A historical and psychological study of the conviction-persuasion concept in public speaking

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A HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE CONVICTION-PERSUASION CONCEPT IN PUBLIC SPEAKING

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the School of Speech The University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

by Robert Stuart Griffin August 1941

UMI Number: DP31952

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T h i s dissertation, w r i t t e n by

...... ROBERT_„STUAOT

.......

u n d e r the g u id a n c e o f hLs.. F a c u lt y C o m m itte e on S tudies, a n d a p p r o v e d by a l l its m em bers, has been p re se n te d to a n d accep ted by the C o u n c il on G r a d u a te S tu d y a n d R e search, in p a r t i a l f u l ­ f i l l m e n t o f re q u ire m e n ts f o r the degree o f D O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H Y

D ean /

Secretary D a te

3 cl /9

C om m ittee on Studies

C hairm an

TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I.

PAGE

THE PROBLEM

. * . . . . . ........ . .........

A.

I n t r o d uc tio n ...........

1

B.

The problem

3

.

..........

Statement of the p r o b l e m ........... Importance of the study

. . .

. • ..............

G. Organization of theremaining chapters II.

1

3 3

• .

4

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONVICTIONPERSUASION CONCEPT A* The ancients Aristotle Cicero

.

•

; . . . . .

• • • • • • • • • • •

5 7

» •

• • • • • • • •

The early English authors Leonard Cox

. . . . . . . .

•

10 13

.............

Thomas Wilson Hugh Blair

5 5

•

Quintilian B.

^

13 13

.................

15

George Campbell • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .

17

Richard W h a t e l y ........ . . .

22

C.

Earlier textbooks in America

........... • • • • • • •

24

Baker and Huntington

* • . . . . . • • • • .

24

Victor Alvin Ketcham

• • • • . . . • • • . •

27

Raymond Macdonald Alden • • . • • • • • • • •

28

in CHAPTER

PAGE

D.

William Trufant Foster . . . . . . ........

30

Arthur Edward Phillips . . . . . . . . . . .

52

New theories of persuasion and critics of the duality

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

James Albert Winans

. . . . . . . . . . . .

Mary Tost

53

....................

36

.........

37

Charles Henry Woolbert

E.

33

• •

Edward Z. Rowell . ........................

57

William Norwood Brigance • . . . ..........

70

Robert T. Oliver . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

Later writers of textbooks in argumentation and debate

79

O’Neill, Laycock, and Scales

............

Warren Choate Shaw •

80 81

Edwin DuBois Shurter .' ........

. . . . . .

83

Collins and Morris • • . . . • • . 4 . . . .

84

Winans and Utterback . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

Charles A. Fritz . . . . . . .

86

............

O’Neill and McBurney . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

Hayworth and Capel . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

. Nichols and Baccus A. Craig Baird

............

91

• • • • . . . . ..........

92

Harold F. Graves . . . . • • . . • . • • • •

95

iv CHAPTER

PAGE Alan Nichols • P.

Summary of the points of view of the various writers

G. III.

96

* * ...

. . . . . . .

Conclusions to historical s t u d y ........

100 109

AN INTEGRATED EXPOSITION OF THE CONVICTION*. PERSUASION DICHOTOMY ........

. . . . . . .

112

..............

112

A.

Statement of the problem

1.

Analysis of the first argument-rational reasoning

113

Psychological aspects of reasoning . . . . .

113

Relevant similarities

121

G.

Analysis of the second argument— non-rational reasoning •

............

126

Psychological hedonism and shifting goal-sets in reasoning •

127

Relevant and irrelevant similarities . . . .

136

Appeals to e m o t i o n s .............

137

The nature of emotions.........

138

The thalamic theory of e m o t i o n s ..........

141

Functional decortication . . . . .

143

Irrational reasoning

........

...................

153

The temporal sequence of reasoning and emotion

156

V CHAPTER

PAGE D.

Distinctions between conviction and persuasion . • • •

........... * . • •

157

Conviction and persuasion as perception and

E.

non-perception of relevant similarities

.

157

Relevance and the experiential background

.

159

Reasoning and overt action •

. .

IV.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . A.

Summary

B.

C o n c l u s i o n s ......................

................

161 166 166

1

CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM A.

INTRODUCTION

From the time of Aristotle down to the present writing the conviction-persuasion concept has occupied a dominant place in the theory of how hest and most effectively to go about the task of influencing the beliefs and actions of those who listen to a speaker*

All the writers of treatises

on rhetoric have included the duality in their systems of rhetoric, although their accounts have differed in various respects*

It remained, however, for the scholars of the

£~'

Twentieth Century to challenge the validity of the division. Today the thinking with respect to conviction and persuasion is beclouded by controversy.

Accounts of the

nature of appeals include a trichotomy of authority-convictionpersuasion, a dichotomy of conviction-persuasion, and a monistic interpretation under which there is only one aspect to the process of influencing others, the process of persuasion. Conviction is said to be appeals to reason, appeals to rationality, logical appeal.

It occupies the central and

most important place in the process, it occupies only secondary place, and it has no place at all in the rhetorical sys­ tem.

Persuasion has been defined as appeal to feelings,

?

appeal to emotions, appeal to prejudices, appeal to stereo­ types, appeal to subconscious reasoning, appeals to the Freudian wish— in short, appeals to every category of drive, urge, desire, motivation, and biological disturbance* In view of the continuous and almost universal atten­ tion given to the concept, it appears that there must be ele­ ments in the speaker-audience situation which call forth all this discussion, agreement, disagreement, and theorizing.

It

might have been expected that modern psychology would have shed much light on the matter, but it appears that quite the contrary may have been true.

Much of the present controversy

appears to have been the result of attempts to criticize the conviction-persuasion concept in the light of psychological principles. The psychologists as a group have not been directly concerned with the process.

Their efforts have been directed

largely at discovering basic facts of human behavior which underlie all forms of human activity.

Their work has passed

the stage of dependence upon theorizing alone, and they have retired to the laboratory.

Their experimental findings have

been piecemeal, often the results of experiments on animals; and these findings may or may not lend themselves to inter­ pretation of human behavior;

Those who have attempted to

deal with conviction-persuasion in the light of psychological facts have found those facts often too scanty to justify

5 valid reasoning based upon them;

On the other hand, the avail­

able facts may not have been adequately utilized. B.

THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. It was the purpose of this study (1) to review historically the theorizing that has taken place as to the nature of the conviction-persuasion con­ cept and its place in a system of rhetoric; (£) to examine the available psychological evidence as it relates to the concept with the view of arriving at a better understanding of the process of Influencing others through the spoken word; (3) to indicate; if possible, the unanswered questions upon the answers to which must depend the final understanding of the process. Importance of the study.

It would be difficult to

overemphasize the importance to the field of speech of a clarification of the process by which others are influenced by the spoken word.

It constitutes the very foundation of

the training of public speakers.

It is the basis upon which

all systems of rhetoric must inevitably rest.

If public

speaking is to be effective and efficient, it must be founded upon accurate knowledge of the entire process by which people are induced to respond to a speaker’s words, to change their beliefs and their modes of behavior. matter:

As Harris stated the

4 The vulgar can give reasons to a certain degree, and can examine, after a manner, the reasons given them by others. . . . If therefore these efforts of theirs have an effect, and nothing happens without a cause, this effect must of necessity he derived from certain princi­ ples. The question is, what these -principles are: for if these can once he investigated, and then knowingly applied, we shall he enabled to do hy rule what others do hy hazard.X Once the process of influencing others is more thor­ oughly understood, the entirevdiscipline of argumentation and debating, as well as speech composition in general, will he, if not entirely re-written, at least more sure of itself than it has ever been before, and certainly more sure of Itself than it appears to he today. 0.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS

The other chapters of this study will he organized as follows:

Chapter II, Historical Background of the Conviction-

persuasion Concept; Chapter III, An Integrated Exposition of the Gonviction-Persuasion Dichotomy; Chapter IV, Summary and Conclusions.

^ Harris, Philosophical Arrangement ch.i., cited hy Theodore Buckley in his translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1857) ; p. 2.

