9 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824,73 Anti-Corruption Bureau, 166 Anti-Malaysia Alliance, 147 Antimony, 73 Aquino, Benito, 178 Arabic sources, 4 Araujo, Father, 51 Aromatic woods, 21, 26, 45 ASEAN, see Association of South-East Asian Nations Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), 197-8 Asian Wall Street Joumal, 175

214

INDEX

Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 172, 176, 178,181,198 Attorney-General, 137 Australia: military, 123-5; relations with Brunei, 180-1, 198-9 Awang Abdul bin O. K. Safar, 159 Awang-awang, 47 Awang Ibrahim bin Muhammad Jahfar, 117, 121, 128 Awang Semaun, 18 Ayala (Holdings) Company, 182 Ayutthaya, 9, 14,37 Azahari, Sheikh, 122, 132-4, 138, 141-2,144-53 BADARUDDIN, PENGlRAN, 184 Badruddin, Pengiran, 74, 76-7 Bahrin bin Pengiran Haji Abas, Pengiran, 176, 185, 192,195 Bajaus, 27, 64-5 Bakong,9 Bakong, Dato, 94 Balabutra, 13 Balambangan, 70-1 Balestier, Joseph, 79, 83 Bampfylde, C. A., 72 Bandar Kassim, 81 Bandar Seri Begawan, 166, 171 Bangladesh, 180 Bank Negara Malaysia, 158 Bank of the Philippines, 182 Baram, 121 Baram Basin, 15 Baram River, 56, 85, 88 Baring-Gould, S., 72 Barisan Buroh Bersatu Brunei, see Brunei United Labour Front Barisan Pemuda Brunei, 131 Bartholomew, James, 162 Batavia, 73 Battle of Muara, 57 Batu Pahat, 23 Batu Tarsilah, 39, 65 Bayon temple, 9

BBPS, see British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate B&he-de-mer, 45, 73 Belait, 48, 94-6, 104, 119, 132, 145 Belcher, Captain, 76 Bencoolen, 73 Berakas, 152 Berembang, Pulau, 105, 113, 116, 120 Bevington, E. R., 129 Bezoar stones, 21, 45 Bhavavarman, 8 Birch, E. W., 96 Birds': feathers, 21, 45; nests, 45 Bisayas, 19, 93, 145 Black Death, 28 BMA, see British Military Administration BMPC, see British Malayan Petroleum Company BNDP, see Brunei National Democratic Party BNO, see Brunei National Organization Board of Commissioners of Currency, 158 Bolkiah, Sultan, 40, 42, 44 Bongsu, Raja, 60, 63-4 Borneo: Federation, 135, 141-3, 146-7,154; Majapahit influence, 14; monsoons, 10 Borneo Bulletin, 126, 135,202 Borobudur, 7, 13 'Boxer Codex', 44, 62 BPA, see Brunei Peoples Alliance Braddell, Roland, 16, 23-4 Bradford, O. F., 85 Brahmanism, 23 Braighlinn, C., 188 Brazil wood, 26 British: Brunei, 70, 79, 89-97, 101-14,119,124-6,137,156, 173, 179-81, 198; Labuan, 79; Malay Peninsula, 87; North

INDEX

Borneo, 70-88; Sarawak, 79; Singapore, 72 British Army, 150-2 British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate (BBPS), 116 British Broadcasting Commission, 173 British Malayan Petroleum Company (BMPC), 116-17, 119-20, 126 British Military Administration (BMA),123-4 British Minister of Defence, 145 British North Borneo (Chartered) Company, 88-91, 108, 124-5, 142 British North Borneo Provisional Association, 88 Brooke, Bertram, 127 Brooke, Charles, 81-2, 85-6, 88-93,95-6,102,105, 107-11, 113, 120 Brooke, James, 73-4, 76-82 Brooke, John Brooke, 81-2 Brooke, Margaret, 88 Brooke, Vyner, 120, 127 Brooketon, 96, 105, 120 Brown, C. C., 29-30, 35-7 Brown, D. E., 18-19,25,40,46, 63,80 Brunei: and British in Borneo, 69-97; early Muslim sultanate, 35-48, 62-6; and European powers, 49-61; independence, 175-202; Japanese Occupation, 121-4; pre-Islamic, 21-31; Residency, 101-20, 124-37; self-government, 137-75 Brunei Agreement (1959), 137 Brunei Alliance Party, 159 Brunei Bay, 15, 17,22,50, 123, 151 Brunei Bluff, 123 Brunei Defence Forces, 176 Brunei Development Plan: First,

