A Gossip Politic 3031151186, 9783031151187

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
Gossip and Politics
An Overview
References
Part I Gossip and the Press
2 The Omigod no! Notes on News Talk
News and the Human-Interest Story
The Mapp and Lucia Novels
Finding Something to Talk About (Newsworthiness)
Having News to Tell
News, Politics, and Power
News and Media
References
3 Talk as News on Television
Introduction
Talk as the Voice of Authority in News
Using Public Talk
Conclusion
References
4 The Celebrity Interview: Gossip, Empathy and News in Oprah Winfrey’s CBS Interview with Meghan Markle
Introduction
Analysing the Discourse of the Meghan Interview in Its Context
Gossip as a Key Element in the Contextual Background to the Oprah with Meghan and Harry Interview
Oprah and Alignment in the Interview
Oprah and the Use of Statements Attributed to a Third-Party
Oprah and the Use of Echoing
Oprah and the Use of Continuers
Oprah and the Use of Reactive Expressions
The Celebrity Interview, Gossip, Empathy and News
Conclusions
References
Part II Gossip and the President
5 Hedda Hopper Meets JFK: Hollywood Gossip, Right-Wing Politics, and the Kennedys
Covering the Kennedys
Political Attacks and Sexual Innuendo
Demanding Presidential Action
Communism and Conspiracy
Conclusion
References
6 “Enquiring Minds Want to Know”: President Bill Clinton and the Blurring of News and Gossip
Introduction
Presidential Scandal Meets New Media: Changes to Journalism & Political News During the Clinton Administration
The Convergence of Gossip and News: Two Cases of Questionable Reporting in the Lewinsky Scandal
Eyewitnesses to the Affair
The Stained Dress
Conclusion
References
7 A Trickle-Down Effect of Foreign Policy on Domestic Narratives: Populism and Trump’s Espousal of Conspiracy and Gossip to “Make America Great Again”
Introduction
Conceptual Framework
Methodology—Socio-Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis
‘The Trickle-Down Effect’—From Foreign Policy and Conspiracy Theories to Domestic Narratives and Gossip
From Inclination Towards Strongmen Populist to Muscular Populism
From Anti-Muslim Bias to Xenophobia and Racism
From Aversion to Neighbouring Countries to Securitization
Conclusion
References
Part III Gossip and the Public
8 Media Framing of the Christine Blasey Ford Testimony: The Influence of Gossip on Sexual Violence Discourses
Introduction
Pervasiveness of Sexual Violence in Contemporary Culture
Political Scandals and Gossip-Style Framing
Gossip-Style Framing of Christine Blasey Ford’s Testimony
Sexual Assault Allegations as a Political Tactic
Speaking up as an Act of Wrongdoing
Conclusion
References
9 The Marriages of Celebrity Politicians: A Social Semiotic Approach to How Commenters Affiliate Around YouTube Gossip Videos
Introduction: YouTube Gossip and Celebrity Politicians
Dataset: Nicki Swift Videos and Comments
Analytical Method: A Social Semiotic Perspective on Gossip
Affiliation Analysis of the Comment Threads
Bonds Tabled in Prompt Questions by the YouTuber
Exploring Affiliation in the Comment Threads
Discussion of Findings and Future Directions
References
10 Gossip on the Hill: Bonding, Bitching, and Politicians’ Home Style on Twitter
Representation and Presentation of Self
The Politics of Celebrity and Gossip
Method
Findings—Home Style and Gossip
Discussion and Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

RHETORIC, POLITICS AND SOCIETY

A Gossip Politic Edited by Andrea McDonnell Adam Silver

Rhetoric, Politics and Society

Series Editors Alan Finlayson, University of East Anglia, Norfolk, UK James Martin, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK Kendall R. Phillips, Syracuse University, Syracuse, USA

Rhetoric lies at the intersection of a variety of disciplinary approaches and methods, drawing upon the study of language, history, culture and philosophy to understand the persuasive aspects of communication in all its modes: spoken, written, argued, depicted and performed. This series presents the best international research in rhetoric that develops and exemplifies the multifaceted and cross-disciplinary exploration of practices of persuasion and communication. It seeks to publish texts that openly explore and expand rhetorical knowledge and enquiry, be it in the form of historical scholarship, theoretical analysis or contemporary cultural and political critique. The editors welcome proposals for monographs that explore contemporary rhetorical forms, rhetorical theories and thinkers, and rhetorical themes inside and across disciplinary boundaries. For informal enquiries, questions, as well as submitting proposals, please contact the editors: Alan Finlayson: [email protected] James Martin: [email protected] Kendall Phillips: [email protected]

Andrea McDonnell · Adam Silver Editors

A Gossip Politic

Editors Andrea McDonnell Communication Providence College Providence, RI, USA

Adam Silver Political Science and International Relations Emmanuel College Boston, MA, USA

ISSN 2947-5147 ISSN 2947-5155 (electronic) Rhetoric, Politics and Society ISBN 978-3-031-15118-7 ISBN 978-3-031-15119-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credits: CSA Images/Vetta/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

We are especially thankful for the efforts of the contributors, whose scholarship has brought this topic to life with rigor and spirit, and whose good humor throughout the editorial process has made work on this project a pleasure and a privilege. We are grateful for the support from members of the editorial team at Palgrave, especially Shreenidhi Natarajan, who helped see the book through to completion. We also wish to thank Zachary Lebreiro and Madison Suitor for their diligence and assistance throughout the research process. Special thanks to the Ross Priory Broadcast Talk Seminar Group, whose innovative interdisciplinary spirit has fostered a number of the projects contained in this volume, and to the Political Science departments at Providence College and Emmanuel College for their ongoing support of our scholarly endeavors.

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Contents

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Introduction Andrea McDonnell and Adam Silver

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Part I Gossip and the Press 2

The Omigod no! Notes on News Talk Paddy Scannell

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Talk as News on Television Michael Higgins

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The Celebrity Interview: Gossip, Empathy and News in Oprah Winfrey’s CBS Interview with Meghan Markle Jin Shen and Martin Montgomery

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Part II Gossip and the President 5

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Hedda Hopper Meets JFK: Hollywood Gossip, Right-Wing Politics, and the Kennedys Jennifer Frost

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“Enquiring Minds Want to Know”: President Bill Clinton and the Blurring of News and Gossip Jennifer Hopper

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CONTENTS

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A Trickle-Down Effect of Foreign Policy on Domestic Narratives: Populism and Trump’s Espousal of Conspiracy and Gossip to “Make America Great Again” Prashant Rastogi

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Part III Gossip and the Public 8

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Media Framing of the Christine Blasey Ford Testimony: The Influence of Gossip on Sexual Violence Discourses Madison A. Pollino The Marriages of Celebrity Politicians: A Social Semiotic Approach to How Commenters Affiliate Around YouTube Gossip Videos Olivia Inwood and Michele Zappavigna Gossip on the Hill: Bonding, Bitching, and Politicians’ Home Style on Twitter Andrea McDonnell and Adam Silver

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Frost Jennifer teaches US history at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, and is the author of Hedda Hopper’s Hollywood: Celebrity Gossip and American Conservatism. Higgins Michael is Senior Lecturer and Programme Leader in Media and Communication at the University of Strathclyde in Scotland. His research focuses on the manner in which media and culture influences the political realm. Recently, this has concentrated on the rise of aggressiveness and conflict in media, including his book Belligerent Broadcasting (with Angela Smith, 2017). Michael’s other books include Media and Their Publics (2008), The Cambridge Companion to Modern British Culture (2010) and The Language of Journalism (with Angela Smith, 2nd ed, 2020). Hopper Jennifer is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Southern Connecticut State University where she regularly teaches courses in American Government, the US Presidency, Congress and the Legislative Process, and Media & Politics. She is the author of Presidential Framing in the 21st Century News Media: The Politics of the Affordable Care Act (Routledge, 2017). Her scholarship has also appeared in White House Studies, Social Science History, and the International Journal of Communication. Her research interests focus on political communication, the presidency, and the US news media, particularly as they relate to health care politics and policy.

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Inwood Olivia is a Ph.D. Candidate in the School of the Arts and Media at the University of New South Wales. Her current research uses methods in Systemic Functional Linguistics to explore issues of mis/disinformation and deceptive communication on YouTube. In 2018, she graduated with First Class Honours in Media, Culture, and Technology, writing her thesis on blockchain technology start-ups from a social semiotic perspective. She has research articles written with Associate Professor Michele Zappavigna recently published in Discourse & Communication and Social Semiotics. McDonnell Andrea is Associate Professor of Communication and Director of the Communication Minor at Providence College, USA, where her research examines the relationship between celebrity culture and media audiences. She is the author of Reading Celebrity Gossip Magazines (2014), and co-author, with Susan Douglas, of Celebrity: A history of fame (2019). Her research has appeared in Psychology of Popular Media Culture and Critical Studies in Media Communication and has been featured in the New York Times, E! News, NPR, Buzzfeed, and the BBC. Montgomery Martin is Emeritus Professor of Literary Linguistics at the University of Macau, China, and Visiting Professor of Media and Communication at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK. He has written widely on language and the media—especially on aspects of broadcast talk. His latest book is Language, Media, and Culture: The Key Concepts, published by Routledge. Pollino Madison A. is a Doctoral Student in Media and Communication at Bowling Green State University. Her research uses critical, queer, and feminist frameworks to examine the role of culture in contemporary discourses regarding gendered violence. She is interested in how hegemonic representations of gender, race, and class influence societal perceptions of gendered violence as well as one’s decision to disclose their experiences in interpersonal relationships. She has published work in Critical Studies in Media Communication, Communication Education, Feminist Media Studies, and Qualitative Inquiry. Rastogi Prashant is a Doctoral Candidate at O.P. Jindal Global University, India, and a Geopolitical Risk Analyst for WoRisGo. His research lies at the intersection of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies with research areas including Conflict Resolution, Populism, Rebel Communication, Terrorism, Public Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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He also works extensively on Geopolitics, Business Continuity Plans, and Information Warfare. Scannell Paddy is Professor Emeritus in the University of Michigan’s Department of Communication. He is a founding editor of Media, Culture, and Society and author of numerous books including Media and Communication, Television and the Meaning of Live, Why do People Sing?, and Love and Communication. Shen Jin received her Ph.D. degree in English linguistics in 2018 from the University of Macau where she worked as a research assistant under Prof. Martin Montgomery’s supervision. Her doctoral research examines the use of interactional devices in The Oprah Winfrey Show. Her research interests focus on discourse interactional sociolinguistics, conversation analysis, and media discourse. Silver Adam is Associate Professor of Political Science at Emmanuel College, USA, where his research focuses on the American Political Party Development, specifically the relationship between political elites and the electorate on the crafting of campaign strategy. He is the author of Partisanship and Polarization: American Party Platforms, 1840–1896 (forthcoming) and co-editor of Agitation with a Smile: Howard Zinn’s Legacies and the Future of Activism (2014). His research has appeared in American Nineteenth Century History and Social Science History, and he has contributed to the Washington Post. Zappavigna Michele is Associate Professor in the School of Arts and Media at the University of New South Wales. Her major research interest is in exploring ambient affiliation in the discourse of social media using social semiotic, multimodal, and corpus-based methods. She is a co-editor of the journal Visual Communication. Key books include Searchable Talk: Hashtags and Social Medi Metadiscourse (2018) and Discourse of Twitter and Social Media (2012). Recent co-authored books include Researching the Language of Social Media (2014; 2022) and Modelling Paralanguage Using Systemic Functional Semiotics (2021).

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 9.1

Illustration 3.1 Illustration 3.2

Screen grab from the interview 1 Dialogic affiliation system (Adapted from Zappavigna, 2018) Higgins illustration Higgins illustration

50 141 32 32

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List of Tables

Table Table Table Table

9.1 9.2 9.3 10.1

Table 10.2

Nicki Swift video dataset Sub-systems of attitude Questions asked in Nicki Swift comment threads Top 3 most followed democrats and republicans on Twitter Tweets by account and member, February 14-March 20, 2022

137 140 142 162 164

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Andrea McDonnell and Adam Silver

The renowned columnist Liz Smith is often quoted as remarking, “Gossip is just news running ahead of itself in a red satin dress. (Cheng & Barnes, 2017).” If we take a juicy tidbit and peel back the glitzy, the kitchy, and the bitchy, what remains? In a twenty-first century era of constantly breaking news, rumors, innuendos, and tweets are significant in their own right; they both respond to and drive the mainstream news cycle. From human interest stories to palace intrigue to punditry, political talk often shares many of the same features of interpersonal gossip: It revels in speculation, casts a moral judgment, influences opinion, and serves as a form of entertainment (Jones, 1980). The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thanks in part to the rise of cable news, national

A. McDonnell (B) Communication, Providence College, Providence, RI, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Silver (B) Political Science and International Relations, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_1

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news magazines, and growth of celebrity media, ushered in a period of increased tabloidization, a shift away from the “objective,” “hard” journalistic values of post-World War II era and toward a discourse centered on gossip, infotainment, and human interest (Franklin, 1997). But in truth, debates about the relationship between news and gossip have existed for as long as there have been publications to cover either. The penny papers of the nineteenth century emphasized the lurid and scandalous (MacGill Hughes, 1940, 11; Schudson, 1981); their low cost and accessible content also allowed them to serve as an entry point into politics for the previously excluded working class (MacGill Hughes, 1940, pp. 7). By the 1930s, gossip columnists like Walter Winchell and Hedda Hopper were famous and influential journalists who blended news and entertainment reporting and toed the line between the worlds of high society, celebrity, and politics. Winchell was known for his dramatic, signature style of reporting, beginning with a “flash” bit—something scandalous or crime-driven—and then moving into a blend of gossip and hard news reporting (Gabler, 1994, pp. 215). This was especially compelling on radio, where his staccato delivery created an immediate sense of urgency and interest. At the height of his career, fifty million Americans (out of a total population of seventy-five million) either listened to Winchell’s weekly radio broadcast or read his daily column, and he has been credited with transforming journalism into a form of entertainment (Gabler, 1994). Of course, Winchell later went on to align himself with Joseph McCarthy and to use his influence in an effort to undermine his rivals; his political machinations ultimately soured his career. Similarly, Hedda Hopper rose to prominence with her column “Hedda Hopper’s Hollywood,” published in the Los Angeles Times (Frost, 2011). She reported largely on movie stars, but politicians were not immune to her exposés; in 1939, her reporting on the divorce of President Roosevelt’s son, Jimmy, made national news (Fine Collins, 1997). Hopper was also a vocal Republican and conservative, speaking at rallies and conventions, and later running (unsuccessfully) on Republican ticket for a county political seat (Fine Collins, 1997). She would later become a prominent force behind the creation of the Hollywood Blacklist, which accused members of the entertainment industry of being Communists. These interconnections between politics and entertainment are longstanding. But they have become ever more enmeshed in the twenty-first

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century, as the countless media platforms that have sprung up to host and disseminate information have become available to users immediately and at relatively low cost. The Internet has created space for amateur and citizen journalism, and a platform for anyone to speak their mind and share information at any time across globally connected networks. This has made news more accessible than ever, but it has also created a complex information ecosystem in which reliable reporting exists alongside speculation, conspiracy theory, and clickbait. In the political realm, sites like The Drudge Report and Infowars rely on traditional tabloid techniques, breathlessly reporting on tidbits that may or may not be true while also fueling political debate and discussion. And gossip sites of the early 2000s, such as The Dirty, Perez Hilton, and Gawker, foreshadowed the ceaseless churn of celebrity and pop culture gossip that now runs through sites like TikTok and Twitter while presenting themselves as news sources. That the boundary between gossip and political news has become so transparent is a fact reflected in the public’s self-reported lack of confidence in reliable reporting; only 6 in 10 adults say they have “at least some trust” in national news organizations and only 27% say the same about news they read on social media (Pew, 2021). Not all gossip is celebrity driven, but the powerful and well-known have long served as recognizable and therefore convenient figures about whom the public shares a gossip repertoire. When it comes to mediated talk, both news and gossip rely upon a known cast of characters about whom information sharing can take place. The society pages of the nineteenth century provided precisely this type of content, reporting on the social galas and goings on of the rich (stories that were often written by, about, and read by, women). More recently, the Internet, paparazzi, tabloid, and social media industry explosion of the early 2000s has produced an ever-increasing pool of famous figures about whom the public could learn, speculate, and envy. It has also transformed public figures from the realm of politics into celebrities in their own rights, as they regularly appear in magazines, on television, and in venues traditionally reserved for stars of the entertainment industry (Wheeler, 2013). Celebrity gossip had long been considered “trash” media—unimportant, and certainly not newsworthy, except in the softest of news frames. Yet as celebrities infiltrate facets of the public sphere that have traditionally been considered newsworthy—humanitarian efforts, crime, and even

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foreign affairs—and as stars of film, television, and music delve into politics, tabloid gossip has become synonymous with news. The line between politician and celebrity, news and gossip, has dissolved.

Gossip and Politics Etymologically, the English word gossip can be traced to the Old English godsib, which referred to a person, such as a godparent, who was an insider (but not a relative) within a family group (Tebbutt, 1995). Such a person would be privy to the personal details of family life, therefore possessing secret knowledge of personal goings on. Over time, the term evolved to connote friendship, companionship, and talk—particularly malicious and scandalous talk—most often engaged by women or feminized actors (McDonnell, 2014). Gossip is also fundamentally a part of women’s oral culture. As Deborah Jones writes, it is a mode of connectivity, of bonding and relationship building, a means of information sharing, and a vehicle for expressing dissatisfaction and resistance (Jones, 1980). Women’s interests, and talk about those interests, have historically been excluded from the public sphere. The term gossip works not only to characterize women’s talk but also to trivialize and dismiss it, to mark it as personal, emotional, and therefore unimportant. The marginalization of women’s talk and the relegation of women’s interests to the personal sphere have been a key point of contention in women’s movements. Jones writes that gossip can be understood as “women speaking in their roles as women” and that bitching, which she defines as a form of gossip, is an important mode of dissent (1980, pp. 194). Feminists of the second wave fostered solidarity through conversation, including consciousness-raising groups, contending that “the personal is political.” And more recently, the #MeToo movement has centered women’s talk as a way of reclaiming personal narratives and pushing back against the notion that women’s accounts are merely anecdotal and better kept private. So while it may be easy to dismiss gossip as trivial or apolitical, to do so is to ignore the myriad ways in which the feminization of certain kinds of speech and subject matter has long been used as a tactic meant to suppress those at the margins. This does not only affect those who identify as women. Media framing of actors as effeminate can serve to stigmatize, other, and delegitimize their claims, as was the case for narratives circulating around gay men during the HIV/AIDS crisis (Lichetenstein, 1996).

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The way in which women’s talk has been sequestered from “serious news” can be seen plainly in the mainstream press. The “women’s pages” and gossip pages have been historically relegated to their own section of the newspaper, while TV talk shows (aired during daytime hours and targeted to stay-at-home moms) are considered fluffy and apolitical, even when they take up issues such as domestic violence, race relations, drug addiction, and gun control. Yet the celebritization of news media that began in the 1980s and intensified throughout the early 2000s pushed mainstream news outlets to cover stories that would have previously been relegated to the E! network and People magazine. What cable news station could possibly decline to cover the OJ Simpson trial, or Bill Clinton’s affair with an intern, or the death of stars Michael Jackson, Kobe Bryant, and Prince without suffering devastating ratings losses? Newspapers—the long-established bastion of reliable reporting—were certainly not immune, suffering massive circulation declines over the past two decades despite efforts to keep apace (Pew, 2020). Still, while “hard” news purveyors increasingly adopted “soft” news stylings and topics, content traditionally aimed at women—even when it overtly takes up political topics or breaks critical stories with its reporting—retains its reputation as trivial and unserious. No single figure epitomized this dissolution more clearly than Donald Trump. Throughout his presidency, Trump used multiple platforms, including cable news, social media (most notably Twitter), and his relationship with David Pecker, CEO of American Media and publisher whose holdings have included tabloid titles from the National Enquirer, to the Sun, to Us Weekly, to craft a representational style as an individual who was “an outside,” external to the political system in Washington D.C. After leaving office and having been banned from Twitter, Trump has continued to cultivate his political celebrity on his own social media platform, Truth Social. Tabloid gossip elevated Trump’s public persona as a real estate developer, fueled his reality television career, and helped launch Trump onto the political stage. His White House transformed presidential messaging into a barrage of insinuations, innuendos, and personal affronts. But while gossip was a defining feature of his presidency, it is not new to politics nor unique to Trump. A Gossip Politic seeks to make explicit the historical, technological, and cultural links between American politics, news media, and gossip as a mode of communication. The analysis yields a new archetype of the gossip politic in which the lines between politician

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and celebrity are completely and irrevocably broken. The celebrity politician advances their own brand without a regard for, or even intention of, advancing public policies. The only goal is to employ gossip to further their fame and influence. While Trump may be the most prominent purveyor of a gossip politic, members of Congress and news media also embody this approach as they seek to develop a national brand that extends beyond the geographic boundaries of their district or occupation. Legislators like Representative Ocasio-Cortez utilize social media to develop a more intimate connection with voters by providing personal commentary on happenings in Washington D.C., policy, and popular culture. At the same time news pundits, like Tucker Carlson, utilize their station to elevate their status in the national conversation about future elective office (Smith, 2022). The advent of this gossip politic archetype raises questions about the nature of representation and democratic responsiveness.

An Overview In the collection of essays that follows, an esteemed cohort of interdisciplinary scholars from the fields of Political Science, Media Studies, Linguistics, and Sociology explore the ways gossip has shaped our understanding of news, impacted democracy, and contributed to the contemporary partisan political landscape in the United States. The book is divided into three sections. The first section, Gossip and the Press, considers the links between news reporting and gossip, past and present. Paddy Scannell’s opening chapter explores the relationship between human interest stories, talk and gender, and the ways in which news makes life “tellable.” Michael Higgins expands on the topic of mediated talk, tracing the ways in which talk is performed, and made authoritative, on broadcast news television. Jin Shen and Martin Montgomery provide an in-depth case study of the ways talk is “done” on television, through a discourse analysis of Oprah Winfrey’s 2021 interview with Megan Markle. Section two, Gossip and the Presidency, examines three historic snapshots of the influence of gossip on American Presidents. Jennifer Frost shows how gossip reporter Hedda Hopper’s ideology shaped her coverage of the Kennedy administration, and how that reporting impacted the Kennedy family and the politics of the 1960s. Jennifer Hopper takes up the entertainment news of the late 1990s in her chapter on Bill Clinton’s

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affair with Monica Lewinsky, and the ways the media ecosystem both influenced, and was shaped by, that scandal. Donald Trump’s history as a creature of the gossip press, and his strategic use of gossip techniques in service of a populist platform, is the focus of Prashant Rastogi’s chapter on the recent Presidency. The final section, Gossip and the Public, explores the function and effects of a gossip politic in contemporary American culture with an eye toward the implications for public discourse, civic engagement, and democratic outcomes. Madison Pollino analyzes media framing of Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony to show how gossip-style reporting about sexual assault allegations influenced public sentiment toward thenSupreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh. Olivia Inwood and Michael Zappavigna turn to the comments section of the Nicki Swift YouTube channel to show how gossip reinforces social bonds while also potentially contributing to the spread of online conspiracy theories. Finally, the editors close the collection with a chapter that examines politicians’ use of Twitter as a discursive space, and the way in which personal talk on social media relates to the connection between elected officials and constituents as the former seeks to develop a representative style that cultivates a personal brand and a connection with followers.

References Cheng, C., & Barnes, M. (2017, November 11). Liz Smith, New York’s grand dame of dish, dies at 94. The Hollywood Reporter. Fine Collins, A. (1997, April 1). The powerful rivalry of Hedda Hopper and Louella Parsons. Vanity Fair. Franklin, B. (1995). Newszak and news media. Arnold. Frost, J. (2011). Hedda Hopper’s Hollywood: Celebrity gossip and American conservatism. NYU Press. Gabler, N. (1994). Winchell: Gossip, power, and the culture of celebrity. Vintage Books. Jones, D. (1980). Gossip: Notes on women’s oral culture. Women’s Studies International Quarterly, 3, 193–198. Lichetenstein, B. (1996). Creating icons of AIDS: The media and popular culture. In P. Davis (Ed.), Intimate details and vital statistics: AIDS, sexuality, and the social order in New Zealand. Auckland University Press. Auckland, NZ. MacGill Hughes, H. (1940). News and the human interest story. University of Chicago Press.

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McDonnell. A. (2014). Reading celebrity gossip magazines. Polity. Pew Research (2020, June 29). Newspapers fact sheet. Pewresearch.org. Pew Research (2021, August 30). Partisan divide in media trust widen, driven by a decline among Republicans. Pewresearch.org. Schudson, M. (1981). Discovering the news: A social history of American newspapers. Basic Books. Smith, D. (2022, July 17). ‘He could be a good president’: is Tucker Carlson the next Donald Trump? The Guardian. Tebbutt, M. (1995). Women’s talk?: A social history of gossip in working-class neighborhoods, 1880–1960. Ashfield Publishing Co. Wheeler, M. (2013). Celebrity politics. Polity.

PART I

Gossip and the Press

CHAPTER 2

The Omigod no! Notes on News Talk Paddy Scannell

News and the Human-Interest Story I have long thought that our (academic) notion of news is wrong or, more exactly, misconceived. I simply don’t see that news is some new thing, an invention of modernity, the profession of journalism, somehow tied into democracy and telling truth to power. I have always thought of it as a shared resource and part of everyday life for the members of any human community. In other words, it is a communally co-produced thing. It is not media dependent. The still prevailing view of news is that it is mediacentric. News got going with newspapers, and then became global, via today’s new media—radio and television in the last century; the internet and subsidiaries in this. All abide by the old print definitions of news as what you get in newspapers as supplied by journalists. At the core of this were a small number of bedrock assumptions. News was a serious matter, as it underpinned democratic values. It was hard as opposed to soft. It was overwhelmingly gendered in favour of men, who were dominant in

P. Scannell (B) Department of Communication, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_2

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the media and academia. Its focus was information, not entertainment. Citizens in democracies needed to be informed, not entertained. This chapter is written as an alternative to the view of news that predominates in journalism studies. It does not deny the role of news as having a central role in informing the public as part of the democratic process. But that is not all it is. A non-mediacentric view of news would see it very differently, as the pearl of price in ordinary daily life. I wish to put forward an account of news that thinks of it as central to everyday life in two ways. News is always political, a power struggle for social dominance. There are those that are newsworthy (who make the news as they struggle for power) and those that are not. A fundamental theme in what follows is that news is good to talk about. News and news talk go together as we shall see in this brief survey of the data corpus that provides the evidence for a view of news that is both serious and popular at the same time. This chapter is, in part, a very belated homage to the late Helen MacGill Hughes who, as a graduate student in the Chicago sociology department in the 1930s, wrote her thesis on news and the humaninterest story. She argued that news then was transmogrifying, slowly at first, to become part of the entertainment, or culture industries (Scannell, 2020). And this she understood as a widening and deepening of the democratic function of popular culture; a culture that addressed everybody—the poor, and uneducated, and women—subsumed under the general title of ‘the human-interest story.’ Human-interest stories focused on what was sensational (murder especially), but also what was personal— true stories with their roots in ordinary daily life (the subject of radio ‘soap operas’). In her account ‘the popular press enlivened everything ’. As it grew, it led the demos [MacGill’s name for the hugely expanded readership of the daily press], through the human interest in a personal story, towards an acquaintanceship with a wider world beyond the immediate concerns of day-to-day life. The effect of this was, she argued, imponderable. Journalists, she felt, ignored this historical process, and social philosophers saw it as beneath them. I believe she was right to emphasise the significance of the humaninterest story, but it is very hard to find evidence of a non-mediatic view of news. Erving Goffman, more than any other sociologist, pioneered the study of everyday life. One technique he used with pungent effect in his writing was to see no intrinsic difference between fact and fiction. Both are historical phenomena of equal value to the sociologist. He

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would take some fictional instance to support his sociological argument as having equal weight with any factual example. News, whether in factual or fictional narratives, serves equally well as a resolution to the fundamental problem of finding something ‘worth’ talking about, in order to maintain the smooth functioning of everyday social existence. I follow him in this, taking the novels of the English author E. F. Benson as my empirical source. I was inspired initially by the research of Dorothy Hobson who, in her pioneering work on the popular culture of television, made a little study of women (mainly working-class British housewives) listening to the radio and watching television (Hobson, 1980). As far as her female interviewees were concerned (and Hobson was a pioneer of born-again ethnographic studies of television) news was something they preferred to avoid. It was (a) depressing, and (b) boring but (c) important. They accepted of course, the news values of central media. They were accepted as true and valid accounts of the real (male) world. But it was not really interesting. Women preferred comedy, entertainment, drama serials (soap operas), and quiz shows. They rejected the things men liked (or said they liked)—e.g. ‘boring’ documentaries, sport, and especially news which, at the time of Hobson’s study, was synonymous with war (Vietnam) for her interviewees (Hobson, 1980). The news they wanted should be fun. It should be entertaining. Later work confirmed this ‘moral hierarchy’ of television viewing: there were ‘important’ male things and unimportant female things. Male preferences were serious, female tastes were frivolous. This moral hierarchy of viewing was explored in an ethnographic study of Finnish men and women watching television undertaken, a decade after Hobson, by Perrti Alasuutari (1992). His research confirmed the division of likes and dislikes between women and men that Hobson discovered. Gendered tastes were polarised between the things that you made excuses for watching (or not), and the things that needed no excuse. A male interviewee declared ‘I’m ashamed to admit it but I have watched Dallas,’ perhaps the most successful American entertainment TV show of all time. It ran for most of the 1980s and in over 150 countries worldwide. It was universally popular (except in Japan) and is probably the most studied of all classic TV shows, partly because of its then novel huge global impact and appeal. The moral law of classic broadcast television, as discovered by Alasuutari, runs like this: good things on television need no justification (because they’re good for you); bad things do because they’re not good for you. The

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moral norms of broadcast television were gendered. News was good. Soap operas were bad. Male taste was moral, female taste was immoral. Taste and television were both gendered in taken-for-granted ways. Dallas was almost universally regarded as rubbish. It was ‘stupid,’ it wasn’t ‘good’ for you, but it was compulsively watchable—like so much of television. And it was good to talk about, particularly among female viewers who made up at least 70% of the audience. ‘Did you see JJ’s wardrobe malfunction at last night’s Super Bowl?’ is cited in the online Urban Dictionary (founded 1999) as a classic watercooler moment, which it defines as ‘a significant moment in television history that is discussed the next day in the workplace.’ Water-cooler TV appears to be an aspect of late twentieth-century American network television, which Amanda Lotz explains as the product of imposed network norms and mass viewing. With little programme choice, and everyone watching the same thing, television programmes provided shared content for discussion by all and sundry (Lotz, 2007, 32). Perhaps the most outstanding water-cooler event of the American network TV era was, appropriately enough, the ‘Who shot JR?’ moment. It came at the end of the 1980–1981 season of Dallas when the carefully crafted cliffhanger final episode climaxed with the shooting of JR by person(s) unknown. The slaying of J. R. Ewing (but was he really dead?)—the smiling villain of the show and, by common consent, ‘the nastiest man on television’— furnished enough conversation about who might have dunnit (since everyone in the show, except his mother, had reason enough to want him dead) to leave viewers on tenterhooks for the first episode of the next season when all would be revealed. 90 million Americans, or 76% of the total available audience, and 360 million viewers around the world watched the episode. It achieved the highest TV rating in US history of any show to date. The JR and JJ (Janet Jackson) moments (one fictional, the other factual) are both embedded in global popular memory as outstanding newsworthy TV events. Both were good to talk about, the primary characteristic of newsworthiness. Both were fine examples of ‘human interest’ stories which, in the classic news optic, were neither news nor newsworthy. The human-interest story is ‘soft’ news, and it became customary, in 1960s Britain, to include a bit of soft news towards the end of the thirty-minute ‘hard’ TV news-programme. Commercial TV, not the BBC, led the way in this effort to liven things up a bit. Hard and soft are, of course, both normative and gendered, as Valerie Hobson found.

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The Mapp and Lucia Novels I came across, by accident really, a body of early twentieth-century English texts in which news was the central fact and driver of the narratives. The corpus was a finite set of six novels, written between 1920 and 1939 by the English author, E. F. (Fred) Benson. They have something of a cult status in England. They have a devoted gay following and have been adapted more than once for television. Their television treatment presented them as high camp whimsy. And of course, I read them all in the first place, eagerly, for fun. They can be read separately as stand-alone texts, but they feed into each other, as a continuing saga between Emeline Lucas and Elizabeth Mapp, as they battle for social supremacy in the fictional worlds of Riseholme and Tilling. Like Goffman, I took the whole corpus as valuable sociological data, an historical source of information. At one level news-as-human interest, as the trigger of daily conversation in the narratives, points to the subfield of the psychology of gossip. And while news of what Lucia (Emeline Lucas) and Elizabeth Mapp are up to endlessly supplies a topic for talk-as-gossip between friends and acquaintances, it is more than just ‘small talk.’ My aim is to show some of the basic features of the zero-sum character of social life as game theory—the subject of Eric Berne’s most successful book (Games People Play), who shared the same interest in it as Erving Goffman. The stories are all focused on the social lives of a small group of people in the two fictional locations: Riseholme (pronounced Rizzum), and Tilling, the fictional name for Rye, the seaside town in Sussex where Benson lived for many years. Each place has what Raymond Williams calls ‘a knowable community’—a small group of people mainly, but not exclusively, female who all know and talk with each other. No one works. Some, like Lucia, are rolling in money. Others, like Mapp, have limited means. Each village is, in effect, a gossip community dominated by a single powerful female. Emeline Lucas (universally known as Lucia) is the queen of Riseholme society. Elizabeth Mapp is the doyenne of Tilling. In the fourth novel, Mapp and Lucia, Lucia leaves Riseholme to live in Tilling where she comes up against the formidable Mapp. The battles between Mapp and Lucia for social pre-eminence in Tilling make up the thrilling substance of the last three novels in the series. Here are the novels in the order they were published: Queen Lucia (QL): 1920. Setting: Riseholme. Lucia only.

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Miss Mapp (MM): 1922 Setting: Tilling (Riseholme mentioned). Mapp only. Lucia in London (LL): 1927. Settings: Riseholme and London. Lucia only. Mapp and Lucia (ML): 1931. Settings: Riseholme and Tilling. Brings Mapp and Lucia together. Lucia’s Progress (LP): 1935. Setting: Tilling. Mapp and Lucia. Trouble for Lucia (TL): 1939. Setting: Tilling. Mapp and Lucia.