CHARTER II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONVICTION-PERSUASION CONCEPT A.

THE ANCIENTS

Aristotle# Aristotle considered that there were three means of influencing his listeners:

(1) the character of the

speaker; (2) disposing the hearer a certain way; (3) hy the thing said, by reason of its proving, or appearing to prove the point# Of the means of persuading hy speaking there are three species: some consist in the character of the speaker; others in the disposing the hearer a certain way; others in the thing itself which is said, hy reason of its prov­ ing, or appearing to prove the point* . • ;i The circumstances under which each type of appeal is to he employed are explained as follows: Persuasion is effected hy means of the moral character; when the speech shall have been spoken in such a way as to render the speaker worthy of confidence# . . . Per­ suasion is effected through the me d i m of the hearers. when they shall have been brought to a state of excite­ ment under the influence of the speech; for we do not, when influenced hy pain or joy, or partiality or dislike, award our decisions in the same way. . . . Men give cred­ it from the force of what is said, when out of the means of persuasion which attach to each subject, we evince the truth, or that which appears so.2

^ Aristotle, Treatise on Rhetoric, translated hy Theodore Buckley of Christ Church, Oxford (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1857), p. 12. 2 Loc. Cit.

6 That Aristotle considered the appeals to the passions as an important instrument of influence, if the speaker de­ sires to utilize it, is evinced from the following statement: Now as persuasion is effected hy these means, it is plain that it will he the privilege of him who is ahle to draw inferences syllogistically, and to take a full view of the subject of morals, and of the virtues, and thirdly of the passions, both what each of the passions is, of what nature it is, and from what causes it is engen­ dered* . . .3 Aristotle considered logical demonstration as the most important of the means of influencing the auditor* But as it is plain that an artificial system is con­ versant about the means of making credible, and as this is a sort of proof* (because we are then most persuaded when we conceive that the point has been proved*) but the proof of rhetoric is enthymem, (and this, to speak gener­ ally, has the most sovereign effect of all the means of persuasion;) and the enthymem is a sort of syllogism.4 Aristotle also considered logical demonstration as the more ethical of the means of persuasion^ . • ♦ For it is not right that an oratorshould bias the judge by winning him on to anger, or pity, or jeal­ ousy j since it is equally absurd as though one were to make a ruler crooked which he is about to use. It is further evident_that the pleader1s business is nothing more than to prove the matter of fact, either that it is, or is not the case; that it has, or has not happened.5 In summary of Aristotle1s attitude on the convictionpersuasion concept, then, it appears that he considered the

3 Ibid., p. 13. 4 M i - P* 7. 5 Ibid., p. 3.

7 influencing of others as falling into three possibilities: (1) the maintenance hy the speaker of a strong moral charac­ ter that would cause the auditor to respect his opinions in cases where proof might be lacking; (2) appeals to the emo­ tions, feelings, or passions of the auditors; (3) appeals to the reasoning capacities of the auditors through logical demonstrations.

It is clear, further, that he considered log­

ical demonstration as most important, most effective, and most ethical; that he considered appeal to passions or emo­ tions as undesirable, but as existing in reality, and conse­ quently as something that must be reckoned with, particularly in cases of controversy where an opponent might seek to per­ vert the reason of the auditor by appeal to emotions. Gicero. Unlike Aristotle, Cicero did not consider logical demonstration as the more important means of persua­ sion. For who is ignorant that the highest power of an orator consists in exciting the minds of men to anger, or to hatred, or to grief, or in recalling them from these more violent emotions to gentleness and compassion? which power will never be able to effect its object by eloquence, unless in him who has obtained a thorough insight into the nature of mankind, and all the passions of humanity, and those causes by which our minds are either impelled or restrained. . . . For the proper concern of an orator, as I have already often said, is language of power and elegance accommodated to the feelings and understandings of mankind.6

6 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Oratory and Orators, edited by John Selby Watson (Philadelphia:' David McKay, 1897;, pp. 26-27.

8 This preliminary statement of his philosophy is follow­ ed at a later point by a detailed discussion of the nature and means of influencing others* When after hearing and understanding the nature of a cause, I proceed to examine the subject matter of it, I settle nothing until I have ascertained to what point my whole speech, bearing immediately on the question and case, must be directed* I then very diligently consider two other points; the- one, how to recommend myself, or those for whom I plead; the other, how to sway the minds of those before whom I speak to that which I desire* Thus the whole business of speaking rests upon three things for success in persuasion; that we prove what we maintain to be true; that we conciliate those who hear; that we produce in their minds whatever feeling our cause may require.*7 In Cicero’s analysis, two kinds of proof present them­ selves to the orator:

first, such things as are not invented

by him, such as deeds, evidence, testimony, etc., all of which have to do with discoverable facts that have a bearing on the point at issue; second, those proofs which consist entirely in the orator’s own reasoning and arguments*8 The supports of my whole eloquence * . ♦ are, as I observed before, throe processes; the first, that of con­ ciliating my hearers; the second, that of instructing them; and the third, that of moving them. The first of these divisions requires mildness of address; the second, penetration; the third, energy; for it is impossible but that he, who is to determine a cause in our favor, must either lean to our side from propensity of feeling, or be swayed by the arguments of our defense, or be forced by

7 Itoid., HP» 127-128. 8 I S M - , p. 128.

action upon his mind.9 Again lie returns to a reiteration of his theme in the following passage: For there is nothing, Catalus, of more importance in speaking than that the hearers should he favorable to the speaker, and he himself so strongly moved that he may he influenced more hy impulse and excitement of mind, than hy judgment or reflection. For mankind make far more determinations through hatred, or love, or desire, or anger, or grief, or joy, or hope, or fear, or error, or some other affection of mind, than from regard to truth, or any settled maxim, or principle of right, or judicial form, or adherence to the laws.10 In summary of Cicero, then, it is clear that he gen­ erally followed Aristotle in considering the three aspects of the persuasive process:

making the speaker appealing to the

audience, appealing to the reason hy logical demonstration, and appealing to the feelings or emotions.

Cicero, however,

stressed the predominance of the appeal to the feelings or emotions, while Aristotle considered this as of secondary im­ portance and less ethical them appeal to the reason. is more idealistic, Cicero more pragmatic. sophistical in his philosophy.

Aristotle

Cicero is largely

He appears to he unconcerned

as to the ethics of an appeal to emotions, except that he doesargue

that the orator must

if he is a good man he will appeal

9 Ibid.. pp. 131-132 10

,p. 146.

he a good man, and presumably to the emotions only in

10 the name of a good cause*

For tlie purposes of this study,

however, it is important only to know that he recognizes a division of the process of influencing people into the two chief aspects of appeal to reason and appeal to emotions# Quintilian# While a concise statement of his views on the dichotomy of conviction-persuasion does not occur at any one place in his exhaustive treatise on rhetoric, it is pos­ sible, nevertheless, to determine his views by a running account taken here and there from Quintilian* s work* Quintilian held that there were three objects which an orator must accomplish:

to inform, to move, to please.

As

he states: There are also three objects which an orator must accomplish, to inform, to move, and to please; for this is a clearer partition than that of those who divide the whole of oratory into what concerns things and passions; since both these will not always find a place in the subjects of which we shall have to treat *11 That he recognized the importance of appeals to feel­ ing is made clear by the following quotation: Deliberative oratory requires appeals to the feelings more than any kind of eloquence; for indignation is often to be kindled and allayed; and the minds of the audience are to be moved to fear, eagerness, hatred, benevolence. Sometimes, too, pity is to be excited, whether we have, for example, to recommend that aid be given to a beseiged town, or whether we be called upon to lament the overthrow

H Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory* translated by John Selby Watson {London: Btenry G. Bohn, 1856), I, 185.

11 of a people in alliance with us.