215

126,129,131; Second, 165-6; Third, 166; Fifth, 182 Brunei Film Production Company, 132 Brunei Investment Agency, 173, 194-5 Brunei-Malaysia Commission, 146 Brunei Museum, 163 Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP), 183, 185-6 Brunei National Organization (BNO),146 Brunei National Solidarity Party (BNSP), 186, 192 Brunei Peoples Alliance (BPA), 159 Brunei People's Independence Party, see Partai Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat Brunei People's Party, see Partai Rakyat Brunei Brunei Shell Petroleum Company (BSP), 146, 154, 165 Brunei United Labour Front (BULF), 145-6 Brunei United Party (BUP), 145 Brunei Youth Movement, see Barisan Pemuda Brunei BSP, see Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Bu-ni,25 Buang Tawar, 105 Buddhism, 5, 7, 9, 23 Bugis, 65-6, 71 BULF, see Brunei United Labour Front Bu1wer, Governor, 88 Bumiputera, 41 Bunut, 151 BUP, see Brunei United Party Bureaucracy, 171-2 Burma, 9 Burns, Robert, 79-80 Burong Pingai, 94 Buzurg ibn Shahriyar, 17,24

216

INDEX

CALAMIONES, 59 Callaghan, Governor, 85 Campbell, D. G., 107 Camphor, 15,21,24-6,28,38, 45,73 Carroll, John S., 44 Cator, G. E., 120 Cauchela, Andreas, 53 CCO, see Clandestine Communist Organization Cebu,52 Cerava,50 Chalfont, Alun, 161-2 Champa, 7, 9, 22, 48 Chams, 7-9 Charles, Prince, 176 Charles II, King, 65 Chau Ju-kua, 13,26,28 Chen Da-sheng, 36 Ch'en T'ieh-fah, 36 Chenla, 7-8, 13, 17 CheokYu, 104, 110 Chermin, Pulau, 63, 70 Cheteria, 47 Chiang Chen Tsong, Patrick, 182 Chih T'u, 16 Chin-li-p'i-shih, 16-17 China: and Funan, 7-8; and P'o-ni, 25-6,29-30; and South-East Asia, 3, 7, 66; and Srivijaya, 12; trade with Britain, 69-70; trade with SouthEast Asia, 10 China Steamship and Labuan Coal Company, 84 Chinese: Brunei, 70, 86, 122, 124, 145, 174-5, 178, 189, 197, 199; Sarawak, 81,156 Chinese records, 3-4 Chiu T'ang Shu, 23 Chola kingdom, 13 Christian missionaries, 51, 58 Chua Cheng Hee, 103-4, 110 Churchill, Sir Winston, 128 Citizenship, 145, 174, 178

Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO), 156-7 Clementi, Sir Cecil, 133 Clinton, President, 198 Coal, 113, 115 Cochrane, Thomas, 76-7 Coedes, George, 4, 8, 23 Coju Geimal (Khoja Zainal), 51 Colonial Office, 124-5, 128, 131 Commonwealth: membership, 173,179 Commonwealth Relations Office, 158 Communists, 143, 147, 156 Constitution, 132, 136-8, 146-7, 152, 163 Corruption, 166 Council of Ministers, 160, 163 Council of Succession, 137, 184 Courts, 112 Cowie, W. C., 89, 105 Cowries, 21, 23, 26, 45 Crafts, 113, 129-30 Crane, H. A., 105 Crisswell, Cohn N., 89 Crown Agents, 166, 173 Crummey, H. G., 108 Currency, 113, 158, 178 Cutch industry, 103-4, 111, 113, 121, 126 DAI ICHI KANGYO, 182 D'Albuquerque, Afonso, 38 Dalrymple, Alexander, 65, 69-71 Darussalam, 30 DauZat, 41 Dayaks, 81, 145 De Abella-fuertes, Don Alonzo, 65 De Adave, Salvador, 53 De Arce, Don Juan, 56-7 De Ataide, Tristao, 50-1 Death rate, 130 De Breu, Simon, 50 De Brito Patalim, Rui, 38 De Eredia, Emanuel Godhino, 62 Defence, 166-7, 173-4