[All subsequent quotations are from two omnibus editions, published by Penguin. Lucia Rising contains the first three, while Lucia Victrix contains the last three novels. Direct quotes are from individual novels as indicated.]

It is a remarkable feature of the whole corpus that the unfolding narrative, spread over six separate novels, is wholly about women (written by a man) and their social rather than domestic lives. There are men too in the stories but, with the exception of Georgie Pillson (who is by common female consent an honorary woman), they are dull souls and largely incidental. Lucia is married to a rich banker when we meet her in the first novel, but has conveniently died by the start of the pivotal fourth. Mapp is unmarried when we first meet her (in the second novel), but marries Major Benjy (Indian Army, Retired) at the end of Mapp and Lucia, as a way of salvaging her lost precedence in Tilling society since Lucia’s arrival. There are no children or young people. The characters are all middle-aged (late thirties to fifties across the series) and upper-middle class. The novels are richly funny and endlessly readable for their sheer entertainment value, and I am a devoted fan. But they can be read sociologically, with the spirit of Erving Goffman in mind. News is the lubricant of social life, the beginning of all conversation in both Riseholme and Tilling, and a main driver of events. ‘‘Any news?’ was the general gambit of conversation in Riseholme,’ Benson tells us. ‘It could not have been bettered, for there was always news’ (LL: 501).

Finding Something to Talk About (Newsworthiness) Here are some opening gambits of conversation in Riseholme and Tilling when people meet each other:

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• And though her voice was low and unsteady, she did say, as they sat down, ‘Any news?’ (LL: 602) • ‘Any news, Georgie? What did you do with yourself yesterday? (LL: 609) • ‘But Riseholme, dear Riseholme will soon put me all right again.’ she said. ‘Such a joy to be here! Any news, Daisy?’ (LL: 658) • ‘Good evening, Diva dear,’ she said. ‘I just looked in. Any news?’ (ML: 208) • ‘Such a lovely morning, isn’t it, dear Diva, for January,’ she said. ‘Si doux. Any news?’ (LP: 315) All conversation begins with a news request as a preliminary endeavour to find something to talk about, a conversational bone to chew over. The data are presented following (loosely) the empirical social-science methods of Conversational Analysis, and Paul Grice’s philosophical work on the logic of conversation (Sacks, [1970] 1992; Grice, 1991) in order to show that news is a pervasive feature of the novels, underpinning their sociological significance. At the beginning of Lucia in London there is intense speculation in Riseholme over the thrilling news that Pepino’s aunt (Pepino, when alive, is Lucia’s largely invisible husband) has died and he has inherited her estate and house in London. The burning question is, of course, what are they worth? There is much speculation on this between Lucia’s two friends and neighbours, Daisy Quantock and Georgie Pillson. Later that day, after Georgie has dined with Lucia, Daisy and Georgie confer once more: ‘Well?’, she said. ‘In Brompton Square’, said Georgie. ‘And three thousand a year’.1 ‘No!’ said Daisy. [LL: 511]

The first chapter ends with this tantalising bit of news. Daisy does not need to demand news of what Georgie and Lucia talked about over dinner, and Georgie understands immediately the (Gricean) force of her ‘Well?’. And in case readers miss (or do not properly hear) what is implied 1 The reader of course is required to decode, based on the assumption that she/he will

understand, the immense significance of this information. So it is worth noting that what Georgie so succinctly describes amounts to an immense fortune: three thousand a year in 1920 translates into an annual income from stocks and shares in today’s money of at least £300,000.00 a year. And a house today in Brompton Square—one of the smartest parts of the smartest part of London then and now—is today worth millions.

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in Daisy’s ‘No!’, the author provides an immediate explanation at the start of the next chapter. This simple word ‘No’ connoted a great deal in the Riseholme vernacular. It was used of course, as a mere negative, without emphasis, and if you wanted to give weight to your negative you added ‘Certainly not’. But when you used the word ‘No’ with emphasis, as Daisy had used it to Georgie, it was not a negative at all, and its signification briefly put was ‘I never heard anything so marvellous, and it thrills me through and through. Please go on at once, and tell me a great deal more, and then let us talk it all over’. [LL: 512]

Here is an example, from Riseholme, of the two ‘No’s. ‘Any more news?’ asked Mrs Antrobus. ‘Yes,’ said Georgie, ‘Olga Bracely is coming down tomorrow –‘ ‘No!’ said all the ladies together. ‘And her husband?’ asked Piggy. ‘No,’ said Georgie without emphasis. ‘At least she didn’t say so…. (LL: 520)

Note that the female (the great Australian opera star, Olga Bracely) is a figure of intense interest and a great conversational object for Riseholmites while her husband is of no interest whatever, and so it is more generally throughout the corpus. The Riseholme and Tilling vernacular, as Benson makes clear, is not some personal, interpersonal thing; it is a sociolect, a way of life, a collective manner of conversation. To know how to talk and what to talk about is to ‘belong,’ to be a ratified member of collective, communal, social life in both villages: • • • •

‘No! Is she really? asked Lucia, with all the old Riseholme vivacity. ‘No!’ said Mrs Boucher in the Riseholme voice. (LL: 591). ‘No!’ said Tony in the Riseholme manner. (LL: 638) Surely some sign of their presence would have manifested itself either to Riseholme’s collective eye, or to Riseholme’s ear. (LL: 581)

News is the obscure object of desire, eagerly sought by the collective eye of the members of the life-worlds of Riseholme and Tilling, and just as eagerly received by their collective ear.

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Having News to Tell To have news is to be in possession of a pearl of price, especially if it has rarity value (no-one else knows). In which case such trove must be broadcast at once: • Daisy bowled out of the dining-room and came with such speed down the steps that she nearly fell into the circular [vegetablegarden] bed where the broccoli had been. ‘At half-past one or two,’ said she, bursting with the news. (LL: 635) • Piggy came whizzing up with the news, while Goosie shouted it into her mother’s ear-trumpet. Before Piggy could come out with it, Goosie’s announcement was audible everywhere. ‘A cab from the station has arrived at The Hurst [Lucia’s home], Mamma,’ she yelled, ‘with the cook and the housemaid and a quantity of baggage.’ ‘O Mrs Boucher, have you heard the news?’ panted Piggy. (LL: 636–7) • Diva trundled swiftly towards her with Paddy, her great bouncing Irish terrier, bursting with news, but Elizabeth got the first word. (LP: 320) What is it, to be bursting with news? What is the compulsion to tell? Its importance is not determined by the news itself, which is mainly about the comings and goings of Lucia and Mapp. There is no objective correlative between the value of news and the irresistible desire to share it with others. Here is Miss Mapp in conversation with Georgie Pilling who unintentionally discloses a valuable nugget of news. He and Lucia are leaving Tilling to return home to Riseholme. Mapp fishes for more information: ‘No chance then of your coming back?’ she asked. ‘In August, I hope, said he, ‘for I’ve taken Mallards Cottage for two months.’ ‘Oh, Mr Pillson, that is good news!’ cried Miss Mapp. ‘Lovely! All August and September. Fancy!’ ‘I’ve got to be away for a week in August,’ said Georgie, ‘as we’ve got an Elizabethan fete at Riseholme. I’m Francis Drake.’ That was trove for Miss Mapp and must be published at once. She prepared to flit off.

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She walked up the street again, bursting with her budget of news. Only the Wyses could possibly know that Georgie had taken Mallards Cottage [it belongs to their daughter], and nobody that he was going to impersonate Francis Drake… There was the Padre talking to Major Benjy, no doubt on his way to the steam-tram, and there were Diva and Irene a little farther on. ‘Good morning, Padre: good morning, Major Benjy,’ said she. ‘Good morrow, Mistress Mapp’, said the Padre. ‘An’ hoo’s the time o’ day wi’ ye? ‘Tis said you’ve a fair tenant for yon Mallards [Mapp’s home].’ Miss Mapp fired off her news in a broadside. ‘Indeed I have, Padre,’ she said. ‘And there’s Mallards Cottage, too, about which you won’t have heard. Mr Pillson has taken that, though he won’t be here all the time as he’s playing Francis Drake in a fete at Riseholme for a week.’ (ML: 56).

General conversation and speculation follow these exciting revelations. It is not simply that news is a trove that oils the wheels of life and keeps it running smoothly from day to day. It is also a source of power. To know something that others don’t but long to know is to have them at your mercy. Mapp is an expert player of the deeply irritating game of teasing, of withholding some desirable nugget of news from those who long for it: ‘Well, Mapp, what luck?’ asked Irene. Miss Mapp waited till Diva had shot in. I think I shall tease you both,’ she said playfully with her widest smile. ‘Oh, hurry up,’ said Irene. ‘I know perfectly well from your face that you’ve let it. Otherwise it would be all screwed up.’ […]. ‘Patience, a little patience, dear,’ said Miss Mapp soothingly. If you know I’ve let it, why wait?’ ‘Because I should like a cocktail,’ said Irene. ‘If you’ll just send for one, you can go on teasing.’ ‘Well, I’ve let it for August and September,’ said Miss Mapp, preferring to abandon her teasing than give Irene a cocktail. (ML: 36. Emphases added.)

News, Politics, and Power Mapp is the Machiavelli of news manipulation and management. She has other ways of ‘playing’ with news to her own advantage and the discomfort of others. One is the annoying habit of trumping someone else’s news (usually Diva, her gossip companion):

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• ‘I don’t suppose you’ve heard, Elizabeth,’ she [Diva] said in a great hurry, ‘that Mr Pillson [Georgie] has taken Mallards Cottage. Miss Mapp smiled pityingly. ‘Quite correct, dear Diva,’ she said. ‘Mr Pillson told me himself hours ago.’ (ML: 57) • ‘I know I’m very early, Elizabeth,’ she [Diva] said. ‘but I felt I must tell you what has happened without losing a moment. I was going up Curlew Street just now, and what do you think! Guess!’ Elizabeth gave a half yawn and dexterously transformed it into an indulgent little laugh. ‘I suppose you mean that the new tenant is settling into Suntrap,’ she said. Diva’s face fell: all the joy of the herald of great news died out of it. (MM475)

It is not just the deflation of the other person’s news (bad enough in itself) that is so annoying, but the even more irritating habit of appearing to know more in advance about the matter than the bearer of news about it. I particularly like the notion of the angelic joy of being the herald of news which is, I think, underpinned by the pleasurably reassuring sense of the worthwhileness of what it is that one has to say. For the compulsion to share news (‘But I felt I must tell you what happened’ as Diva puts it) is surely justified by the moral claim upon the attention of another as validated by the intrinsic interest (or newsworthiness) of what one has to say. Finding meaningful things to talk about is no small matter. Small talk (aka news) is the underpinning of social life. An even more annoying trick of Elizabeth’s is deliberately ignoring what is obviously newsworthy: Her attention was diverted by seeing Diva pop out of the hairdresser’s establishment in that scarlet beret and frock which made her look so like a round pillar-box. She had taken the plunge at last after tortures of indecision and had had her hair cropped quite close. The right and scathing thing to do, thought Elizabeth, was to seem not to notice any change in her appearance. ‘Such a lovely morning, isn’t it, dear Diva, for January,’ she said. ‘Si doux. Any news?’ Diva felt there was enough news on her own head to satisfy anybody for one morning, and she wheeled so that Elizabeth should get a back view

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of it, where the change was most remarkable. ‘I’ve heard none,’ she said. (LP: 315) [later that day]

‘I’ve had my hair cut short this morning,’ she said. ‘Didn’t you notice it?’ ‘Yes, dear, to be quite frank, since we are such old friends, I did,’ said Elizabeth. ‘But I thought it far kinder to say nothing about it. Far!’ Ho!’ said Diva, turning as red as her beret, and she trundled down the hill.’ (LP: 317)

The smallest changes in everyday life are noticeable, remarkable events that stand out against the backdrop of the ever-same about which there is nothing to be said. Diva is quite entitled to assume that her drastic hair cut is a newsworthy phenomenon. It is eminently noticeable and therefore talkable-about, a natural conversational topic, a social gift.2 A moment later Lucia joins them both and immediately does the right thing: [Her] eye fell on Diva’s cropped head. ‘Dear Diva. I like it immensely!’ she said. ‘Ten years younger’.’ Elizabeth remained profoundly unconscious. (LP: 316)

The proper response is not to comment critically on Diva’s new hairstyle, still less to say nothing, but to do an appreciation, as Lucia does. What is quite uncalled for is one’s honest opinion. Lucia is telling a white lie, and Mapp the truth (it probably is kinder to say nothing). Who, in the circumstances, is behaving well and who is behaving badly? Is this what morality is—a social convention, a white lie? In usual daily life nothing ever happen. News is a solution to the existential ‘nothing’ at its heart. ‘What did you do, dear, at home/school/work today?’ To which of course there is only one answer, ‘Nothing’. News is, in the first place, a human-interest story, because human beings make their lives interesting and in so doing find them to be interesting to themselves and others—and this in some public, communicable, shareable, and tellable sense. It is part of the stuff of meaningful 2 The Eton crop was a fashionable hairstyle at the time, particularly for the younger, London, female smart set. Diva is older and provincial, so perhaps Mapp is right that it is kinder to say nothing.

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existence, for it consists of the work of making it so. Its joys lie ultimately in the ways that it affirms this for social members of any society, for participants in any conversation. It is for reasons like these that news appears as the solution to social encounters in everyday life. But it is more than ‘merely’ this. I have tried to show the politics of news and news talk as central to the zero-sum power game between Mapp and Lucia which mobilises the narrative in the whole corpus of novels. Those who lack news are eager to get it from those who have it. The bearers of news may torment those who desire it, by holding back a little, by teasing them. On the other hand, the teller of news had better be sure that her news is fresh and new: if not what they tell will be received with scorn by those who are already in the know. The subtleties of the socio-culture of gossip, with news as its living heartbeat, are wonderfully explored in Benson’s novels. In rare fashion, they explore the play of the serious human power game of news in mundane contexts, with wit and humour. My account is only a taster. To do full justice to the significance of news across all the novels would require attention to news spin and fake news as practised by both newsworthy women, Mapp and Lucia. But this is beyond the scope of this chapter.

News and Media News has, over the last few hundred years, been largely expropriated by the gradual, inexorable, historical processes—human and technological—of print, newspapers, media, journalists, and academics. But in a much longer time span—historically, anthropologically—news remains today very much like the accounts I extracted from the Benson corpus of novels. It only appears to have been overtaken by modern media. The new media of the period intruded upon the life-worlds of Riseholme and Tilling, but only occasionally. Everyone looked at newspapers now and then, and listened to the radio and that very new thing, the BBC. Very few homes had a telephone a century ago—it was mainly a masculine tool of politics, business, and the military—but all the main characters in Benson’s novels had one. It was as necessary a resource for the novels’ gossip culture as the smart phonephone, tablet and laptop are for today’s TV and movie fictions. News is immediate and local. London is, fictionally as in real life, a metropolitan backdrop to the news events in Benton’s social world. Lucia takes up residence in Aunty’s house in Brompton

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Square, near Harrods, for a while. But she returns home to Riseholme in the end. ‘London has no true life of its own’ in her opinion (QL. 11). This chapter has drawn attention to the significance of news as the god of small things: an endlessly renewable source of conversation in the bounded nutshell of ordinary daily existence. The water-cooler phenomenon of news as human interest was not the effect of early twentieth-century newspapers, nor of late twenty-first-century television compounded by Twitter. The things that get talked about by everyone now (a wardrobe malfunction, what Donald Trump just said or did) are no different from what concerned Benson’s fictional characters— Lucia’s inheritance, Diva’s new hairstyle. News, human interest, gossip, and conversation; the stuff of sociology and literature, of talk and texting, of television especially, and social media old and new. This was what Helen MacGill foresaw in the transformation of (masculine) hard news into a (feminine) human-interest story. Benton’s fictional life-worlds are based on real places: Riseholme on Broadstairs in the Cotswolds, while Tilling maps closely, still, onto the Sussex coastal town of Rye. Benson lived there for over twenty years and eventually became its mayor. And Lucia, in the penultimate narrative, becomes the Mayor of Tilling, with Elizabeth Mapp as her mayoress. But the fictional worlds are foregrounded, with the real world as backdrop, as London is in the third novel in the saga. Today metropolitan global issues belong to the mediated global world of mainstream news—to CNN and the BBC; to journalists, pundits, and professors; to newspapers, radio, and the internet, the world over. They don’t matter that much if you live in Tilling or Tallahassee and you’re not a professor, and you don’t much care about democracy and politics (although you know you should). What matters is what’s going on, who’s doing what, who knows, and who doesn’t. This immediate, situated world news, whether fact or fiction, is seriously different from what is put out by journalists who service the media centres. LOL cats, ‘Charlie bit my finger’ and, (we can imagine) a selfie of Diva’s new haircut—these are the kinds of thing that entertain and engross people, whether real or imagined, all over the world. Perhaps all this is obvious. But I hope it makes more vividly clear what is at stake in the two worlds of today, centre, and margins; the metropolitan media centres, and, far from them, places like Riseholme and Tilling. Two kinds of news sustain them, and yet news above all is News of the World, depending on who you are and which world you live in.

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References Alasuutari, P. (1992). I’m ashamed to admit it, but I have watched. Dallas Media Culture and Society, 14(4), 561–582. Benson, E. F. (1991a). Lucia Rising (Omnibus edition). Penguin Books. Benson, E. F. (1991b). Lucia Victrix (Omnibus edition). Penguin Books. Grice, P. (1991). Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press. Hobson, D. (1980) Housewives and the mass media. In S. Hall et al. (Eds.), Culture, media, language (pp. 105–114). Hutchinson. Lotz, A. (2007). The television will be revolutionized. New York University Press. MacGill Hughes, H. (1937). Human interest stories and democracy. Public opinion wuarterly (in Peters and Simonson 2004, pp. 118–124). MacGill Hughes, H. (1940). News and the human interest story. Chicago University Press. Peters, J. D., & Simonson, P. (Eds.). (2004). Mass communication and American social thought (pp. 139–156). Rowman and Littlefield. Sacks, H. 1970 (1992). Doing being ordinary. In E. Schegloff (Ed.), Lectures in conversation (two volumes) (Vol. 1, pp. 215–248). Blackwell. Scannell, P. (2020). Media and communication. Sage.

CHAPTER 3

Talk as News on Television Michael Higgins

Introduction Gossip has long enjoyed a dynamic presence in public discourse. In an essay on the use of public space in Calcutta, Kitirj (1997) describes how the indulgence of vulgarity and petty disobedience—expressed in loud, irreverent chatter—gains momentary control of public life from the governing institutions and political elites. In media too, Feeley (2012) shows how celebrity rumour and indiscreet talk have accelerated novel configurations of news, purposively aligning existent professional practices with the norms of everyday popular engagement. Across various settings, gossip provides an ostensible means of freeing talk from the normative constraints of formal judgement and public decorousness. As we will see in this chapter, while subject to limits, the norms of ordinary talk complete with and gradually integrate into public discourse:

M. Higgins (B) Department of Journalism, Media, and Communication, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_3

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emerging, variously, as the illustrative personal anecdote from the politician, or, pertinent to what we have to say, the informal chatter between news presenters. Literary references to gossip itself already hint at its utility in news: its unabashed triviality as “common chat” (Dryden, 1687: 123) and “prattling” (Hearn 1886: 212); the parochialism it displays in fixating on the affairs of “neighbours” (Martineau, 1833: 6) over than the elevated deliberations of civic life. Even if the subject matter is weightier, this chapter hopes to show that news shares many of the imperatives of gossip—the instincts to confide, conspire and empathise within a social environment— while also adapting gossip’s interactional imperatives. We will explore the ways in which news discourse exploits the benefits of gossip, situating elements of popular talk alongside and in a dynamic with discourses of truth, authority and professional sincerity. To do this, we will apply multimodal critical discourse analysis to stretches of news talk (Smith & Higgins, 2020), exploring forms of address and performance, along with the interplay between institutional expression and popular language. Much that have to say will centre on what Goffman (1981) refers to as “forms of talk”; that is, how the management of language, tone and orientation contributes to news as a discursive activity. On the face of it, professional news demands descriptive clarity and the precise recital of information, in a manner that conforms to legal constraints and professional standards of impartiality. This seems to be the opposite of what Goffman (1981: 171) calls “fresh talk”, “formulated by the animator from moment to moment” and foregrounding intuition and spontaneity. Yet, the production of unscripted talk plays a surprising role in producing the sense of conviviality appropriate to broadcast talk in general (Scannell, 1991) and place us more at ease with the news within the terms of our social universe. For example, even the most hostile news interview, committed to the formal language of economic policy and accountability, will routinely be concluded by genial and overtly unscripted thanks to the bruised interviewee and watching viewers. Similarly, and as noted above, unceremonious language dominates the shifts between items and presenters, ameliorating the weight and consequence of the content with the personality and mutual care of the messengers. However, even though news is routinely mediated by the production of talk, surprisingly little analysis compares across the various mobilisations of talk in a developing broadcast news environment. Here we outline a few of the ways in which talk is organised and represented

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in news discourse. The overall intention is to offer a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics between convention and innovation in reproducing authority, as well as the role that talk has in constructing different iterations of truth. The chapter challenges the everyday assumption that news is departing its original register of didactic information provision, to settle on an opposing style exclusively concerned with oneto-one engagement and mutual participation. In terms of how talk may be shaping news, we will increasingly see that adaptability and shared competence in different types of talk is generating a hybrid news-talk experience, where talk is used tactically to present various forms of standing. The chapter divides into two main sections: (1) talk as the voice of authority in news, and; (2) using public talk. The first section looks at the performance of talk in the production of power, ordinarily invested in formalised traditions of institutional authority and scriptedness in the production of expert commentary, all aligned with the institutions of government and media and the expectations of a normative public sphere. The second section looks at how “authentic” public talk is co-opted into news, constructing an association between the lifeworld and the subjective iterations of spontaneous truth and emotional integrity, and will discuss the implications of a sustained association between private talk and news’s claimed pursuit of candour and openness. Goffman’s (1981) “participant frameworks” will help conceptualise various ways of performing talk and the discursive relationships these invoke, including setting popular against formal talk. As a whole, the chapter offers a broad understanding of the dynamic tension between the priorities of news and the imperatives of talk, and the role these play in any shifts towards popularisation and increased emotionality we may associate with news.

Talk as the Voice of Authority in News A variety of professional titles are given to those media performers—often trained journalists—fronting the news broadcast. Tolson (2006) writes of “presenters”, with other coinages such as “newscaster” coming to and from prominence. The early description “newsreader” shows a continuing resonance in the relationship between news, talk and authority, finding daily expression in the standard UK BBC Radio 4 introduction “the news today is read by…”. Indeed, in a way that echoes with “presenter’s” agency in time, place and context, the very composition of “news-reader” foregrounds the sanctity of the settled words at a given

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moment. As McLuhan (1964: 88) observes, even as media technology embraces and drives the immediacy and texture of interaction, “our Western values [are] built on the written”. Far from diminishing, we see this prevalence continue in media settings from employment contracts to the dominance of Twitter as an archive of sentiment and outrage (Higgins & Smith, 2014). Perhaps less obviously, this inviolability of the written word is also inscribed within the particular “participation framework” (in Goffman’s 1981 terms) the newsreader occupies: that is, the role they inhabit in a given interaction. The ideal of the newsreader rests upon the delivery of pre-inscribed words as a professionalised enactment of recitation, foregoing the lures of interpretation or invention. While they can routinely switch to interview mode, introducer or even engage in studio banter, submitting to the participant frame appropriate to newsreading maximises directness and clarity and acts to minimises the “noise” of opinion and diversion. However, the efforts undertaken to minimise any noise have been considerable. Even in the early decades of public service radio, those delivering the BBC news would be required to wear formal attire and maintain a tone that conceals their own attitude towards the information they are tasked with imparting. The design is to reproduce recognisable codes of authority, albeit with notes of reassurance that this is exercised on our behalf and directed to our benefit. There are clear parallels here with what Nimmo and Combs (1992: 25) describe as the “priestly caste” in political punditry in US journalism. They talk of a cadre of well-connected journalists, representing a social, cultural and education type that “rub elbows, speak to, with, and of established elites”. In his account of the “tribunes of the people”, Clayman (2002) identifies such characters amongst elite interviewers, albeit presented as champions of the popular interest. Of course, and in a way that we will return to below, even as they speak from the establishment, the attentive newsreader is obliged to interpret, mitigate, explain and at times cushion these weighty discourses; tempering authority with sensitivity. This attitude is apparent in early citations of the newsreader, such as the 1926 Daily Herald reassurance that “Instead of receiving a shock at a national calamity, the news reader breaks it to you in a calm and quiet voice”. In discussing the variety of descriptions for the personnel fronting the news broadcast, we hinted that a number of the representative and performative expectations have adapted considerably. The following illustration and extract show how the many of the conventions of the newsreader

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sustain, alongside accommodations of other forms of news talk we discuss later in the chapter. The extract is from the main story of UK public service broadcaster Channel 4’s flagship evening news, broadcast on 22 December 2021. With Europe Correspondent Matt Frei taking the role of reader, the item concerns the spread of a new variant of the COVID-19 virus: There are a number of important visual elements to the framing of the presenter and how we are invited to interpret their talk as news. The first, which we can see from the two illustrations, is the conspicuously professional setting from which the talk is delivered. The studio and broadcast centre within which it is situated are emphasised in the composition of the shot, with lighting and internal architecture emphasised in the opening frame (Illustration 1) and angled to remain in view through the reading of the story (Illustration 2). In Montgomery’s (2007: 77) words, “care is taken to articulate and embody visually and verbally the primary space of the studio as the site of enunciation”. Secondly, while possession of a business suit scarcely betokens membership of the establishment elite, presenter Frei’s attire nonetheless situates the presenter and their words within the semiotic lexicon of the “priestly caste” (Nimmo & Combs, 1992). As Owyong (2009: 204) argues of the tightly tailored, dark-coloured “power suit” and its “epitomic” necktie, these project a willingness to inhabit the known conventions of power and dependability, with its access to and understanding of the elevated discussions and comings and goings of government and cultural authorities. Every bit as telling is the pile of typed papers that the presenter carries in their hands, and is seen to be checking in the opening studio shot (illustration 1). The widespread adoption of autocue technology from the 1960s onwards enables presenters to maintain “eye contact” with the camera while remaining faithful to the news script (Montgomery, 2007: 74). However, as well as providing a backup measure in case of autocue failure, the retention of the papers on-screen foregrounds the communicative activity as one of recital, rather than a stretch of unscripted talk or even gossip. Indeed, we can see in the few moments between illustration 1 and illustration 2 how the script anchors the preparedness of the words: Extract 1

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Illustration 3.1 Higgins illustration

Illustration 3.2 Higgins illustration

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Good evening (.) Omicron is spreading like wildfire with more than a hundred thousand cases in one day (.) a new record for a variant as infectious as measles (.) but also a glimmer of good news tonight as two studies show that Omicron is slightly less likely to land you in hospital (.) than Delta (..) with city centres empty by fear and not by decree (.) is greater society now paying the price for the unvaccinated (..) in Wales they go even further (.) you can still go to the pub (.) though in groups of six people (.) and they must be socially distanced (..) the booster programme marches on and now vulnerable kids between five and seven will finally be able to get their jabs

A shift in look from the hand-held script to a prolonged stretch of direct gaze is signalled by a ritual greeting towards camera (in this case “good evening”, line 1). This occasions an important reorientation of the presenter’s “mode of address” (Corner, 1995) from a concentration on their papers (seen in illustration 1), to the enactment of what Horton and Wohl (1956) refer to as a “para-social interactional” relationship with the viewing audience (illustration 2). Even then, the very presence of the script, allied with the visual framing of the delivery, betrays the constructedness of this engagement: “the scripted delivery (even if the script is invisible) and the conditions of mediation ultimately preclude any form of actual reciprocity” (Montgomery, 2007: 74). In terms of the contribution of both elements, there is a parallel reassurance of scriptedness and interpersonal attention. As we turn to the words themselves, we see that the language too shows a compromise between conventional and conversational news forms. First in terms of what we might have expected of a scripted news text, we can see the benefits of record manifest in the easy recall of the latest pandemic statistics and parameters: “more than a hundred thousand cases in one day” (lines 1–2), “groups of six people” (line 6) and “between five and seven” (lines 7 and 8). Second, and in keeping with the emphasis on the studio space, there is also the “deictic zero point” of enunciation reflecting the United Kingdom’s discursive centre (England), which is then directed outward to one of the other UK nations (Higgins, 2004). In this case, the account moves from the unmarked English interior of “city centres” (line 4) out to “In Wales they go even further” (line 5), discursively occupying a shared space with the perceived majority of viewers. However, for all the qualities that disqualify this news extract as reciprocal chatter, the extract reveals to us a considerable range of chat-like characteristics. Firstly, there are several markers of what Fairclough (1995) refers to as the “conversationalisation” of news, through the use of informal and colloquial phrasings. Included in this is the idiomatic simile

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“spreading like wildfire” (line 1) to express the degree of contagion, and the use of “land you in hospital” (lines 3 and 4) in alluding to the consequences. There are also colloquially expressed assumptions around shared cultural practice in “you can still go the pub” (lines 5 and 6) which then immediately reverts to the formalised policy register of third person in “and they must be socially distanced” (lines 6–7). The extract also displays a technique of rhetorical opposition, in “empty by fear and not by decree” (line 4), more commonly associated with spoken discourse, as well as the pretence of para-social responsiveness with the rhetorical question “is greater society now paying the price for the unvaccinated?” (lines 4–5). A further aspect of reciprocal talk that even this brief extract foregrounds is the emotionality of the story. Wahl-Jorgensen (2019) argues that emotionality is an increasingly important currency for aligning and connecting news with its audiences, and that sensitivity to emotive latency has infiltrated the core practices of news production (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2020). In this extract there is, first, the orientation of “a glimmer of good news tonight” with the direct address of “you” (lines 2 and 3), projecting an ostensible offer of individual comfort to the viewer. Secondly, and more subtly, the text inhabits and expresses an assumed exasperation and unease on the part of the viewer by emphasising the amplifying adverb “finally” in “now vulnerable kids between five and nine will finally be able to get their jabs” (lines 7 and 8). Richards (2007) criticises such associations between emotionality and the management of audience fear, suggesting the news’s exercise of interpretative authority over the story and its legitimate response outweighs any submission to the natural empathies of mutually productive human interaction. In these regards, the style used calls upon many of the communicative strategies Tolson (2006: 69) identifies in the dynamic of the multi-presenter studio context: the linguistic expression of approachable informality, allied with a recognisably emotive performance on the part of the presenters.

Using Public Talk A number of scholars have pointed to an appreciable shift in the use and treatment of public voices in media (Higgins, 2008; Turner, 2010). In a study conducted almost two decades ago, Brookes et al (2004) outlined a number of ways in which various iterations of public opinion were incorporated into news texts, ranging from the use of vox pops (brief

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street interviews with members of the public) to casual references to supposed popular sentiment by journalists and presenters. The advantage of using, and emphasising the use of, the voices of non-professionals in news is that they come with the assurance that the contributions are unscripted—the comfort of which Scannell (1991) highlights as the heart of much successful broadcast talk. Another key to the prominence of public voices in news is their association with notions of what Enli (2015) calls “mediated authenticity”. While Enli (2015) stresses the construction of “authenticity illusions” using filming and lighting techniques and post-production editing, it is possible to conceive of the use of language and management of talk to secure the advantages of authenticity in news discourse. What follows is an extract in which two members of the public have called into a regular radio programme to offer their views on one of the big issues of the day. Mornings with Kaye Adams is a BBC Radio Scotland morning discussion programme, dedicated to chat and analysis of current controversies, including a daily public phone-in on news items that are seen to excite public discussion. Before we look to the main extract, what follows in extract 2 is the first part of the presenter’s (KA) opening summary of the day’s programme. Extract 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

[KA] The First Minister is pretty firm in her direction [First Minister Nicola Sturgeon recorded insert] Please follow the new guidelines I have offered today (.) although it is guidance do not think of it as optional (.) cut down unnecessary contact as much as possible in the run up to (.) and immediately following Christmas (.) please avoid socialising with people in other households as much as we can [KA] so there you go (.) what changes will you be making and do you think this guidance goes far enough (.) should we be bringing in even stronger measures oh eight oh eight five (.) nine two nine five double oh is the number to call (.) also coming up a Christmas conundrum from our judgemental Karen McKenzie [Karen McKenzie recorded insert] am I being unreasonable asking people not to drink at Christmas this year [KA] SORRY (.) WHAT DID SHE SAY (.) I don’t know I’ve no idea it’s not for me to judge but Karen will eight oh two nine five as she always does but she wants to hear your response (.) ahm try that out (.) you know (.) on the people you have got coming for dinner (.) three of them (.) and by the way there’s no booze we’re going to have a riot (.) your ess I DON’T EVEN DRINK

The topic shift in the extract shows how the programme blends conventional news stories, in this case covering the release of pandemic guidance, alongside routine health advice on refraining from alcohol.