T*>

Furthermore, that Quintilian gave weight to the author­ ity of the speaker is shown hy the statement: But what:is of most weight in deliberative speeches is authority of the speaker; for he who desires everybody to trust to his opinion about what is expedient and honorable, ought to be, and to be esteemed, a man of the greatest judgment and probity. . ♦ .13 Another statement occurs at a later point in his trea­ tise on the place of appeals to feelings and emotions: I am the more surprised at those, therefore, who think that we are not to touch the feelings in a statement of facts. If they mean, indeed, that we are not to work on them long, or as in the peroration, they are of the same opinion with myself; for tediousness is to be avoided; otherwise, why should I not move the judge while I am instructing him? Why should I not secure, if possible, at the very opening of my case, the object which I am de­ sirous to attain at the conclusion of it, especially as I shall find his mind more manageable, when I come to proofs, if it has previously been swayed by indignation or pity? Again, while discoursing on the subject of digressions, he returns to the theme of the place of passions, again show­ ing how much importance he attached to them in the rhetorical process. Similarly digressive is everything that does not lie within the question; all amplification, extenuation, and excitement of the passions: all those moral observations concerning luxury. avarice, religion, duty, which contrib­ ute so much to the agreeableness and ornament of a speech,

13 Ibid., p; 2S7. loo* Cit; 14 Ibid.. p. £96.

12 but which, however, as they are attached to cognate sub­ jects, and naturally cohere with them, do not appear to be digressions.!^ Still further advanced in his treatise he finds occa­ sion to take exception to the attitude of Aristotle on the place of emotional appeal in the oration.

Perhaps more than

any other passage cited, this one makes clear his position on the dichotomy of conviction-persuasion. There have been authors, and some, indeed, of high reputation who have thought that the sole duty of an orator is to inform. Excitement of the feelings, they considered, was to be prohibited, for two reasons: first, because all perturbation of the mind is an evil; and, secondly, because it is inexcusable for a judge to be di­ verted from the truth by pity, anger, or any similar pas­ sion; and to aim at pleasing the audience, when the ob­ ject of speaking is to gain victory, they regarded not only as needless in a pleader, but scarcely worthy even of a man. Many, too, who doubtless did not exclude those arts from the department of the orator, considered, never­ theless, that his proper and peculiar office was to estab­ lish his own propositions and to refute those of his ad­ versary. Whichsoever of these opinions is right, (for I do not here offer my own judgment,) this book must appear, in the estimation of both parties, extremely necessary, as the entire subject of it is proof and refutation; to which all that has hitherto been said on judicial causes is subservient. For there is no other object either in an introduction or a narrative than to prepare the judge; and to know the states of causes, and to contemplate all the other matters of which I have treated above, would be useless, unless we proceed to proof. In fine, of the five parts into which we have distinguished judicial pleading, whatever other may occasionally be unnecessary in a cause, there certainly never occurs a suit in which proof is not required.!6

PP* 503-304 !6 ibid.. p. 313.

13 in view of the foregoing statements from Quintilian, there can be no doubt that he considered the means of persua­ sion as of a three-fold nature, the authority of the speaker, the appeal to feelings or emotions, and appeal to reason in the form of proof. B. Leonard Cox;

THE EARLY ENGLISH AUTHORS The textbook by Gox^7 is sketchy, is writ­

ten in Old English, was designed primarily for beginners, and adds nothing of importance to the controversy or the concepts; 18 Thomas Wilson- Wilson states that three things are required of an orator:

to teach, to delight, and to persuade.

An orator must make his meaning clear, "for what man can be delited, or yet be perswaded with the only hearing of those thinges, which he knoweth not what they meane.*^ Evidently his concept "to delight* implies use of care­ fully chosen words, wit, and pleasing voice, for he says, "The next part that he hath to play, is to chere his geastes,

17 Leonard Cox, The Arte or Crafte of Rhetoryke. edited by Frederic Ives Carpenter (Chicago: The University of Chica­ go Press, 1899), 117 pp. 18 Thomas Wilson, Arte of Rhetorique. edited by G. H. Mair (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1909), pT zl 19 Loc. Cit.

14 and to make them take pleasure, with hearing of thinges wittely devised, and pleasauntly set foorth."^ The concept ,fto perswade" is explained when he says, ". . . How when these two are done, hee must perswade, and move the affections of his hearers in such wise, that they shalhe forced to yeeld unto his saying.*^. As to the place of logic in the system, one of the seven parts of the oration consists of the confirmation, which is a "declaration of our owne reasons, with assured and con­ stant proof e s." ^

In elaboration of this concept, he con­

tinues: Therefore when wee goe about to confirme any cause, wee male gather these groundes above rehearsed, and even as the case requireth, so frame our reasons. . . . The places of Logique as I saied, cannot bee spared for the confirmation of any cause# # # ♦ Therefore I wish that every man should desire, and seeke to have his Logique perfit, before he looke to profite in rhetorique# consid­ ering the ground and confirmation of causes, is for the most part gathered out of Logique. It is clear from the foregoing quotations that Wilson had in mind the concept that in influencing others it is necessary to secure conviction through the logical process,

20 Ibid., p. 3. 21 Ibid., pi 4. 22 Ibid.. p. 7. 23 Ibid., p. 113.

15 and that the appeal might he reinforced hy some kind of appea; to the feelings or emotions, although his concept of how this might take place appears to he a hit vague. Hugh Blair. With the advent of Blair, begins a more significant phase of the controversy.

He considered that

oratory was primarily for the purpose of influencing conduct and moving to action. persuasion."24

Eloquence was defined as the "art of

In order to persuade,

. . . the most essential requisites are, solid argu­ ment, clear method, a character of probity appearing in the speaker, joined with such graces of style and utter­ ance, as shall draw our attention to what he says. . . . In order to persuade a man of sense you must first con­ vince him.25 In respect to the conviction-persuasion concept, he set forth his ideas clearly and concisely: This leads me to observe that convincing and persuad­ ing, though they are sometimes confounded, import, not­ withstanding, different things, which it is necessary for us, at present, to distinguish from each other. Convic­ tion affects the understanding only; persuasion, the will and the practice. . . . Conviction and persuasion do not always go together. . . . I may he convinced, that vir­ tue, justice, or public spirit, are laudable, while at the same time, I am not persuaded to act according to them. The inclination may revolt, though the understand­ ing he satisfied: the passions may prevail against the judgment. Conviction is, however, always one avenue to the inclination or heart; and it is that which an orator

24 Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belies Lettres (Philadelphia: S. C. Hayes, 1861), p. 262. 25 Loc. Cit.

16 must first bend bis strength to gain; for no persuasion is likely to be stable, which is not founded on conviction* But in order-to persuade, the orator must go farther than merely producing conviction; he must consider man as a creature moved by many different springs; and must act upon them all. He must address himself to the passions; he must paint to the fancy, and touch the heart It is apparent from his statements that Blair regarded persuasion to have been attained when it evoked action— pre­ sumably overt action.

Further light is shed on his concept

as he develops his theory*

For him there are three kinds,

or degrees, of eloquence.

"The first, and lowest, is that

which aims only at pleasing the hearers . . gyrics, inaugural orations, and the like.

as in pane­

A second, and

higher, degree of eloquence is seen when the speaker aims not merely to please, but also to inform, to instruct, to con­ vince* ” . . .

disposing us to pass that judgment, or embrace

that side of the cause, to which he seeks to bring us."28 But there is a third, and still higher degree of eloquence, . . . wherein a greater power is exerted over the human mind; by which we are not only convinced, but are interested, agitated, and carried along with the speaker; our passions are made to rise together with his; we enter into all his emotions; we love, we detest, we resent, according as he inspires us, and are prompted to resolve, or to act, with vigour and warmth; . * .

26 Loo. eit. 27 Ibid;. p. 263. 28 Loo. Cit.

17 I am here to observe, and the observation is of con­ sequence, that the high eloquence which I have last men­ tioned, is always the offspring of passion* By passion I mean that state of mind in which it is agitated, and fired by some object it has in view. A man may convince, and even persuade others to act, by mere reason and argument. . . * Passion, when in such a degree as to rouse and kindle the mind, without throwing it out of the possession of itself, is universally found to exalt all the human powers • Xt renders the mind infinitely more enlightened, more penetrating, more vigorous and master­ ly, them it is in its calmer moments. A man, actuated by a strong passion, becomes much greater than he is at other times. He is conscious of more strength and force; he utters greater sentiments, conceives higher designs, and executes them with a boldness and a felicity, of which, on other occasions, he could not think himself capable. » . .29 Thus does Blair give his version of the convictionpersuasion concept.