INDEX

De Goiti, Martin, 52 De Legazpi, Don Augustine, 57, 59 De Legazpi, Don Miguel Lopez, 52-3 Demang,18 De Meneses, Jorge, 50 Dent, Alfred, 87-8, 90 Dent and Company, 87 Derhaka, 13,41 De Rivera, Gabriel, 58 De Sande, Francisco, 54-9 Deva-raja, see God-king Dewa Emas Kayangan, 41 Dharmavamsu, King, 13 Di Gadong, Dato, 94-5 Dipa, Pengiran, 82-3 District Advisory Councils, 132, 137, 147 Dragon Mountain, 27 Dryobalanops aromatica, 15 Dusuns, 19, 145, 175 Dutch, 59-60, 63-4, 66, 73, 79, 81,85,87-8 EAST INDIA COMPANY, 69-70 East Timor, 198 Eastern Archipelago Company, 79 Economic growth, 114-16 Education, 118, 129, 166 Edward VII, King, 96 Edwardes, G. W., 82-3 Egypt, 181 Ehsan, Tuanku, 127-8 Elections, 136-7, 145-7, 159 Electricity, 118 Elizabeth, Queen, 163 Ellana,84 Emergency Council, 152 Employment: mining, 113; oil, 119 Everett, A. H., 90 Executive Council, 137, 159 Expatriates, 129, 131, 166; Malay, 142-3, 158 Exports, 113

217

FA-SIEN, 15,23 Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook, 165, 167, 180, 182, 187-8 Farquhar, Robert, 71 Fayed, Mohamed Ai-, 181 Federated Malay States, 110, 116 Federation of Malaya, 135, 142-3, 152 Feroz Shah, 25 Ferrand, G., 17 Foreign Correspondents' Association of South-East Asia, 143 Foreign Office, 125 Foreign relations, 172-3, 178-81 Forrest, Thomas, 70-1 Fox, Charles, 81 France, 180 Franciscans, 51, 58 Francisco de Santa Maria, 58-9 Franke, Wolfgang, 36 French,69 Funan, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 19-20 GAHARU WOOD, 21

Gajah Mada, 14 Galvao, Antonio, 51 Gapor, Dato Haji, 81 Gaya Bay, 85 George VI, 124 Germany, 180 Gilbert, J. 0., 133 Go-Oc-Eo, 7, 11 God-king, 5, 7, 9, 13 Gold, 15,21,24,26,45 Government: departments, 117; revenue, 111, 126, 165; servants, 166 Groenveldt, 25 Gum, 45,119 Gunavarman, 23 Gurkhas, 150-1, 167, 173--4, 176, 198 HAKEEM, PRINCE, 195

218

INDEX

Hall, D. G. E., 5 Hapidz Laksamana, 145, 149, 160 Harris, Thomas B., 84 Harris Salleh, Datuk, 172 Hasbollah, Haji, 146, 159 Hashim, Pengiran Anak, see Hashim Jalilu1, Sultan Hashim bin Pengiran Shahbandar, Pengiran Anak, 112, 119 Hashim Jalilul, Sultan, 77, 80-1, 84-5,87,89-97,101-3,105-8 Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan: accession, 160; and British, 173-4, 180; coronation, 162; descent, 3, 19; education, 161-2; and foreign relations, 178-80; heir, 183-4; and Islam, 170, 179, 184-5, 187-8, 199; knighthood, 163; personal life, 163,168-70; role in government, 165, 168, 170, 175-6, 183, 190, 193-4, 198, 200-1; and Sultan Omar Ali, 163, 183-5; wealth and business, 181-2, 190 Hassanal Bolkiah National Stadium, 171 Hassim, Pengiran Muda, 72-4, 76-7,79 Hayam Wuruk, 14,29 Herbert, John, 70 Hewett, G., 94-6, 105 High Commissioner, 137 Hikayat Hang Tuah, 31 Himmaleh,73 Hinduism, 5 HMS Hazard, 77 HMS Iris, 77-8 HMS Samarang, 76 Hornbill, 21, 45 Horton, A. V. M., 101, 107, 110, 116, 118, 121, 126, 135 Hsia-wang, 30, 42 Hsin T'ang Shu, 23-4 Hsu Yun-ts'iao, 16 Huang Sheng-ts'eng, 39