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Each item’s summary includes its own brief insert: from Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon (lines 2–5) and resident health expert Karen McKenzie (lines 9–10) in turn. Just as both inserts give voice to particular regimes of power—the first over political policy and the second over the responsible consumption of alcohol—the presenter (KA) uses different strategies for each, disaligning the presenter’s own implied position from that expressed in the insert. In responding to the First Minister, the presenter foregrounds their own claim to objectivity by submitting to the listeners to deliver their own unvarnished response (lines 6 and 7), albeit based on the provocative assumption that the guidance will be obeyed. In responding to the resident expert, the presenter asserts their distance by feigning pantomimic disbelief at the suggestion of an alcohol-free Christmas (“SORRY (.) WHAT DID SHE SAY”, line 10), ventriloquising the enactment of this temperance with a sardonic sign-off (“and by the way there’s no booze we’re going to have a riot”, lines 13– 14). In various ways, this extract positions the presenter as the facilitator and enactor of certain types of talk, helping to establish their position for the following extract: as the neutral enabler of public reaction, and as legitimate facilitator of public sentiment. Extract 3 is from the beginning of the phone-in segment of the programme, where the audience are invited to call and talk about the selected topic. As trailed, the discussion is framed as a platform for audience views on the latest pandemic restrictions in Scotland. Our chosen extract begins just as the presenter (KA) concludes a short interview with Gavin Stevenson, owner of a chain of bars and spokesperson for the business oriented Night Time Industries Association (NTIA) Scotland, in which the new measures have been condemned as unnecessarily stringent. We pick up as the presenter (KA) introduces a call from listener James (J): Extract 3

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James in Shawlands (.) good morning James Good good morning Kaye [Good morning (.) what do (.) you make of these new measures Well I think it’s (.) eh (.) a shambles actually (.) eh [In what way Well she’s more or less saying you can do this but gonnae no dae it type of thing (.) y’know you can have your Christmas you’ve gotta dae this (..) there is for instance my sister (.) she works (.) from home (.) for the council (.) now she she was at a do last Saturday (..) there was about forty of them (..) now she’s been telt to work from home but she can go out for a Christmas night with her KA colleagues (.) now where is the balance here [Well actually you know how hm the advice came to cancel those J nights out with colleagues Aye but (.) they just went ahead (.) and you watch how many people will go out this weekend too (..) now what I’m trying to say here the bottom line is she’s letting you do what you want to an extent or she’s hoping people won’t do (.) but people will (.) and she’s not actually (.) if she was gonnae be serious about this KA (.) she would shut down (.) restaurants (.) hotels (.) football stadiums (.) theatres [Well we’re being told it’s a balance isn’t it (.) there’s a recognition that businesses need to survive and Gavin Stevenson has told us that businesses in his sector they’re on the wire of survival (.) and also there is an appreciation that erm another J Christmas (.) em (.) like the one we had last year (.) might really do people in (.) KA so they’re trying to tread a fine line Well we were told we could have families (.) parties in the house but now she’s saying that you cannae have so J [So what would you do (.) if you were Nicola KA Sturgeon John Eh honestly I would if she’s that determined I would shut down everything from J tonight Now [If she’s that serious to get rid of this (.) or stop this spreading (.) because the K only thing it’s going to come to this she’s going to shut down everything after J the new year and blame it all on ah but people got together (.) more than we KA thought they should have KA J KA J K J

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H [Hmm KA I would shut down things right now if they’re serious about this H Ah em I get where you’re coming from John (.) let’s see what Hazel thinks hi KA Hazel Hi there [Hi Hi b H [What do you think (.) would you just shut things down now stop sort of dancing about the edges (.) if this is the threat that we’re being told (.) that it potentially is (.) then you just go hard and go early Well I must say that I would have preferred if we’d gone back to some of the measures that were taken previously which had the force of law behind them so that (.) people know exactly where they stand (.) but I do appreciate that without any (.) sort of (.) financial support (.) people (.) are (.) going to be in real difficulty (.) I was disappointed because nothing at all has been said about people (.) who KA were previously shielding (..) and their situation is that there’s lots of people now who were not particularly well protected by the last vaccines that we’ve got so far (.) we were (.) told that there would be a fourth jag for people in these situations (.) we don’t know when this is going to happen H [I I’m pretty sure I heard Hazel that the chief medical officer said that you know erm all the people in that category (.) would (.) be (.) written (.) to so that you could expect a letter which would sort of outline clearer guidance KA Well that’s good but it would have been better if it had arrived with these H announcements because we’re left in limbo at the moment (.) and I I do not think that if (.) we do need the sort of support that was there previously and that can KS only come if there’s financial help [Hmm I do understand the difficulty that Nicola was in as she explained because the financial [phone line dips] can’t be provided in these circumstances Though to take James’ point (.) I’m going to bring in Gavin Stevenson again (.) would that have been better for you Gavin if as James suggested don’t muck about just go for a lockdown (.) make it law and therefore y’know for you as a business y’know the sort of worry would be taken off your shoulders to a certain extent (.) and there you go (.) it’s part of law you have to shut down and therefore the support has to come

Higgins (2008) discusses the variety of associations that the public voice invokes in news and that recommend its deployment: spontaneity, lived experience and emotional expression, amounting to an overall claim to the authentic. Since public talk, packaged in this way, is subjective and has to be taken on trust rather than using professional credentials, claims of veracity can be foregrounded more frequently, such as caller John using “honestly” as a means of re-asserting the sincerity of his central claim (line 27). Markers of such ordinariness have a particular prominence in John’s call. In turning Fairclough’s (1995) account of informalisation into a rhetorical device, we see a temporary switch from a standard to regional

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dialect, “Well she’s more or less saying you can do this but gonnae no dae it type of thing” (line 6), in which we see a rapid code switch from the standard “do” to the local Scots “dae”. This conceivably references the line “Gonnae no”, popular in Scottish popular culture through the BBC comedy sketch show Chewin’ the Fat, and the clash of styles asserts a supposed inconsistency in the government message. Used in this manner to summarise the First Minister’s words, this represents an account of the authority of government but reconfigured as an ironic construction of everyday talk. This draws upon an opposition that Habermas (1987) identified in public discourse between the systematic language of authority and the “lifeworld” of lived experience, routinely tacit but constituting the basis of shared social understanding (Habermas 1987: 131). This lived experience is particularly foregrounded in John’s contribution, where he draws upon the example of a family member (“there is for instance my sister (.) she works (.) from home”, extract 3, lines 7–8), laying the conditions for John’s rhetorical plea for “balance” (line 11). However, John’s expression of lived experience contrasts with the professed objectivity of the presenting journalist. Looking to the presenter, we can see how they display an opposing imperative, disavowing the discursive resource of the lifeworld by asserting their own personal disinterestedness at the prospect of an alcohol-free festive season (“I don’t even drink”, extract 2, line 14); professionally warranted to animate public outrage, but keen that the expression of individual interests is limited to callers. Moreover, even as the presenter sustains a professional distance from an experiential discourse, they are just as committed to confining the public voices of the callers within the expressive limits of the lifeworld. In this turn, drawn from the above extract 3, second caller Helen tries to express her advocacy for those that had been categorised as vulnerable earlier in the pandemic: I was disappointed because nothing at all has been said about people (.) who were previously shielding (..) and their situation is that there’s lots of people now who were not particularly well protected by the last vaccines that we’ve got so far (.) we were (.) told that there would be a fourth jag for people in these situations (extract 3, lines 47-51).

While the production team will have established that the caller expresses their own difficulties in getting information on vaccines, she

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frames here as a broadly shared concern for which she advocates. In Helen’s description, those less protected by the vaccine are referred to in the third person, switching between “their” and the collective noun “people”, set within that broader and inclusive “we” that receive vaccines and information (all highlighted in the extract). However, this distance from the lifeworld is challenged by presenter KA’s response that the necessary information had been promised (“I’m pretty sure … that you could expect a letter”, lines 55–56), prompting caller Helen to concede to the presenter’s direct orientation of “you” by narrowing the range of the third-person collective in “we’re left in limbo at the moment” (line 58). So while it is tempting to concentrate on the value accorded to the ordinary voice and its distinctiveness from the constraints of journalism practice, we can also see how public talk is directed and managed using conventions of professional practice (Higgins, 2008). The example above shows how a caller is piloted towards a dependence on lived experience, using a direct challenge we would associate with what Clayman and Heritage (2002) call “the accountability interview”. Goffman (1981: 153) refers to such tactics as the “playful transformation” of a participant framework, in this case that of a public phone in presenter, to enable the “self-conscious transplant” of accountability discourse to a related interactional environment. Also in keeping with an accountability style, the presenter holds the second caller to account for information provided by the earlier contributor (“Though to take James’s point (.) I ‘m going to bring in Gavin Stevenson again”, line 63), using a strategy in which several figures representing opposing perspectives are interviewed simultaneously. Together, these adaptions are used to contain callers within established forms of experience-based public talk.

Conclusion Many of the attractions of gossip—the immediacy, the emotional engagement—are also those that guide the development of news discourse, and its shift towards participation and involvement. Even in looking at the performance of the news presenter as the embodiment of institutional, legitimised authority, we find that the most conventionally scripted talk includes key elements of informalisation and emotionality. Likewise, our discussion on the management of public talk on a news and current affairs phone-in reveals participatory talk directed to accentuate

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the qualities of authenticity and expressed lived experience. The imperative to deliver information in a familiar manner permeates news discourse, and this chapter has sought to exemplify a more flexible analysis that accommodates the tactical and fluid ways in which talk appears in news. The news and the forms of talk used in its delivery are in continual transition. The discursive role that Tolson (2006: 69) ascribes to the news anchor, “a relatively formal reading from a script”, has a continued influence, subject to innovations in production and accommodations language style. The relationship between news and talk is, therefore, complex one, with commitments to maintain control over the detail and veracity of content, while at the same time navigating the reciprocal conceits of personable-seeming communication (an increasing sophistication in para-social interaction). Added to this, are the demands for a greater emotional competence in the production and composition of the institutional component of the news text itself (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2020). We can see notes of conversationalisation (Fairclough, 1995) and a shift towards informality in even the most scripted news talk. Contrarily, while the benefits of public involvement in news become integral to journalistic practice, so too can we see the obligation to situate these within established hierarchies. What emerges are various sets of practices geared to different forms of news delivery and discussion, but all invested in power and control. News adores the vivacity of gossip, but abhors its mischief.

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Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action: The critique of functionalist reason. Polity. Hearne, T. (1886). Remarks and collections (Vol. II). Oxford Historical Society. Higgins, M. (2004). Putting the nation in the news. Discourse & Society, 15(5), 633–648. Higgins, M. (2008). Media and their publics. Open University Press. Higgins, M., & Smith, S. (2014). Disaffiliation and belonging: Twitter and its agonistic publics. Sociologia e Politiche Sociali, 17 (2), 77–89. Horton, D., & Wohl, R. (1956). Mass communication and para-social interaction: Observations on intimacy at a distance. Psychiatry, 19(3), 215–229. Kaviraj, S. (1997). Filth and the public sphere: Concepts and practice about space in Calcutta. Public Culture, 10(1), 83–111. Martineau, H. (1833). The Loom and the Lugger, a Tale: Part 1. Charles Fox. McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding media: The extension of man. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Montgomery, M. (2007). The discourse of broadcast news: A linguistic approach. Routledge. Nimmo, D., & Combs, J. E. (1992). The political Pundits. Praeger. Owyong, M. Y. S. (2009). Clothing semiotics and the social construction of power relations. Social Semiotics, 19(2), 191–211. Richards, B. (2007). Emotional governance: Politics, media and terror. Palgrave. Scannell, P. (1991). Introduction: The relevance of talk. In P. Scannell (Ed.), Broadcast Talk (pp. 1–13). Sage. Smith, A., & Higgins, M. (2020). The language of journalism: A multi-genre perspective (2nd ed.). Bloomsbury. Tolson, A. (2006). Media talk: Spoken discourse on TV and radio. Edinburgh University Press. Turner, G. (2010). Ordinary people and the media: The demotic turn. Sage. Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2019). Emotions, media and politics. Polity. Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2020). An emotional turn in journalism studies? Digital Journalism, 8(2), 175–194.

CHAPTER 4

The Celebrity Interview: Gossip, Empathy and News in Oprah Winfrey’s CBS Interview with Meghan Markle Jin Shen and Martin Montgomery

Introduction In March 2021, CBS TV in the United States and ITV in the U.K. broadcast an interview by Oprah Winfrey with Meghan Markle, Duchess of Sussex, who was joined in a late segment of the interview by her husband Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex, and third in line to the British royal throne. Entitled Oprah with Meghan and Harry, the interview as edited for broadcasting lasted well over an hour and took place just over a year after the couple had announced that they would no longer continue to perform official functions as members of the British royal family: in effect

J. Shen · M. Montgomery (B) University of Macau, Taipa, Macau e-mail: [email protected] M. Montgomery University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_4

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they intended to carve out independent public careers free of royal duties and responsibilities, a decision which had manifold consequences in terms of residence, remuneration, security arrangements and family relationships. Oprah’s interview—mostly with Meghan—explored some of the reasons behind this decision, as well as Meghan’s experiences both joining and leaving the royal family. It was viewed by audiences worldwide of around 50 million, 14 million in the U.K. and over 17 million in the U.S. (Bauder, 2021, March 9) and attracted extensive media comment across a range of publications including Time, The Hollywood Reporter, The Washington Post and the New York Times in the U.S. as well as the Economist and most of mainstream press in the U.K. For various reasons—which we shall discuss below—the interview, while drawing extensively upon an existing news context about the couple, was news, and it also made news. And Oprah’s performance, in a genre—the celebrity interview— which she has made particularly her own, won praise, Lucy Mangan in the U.K. Guardian (Lucy, 2021, March 8), for instance, describing her as “a woman whose patented blend of warmth, empathy and persistence makes her still the best in the business.” In this chapter by analysing the interview as an instance of verbal interaction in the mediated public sphere, we consider how gossip can work not only in private but in public so as to drive and shape the news agenda.

Analysing the Discourse of the Meghan Interview in Its Context Our approach to the interview draws upon existing frameworks of close analysis developed over the last two or three decades for the detailed study of broadcast talk and particularly the broadcast interview, as seen, for example, in work by—among others—Goffman (1981, Ch.3), Scannell (1991, Ch.1), Haarman (1999), Tolson (2001, Ch.6), Clayman and Heritage (2002), Montgomery (2007, Cha’s 6 and 7) and Thornborrow (2014). Generally, this work takes talk as a form of social action in which utterances are susceptible to analysis for the actions they perform, the alignments they take up with respect to interlocutors, and the identities which they project. The techniques and terms of analysis are drawn from within linguistic pragmatics and conversational analysis but applied with a particular focus on the nature of broadcast talk as mediated verbal interaction—as talk for an overhearing audience. In attending to the particularities of interview talk, analysis focuses not so much on individual,

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isolated utterances but on recurring patterns of utterance types and their role in interaction. The interview itself fits straightforwardly into a specific sub-genre of broadcast interview, the celebrity interview, a format well established by Winfrey though not adopted by her until well into her career. Winfrey’s initial steps into broadcasting came in TV news where she worked as a co-anchor on a local evening news programme. By the 1980s, she had become the recognisable face and the persona of the most widely syndicated daytime talk show in the U.S. In doing so, she transformed the format over time from studio discussion of public issues to a focus on the personal and the emotional—a shift, as Scannell (2020) suggests “from report to rapport” in which the matter of the talk show migrated towards topics more associated with the private sphere, and with women rather than men, in effect revising what counted as public material. Indeed, the Oprah Winfrey Show has become the heart of a highly successful business empire, to the degree that Oprah has been variously described as “arguably the world’s most powerful woman” by CNN, with a net worth calculated at 2.7 billion dollars by Forbes, and subject of a Harvard Business Review case study entitled “Business Leaders: Oprah Winfrey and the Power of Empathy” (HBR, 2020, March 26). As part of this development, the show came to focus on extended one-on-one interviews with celebrity figures. In this process, Oprah Winfrey has been both intermediary and creative facilitator for the celebrity status of her interviewees. Meghan Markle herself, before her marriage to Prince Harry, worked as an actor with parts in film and in seven series of the networked U.S. TV drama Suits. Her marriage in 2017 to Prince Harry, and her subsequent duties as a member of the U.K. royal family, including official visits to Australia and a Pacific tour with Prince Harry, confirmed her position in the public eye. Following their break with the Royal Family, the couple retreated to California and from there developed a series of media projects designed to capitalise on their celebrity status, including agreements and contracts with high-profile internet content-providers such as Netflix and Spotify. At the same time, however, they have developed an ambivalent and sometime difficult relationship with the press—particularly with sections of the British tabloid media—whose coverage of their lives they regard as intrusive and inaccurate. Both Harry and Meghan, for instance, have sued the Associated Newspapers—publishers of the British mid-market tabloid The Daily Mail—Harry for libel, and Meghan for breach of copyright in

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publishing a letter which she had written to her father before her marriage to Harry. The CBS interview Oprah with Meghan and Harry thus took place against the background of a firmly established celebrity status for the couple but also, as we shall see, against the background of some perceived negative commentary in the British tabloid press. The TV celebrity interview, of course, may be inflected in a variety of ways: sometimes it may be used to reflect on the skills and achievements of the interviewee in their chosen field over the course of their career; sometimes it may be used to showcase their particular talents of mimicry, humour and storytelling; often they are used incidentally to promote a forthcoming output such as a book, album or film. In Winfrey’s case, they are typically oriented to exploring some personal difficulty or trauma in the life of the celebrity. It is this that gives her interviews their characteristic blend of personal experience, confession and therapy, underpinned throughout by displays of apparent empathy. Much has been made of Oprah’s signature quality of empathy as an element in her interviewing style. In conversational-analytic terms, this is displayed most clearly in what might be called practices of “active listening” (Shen, 2018). These are perhaps most evident in the interviews that comprise the celebrity phase of the Oprah Winfrey Show—interviews with figures such as Michael Jackson, Whitney Houston or Ellen DeGeneres. As Shen points out, interviews of this type are characterised by devices such as “continuers”, “shadowing”, “mirroring”, “collaborative finishes” and so on. Such overlaps as do occur tend to be supportive, rather than turn-competitive and interruptive. And significant pauses of more than a second may occur between turns—especially following a question by the interviewer. In this respect, the interviews are quite different in style to those of the accountability kind as described in detail by Clayman and Heritage (2002) and Montgomery (2007), which are often characterised by significant overlapping of turns and an absence of in-turn supportive vocalisation. In this respect, Oprah’s interview style shares qualities with what Montgomery termed “talking in earnest” (2017) as well as with what Tannen termed “rapport talk” (1990). More generally, commentators on Oprah’s celebrity interviews have noted their “confessional” or even their “therapeutic” qualities. On the face of it these qualities might be seen as sui generis to Oprah’s distinctive style of celebrity interviewing. But there remain noticeable affinities, it happens, with a major sub-genre of news interviewing, characterised by Montgomery (2007) as the “experiential (news) interview”,

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where the main thrust of the interview, even in the news context, is carried by questions that address aspects of the interviewees’ experience in terms broadly of subjective states, especially thoughts, beliefs and feelings: for example, “how do you feel today”; or “you were ready to give up everything?”; or “were you happy with yourself”. It is worth noting incidentally that the elicitation of these subjective states often leads to their contextualisation within “narratives of personal experience” (Labov, 1972). For all Oprah’s focus on feelings, framed by her characteristic markers of empathy, her interview with Meghan proves by no means devoid of news value. Meghan’s celebrity status after all is underpinned by news coverage across a variety of news outlets both before and after the interview. At the same time, it should be noted that a degree of significant scene-setting and contextualisation takes place at the very outset of the interview. Oprah first of all notes the signs of Meghan’s pregnancy, compliments Meghan on her appearance and inquires after the sex of the baby: Extract 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

O M O M O M O

M O M O M

whoa::: ho:: ho:: heheheheheheh I know you really ARE having a BA:BY: [yea:h we are having a baby= =that's more than a bump (.) I know I know:: I (.) I I know [wo:w [xxxxx a hug (.) a virtual hug(.) yeah distance hug (.) so you know (.) we we we can't hug cause we've been so strict (.) everybody here (.) literally is (.) double masked and has face shields (.) but you look lovely = =thank you so do you you're pregnant and lovely thank you yes do you know if you’re having a boy or a girl (.) we DO this time (.)

They also jointly confirm the terms of the interview—that Meghan is not being paid for it, that it is taking place open air in the garden pergola of a friend’s house (in deference to Covid pandemic restrictions), and that no subject is off-limits. This opening scene-setting helps to confirm a particular tone or key for the interview, one in which they are on sisterly good terms (Oprah after all, we learn, was a guest at Meghan’s wedding)—but that nonetheless certain professional codes apply: Meghan apparently does not know what Oprah will ask. So there is a sense of

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professional distance operating alongside a perceivable sense of women’s solidarity—even perhaps a shared sense of experience as women of colour.

Gossip as a Key Element in the Contextual Background to the Oprah with Meghan and Harry Interview Gossip as a behavioural genre (Vološinov, 1929/1976) of everyday life is both prevalent and widely recognised across many cultures and has attracted attention from a variety of academic disciplines including psychology, sociology, anthropology and linguistics. A clear definition of gossip has, however, proved elusive. Foster suggests that in everyday contexts gossip can be understood simply as “the exchange of personal information (positive or negative) in an evaluative way (positive or negative) about absent third parties” (2004: 83). As a genre, however, the activity of gossiping itself is routinely deprecated. Indeed, in any hierarchy of communicative genres gossip comes very low down in esteem, even though widely indulged. At the very least we can identify three main components of everyday gossip: The relay or mediator of gossip, who we may designate the gossip teller (Gt); the recipient of gossip (Gr); and the target or subject of gossip (Gs). In everyday interaction, the twin and related participant roles of gossip teller (Gt) and gossip recipient (Gr) are likely to enjoy shared membership of a relatively close-knit social network. The teller and the recipient, for instance, are likely to be known to each other, perhaps as family members or by virtue of common workplace or friendship group. And the target or subject of gossip will most likely be a member of the same network, known to both teller (Gt) and recipient (Gr). Negative gossip by definition needs to reflect badly on the subject of gossip (Gs), typically by adverting to some misdemeanour, breach of etiquette, moral lapse or failure of taste on the part of the target or subject of the gossip (Gs). At the same time, at the moment of telling, the item of gossip should be a secret or at least not well known within the social network—it enjoys the status of “insider knowledge”. The transmission of gossip, therefore, acts as rehearsal of relative intimacy or as a mark of trust between the teller (Gt) and the recipient of gossip (Gr). It should— as Bergmann puts it—amount to a “discreet indiscretion” (Bergmann, 1993).

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The dynamic of gossip in the public sphere rather than in the relatively private sphere of everyday life is somewhat different. The functional role of gossip teller in the public sphere becomes institutionalised in reserved or specialised spaces in the media landscape such as gossip columns or gossip magazines, some of which have a long history (see McDonnell, 2014). In the U.K., it has long been the preserve of “redtop” tabloid newspapers such as the Sun or the Mirror. The target of gossip becomes figures who enjoy some kind of celebrity status—typically film stars, pop singers or well-known sporting personalities. And gossip material itself—its raw meat, so to speak—will often feature sexual indiscretions, marital breakdowns, addictions of various kinds, petty vendettas with other celebrities, social gaffes, extravagant expenditures, and the like. Mass-mediated gossip, it should be noted, is not the same as scandal, though the boundaries between the two are often blurred, since each in itself constitutes in any case a fuzzy category. Celebrity gossip, however, usually targets private infractions of the kind which can be a source of embarrassment when made public. Scandal, on the other hand, more typically features more fundamental breaches of the public order and its associated codes (involving, for example, legal constraints or standards of professional conduct)1 which when the breach comes to light may then entail considerations of shame, or guilt or sanction. Mediated celebrity gossip provides an important contextual backdrop to Oprah’s interview with Meghan Markle and Prince Harry. At points during the broadcast, Oprah cuts away from the interview to reference gossip material from the British tabloid press. As pointed out earlier, the interview took place just over a year after the couple announced that they would no longer undertake duties as senior members of the royal family. And in the period following their announcement, they had enjoyed a mixed press from the British tabloid newspapers where gossip about celebrities—especially members of the royal family—comprises a significant portion of their coverage. Oprah, indeed, references some of this material onscreen at an early stage in the interview. The following would be a fairly typical example, where elements in headlines of stories in the

1 For example, holders of public office in the U.K. are expected to adhere to the seven principles of public life as enshrined in the Nolan Report. These include: integrity, honesty, accountability, objectivity, selflessness and openness. https://www.gov.uk/govern ment/publications/the-7-principles-of-public-life. Breach of these is more likely to be seen as scandal rather than subjective of gossip

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British tabloid press are presented in the form of a collage, momentarily displacing on screen the actual interview Fig. 4.1. This material in the form of a still image was—along with other still images of selected headlines—embedded in the programme with commentary from Oprah, subsequently providing context for the following kind of interchange within the interview itself: Extract 2

Fig. 4.1 Screen grab from the interview 1

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an:d (.) soon after your marriage the tabloids started (.) offering stories that (.) painted a not so flattering picture (.) of you (.) in your new world there were rumours about you being (.) hurricane meghan I hadn’t heard that ok hhhh so there were rumours about you being hurricane (.) MEghan (.) ei for the departure of (.) several (.) high profile (.) palace staff members (.) [uhum an:d (.) there was also (.) a story did you hear this one about (.) you (.) making Kate (.) Middleton cry (.) this I heard about you heard about that (.) ok this was that was er (.) hhhh that was a turning point

M O

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M O M

At several points during the interview, therefore, the substance of exchanges between Oprah and Meghan is informed by threads of gossip from the British tabloid press.

Oprah and Alignment in the Interview During the interview, Oprah consistently positions herself with the audience in her interviewer turns with Meghan. Extract 3 733 734 735 736 737 738 739

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you know we had heard the world tho- those of us out here (.) reading the things or hearing the things hhhh that it was you and harry (.) who (.) didn’t want (.) archie to have a prince title (.) so you you’re telling me that is not true = = no and it’s not our decision to make (.) right

In the context of this kind of move, Oprah frames herself and her audience as ingénues through the use of “us” effectively as gossip recipients in relation to Meghan and the world of royalty that the latter inhabited by virtue of her betrothal and marriage to Harry. Together Oprah and her audience (i.e. “we”, “us”) have heard some things—as if in gossip rumour—which Meghan is invited to confirm or elaborate upon. “We”, as it were, know things, but only at second- or third hand. Meghan’s knowledge, however, is at first hand and it is this first-hand knowledge that the interview will access by virtue of Oprah’s mediation.

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Sometimes the invitation takes the form of requesting a narrative report. Sometimes the request is for an explanation. Extract 4 304 305 306

O M

so when you say the reverse happened (.) explain to us what you mean by that (2.0) hhhh a few days before the wedding

In all cases, however, in a classic move within the gossip framework Oprah aligns herself with the audience as the potential joint recipients of what will be offered by or elicited from Meghan as previously undisclosed, privileged knowledge. The interview can thus be seen as performing a kind of double work in relation to gossip. It draws heavily on an existing background of gossip—as previously circulating, for instance, in the British tabloid press. At the same time, it invites a response on similar terms to this gossip within the interview itself. “Did you make Kate cry?” “No, she made me cry”.

Oprah and the Use of Statements Attributed to a Third-Party A third-party attributed statement is a common component of questioning turns in broadcast interviews where—especially in the context of news interviews of an adversarial kind—they are used to introduce into the interview material that is potentially critical of the interviewee by tracing it, defensively, to a source other than the interviewer. They provide a means of maintaining some kind of epistemological distance between interviewer and the knowledge frame being activated or accessed in a question. Oprah in her interview with Meghan and Harry often uses this kind of third-party attributed statement, as in extract 5 below. Extract 5 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389

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mmhmm you know there were several stories that (.) compared headlines written about you hhhh to those written about kate erm (.) [mm since you don’t read things let me tell you what was said hhhh er (.) [heheheheh [ok there were stories where kate was being praised for hhhh holding her baby bump oh gosh have I done it since

In this there is an implicit dramaturgical model at work in which Meghan’s life among the royals has previously been conducted “front stage” in Goffman’s terms (1990) in public view and recorded by the

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press and media. This front-stage life is often referred to by Oprah in terms of “stories”, such as following examples: “there was a really big story at the time”; “and there was also a story…about you making Kate Middleton cry” In contrast with these stories couched in third-party attributed statements, Meghan is invited to reveal what was happening back stage behind the scenes. Extract 6 463 464 465 466 467 468

O

(.) hhhh so how does that work wer- were you told by the comms people (.) or the (.) I don’t know the institution the were were you told to (.) keep silent how were you told to hhhh handle tabloids or (.) gossip were you were you told to (.) say nothing

In this respect, Oprah in her role as interviewer, positions herself as an intermediary—one who can assist in bridging between the front stage and the back stage—or, more accurately, one who prompts Meghan to provide her account of the back stage. In contrast, therefore, with the use of thirdparty attributed statements in accountability interviews—which tend to be used in what Clayman (2010) has referred to as “hostile (interviewing) environments”—Oprah’s use tends to introduce such statements in order to allow Meghan to produce an alternative account in explicit contradistinction to the gossip material previously in circulation. This practice, indeed, falls within a spectrum of devices such as continuers, reactive expressions and echoing, which—working together—realise or constitute Oprah’s role as an active, empathetic listener. It is to the discussion of these devices that we now turn.

Oprah and the Use of Echoing Oprah also creates a kind of discursive space for Meghan to occupy by routinely following up on her utterances using a phrasal repetition of a segment of Meghan’s answer, as in: Extract 7

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958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967

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well the way you’re describing this it it’s like you (.) were trapped and couldn’t get help (.) even though (.) you’re on the verge of (.) suicide that’s (.) what you are describing (.) that’s what I’m hearing= =yes (.) and that would be an accurate interpretation (.) yes [that’s the truth= =that’s the truth

These are more than simply a retrospective summing up and acknowledgement of some aspect of Meghan’s turn. Instead, they work not only retrospectively—to highlight an element in Meghan’s response to a question—but also prospectively to elicit a confirmation from Meghan of the highlighted element, as in: Extract 8 262 263 264 265 266

O M O M

you heard about that (.) ok this was that was er (.) hhhh that was a turning point (.) that was a turning point yeah

Occasionally they can be used to check an aspect of the previous turn by Meghan, as in the following example. Extract 9 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214

O M O M O M

[how does one curtsy (.) yes deeply (.) erm (.) to show respect and I learned it very quickly [uhum uhm (.) right in front of the house we just practised and walked in you and harry practised (.) yeah (.) and fergie ran out and she said are you ready do you know how to curtsy

In no case, however, do they amount to a challenge to some element of Meghan’s prior turn. Nor do they typically introduce new material into the interview. They maintain a conversational presence on Oprah’s part by simply recycling existing material. Only occasionally do they require more than a minimal turn component to respond to them as in the following example: Extract 10 98 99 100

M O M

well I didn’t do any research about what that would mean [you didn’t do any research no (.) I never looked up my husband online (.)

Mostly they serve to project or maintain a kind of conversational convergence in which Meghan’s version of events is not put under particular pressure.

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Oprah and the Use of Continuers Continuers such as “mm” and “mmhum”—sometimes referred to as a form of backchannel behaviour (Yngve, 1970)—are a complex phenomenon in the study of “talk-in-interaction”. Basically, they consist of supportive vocalisations by an interlocutor or a party to talk who is neither holding a turn nor claiming a turn by their production. In this sense, they amount to a signal of attention, or “listenership”, on the part of the vocaliser, often coinciding with a possible turn transition point in the turn-holder’s turn, but indicating that the current holder of the turn may/should continue. In this, they serve as non-interruptive, noncompetitive accompaniments to the flow of talk. They are susceptible to further classification on various parameters such as pitch and volume but also by the degree of commitment projected by the vocaliser with respect to the sentiments expressed by the turn-holder. They can for instance be used fairly noncommittally or more empathically. They are certainly a salient feature of Oprah’s interviews. Shen (2018) notes that they occur on average nearly 100 times in a one-hour show. In the particular case of the Oprah’s interview with Meghan and Harry, they occur nearly 50 times in environments such as the following: Extract 11 82 83 84 85

M (.) I would say I went into it naively (.) O [uhum M because I didn’t grow up (.) knowing (.) much about the royal family

Extract 12 119 120 121 122

M O M

[yeah I mean I didn’t fully understand what the job was (.) right [uhum what does it what does it mean to be a working royal

Continuers have been identified, it should be noted, as a feature of therapeutic discourse (Fitzgerald & Leudar, 2010). And, on the other hand, it has also been noted conversely that they rarely occur in formal political interviews or accountability news interviews where the emphasis falls instead on restricting the interviewee from talking at length on a topic not immediately germane to the agenda of the interviewer (Montgomery, 2007). In addition, they can be heard as affiliative, thereby running the risk of compromising the apparent neutrality of the interviewer in an accountability interview (Atkinson, 1992). Continuers, by contrast, as here enlarge the discursive space available to the interviewee rather than

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close it down. As non-lexicalised vocalisations, however, they do so in a relatively non-committal fashion.

Oprah and the Use of Reactive Expressions Like continuers, reactive expressions tend to operate along the back channel between the active turn-holder and their attentive interlocutor: in other words, they tend not to constitute a turn in themselves but serve as an accompaniment on the part of the listener to an ongoing turn. Unlike continuers, however, they are lexicalised and thereby carry or express a more determinate content, often emotive or attitudinal, than a simple vocalisation like “mmhum”. In the interview, Oprah uses a range of expressions, such as ok (over 14 times), yeah (over 22 times), as well as right, obviously, which seem to signal acknowledgement and/or agreement with the turn-holder. But she also uses expressions, such as oh nice, and wow where a specific attitude is projected. Wow provides an interesting case in point. Occurring at least 5 times in the transcript of the interview, it is defined by the Oxford English Dictoinary as “An exclamation of surprise, admiration, aversion, or commiseration”. The precise attitude expressed by the item is of course contextually determined. In the following example, Meghan is talking about curtseying on her first introduction to the queen even though the encounter takes place in private, “inside” and thus “backstage”. Oprah’s reaction, “wow”, seems to express a mixture of being both impressed and surprised. Extract 13 194 195 196 197 198 199 200

M O M O M

I didn’t think that’s what happens inside [yeah I go but it’s your grandmother he goes (.) it’s the queen (.) [wow and that was really the first moment the penny dropped that this wasn’t (.)

Note however that Oprah’s “wow” (like her “yeah”) does not interrupt Meghan’s turn but coincides with a slight pause by Meghan, whose turn nonetheless continues post Oprah’s reaction without being discernibly affected by it. Overall, therefore, Oprah’s role as interviewer rests as much—crucially—on shadowing, echoing, acknowledging, checking and reacting to Meghan as it does on questioning itself.

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The Celebrity Interview, Gossip, Empathy and News Most definitions of the broadcast interview regard them as characterised by a pre-allocation of turns in which the interviewer asks questions, and the interviewee answers them. There are, however, different types of broadcast interview. Montgomery (2007) suggests that there are 4 main types of broadcast news interviews, the experiential, the accountability, the expert and the affiliated news interview. As suggested earlier, Oprah’s celebrity interview with Meghan seems most like a variant of the experiential interview—one where the experiences recounted are significant because of the status of the interviewee. In practice, of course, individual interviews may consist of blends of one type or another but nonetheless there are distinctive traits that distinguish one ideal type from another. In the experiential news interview, says Montgomery (2007), the interviewee is presented in the role of an observer, victim or survivor rather than as an active agent in relation to the news and is interviewed not to answer for the event but to answer about it – to give a viewpoint privileged by some kind of closeness to proceedings. There is a sense in these kinds of interview of the interviewee having been caught up in the news field involuntarily, not by choice but by accident. (pp. 155–156)

Because of this, questions in an experiential interview tend to be of the kind “what did it feel like when..”, “could you see..”, “when did you first realise …”: in other words, they are framed around verbs of cognition, sensation and feeling. These then constitute the ideational spine of the interview. And, indeed, they run as the dominant thread throughout the Oprah-Meghan interview where the experiences are treated as significant because they belong to a celebrity and because they have been the subject of media gossip. Extract 14 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442

Extract 15

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you came in as the first mixed race person to (.) marry into the family and yours was a different story [mmm and did that (.) concern you in in in in (.) being able to fit in did yo- did you think about that at all (.) well I thought about it because (1.5) they made me think about it

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574 575 576 577

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hmm (.) you were feeling lonely even though (.) yo- your prince you’re in love you’re with him I’m not lonely I wasn’t lonely with him (.)