It is clear that he considered it pos­

sible to have a clean-cut dichotomy, a division based upon intellectual activity on the one hand and emotional activity on the other; and that emotional activity may be even carried to the point of overt action; George Campbell.

In the introduction to his book,

Campbell makes the first reference to the conviction-persua­ sion dichotomy when he says, Farther, if the logical art and the ethical be useful, eloquence is useful, as it instructs us how these arts must be applied for the conviction and persuasion of others. It is, Indeed, the grand art of communication,

29 Ibid., pp; 263-264.

18 not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, disposi­ tions, and purposes.30 For Campbell there are four ends under which all types of.speaking may be classified:

to enlighten the understand­

ing, to please the imagination, to move the passions, and to influence the will.3^

The relative functions of "appeals to

the passions" and "convincing the judgment" are set forth when he writes, Finally, as that kind, the most complex of all, which is calculated to influence the will, and persuade to a certain conduct, is in reality an artful mixture of that which proposes to convince the judgment, and that which interests the passions, its distinguishing excellence results from these two, the argumentative and the pathe­ tic incorporated together. These, acting with united force and, if I may express myself, in concert, constitute that passionate eviction, that vehemence of contention, which is admirably fitted for persuasion, and hath always been regarded as the supreme qualification in an orator.33 Campbell defined conviction as appeal to the under­ standing for the purpose of establishing as true some propo­ sition disbelieved or,doubted by the hearers.

Persuasion is

said to influence the will and lead to a certain conduct. The sole and ultimate end of logic is the eviction of truth; one important end of eloquence^ though, as appears from the first chapter, neither the sole, nor always the ultimate, is the conviction of the hearers. Pure logic regards only the subject, which is examined solely for

30 George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Hew York: Harper and Brothers, I860), p. 18. 3 1 I b i a *. P* £ 3 .

32 Ibid.. p. 26.

19 the sake of information* Truth, as such, is the proper aim of the examiner* Eloquence not only considers the subject, but also the speaker and the hearers, and both the subject and the speaker for the sake of the hearers, or, rather, for the sake of the effect intended to be pro­ duced in them* Bow to convince the hearers is always either proposed by the orator as his end in addressing them, or supposed to accompany the accomplishment of his end. Of the five sorts of discourses above mentioned, there are only two wherein conviction is the avowed pur­ pose. One is addressed to the understanding, in which the speaker proposeth to prove some proposition disbe­ lieved or doubted by the hearers; the other is that which is calculated to influence the will, and persuade to a certain conduct; for it is by convincing the judgment that he proposeth to interest the passions and fix the resolution* As to the three other kinds of discourses enumerated, which address the understanding, the imagina­ tion, and the passions, conviction, though not the end, ought ever to accompany the accomplishment of the end. . . • Thus, in order to satisfy the mind, in most cases, truth, and, in every case, what bears the resemblance of truth, must be presented to it. This holds equally whatever be the declared aim of the speaker. 33 Up to this point, Campbell has not attempted to explain how the processes of conviction and persuasion result In ac­ tion;

But now he shows that action can be induced only by a

combination of the appeals to reason, in which the auditor judges a thing to be true, and appeals to the passions, In which, relating the favorable judgment to the desires of the individual, the auditor is induced to take action.

It is

important to keep In mind that persuasion, to Campbell, means action. To conclude:

when persuasion is the end, passion also

33 Ibid., pp. 54-55

20 must be engaged* If It is fancy which bestows, brilliancy on our ideas, if it is memory which gives them stability, passion doth more: it animates them. Hence they derive spirit and energy. To say that it is possible to persuade without speaking to the passions, is but, at best, a specious nonsense. The coolest reasoner always, in per­ suading, addresseth himself to the passions in some way Or other. This he cannot avoid doing if he speak to the purpose. To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show me that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me which gratifies no passion or affec­ tion in my nature. You assure me, "It is for my honour." Mow you solicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You say, "It is for my interest." Now you bespeak my self-love. "It is for the public good." Now you rouse my patriotism. "It will re­ lieve the miserable." Now you touch my pity* So far, therefore, is it from being an unfair method of persuasion to move the passions, that there is no persuasion without moving them.$4 But Campbell does not appear satisfied with the pre­ liminary statement of the relation between conviction and persuasion.

He considers the matter of such importance that

it needs elaboration and reinforcement.

His more specific

analysis of persuasion is contained in the following passage: But if so much depend on passion, where is the scope for argument? Before I answer this question, let it be observed, that, in order to persuade, there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first . is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers; the second is, to satisfy their judgment that there is a con­ nexion between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of.the desire or passion which he excites. This is the analysis of persuasion. The former is effected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object; the latter, unless so evident of Itself as to supersede the necessity, by presenting the best and most

34 Ibid., p. 99

21 forcible arguments which the nature of the subject admits. In the one lies the pathetic, in the other the argumenta­ tive. These, incorporated together (as was observed in the first chapter), constitute that vehemence of conten­ tion to which the greatest exploits of eloquence ought doubtless to be ascribed. Here, then, is the principal scope for argument, but not the only scope, as will appear in the sequel. When the first end alone Is attained, the pathetic without the rational, the passions are indeed roused from a disagreeable iangour by the help of the imagination, and the mind Is thrown into.a state which* though accompanied with some painful emotions, rarely fails, upon the whole, to affect it with pleasure. But if the hearers are judicious, no practical effect is produced. They cannot, by such declamation, be influenced to a particular action, because not convinced that that action will conduce to the gratifying of the passion raised. Your eloquence hath fired my ambition, and makes me burn with public zeal. The consequence is, there Is nothing which at present I would not attempt for the sake of fame, and the interest of my country. You advise me to such a conduct, but you have now shown me how that can contribute to gratify either passion. Satisfy me in this, and I am instantly at your command. Indeed, when the hearers are rude and ignorant, nothing more is necessary in the speaker than to inflame the passions. They will not require that the connexion between the conduct he urges and the end proposed be evinced to them. His word will satisfy. And therefore bold affirmations are made to supply the place of reasons. Hence it is that the rabble are ever the prey of quacks and impudent pretenders of every denomination.33 In the opinion of Campbell, the two processes are sub­ ject to such definite division that one may exist entirely independent of the other.

In order to secure action, the

will and the passions must be excited.

If this is not done,

conviction may occur, but action may not follow. On the contrary, when the other end alone is attained,

35 Ibid., pp. 99-100.

22

the rational without the pathetic, the speaker is as far from his purpose as before. You have proved beyond con­ tradiction that acting thus is the sure way to procure such an object. I perceive that your reasoning is con­ clusive, but I am not affected by it. Why? I have no passion for the object. I am indifferent whether I pro­ cure it or not. You have demonstrated that such a step will mortify my enemy. I believe it; but I have no re­ sentment, and will not trouble myself to give pain to another. Your arguments evince that it would gratify my vanity. But I prefer my ease. Thus passion is the mover to action, reason is the guide. Good is the object of the will, truth is the object of the understanding.36 In summary of Campbell fs version of the convictionpersuasion concept it appears that he conceived of a clearcut division of conviction on the one side and persuasion on the other.

Eloquence is the art of persuasion; persuasion is

action produced by the speaker; conviction is necessary before action can take place; conviction may take place independent of action; and conviction will not result in action unless the passions are aroused toward the achievement of a definite goal. Richard Whateiy. Whately regarded persuasion as the art of influencing the will, and conviction as an essential part of persuasion.

In order for the will to be influenced,

the proposed object must be desirable.^: and the means suggest­ ed must be shown to be conducive to the attainment of that object.