Huei-kiau, 23 Hulubalang,47 Hung-wu, Emperor, 29 Husin Kamaluddin, Sultan, 64 Hussein Onn, Tun, 165 I-Szu-MA-I (ISMAIL), 29, 37 I-tsing, 11 labadiou, 22-3 Iban, 78, 80 Ibn Batuta, Sheik Abu Abdullah Muhammad, 27-8 Ibn Rosteh, 24 Ibn Sa'id, 16 Ibnu, Major-General, 185 Ibrahim Ariff, 152 lOB, see Island Development Bank Igan,82 Import and export duties, 110-11, 115 Independence, 175-6 India: British, 69; trade with South-East Asia, 10 Indian sources, 3-4 Indonesia: and Brunei, 172, 178, 199; and Malaysia proposal, 147,151,156 Indravarman 1, 9 Infant mortality, 118 Infrastructure development, 118, 129-30,166,171 Inter-Territorial Conference, 134 Internal Security Enactment, 174 Iran, 179 Iro (110), Raja, 60, 63 Iron-works, 15,21 Irwin, Graham, 78-9 Isa, Pehin Haji, 185 Isanavarman, 8 Iskandar Muda, Sultan, 49, 60-1 Islam: Brunei, 19,35-48,109, 112,162-3,169-70,179, 187-9, 199-200; Malacca, 37; Malay Peninsula, 14; missionaries, 48, 51, 59; Moluccas, 37; South-East Asia,

INDEX

31, 35; Spanish and, 57-9; Sumatra, 14,37; taxes, 135 Island Development Bank (IDB), 182 Island Trading Syndicate (Company), 103, 111, 126 Ismail bin Dato Haji Abdul Rahman, Dato, 154 Istana Nurul Iman, 171 Italians, 85 JACKSON, JAMES C., 21 Jais bin Haji Karim, 150 James, Harold, 151 Jamil, Haji, 131, 154 Japan, 165, 180-1 Japanese Occupation, 121-4 Japar,77 Japara, 50-1, 60 Jasin Affandy, 148, 150-1, 193 Java, 8-13, 26 Java the Great, 26-7 Javaga,24 J ayanagara, 14 J ayavarman II, 8-9 Jayavarman VII, 9 Jefri, Prince, 176, 179, 182-3, 185,192-6 Jeludin, Pengiran, 105 Jelutong, 119 Jerambak, 18 Jesse, John, 70 Jesuits, 51 Jiang Zemin, President, 197-8 Johnson, Charles, see Brooke, Charles Johnson, President, 85 Johore, 39, 49, 51, 60-1, 66 Jolo,59 Jordan, 179 Jumaat, Haji, 186 Jungle produce, 21, 45 KALAM, DATO, 95 Kampong Ayer, 15, 112, 115, 118, 124, 129

219

Kamrun, 16 Kanowit,81 Kapuas Delta, 50 Kama, Maharaja, 29, 42 Kaundinya, 7 Kaundinya (ofP'o-li), 23 Kaundinya Jayavarman, 8 Kayans,88 Kaylukari, 27 Kedayans, 115, 145, 151, 175 Keith, H. G., 85 Keningau Plateau, 27 Kerajaan, 47, 86, 110 Kertanagara, 14 Keyser, Arthur, 104, 107 Khashoggi, Adnan, 181 Khmer, 8 Khoo Ban Hock, 182 Khoo Teck Puat, 182 Kidurong Point, 86 Kim Dae-Jung, President, 198 Kimanis, 76, 84, 87 Kinabalu, Mount, 15-16, 27, 40 Kinabatangan, Puteri, 42 Kota Batu, 30, 36, 40, 42, 105, 113, 120, 163 Kuala Belait, 116-19, 121, 126, 130, 150, 166 Kublai Khan, 14,26-7 Kuching, 81, 86, 94, 122 Kuripan, 47,86, 110 LABU, 113 Labuan, 15,70-1,76,78-83,85, 106-8,115-16,121,123 Lacondala, Raja, see Lakan Dula, Raja Lakan Dula, Raja, 52-4, 59 Land Code, 114-15 Langkasuka, 8-9, 11 Laoe,31 Laurenco, Vasco, 44, 50 Lawas, 122 Lawas River, 27, 30, 92 Lawe,50 Lawson, Dato Neil, 154

220

INDEX

Lay, Tradescant, 73 League of Nations, 116 Leake, David, 153, 166, 174, 181-2, 187 Lee Cheng Lan, 90 Lee, John, Pehin Dato, 173 Lee Kuan Yew, 172 Legal system, 172 Legends, 18-19 Legislative Council, 137-8, 146-8, 152-3, 159-60 Leigh, Michael, 175 Lennox-Boyd,AJan,136 Leong Ah Ng, 118 Leys, Peter, 89, 91 Liang Shu, 23 Ligor, 51 Limahon,54 Limbang, 87, 90-4, 104, 113, 120, 122,127,150,164,178-9 Lincoln, President, 83 Liquefied natural gas, 165, 180 Local Government Enactment, 132 Lochac,26 Lopes da Costa, Afonso, 49 Low, Hugh, 39, 44 Lung Shan, 27 Lupar River, 79-80 Lutong, 121, 126 Luzon, 31 MA-HA-Mo-SHA, 29, 36 Ma Huan, 27 Ma-na-je-chia-na, 29-30, 37 McAfee, G., 115 McArthur, Malcolm, 94, 96, 101-14 Macaskie, Brigadier, 123, 125 MacBryan, Gerard, 127-8 McClelland, F. A. S., 108 MacDonald, Malcolm, 125, 131, 134 MacMichael, Sir Harold, 125 Macmillan, Harold, 146 Magellan, 49, 52