Typically, Oprah’s experiential questions are polar interrogatives (e.g. “did you think about that at all?” Ex. 14) appended to an exposition of some event or circumstance relating to Meghan’s marriage and subsequent incorporation in the royal family (e.g. “you came in as the first mixed-race person to marry into the family”. Ex. 14). In effect, Oprah’s speaking turns provide a narrative framework in the form of an event-line against which to elicit what Labov (1972), in his account of narratives of personal experience, would term evaluations by Meghan (e.g. “I thought about it because they made me think about it” Ex. 14, or “I’m not lonely I wasn’t lonely with him” Ex. 15.) In the following example, Oprah (who was an invited guest at Meghan’s marriage to Harry) describes a moment at the marriage ceremony, before posing the question, “were you even inside your body at that time?” Extract 16 56 57 58 59 60

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wh- when you came through that door it seemed like you were like (.) floating (.) down the aisle (.) were you even inside your body at that time = =I’ve thought about this a lot because (.) it was like having an out of body experience

Overall, therefore, this interview (which lasts in its broadcast and edited version for over an hour) puts Meghan’s “backstage” experiences with the British royal family front and centre stage through a series of experiential questions, to which Oprah responds with supportive but relatively non-committal back-channel vocalisations, or follows up with requests for clarification or elaboration. The overall stance may be described as neutral, but nonetheless empathetic—inasmuch as it offers Meghan discursive space to rehearse or explore her experience—and nonaligned. The only exceptions come towards the end of the interview with increasingly reactive utterances such as “wow”, “whoa”, “whoo”, “oh nice”. Perhaps the most reactive utterance of all comes about threequaters of the way into the interview when Meghan is describing concerns that arose during her first pregnancy about the future title and security arrangements regarding her as yet unborn child: Extract 17

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(.) but I can give you an honest answer (.) (hhhh) in those months when I was pregnant (.) all around this same time (.) so we have in tandem the conversation of he won’t be given security (.) he’s not going to be given a title (2.0) and also (.) concerns and conversations about how dark his skin might be when he’s born (4.0) WHAT and (.) who (.) who is having THAT conversation (.) with you (5.0) what (.) so (hhhh) erm (3.5) there is a CONVERSATION ((rising tone)) hold on hold up hold up stop right now [there were there were several conversations about it there’s a conversation (.) with you with harry (.) about (.) how dark your baby is going to be (.) potentially and what that would mean or look like whoo (4.0) and you’re not going to tell me who had the conversation (1.0) I think that would be very damaging to them ok hhhh (.) so how how does one have that meeting

Oprah’s “What?” is the most forceful reaction that she shows at any point in the interview and registers a mixture of surprise, disbelief and even shock at the revelation by Meghan that ‘backstage’ conversations among the family prior to the birth of Archie touched on “how dark his skin might be when he’s born”. In addition, it is almost the only time in the interview where Oprah’s subsequent “follow-up” turns cut across any continuation of Meghan’s turn. Meghan, immediately following Oprah’s “what?”, produces an element, “and”, which seems most likely to be a continuation of her turn prior to Oprah’s “what?”. This, however, is interrupted by Oprah with “who who is having that conversation with you what” where the reduplicated “who” reinforces the notion that this is a turn-competitive incoming on her part. When Meghan restarts her continuation with the resumptive “so”, Oprah actually puts an overt pause on the development of the turn with “there is a conversation hold on hold up hold up stop right now”. On Oprah’s part, the whole exchange works to point up, reinforce and foreground the original claim: “there’s a conversation …. about how dark your baby is going to be …. Whoo”.

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This is one of the few moments in the broadcast version of the interview in which Oprah can be heard taking up or articulating a position or aligning herself in relation to Meghan’s account. Even here, however, her views have to be extrapolated from a somewhat indeterminate reactive utterance (“What?!”), some shadowing/mirroring (“there is a conversation”) and some metadiscursive work (“hold up stop right now”). Oprah’s accentuated reaction (“What?”) to Meghan’s revelation regarding the speculation about the colour of her expected baby in effect identifies and foregrounds the most highly charged, gossip-worthy material of the interview. It thereby completes a transformation within the interview from gossip as background to the interaction to the interview as gossip itself. In terms of the participation framework of gossip which we outlined in Section 3.0 of this chapter, we can now articulate the realisation of its components in the following way: Gossip Teller1 (Gt1): Gossip Teller2 (Gt2):

Gossip Recipient1 (Gr1): Gossip Recipient2 (Gr2): Subject (or Target) of Gossip1 (Gs1): Subject (or Target) of Gossip2: (Gs2):

Pre-existing press coverage of Meghan (particularly U.K. tabloid journalism) Meghan herself (though often in reaction to material mediated by Oprah from Gt1) Tabloid readership Broadcast audience (with Oprah mediating between Gr1 and Gr2) Meghan The British Royal Family.

Conclusions In effect, the Oprah-Meghan interview provides a forum or arena for what might be described as a counter-gossiping response (by Meghan) to a pre-existing gossip framework supplied by tabloid journalism. In this, Oprah’s role is crucial, partly by offering a conduit for stories in prior circulation through her use of third-party attributed statements (see Section 3.0 above) (e.g. “there was also a story about you making Kate Middleton cry”), but also by providing an empathetic discursive space for

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Meghan to offer her own insider alternative account of what was taking place “backstage”. Oprah’s empathetic style of active listening, involving a range of discursive devices, which include echoing, continuers and reactive expressions, is crucial to the development of this discursive space. Indeed, these devices may provide the realisation in discourse of a tangible sense of women’s solidarity—even perhaps of a shared sense of experience as women of colour—that characterises the interview. The terms of Meghan’s counter-gossiping response are significant. Except for very positive anecdotes about the Queen and the incident involving Kate Middleton, the Subject or Target of Gossip (Gs2) usually remains broad (“the royals”, “the institution”, “the family”, “the palace”, “the firm - the monarchy”). When individual actors surface against this amorphous background, they are not identified, except in the vaguest of terms (e.g. “the people that are running the institution”, “one of the most senior people”). Non-identification of specific actors is thus a feature of Meghan’s counter-gossip. This tactic is particularly evident in perhaps the most crucial moment of the interview where Meghan refers to “concerns and conversations about how dark” her first child’s “skin might be when he’s born”. Oprah’s subsequent efforts to identify the bearer(s) of these concerns meet with little success: Extract 18 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812

O M O M O M O M O M O

(.) who (.) who is having THAT conversation (.) with you (5.0) what (.) so (hhhh) erm (3.5) there is a CONVERSATION ((raising tone)) hold on hold up hold up stop right now [there were there were several conversations about it there’s a conversation (.) with you with harry (.) about (.) how dark your baby is going to be (.) potentially and what that would mean or look like whoo (4.0) and you’re not going to tell me who had the conversation (1.0) I think that would be very damaging to them ok hhhh (.)

In other generic contexts (legal cross-examination or political interview, for example), it might be difficult to evade prompts to provide greater specificity. But in the context of a celebrity interview and a movement from gossip to counter-gossip, the vagueness has tactical value. It

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enables precisely that quality of gossip identified by Bergmann (1993) as “discreet indiscretions”. There were other salient points of interest in Meghan’s account apart from this reference to conversations by unspecified persons about the projected skin colour of a baby. Meghan generally alludes to what she feels was a lack of support at crucial periods during her time with the family, all of which cohere to provide justification for the decision of the Sussexes to withdraw from an official role. But the reference to skin colour proved to be perhaps the most striking feature for the subsequent journalism that followed up on the interview. For in the days following its broadcast, the interview dominated news coverage in the U.S. and the U.K. (attracted comment over a year later). The main front-page headline in the Guardian newspaper the next day was “Palace in crisis following devastating racism claim”. The BBC ran a news bulletin in which a reporter could be heard asking Prince William— second in line to the throne and thus a future king—“Is the Royal Family a racist family, sir?”, to which the Prince replied, unusually and with evident irritation: “We’re very much not a racist family.” The interview thus clearly had quite definite reverberations in the news field and also even in the political realm, placing the British monarchy under additional scrutiny in a year that carried other negative stories about high-profile members of the Royal Family. It could be said, simply, that it offered a striking example of how the personal could become political. Certainly it seemed to illustrate a trajectory in which news could become gossip but could become in turn again news.

References Atkinson, J. M. (1992). Displaying neutrality: Formal aspects of informal court proceedings. In Talk at work: Interaction in institutional settings (pp. 199– 211). Bauder, D. (2021, March 9). World viewership of royals’ interview nearly 50 million. AP News. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/world-viewer ship-meghan-harry-interview-nearly-50-million-14256f9948ad4fd7b0b5c290 46402a13 Bergmann, J. R. (1993). Discreet indiscretions: The social organization of gossip. Aldine Transaction. Clayman, S. E. (2010). Questions in broadcast journalism. In A. F. Freed, & Ehrlich, S. (Ed.), Why do you ask ?: The functions of questions in institutional discourse. Oxford University Press.

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Clayman, S. E., & Heritage, J. (2002). The news interview: Journalists and public figure on the air. Cambridge University Press. Fitzgerald, P., & Leudar, I. (2010). On active listening in person-centred, solution-focused psychotherapy. Journal of Pragmatics, 42, 3188–3198. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2010.07.007 Foster, E. K. (2004). Research on gossip: Taxonomy, methods, and future directions. Review of General Psychology, 8(2), 78–99. https://doi.org/10.1037/ 1089-2680.8.2.78 Goffman, E. (1981). Forms of talk. Basil Blackwell. Goffman, E. (1990). The presentation of self in everyday life. Penguin. Haarman, L. (Ed.). (1999). Talk about shows: La Parola e lo spettacolo. CLUEB. HBR. (2020, March 26). Real leaders: Oprah Winfrey and the power of empathy. HBR IdeaCast. Labov, W. (1972). Sociolinguistic patterns. University of Pennsylvania Press. Lucy, M. (2021, March 8). Oprah with Meghan and Harry interview—Just give in and watch. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/ tv-and-radio/2021/mar/08/oprah-with-meghan-and-harry-review-just-givein-and-watch McDonnell, A. (2014). Reading celebrity gossip magazines. Polity Press. Montgomery, M. (2007). The discourse of broadcast news: A linguistic approach. Routledge. Montgomery, M. (2017). Talking for fun and talking in earnest: Two styles of mediated broadcast talk. In J. Mortensen, N. Coupland, & J. Thogersen (Eds.), Style, mediation, and change: Sociolinguistic perspectives on talking media. Oxford University Press. Scannell, P. (Ed.). (1991). Broadcast talk. Sage. Scannell, P. (2020). Media and communication (2nd ed.). SAGE Publications. Shen, J. (2018). Reactive tokens and the performance of listening in The Oprah Winfrey Show (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Macau. Tannen, D. (1990). You Just don’t understand: Women and men in conversation. William Morrow. Thornborrow, J. (2014). The discourse of public participation media: From talk show to Twitter. Routledge. Tolson, A. (Ed.). (2001). Television talk shows: Discourse, performance, spectacle. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Vološinov, V. N. (1929/1976). Marxism and the philosophy of language. Routledge. Yngve, V. (1970). On getting a word in edgewise. Paper presented at the the Sixth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society Chicago.

PART II

Gossip and the President

CHAPTER 5

Hedda Hopper Meets JFK: Hollywood Gossip, Right-Wing Politics, and the Kennedys Jennifer Frost

In 1960, famed Hollywood gossip columnist Hedda Hopper’s power and influence were waning, just as Democrat John F. Kennedy won the White House. These two developments played out in her daily gossip column. Although Hopper was still syndicated in 130 newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and the New York Daily News, with a readership estimated at 32,000,000 readers, at the turn of the sixties, her position as a Hollywood powerhouse was under threat.1 Over 1 The method for calculating newspaper readership numbers is imprecise: the number of newspapers in circulation multiplied by the estimated number of readers per copy. 32,000,000 readers was also the estimate at the height of Hopper’s career a decade earlier, but Hopper’s syndicate assured her in 1962 that her column remained just as popular. Maurice T. Reilly. Letter (1962, February 2). To Hedda Hopper, Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, 1962 folder, Hedda Hopper papers.

J. Frost (B) Department of History, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_5

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a 28-year career that began in 1938 when the Los Angeles Times picked up her fledging gossip column, “Hedda Hopper’s Hollywood,” she established herself as a player in the movie industry and right-wing politics, shaping both American popular and political culture. Hopper’s distinctive contribution lay with how she combined and wielded gossip about the worlds of entertainment and politics in her column. Gossip is “private talk”—true or false talk about private life—voiced, often illegitimately, in the public realm. As a purveyor and publicist of private talk, Hopper used this powerful discourse to shape celebrity personas and stigmatize those who stepped outside what she deemed acceptable social norms and political views. The Kennedys, their connections to Hollywood, and liberal politics were fodder for her weaponized gossip. Always a highly partisan member of the conservative wing of the Republican Party, Hopper privately expressed and publicly sought to build opposition to JFK’s election in 1960. After he won the presidency, she did publish favorable comments about Kennedy and his family. But she continued her political attacks in her personal correspondence and included in her column incriminatory albeit indirect accusations. She placed items in her column about JFK himself, his wife Jacqueline Kennedy, his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, a Hollywood mogul whom she knew in the 1920s, as well as his brother-in-law film star Peter Lawford. These items were a mix of straight reporting and gossip. Hopper’s column included discussion of the Kennedys’ political ties to Hollywood liberals and hinted at personal ties to Hollywood actresses. In personal correspondence with friends and readers, where she was not subject to an editor’s red pencil or a publisher’s concern about libel, she could be bolder about the political danger she believed the Kennedys posed and more explicit in her accusations of sexual liaisons. Hopper also mobilized her readers to take political action, demanding the president prohibit the export of movies that presented an unflattering picture of the United States. Hedda Hopper’s coverage and correspondence about President Kennedy and his family illustrates her well-honed practice of Hollywood gossip. She had long given celebrity status and coverage to politicians and inserted politics into her coverage of Hollywood stars. Her function as a publicist of private talk in the movie capital always extended to the nation’s capital. In offering political commentary, Hopper was not unique among gossip columnists, as other famous gossip columnists such as Walter Winchell, Louella Parsons, and Ed Sullivan did so too. But the depth of her political commitment and the continuity in her conservative

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ideas and beliefs over her long career were unique. Long-standing conservative ideas and more recent conspiracy beliefs determined the political positions she took, and she never wavered in her dedication to using her column in the interests of her political agenda. Key to advancing her political agenda was connecting with and mobilizing her vast readership. As a result, Hopper crafted her columns to foster community and conversations among her readers, and addressed them not just as readers or film spectators but also as citizens. She assumed her readers shared her ideology and partisan affiliation, and her readers’ letters confirmed that assumption. In the process, she communicated her political agenda with her readers: opposing liberalism and the welfare state, the civil rights and labor movements, and modern manners and morals. With Democrats back in the White House, after eight years of Republican rule, Hopper felt everything she politically believed in was a stake. At the same time, her gossip career faced unprecedented challenges. The old Hollywood system of a few major studios controlling the production, distribution, and exhibition of motion pictures—upon which she depended—was breaking down, giving way to a new, less integrated, more fluid industry. Meanwhile, new outlets for celebrity news appeared at both the low and high ends of journalism, crowding Hopper’s column. Tabloid magazines, such as Confidential which debuted in 1952, took advantage of waning studio power to control both star behavior and information about it to focus exclusively on exposing and sensationalizing star scandals. Their existence greatly angered Hopper. “Those horrible stories in Confidential magazine are doing our stars more harm than anything that’s ever happened to them” (Hopper, 1955). Meanwhile, traditional newspapers and magazines expanded their celebrity coverage. By the early 1960s, Hopper felt she needed to shore up her declining influence both politically and professionally, and she fought back with everything she had.

Covering the Kennedys Hedda Hopper never liked the Kennedys. Both she and Joseph P. Kennedy moved to Hollywood in the 1920s, a decade of spectacular growth and consolidation in the motion picture industry. Kennedy’s financial wheeling and dealing—ruthlessly buying, merging, and selling multiple companies—earned him a fortune, and his flagrant extramarital affair with actress Gloria Swanson earned him a disreputable image.

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Hopper, at the time an actress under contract to Metro-GoldwynMayer, objected to both. When Joseph Kennedy supported and provided financing for Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt’s successful presidential campaign in 1932, her antagonism grew. Although her conservative Republican politics and abhorrence of Democrats primarily motived Hopper’s negative feelings toward Kennedy, her friendship with Swanson and Kennedy’s ill-treatment of the glamorous star only heightened Hopper’s antipathy. The two women’s friendship led to favorable items for Swanson and scoops for Hopper after her fledgling gossip column was picked up by the Los Angeles Times in 1938. “Trying to get an interview with Gloria Swanson is like talking to the United States Army,” Hopper led off her 12 May 1941 column (Hopper, 1941). They appeared together in Sunset Boulevard (1950), an iconic and ironic film about Hollywood’s golden age. A decade later, Swanson’s star presence boosted and benefited the columnist’s January 1960 television special, “Hedda Hopper’s Hollywood.” They also shared extremist political views. During the Cold War, they grew concerned that mental health reform could lead to “brainwashing” in the United States. “Gloria Swanson,” Hopper reported in 1957, “passed me a pamphlet pointing out threats to our constitutional freedoms in the [pending] mental health bill, a matter in which we are both vitally interested” (Hopper, 1957a). This familiarity led to Hopper alluding to the affair in her column, such as a comment about Swanson in the 1960s: “After all she was once mighty close to the Kennedys” (Hopper, 1964c). A brief exception to Hopper’s antagonism toward the Kennedy clan occurred before the United States entered World War II. Then US Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph Kennedy was a staunch antiinterventionist. Hopper joined him in seeking American neutrality in the war. In 1940, as Nazi Germany rapidly advanced on France and British troops retreated from the European continent, Kennedy urged President Roosevelt to make peace with Germany. In her 2 May 1940 column, Hopper mentioned that “Joe Kennedy” was doing “much good” for the country (Hopper, 1940). When Kennedy returned to Hollywood in November 1940—just before Roosevelt demanded he resign his ambassadorship—he told movie producers to stop making anti-Nazi films and begin to reconcile themselves to a neutral United States and a Europe dominated by Germany. When Hopper saw Kennedy at a party during

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his California visit, she sought him out and spurred him on in speaking out against US involvement in the war (Beschloss, 1980; Eells, 1972). This moment of agreement did not last and was two decades in the past by the time JFK ran for president. Kennedy did not formally announce his candidacy until January 1960, but he had been unofficially on the campaign trail for three years. Hopper could not help but notice. She also could not help but notice the publicity the photogenic Kennedys garnered over the years, including multiple Life and Look magazine covers (Berry Jr, 1987). So she began participating in the celebrity publicity the presidential candidate already enjoyed. Hopper started including mentions alongside her coverage of actor Peter Lawford, husband of Patricia Kennedy, JFK’s younger sister. “The Peter Lawfords and the entire Kennedy clan are hanging up their stockings at Palm Beach” for Christmas 1957. “Quite an illustrious get-together” (Hopper, 1957b). The next year, Hopper caught up with the British-born Lawford at a gala. She asked him “if he’d give up acting to become an ambassador if and when his brother-in-law John Kennedy became president.” “Certainly not,” Lawford quipped. “I can’t afford it.” “I’ll stick to the job I know,” he added. “Bully for him,” Hopper commented (Hopper, 1958). While Peter Lawford linked Hollywood to the Kennedys and legitimized Hopper’s items on these connections, her coverage also continued her practice of intertwining celebrity and political gossip in her column. As the 1960 presidential campaign heated up, Hopper began to express her strident opposition to JFK where she could—in her personal correspondence—and not just because she was a Republican. “He is Joe’s son—enough said!” She hoped that his candidacy would be doomed by a sex scandal. “They tell me he’s like his pappy, a woman in every port,” she wrote a colleague. “If that’s the case, he’ll slip some time and that’ll help our side” (Hopper Letters, 1960). Hopper received Kennedy’s win in November with dread and alarm. “I won’t listen to his speeches nor will I read them,” she declared to a friend after the election. “He sounds so much like FDR it makes my stomach turn, and it is always a Democrat who gets us into war” (Hopper Letter, 1962b). Never in her published column would editors or publishers have allowed Hopper to make such impolitic accusations or be this explicit in her political opposition to Kennedy. Once the Kennedys were in the White House, Hopper’s column contained mostly straight reporting and even some compliments. “Finding actors to play the President this year is the problem,” she

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wrote in 1962. Warner Brothers Studio, for example, had taken much time and testing before finally settling on actor Cliff Robertson to star as JFK in PT-109 (1963) (Hopper 1962a). Behind the scenes, it turns out that President Kennedy had wanted Warren Beatty to play himself, with Robertson his second choice. He also had screenplay approval, which Hopper did not report (Berry Jr, 1987). She did report on the president’s enjoyment of James Bond novels and movies, and how the Kennedys hosted author Ian Fleming and screened the films at the White House. “If you have a print of From Russia, With Love, send it over. Somebody wants to see it,” a staffer told the film’s producer in 1963. “Somebody being JFK, one of Fleming’s fans,” Hopper added (Hopper, 1963d). She included praise of the president from Jody McCrea, son of actor Joel McCrea. “Before I met the President…I felt that possibly he might be too young for the job’s responsibilities, but after talking with him, I’m convinced his youth is an asset” (qtd. in Hopper, 1961a). Hopper issued her own praise as well, admiring the star quality of the Kennedys. “President Kennedy set a style and pattern with his inner vitality—Jacqueline Kennedy matched it” (Hopper, 1964a). In this way, Hopper conveyed her attention to and admiration of the charisma and celebrity the couple brought to the White House. After all, Mrs. Kennedy, according to Life magazine, was “one of America’s ten most photographed women” (qtd. in Winfield, 1997). Still criticisms always offset any positive items about the Kennedys in her column. “There’s good news today! And it’s from Washington, DC.” For his many appearances before US military personnel around the world and charities, comedian Bob Hope had been awarded a Congressional Gold Medal, which “President Kennedy will present” (Hopper, 1962c). At the same time, Hopper expressed anger at the poor treatment of Hope by Kennedy’s Defense Department. “Bob Hope wasn’t bitter about the long delay in customs on his return from entertaining our troops, but he should have been” (Hopper, 1963a). Hopper similarly conveyed with a bite her ostensible admiration for Jacqueline Kennedy’s artistic and fashion sense. She may have quoted actor Vincent Price’s approval of the current renovation and interior decorating of the White House: “I think Mrs. Kennedy is doing a wonderful job of making it into a national monument” (Hopper, 1962b). But the columnist also gleefully noted that, due to a big Hollywood event, “Jacqueline Kennedy’s campaign to make Washington, DC, the center of culture is in for a severe setback” (Hopper, 1963a).

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Political Attacks and Sexual Innuendo Yet such criticisms of the Kennedys were nothing compared to Hopper’s outright political attacks and less than subtle sexual innuendo. In reporting about the great turnout for “JFK’s giant party to pay off the last election contest,” she could joke about comedian George Burns singing for the guests. “I wouldn’t even wish that on a Democrat” (Hopper, 1963a). She was not joking when she offered this “riddle” for her readers. On a cold January morning, a man took the oath of office as chief executive of his country. He was 43. Standing beside him was his predecessor, a beloved general who, 15 years before, commanded the armed forces of his country in a war which resulted in the complete defeat of Germany. The man who took the oath had also served in the armed forces in this war and had been brought up in the Roman Catholic faith.

“It was not John F. Kennedy,” she insisted. “Who was it?” (Hopper, 1962e). She later provided the answer. “Many readers were stumped with that riddle I had in the column last week—the one about a world leader who sounded like JFK but turned out to be Hitler” (Hopper, 1962g). Juxtaposing John Kennedy with Adolf Hitler posited a relationship between them, a relationship hard to dislodge once established. And, although she pretended to differentiate the two men, she provided only similarities. To anyone who criticized her for a disturbing item like this one, Hopper would have countered that they should not take it seriously, it was just a riddle. But the damage had been done. Other kinds of juxtapositions may have been more subtle than explicitly connecting Hitler and JFK, but they did not happen by chance in Hopper’s column. She ordered and linked items she wanted her readers to relate, often separated by ellipses. She used this technique in her discussions of the president’s Hollywood supporters, like Frank Sinatra. The actor-singer’s messy personal life and mob connections were well known to Hopper. After Sinatra became friends with Peter and Patricia Lawford, he campaigned hard for the Democratic ticket in 1960. Hopper sought to implicate them all when she followed an item on Sinatra visiting the First Family with a storm in Las Vegas, home of mob-run casinos. “Frank Sinatra’s friendship with Pat Lawford paid off; he spent the week-end with President Kennedy and his family at Hyannis Port. … The devil struck Las Vegas!” (Hopper, 1961c). If confronted about this connection, Hopper would have denied it or ascribing any meaning to it. But

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as screenwriter Leonard Spigelgass recalled, “She could say it was just a news item that followed the other by chance. But the column had that kind of continuity” (qtd. in Eells, 1972). It was harder for Hopper to disavow responsibility for printing damning direct quotes. An example occurred after Sinatra co-hosted with Lawford a pre-inaugural ball, one of the biggest in American history, for JFK. “We talked about how much Frank Sinatra had given of himself to stage the inauguration party,” she reported on a conversation she had with comedian Red Skelton. “What can Kennedy do to repay Frank, the man who has everything?” she asked. “He can repeal the Mann Act,” Skelton answered (Hopper, 1963b). With this reported exchange, Hopper and Skelton indicted Sinatra and by implication Kennedy not just of immoral but also of illegal behavior. Passed in 1910, the Mann Act, popularly known as the White Slave Traffic Act, made it a felony to transport a woman across state lines for immoral purposes. Given that gossip is talk about private lives and personal issues, such sexual innuendo was Hopper’s stock in trade. But the most sexually suggestive of her items about the Kennedys, like the Skelton quote, appeared in the Chicago Tribune, owned by the reactionary conservative Colonel Robert R. McCormick. Hopper’s column had a choppy structure, jumping from item to item. This structure allowed it to be easily edited for size and content, particularly political or libelous content, and reordered by local newspapers subscribing to her syndication service. The editors of the Chicago Tribune permitted Hopper the most freedom to damage the reputations of their partisan opponents. Her information about consensual sexual relationships was often correct, and she was right to criticize how powerful, predatory men used and abused women. But she chose when to go public with her information and in her criticism. And, more often than not, she did so when she disliked the people involved, or they had more liberal politics than she did (Frost, 2007). So Hopper alluded to liaisons between Kennedy men and Hollywood actresses. “Angie Dickinson went stag to Pat Lawford’s home when President Kennedy was a house guest. She was the only actress there that day, but she was one of his most devoted workers during the campaign” (Hopper, 1961d). Loaded language like “stag”—going solo to a romantic event for couples—and “devoted”—being loving and loyal—made it clear to careful readers that JFK and the actress were having an affair. More implicit but still incriminating was this item: “President Kennedy has accepted the honorary world chairmanship of the Star Spangled ball, to

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be held Nov. 8 at the Waldorf, to which Marilyn Monroe will also be invited” (Hopper, 1962b). It was not by accident that, despite a guest list of hundreds for the ball, only two—Kennedy and Monroe—were listed in Hopper’s column. That Hopper’s readers understood the full meaning behind these items was evident in their letters to the columnist following Monroe’s tragic death in 1962. Hopper dedicated several columns to the actress’s life and career, which included her post-divorce friendship with ex-husband and baseball great Joe DiMaggio, and the mail poured in from her readers. One of her items in particular pointed out a Kennedy, the president’s sister Patricia. “Hollywood is still smarting from the blow Joe DiMaggio dealt it when he excluded the motion picture industry from Marilyn Monroe’s funeral…. Mrs. Peter Lawford, a true friend, had flown out from Hyannis Port but couldn’t get in” (Hopper, 1962f). This item catalyzed several readers to respond with their criticisms in letters to Hopper. “Can’t the Kennedys keep out of anything?” “The Kennedys seem to have no conscience.” One reader reminded Hopper that the president’s brother, Robert, also had had a relationship with Monroe. “You might even invite Bobby Kennedy” (Readers Letters—Monroe 1962–1963). Although Hopper called Patricia Lawford “a true friend” to Marilyn Monroe, her readers had their doubts, based on information and gossip drawn from beyond Hopper’s column. Indeed, Hopper did not cover every Kennedy scandal in her column. When a rumor arose in the early 1960s that Jackie Kennedy was not the president’s first wife, because he had been married to a twice-divorced socialite in 1947, both the tabloids and the traditional press took notice. “Kennedy’s Divorce Exposed! Is Present Marriage Valid? Excommunication Possible,” headlined tabloids. Planned stories at the New York Daily News, one of Hopper’s most important newspapers, and Look magazine were soon quashed, but Newsweek later ran with it. According to reporters, JFK “never flatly denied” the rumor (qtd. in Berry, 1987). However tempting this item may have been for Hopper, the lawyers at her syndication company would have held her in line.

Demanding Presidential Action Although mostly an antagonist of President Kennedy, Hopper had one area where she hoped to ally with him and his administration: banning the export of certain Hollywood movies. Over the years, the columnist

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had campaigned against the film content of countless films, most famously The Blackboard Jungle (1955), and continued to do so. She objected to “pictures that show the worst side of American life,” especially when they “went all over the world and did a great deal of harm” (Hopper Letter, 1955). In 1961, she reported that another of the president’s sisters, Jean Kennedy Smith, had just returned with similar objections after traveling through several Asian countries. [She] was horrified to learn Asians believe what they see in American movies is the whole truth about the United States. They consider Americans are gangsters, cowboys, decadent millionaires, or beatniks…. I’ve been screaming this ever since Dore Schary produced Blackboard Jungle, but has it done any good? Maybe Mrs. Smith’s words will. (Hopper, 1961b)

Hopper and her readers certainly held out hope. One film they strongly campaigned against during the Kennedy years was Otto Preminger’s Advise and Consent (1962). The film presented the political machinations around the Senate confirmation hearings of a nominee for Secretary of State, taking aim at conservatives and liberals as well as the partisan uses of anticommunism and homophobia. While Preminger saw the film as dramatizing how government worked, the film’s ultimate message was that “politics is a dirty business,” and critical and political reception was mainly negative (Christensen, 1987). Hopper hated the film. She objected to the plot in which the nominee “has played footsies with the Communists and lied under oath” about it and how one of the key Senators “was friendly with a homosexual.” She could not do anything about the film’s domestic release, but she campaigned against its overseas distribution. “Many nations don’t understand democracy. They love our pictures and take them as the literal truth” (Hopper Letter, n.d.). She called upon her readers to help. “If enough people write the State Department, or our President, or the members of the Cabinet, we may be able to prevent the film’s being shown in foreign countries” (Hopper Letters, 1962a). Hopper’s readers responded, promising to send their letters and organize against Advise and Consent ’s export. One man believed “this picture can nullify Millions of Dollars that have been spent trying to get the United States good publicity in other ways.” “If this picture had been produced by the Russians,” he added, “we would have every right to cause an international incident with it.” “Aren’t our movies bad enough,”

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asked a woman, “without taking a poke at our politics?” “I hope that there will be enough people; no matter how small and unimportant; who will do all they can to have the movie banned from being shown outside of this country.” “I’ve been busy here in Portland via telephone,” wrote an Oregon woman. She informed Hopper that “the American Legion are not too fond of the idea of its export to other countries” either (Readers Letters—Preminger 1962). Hopper’s campaign received organizational support from women involved in charity work and, most prominently, the California Federation of Women’s Clubs. In their letters to President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the California women’s clubs denounced Advise and Consent. They believed “the image it creates of our national government is one of corruption, dishonesty, and lack of integrity, thereby hurting the American image,” a quote Hopper soon got into print (Hopper, 1962d). Her practice of referring to and publishing letters in her column allowed readers to see themselves as participating in national conversations and campaigns. However, they failed to persuade the president, his administration, or industry leaders, or to prevent the film’s export. A further example of Hopper’s waning influence, this failure reinforced her reputation by the early 1960s as flailing fervently but fruitlessly against the industry and the nation she sought to change morally and politically.

Communism and Conspiracy Hopper’s increasing pessimism about politics, morality, and her own career intensified her fears of communism and conspiracy taking over Hollywood and the country. Most often, she expressed such fears in her personal correspondence or in unpublished interviews, such as a 1963 interview with actress Lillian Gish. “I think Kennedy is the most literate president in my lifetime,” Gish shared, “if only his deeds matched his words, wouldn’t it be wonderful!” “I’m glad I’m as old as I am,” Hopper responded, “I don’t want to live under Communism” (qtd. in Gish Interview). This exchange occurred in June 1963, just as Kennedy began to express greater support for the civil rights movement showing how, for Hopper, liberalism and racial equality were indistinguishable from Communism. Similarly, Hopper’s suspicion and paranoia also appeared in her published writings during the Kennedy years. In 1961, when Hopper discovered a dollar bill without “In God We Trust,” she expressed fears of a government conspiracy to remove the

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phrase (Eells, 1972). Congress had made “In God We Trust” the nation’s official motto in 1956, and it began to appear on dollar bills and coins after that. Money without the motto was still in circulation, however, so the fact that Hopper found one bill could hardly be attributed to the machinations of the Kennedy administration. Even so her readers sent letters exhibiting the belief that Christianity was a bulwark against communism and needed buttressing in the contemporary United States. “[M]ay God bless you for printing that article,” wrote one man. “A Godless country is a Communist country” (Reader Letter, 1961). For Hopper and her anticommunist respondents, anyone who disagreed with them became a suspect “un-American,” with liberals and Democrats falling under such suspicion. Hopper reacted similarly to Supreme Court decisions in the early 1960s banning school prayer. Worried that liberal Democratic politics would replace Republican and religious beliefs in America’s classrooms, she told this apocryphal story in a 1963 Chicago Tribune column. There was this teacher in Hollywood who asked her class, “Who gave us our fine postoffice?” “President Kennedy,” they answered. “And who gave us our fine school building?” … “President Kennedy.” … “And who gave us our beautiful skies and trees?” … One kid said, “God.” The rest of the class yelled, “Throw that Republican out of here” (Hopper, 1963c).