36 Loc. Git.

23 Persuasion, properly* so called, i.e. the art of in­ fluencing the Will, is the next pointT'to he considered. And Rhetoric is often regarded (as was formerly remarked) in a more limited sense, as conversant about this head alone. But even, according to that view, the rules laid down will be found not the less relevant; since the con­ viction of the understanding (of which I have hitherto been treating) is an essential part of persuasion; and will generally need to be effected by the Arguments of the Writer or Speaker. For in order that the Will may be influenced, two things are requisite; viz. 1. that the proposed Object should appear desirable; and 2. that the Means suggested should be proved to be conducive to the attainment of that object; and this last, evidently must depend on a process of Reasoning. In order, e.g. to induce the Greeks to unite their efforts against the Per­ sian invader, it was necessary both to prove that cooper­ ation could alone render their resistance effectual, and also to awaken such feelings of patriotism and abhorrence of a foreign yoke, as might prompt them to make these com­ bined efforts; For it was evident, that however ardent their love of liberty, they would make no exertions if they apprehended no danger; or if they thought themselves able, separately, to defend themselves, they would be backward to join the confederacy: and on the other hand, that if they were willing to submit to the Persian yoke, or valued their independence less than their present ease, the fullest conviction that the Means recommended would secure their independence, would have had no practical effect. Persuasion therefore, depends on, first, Argument, (to prove the expediency of the Means proposed,) and secondly, what is usually called Exhortation. l;e. the excitement of men to adopt those Means, by representing the end as sufficiently desirable.3” Following this' statement of how the processes of con­ viction and persuasion are subject to division, Whately then considers further the subject of passions.

He agrees with

Aristotle that an ■unwarranted use of appeal to passions is

37 Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (Boston and Cambridge: James Munroe and! Company, 18^5), pp. 209-210.

24 reprehensible, but he agrees with Campbell that there can be no complete persuasion without utilizing the appeal to pas­ sions.

In other words, appeal to passions is necessary and

desirable, but their use must not be perverted to wrong ends.38 G.

EARLIER TEXTBOOKS IN AMERICA

Baker and Huntington. In 1895; George P. Baker pub­ lished his Principles of Argument at i on.59

The textbook was

revised in 1905 in collaboration with Henry Barrett Hunting­ ton.

The authors define argumentation as "the art of produc­

ing in the mind of another person acceptance of ideas held true by a writer or speaker; and of inducing the other person; if necessary, to act in consequence of his acquired belief."40 The successful arguer must be able to think clearly and be able to present his thoughts so as to be both convincing and persuasive. Conviction aims only to produce agreement between the writer and reader; persuasion aims to prepare the way for the process of conviction or to produce action as a result of conviction. In pure conviction one appeals only to the intellect of a reader by clear and cogent reasoning. In persuasion one may produce desired action by arousing

38 Ibid., pp. 211-212. 39 George P. Baker, The Principles of Argumentation (Boston and New York: Ginn and Company, 1895) • 40 George P. Baker and Henry Barrett Huntington, The Principles of Argumentation (New York and Boston: Ginn and Company, 1955), p. 7.

25 emotion in regard to the ideas set forth or by adapting the presentation of one* s case as a whole or in part to special interests, prejudices, or idiosyncrasies of a reader*41 Pure conviction ♦ ♦ . may at times be found in the world of science among a group of men in whom all other interests and emotions are subordinated to eager desire for truth, but ordinarily the people with whom we argue have many pre­ judices or idiosyncrasies which make it difficult to de­ velop our case unobstructed.42 Conviction and persuasion are complementary in that both are usually found together and work together to achieve the desired response* Though persuasion, in the sense of emotional appeal, may appear alone as in a paragraph, division, or even a complete speech or article, conviction, except in para­ graphs, very rarely appears without persuasion* Really," as the definition of persuasion already given suggestsi the two are complementary, one being the warp, the other the woof of argumentation. He who addresses the intellect only, leaving the feelings, the emotions, untouched, will probably be dull, for his work will lack warmth and color; and he will not produce action, for to accept something as true does not, in nearly all cases, mean to act prompt­ ly or steadily on that idea* * * • Ideal argumentation would, then, unite perfection of reasoning, that is, com­ plete convincingness, with perfection of persuasive pow­ er • • ♦ The history of argumentation shows that usually conviction is preceded or followed by persuasion, and that often the very exposition which convinces is made also to persuade.4^

Loo* Git; 42 Ibid*, pi 8* 43 Ibid;. pp. 9-11;

The means by which a speaker aims to produce action is by winning sympathy for himself or his subject, and this is secured from one or from all of three sources:

"the nature

of the subject; the relation of the audience to it; and the relation of the speaker to subject or audience*"44 The authors do not consider emotional appeal as the only means of persuasion, however, for they state that, "Be­ ginners in argumentation are too ready to put all their per­ suasive trust in emotional appeals. . . . This is but one of many means to persuasion, and by no means the surest or safest;"4** Emotion is considered a powerful means of persuasion, as is shown by the statement, The effort is to stir an audience to emotion so strong that it will seek relief in action, and since the act suggested by the speaker is placed most vividly before the hearers, relief in that particular action. Excita­ tion-arousing the emotions, the passions— is, then, another means of persuasion.4® Again they state that emotions are aroused in two ways • either by dwelling on matters likely to stir these de­ sired emotions or by exhibiting the emotions ourselves."47

44 Ibid., p; 894. 45 Loc. Cit. 4^ Ibid., p. 331; 47 Ibid., p. 338*

27 From these statements, it may be concluded that the authors held that:

(1) conviction is pure appeal to reason­

ing; (:2) persuasion is inducing action; (5) appeal to emotions is one form of persuasion or one means of persuasion; (4) con­ viction and persuasion both fall under the heading of argumen­ tation* Victor Alvin Ketchaml

In the theory of Ketcham,

The object of argumentation is not only to induce others to accept our opinions and beliefs in regard to any disputed matter, but to induce them to act in accord­ ance with our opinions and beliefs. The end of argumen­ tation is action. . . . It may be only an action of the mind resulting in a definite belief which will exert an influence in the world. . . . It may be that some more physical action is desired.48 This author believes that among the educational values of debating is the cultivation of "the power to persuade as well as convince."49

Evidently desire is linked up with con­

viction and persuasion, for Ketcham states that The main part of the argument which is contained in the proof carries forward the work of persuasion. . . . When we say that the desire is created by the conclusion we mean that all the good effect produced by the proof is summed up and presented in such a forcible manner that it awakens the desire for action. • . . The object of the conclusion is to arouse emotions sufficient to move the will.50

45 Victor Alvin Ketcham, The Theory and Practice of Argumentation and Debate (New York: ¥he Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 5. 49 Ibid.. p. 7: 50 Ibid;; Pi 121.

28 At another point, Ketcham appears to have in mind a clear-cut differentiation between conviction and persuasion when he-writes that All the labor spent upon the introduction in arousing and fixing the attention, and all the labor spent upon the proof in maintaining the interest and building a firm basis for persuasion in rational conviction, is now lost unless the conclusion rises supreme above these and pre­ sents a culmination forcible and commanding* The conclu­ sion should reap the harvest of persuasion sown through­ out the argument. The emotions must be aroused as they have not been aroused in the presentation of the proof; they must be stimulated to the highest pitch. The con­ clusion must . . . unite the audience, the subject, and the personality of him who presents the argument into one mighty current of thought and emotion which leads onward to action.53In summary, It appears that Ketcham held to the con­ cept that (1) the end of argumentation is action; (2) that conviction and persuasion are separate parts of the process of argument; (3) that both converge to produce action. Raymond Macdonald Aiden. Alden believed that the tasK of the debater was something more than the expression of a train of reasoning, or even the ability to mate others admit that one’s reasoning is correct.