Mahabharata, 5 Maharaja di Raja, Pengiran, 55-7 Mahathir Mohamad, Dato' Seri Dr, 172, 178 Mahmud Saedon bin Awang Othman, 200 Majapahit, 14,27-9,37 Majlis Perunding Mukim dan Kampong (MPNK), 193-4, 202 Malacca, 37, 41, 45, 49-50, 60, 73 Malacca Strait, 10-11, 13-14 Malaria, 118, 130 Malay Islamic Monarchy, see Melayu Islam Beraja Malay language, 171, 174,205 Malay Peninsula, 7-12, 14,37,49, 87 Malay Teachers' Association, 135 Malayan Union, 125 Malays: and Brooke, 81-2; expatriates, 142-3, 158; in Japanese Occupation, 122-3; police, 112, 115 Malaysia: formation, 157; proposed Brunei membership, 143-8, 153-8; relations with, 164-5, 172, 178-9, 198-9 Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee, 146 Malaysia Airlines System, 158 Manila, 26, 46, 52-4, 59-60, 69 Manoel, King, 38 Marcos, President, 178 Marhum Tuha, see Abdul Jalilul Akbar, Sultan, 62 Mariam binte Abdul Aziz, Pengiran Isteri, 169, 183 Marine Department, 152 Marsal bin Maun, Daro, 149, 154 Marudu Bay, 76 Masna, Princess, 183 Matanda, Raja, 52 Mataram,13 Matassan, Pengiran Di-Gadong, 90,93

INDEX

Matusin, Pengiran, 82 Maundrell, E. B., 114 Maxwell, F. 0., 90 Media Permata, 202 Medical services, 118, 129-30 Mekong Delta, 7-8 Melanaus, 19, 24 Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), 178, 187-8,199-201 Mendoza, Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera y, 63 Menteri,47 Mentri Besar, 137 Merchant Shipping Enactment, 172 Merdeka Mission, 134 Meru, Mount,S, 8 Metussin bin Pengiran Haji Lampoh, Pengiran, 149 MIB, see Melayu Islam Beraja Miguel, Father, 58 Mindanao, 46, 51 Mining, 78-9, 84, 89-90, 105, 111, 113, 122 Miri, 116, 122 Mitsubishi Corporation, 165 Modura,50 Mohamad Hatta bin Haji Zainal Abidin, 186 Mohamed, Prince, 175-6, 179, 182-3,185,193,195 Mohammad, Inche, 105 Mohammad Zain, Dr Haji, 185 Mohd. Jamil Al Sufri, 57-8 Moluccas, 37, 49-51 Mongols, 9, 26, 29 Monsoons: effect on trade, 10 Moses, Charles Lee, 83-5 Mother-of-pearl, 45 Mountbatten, Lord, 124 Muara, 84, 89, 96, 105, 113, 120, 123, 167 Muhammad, Pengiran (19th century), 77-8, 80 Muhammad, Pengiran (20th century), 117

221

Muhammad, Sultan, 19,29,38-9, 42, 44, 127 Muhammad Alam, Pengiran Muda, 72 Muhammad Alam, Pengiran Pemancha, 162 Muhammad Ali, Sultan, 44, 63-4 Muhammad Aliuddin, Sultan, 64 Muhammad Daud, 115 Muhammad Hasan, Sultan, 46, 60-3 Muhammad Jamalul Alam I, Sultan, 71, 72 Muhammad Jamalul Alam II, Sultan, 108, 111, 114, 120 Muhammad Kanzul Adam, 71-3 Muhammad Salleh, Pengiran Indera Makota Shahbandar, 73-4,78,82 Muhammad Salleh, Pengiran Pemancha, 94, 102, 108, 114 Muhammad Tajuddin, Sultan, 71 Muhammad Yusofbin Pengiran Abdul Rahim, Pengiran, 162 Muhyiddin, Sultan, 63-4 Mukah, 82-3 Mumin, Sultan, 77-8,80,82-91, 105 Mundy, G. Rodney, 77-8 Muruts, 90, 145 Musa Hiram, Datuk, 172 NAGA,7-8 Nan Chao, 9 N arai, King, 37 N asibah, Princess, 165 Nasruddin, Sultan, 64 National Bank of Brunei (NBB), 182 National Economic Council, 195 National wages policy, 146 Nationalist movement, 131-6 Nationality Enactment, 145-6 Natural gas, 165 NBB, see National Bank of Brunei Negara-Kertagama, 28