This unsubtle story revealed Hopper’s growing sense of grievance as the world changed around her. Belied by her persistent attacks and position of power, Hopper always believed herself to be on the defensive politically and professionally. “I was almost thrown out of the industry,” she claimed, due to her conservative politics. “I was almost thrown out of Hollywood” (qtd. on Small World Telecast, 1959). Feeling victimized by liberals and Democrats in both popular and political culture, she considered herself an innocent, no matter what libelous words she used or alarming actions she took. This conviction led her to take more risks with her published gossip. In her 1963 book, The Whole Truth and Nothing But, she linked the Kennedys to corruption. She then lost an expensive libel case unrelated to the Kennedys but stemming from that book. After JFK’s assassination in November 1963, she took another professional risk by circulating Norman Vincent Peale’s conspiracy theories. Hopper had long been a believer. Since the start of her career, she had

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believed in a communist conspiracy to infiltrate the movie industry and subvert the political content of American films. She still possessed and promoted this belief thirty years later. Film was the “greatest propaganda medium,” she wrote in the mid-1960s; the “Commies thought so, too,” and so they had infiltrated Hollywood. “We’re still suffering that infiltration” (Hopper Special Feature). Both Hopper’s politics and her profession primed her to see conspiracies operating in secret in Hollywood and government. By gossiping about the personal lives of film and political celebrities, she took readers “behind-the-scenes” where supposedly the “truth” about their “real” selves and actions lay. Hopper profiled Peale in her column while he was promoting One Man’s Way (1963), a biopic based on his life as a minister and selfhelp author. They had a lot in common. Like Hopper, Peale felt under attack for his conservatism. “I’ve been fighting communism for years,” he argued, and after he published his book, The Power of Positive Thinking (1952), “some of the leftist types began gunning for me.” He opined on Hopper’s recent concerns. “Children can no longer pray in school…and how long will our coins carry the motto ‘In God We Trust’…?” Moreover “the deterioration of our films has become obvious” (qtd. in Hopper, 1964b). And he, too, had opposed Kennedy’s election. Peale cited the supposed danger posed by the candidate’s Catholicism, revealing his penchant for conspiratorial thinking. Peale went further in his talk of conspiracy with Hopper. After the assassination, “people jumped the gun, said the President had been killed by right wingers. Then, when it came out that [the assassin] had been trained in Moscow, they stopped talking about how bad he was.” Peale also asserted that “gullible” church ministers “permit leftists to infiltrate in the name of ‘brotherhood.’” Hopper not only printed Peale’s false accusations against shadowy, unnamed groups of Americans, including so-called leftists and infiltrators. She endorsed his effort “to offset their propaganda”—unspecified—with his motion picture (qtd. in Hopper, 1964b). Meanwhile her column had become a platform for Peale’s own incendiary propaganda.

Conclusion Hopper’s increasing political stridency with another presidential win for the Democrats in 1964 accelerated her personal and professional decline. She had worked hard for the Republican presidential nominee, Barry

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Goldwater, whose politics reflected her own. His nomination showed the success of the conservative grassroots movement she had long supported. Despite Goldwater’s defeat, conservative Republicans now had organizational and ideological control of her party. But Hopper did not know that, and she had suffered losses of her own. The libel suit was one; her campaign against more realistic and risqué Hollywood movies was another. Then politics was banned from her column. “I’m not permitted to write anything about politics,” she wrote a month after the 1964 election. “The syndicate tells me they have their own political writers, and I’m not one of them” (qtd. in Slide, 1986). Demoralized and in declining health, Hopper died suddenly at age eighty in early 1966. During the years the Kennedys were in the White House, Hopper’s professional influence in the movie industry and political impact in the nation declined. Still she persisted in her practice of Hollywood gossip. And her coverage of the Kennedys and her crusade against the political and cultural changes they represented laid the foundation for a new rightwing politics in the United States. Her use of private talk and personal attacks debased political discourse in her own time that has only deepened in our own. It is not a coincidence that at her career’s end she used her gossip column to promote the conspiracy theories of Norman Vincent Peale, a man who motivated and mentored—and officiated at the first wedding of—one Donald Trump. Another connection between celebrity gossip and conservative politics Hedda Hopper would have happily published.

References Berry, J. P., Jr. (1987). John F. Kennedy and the media: The first television president. University Press of America. Beschloss, M. R. (1980). Kennedy and Roosevelt: The uneasy alliance. Norton. Christensen, T. (1987). Reel politics: American political movies from Birth of a Nation to Platoon. Basil Blackwell. Eells, G. (1972). Hedda and Louella. G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Frost, J. (2007). ‘Good riddance to bad company’: Hedda Hopper, Hollywood gossip, and the campaign against Charlie Chaplin, 1940–1952. Australasian Journal of American Studies, 26(2), 74–88. Gish, L. Interview (1963, June 5), Lillian Gish folder, Hopper papers. Hedda Hopper papers. Margaret Herrick Library, Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences, Beverly Hills, CA.

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Hopper, H. (1940, May 2). Hedda Hopper’s Hollywood. Los Angeles Times, p. 12. Hopper, H. (1941, May 12). Hedda Hopper’s Hollywood. Los Angeles Times, p. A10. Hopper, H. (1955, May 7). Brando, paramount discuss film deal. Los Angeles Times, p. 14. Hopper, H. (1957a, May 6). Bob Hope planning ‘Holiday in Italy’. Los Angeles Times, p. C12. Hopper, H. (1957b, December 23). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. B7. Hopper, H. (1958, June 21). Columnist reports Monte Carlo Gala. Los Angeles Times, p. B2. Hopper, H. (1961a, April 11). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. A2. Hopper, H. (1961b, June 10). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. 17. Hopper, H. (1961c, September 20). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. A4. Hopper, H. (1961d, November 29). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. B2. Hopper, H. (1962a, May 4). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. C12. Hopper, H. (1962b, June 4). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. B9. Hopper, H. (1962c, June 5). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. B3. Hopper, H. (1962d, July 11). ‘Cleopatra’ movie cast coming home this week. Chicago Daily Tribune, p. A. Hopper, H. (1962e, August 3). Liz Taylor planning return in October. Los Angeles Times, p. C9. Hopper, H. (1962f, August 11). Unknown will play Sinatra’s brother. Los Angeles Times, p. B6. Hopper, H. (1962g, August 16). Universal aspect of films defended. Los Angeles Times, p. C8. Hopper, H. (1963a, January 4). George Burns will ‘sing’ for Kennedys. Los Angeles Times, p. C8. Hopper, H. (1963b, March 8). Gangster Was Pal of Stars. Chicago Tribune, p. B10. Hopper, H. (1963c, May 4). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. W_B5. Hopper, H. (1963d, November 1). Hitchcock to Star Connery and Tippi. Los Angeles Times, p. D12. Hopper, H. (1964a, January 18). Looking at Hollywood. Chicago Tribune, p. W14. Hopper, H. (1964b, March 10). Peale Film Story to Pull No Punches. Los Angeles Times, D10. Hopper, H. (1964c, May 18). Cukor arranging to film ‘Othello.’ Los Angeles Times, p. C18.

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Hopper, H. Letter (1955, December 9). To Robert B. Pitkin, American Legion folder, Hedda Hopper papers. Hopper, H. Letters (1960, July 11 & July 19). To Mary Patterson and to Richard Clarke, Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, 1960 folder, Hedda Hopper papers. Hopper, H. Letters (1962a, June 14). To reader-respondents, Otto Preminger folder, Hedda Hopper papers. Hopper, H. Letter (1962b, October 23). To Clare Boothe Luce, Life magazine and Time magazine folder, Hedda Hopper papers. Hopper, H. Letter (n.d.). To Ellen Switzer, Otto Preminger folder, Hedda Hopper papers. Hopper, H. Special Feature. Story on Hollywood in the 1940s, requested by Chicago Tribune, mailed January 20, 1966, Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, 1965 folder, Hopper papers. Slide, A. (1986, April 4). Hedda Hopper’s Hollywood. Reader, n.p. Small World Telecast. (1959, December 6). Edward R. Murrow, moderator and co-producer with Fred W. Friendly, CBS, Museum of Radio and Television, Beverly Hills. Winfield, B. H. (1997). The first lady, political power, and the media: Who elected her anyway? In P. Norris (Ed.), Women, media, and politics (pp. 166– 179). Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 6

“Enquiring Minds Want to Know”: President Bill Clinton and the Blurring of News and Gossip Jennifer Hopper

Introduction On January 25, 1998, edition of NBC’s Meet the Press, Tim Russert hosted a somewhat unusual group for the roundtable portion of the program, in the midst of an explosive news cycle in American politics. Just a week prior, President Bill Clinton was accused of having a sexual relationship with a White House intern and lying about it while being questioned under oath in a sexual harassment lawsuit brought by Paula Jones. Michael Isikoff, an investigative correspondent for Newsweek, had been looking into the intern affair story for a year, but his superiors at the magazine did not yet feel comfortable moving forward with publishing

J. Hopper (B) Political Science at Southern Connecticut State University, New Haven, CT, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_6

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it. Then on January 17, Matt Drudge, on his political gossip website The Drudge Report , posted a “blockbuster” item that Newsweek had killed a story about a 23 year old former White House intern’s sexual involvement with the president of the United States. In the hours and days that followed, the story gained a massive amount of coverage throughout the media, including in print, on television, and on the internet, in both traditional news outlets and entertainment programming. Now included among Russert’s guests were both Isikoff and Drudge, to provide their commentary on the state of the scandal. Russert first asked Isikoff what he had to share, and the journalist referenced transcripts his reporting had relied on of the intern, Monica Lewinsky, discussing the affair with her friend Linda Tripp, who was secretly recording her. Then the host turned to the second roundtable participant, legal commentator Stuart Taylor, who discussed the verbatim content of President Clinton’s attorneys’ filings responding to the Jones case. Finally Russert came to Drudge, who had never appeared on a Sunday news program before, for his take. Drudge proceeded to express concern for what he called years of deception coming out of the Clinton White House, adding “I’ve been told” and “it’s my understanding from sources down there” [in Little Rock] that if the president were to ask for the release of his deposition in the Jones case, the gag order might be lifted and his statement would be made public. The web-based columnist did not provide any further details about his sources, nor did Russert ask for them.1 When the Meet the Press host followed up with a question about other women, including some working in the White House, possibly involved with the president, Drudge responded “there is talk all over this town” about another staffer that would come forward in the week ahead, and “you couple this with the headline that the New York Post has – there are hundreds – hundreds, according to Miss Lewinsky, quoting Clinton,” while holding up a physical copy of the paper for the show’s audience. “We’re in for a huge shock that goes beyond the specific episode,” predicted Drudge. Russert then turned to the last member

1 In June 1998, Drudge told the National Press Club that the process of editorial

review and assessment of sources’ credibility was composed entirely of his own judgment, and that posts on his site could be reliant on just a single source (Kalb, Marvin, “The Rise of the ‘New News’: A Case Study of Two Root Causes of the Modern Scandal Coverage,” Discussion Paper, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, October 1998, 24).

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of the roundtable, columnist William Safire, with no comment about Drudge’s primary sources of information being “talk all over” Washington and the sensational tabloid The New York Post (NBC News, 1998, January 25). No evidence ultimately surfaced of another White House staff member alleging an affair, nor of hundreds of women linked to Clinton as indicated by the Post. Even as professional standards and traditional conventions of journalism had begun to erode over the course of the 1980’s and nineties, the major broadcast networks’ Sunday morning talk shows were typically considered to exemplify more substantive, hard political news. How is it then that an Internet gossip columnist was prominently featured on Meet the Press and in no way challenged on the veracity or sourcing of his controversial charges? For starters, Drudge was invited because of his role in breaking the Lewinsky story—his post set off a feeding frenzy (Sabato, 1991) of scandal coverage in the media and forced Newsweek’s hand into publishing Isikoff’s report. Second, although Drudge now had a prominent seat at the table for reporting and commentary on the story, he was not held to journalistic standards regarding credible sourcing. Perhaps this was due to his identity as a web-based gossip site purveyor, or to the nature of the story, which was rapidly unfolding with potentially massive political ramifications, or both. But it meant that the show’s viewers, and audiences of subsequent related coverage, would come away with what amounted to rumors and innuendo about Clinton’s sexual involvement with other White House staffers and the legal status of his deposition, without concrete proof for either claim. To be fair, though the show’s other guests might be citing more tangible sources of information such as legal testimony and recording transcripts, fellow panelists Isikoff, Taylor, and Safire also engaged in speculative commentary on the story that stemmed from their opinions and analysis rather than hard evidence. The other men mused about both Clinton and Lewinsky’s motivations and emotions, how Americans might react, and what kind of legal trouble the president could be looking at. Such is the nature of roundtable segments on political talk shows, and a style of news stressing speculative analysis that had increasingly proliferated by the late nineties, particularly with the emergence of the Internet and 24-hour cable news networks. Additionally, what Drudge had posted on his website the week prior was true—editors at Newsweek had been deliberately withholding a major story about the president allegedly engaging in improper sexual relations and possible illegal actions

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related to lying about what had occurred. In his exchange with Russert on the show, Drudge chided “a press corps that wasn’t monitoring the situation close enough,” which, though self-serving, fell in line with arguable advantages to new media actors’ ascendance, that they might check the monolithic power of the old media and cast light on stories previously ignored. Thus we can see some of the complexities of gossip—defined here as unconfirmed, often salacious information transmitted amongst individuals and amplified through the media—in the Lewinsky scandal case. In the following chapter, I explore this major presidential scandal as a pivotal moment in the convergence of political, technological, and cultural changes that elevated the presence of such gossip and rumor in mainstream news sources, with major, lasting ramifications. The case provided Americans with unprecedented scrutiny of a president’s personal activities while also numbing them from being shocked by its lurid details, and accelerated a trend of mounting distrust in the news media and the political system, both increasingly viewed through a partisan lens.

Presidential Scandal Meets New Media: Changes to Journalism & Political News During the Clinton Administration The technological developments that allowed for the creation of cable television and the Internet dramatically altered the media environment over the course of the eighties and nineties by creating innovative formats for news no longer constrained by the strict time and space parameters of, for example, a nightly news broadcast or physical printed newspaper. The web and 24-h news networks could provide a seemingly limitless amount of content, what some would argue went well beyond the original journalism and factual reporting that they were actually able to produce. Much of what appeared in these forums went beyond news in the conventional sense, to include analysis, conjecture, rumor, and gossip related to the news. Furthermore, as commercial pressures on news organizations intensified, and competition for Americans’ attention escalated among a myriad of media options, even traditional news organizations embraced more of this entertaining but frequently unsubstantiated content. Throughout key points in the Lewinsky scandal, major national news outlets presented stories heavily reliant on mere speculation. In print and on television, media figures pondered whether Hillary

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Clinton had known about the affair long before it became public, whether Clinton publicly wore a tie Lewinsky gave him to send her a secret message about her testimony in the investigation, whether the president was involved in a “Wag the Dog” scenario of attacking Iraq to distract from the scandal, and whether Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr had more damaging evidence on Clinton than the public knew, to cite just a few examples (Hopper, 2013). The very nature of the Lewinsky scandal, with its sexually explicit, sensational details, also gave more entertainmentoriented programming an incentive to cover the story exhaustively, and so news outlets competed with websites like Drudge’s and television shows like Entertainment Tonight, Hard Copy, and A Current Affair for audiences’ attention. In fact, there was so much content on the story, one could constantly be following the scandal without ever having to turn to a traditional news source (Williams & Carpini, 2000, p. 75). Just as even the more respected Sunday news shows prominently featured discussion roundtables, subjective analysis became more deeply integrated into political news. Journalists themselves engaged in more commentary rather than straight reporting of information, focusing the construction of news on their interpretation of events, and outlets were full of pundits and media personalities valued for their attention-grabbing, controversial claims, simultaneously unconstrained by a professional code of ethics. Interactive elements of new media allowed for a guest or caller on a talk show or a commenter on the internet to bring up unsubstantiated, rumored content, causing its further dissemination, even if hosts or journalists were wary of providing the information first-hand. Partisan sources and late night comedy shows also became more popular sources of news around this time, and typically were more comfortable sharing gossip or tidbits of questionable origin. A sense that news programming needed to be profitable for its ownership also took hold in this era, accelerating a shift away from hard news programming toward soft news, and increasing pressure to break news developments before competitors. At its most extreme, this led to news organizations appearing to abide by a mantra of it being better to be first and possibly wrong than to miss out on the next big story. Still, even in the case of the Lewinsky scandal some influential in journalism expressed reservations about the changing landscape. When it came to reporting on the president’s sex life, the Wall Street Journal ’s Washington bureau chief spoke of a “race to be last,” and a New York Times editor told staff

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members this was the one area of news where he couldn’t fathom wanting to report first (Hayden, 2002, p. 83). The lightning-fast pace of the news cycle and intense battle for viewers, readers, and clicks helped loosen the professional standards journalists had traditionally adhered to, jeopardizing the accuracy of information provided to news consumers. Anonymous sources have long allowed reporters to obtain and make public information about politicians and their actions that would not be possible to get otherwise. But conventional practices in journalism typically required basing reporting on at least two solid, credible anonymous sources, and giving the audience an indication of the source’s position to allow for some independent assessment of the trustworthiness of the information. These norms often fell by the wayside in reporting on the Lewinsky story, particularly in its early days, and critics expressed concerns anonymous sourcing was being abused, overly relied upon and with such sources being described too vaguely, if at all. A study by the Committee of Concerned Journalists found that in the first two weeks after the scandal broke, only 26% of stories in major national news outlets used named sources, with the rest based on anonymous sourcing. Of those anonymously sourced news items, 40% were dependent on just one source (Kalb, 1998). Another study of the first nine months of scandal coverage on the major networks’ nightly news broadcasts and CNN identified 72% of stories as including at least one anonymous source (Esposito, 1999, p. 7). There are some indications, however, that by March 1998, news outlets had cleaned up some of their behavior, providing coverage less dependent on anonymous sources and commentary than in the weeks before (Pew Research Center, 1998). In the meantime, major figures in the scandal used anonymous sourcing to their advantage, strategically leaking information to journalists, frequently without those reading or watching such stories realizing this was taking place. For instance, when anonymous sources were ambiguously described in news reports as “close to the investigation” or “lawyers who listened to portions of the tapes,” audiences likely did not realize that the source was probably providing information in line with what the independent counsel’s office, in the process of investigating Clinton, wanted public (Herbers, 1998). Whereas major national news outlets in the mid-twentieth century played an influential agenda setting and gatekeeping role, determining what stories made it into the news and whose voices would be heard

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in them, that power was disappearing in the 1990s, as the DrudgeNewsweek episode reveals. Over the course of the Lewinsky scandal, stories that began as tabloid content would eventually find their way into prestige press publications. For example, in early February of 1998, the National Enquirer, the Star, and the Globe published deeply personal stories about Lewinsky’s upbringing and family history and connected that backstory to Clinton’s own difficulties as a child. Just a few weeks later, publications like Newsweek and the Washington Post were now covering that same content (Owen, 2000). Politicians have sought to shame mainstream news outlets away from such stories as a scandal damage control tactic, with mixed results. When the Star in January 1992 published Gennifer Flowers’ claim she had a 12-year affair with Clinton, his advisers sought to dissuade journalists from covering the allegations by threatening their reputations would be ruined, and they would be viewed as no more credible than a supermarket tabloid (Williams & Carpini, 2000, p. 69). The new media landscape also meant many sources traditionally left out of conventional journalism were given a high-profile platform for their messaging they would not have had just a few years prior. Conservatives looking to damage the Clinton administration used not only allegations about the president’s sexual activities but also rumors and gossip about supposed presidential financial wrongdoing, drug dealing, and even involvement in murder to shape the public discourse around Clinton for his two terms (Williams & Carpini, 2011, p. 154). The altered relationship between journalists and powerful politicians like the president also contributed to these changes in news content. While presidents like Franklin D. Roosevelt or John F. Kennedy gave some in the press corps insider access and in turn relied on them to be discreet and not report on matters that could prove embarrassing, those arrangements had been shattered by the time Bill Clinton took office. The news media’s role in exposing government coverups and presidential lying in the cases of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal was a major part of this evolution in which journalists took up a far more antagonistic stance toward political figures. The personal lives and psychology of presidential candidates and presidents were increasingly tied to performance in office and perceived as important for Americans to know about. By the time of the Clinton administration, mainstream political journalism viewed virtually all aspects of a politician’s life to be the subject of legitimate scrutiny. On the one hand, this made journalists more independent

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and a more effective check on political figures, increasing transparency. At the same time, it accelerated a growing public distrust in government and devalued the news media as an institution trafficking in sensationalism to accrue power and money for itself.

The Convergence of Gossip and News: Two Cases of Questionable Reporting in the Lewinsky Scandal Below, I take a closer look at two cases involving early coverage of the Lewinsky scandal in which prominent national news outlets publicized information reflecting weaker reporting standards and in which unsubstantiated rumors were conveyed as news. In one case, the story the media ran with turned out to be false, in the other it eventually proved true. Both cases, however, involved reports that could significantly impact public opinion and political figures’ actions in the scandal, making it highly consequential that the press disseminated them before obtaining substantial evidence they were accurate. Eyewitnesses to the Affair On January 25, 1998, edition of ABC’s This Week, correspondent Jackie Judd reported “several sources” had informed ABC News “that in the spring of 1996, the President and Lewinsky were caught in an intimate encounter in a private area of the White House. It is not clear whether the witnesses were Secret Service agents or White House staff.” Judd went on to declare, “this development is important because, until now, there had only been circumstantial evidence of an affair and Lewinsky’s claims on the tapes…it does undercut Mr. Clinton’s reported denial of a sexual relationship made under oath” and “underscores how Ken Starr is collecting evidence and witnesses to build a case against the president – a case that would not hinge entirely on the word of Monica Lewinsky” (ABC News, 1998, January 25). In this initial report of “eyewitnesses,” Judd relied entirely on anonymous sourcing, provided no descriptive traits of those sources nor how many sources there were, yet went on to analyze the implications of the information she had just provided with a language of certainty. A viewer would come away with the impression that these

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were witnesses Kenneth Starr had already “collected,” who proved the president engaged in perjury. Reflecting the cutthroat competition between outlets and desperation for any new snippet in the deluge of scandal coverage, other news organizations picked up the eyewitnesses story, citing the ABC report as their only source. This indicated these other news organizations looked into the allegations but were not able to confirm them with independent reporting, forcing them to rely entirely on Judd’s account. NBC News even cut into the network’s Super Bowl pre-game coverage at 4:30 pm on the 25th to relay the competing channel’s story to viewers, though Tom Brokaw described it as “an unconfirmed report” and reporter Claire Shipman added that Starr’s office could not confirm the existence of such a witness (Kalb, 1998, p. 18). Several outlets also covered denials by the White House chief of staff and his deputy that anything had been reported to them by the Secret Service or others, as well as the information that Lewinsky in taped conversations told Tripp she did not believe anyone saw what went on between her and Clinton. But even couched in such caveats, the story quickly spread through the media and reached millions of Americans. The aforementioned speculative nature of news coverage in this era was also apparent in the eyewitness story. In a January 25th Wolf Blitzer interview with Monica Lewinsky’s lawyer William Ginsburg, he used the ABC News report to ask, “If there is another eyewitness who has firsthand knowledge that there was some sort of sexual relationship…and Ken Starr has access to such a witness – we are hearing these reports filtering through – wouldn’t that undermine her, tremendously weaken your client’s case?” When Blitzer tried to ask Clinton adviser Rahm Emanuel about the story in a similar way later in the program however, Emanuel pushed back that he would never “base anything on a leak or a hypothetical.” “Have you checked that story out yourself?” Emanuel asked Blitzer, then asserting, “before we try to get it right away, let’s get it right…it’s not good to the viewers” (CNN, 1998). An exchange like this illustrates how news organizations could use the information reported by a single outlet to question their guests, thereby making their audiences aware of it, without technically reporting it themselves or staking their reputation on its accuracy. Blitzer went on to admit to Emanuel that “we have heard that similar allegation at CNN. We had decided we weren’t going to report it until we did have additional basis to report it. But ABC decided they had enough in their judgment.” At the same

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time, Emanuel’s comments show how the president’s defenders could use anonymous sourcing and stories other outlets could not substantiate as a means to discredit reporting on the scandal, promoting the idea that none of the charges against the president could be trusted. The story was further bolstered by the Dallas Morning News posting a report on its website on January 26th of a first-hand witness to Clinton and Lewinsky’s sexual relations who had spoken to Starr’s office, citing two anonymous attorneys “familiar with the investigation” as its sources. The paper retracted the story the next day, updating readers that there was in fact just a single source, who now said the information was inaccurate (Kalb, 1998, p. 19). Prior to the retraction though, numerous outlets including the Associated Press, CNBC, and Nightline repeated the story. In several cases, these subsequent reports indicated that follow up questions to the Secret Service and White House staff yielded denials and shed doubts on the report’s accuracy. But again, by virtue of repeating the initial, questionable information, the case demonstrated how poorly sourced gossip could become a full-fledged news story. Outlets like NPR, USA Today, and CNN provided entire stories in this period focused on the role of the Secret Service, such as whether agents could be forced to testify against a president, how closely the president is monitored in the White House, etc. that focused attention on the witness angle, without independently verifying the report itself. And those media outlets more comfortable with supplying gossip as news did not hold back following the Dallas newspaper’s initial, incorrect reporting—the New York Post led with the headline, “Caught in the Act.” Ultimately, actual eyewitnesses to the Clinton-Lewinsky affair never materialized. Some journalists pointed to problems with the story stemming from second hand sourcing, admitting the sources they relied on had no direct knowledge of witnesses and were certainly not themselves witnesses to what had occurred behind closed doors (Pew Research Center, 1998). On January 26th, even ABC’s Jackie Judd seemed to be backtracking, characterizing what she had said days earlier as “We reported, for example, over the weekend, Peter, that Starr’s office is investigating whether or not there was a witness to a moment between the President and Lewinsky at the White House. If true, that kind of witness could support allegations of an affair again with or without Ms. Lewinsky” (ABC News, 1998, January 26). But in the actual wording of Judd’s report discussed at the beginning of this section, the substance of the information appeared much differently, indicating the witness(es)

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did exist, not that Starr was trying to determine whether such a witness existed. The coverage of this unfounded rumor held particular importance for the actual progress of the Independent Counsel’s investigation: Starr could use these reports to pressure Lewinsky to cooperate, based on the sense he might not need her testimony to shed light on what happened between herself and the president (Pew Research Center, 1998). Additionally, the information could bolster public perceptions of presidential guilt at this early point in the scandal. The Stained Dress Reports that Monica Lewinsky had kept a dress stained with the president’s semen on it began to circulate around this same time, again based on questionable single-sourcing by the media. This particular piece of information would months later be proven true, but for the purposes of this study, it still reflects problematic, rushed reporting absent sufficient evidence. The dress story might easily have followed the same trajectory as news reports eventually discredited, such as Clinton affairs with other White House interns and witnesses to his relationship with Lewinsky. The dress item first emerged on January 21, 1998, when Matt Drudge, citing no source, posted on his site, “the Drudge Report has learned, investigators have become convinced that there may be a DNA trail that could confirm President Clinton’s sexual involvement with Lewinsky, a relationship that was captured in Lewinsky’s own voice on audio tape. Tripp has shared with investigators a conversation where Lewinsky allegedly confided that she kept a garment with Clinton’s dried semen on it – a garment she said she would never wash!” (Drudge Report, 1998). The columnist went on to repeat the claim on NBC’s Today show on January 22nd, although his interviewer Matt Lauer did follow up by asking what evidence and confirmation he had, and throughout the appearance challenged Drudge on his fact-checking process, pointing to specific times he provided false information in the past (NBC News, 1998, January 22). Still, critics charged that “simply by appearing on NBC News’s highly regarded Today, the stained-dress story immediately graduated from gossip to news, gaining a measure of credibility and legitimacy despite the fact that no mainstream journalist had yet verified it (Grossman, 1998).”

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Then on January 23rd, Jackie Judd also reported on the stained dress on ABC News, citing a single anonymous source. The anchor introduced the segment by recounting “someone with specific knowledge of what it is that Monica Lewinsky says really took place between her and the President has been talking to ABC’s Jackie Judd.” Judd then declared, “according to the source, Lewinsky says she saved, apparently as a kind of souvenir, a navy blue dress with the President’s semen stain on it. If true, this could provide physical evidence of what really happened” (ABC News, 1998, January 23). In later interviews, Judd argued she did adhere to traditional journalistic standards requiring two sources before going forward with the story. The other source was not mentioned in the report, according to Judd, because the person had spoken to her off the record and insisted she not use the information. Some charged Judd’s source was Lucianne Goldberg, a book agent working with Linda Tripp 2 who harbored known antipathy toward Clinton, and who would only have this information indirectly, from Tripp. Though Goldberg herself claimed to be the source (Dwyer, 1998), Judd denied this (Grossman, 1998). Additionally, even information from Tripp or recordings of Lewinsky would be difficult to verify, as Lewinsky could have been lying about the dress’ existence in the first place. Further illustrating difficulties with the story, several reputable news published incorrect information about the dress. The New York Times, the Associated Press, and the Baltimore Sun, among other outlets, reported in late January that the stained dress was one that had originally been gifted to Lewinsky by Clinton, which was inaccurate, and not what Lewinsky told Tripp in recorded phone conversations. The Times described its source for the information as “investigators who have heard the tapes” (Broder, 1998). An editor at the Sun indicated the paper’s only source may very well have been the Times, in another instance of a fellow news organization being used as the sole source for a report (Cohen, 1998). The dress story faded from the news over the course of the spring of 1998, as Lewinsky’s lawyer denied it existed, and CBS News reported the FBI found no such incriminating stains on Lewinsky’s clothing. When Lewinsky did turn over a stained dress (that she had been hiding at her mother’s apartment) to Starr as part of an immunity deal in late July, the story returned to the media in full force. On the one hand, this appeared

2 Dwyer, Jim, “The Unmaking of the President 1998,” Daily News, January 25, 1998.

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to vindicate much of the early reporting on the dress discussed above. But that the stained dress had disappeared for such a lengthy period (despite how central it would be to proving a relationship between Lewinsky and Clinton) makes clear how little news outlets had to go on when they initially reported its existence back in January.

Conclusion The prevalence of rumor, gossip, and innuendo in the news and blurred lines between news and entertainment, and fact and opinion, were not new or distinctive to the Lewinsky scandal moment. Scholars of newspaper content at the turn of the eighteenth century argue the way these outlets covered politicians, particularly the sex lives of Founders like Thomas Jefferson or Alexander Hamilton, looked more like what we would today associate with the National Enquirer than the New York Times (Williams & Carpini, 2011). Further, even for the feeding frenzy-prone Clintons, there were times the news media refused to give credence or attention to unsubstantiated rumors. For instance, when Hillary Clinton ran for a New York U.S. Senate seat in 2000, a group of conservative activists sought to spread the story she was secretly a lesbian, but the charge was largely ignored by the news media (West, 2003). Lastly, there is potentially a bright side to these changes: the upending of the old media’s gatekeeping influence could empower others to usefully question the ways issues and events are framed by political elites (Williams & Carpini, 2000). Still, by the late 1990s, it was a marked change in even more reputable outlets to prioritize entertainment, speculation, and rumor, with troubling consequences for the trajectory of public opinion and political events. Returning to January 25, 1998, edition of Meet the Press, even conventional guests such as Michael Isikoff and William Safire made statements that could be classified more as gossip than news. Isikoff told Russert his read of Lewinsky in the transcripts was of “a woman who is anguished and very distraught over the dilemma she’s in.” Safire speculated of Clinton, “there he is in the White House, and it can be a lonely job, and he’s going through a mid-life crisis, around 50, and here’s this adoring, fun, young thing and over the course of 18 months, he becomes friendly with her and a kind of mentor to her and gets some genuine pleasure out of being with her and talking to her late at night on the telephone or in person.” And though the allegations had been public for just a week,

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Russert asked his roundtable, “Do you believe Bill Clinton survives this crisis without resigning or being impeached?” further encouraging speculation based on the sketchy information of the time, rather than concrete facts. Was much of this content verifiable? Was it news? By 1998 standards it was deemed to be, reflecting wholesale changes in the role of the media, perceptions of public demand, and a fiercely competitive environment between media outlets with the technological ability to immediately dispense information to audiences of millions. Somewhat counterintuitively, these developments have not been all bad news for politicians and may have contributed to Clinton surviving the scandal and impeachment. Some argue the prominence of new media sources and how citizens became immersed in the tawdry details of the sex scandal made it less likely Americans would think of Clinton’s behavior as a major public affairs concern rather than purely entertainment, a distinction that potentially helped Clinton disassociate the scandal from his work as president (Owen, 2000; Williams & Carpini, 2011). Clinton was also aided by a perception he deliberately encouraged in his public statements on the scandal, that he was the victim of a partisan witch hunt on the part of his political enemies, a narrative that fits easily into existing media norms of covering politics as personalized conflict. The administration’s presidential papers reveal that Clinton surrogates such as his adviser Sidney Blumenthal sought to drum up media stories that would depict key figures such as Lucianne Goldberg and members of Starr’s prosecutor team as sketchy, untrustworthy figures (Hopper, 2013). The new media environment so difficult for the Clinton administration to control with its instantaneous spread of gossip and damaging information would eventually prove to be quite useful for some politicians. The internet and social media became a way of getting around the filter of the traditional media, allowing politicians’ preferred messaging to reach supporters, who could in turn spread those communications further and in innovative ways (Hopper, 2017). Americans’ dissatisfaction with the scandal coverage also helps explain why public opinion remained relatively stable throughout the lengthy political crisis, and why the flood of negative news may have been limited in its impact (Miller, 1999). Gallup polling data from the 1970s identified 68 to 72% of Americans professing trust and confidence in the mass media, but since 1997, it has averaged closer to 45% (Brenan, 2021). As the news media devalued itself, abandoning professional conventions and prioritizing sensational, entertaining content, the public began to

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no longer trust or rely on such sources to help it interpret events. We continue to see the ramifications of this trend in the present, with widespread beliefs in fake news, little consensus on what constitute facts or reality, and stark partisan divides about who can be relied upon to transmit the truth of political events. Americans are increasingly siloed in how they obtain political information, gravitating toward partisan content and curated social media feeds, forums that can make it difficult for anyone to discern gossip from truth.