In setting forth this point

of view, he states that One may wish to induce his hearers not only to agree to his doctrine but to act upon it; and experience shows that action does not by any means always follow convic­ tion. . . . From these considerations it has become

51 Ibid., p. 127.

29 common to say that the two great divisions of argument are Conviction and Persuasion. The first has to do with the ability to show that one’s reasoning is right; the second with the power to dispose onefs hearer’s to accept the reasoning as their own, and— -if need he— to act upon it. It may he that this conquest of the disposition will come after the conquest of the intellect, or it may he that it must come first in order to make the conquest of an obstinate intellect p o s s i b l e .52 Alden believes that the two elements belong side by side in all successful debate: These two elements, then, the power of reaching the reason, and the power of winning the disposition and mov­ ing the will, belong side by side in all successful de­ bate. It is not that one part of a speech is given up to the one, and another part to the other; but that the whole, both in matter and manner, is to be made to serve the ends of e a c h . 53 Further evidence of the dichotomy of conviction-persuasion in Alden1s thinking is found when he states in the text: Something like an application of one’s case to the immediate audience, then, will naturally follow the re­ statement of proof. But whether this application shall be direct and unimpassioned,— a simple effort to reach the will of the hearers through their reason,--or more elaborate and impassioned,— an effort to reach the will through the feelings,— must be decided for each partic­ ular debate.54 '

York:

52 Raymond Macdonald Alden. The Art of Debate (New Henry Holt and Company, 1906X7 p®* 4-5. 55 Ibid.. pp. 6-7. 54 ibid.. p. 147.

30 In summary, Alden appears to believe:

(1) that con­

viction and persuasion are separate processes available to the speaker at will; (2) that usually both elements are nec­ essary for complete success; (3) both are means of influenc­ ing the hearers through the will* not made clear.

The meaning of the will is

Overt action is not regarded as the essential

aim of persuasion. William Trufant Foster.

In his textbook on argumenta­

tion and debating, Foster makes it clear that he considers conviction and persuasion as separate processes.

Conviction

addresses the understanding; persuasion addresses the will through the emotions.

The author states that

The study of analysis, structure, reasoning, and evi­ dence is the study of conviction. Conviction addresses the understanding; it aims to establish belief on rational grounds. But so strong are the influences of inherited opinionsj the pressure of the crowd, personal desires and feelings, that action is not often based on purely ration­ al motives. MA man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still," and he acts accordingly. The voli­ tion must be secured through arousing the emotions* This is the work of persuasion. A reasoning process as cold as a demonstration in Geometry, which utterly disregards the feelings, is pure conviction. Nothing more would be needed for a scientist who, in the pursuit of truth, had succeeded in trampling his prejudices under him. But argument is commonly addressed to men and women with desires and latent emo­ tions which conviction alone cannot use or overcome.55

55 william Trufant Foster, ^Argumentation and Debating (New York, Boston, and Chicago: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1908), p. 262.

51 Foster regards persuasion as necessary to secure action, as he makes clear when he explains that A person may be convinced on rational grounds, and,yet not be moved to act until his emotions are aroused. . . . So important is persuasion as an adjunct to conviction that examples of pure conviction are rare outside text­ books in logic, mathematics, and other exact sciences.56 Foster does not believe that pure persuasion is ever satisfactory in securing action which is based upon irration­ al grounds. Valuable as is persuasion in reaching the will, it can never do the work of conviction. When the mind yields to persuasion, belief may or may not be conformable to fact; it may or may not be rational. . . . Conviction is safer, because conviction is a matter of reason, and reason is based on logic, which is a science,— the same for all people at all times. For these reasons, persuasion with­ out conviction is unreliable. These two parts— convic­ tion, which appeals to reason, and persuasion, which appeals to emotion--work together in nearly all success­ ful argumentation.5” In summary, it may be said that Foster (I) regarded conviction and persuasion as two separate processes; (B) re­ garded conviction as addressing only the understanding; (5) regarded persuasion as addressing the will through the emo­ tions; (4) regarded conviction as an essential accompaniment of persuasion in successful argument. appears to be overt action.

56

p. 265.

57

» • 264-865.

The end of persuasion

32

Arthur Edward Phillips* In 1908, Phillips wrote one of the earliest important textbooks in general Public Speak­ ing*^®

He divided the ends of speech into the following

classifications:

(1) Clearness. in which the end is to have

the listener see; (2) Impressiveness* in which the end is to have the listener feel; (3) Belief* in which the end is to have the listener accept; (4) Action* in which the end is to secure action by the listener; (5) Entertainment * in which the end is enjoyment.®®

Of these five ends, two— action and

belief— seem to correspond to the concepts of conviction and persuasion*

Belief— conviction— is acceptance*

"The subject

matter must come into his mind as reality— truth. * * *

It

demands, however, no action, but discusses matters of opinion."®® On the other hand, "Action is doing.

It is never passive.

The end of the speaker can be denoted as Action, therefore, when his dominant desire is to have the listener act— to be, to go, to give, to bring, to join— to do*"®^

"The action sought

must be shown to resemble that action which comes into the

(Chicago: 59

Arthur Edward Phillips, Effective Sneaking; reprint The Newton Company, 192$), bid pp. £*» P* Ibid* * p* 21*

6* Ibid.. p. 22*

33 ep listenerfs life as affecting him or others favorably."*^ Phillips does not use the terms conviction and -persua­ sion, hut it seemsCohvious^ that their counterparts existed as c ” separate processes in the influencing of listeners. B.

NEW THEORIES OE PERSUASION AND CRITICS OF THE DUALITY James Albert Winans. After Phillips, one of the most

important hooks in the field of general Public Speaking was that by Winans.63

Winans believed that conviction and per­

suasion are useful terms in designating different processes in influencing an audience.

He stated:

It is convenient to use the word -persuasion when we come to treat of influencing conduct, . . . A review of the authorities justifies us in accepting tentatively Whateleyfs definition of the word: "Persuasion, properly so-called, i.e., the art of influencing the will." . . . The term is broad enough to include conviction, but it is convenient to use the latter term to designate the pro­ cess of "bringing any one torecognize the truth of what he has not before accepted."64 With such preliminary observations, however, Winans proceeded to give a further definition of the relation be­ tween the two concepts.

Said he,

To influence the will is identical with influencing conduct, and includes inducing or checking single acts or

6® Ibid., p. 60. 63 James Albert Winans, Public Speaking (New York: Century Company, 1017), 526 pp. 64 Ibia*» »• 185.

The

34 affecting a prolonged course of conduct; tut, as we shall use the term persuasion, it is not limited to inducing physical acts, hut includes changing the mental attitude, as hy removing prejudice, bringing about a fair-minded attitude toward a person, a willingness to consider a proposition, or a desire to accept it*65 While Winans stated that conviction (belief) and per­ suasion (action) could be both included under the concept of •persuasion; he, nevertheless, found it convenient, even desir­ able, to deal with them separately as worthy of individual attention*

This he showed by writing two chapters on "Persua­

sion— influencing conduct" and "Persuasion and Belief."

More­

over, he stated that It is possible, as we noted in the preceding chapter, to cover the whole process of producing conviction with the term persuasion: but it is both correct and convenient to limit its meaning, as applied to this process, to the winning of attention and acceptance for the arguments which reason presents*®6 It is clear from these statements that Winans regarded conviction and persuasion as merely two very closely related aspects of the same process* Having made clear that he considered conviction and persuasion as merely two aspects of the same process, and having decided that he preferred to use the term persuasion as an all-inclusive term to denote the entire process of influenc­ ing the listener, Winans then set forth his definition of

65 £22* Cit. 66 Ibid.; p: 248:

35 persuasion in the following words: To persuade a man, then, seems to he nothing more or less than to win his undivided attention to the desired conduct, to make him think of that and stop thinking of other courses, or of any inhibiting ideas. . . . Persua­ sion Ja process of inducing others to give fair, favorable, or undivided attention to propositions.67 Winans believed that "it is quite correct to insist upon the importance of emotion in persuasion.

As already

said, ideas which arouse emotion hold attention."®8

As to

how emotions are aroused, "The most evident way in which we arouse ©motion to fix attention is by awakening desire for the end sought; and an effective desire we call a motive."®9 Thus it appears that to fix attention, we arouse emotion; and to arouse emotion we awaken desire for the end sought. In summary of Winansf theory, then, we may say that he considered conviction and persuasion as closely allied phases of the one process of influencing others; that he classified both processes under the single term persuasion: that persua­ sion, as he used it, was obtained by focusing attention upon the end sought; that focusing attention on the end sought was to be obtained largely by arousing ©motion; that emotion was aroused by awakening desire.