222

INDEX

Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (NKKU), 148-9 New Zealand, 198 News Express, 202 Nicaragua, 180 Nicholl, Robert, 15-17, 22-8, 30, 36,38-9,42,45-6,48-55, 57-65 NKKU, see Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara North Borneo, 87-8, 92, 106 North Borneo National Army, see Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara Nur Alam, Raja, 72 ODORIC OF PORDENONE, 27 OIC, see Organization of Islamic Countries Oil, 105, 113-14, 116-19, 121-2, 126,165,197-8 Oman, 179, 181 Omar Ali Saifuddin I, Sultan, 65, 71 Omar Ali Saifuddin II, Sultan, 72, 74, 77-80 Omar Ali Saifuddin III, Sultan: abdication, 160; and Borneo Federation, 133-6, 141-4; death, 185; and defence, 167-8, 176; and Limbang, 164-5; and Malaya, 135-6, 144-6, 153-9; and PRB rebellion, 150-3, 164; and selfgovernment, 131-8, 147, 159-60; and sons, 183-5; Seri Begawan Sultan, 163; succession, 126-8; wife's death, 167 Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque, 126, 130, 136, 162 Ong Sum Ping, 40, 42 Opium, 111, 116 Opium Revenue Replacement Fund, 116 Orang Bukit, 19

Orang laut, 11-12, 14,22,25,28 Organization of Islamic Countries (0IC),179 Osman Sheikh Mahmud, Sheikh, 149,151 Outram, A. N., 149 Overbeck, Baron von, 87 PACIFIC DEMOCRATIC UNION,

186 Padas, 90-2 Paduka Seri Ilmu Alam, 64 Pagan, 7 Pahang: Sultan, 51,165 Pakistan, 181 Palawan, 167 Palembang, 11 Palestine Liberation Organization, 179 Pameran Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Brunei, 48 Pandas an River, 90 Pangasinan, 54 Parks, W. J., 149 Partai Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat (PBKR), 160 Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB), 122, 131,133-8,141,143-7,159, 164; revolt, 148-53, 193 Partai Rakyat Malaya, 133, 141 Partai Rakyat Singapore, 141 Pani Perpaduan Kebangsaan Brunei (PPKB) 192 Party Negara Sarawak, 143 Pas ai, 37 Pateh Berbai, 39 PBKR, see Partai Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat Pearce, J., 129 Pearls, 24, 26, 28, 30, 45 Peel, W. J., 124 Pegawai,47 Pelita Brunei, 190 Pelliot, P., 17,25, 36 Penghulu, 118 Pengilly, E. E., 121

INDEX

Pengiran, 22, 46, 90 Pengiran Bendahara, 46 Pengiran Di-Gadong, 46 Pengiran kebanyakan, 47 Pengiran Pemancha, 46 Pengiran Temenggong, 46 Pensions, 110, 129 Pepper, 70, 73, 117 Pereira, Antonio, 61 Pereira, Goncalo, 50 Perlak,37 Persatuan Islam Malaya, 141 Philippines: and Borneo, 147, 151, 157; and Brunei, 172, 178; missionaries, 48, 51; monsoons, 10; and P'o-ni, 25-6; Spanish, 52-9 Phlegethon, 76-7 Phnom Penh, 9 Pigafetta, Antonio, 31, 44, 49-50 Pigot, Lord, 69 Pina, Antonio de, 50 Pirates, 73, 76-8 Pires, Monso, 44-5, 50 Pires, Tomes, 38 P'o-li, 15-16, 21-4 P'o-ni, 3, 17,21,25-9 Police force, 112, 115, 149-50, 167 Polo, Marco, 26 Pope-Hennessy, Governor, 86 Population, 46, 175 Port, 166 Portuguese, 38, 44-5, 49-53, 58, 60 Post Office, 111 Postage stamps, 111 Pottery, 21, 29, 45 Prapanca, 28 PRE, see Partai Rakyat Brunei Pretty, E. H. F., 126 Privy Council, 137 Protectorate Agreement of 1888, 92, 96-7, 106 Pryer, W. B., 88 Ptolemy, 22-3