References ABC News. (1998, January 25). New Development in Clinton-Lewinsky Scandal. ABC This Week. ABC News. (1998, January 26). President Clinton Delivers Remarks. ABC Special Report. ABC News. (1998, January 23). More on the Crisis at the White House. World News Tonight With Peter Jennings. Brenan, M. (2021). Americans’ Trust in Media Dips to Second Lowest on Record. Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/355526/americans-trustmedia-dips-second-lowest-record.aspx. Accessed 3 May 2022. Broder, J. M. (1998, January 24). The President Under Fire: The Overview; ExIntern Offered to Tell of Clinton Affair in Exchange for Immunity, Lawyers Report. The New York Times. CNN. (1998, January 25). Crisis Develops Inside White House. Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer. Cohen, A. (1998, February 16). The Press And the Dress. Time Magazine. http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,987819-2,00. html. Accessed 3 May 2022. Drudge Report. (1998, January 21). Drudge Report Archives. http://www. drudgereportarchives.com/data/2002/01/17/20020117_175502_ml.htm. Accessed 3 May 2022. Dwyer, J. (1998, January 25). The Unmaking of the President 1998. Daily News. Esposito, S. A. (1999). Anonymous White House Sources: How They Helped Shape Television News Coverage of the Bill Clinton-Monica Lewinsky Investigation. Communications and the Law, 21(3), 1–18. Grossman, L. K. (1998). Spot News: The Press and the Dress. Columbia Journalism Review. Hayden, J. (2002). Covering Clinton: The President and the Press in the 1990’s. Westport, CT: Praeger. Herbers, J. (1998). Editors without backbone. Nieman Reports, 52(1), 5–7.

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Hopper, J. (2013). Pardoning the President: President Clinton, the Lewinsky Scandal, and the Politics of Presidential Redemption. White House Studies, 13(2), 159–186. Hopper, J. (2017). Presidential Framing in the 21st Century News Media: The Politics of the Affordable Care Act. New York: Routledge. Kalb, M. (1998). The Rise of the “New News”: A Case Study of Two Root Causes of the Modern Scandal Coverage. Discussion Paper. The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy. Miller, A. H. (1999). Sex, Politics, and Public Opinion: What Political Scientists Really Learned from the Clinton-Lewinsky Scandal. PS: Political Science and Politics, 32(4), 721–729. NBC News. (1998, January 25). Michael Isikoff, Matt Drudge, Stuart Taylor, and William Safire Discuss the Allegations Against President Clinton. Meet the Press. NBC News. (1998, January 22). Matt Drudge Discusses Report of President Clinton’s Alleged Affair With White House Intern. Today. Owen, D. (2000). Popular Politics and the Clinton/Lewinsky Affair: The Implications for Leadership. Political Psychology, 21(1), 161–177. Pew Research Center. (1998). Report: The Clinton/Lewinsky Story. https:// www.pewresearch.org/journalism/1998/10/20/the-clintonlewinsky-story/. Accessed 3 May 2022. Sabato, L. (1991). Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has Transformed American Politics. New York: Free Press. West, D. M. (2003). Responsibility Frenzies in News Coverage: Dissecting a Hillary Clinton Rumor. Press/Politics, 8(2), 104–114. Williams, B. A., & Carpini, M. X. D. (2000). Unchained reaction: The collapse of media gatekeeping and the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. Journalism, 1(1): 61–85. Williams, B. A., & Carpini, M. X. D. (2011). After Broadcast News: Media Regimes, Democracy, and the New Information Environment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 7

A Trickle-Down Effect of Foreign Policy on Domestic Narratives: Populism and Trump’s Espousal of Conspiracy and Gossip to “Make America Great Again” Prashant Rastogi

Introduction A celebrity-turned politician or a politician-turned celebrity, scholars working on Donald Trump often use these two broad categorizations to define him. The apple of several American tabloid magazines, Trump is known to plant stories about himself which does not make him a topic of discussion for long but garners enough attention to be gossiped about. If gossip helps people to make sense of what and who Trump is, Trump helps them in providing the context as an essence to channelize their gossip into meaning-making. Additionally, he builds the context via

P. Rastogi (B) O. P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_7

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conspiracy theories and trickle them down into gossip in society through social media mediums like Twitter. Turning out as it may, gossip does not have a prolonged life, but it may well create more grounds on which further gossip can be elucidated. However, in the case of Trump, gossip has found recourse in conspiracy which helps it in advancing to the next stage of constructing narratives. And when narratives find emerging ground in internationallevel conspiracies, they withstand the tide of duration and become more durable for domestic narrative-building in what this chapter term as ‘gossip in the society’. With Trump, the interplay between internationallevel-led foreign policy conspiracies and gossip-led domestic narratives becomes more concentrated as he himself is the agent and structure looking to find ways to promote his populist credentials. Thus, gossip adds to the “vehicle through which agents get things done or undone” (Besnier, 2009, p. 1) and conspiracy theories are its impetus. Even before becoming the President of the United States in 2017, Trump was an all-encompassing phenomenon in American discourse. He was a businessman, TV-series host, appeared in World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE), casino proprietor, and whatnot. More than anything else, Trump knew how to remain in public discourse. And more than being the ‘media spectacle’, Trump understood the importance of him creating news rather than the news creating him. Johnston (2016), in his book, has defined Trump as a ‘world-class narcissist who dismisses those who do not see him as he sees himself’ (p. 207). He is also a ‘gossipcreator’ who claims to have accurate information about everything but often ends up distorting the information and deflects investigations into what he asserts he knows. To speak and remain silent, to argue and fall short of elucidating clearly and to muddy facts with flattery and his own feelings, in many ways, suggests that Trump is also a populist. However, unlike many other populists like Narendra Modi in India, Marie le Pen in France, Joko Widodo in Indonesia, and Pauline Hanson in Australia, Trumpian variety of populism emanates more from the malleability of ideology based on situational contexts rather than the advocacy of universal categories. This brings him closer to populists like Imran Khan in Pakistan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, and Viktor Orban in Hungary for whom pursuit of power leads to fomenting ideological bias based on personal beliefs. But the ‘constant need of crisis’ as suggested by different perspectives on populism to reorient and refashion the society according to the fancies of

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the leader is an aspect which finds similarities among populists all around the globe with Trump not being any different. For Trump, the crisis emanates from the espousal of conspiracies in his foreign policy which he lucidly connects to domestic narratives. In the 2016 election campaign, rather than Trump focusing more on economic issues like other populists do, he showed an ‘alignment to partisanship and identities tied to race, ethnicity and religion’ (Sides et al., 2019, p. 24). Not to say that the economic issues were not irrelevant. Instead, cultural cleavages were enhanced by economic measures of criticism as the second order of values. In his bid to power, Trump was supported by the emerging conditions not only within America but also within the Republican Party. As per the societal conditions, what Inglehart and Norris (2016) called the ‘tipping point’, Trump’s rhetoric catered to the existing grievances of the conservative base which underlined that America was running on a safety net. Beneath the safety net, the country remained divided more than ever. On the other hand, despite more than 17 candidates entering the Republican Presidential Primaries of 2016, Trump’s triumph was based on the divisions within the party. Additionally, his rhetoric along with the resurrection of “racial anxiety driven by economic anxiety under two decades of Obama administration” (Sides et al., 2019, p. 8) among the Republican voters left his opponents with no strategy to counter the rising popularity of Trump. Political Parties make way for populist leaders when they weaken in winning elections and when populism taps into delicate identity issues which many believe in the party and in society but remain silent owing to the fear of general opinion going against them, the rawness of such populists incites fascination and appreciation for them (Barber, 2019). As a result, what people usually gossiped about at home in private, was brought out into the public sphere in collusion with the formation of group conformity and loyalty to Trump and his discourse. A Pew Research Centre report in 2017 found that more than 40% high school or less, republican leaning, inter-war generation, and white evangelicals formed the support base of Trump in his bid to win the presidential elections (Lipka and Gecewicz, 2017). For them, Trump was able to channelize the conspiracy theories into gossip echo chambers by strategically reiterating rhetoric that was often untrue and yet believable due to its rootedness in their racial anxiety. From ‘Birther Conspiracy’ to the ‘Great Replacement Theory’, Trump struck on issues which could develop immediate reactions among the followers (Moody

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and Holmes, 2015). It conjoined with the personality of Trump agreed to be narcissistic, grandiose, and disagreeable in nature which promoted affinity towards similar strongmen like Russian President Vladimir Putin and Philippines President Duterte (McAdams, 2016). With multiple such examples in the Trumpian discourse, the chapter asserts that his tenure as President, endorsed a causal relationship between mobilization at the international and polarization at the domestic level. Towards this end, the chapter argues that Trump was able to transform the conspiracy theories used at the international level based on strongmanship, anti-Muslim bias, and aversion to neighbouring countries into gossip at the domestic level formulated as muscular populism, xenophobia and racism, and securitization, respectively, with its effects as gossip penetrating the society longer than the conspiracy holds. This study is different from the earlier scholarly work pursued on Trump as it brings into perspective the importance of conspiracy and gossip through examining the trickle-down effect of foreign policy on domestic narratives, thereby engaging in a holistic level categorization helpful to understand the way America changed under Donald Trump, a celebrity-turned political figure who promised to ‘Make America Great Again’.

Conceptual Framework Conceptually, populism, as the widely used definition of Mudde (2004) puts it, “is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volante generale (general will) of the people” (Moffitt, 2015, p. 543). With Trump being a right-wing populist like others such as Modi in India, Erdogan in Turkey, and Mahinda Rajapaksha in Sri Lanka among others, the antagonism is not exclusively limited to political elites but also to the presence of those who do not align with the values of the ‘people’ based on identifications of culture, religion, traditions, and the understanding of people as a ‘bounded community’ (Brubaker, 2020; Finchelstein, 2019; Mouffe, 2005). Such identifications often comply with right-wing populist narratives wherein the discourse is not exclusively limited to anti-elitism but is also mutually constituted with racial cleavages in the society (Brubaker, 2017, 2020). Being a sympathizer or supporter of the liberal values of equality are frequently used by right-wing populist to be against the cultural majority of the nation. In the case of Trump,

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underneath the anti-elitism and racial cleavages lie identifications based on conspiracy theories. Like populism, conspiracies promote a Manichean view of the world but ‘while populism stresses the innocence of the people’, conspiracies stress their “lack of knowledge about the secret plot” (Bergmann & Butter, 2020, p. 333). The belief in a secret plot reinforces the personality of the populist who in being able to promote conspiracies dilutes analytical thinking based on calculative behaviour by escalating the role of intuition based on emotions of fear, anger, and anxiety among his followers. In Trump’s case, analytical thinking has been used to justify intuition with him providing detailed reasoning over what and why it occurred despite the evidence publicly illustrating his lies. An instance of this was seen when Trump alleged Ted Cruz’s father of accompanying Lee H. Oswald who assassinated John F. Kennedy in 1963 during a Republican presidential nomination in 2016 (Fichera, 2020). On the other hand, Trump not only promotes conspiracies but also his ‘touch and go’ rhetorical strategy by personalizing what he says and what he wants others to believe. Trump’s endless usage of pronounce like ‘I was there, or I have seen it’ and no elaboration like ‘it is under investigation’ and later depicting his un-involvement with the conspiracy like ‘I don’t know. I read it somewhere’ seeps into speculation, blurring of fact and fiction and everyday discussion turning the same conspiracy into gossip among the people. Gossip is everyday discussion and helps people in acknowledging the knowledge in their existing environment via the relationship of conspiracy and populism (Birchall, 2006). Since people are innocent as populism suggests and don’t have knowledge about the secret plot as conspiracy illustrates, gossip can help them draw inferences about “the world from a necessarily limited amount of information” (ibid., p. 108–109). With the growing digitalization, gossip is no more part of informal talks happening among a group of people but has shaped into hashtags on social media spaces enabling collective communication. After Trump alleged that ‘a very sad group of people is trying to disenfranchise (people who voted for me) and we won’t stand this’ (Wilkie, 2020) and claimed victory in the elections, a long thread of gossip got channelized into tweets. Trump deliberately left the category ‘a very sad group of people’ open to interpretations. Soon a hashtag of #stopthesteal was nurtured on Twitter with some of his followers alleging China of controlling the voting machines, some

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alleging politicians like Biden of being paedophile, some targeting the Blacks and Muslim voters, and some believing that ANTIFA was behind it. These were not only suddenly emanated gossip but a coming into being through the pre-existing circulation of conspiracy theories by Trump-relating Democrats and Chinese appeasement to CCP rigging elections, the QAnon conspiracy to Biden’s paedophile activities and linking Biden to ANTIFA as ‘radical left’ groupings. Later this led to a violent siege of Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, wherein hundreds of protestors chanting “Fight for Trump! Fight for Trump!” (Jacobo, 2021) marched with the intention of overturning the joint session of the US Congress that commenced to facilitate the victory of Joe Biden underlining that gossip if not controlled through accurate counter-information could lead to violence. But the component of violence is out of the scope of this chapter. These examples, while are true in the American context, have also been employed by populist all around the world with questions emanating about the credibility of elections, foreign intervention, anti-immigration narratives, and depicting the leader as a messiah. But the shift of international conspiracy theories into gossip among the American people after the arrival of Trump is a phenomenon which demands further elaboration as the same is happening in other countries like India, Turkey, Pakistan, Hungary, and France.

Methodology---Socio-Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis Socio-Cognitive approach like other CDS methods focuses on the relationship between discourse and society but with a key difference. It believes that cognition i.e. “the mind, memory and cognitive processes and representations involved in the production and comprehension of discourse” (van Dijk, 2015, p. 66) mediate between structures of text and talk and society. Since both conspiracy and gossip are a part of knowledgebased intuitive thinking, a knowledge falling under the domain of being illegitimate and popular (Birchall, 2006), they cater to the pre-existing human bias and the need to allude causes with finality to events based on inferences. With memory playing a prominent role in the pre-existing biases, Trump’s discourse has been structured by semantic interpretation of episodic events governed by contextual models incorporating situations feeding into those biases.

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For instance, the ‘Make America Great Again’ campaign featured one of the most prominent examples of Trump’s discourse. For years, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, security concerns have been a part of the socially shared knowledge of Americans because 9/11 was a direct attack on the heart of the United States. Subsequent American Presidential candidates and Presidents themselves provided assurances of safeguarding the American territory from attacks by terrorist organizations. The mass shooting incident in San Bernardino in 2015 and the Orlando nightclub shooting in 2016 augmented the existing threat to security concerns from terrorism among the US citizens. These episodic events piped into the socially shared or semantic knowledge of the people about the US vulnerability to terrorism as highlighted by 40% overall adults and 59% Republicans or leaning supporters believing the same which was utilized by Trump in his discourse during the election campaigns (Pew Research Centre, 2016). By constantly linking ISIS and al-Qaeda as perpetrators behind the incident with Clinton and Obama’s inability to curb them, Trump underlined in a series of tweets a polarizing discourse structure pitting Obama and Clinton as pro-Muslims and himself as pro-American, an example of which was ‘Crooked Hillary Clinton looks presidential? I don’t think so! Four more years of Obama and our country will never come back. ISIS laughs!’ (Trump, 2016). This relationship between discourse and cognition is not only limited to socially shared knowledge but also affects individual experiences from which several inferences are drawn, an example of which is the rising Islamophobia in the United States with 48% American Muslims facing discrimination (Mohamed, 2021)—something that the subsequent section will elaborate upon. Hence keeping cognitive structures of knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies at the centre, I establish conspiracy theories in the realm of discourse and gossip as inferences drawn and discussed upon by society based on the discourse structures of polarization and identification as promoted by Trump in his tweets, speeches, and interviews among others.

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‘The Trickle-Down Effect’---From Foreign Policy and Conspiracy Theories to Domestic Narratives and Gossip From Inclination Towards Strongmen Populist to Muscular Populism According to Frum (2018), “Donald Trump did not create the vulnerabilities he exploited. They awaited him. The irresponsibility of American elites, the arrogance of party leaders, the insularity of the wealthy: those and more were the resources Trump used on his way to power” (p. 13). But moreover, his foreign policy fed into the pre-existing grievances of the American people concerning the reducing prestige of the United States around the world due to past American elites. Trump portrayed Obama and Clinton as weaklings who could not negotiate with strongmen like Putin as he expressed ‘does the Fake News Media remember when crooked Hilary Clinton, as Secretary of State, was begging Russia to be our friend with the misspelled reset button? Obama tried also, but he had zero chemistry with Putin’ (Trump, 2017). Similarly, flaunting the benevolent and decisive attitude of his as well as America under him, Trump popularized himself as the only President who could make impossible possible by getting into negotiations with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un whom the previous US Presidents had denigrated. In one of his tweets, Trump wrote, ‘Chairman Kim does not want to disappoint me with a violation of trust, there is far too much for North Korea to gain - the potential as a Country, under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, is unlimited. Also, there is far too much to lose. I may be wrong, but I believe that……’ (Trump, 2019). By surfacing such tweets and speeches, Trump underscored the conspiracy that American elites have consciously undermined the status of the United States as despite the omnipresent position of the country in the world, the erstwhile Presidents were unable to channelize it into positive reception particularly with those countries with whom negotiations were difficult to penetrate. Moreover, on multiple occasions, Trump also spearheaded the conspiracy through the ‘Dossier controversy’ alleging Hilary of funding research against him and his links with Russia—underlining the way the establishment has been trying to promote a ‘witch hunt’ against him because he wants to ‘Make America Great Again’ (BBC News, 2017).

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This formed into gossip-led hashtags within the country like #MAGA, #NASTYWOMAN, #LOCKHERUP, #TELLAMERICAISGREAT, #BASKETOFDEPLORABLES among others on Twitter. It led to the phenomenon of muscular populism wherein the American elites were identified as the enemy or the ‘other’ and Trump as a man of vision, record, and integrity who is here to implement knee-jerk policies to transform America into a ‘utopian’ state of existence and bolster a sense of group identity (Ben-Ghiat, 2020; Finchelstein, 2019). As mentioned in the introductory section of the chapter, the cracks within GOP, helped Trump deal with strongmen who negated human rights, press freedom, and democracy with little to no opposition (Sides et al., 2019). Every other presidential candidate in the Republican Party wanted to behave and speak like Trump but none succeeded. This is where Trump was able to dominate the news as media sources calculated their coverage based on “how well candidates were doing in the polls” (Sides et al., 2019, p. 52). A personalization of politics whereby the belief in Trump’s righteousness no matter what or how he does, became prominent as the result mattered- to re-establish the prominence of not only the ‘Make America Great Again’ rhetoric but also the popularity of the Republican Party. Trump was tilted towards Muscular populism but the context in which he was operating assisted him in building up his hegemony amidst the gossip roaring against his opponents in the politics of America. From Anti-Muslim Bias to Xenophobia and Racism While anti-Muslim sentiments have been on the rise post-9/11 attacks in the United States as mentioned previously, Trump’s foreign policy even before him becoming the President was averse to the Muslim world as he tweeted ‘Credible Source on 9–11 Muslim Celebrations’ (Trump, 2015) with an attached report. Obama’s further emphasis on China and Climate Change rather than terrorism and the Middle East helped Trump’s cause as he portrayed himself as a candidate who seeped into the pre-existing notions of threat and would make America feel safer vis-a-vis the identified Muslims. In a couple of hours, the same day, Trump again tweeted the following ‘Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration’ and ‘The United Kingdom is trying hard to disguise their massive Muslim problem. Everybody is wise to what is happening, very sad! Be honest’ (Trump, 2015). This occurred in the background of the growing anti-Muslim bias

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globally with a report by CAIR illustrating a 57% rise than the previous year (CAIR, 2017). In this manner, Trump raised the spectre of anti-immigration based on the perceived negative impact of Muslims on white Americans. It became a source to mobilize the people through ethnocentric fear mongering and an indivisible binary creation. By bringing in the example of UK, his anti-Muslim rhetoric assumed a “focus on security” which “reflected a deep-rooted cultural response to threatening conditions” (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 76). The anti-immigration foreign policy narrative was again noticeable in 2016, when Trump during the second Presidential Debate alleged Clinton of allowing an increase of 550% Syrian refugees into America which was reiterated on Twitter. Exaggerating the claim of 550%, Trump was building up support for his impending Executive order 13,769 passed in 2020 that banned travel from several Muslim majority countries and a decreasing number of visas issued to Muslims by 90% since 2017 (Khan et al., 2021, p. 3). The reiteration of radical Islamic terrorism on multiple occasions also helped in combining terror, immigration, and inequality to the flux of Muslims to America. Suddenly the mainland Muslims became the adversary with Trump for attention yet intentionally promoting the ‘Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory’ among white Americans. They were now being made to believe that Muslims want to convert Europe and America to Islam and implement Shari’at law. With every tweet or speech of his depicting anti-Muslim sentiments, xenophobic gossip in the form of tweets emerged on social media. Popular gossip hashtags like #Draintheswamp, #stopIslam, #RadicalIslamicTerror, #stopillegalimmigration among others surfaced regularly on Twitter followed by an exponential rise of anti-Muslim hate crimes with 82% Muslims in America facing discrimination according to a study by Pew Research Centre in 2019 (Masci, 2019). However, Trump, on the contrary, in his foreign policy became increasingly involved with the Gulf countries with his first foreign trip as President to Saudi Arabia in 2017 and subsequent involvement with the Muslim world including assistance to the Abraham Accord and peace agreement with the Taliban in 2020. Trying to draw cordial relations with the Muslim world, Trump regularly emphasized that Muslims involved in militant activities are enemies of America rather than his perpetual generalization. Nonetheless, the damage at home was already done. The sweeping-conspiracy-turnedgossip in the Trumpian era persisted in a highly polarized America with 69% Muslim Americans voting for Biden than Trump (saw an increase of

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4% vote share among Muslims from 13 to 17%) in the 2020 Presidential elections (Fadel, 2020). From Aversion to Neighbouring Countries to Securitization In 2014, Trump first tweeted ‘SECURE THE BORDER! BUILD A WALL!’ (Trump, 2014) as a direct reference to threats emanating from keeping the border open with Mexico. Trump also during his Presidential Speech Announcement portrayed Mexicans as indulged in narcoterrorism, rape of American women, and perpetrating criminal activities as a justification to build the wall like some of the beliefs perpetuated by him against Muslims (Reilly, 2016). On many instances, during his presidency, he also alleged the Democrats of supporting Mexicans which inversely meant they were promoting drugs and illegal immigration in America and that it was his duty to protect the lives of all Americans. Not only were security threats prominent in Trump’s discourse but also his displeasure towards NAFTA acting as a treaty that supported the drain of manufacturing jobs from the United States which directly targeted Mexico as a beneficiary vis-a-vis trade with America. This played into the pre-existing predominant unfavourable public opinion among the Americans on Mexico and Mexicans with the age groups of 65 +, 45–64, 30–44, and 18–29 carrying 58%, 47%, 37%, and 41% negative views respectively in 2016 (Wilson et.al, 2017, p. 10). Many conspiracies due to the combination of unfavourable public opinion and Trump’s discourse emanated making Mexican–American Hispanic population—54% women and 41% men experience a deterioration of their place in the US society (Pew Research Centre, 2016). The divide between Trump’s white American support and the Hispanic population was also seen during the 2016 Presidential Elections wherein 66% of Hispanics predominantly voted for Clinton (Lopez et al., 2016). Such antagonism has also been shared by relationships between countries such as IndiaBangladesh, Afghanistan-Iran, and Belarus-Poland among others where populists like Trump have used threat perceptions to polarize public opinion. Various gossip hashtags featured on Twitter starting from Trump’s election campaign before the 2016 Presidential elections like #mexicansarerapists, #immigrantchildrenareanimals, #boycottgoya, #Goyaway, #mexicogonnapay, #buildthewall, and #Drugcartels referring to Mexicans as dangerous and menacing towards all-encompassing aspects of the

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American society till the end of Trump’s tenure. What Trump has done is to bring the low-priority concerns to priority issues through his discourseled conspiracy trickling down into gossip that requires immediate action, as the securitization theory illustrates, by identifying Mexicans and those supporting them as enemies (Eroukhmanoff, 2018). Conversely, Trump has supported a new trade deal USMCA replacing NAFTA that includes Mexico and tried to show himself as the victim of Congressional lack of reciprocity to release funds as the reason behind not being able to build the wall. But despite that, hate crimes are increasing against the Mexican–American Hispanic community with less Mexicans migrating to the United States from 2940 in 2001 to 870 in 2018 with an exception in the year 2021 due to the negative impact of COVID-19 on Mexican economy (Gonzalez-Barrera, 2021).

Conclusion With a new Biden administration in power calling for bi-partisan consensus and unity, it is definitive that Trump has lost the 2020 Presidential elections with his approval rating falling below 34% when he vacated office in 2021—a significant 25% lesser than Obama’s approval rating in 2017. However, the Trumpian phenomenon has not vanished from American society as he received the second-highest number of presidential votes ever received by any Presidential candidate in American history (Camara, 2020). The number of conspiracies that he promoted is still present in the minds of the citizens who in their everyday discussions in person as well as on social media spew hatred against those Trump denigrated, leaving behind a polarized country which Biden must deal with. Not only does the country stand divided into personal lines but also a widened partisan divide on party lines has been created with 86% Republicans against 6% Democrats approving of Trump’s job as President (Dimock & Gramlich, 2021). But moreover, Trump has accentuated international conspiracy theories to new heights with immigrants, political elites, and border security becoming rampant issues emerging populists are employing to come to power around the globe or the current populists taking inspiration from Trump’s disruptive brand of politics to mobilize domestic audiences. It has led to a ‘trickle-down’ effect wherein the perpetuation of conspiracy theories into gossip, previously understood to be “an improper quality of knowledge” is now comprehended as “potentially positive and useful

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in appropriative reading of the world” (Birchall, 2006, p. 108). In his ‘Make America Great Again’ campaign, Trump has normalized misinformation and ‘alternative facts’ that are contrary to the idea of America which existed at least in the minds of those living in the developing world who considered the country to be full of opportunities for everyone without distinctions. Therefore, more research needs to be conducted on the activities of Trump who is planning to contest again in 2024 with the GOP lining behind him. This study could also be extrapolated to the South Asian context wherein the leadership of the populists like Modi in India, Khan in Pakistan, and Rajapaksha in Sri Lanka have employed global level conspiracies to generate gossip among the citizens to stay in power.

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Eroukhmanoff, C. (2018, May 7). Securitisation theory: An introduction. EInternational Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisationtheory-an-introduction/ Fadel, L. (2020, December 4). Majority of Muslims voted for Biden, but Trump got more support than he did in 2016. NPR. https://choice.npr.org/index. html?origin=https://www.npr.org/2020/12/04/942262760/majority-ofmuslims-voted-for-biden-but-trump-got-more-not-less-support Fichera, A. (2020, October 21). Trump’s long history with conspiracy theories. FactCheck.Org. https://www.factcheck.org/2020/10/trumps-long-his tory-with-conspiracy-theories/ Final Presidential Job Approval Ratings | The American Presidency Project. (n.d.). The American Presidency Project. Retrieved November 27, 2021, from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/data/final-presidential-jobapproval-ratings Finchelstein, F. (2019). From fascism to populism in history. University of California Press. Frum, D. (2018) Trumpocracy—the corruption of the American Republic (p. 13). HarperCollins Publishers. Gonzalez-Barrera, A. (2021, July 9). Before COVID-19, more Mexicans came to the U.S. than left for Mexico for the first time in years. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/07/09/before-covid-19more-mexicans-came-to-the-u-s-than-left-for-mexico-for-the-first-time-inyears/ Holmes, C. C. M. A. K. (2015, September 19). Trump’s history of suggesting Obama is a Muslim—CNNPolitics. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2015/ 09/18/politics/trump-obama-muslim-birther/index.html Inglehart, R. F., & Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash. Jacobo, J. (2021, January 10). This is what Trump told supporters before many stormed Capitol Hill. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumptold-supporters-stormed-capitol-hill/story?id=75110558 Khan, M. H., Qazalbash, F., Adnan, H. M., Yaqin, L. N., & Khuhro, R. A. (2021). Trump and Muslims: A critical discourse analysis of Islamophobic Rhetoric in Donald Trump’s selected Tweets. SAGE Open, 11(1), 3. https:// journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/21582440211004172 Latinos Have Become More Pessimistic About Their Place in America. (2018, October 25). Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project. https://www. pewresearch.org/hispanic/2018/10/25/latinos-have-become-more-pessim istic-about-their-place-in-america/

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Lipka, M., & Gecewicz, C. (2017, September 6). More Americans now say they’re spiritual but not religious. Pew Research Center. https://www.pew research.org/fact-tank/2017/09/06/more-americans-now-say-theyre-spirit ual-butnot-religious/ Lopez, M. H., Gonzalez-Barrera, A., Krogstad, J. M., & López, G. (2016, October 11). The Latino vote in the 2016 presidential election (p. 2). Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project. https://www.pewresearch.org/ hispanic/2016/10/11/the-latino-vote-in-the-2016-presidential-election/ Masci, D. (2019, May 17). Many Americans see religious discrimination in U.S.—especially against Muslims. Pew Research Center. https://www.pew research.org/fact-tank/2019/05/17/many-americans-see-religious-discrimin ation-in-u-s-especially-against-muslims/ McAdams, D. P. (2016). The mind of Donald Trump. The Atlantic, 5. Mouffe, C. (2005). The return of the political (Vol. 8). Verso. Moffitt, B. (2015). How to perform crisis: A model for understanding the key role of crisis in contemporary populism. Government and Opposition, 50(2), 189–217. Mohamed, B. (2021, September 1). Muslims are a growing presence in U.S., but still face negative views from the public. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/09/01/muslims-area-growing-presence-in-u-s-but-still-face-negative-views-from-the-public/ Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 543. Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world. (2016, September 7). Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-aroundtheworld/ New CAIR Report Shows More than 50 Percent Spike in Anti-Muslim Incidents. (2017). CAIR California Sacramento Valley. Retrieved October 27, 2021, from https://ca.cair.com/sacval/updates/new-cair-report-shows-more-than50-percent-spike-in-antimuslim-incidents/ Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism (p. 76). Cambridge University Press. Reilly, K. (2016, August 31). Here are all the times Donald Trump insulted Mexico. Time. https://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meetinginsult/ Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2019). Identity crisis. Princeton University Press. Trump Twitter Archive. (2014, August 5). [Tweet]. Twitter. https://www.the trumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22SECURE+THE+WALL%22 Trump Twitter Archive. (2015, November 25). [Tweet]. Twitter. https://www. thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22credible+source%22

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Trump. (2016, March 24). Trump Twitter Archive [Tweet]. Twitter. https:// www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22it+is+amazing+how+often%22 Trump Twitter Archive. (2016, May 20). [Tweet]. Twitter. https://www.thetru mparchive.com/?searchbox=%22crooked+clinton%22&results=1 Trump Twitter Archive. (2017, November 11). [Tweet]. Twitter. https://www. thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22Fake+News+Media+hillar y%22 Trump Twitter Archive. (2019, August 2). [Tweet]. Twitter. https://www.the trumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22chairman+kim+does%22 Van dijk, T. (2015). Methods of critical discourse (p. 66). Critical Discourse Studies. Wilkie, C. (2020, November 6). Trump tries to claim victory even as ballots are being counted in several states—NBC has not made a call. CNBC. https:// www.cnbc.com/2020/11/04/trump-tries-to-claim-victory-even-as-ballotsare-being-counted-in-several-states-nbc-has-not-made-a-call.html Wilson, C., Parás, P., & Enríquez, E. (2017). A Critical Juncture: Public Opinion in US-Mexico Relations (p. 10). Years After 9/11, a Sharp Partisan Divide on Ability of Terrorists to Strike U.S. (2019, December 31). Pew Research Center—U.S. Politics & Policy. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/09/07/15-yearsafter-911-a-sharp-partisan-divide-on-ability-of-terrorists-to-strike-u-s

PART III

Gossip and the Public

CHAPTER 8

Media Framing of the Christine Blasey Ford Testimony: The Influence of Gossip on Sexual Violence Discourses Madison A. Pollino

Introduction “I have had to relive my trauma in front of the entire world, and have seen my life picked apart by people on television, in the media, and in this body who have never met me or spoken with me. I have been accused of acting out of partisan political motives. Those who say that do not know me. I am a fiercely independent person and I am no one’s pawn.” –Christine Blasey Ford

The quote above comes from Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony to the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hereafter referred

M. A. Pollino (B) School of Media and Communication, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_8

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to the Senate Judiciary Committee, in the fall of 2018 regarding her alleged sexually violent experience with Supreme Court nominee Judge Brett Kavanaugh. To provide context, in the summer of 2018 President Donald Trump announced Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination for the United States’ Supreme Court. Before the Senate can confirm the nominee, the Senate Judiciary Committee—which consists of twentytwo senators—holds a public hearing where the nominee gives testimony and answers questions asked by the panel. These questions may center on the nominee’s qualifications for the role, philosophy, and/or judgment. Additionally, the committee examines the nominee’s previous judicial decisions. In preparation for the hearing, the Senate Judiciary Committee gathers and reviews records about the nominee provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as other sources (Georgetown University Law Library, 2021). During this hearing, witnesses who either support or oppose the nomination may also give testimony. Per Senate rules, these witnesses may include “members of Congress, cabinet officers and other administration officials, representatives of business and labor organizations, and members of the general public” (United States Senate, n.d.). Following Kavanaugh’s nomination, Blasey Ford anonymously sent a letter to a senior lawmaker from the Democratic Party which alleged that Kavanagh sexually assaulted her during their time in high school in the early 1980s (Brown, 2018). In September 2018, the Washington Post publicly shared Blasey Ford’s story. Blasey Ford initially wanted her identity to remain confidential, however once the story leaked, she expressed that it was her civic duty to tell the public about her experience (Brown, 2018). On 27 September 2018, Blasey Ford testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee. As Besnier (2009) reminds us, “talk matters in the conduct of politics, the assertion of power and its contestation, the construction and destruction of reputations, the manipulation of truths, and the formation of alliances and conflicts among people” (p. 189). News media representations serve a critical role in shaping how the public perceives social phenomena (Benedict, 1992; Cuklanz, 1995, 2000; Meyers, 1997; Nettleton, 2011). Problematically, misrepresentations of sexual violence persist in contemporary news media and continue to influence public perception of this systemic issue (Pollino, 2020). For instance, political commentators and politicians represented Blasey Ford’s allegations as a

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political scandal with the explicit purpose of denying President Trump a fifth vote on the Supreme Court. One way that media misrepresent sexual violence is by treating it as gossip, a term which holds negative connotations in contemporary culture. Gossip is often associated with scandals, acts of transgression, and/or violation of social norms and expectations (Besnier, 2009; Shah et al., 2002). Gossip serves several functions in media framing, such as exposing and publicly shaming a transgressor for their perceived wrongdoing. The content of gossip itself not only requires attention, but also the broader sociocultural context where this gossip emerges (Besnier, 2009). The purpose of this chapter is not to make claims about the truthfulness of either party involved in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, but to (re)center the issue of sexual violence and its representation relative to Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony. First, this chapter will explore the pervasiveness of sexual violence in contemporary culture and the function of gossip in politics. Next, this chapter will address the adverse effects of gossip-style framing on public perception of Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony as well as perceptions of broader sexual violence discourses.