67

. p. 194.

68 Ibid., p; 195: 69 Ibid.. p; 196:

Upon these premises he built

36 Ms

elaborate system of persuasion*

The entire work consti­

tutes a landmark in the theory of persuasion.

For the first

time, an attempt was made to explain the entire process of influencing others in the light of modern psychological theory; Mary Yost*

One of the people responsible for the mod­

ern controversy over the conviction-persuasion duality was Deem Mary Yost of Vassar College.

Writing in the Quarterly

Journal of Public Speaking*^ she argued that the traditional dichotomizing of conviction-persuasion, as represented in the current textbooks on argumentation did not serve the purpose of equipping the student to undertake the process of influenc­ ing others;

Said she,

A H of the usual text—books--the good and the poor alike— approach the subject of argumentation from the point-of-view of logic. . . . Yet we may well ask if a study of Argument can be made only from the standpoint of logic. Might not an examination of the subject from a standpoint essentially different in some respects from the traditional one serve to clarify the current ideas for argument and possibly lead to the finding of princi­ ples which could direct more effectively the students * practice than those in use today. The fault, she believed, lies in the traditional split­ ting of the process into conviction-persuasion.

In the light

Mary Yost, "Argument from the Point-of-view of Sociology," The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking. Ill (April, 1917),109-124. 71 Ibid., p. 112;

37 of modern psychology, this was no longer acceptable, as she explained that This explanation of the terms conviction and persuasion was formulated when the belief hold sway tliat the mind was divided into three compartments, the reason, the emo­ tions, the will— roughly the assumptions of the old facul­ ty psychology* Today, however, the leading psychologists have found these assumptions inadequate to explain the phenomena of the mind* A conception of the mind as an organic unit performing a particular function— reasoning, feeling, willing— as may be demanded by the situation the individual is meeting, has taken the place of the more rigid, formal idea.7* It was her opinion that argument should take on more of the social point of view*

The rest of the article is de­

voted to an analysis of argumentation in the broader socio­ logical situation. Charles Henry Woolbert. Perhaps the most important critic of the old dichotomy of conviction and persuasion was Professor Woolbert.

In a series of articles published in the

Quarterly Journal of Public Sneaking, he criticized the writ­ ers of text-books and later offered his own explanation of the psychological nature of the process by which others are induced to believe and to act in response to the speaker. In his first article7** he examined the explanations

72 Ibid.; p. 111. 73 Charles Henry Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion: Some Considerations of Theory,” The Quarterly Iournal of Public Sneaking. Ill (July, 1917)”, 849-264.

38 given by same of the previous writers *

Then he began his in­

quiry by asking a series of questions: The issue can be stated in various ways: (1) Are belief and action two different entities, or are they one and the same thing? (£) Shall we speak of conviction and persuasion, or use one term for both? (3) Gan o il process­ es induced in a hearer or reader be described by the same concept, or must we use two, and even more? If we answer that the processes are essentially different, then we face, despite the presumption implied by centuries of use, certain subsidiary questions: (a) Precisely where does one method end and the other begin? (b) What are the terms that accurately describe their essential dif­ ferences? (c) Can we conceive of conviction and persua­ sion as essentially different but nevertheless as guided by a single common principle? These must be answered# But, on the other hand, if we contend that the process is one and one only, we then face questions like these: (a) In what terms can you state the unity so that there will be no omissions? (b) How do you explain away a duality so easily apparent and so obviously useful? (e) What is the one law that governs all the phenomena of speech and appeal— argumentation, conviction, persuasion, entertainment, exposition? (d) How can such a law be stated so as to fit all c a se s? 74 Woolbert then answered his questions by asserting that the answer is to be found in psychological monism of stimulus and response#

All mental and physical activity are found to

have unity in the fact that they are all forms of activity, and from the standpoint of psychology, they are all forms of response#

This is asserted to be true, regardless of whether

it is mental activity or physical activity* Psychologists present a strikingly solid front on this issue* 'Wo t them there is only one concept that describes

74 Ibid., pp. 252-253.

39 what happens when an organism is stimulated in any and * all possible ways, and that concept is expressed in the term action; or its synonyms, activity and reaction— as the psychologist uses them— all mean fundament ally the same thing; Beginning with the purely chemical change that takes place in, say the taste buds or the retina, or the physical change involved in the vibration of the end organs of the ear, and going on up to the complex pro­ cesses described as perception and emotion, or thence to such intricacies as solving a problem in calculus or en­ listing for war— the term action does universal and sat­ isfactory service* Terms used by the psychologists to suggest divisions into mental processes are not meant to denote any differentiation into action and that-which-isnot-action. So the terms sensation, feeling, association, perception, ideation, emotion, attention, will,while use­ ful for psychological description, are understood as hav­ ing reference to aspects of the larger whole— action; or let us use a word in many ways better suited to our pur­ poses, and one that will be used freely in the future— response*75 But Woolbert did not believe that this concept would have ready acceptance*

He anticipated certain objections and

tried to answer them beforehand;

In answer to a hypothetical

inquiry, "Isn*t it legitimate to speak of *physical* and *mental* acts?*5 he replied that **The psychologist cannot today make any distinction between 1physical* action and *mental* action; to him it is one and the same thing.”76 Mind and body are two aspects of the same entity; all action is both of the mind and of the body; there can be no separation which implies that mind exists somewhere else than in the body or that it exists in any one bodily member. Mind and body are so inextricably interwoven that such a solution ignores the fundamental realities

75 Ibid.. Ep; 253-254; 76 IM S L a i

»♦

255.

40 and is, purely verbal.

77

The second answer to the query as to why we cannot be satisfied with the division into physical acts and mental' acts was "that it offers no two divisions that are mutually exclusive.”78 Woolbert was still not sure that he had disposed of all the objections that would be made.

He recognized that

Somewhere here is an important difference, on that all seem agreed. Where is it to be found? How can we state it? Evidently something that looks like a dichotomy into action and non-action has got itself mistaken for the real thing: what is this interloper and where is it to be found?75 The answer was to be found in the fact that responses were of two kinds:

those that the observer could see and

those that were unseen.

In offering this answer Woolbert

stated that The error of the conviction-per suasion^ emoti on-intellect, thought-action duality is found in the fact that we discuss this issue, not in terms of what the responder actually does, but in terms of what the observer perceives him doing. What we have been talking about for ages in our rhetorical theory is not what the actor does, but what a spectator can detect by eye and ear. It is a dif­ ference, not between acting and thinking, but between one kind of* action that happens also to be perceivable move­ ment and ano'tEer kind of action in whTch the movement is

77 Ibid.. p®. 255-256. Ibid.. p. 256. 79 I £ M ‘» P* 257;

80 invisible and unnerceivablei Woolbert went on to say that the difference was not to be found in the often-expressed distinction between emotional states and states non-emotional, or intellectual.

Both were

types of response; hence no distinction could be drawn between them.

nThey cannot be differentiated in terms of action and

non-action.w®^ Next Woolbert raised the question as to whether the distinction might not be found in action instigated rationally and action instigated non-rationally.

This concept was un­

acceptable to him because n a. speech or appeal, stripped of all reasoning and given up wholly to non-rational processes, is unthinkable.

Every kind of address or speech rests in some

degree on reason. In denying the rational and non-rat ional dichotomy, Woolbert dismissed it upon the grounds that Mreason in speech and writing is a matter of orderliness, consistency, regular­ ity, system,

p l a n . f,8 3

He stated that

80 Ibid., p. 258. 81 Ibid.. p. 260.

In a strict sense non-rational, as applied to composi­ tion, is synonymous with muddled, futile, merely exclam­ atory. If there is sequence, form, order, there is some element of rationality present. But the conventional division contemplates no such meaning as this; according­ ly we have no alternative than to declare that a division on the basis of rationality cannot be alleged as the same one intended by the division into conviction and persua­ sion.84 It is of the utmost importance to note at this point that the meaning ascribed by Woolbert to the term "rational appeal" is far removed from the meaning ascribed to the term when it denotes evidence and logical reasoning aimed at estab­ lishing a logically valid conclusion by speaker and listener; In order to clinch his argument, Woolbert cast about him for some plausible explanation of why the line had been so consistently drawn at the point where movement is detect- . able.