223

P'u-kung, 35 Pu-lo-chung, 14 Pu-lu-hsia, 25 Public Service Commission, 137 Public works, 112, 117, 171 Public Works Department, 152 Pus at Sejarah Brunei, 42, 44 Putatan,90 Putin, President, 198 QAF HOLDINGS, 181 Quanzhou, 36 RADIO TELEVISION BRUNEI, 173, 184 Raffles, Thomas Stamford, 73 Ragam, Nakhoda, 42, 44 Raja-raja bertara, 47 Rajacapor (Raja Ghafur), 62 Rajang River, 80-1 Rajaratnam, P., 166 Rakyat, 48 Rama Khamhaeng, 9 Rama Tibodi, 9 Ramayana, 5, 23 Ranjit Singh, 96, 108, 141, 144 Rattans, 21, 45, 119 REMR, see Royal Brunei Malay Regiment Reaal, Laurens, 60 Reece, R. H. W., 128 Regency Council, 13 7 Religious Affairs: Department, 170; Ministry, 185 Religious Council, 137 Residency, 107-21, 126 Revenue farms, 111, 116 Rhinoceros horn, 45 Riau,73 Rice cultivation, 115, 119, 130 Roads, 166 Roberts, Edmund, 103, 108 Rowland, Roland, 181 Royal Air Force, 116 Royal Brunei Airlines, 166, 169

224

INDEX

Royal Brunei Malay Regiment (RBMR),167 Royal Dutch Shell, 116 Royal Military College, Sandhurst, 162 Royal Navy, 78, 81, 83 Royalist, 74 Ruan Sepakoi, 30 Rubber, 113, 115, 117, 126, 130 Rubber Restriction Scheme, 117 Rudravarman, 8 Ruling elite, 94, 101-3, 109, 138 Runciman, Steven, 74, 80 Russia, 198 SABAH, 157, 172 Sago trade, 82-3, 94, 119 Saiful Rijal, Sultan, 40, 44, 55-6, 62 Sailendra dynasty, 8, 13, 17 Stjohn, Spenser, 82-3 Sakam, Bendahara, 57 Saleha, Raja Isteri, 162, 169, 183 Salileh, Bukit, 150 Salleh, Inche, 131 Salleh, Sheikh, 151 Saman, Haji, 77 Samara tunga, King, 13 Sambas, 60-1, 64, 73 Sandakan,87 Sanitary Boards, 118 Santubong, 23 Sapong Estate, 122 Sarawak: and British, 79, 92; and Brookes, 74-86, 106; and Brunei, 73-4,109,120,125-6, 133, 164-5; and Limbang, 90-1,93,113, 120, 127; and Malaysia proposal, 157 Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP), 141, 143-4, 151, 157 Sarikei,81-2 Sassoon, Sir E., 109 Satryes,23 Saudi Arabia, 179, 181 Saunders, Graham, 76, 81

Schools, 118, 124, 129-31, 166; religious, 1 70 Schultz, Charles, 180 Sebuko River, 87 Self-government, 137-8 Selkirk, Lord, 156 Seluang,42 Seludong, 42 Serdang, 149, 151 Seri Lela, Pengiran, 55-7, 59 Seri Ratna, Pengiran, 57 Seria, 116, 118, 122, 126, 130, 150,152,166-7 Serudong River, 42, 64 Sewage schemes, 166 Seward, William, 83 Shaer Awang Semaun, 18-19, 39-41,44 Shah Brunei, Sultan, 59, 62 Shahbandar, 47 Sharif, 78 Sharif Ali, Sultan, 40, 42, 45 Sharif Musahor, 81-3 SharifUsman,76 Shariffuddin, P. M., 36, 39 She-P'o,23 Sheil-Small, Denis, 151 Shih-li-fo-Shih, 24 Siam, 50-1 Silsilah Raja-raja Berunai, 39-42, 44, 60, 62, 65 Singapore, 73,143,155,157-8, 178, 198-9 Singapore International Airlines, 158 Singora, 16 Siripada, Rajah, 49 Slaves, 45, 48, 76, 109 Smallpox, 101 Solodon,64 Songkhla, see Singora South-East Asia, 4-7 South-East Asia Command, 124-5 South Korea, 180-1, 198 Spanish, 45, 49-50, 52-5, 59-66; and British, 79; and Brunei