Pervasiveness of Sexual Violence in Contemporary Culture Contemporary culture often conceptualizes rape as an attack by a violent stranger upon a passive victim (Cuklanz, 1995). This limited view fails to recognize the complexity of sexual violence situations and ignores stories that do not adhere to the dominant narrative. Based on research by Young and Maguire (2003), sexual violence can include, but is not limited to “unwanted verbal, coercive, physical, and sexual events” (p. 4). These events can include assault committed by a stranger, acquaintance rape, date rape, harassment, and intimate partner violence (Cuklanz, 1995, 2000; Harris, 2011; Meyers, 1997, 2004; Young & Maguire, 2003). According to the National Sexual Violence Resource Center (NSVRC, 2015; Smith et al., 2018), a national study found that 81% of women experienced some form of sexual violence in their lifetime. In most cases, the victim knows the perpetrator (Breiding et al., 2014). Approaches to sexual violence as a cultural systemic problem rather than isolated incidents emerged in the 1970s within feminist movements. Efforts to address this cultural problem—deemed rape culture—center

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on combatting the normalization, justification, tolerance, and/or disregard of sexually violent acts (Cuklanz, 1995, 2000; Women Against Violence Against Women [WAVAW], 2018). The movement also focuses on countering prevalent rape myths. For instance, a common rape myth within contemporary culture is the idea that most accusations of rape are false (Weiser, 2017). Even though studies show that false reporting only accounts for 2 to 10% of rape accusations, this myth suggests that the majority of victims “cry rape” either out of guilt over an intimate encounter or vengeance due to unreciprocated advances (Garland & Bennett, 2017, p. 14). This myth sustains the hegemonic narrative that women use accusations of sexual violence as a tactic or as a means to an end. Scholars have also shown the prevalence of rape myths that assume that women deserve sexual violence if they “dress provocatively, have prior sexual experience, drink alcohol, or engage in activities at inappropriate places and/or times” (Garland & Bennett, 2017, p. 16; see also AdamCurtis & Forbes, 2004; Pica et al., 2017). According to Hill (2016), “Discourses of denial (nothing criminal happened) and blame (she caused what happened) make women acutely aware that their appearance and account will be viewed with the suspicion that they are lying, regretful, vengeful, or should have expected what they experienced” (p. 31). As witnessed in the discourses surrounding rape trials, these false assumptions negatively affect how society perceives victims, and as a result, discourages individuals from coming forward for fear of harsh judgment, ridicule, and the concern that no one will believe their story (Lozano & Cline-Thomas, 2018; Reilly, 2018). What rape myths fail to acknowledge is that power is the real motivation behind rape, and as such, these myths reinforce the idea that sexual assault is acceptable and even warranted. Even though statistics contradict the dominant cultural stereotypes of sexual violence, news media representations of sexual violence do not accurately reflect the issue or its social importance (Bullock, 2007; Cuklanz, 2000; Nettleton, 2011).

Political Scandals and Gossip-Style Framing In politics, a scandal refers to a “publicly revealed transgressions of moral, political, or legal norms by politicians or political institutions” (Lee, 2018, p. 714). It is clear that when a scandal emerges, the public does not always perceive that scandal the same way. A primary reason for these

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“variations in the impact of scandals is that people could hold different perceptions about the factuality, seriousness, and relevance of a scandal, that is, people may see the accusation as wrongful, trivial, or irrelevant to public duties” (Lee, 2018, p. 715). Additionally, research also indicates that individuals perceive information in a manner that does not contradict their pre-existing views (Lee, 2018). Relative to political scandals, those who support the implicated person are more likely to disregard or excuse the incident. When reporting on political scandals, news media might rely on gossip-style framing. Existing research indicates that gossip serves some valuable social functions, such as providing a way for the public to call out and/or condemn conduct that seemingly contradicts their values (Archard, 1998). Similarly, gossip can expose perceived wrongdoers to public ridicule, shame, and/or judgment (Jones & Pitcher, 2015). Conversely, those in power can also use gossip as a tool of oppression in order to sustain pre-existing inequalities (Besnier, 2009). Drawing on the work of Max Gluckman (1963), Besnier (2009) suggests that “gossip provides a way of asserting the boundary between morally acceptable action and deviant behavior” (p. 15). In other words, gossip creates social cohesion and differentiates one group (i.e., those who align with the norm) from the other (i.e., those who reject the norm and are marked as deviant). Gossip, then, offers the means to (re)produce pre-existing views that reinforce an oppressive status quo. In today’s news media landscape, political scandals receive significant attention from commentators (von Sikorski, 2020). The way that news media frame a situation can affect how the public perceives and reacts to that situation (Lee, 2018; Shah et al., 2002). News media representations emphasize specific details and omit others in order to “shape citizens’ political perceptions and preferences by encouraging certain avenues of thought and action” (Shah et al., 2002, p. 340). Further, research suggests that the attention to particular issues in news coverage primes “the public to focus upon those considerations as standards for social judgment” (Shah et al., 2002, p. 341). These standards for social judgment become visible in the ways that the news media represent these scandals along with the ways the public perceives these scandals. This gossip-style framing can also be witnessed in the way that news media represented—and misrepresented—the issue of sexual violence relative to the Ford and Kavanaugh testimonies.

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Gossip-Style Framing of Christine Blasey Ford’s Testimony In accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, witnesses who either support or oppose the Supreme Court nomination may testify before the committee (Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate [CJUSS], n.d.). In her testimony, Christine Blasey Ford explained why she chose to testify: “I am here because I believe it is my civic duty to tell you what happened to me while Brett Kavanaugh and I were in high school” (CJUSS, 2018). Blasey Ford expressed that she had a responsibility to inform the public about her past experience with Kavanaugh and how this experience could potentially influence his position as a Supreme Court Justice (Brown, 2018; CJUSS, 2018). Despite Blasey Ford’s reasoning for her choice to testify, some political commentators relied on gossip-style framing which can significantly affect public perception of not only the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, but also the systemic issue of sexual violence. Besnier (2009) explains that “As a social activity, gossip is often dismissed as lacking in importance and is equally often regarded as a reprehensible activity to be avoided or feared” (p. 13). Relative to instances of sexual violence, gossip-style news reporting can lead the public to question the legitimacy of a sexually violent experiences, hold victims accountable for their experience, and promote the idea that women fabricate instances of sexual violence to hide either their shameful activities or advance an agenda (Pollino, 2020). Women experience an increased vulnerability to publicity and gossip that is both intrusive and unwanted (Fraser, 1998). We can see this vulnerability in the clear hierarchy of power that emerged relative to gossip, gender, and the framing of Blasey Ford and Kavanaugh. Research has found that social perceptions of gossip fall along gendered lines (Besnier, 2009; Fraser, 1998). For instance, “the characterization of women’s communicative activities as reprehensible and unwholesome gossip and of men’s as morally neutral talk is a phenomenon that finds echoes in many other societies” (Besnier, 2009, p. 14). This dichotomy of gossip became apparent in the media framing of Blasey Ford’s and Kavanaugh’s respective testimonies. While some media sources framed Blasey Ford’s testimony as gossip-fueled character assassination—a frame usually applied to women—Kavanaugh’s testimony did not receive the same framing even though it was highly emotional and at times aggressive (Murray,

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2018; Pollino, 2020). This framing—particularly the framing of Blasey Ford’s testimony as shameful and malicious gossip—maintains this power hierarchy (Paasonen & Pajala, 2010). More problematically, the gossip-style framing of Blasey Ford’s experience and testimony has significant implications for individuals who have personally experienced sexual violence. For instance, at the time of her assault, Blasey Ford was a young woman in high school. As such, framing Blasey Ford’s experience and testimony as gossip not only minimizes her narrative, but also the narratives of young women and girls who have experienced sexual violence. Framing sexual violence in this way may, in turn, prevent those affected by sexual violence from speaking up about their experiences and/or seeking support that may be crucial for their healing and well-being. Two common frames that emerged from an analysis of media reports regarding Blasey Ford’s testimony centered on sexual violence as a political tactic and sexual violence as an act of wrongdoing. Sexual Assault Allegations as a Political Tactic Surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center (2019) indicate the continued increase of partisan division. In 2012, 47% of Americans deemed partisan conflicts very strong. In 2016, that number increased to 56%, and in 2019 the number further increased to 71%. Further, Republicans and Democrats increasingly associate negative traits with members of the opposing party. The survey found that 47% of Democrats believe Republicans are more immoral than other Americans, whereas 55% of Republicans believe that Democrats are more immoral than other Americans. These partisan divisions do not remain confined to the realm of politics but shape how the public understands and reacts to systemic issues like sexual violence. The gossip-style framing of sexual violence within the political landscape is not a new phenomenon. For instance, in 1991 Anita Hill testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding her claims of sexual harassment against Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas. Some political commentators and politicians in support of Thomas’s confirmation deemed Hill’s accusations as a “political ploy to damage the Supreme Court nominee’s reputation” (Pollino, 2020, p. 73; see also, CJUSS, 1991; Reuters, 1991). In 2018, similar to the testimony of Anita Hill, the idea that women use sexual violence to further a political agenda also emerged relative to Blasey Ford’s testimony. In his testimony, Kavanaugh

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claimed that Blasey Ford’s allegations emerged in order to prevent his confirmation: “When it looked like I might actually get confirmed, a new tactic was needed. Some of you were lying in wait and had it ready. A long series of false last-minute smears designed to scare me and drive me out of the process” (CJUSS, 2018, p. 126). Further, Kavanaugh referred to the allegations as a “calculated and orchestrated political hit” (CJUSS, 2018, p. 126). For instance, Fox News political commentator Laura Ingraham framed Blasey Ford’s story and testimony as a political ploy crafted by the Democratic Party to prevent President Trump from obtaining a fifth vote on the Supreme Court (Fox News, 2018a). She stated: “Claiming to be defenders of women, the Democrats cynically and I think cruelly use Christine Ford in a desperate attempt to derail a supreme court nominee” and “use victims to pursue a radical political agenda” (Fox News, 2018d). Rather than recognizing the issue of sexual violence, this reporting situates sexual violence as a tactic employed by the Democratic Party (Pollino, 2020). This framing brings the legitimacy of sexual violent experiences into question, and further, deprives victims of their narrative agency by positioning them as political tools. Laura Ingraham also suggested that Blasey Ford’s testimony sought to damage Kavanaugh’s reputation (Fox News, 2018b). Further, she claimed that sexual violence disclosures should be feared. For instance: Among the many ill effects of the Kavanaugh saga are the twisted lessons that some young people might glean from it. Among them: men are presumed guilty when accused by woman…boys should fear or even avoid close relationships with girls or young women in high school and in college…if you are man, no matter how hard you work, how much you succeed, how devoted you are to equality, uncorroborated allegations can derail your next job or your next promotion. It’s up to each of us to defend our sons, brothers, and your husbands to make sure that a travesty does not happen like this again. (Fox News, 2018c)

Here, Ingraham’s discourse is embedded with problematic stereotypes of sexual violence such that sexual violence is on par with a weapon and that women fabricate their sexually violent experiences to damage a man’s reputation. By reducing Blasey Ford’s accusations to a gossip-fueled political tactic that reinforces rape myths, the issue of sexual violence is also reduced.

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Conversely, MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow attempted to combat these notions of Blasey Ford’s testimony as gossip. Maddow stated, “She [Ford] jumped in and tried to raise the alarm about Kavanaugh because she had had this experience specifically with Kavanaugh, and she wanted to raise the alarm just in case he might seriously be under consideration” (MSNBC, 2018a). Here, Maddow explains that Blasey Ford’s actions were not a gossip-fueled political tactic, but rather, a morally acceptable way to inform the public about an individual that might come to occupy a key position of power in the United States’ highest court. The framing of Christine Blasey Ford’s accusations and testimony as a political tactic regarded sexual violence disclosure as an unethical political practice. The framing of this issue matters because implying that sexual violence is an orchestrated political ploy damages credibility, perpetuates stereotypes, and devalues the problem. In addition to the framing of sexual violence as a political tactic, sources also framed sexual violence as an act of wrongdoing. Speaking up as an Act of Wrongdoing In her testimony, Blasey Ford explicitly stated why she chose to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee and the public: “I am here today not because I want to be. I am terrified…I have had to relive my trauma in front of the entire world” (CJUSS, 2018). Talking about one’s sexually violent experience remains a highly personal choice. Those affected by sexual violence may choose to speak about their experience immediately after it occurs, they might wait decades to share their experience, or they may choose to never speak about the trauma they endured. As mentioned previously, gossip creates a boundary between actions and/or behaviors perceived as morally acceptable and those perceived as deviant. Gossip also provides the means for the public to condemn conduct that does not align with common values. In the case of Blasey Ford’s sexual assault allegations against Kavanaugh, this moral-deviant differentiation contributes to an us versus them dynamic that firmly situated the issue of sexual violence within the political sphere (Pollino, 2020). Some commentators and politicians framed Blasey Ford’s testimony as gossip by condemning her disclosure, which in turn positioned her as a wrongdoer. For instance, in an article published in The Federalist, attorney Chris Murray argued that Kavanaugh should sue Blasey Ford for

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defamation given that she “came forward to block Kavanaugh’s confirmation, a form of punishment” and that “the conduct Ford attributed to Kavanaugh was clearly criminal” (Murray, 2018). Legally, Blasey Ford’s allegations of sexual assault were never proven nor disproven, and yet, this gossip-style framing marks Blasey Ford as a violator of the law for speaking up and Kavanaugh as an injured party. The repercussions of this marking are considerably dangerous to public perception of sexual violence in that the public may perceive those who speak up about their sexually violent experiences as immoral and perceive the act of speaking as a way to punish perpetrators. Studies regarding political scandals indicate that while scandals might not severely damage the reputation of the involved politicians, the negative effect of scandals can extend far beyond the individuals directly involved (Lee, 2018). During the hearing, Republican Senator John Cornyn said to Kavanaugh: I can’t think of a more embarrassing scandal for the United States Senate since the McCarthy hearings… the American people are listening to this, and they will make their decision and I think you’ll come out on the right side of that decision. (CJUSS, 2018, pp. 173–174)

Conceptualizing this hearing—more specifically, the testimonies regarding Blasey Ford’s sexual assault allegations—as an “embarrassing scandal for the United States,” implies that those affected by sexual violence should feel ashamed for facing the accused perpetrator. Further, this conceptualization sends a message to the public that Blasey Ford’s testimony is embarrassing—not because sexual violence is a pervasive problem both in the United States and globally, but because Blasey Ford’s accusations against Kavanaugh are perceived as a threat to a man in power rather than a disclosure of a woman’s traumatic experience. The gossip-style framing of Blasey Ford’s testimony not only serves to condemn Blasey Ford but also her experience. But the implications of this gossip-style framing go far beyond that of Blasey Ford’s testimony. This issue was brought front and center before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the American people, and also garnered international attention. Among the major broadcast and cable networks in the United States, more than 20 million people watched the hearing (Reuters, 2018). Despite the prevalence of sexual violence in the United States and around the world, news media rarely, if ever, position the issue directly in front

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of its viewers. Although it is fair to reason that the news only prioritized the representation sexual violence because of its political ramifications, the issue still received attention, nonetheless. The news coverage of Blasey Ford’s testimony offered a remarkable opportunity to address the extent that sexual violence in our world; however, discussions of the issue remained polarized. In Senator Chris Coons remarks to the Senate floor on 4 October 2018, he drew awareness to these wider implications: This conversation is bigger. It’s bigger. It’s more pressing, and I’d say it’s more important than the question of one Supreme Court seat and one current nominee. This is a question about whether we as a country at the highest levels of power believe victims and survivors of sexual assault and are willing to listen to them, to believe them, and to take action. (MSNBC, 2018b)

Given that the notion of gossip is often associated with acts of wrongdoing and morally deviant behavior, the gossip-style framing of Christine Blasey Ford’s story and testimony can lead the public to reflexively question the legitimacy of sexually violent experiences, and further, discourage individuals from disclosing their experiences. Creating spaces where those affected by sexual violence feel comfortable to talk about their experiences is of the utmost importance because releasing the pain and receiving social support can help survivors move toward healing (Pollino, 2021). However, in Christine Blasey Ford’s situation, she entered an environment where individuals equated her disclosure with national embarrassment and perpetuated an abusive cycle.

Conclusion In sum, the gossip-style framing of Blasey Ford’s testimony reflects society’s tendency to minimize the severity of sexual violence situations (Besnier, 2009). The discourses of political commentators and politicians regarding the testimony reinforce stereotypes such that sexual violence serves as a tactic to further a political agenda as well as promotes the notion that those affected by sexual violence should not disclose their experiences. Besnier (2009) notes that “An understanding of the consequences of gossip helps explain how gossip is embedded in a broader social and political context” (p. 17). These consequences go far beyond

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the Blasey Ford’s testimony. Given that gossip is viewed as lack of truth or the idea of false information, the reporting of sexual violence as gossip had significant implications not only on public perception of Blasey Ford’s testimony, but also on perceptions of sexual violence. News coverage that accurately represents the issue of sexual violence can “foster changes in public opinion by promoting particular definitions and interpretations of political issues” (Shah et al., 2002, p. 343). In a society where those affected by sexual violence continue to be shamed and blamed, news media have the power to represent this issue without adhering to oppressive stereotypes; however, the need to sensationalize political issues takes precedent.

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Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate. (2018). The Nomination of the Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 115thCong., 5th sess., 2018. Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate. (n.d.). Rules of Procedure United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. https://www.judiciary.sen ate.gov/about/rules Cuklanz, L. (1995). Rape on trial: How the mass media construct legal reform and social change. University of Pennsylvania Press. Cuklanz, L. (2000). Rape on prime time: Television, masculinity, and sexual violence. University of Pennsylvania Press. Fox News. (2018a, September 25). Democratic emotional extortion and lessons to be learned [Video File]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCH41h dhBo0. Fox News. (2018b, September 26). The lessons of the Kavanaugh battle [Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvEvWqDjFGg Fox News. (2018c, September 26). Sad lessons our kids will learn from the Kavanaugh debacle [Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Doi16qLlJKs Fox News. (2018d, October 6). The Democrats’ phony victim play [Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9TzK2rU0zi4 Fraser, N. (1998). Sex, lies, and the public sphere: Reflections on the confirmation of Clarence Thomas. In J. B. Landes (Ed.), Feminism, the public and the private (pp. 314 337). Oxford University Press. Garland, T. S., & Bennett, A. (2017). An overview of sexual assault and sexual assault myths. In F. P. Reddington & B. W. Kreisel (Eds.), Sexual assault: The victims, the perpetrators, and the criminal justice system (3rd ed., pp. 3–25). Carolina Academic Press. Georgetown University Law Library (2021, June 17). Supreme Court nomination research guide. Georgetown Law Library. https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/ c.php?g=365722&p=2471070 Gluckman, M. (1963). Papers in honor of Melville J. Herskovits: Gossip and scandal. Current Anthropology, 4(3), 307–316. Harris, K. L. (2011). The next problem with no name: The politics and pragmatics of the word rape. Women’s Studies in Communication, 34(1), 42–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/07491409.2011.566533 Hill, A. (2016). SlutWalk as perifeminist response to rape logic: The politics of reclaiming a name. Communication and Critical/cultural Studies, 13(1), 23–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2015.1091940 Jones, N., & Pitcher, S. (2015). Reporting the tittle-tattle: Twitter, gossip, and the changing nature of journalism. Communication, 41(3), 287–301. https:// doi.org/10.1080/02500167.2015.1093321

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Lee, F. L. F. (2018). The spillover effects of political scandals: The moderating role of cynicism and social media communications. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 95(3), 714–733. https://doi.org/10.1177/107 7699017723604 Linder, C. (2018). Sexual violence on campus: Power-conscious approaches to awareness, prevention, and response (First ed.). Emerald Publishing. Lozano, A. V., & Cline-Thomas, A. (2018, July 9). Ex-Temple fraternity president faces rape accuser in court. NBC News Philadelphia. https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/national-international/ex-tem ple-fraternity-president-faces-rape-accuser-incourt/2096374/ Meyers, M. (1997). News coverage of violence against women: Engendering blame. Sage. Meyers, M. (2004). African American women and violence: Gender, race, and class in the news. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 21(2), 95–118. https://doi.org/10.1080/07393180410001688029 MSNBC. (2018a, September 28). Hearing exposes Brett Kavanaugh temperament, credibility issues [Video File]. Retrieved from http://www.msnbc. com/rachel-maddow/watch/hearing-exposeskavanaugh-temperament-credib ility-issues-1331311171639 MSNBC. (2018b, October 4). Meager FBI report no help to senators conflicted over Brett Kavanaugh [Video File]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNL33DyafQ Murray, C. (2018, October 17). Why Brett Kavanaugh should sue Christine Blasey Ford for defamation. The Federalist. https://thefederalist.com/2018/ 10/17/brett-kavanaugh-sue-christine-blasey-ford-defamation/ National Sexual Violence Resource Center (NSVRC). (2015). Statistics about Sexual Violence. Nettleton, P. H. (2011). Domestic violence in men’s and women’s magazines: Women are guilty of choosing the wrong men, men are not guilty of hitting women. Women’s Studies in Communication, 34(2), 139–160. https://doi. org/10.1080/07491409.2011.618240 Paasonen, S., & Pajala, M. (2010). Trashing The Prime Minister’s Bride: Public dismay and intertextual media. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 27 (2), 174–192. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295030903550985 Pew Research Center (2019, October 10). Partisan antipathy: More intense, more personal. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/10/ 10/partisan-antipathy-more-intense-more-personal/ Pica, E., Sheahan, C., & Pozzulo, J. (2017). “But he’s a star football player!”: How social status influences mock jurors’ perceptions in a sexual assault case. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 35(19–20), 3963–3985. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0886260517713715

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Pollino, M. A. (2020). (Mis)Representations of sexual violence: The Brett Kavanaugh and Christine Blasey Ford testimonies. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 37 (1), 71–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2019. 1694161 Pollino, M. A. (2021). Turning points from victim to survivor: An examination of sexual violence narratives. Feminist Media Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 14680777.2021.2006260 Reilly, K. (2018, March 9). A Yale student accused her classmate of rape. His lawyers asked what she was wearing and how much she drank. Time Magazine. https://time.com/5192004/yale-university-sexual-assault-trial/ Reuters. (1991, October 8). The Thomas nomination; Excerpts of news conference on harassment accusations against Thomas. New York Times. Reuters. (2018, September 28). More than 20 million Americans glued to Kavanaugh telecast. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-kavana ugh-ratings/more-than-20-million-americans-glued-to-kavanaugh-hearing-tel ecasts-idUSKCN1M82MI Shah, D. V., Watts, M. D., Domke, D., & Fan, D. P. (2002). News framing and cueing of issue regimes: Explaining Clinton’s public approval in spite of scandal. The Public Opinion Quarterly 66(3), 339–370. http://www.jstor. org/stable/3078767 Smith, S. G., Zhang, X., Basile, K. C., Merrick, M. T., Wang, J., Kresnow, M., Chen, J. (2018). The national intimate partner and sexual violence survey (NISVS): 2015 Data brief–Updated release. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. United States Senate. (n.d.). Senate committees. https://www.senate.gov/artand history/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm von Sikorski, C. (2020). Scandalous?! Examining the differential effects of news coverage about (non-) severe political misconduct on voting intentions and news source evaluations. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 97 (3), 762–789. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699020911081 Weiser, D. A. (2017). Confronting Myths about Sexual Assault: A Feminist analysis of the false report literature. Family Relations, 66(1), 46–60. https:// doi.org/10.1111/fare.12235 Women Against Violence Against Women. (2018). What Is Rape Culture? Retrieved from http://www.wavaw.ca/what-is-rape-culture Young, S. L., & Maguire, K. C. (2003). Talking about sexual violence. Women & Language, 26(2), 40–52.

CHAPTER 9

The Marriages of Celebrity Politicians: A Social Semiotic Approach to How Commenters Affiliate Around YouTube Gossip Videos Olivia Inwood and Michele Zappavigna

Introduction: YouTube Gossip and Celebrity Politicians The idea of celebrity is a key focus of YouTube culture, given the tabloidlike videos resplendent with celebrity drama and gossip that proliferate on this platform, often in the form of short click-bait videos focused on niche topics or individuals (Burgess & Green, 2018). A particular target of this

O. Inwood (B) · M. Zappavigna School of the Arts and Media, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia e-mail: [email protected] M. Zappavigna e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_9

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gossip is the figure of the ‘celebrity politician’, that is, politicians whose private life is scrutinised in similar ways to that of traditional celebrities, with similar issues foregrounded, such as their appearance and the state of their marriage or relationships (Street, 2004). Some politicians can be characterised as ‘media stars’ because ‘their research and popularity is rarely restricted by geography’, instead receiving worldwide coverage (Ibroscheva, 2020, p. 305). The term ‘celebrity politician’ can encapsulate politicians who have worked in the entertainment industry or already have popular notoriety, for instance, former US President Donald Trump was widely known as a reality TV star prior to entering politics (Street, 2019; Wood et al., 2016). The notion can also intersect with political populism, since populist leaders, as ‘quasi celebrities’ (Moffitt, 2020), often adopt certain ways of performing and connecting with audiences that mimics practices seen in the entertainment industry (Moffitt, 2020; Washbourne, 2013). Politicians often associate themselves with particular celebrities for marketing opportunities (Street, 2004). It has also been noted that metaphors and analogies used by journalists in media reporting play a significant role in constructing politicians as celebrities, and enabling extreme forms of behaviour such as Trump’s claims about not losing any voters if he shot someone on Fifth Avenue (Street, 2019). This chapter adopts a social semiotic approach to understanding the phenomenon of YouTube gossip videos and how solidarity is enacted through the social semiotic practice of gossiping. Social semiotics is the study of how semiotic resources are construed in ‘specific historical, cultural and institutional contexts’ (Van Leeuwen, 2005, p. 3). By semiotic resources, we mean that language is not a set of prescribed rules but rather ‘a resource for making meanings’ (Halliday, 1978, p. 192), and so semiotic resources can also be broadened to not just language, but ‘the actions and artefacts we use to communicate’ (Van Leeuwen, 2005, p. 3). In particular, the social semiotic approach employed in this chapter is concerned with understanding how YouTube gossip videos evoke the notion of a ‘celebrity politician’ and how commenters affiliate around this notion, in other words, forming social bonds with each other based on this shared fascination with the private lives of politicians. This chapter also proposes that gossip plays a role in the success of popular conspiracy theories. Even though gossip is an everyday phenomenon, it can be difficult to define since, like casual conversation more generally, it tends to have a prosodic rather than particulate structure, spanning variable stretches of

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interaction (Eggins & Slade, 2005). It can also be challenging to distinguish gossip from related types of communication such as rumour (Foster, 2004). These problems are exacerbated in online contexts that often involve large datasets spanning multiple types of interactions amongst large volumes of users. Studies of gossip in casual verbal conversations have noted its role in interactively maintaining the values of social groups and have suggested that there is a ‘dialectical relationship between the linguistic form and the social purpose of gossip’ (Eggins & Slade, 2005, p. 310). In terms of structure, gossip tends to differ from narratives because it does not contain a complication or resolution, instead involving ‘judgement of an absent other’ (Eggins & Slade, 2005, p. 278). As a form of verbal casual conversation, it involves the following generic stages (Eggins & Slade, 2005; White, 2003): – Third Person Focus: the target of the gossip is revealed, and an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ framing is formed; – Substantiating Behaviour: the speaker provides evidence which allows the participants to form an implicit negative evaluation of the person; – Pejorative Evaluation: based on what was said in the previous stage, an explicit negative evaluation is then given of the person; – Defence: a defence of the target of the gossip is offered; – R esponse to Defence; – Wrap-up: an optional element that provides a summary of the issue previously discussed; – Probe: one speaker questions the other speaker, in order to gain further information. The probe stage can occur at multiple times throughout the conversation. In terms of function, gossiping is commonly seen as an ‘in-group’ activity where users can ‘air negative opinions without too much sanction’ (Robles, 2017, p. 8). Gossip can also involve the sharing of ‘extreme opinions’ that are used as a strategy for affiliating with others, and as a way of generating ‘positive politeness’ aiding the formation of collective group identity, although sometimes with the risk of creating discord (Robles, 2017, p. 7). Accordingly, it is important to analyse gossip from a dialogic perspective, considering the different ways in which users can affiliate or

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disaffiliate in terms of the social bonds shared in an instance of gossip, as undertaken in this paper.

Dataset: Nicki Swift Videos and Comments The particular dataset analysed is a collection of ten comment threads from ten different videos by the YouTube gossip channel Nicki Swift. 1237 comments across the ten comment threads were analysed in total. A brief overview of the ten videos will firstly be provided in order to understand the genre that commenters were engaged in. The Nicki Swift channel, that has over two million subscribers, is known for its short videos which tend to focus on a single celebrity, employing a visual montage of images and videos of that celebrity together with a voiceover explaining relevant ‘gossip’. Nicki Swift is owned and operated by the Static Media corporation, and exists as a social media driven business, with its website stating that it generates most of its revenue from ad platforms such as Google.1 The Nicki Swift channel was selected as a case study because it is one of the most popular self-described gossip channels that focuses on both celebrities and politicians. What is particularly interesting about Nicki Swift videos is how they apply the same rhetorical strategies to discussing both Hollywood celebrities and US politicians. The marriages of celebrity politicians that are discussed in the video dataset include Donald Trump and Melania Trump, Joe Biden and Jill Biden, Kamala Harris and Douglas Emhoff, and Hillary Clinton and Bill Clinton. As shown in Table 9.1 ten videos about these politicians were selected for this study, created between May 2017–September 2020, with these videos adopting a similar style of coverage applied to both politicians and celebrities. For example, similar phrases and themes such as the ‘most cringeworthy’ moments in relationships and ‘the truth about ’ a selected person, appear in videos about these politicians and other celebrities. It is the repetition of these rhetorical strategies that garner user attention. Nicki Swift videos follow a particular generic structure that involves: – Using a click-bait title with evaluative language that reveals the target of the gossip (third person focus)

1 See: www.nickiswift.com/policies/.

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Table 9.1 Nicki Swift video dataset Name of video from the Nicki Swift dataset analysed for this study

Other Nicki Swift videos that use a similar rhetorical structure

1. Donald and Melania Trump’s Most Cringeworthy Moments

The Most Cringeworthy Dancing With The Stars Moments The Most Cringeworthy Live! Moments Ever The Most Cringeworthy Moments Ever On Sister Wives The Truth About Mila Kunis Revealed The Truth About Rose McGowan Finally Revealed The Truth About Emma Stone’s Marriage Revealed Celebrity Marriages That Just Keep Getting Weirder And Weirder Kylie Jenner’s Relationship Just Gets Weirder And Weirder Cardi B’s Marriage Is Just Getting Weirder And Weirder The Real Reason Bill Gates Is Getting Divorced The Real Reason Miley And Liam Split After Marriage The Real Reasons Why Miranda Lambert and Blake Shelton Divorced This Is How Much The Most Controversial HGTV Stars Are Worth Here’s How Much Bill Cosby Is Really Worth Now Here’s How Much Kaley Cuoco Is Really Worth Who Is Christina Haack Dating Now? Who Is Jamie Foxx’s New Woman? This Is Elon Musk’s Girlfriend Venus Williams’ Boyfriend Comes From A Lot Of Money McEnany’s Husband Breaks Silence After Briefing Room Incident Kobe Bryant’s Wife Vanessa Receives A Huge Inheritance

2. The Truth About Donald Trump Revealed

3. Joe Biden’s Marriage Just Keeps Getting Weirder And Weirder 4. The Clintons’ Marriage Just Keeps Getting Weirder And Weirder

5. The Real Reason Jill Biden Got Divorced 6. The Real Reason Donald Trump And Melania Sleep In Separate Bedrooms

7. Here’s How Much The Clintons Are Really Worth

8. Douglas Emhoff: Who Exactly Is Kamala Harris’ Husband? 9. Kamala Harris’ Husband Recently Made An Interesting Job Change

(continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued) Name of video from the Nicki Swift dataset analysed for this study

Other Nicki Swift videos that use a similar rhetorical structure

10. The Strange Truth About Donald Trump’s Marriage

The Strange Truth About Geraldo Rivera Revealed The Untold Truth Of Harry Styles Strange Things Everyone Just Ignores About Beyonce And Jay Z’s Marriage

– Providing negative or speculative judgement of the chosen celebrity (third person focus) – Providing evidence in the form of video or social media footage of someone else evaluating the celebrity (Substantiating Behaviour) – Providing an opinion of the footage discussed (Pejorative Evaluation) – Showing footage of the celebrity giving their side of the story (Defence) – Responding to the footage shown of the celebrity giving their side of the story (response to defence) – Providing a summary of the gossip discussed (Wrap-up) – Advertising the channel and asking for subscribers. The videos follow some similar generic structures to those identified by Eggins and Slade (2005). However, what is different with Nicki Swift videos is the monologic voice-over that does not ‘probe’ for more information from participants or gives other participants an opportunity to ‘debate’ their opinion. Rather, it is the Nicki Swift monologue that makes the montage of various videos clips coherent and dictates what substantiating behaviour and pejorative evaluations are shown.

Analytical Method: A Social Semiotic Perspective on Gossip A social semiotic perspective, grounded in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), is a model of language that considers how meanings are made

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in their functional context. It employs the tools of appraisal and affiliation, developed within SFL, to analyse gossip in the dataset of YouTube comments. Appraisal is a framework used to analyse evaluative language and is concerned with studying emotion in language, in terms of three discursive systems of attitude (Martin & White, 2005): – Affect: construing emotional reactions – Judgement: assessing behaviour – Appreciation: construing the value of things (rather than humans). Within these three systems we have further sub-system categories that are illustrated in Table 9.2. What is being evaluated (the ideation) and how it is being evaluated (the attitude) forms an ideation-attitude ‘coupling’. In this chapter, the appraisal analysis will be notated as follows, with Appraisal terms shown in small caps to distinguish them from everyday non-technical use: Text: We already know Joe is a huge liar. Coupling: [ideation: Joe/ attitude: negative veracity]. Throughout the chapter, the attitude will be highlighted within examples sampled from the comment threads in bold (as in ‘huge liar’, the negative attitude) and the ideational target will be underlined (as in ‘Joe’, the target of the evaluation). Attitudes can also be negative (e.g. negative veracity means dishonest behaviour) or positive (e.g. positive veracity means honest) in terms of their polarity. Identifying patterns in appraisal is only the first step in exploring how social bonds are enacted in gossip. The next step is to identify the kinds of linguistic strategies that are used to negotiate couplings, for instance by accepting or rejecting them. These strategies are modelled in SFL as what is referred to as affiliation, where social bonds (realised in language as couplings) are dialogically negotiated or ambiently communed around (Zappavigna, 2018). This chapter is specifically interested in the interactive process of dialogic affiliation (Knight, 2010; Zappavigna, 2018) whereby users support, reject or laugh off particular bonds. The choices in the dialogic affiliation system are shown in Fig. 9.1, together with examples from the dataset illustrating each choice (known as a feature). The dialogic affiliation system consists of six main sub-types: rally (agreeing

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Table 9.2 Sub-systems of attitude

Examples of attitude

Sub-system categories

Examples (positive or negative)

Affect

Un/Happiness In/Security Dis/Satisfaction Dis/Inclination

Judgement

Normality Capacity Tenacity Veracity Propriety

Appreciation

R eaction Composition Valuation

Cheerful or sad Disquiet or confidence Displeasure or pleasure Fear or desire Special or strange Capable or incapable Dependable or undependable Honest or dishonest Moral or immoral Engaging or dull Balanced or unbalanced Worthwhile or shallow

Adapted from Martin and White (2005)

with the bond proposed and providing no alternatives), adjust (agreeing with the bond but also providing another bond in response), defer (laughing off the bond that was shared), dismiss (disagreeing with the proposed bond and providing no alternative bonds), oppose (disagreeing with the proposed bond and providing an alternative bond) and ignore (completely ignoring the proposed bond).