His answer was found in the fact that people were

loathe to give overt response to an appeal, for they were thereby committed to acceptance of the speaker and his argu­ ment, and that carried social consequences.

One's neighbors

observed this overt action, branded the individual as a con­ vert, and he became morally.bound to abide by that decision; OR

Hence people were averse to overt response. ^ Following this (to him) momentous discovery, Woolbert followed it up by stating:

43 So we have a way of putting a speaker to his hest trumps to get any visible sign out of us; we habitually defy him to make us show down. And this is the reason, I am convinced, that rhetorical tradition has drawn the line at perceived movement. The difference is one easy to detect, in plain sight. Also a dichotomy has fitted in with the old conception of separating the intellect from the emotions, thought from action, conviction from persuasion, soul from body; and so the men who have writ­ ten on rhetoric, from Aristotle down, aided and abetted by the dictionary makers, have filled our texts and load­ ed our speech with terms that rest on this dualism.86 By the way of summary to this first article by Woolbert, we may let him speak for himself: By way of brief summary, then, this paper aims at the following conclusions: (1) as a matter of theory of pub­ lic address and appeal, all dualistic attitudes separat­ ing response into action and non-action are untenable and misleading. (2) The dichotomy into perceived movement and movement not perceived, to which the rhetorical theory of tradition is committed, is restricted in its applica­ tion to one of many subsidiary hints with respect to dif­ ferences in method, but is not a difference of a major character; (3) The whole theory of argumentation, convic­ tion, persuasion, the rhetoric of public address, must be rewritten to fit the facts of mind as accepted today; which will be tantamount to restating them in terms of stimuj^s-response, object-subject, and environment-attiAs a final word, it should be noted that not all of the theories of the rhetoricians whose works have been re­ viewed incorporated any distinction between action and nonaction as Woolbert perceived it and which Woolbert seemed to

86 Ibia.. P- 262. 87 Ibid.; p. 264.

take for granted as t&e traditional meaning of the terms con­ viction and persuasion. in his reasoning.

Yet this interpretation is crucial

Under his interpretation, there can be n o :

distinction between material presented by the speaker for the purpose of leading the hearer to an objectively-arrivedat conclusion based upon evidence and logical processes, and between an appeal directed at the individual in the form of emotionally charged words and unsupported assertions which if accepted will touch off emotional responses in the auditor. In the second of the series of articles published by Dr. Woolbert,88 he took up where he left off in the preced­ ing article, reiterating the conclusion that "We have come to look upon hidden responses as the aim of conviction, and overt responses as the aim of persuasion."89

In this second

paper he tried to show that such a division resolves itself into a division between overt and covert processes, and only that.

He contended that logic runs throughout the process,

and that "in all our activities there is an unconscious logic playing its part even when we think it is not there, although we are never able to detect its presence or to be sure of its

88 Charles Henry Woolbert, "The Place of Logic in a System of Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Speech Educa­ tion. IV (January, 1918)',' 19-39. 89 ibid., p; 19.

45 resuits*"90 In support of this concept, he argued that "a very sat­ isfactory explanation of the phenomenon is given by the uni­ versally accepted fact that mental processes of all kinds are neuromuscular processes* * * *"91

His reasoning from this

point is "based upon the concept that mental process Is really neuromuscular process, and this process is going on at dif­ ferent levels of consciousness. Once we accept the reality of this unconscious logic, we are in a position to discover that it is a part of all our thinking, that we are never free from it, that in reality it dominates not only our unseen thought, hut our overt activities, in fact our very lives. For every act of -percention, of understanding. of cognition, of beliefr of conviction, is a process of this subconscious making of inferences and "judgment s * ™ The place of logic in the thought processes is consid­ ered as being only at the level of the spoken word.

"We use

words— speech— only when there are other people to whom we wish to communicate."95 Formal logic deals with those Inferences that are made with words in the open before the eyes and ears of men. But the words do not make the logic; they are not the part essential to the fundamental reasoning processes; they are only the surface expression* The real reasoning,

90 Ibid., p. 20. 91 Ibid., p. 21. 92 Ibid., p. 22. 93 Ibid., p. 24.

46 the analyzing, the discriminating, the abstracting— the fundamental processes involved in reasoning— are carried on in nervous patterns below the level of speeeh, and are lifted up to the level of words when there is a social situation wherein one man wishes to communicate verbally to others* For such situations logic has been formulated. Yet the overwhelmingly great majority of inferences we make are non-verbal.94 These levels of exposure of logical processes fall in­ to three categories:

(1) Subconscious Inferences— made be­

low the surface, below the level of introspective awareness, and scarcely ever employing words.

(2) Semi-Open Inferences—

the level of suggestion instigated by speech, the acceptance of the word of others; authority.

(3) Openly-Made Inferences—

the level at which the speaker must use words in the form of more-or-less rigorous logic in attempting to win the auditor to his way of thinking.95 Woolbert then attempted to set forth logical formulaefor each of the three levels of inference.

On level (1) that

of hidden inference, the rules that govern are those that have to do with the choice of words and the construction of sentences and paragraphs. Words must be chosen, if the speaker is to induce hid­ den inferences in others, so that they give clear mean­ ing free from ambiguity and haziness, so that they impress above the mass of other competing stimulators, so that they win in the struggle among the contending parties for

94 Loc. Git. 95 Ibid.. PP. 27-31.

47 a motor outlet* Words are well chosen for this end if they call up old memories, clear images, intense attitudes, and long-cherished concepts*96 For level (2), that of Authority, he stated that some of the formulae have been worked out, while others have not. A body of miles for the exercise of Prestige has not yet been organized and perfected; this is the one spot in the system of persuasion that reveals a pronounced g a p . 97 For level- (3), that of Open reasoning, • • • the formulae are as definite and precise as the most exacting needs of speech require; the rules of logic are one of the surest possessions of the science of persua­ sion in its- known forms* • * • All judgments made in the open must conform to the rule of logic or fail in effective­ ness; they must be made according to an accepted logical method or be declared Insufficient for their p u r p o s e *98 Thus Dr. Woolbert appears to follow a devious course, now denying that a dichotomy exists, because others have been dividing the process on the basis of seen and unseen responses*

This cannot be accepted, because they are both

still responses*

The next moment we find him dividing the

processes of inferences into three categories, one of the surface and requiring logical rigor, the other two having to do with the wsubconsciousn inferences of the individual, and involving feelings, emotions, prejudices— in short, all the

96 Itoia., EP. 32-33; 97 I S M * ,

p*

^

98 Ibid.. pi 34;

48 processes which the earlier writers have included under their concepts of persuasion.

It suggests that Woolbert has back­

tracked on himself and has found himself following the blazed trail of Aristotle and all the others, although he makes a desperate effort to distinguish his own concept from that of the others. But Woolbert has not completed his analysis.

He must

find some motivation for inferences made on any level.

In

casting about for an answer, he hit upon the psychology of Freud. Wish.

All inference, all conduct, arises from the Freudian In order to make his three levels square with the Wish,

he stated that Inferences are hardly made out of blue sky; they are forced upon us. Every inference arises because we are pleased to make it; we believe because we want to; we respond in a given way because that is the way we are heading. So, to speak of levels of inference is also to speak of levels of openness in wishing^ We can wish in the dark, as we all ao most sinfully; or we can wish half in the open, and charge the wish to some man of prestige or expertness; and then again we can wish fairly in the open where everyone can see us in the act.99 Applying his Freudian psychology to fallacies, he stated that All fallacies in reasoning reveal attempts to supplant a wish of which we are ashamed by one which we think will be more socially acceptable •3.00

99 Ibid.. p. 36. 10° Ibid.. p. 37.

49 In concluding the second article in the series, Woolhert gave his own summary as follows: (1) Inferences, 3'a