INDEX

city, 55-9; Philippines, 52-7; Sulu, 85, 87-8 Spice trade, 38, 49, 60, 69 Sri Maharaja, 25 Sribuza, 17, 24 Srivijaya (Borneo), 17,21,24 Srivijaya empire, 11-14,24-5 State Council, 112, 129, 132, 134-6 State Custom, Religion, and Welfare Office, 135 State Financial Officer, 137 State of Emergency, 152, 163, 174 State Secretary, 13 7 Steele, Henry, 81 Stephens, Donald, 144 Stewart, Duncan, 126 Straits Times, 96, 134-5 Strikes, 124 Stubbs, R. E., 93 Sufri, Prince, 176 Suharto, President, 172 Sukhothai, 9, 14 Sulaiman, Raja, 52-4 Sui aim an, Sultan, 40, 42 Sultan Muhammad Jamalul Alam Malay Primary School, 161 Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin College, 161, 169 Sulu, 25-6, 31, 42, 46, 48, 51, 59-60,62-4,70,76,85-8 Suluks,28 Sumatra: Aceh control, 49; Islam, 14,37; Malacca control, 37; monsoons, 10; trade, 50 Sumur, 148 Sunda Strait, 10-11, 13-14 SUPP, see Sarawak United Peoples Party Suryavarman II, 9 Sweeney, Amin, 39, 65 Swettenham, Sir Frank, 96 Switzerland, 181 T'AI,9

T'ai p'ing yu lan, 16

225

Tajuddin, Pengiran, 94-5, 101 Tan Ch'o, 25 Tan Siew Sin, 154 T'ang Shu, 16 Tanjapura, 50 Taoism, 26 Tarling, Nicholas, 70, 74, 80, 85-6,89 Tawalisi, 27-8 Tawaran,24 Taxes, 47, 86, 94-5,111,126, 137; religious, 135 Television, 166, 170 Tello, Don Francisco, 59 Temburong, 113, 115, 167, 178 Tempasuk, 70 Tengah, Raja, 60, 62-3 Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU), 148-50 Teteng, Dato, 70 Thailand, 172, 178, 199 Thailand, Gulf of, 8, 11 Thatcher, Margaret, 180 Timber industry, 113 TNKU, see Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara Tonie Sap, 9 Topographical survey, 116 Torrey, Joseph W., 84, 87 Trade, 9-11, 21-2, 38, 45-6,50, 52, lO3-4, 110-11 Trailok, King, 9, 14 Treacher, William H., 90 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 168, 174 Treloar, F. E., 15 Trevenan, 93, 107 Tribhuvana, Queen, 14 Trinidad, 50 Trusan, 90-1 Tuberculosis, 118, 130 Tugau,19 Tutin, 47, 86, 90,110 Tunjang,81 Tutong, 48, 94-6, 104, 119, 130, 145, 166

226

INDEX

UNEMPLOYMENT, 146 Unitary State of North Borneo, see Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara United Arab Emirates, 179 United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 133 United National Finance, 182 United Nations, 157-8, 160, 164, 175, 179-81 United States, 79, 123, 180-1, 198-9 Universiti Brunei Darussalam, 187,200 Urduja, 27 USS Constitution, 79 USS Kittyhawk, 180 Ussher, Governor, 89 VAN NOORT, OLIVIER, 59-60, 62 Veiga, Father, 51 Ver, Fabien, 178 Victoria (East India Company ship),83 Victoria (Magellan's flagship), 49 Victoria, Queen, 78, 92 Victoria Institution, 161 Vietnam, 9, 22, 198 Vijaya, 14 Vijayapura, see Srivijaya (Borneo) Vyadhapura, 7

Wang Ta-Yuan, 27 Ward, A. B., 105 Water-supply, 117, 130, 166 Watson, Arthur, 173 Wax, 45 Wazir, 47, 90,107,114 Weld, Sir Frederick, 92 Wheatley, Paul, 11 White, Denis Charles, 137, 152 Wise, Henry, 79 Women, 188 World War 11,121-4 Wright, L. R., 90 YAKIM BIN HAJI LONG, 143 Yang di-Pertuan Agong, 165, 176 Yassir Arafat, 179 Yava-dvipa, 23 Ye-po-ti, 14,22-3 Yong, Stephen, 141 Yueh Shih, 25 Yung-lo, Emperor, 29, 35 Yusof, Pengiran, 74, 76 Yusuf bin Pengiran Haji Limbang, Pengiran, 122, 159 ZAHORA,108 Zaini Haji Ahmad, 133, 148-9, 153,158-9,164,193 Zamboanga, 63 Zobel, Enrique, 182

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