Affiliation Analysis of the Comment Threads Within the Nicki Swift video dataset, it is not just the videos that contain gossip, the comment feed also features ongoing gossip with a different generic structure. In these comments, users affiliate with each other based on shared bonds that negatively evaluate the target of the gossip and blur the boundaries between what is considered gossip and a conspiracy

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Rally Warrant

Support

Defer

Manage

Ignore

They are all cringeworthy moments (agreeing and providing no alternatives) Holding hands with this swine is cringeworthy (agreeing and adjusting the bond)

hahahaaa keep crying!! (laughing off the bond shared)

Dismiss

I disagree! (disagreeing and providing no alternatives)

Oppose

I actually feel bad for her. She’s basically in prison. (disagreeing and providing an alternative bond)

Reject

Dialogic Affiliation

Adjust

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$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ (ignoring the bond)

Fig. 9.1 Dialogic affiliation system (Adapted from Zappavigna, 2018)

theory. An affiliation analysis shows how these bonds are negotiated in online ambient environments, leading to the formation of gossip. Bonds Tabled in Prompt Questions by the YouTuber Table 9.3 compiles the questions asked by the Nicki Swift channel, corresponding to each of the ten videos. These questions appeared as a pinned comment at the top of the YouTube comment feed for each video, with users then directly replying to the question. The table also provides a linguistic analysis of the ideation-attitude couplings in each question, illuminating how the YouTuber prompts users to rally around a key bond. For example, the question ‘What are your thoughts on the couple’s most cringeworthy moments?’ negatively evaluates the couple’s moments as ‘cringeworthy’. The coupling of the attitude (cringeworthy) with the ideation (the couple’s moments) forms a ‘cringeworthy couple’s moments’ bond that is then open to negotiation by the commenters. Most of the questions are addressed towards an ambient ‘you’ through an affiliation strategy which marshals the audience around the bonds that are tabled and invites the audience to show their solidarity through continuing the gossip in the thread. In other instances, the phrase ‘what are your thoughts ’ designates the audience by again inviting them to continue the gossip in the threads, and one question uses the phrasing ‘what’s the weirdest thing ’ (question 4) creating a definitive evaluation (the Clinton’s

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marriage is weird) that indicates the audience should only bond around this evaluation. Table 9.3 Questions asked in Nicki Swift comment threads Question asked by Nicki Swift in the YouTube comment thread

Linguistic analysis

1. What are your thoughts on the couple’s most cringeworthy moments?

[ideation: couple’s moments/ attitude: negative reaction] Use of ‘your’ to designate the audience Cringeworthy couple’s moments bond [ideation: Trump/ attitude: negative tenacity] Use of vocative ‘you’ to marshal the audience Challenged Trump bond [ideation: Biden/ attitude: negative tenacity] Use of vocative ‘you’ to marshal the audience Challenged Joe Biden bond [ideation: Clinton’s marriage/ attitude: negative valuation] Use of ‘what’s’ creating a definitive statement Strange marriage bond [ideation: story/ attitude: positive valuation] Use of vocative ‘you’ to marshal the audience Scrutinise story bond [ideation: sleeping separately from your partner/ attitude: negative valuation] Use of vocative ‘you’ to marshal the audience Strange sleeping separately from partner bond [ideation: Clintons/ attitude: positive capacity] Use of vocative ‘you’ to marshal the audience R ich Clintons bond

2. Who do you think Trump will face in the 2020 election?

3. Do you think Joe Biden will make it to the 2020 election?

4. What’s the weirdest thing about the Clintons’ marriage?

5. Which story do you think is true regarding the beginning of Jill and Joe’s relationship?

6. Would you ever sleep separately from your partner?

7. How do you think the Clintons amassed their fortune?

(continued)

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Table 9.3 (continued) Question asked by Nicki Swift in the YouTube comment thread

Linguistic analysis

8. What do you think about Douglas Emhoff and Kamala Harris’ relationship?

[ideation: Emhoff and Harris relationship/ attitude: negative normality] Use of vocative ‘you’ to marshal the audience Scrutinise marriage bond [ideation: partner/ attitude: positive propriety] Use of vocative ‘you’ to marshal the audience Benevolent partner bond [ideation: Melania’s life as first lady/ attitude: negative normality] Use of ‘your’ to designate the audience scrutinise melania bond

9. Have you ever had to make a big change for a spouse or partner’s career?

10. What are your thoughts on Melania’s life as the First Lady?

Exploring Affiliation in the Comment Threads The ten comment threads differ in terms of the evaluative meanings attributed to each politician and thus the social bonds that were supported or rejected in terms of the patterns of affiliation visible in the dataset. Firstly, in terms of generic structure of the comments, there were six main types of comments: – Gossip: negatively evaluating a politician’s private life – Conspiracy: negatively evaluating a politician by linking them to a conspiracy theory – Compliment: positively evaluating a politician – Humour: making a joke in relation to the question asked – Critique: negatively evaluating a politician or Nicki Swift without providing details – Tag: tagging another YouTuber and not using any evaluative language. As will be discussed later, some comments blurred the boundaries between gossip and conspiracy (depending on whether the comment was linked to the politicians’ private life). However, dividing comments into

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these categories helped to identify instances of gossip. The comments that have been selected for inclusion in this chapter exemplify the key social bonds that were evident in the comment threads and the strategies used to affiliate or disaffiliate with the bonds proposed by the comment thread’s question that invited users to gossip. This section will now present the main findings regarding how each celebrity politician couple were evaluated in the comment threads and the social bonds that users shared in order to invite gossip. Comments about Donald and Melania Trump featured instances of negative evaluation where users supported the bond that was presented in the question, therefore extending the gossip by further speculating on the Trump’s private lives. For example, the following users supported the ‘scrutinise Melania bond’ that was presented in question 10, but also adjusted this bond to speculate about Melania’s life: 1. I think it’s pure greed 1 or she’s one of Putin’s KGB kittens/mole.2 Malaria Trump grew up poor and came from a Soviet bloc country 3 and traded on her looks4 for a rich moron5 like treasonous6 Trump. 1 [ideation: it’s (marriage)/ attitude: negative valuation] Shallow marriage bond adjusting scrutinise melania bond 2 [ideation: Melania/ attitude: negative propriety] Evil melania bond adjusting scrutinise melania bond 3 [ideation: Malaria (Melania) Trump/ attitude: negative capacity] Poor melania bond adjusting scrutinise melania bond 4 [ideation: her (Melania)/ attitude: positive capacity] Beautiful melania bond adjusting scrutinise melania bond 5 [ideation: Trump/ attitude: negative capacity] Ignorant trump bond adjusting scrutinise melania bond 6 [ideation: Trump/ attitude: negative propriety] Evil trump bond adjusting scrutinise melania bond 2. she marry him for a green card and fat bank account. [ideation: she/ attitude: negative veracity] Shallow Melania bond adjusting scrutinise melania bond

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There are a number of negative evaluations about Melania and Donald Trump. The ‘scrutinise Melania bond’ (1) is adjusted with additional bonds that critique the shallow marriage of the Trumps, speculate about Melania’s connections to the KGB and discuss her upbringing (which incorrectly identifies Slovenia as part of the Soviet Union). There is only one positive evaluation of Melania’s appearance, contrasted with the negative evaluations of Trump. In another example, a singled bond is shared, a ‘shallow Melania bond’ that adjusts a ‘scrutinise Melania bond’ by speculating about Melania’s motivations for marrying Trump (2). These two examples demonstrate how users propose their own bonds, beyond those offered by Nicki Swift, in order align around shared speculation about the Trumps. There were also comments that rejected the proposed bonds by Nicki Swift. These comments criticise the Nicki Swift video and the proposed ‘cringeworthy couple bond’ of question 1. In the first example (3), a user dismisses the ‘cringeworthy couple bond’ proposed by Swift. Another user (4) responds to this comment by dismissing it (3) and supporting the ‘cringeworthy couple bond’: 3. I THINK YOU NEED TO UPDATE IT, SINCE MOST OF IT HAS BEEN PROVEN TO BE FALSE LMAO [ideation: most of it (video)/ attitude: negative valuation] False video bond dismisses cringeworthy couple bond 4. I disagree!1 Trump is a pathological liar who thrives on chaos– a malignant narcissist2 . Look it up on Google. If you don’t see the emotional abuse3 with your own eyes, you are blind. Wake up!4 Melania would much rather stay in5 NY 1 [ideation: (previous comment)/ attitude: negative valuation] False comment bond dismissing false video bond 2 [ideation: Trump/ attitude: negative veracity] Lying Trump bond adjusting cringeworthy couple bond 3 [ideation: Trump/ attitude: negative propriety] Evil Trump bond adjusting cringeworthy couple bond 4 [ideation: you/ attitude: negative capacity] Ignorant YouTuber dismissing false video bond 5 [ideation: NY/ attitude: positive valuation] Good NY bond opposing false video bond

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A false video bond is tabled that dismisses the ‘cringeworthy couple bond’ by stating that the video is false, however, it does not propose an alternative bond besides calling the video out as false (3). The other user (4) dismisses the false video bond proposed (3), instead supporting the ‘cringeworthy couple bond’ by adjusting the bond to negatively evaluate Trump via negative veracity and propriety. The user continues to dismiss (3) by negatively evaluating the commenter and creating the new bond of ‘Good NY’ that opposes the ‘false video bond’. These examples show how proposed bonds are not always rallied around, instead users can decide to either not engage with the gossip at all or to propose alternative bonds that users might instead rally around. Comments about Joe and Jill Biden were focused on Joe Biden’s negative capacity, with this evaluation being used to further speculate about their private lives. These examples (5 and 6) show how users responded to the ‘challenged Joe Biden bond’ proposed in question 3: 5. Joe’s wife stays close to him1 so he won’t say something stupid 2 on the campaign trail. 1 [ideation: Joe’s wife (Jill Biden)/ attitude: invoked positive capacity]. Capable Jill Biden bond adjusting challenged Joe Biden bond 2 [ideation: he (Joe Biden)/ attitude: negative capacity] incapable Joe Biden bondadjusting challenged Joe Biden bond. 6. He will never make it pass the debates1 he meds do not last that long..wife is doing his interviews and Obama does the rest2 ..when he does speak 75% of the time I have no idea what he is saying 1 …Trump 20203 1 [ideation: Biden/ attitude: negative capacity] incapable Joe Biden bondadjusting challenged Joe Biden bond 2 [ideation: Jill Biden and Obama/ attitude: positive capacity] Capable jill biden and obama bond adjusting challenged Joe Biden bond 3 [ideation: Trump/ attitude: positive capacity] Winning Trump bond adjusting challenged Joe Biden bond

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Jill Biden is positively evaluated for helping Joe Biden on the campaign trial (5). This ‘capable Jill Biden bond’ adjusts the ‘challenged Joe Biden bond’ proposed in question 3. Joe Biden’s speaking skills on the campaign trail are also negatively evaluated, again adjusting the ‘challenged Joe Biden bond’ by criticising an addition dimension of his performance. Other negative evaluations of Biden included commenting on his medical state and speaking skills (6). Jill Biden and Obama are positively evaluated for aiding Joe Biden on the campaign trail, whilst Trump at the end is also positively evaluated as the user’s choice for President in 2020 (6). These new bonds all adjust the ‘challenged Joe Biden bond’. As we can see with these examples, the ‘challenged Biden bond’ proposed by question 3 invites users to speculate about Biden’s physical and mental state, proposing their own bonds to invite further gossip. The Bidens were also negatively evaluated via negative veracity in order to invite further gossip. In question 5, a ‘true story bond’ was proposed by Nicki Swift, with one user responding by echoing this bond: 7. Adultery 1 . The Bidens are absolute LIARS2 . Now research who was offered $$ to off Biden’s first wife. He signed an affidavit. 1 [ideation: elided (Bidens)/ attitude: negative propriety] unethical Bidens bond adjusting true story bond 2 [ideation: Bidens/ attitude: negative veracity] Lying Bidens bond adjusting true story bond

The Bidens are negatively evaluated as ‘absolute LIARS’ (7). This evaluation means that the user adjusts the ‘true story bond’ by creating additional bonds that the Bidens are liars due to their supposed adultery and involvement in the death of Joe Biden’s first wife. From this example, we see how the ‘true story bond’ proposed by Nicki Swift invites more speculation and additional bonds. These additional bonds therefore function as the fuel for the gossip to continue. Comments about Kamala Harris and Douglas Emhoff were primarily focused on negatively evaluating Emhoff, inviting further speculation about Harris’ and Emhoff’s marriage. In response to question 8 that shared an ‘evaluating relationship bond’, Emhoff was evaluated with either negative capacity or negative propriety:

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8. I think he is a pathetic, self-loathing ‘man’ 1 who settled for1 sloppy seconds2 from Willie Brown. That’s what I think of him! 1 [ideation: he (Emhoff)/ attitude: negative capacity] worthless Emhoff bond adjusting evaluating relationship bond 2 [ideation: sloppy seconds (Kamala Harris)/ attitude: negative capacity] Worthless Kamala Harris bond adjusting evaluating relationship bond 9. Hes a jewish hater1 of the Constitution. His buddy George Sorus2 he married kamala both to do away with the constitution1 1 [ideation: he (Emhoff) & both (Emhoff and Harris)/ attitude: negative propriety] Evil Emhoff and Harris bond adjusting evaluating relationship bond 2 [ideation: George Sorus (Soros)/ attitude: negative propriety] Evil George Soros adjusting evaluating relationship bond

These negative evaluations (8 and 9) either trigger gossip, or a mix of gossip and conspiracy. Emhoff is evaluated with negative capacity for being ‘pathetic’ and ‘self-loathing ’, and ‘settling for’ Kamala Harris, therefore forming a ‘worthless Emhoff bond’ (8). Kamala Harris, who is not named directly, is evaluated with negative capacity because she is described as ‘sloppy seconds ’ due to her previous relationship with the former politician Willie Brown (8). Thus, the user also forms a ‘worthless Kamala Harris bond’ adjusting the ‘evaluating relationship bond’ proposed by Nicki Swift, creating a comment that shares the user’s own opinion about the gossip (8). In other instances, the bonds propose a mix of gossip and conspiracy. Emhoff is evaluated with negative propriety for being a ‘jewish hater’ and for supposedly being friends with George Soros, a Jewish billionaire (9). Comments about Emhoff often contained these anti-Semitic implied evaluations, a common trait in conspiratorial discourse. ‘evil Emhoff and Harris’ and ‘Evil George Soros’ bonds were shared that adjust the ‘evaluating relationship bond’ towards Emhoff’s and Harris’ supposed desire to ‘do away with the constitution’ (9). Thus, this comment blurs the distinctions between gossip and conspiracy, by reflecting on Emhoff and Harris’ private life, and incorporating implied anti-Semitic discourse. Elites such as George Soros, Bush, Obama, Clinton and Biden

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were also negatively evaluated for belonging to dangerous ideologies, forming an ‘evil elites bond’ (10). Additionally, Kamala Harris is negatively evaluated with negative capacity for being ‘brainwashed’ by these evil elites: 10. George Soros, Bush’s, Obama’s, Clinton’s Biden are going to brainwash1 her2 into joining The New World Order Globalization Hitlers ideology! 1 1 [ideation: George Soros, Bush’s, Obama’s, Clinton’s, Biden/ attitude: negative propriety] Evil Elites bond adjusting evaluating relationship bond 2 [ideation: Kamala Harris/ attitude: negative capacity] ignorant kamala harris bond adjusting evaluating relationship bond

These additional bonds adjust the evaluating relationships bond that was initially shared by Nicki Swift (10) and invite conspiratorial discourse by adding the ‘Evil Elites bond’, again showing how gossip can lead to conspiracy. Overall, in the Emhoff and Harris dataset, it was Emhoff who received the most negative evaluations, that provided additional bonds of an Anti-Semitic and Anti-Elitist tone, blurring the boundaries between gossip and conspiracy theories. Comments about Hillary and Bill Clinton also frequently blurred the distinctions between gossip and conspiracy theories via the use of evaluation and bonds that can be affiliated around. In response to question 4 that proposed a ‘strange marriage bond’ users adjusted the bond to propose a new bond highlighting the Clinton’s negative propriety: 11. They get away with MURDER! [ideation: they (Clintons)/ attitude: negative propriety] Evil Clintons bond adjusting strange marriage bond 12. A crime family who keep on getting away with it all surely it must end soon surely. [ideation: family (Clintons)/ attitude: negative propriety] Evil Clintons bond adjusting strange marriage bond

These comments (11 and 12) border between gossip and conspiracy theory; they discuss the private lives of an absent other with negative evaluation, but also discuss a powerful family that are supposedly taking

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part in something sinister, which aligns with the definition of a conspiracy theory. This shows how YouTube comments due to their brief nature manage to blur the definitions of gossip and conspiracy theory due to their lack of clearly defined generic structures. In terms of other affiliation strategies, users can initially rally with the proposed bond in the question and create additional bonds later that unpack the gossip in more detail. For example (13), a user rallies around the ‘strange marriage bond’ by evaluating the Clintons with negative normality: 13. That they are simply business partners1 . They don’t have a real marriage1 . And Chelsea is the daughter of Webb Hubble2 from Hillary’s Rose Law Firm days. 1 [ideation: they/ attitude: negative normality] R allying around strange marriage bond 2 [ideation: Hillary/ attitude: negative veracity] Lying Hillary Clinton bond adjusting strange marriage bond The user expresses full agreement with the ‘strange marriage bond’ proposed by Nicki Swift, by expressing that they find it strange the Clinton’s are ‘simply business partners ’ and ‘don’t have a real marriage’ (13). The user then provides an additional bond, the ‘Lying Hillary Clinton bond’ that adjusts the ‘strange marriage bond’ by claiming Hillary Clinton cheated on Bill Clinton and that Chelsea is not Bill Clinton’s daughter. Thus, Hillary Clinton is associated with the implied evaluation of negative veracity. Overall, in the Clinton dataset, there were repeated speculations about the Clinton’s marriage that either intersected with conspiracy theories or simply invited more gossip.

Discussion of Findings and Future Directions The social semiotic analysis undertaken in this study shows how solidarity among people is construed in digital gossip, where social media users evaluate the marriages of celebrity politicians, bonding around shared speculations and conspiracy theories. The Nicki Swift YouTube channel is an example of the commodification of digital gossip within an attention economy (Abidin, 2021). The channel’s use of prompt questions in their

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own comment feed actively invites users to speculate about the private lives of these politicians. Users’ responses tended to propose new bonds and incorporate additional negative evaluation, fuelling further gossip. Due to the open-ended bonds shared in the channel’s questions, more comments would adjust the bond rather than completely reject it. If there was disagreement, it was more commonly disagreement over which gossip to believe, rather than a direct rejection of gossip altogether. Due to their brevity, the YouTube comments, unlike the generic structure for gossip proposed by Eggins and Slade (2005), did not feature stages such as Substantiating Behaviour. Instead, negative judgement of an absent other was the main feature that locates the comments within the realm of gossip. Most users replied to the main question rather than replying to each other, meaning there was not a sustained dialogic exchange structure across the comment feeds. Across the four celebrity politician couples in the dataset, all were the target of negative judgement, although in relation to different key bonds, and often blurring the boundaries between conspiracy theory and gossip. Comments targeting the Trumps tended to be aesthetic, such as the Shallow Melania bond. Comments targeting the Bidens, in contrast, tended to focus on ability, such as the Incapable Biden bond. Comments targeting Kamala Harris and Douglas Emhoff enacted bonds relating to ethics, for instance the Evil Emhoff bond, and featured Anti-Semitic conspiratorial content. Comments targeting the Clinton also shared features in common with conspiracy theories, enacting an Evil Clintons bond related to conspiracy theories about the Clintons being murderers. A linguistic affiliation analysis of comments on YouTube gossip videos provides a way of understanding the unfolding of gossip and its ramifications regarding the key social bonds at stake in this discourse. This study can be seen as an extension of Eggins’ and Slades’ work to the digital realm, where Eggins and Slade remark that more research needs to be completed regarding a ‘dynamic analysis that focuses on the unfolding of talk, move-by-move’ (Eggins & Slade, 2005, p. 310). In an age of social media this unfolding of talk is happening even more rapidly, and new methods need to be developed in order to understand the affiliative potential of online discourse as this is what mobilises communities. This analysis is also useful for understanding how gossip can generate conspiracy theories. What might start as a fascination with the marriages of celebrity politicians can grow into a more dangerous discourse with

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Anti-Semitic and sexist undertones (as with the Harris and Emhoff examples), reinforcing extreme stances (Robles, 2017). The results of this study show a preference for negative gossip, thus understanding how this negativity generates attention is important in order to dismantle the cultural and economic systems that help fuel misinformation and conspiracy theories. Strategies can be developed that remove the incentives to interact with negative discourses. Future directions for this sort of work might also focus on the kinds of textual personae that emerge in digital gossip to understand the social bonds of specific communities, following the approach adopted in Inwood and Zappavigna (2021), and extend this work to cover broader and more diverse datasets. Understanding the linguistic functions of gossip in the digital realm intersects with many current concerns regarding misinformation and hate speech, and thus is an area of study that requires further research.

References Abidin, C. (2021). From “networked publics” to “refracted publics”: A companion framework for researching “below the radar” studies. Social Media+ Society, 7 (1), 2056305120984458. Burgess, J., & Green, J. (2018). YouTube: Online video and participatory culture. Wiley. Eggins, S., & Slade, D. (2005). Analysing casual conversation. Equinox Publishing Ltd. Foster, E. K. (2004). Research on gossip: Taxonomy, methods, and future directions. Review of General Psychology, 8(2), 78–99. Halliday, M. A. K. (1978). Language as social semiotic: The social interpretation of language and meaning. Hodder Arnold. Ibroscheva, E. (2020). The world according to Siderov: The rise of the far-right celebrity politician in Bulgaria. Celebrity Studies, 11(3), 305–319. Inwood, O., & Zappavigna, M. (2021). Ambient affiliation, misinformation, and moral panic: Negotiating social bonds in a YouTube internet hoax. Discourse & Communication, 15(3). Knight, N. K. (2010). Laughing our bonds off: Conversational humour in relation to affiliation (PhD Thesis). University of Sydney, Unpublished. Martin, J. R., & White, P. R. R. (2005). The language of evaluation: Appraisal in English. Palgrave Macmillan. Moffitt, B. (2020). The Global Rise of Populism. Stanford University Press. Robles, J. (2017). Exclusion in gossipy talk: Highjacking the preference structure for ingroup belonging. CADAAD Journal, 9(2), 5–22.

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Street, J. (2004). Celebrity politicians: Popular culture and political representation. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6(4), 435–452. Street, J. (2019). What is Donald Trump? Forms of ‘celebrity’ in celebrity politics. Political Studies Review, 17 (1), 3–13. Van Leeuwen, T. (2005). Introducing social semiotics. Psychology Press. Washbourne, N. (2013). More than Cleggmania? The celebrity politician, presidentialization and the UK 2010 televised leader debates. In M. Ekström & A. Tolson (Eds.), Media Talk and political elections in Europe and America (pp. 113–132). Springer. White, P. R. R. (2003). News as history: Your daily gossip. In J. R. Martin & R. Wodak (Eds.), Re/reading the past: Critical and functional perspectives on time and value (pp. 61–89). John Benjamins. Wood, M., Corbett, J., & Flinders, M. (2016). Just like us: Everyday celebrity politicians and the pursuit of popularity in an age of anti-politics. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18(3), 581–598. Zappavigna, M. (2018). Searchable talk and social media metadiscourse. Bloomsbury Publishing.

CHAPTER 10

Gossip on the Hill: Bonding, Bitching, and Politicians’ Home Style on Twitter Andrea McDonnell and Adam Silver

In the 116th Congress (2019–2020), the most popular members, those who were recognizable to the general public, or otherwise “household names,” were not necessarily the most effective (Elbeshbishi, 2021). To be “effective”, according to the Center for Effective Lawmaking, a representative or lawmaker must demonstrate the ability “to advance [their] agenda items through the legislative process and into law” (Center for Effective Lawmaking). The fact that the most popular members of Congress from 2019–2020 failed to meet this standard of effectiveness raises important questions about the nature of representation in

A. McDonnell (B) Communication, Providence College, Providence, RI, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Silver Political Science and International Relations, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4_10

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the United States. Studies examining the relationship between representatives and constituents ponder the influence of the latter on the former, and vice versa, in assessing the degree to which a representative truly represents and is responsive to the needs and interests of their voters. Engaging in the legislative process constitutes one avenue. But, as suggested by the relationship between member popularity in the 116th Congress and the Center’s measure of legislative effectiveness over that time span, lawmakers pursue other avenues to foster a relationship with their constituents, such as by crafting a public image or brand and what Richard F. Fenno (1978) identified as developing a home style that may or may not be responsive to voters’ policy interests. This study explores the nature of political representation, specifically considering how representative, home style is crafted on social media. This is not a study of lawmaking and the degree to which representatives embody and pursue the policy objectives of their constituents, but rather one that considers how politicians discursively present themselves in ways that “represent” and hail their intended audience, crafting of a representative style. Social media, and Twitter in particular, enable lawmakers to be in regular “contact” with their constituents and set the agenda and terms of debate in the process. In doing so, they develop a “digital constituency” that may extend beyond their district’s geographic boundaries (Russell, 2021a, 2021b, 2022). An examination of Twitter accounts—official and personal—may reveal patterns depicting how popular or engaged members use online discourse to connect with their constituents and members of the American public. Specifically, this chapter considers the ways in which members of Congress use rhetorical strategies of gossip—what Deborah Jones describes as gossip’s “functions”—to advance their political profiles on social media raising new questions about the nature of representation and what it means to be responsive to constituent demands in the twenty-first century.

Representation and Presentation of Self Reelection serves as a key motivating factor for members of Congress. Scholars, such as Fenno (1978) and Mayhew (1974), explore the ways in which representatives realize this goal beyond legislative pursuits in Washington, to the relationships members strive to develop with their constituents. Mayhew (1974) examines how representatives advertise, claim credit, and adopt positions to enhance their reelection prospects.

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Further, in addition to policy, representatives allocate resources to the district, address constituent concerns through casework, and attempt to develop to a psychological connection with their constituents to connect with their constituents (Eulau and Karps (1977). Fenno builds on this approach in Home Style (1978). According to Fenno, representatives craft a “presentation of self” that involves communication between a member and their constituents that, if done successfully, will become “more valued by their constituents than policy congruence” (241). A key element to developing the constituent-representative relationship is for the latter to engender trust from the former. Promoting one’s qualifications through honesty and competence, being able to identify with one’s constituents, and conveying empathy constitute trust (54–100). These sentiments are also expressed in the sociological literature in the work of Erving Goffman, who writes of the importance of impression management and the strategies for self-presentation, which can allow an actor to be perceived as trustworthy, authentic, and relatable (1959). During the time in which Fenno conducted his landmark study, members crafted and honed their home style through in-person meetings with their constituents in their district. Members navigated possible tensions between their reelection and primary constituencies by speaking with constituents on a one-to-one basis or in small group settings. Today, members certainly continue this practice, but social media—Twitter, in particular—has enhanced the ability of representatives to communicate with voters more frequently, easily, and beyond their district’s geographic boundaries. As Annelise Russell has argued, members use Twitter to develop a “digital constituency” that offers the ability to construct a more national brand (2021a; 2021b; 2022). Social media provides the means for more direct and frequent communication between a representative and the electorate through which members extend elements of Fenno’s understanding of the “presentation of self” to a new medium. Members strategically utilize social media to construct a digital home style, which becomes “a nationalized style of representation to connect with constituents at home and online” (2021b, p. 302).

The Politics of Celebrity and Gossip In twenty-first century American politics, fame is a central component of a politicians’ brand, and the celebrity politician has become a recognizable fixture (Street, 2004, 2010). Social media platforms provide politicians

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with communicative space to enhance their political capital and celebrity status, often relying on personal modes of address and mediated engagement that has been historically associated with famous figures from film and television, allowing them to enhance their currency as “real” and “relatable” figures (Wheeler, 2014). This kind of engagement, in which the audiences engage in a mediated, one-directional interaction with public figures is known as parasocial engagement (PSI) (Horton & Wohl, 1956). When experiencing parasocial engagement, audiences may interact with public figures as if interacting with friends or relatives, in other words, with people who are known in everyday life, despite the fact that they may never actually meet that person. Social media platforms foster PSI by allowing politicians and “ordinary people” alike to post comments, share, like, and exchange messages in a public forum. Users are therefore able to follow, like, comment, and even directly message politicians on social media, thus potentially enhancing PSI. For instance, a study by Paravati et al (2020) found that participants with preexisting political attitudes similar to those of a politician (in this study, Donald Trump) demonstrated increasing affinity for Trump when exposed to his Twitter feed; further, this enhanced affinity was mediated by the formation of a parasocial bond which allowed users to feel that they “knew [Trump] personally” (Paravati et al., 2020). Studies suggest that when users feel a parasocial connection to public figures, identification may also be enhanced, especially when the situational context of the engagement is realistic (Cohen, 2001). Identification also plays a role in social learning and identity formation (Maccoby & Wilson, 1957). A particular type of identification, similarity identification, occurs when one identifies with a public figure based on a perceived set of shared characteristics (Feilitzen & Linne, 1975). Citizens may be more likely, for instance, to identify with politicians with whom they perceive shared beliefs and traits (McDonnell & Wheeler, 2019). In the context of social media, therefore, politicians with whom users identify may come to represent one’s own political attitudes and beliefs. Here, representation is not only—or even necessarily—constituted by political representation in office, but rather by feelings of identification and parasocial interaction, which foster in users a sense that the politician is similar to one’s self and therefore represents me, which is an essential component of a representative’s ability to construct an effective home style (Fenno, 1978).

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Parasocial connections and identification between the public and elected officials is further enhanced through an understanding and application of gossip. In her analysis of gossip in all-female speech communities, Deborah Jones (1980) provides a framework for considering the function of gossip. While often considered as a singular mode of talk, Jones identifies four distinct categories, or functions, of gossip: house-talk, scandal, bitching, and chatting. Jones defines house-talk as the feminine equivalent of shop-talk, a form of information sharing and practical advice-giving that “usually centres (sic) around concrete tasks” (196). Gossip on scandal is not only, or even primarily, about maliciousness, but rather about judgment of social mores and about bonding with others over shared belief systems, which are articulated when pointing out perceived indiscretions. Moreover, it serves as a means of connection between people who might otherwise feel isolated. Bitching is an overt expression of dissatisfaction or anger, expressed in the private sphere, that relates to specific complaints. (Here, Jones notes that consciousnessraising in the women’s movement is “bitching in its political form”) (1980, p. 197). Finally, chatting is the most intimate form of gossip, a form of mutual self-disclosure that amounts to a form of caring for one another, providing a mode of “emotional sustenance” and relationship building (1980, p. 1997). Taken together, gossip represents a mode of talk that affords participants the ability to share information, assess and monitor social norms, express dissatisfaction, and forge social bonds. Gossip, according to Jones, is highly reciprocal, which also serves as a key element in the development of a representative’s home style. This study draws on Fenno and Russell’s examination of home style in the digital and non-digital spheres, using Jones’ gossip framework to advance a typology of how the functions of gossip have become integral to politicians’ style of representation on social media. While Russell focused solely on Senators over multiple years, this analysis considers both members of the House and Senate over a one-month period surrounding President Biden’s State of the Union address in March 2022. The shorter period is designed to narrow the scope of policy issues and political events to assess how representatives speak to their digital constituencies on a similar range of issues. Here, we also note that Jones specifically considers gossip in face-to-face, all-female speech communities, and finds the functions of gossip to be specific to women; while we agree that

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these speech communities share key features that are distinct from mixedgender, mediated discursive spaces, we contend that the functions of gossip she outlines can nevertheless be identified on social media. Overall, social media serve as influential platforms for candidates seeking to communicate with their constituents and manage their brand (Akbar et al., 2021; McDonnell, 2020). Twitter is chosen as the social media format in this analysis due to its popularity among the general public—76.9 million users in the United States as of January 2022 (Statista, 2022)—and format that facilitates its analysis. According to a Pew Research report, in 2021 23% of Americans reported using Twitter and roughly seven in ten U.S. Twitter users (69%) say that they get news from the site; in addition, 70% of Twitter users report that they use the platform to follow live or breaking news (Mitchell et al., 2021). Twitter users lean younger than the average American; the median Twitter user’s age is 40 and 73% of users are under the age of 50 (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019). Users are also more educated, and wealthier than the general public, and more likely to identify as Democrats; 63% of Twitter users ages 18–49 identify as Democrats or lean toward the Democratic party (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019). Two-thirds of Twitter users express at least some level of trust toward the information they read on Twitter, which is higher than the average 27% who say they have this level of trust across other social media platforms (Mitchell et al., 2021). Twitter users who identify as Democratic/Democratic leaning are more likely to have “a great deal” or “some” trust in the news they view on Twitter, whereas only 52% of those who identify as Republicans/Republican learning say the same (Ibid). These data suggest why members of Congress have turned to Twitter to communicate with voters (Van Kessel, 2020).

Method We conducted an analysis of the social media influence of members of Congress in the two weeks preceding and two weeks following the 2022 State of the Union address by President Biden, which took place on Tuesday, March 1. The State of the Union summarizes issues facing the nation and sets forth the President’s agenda for the year to come. As such, this period, between February 14 and March 20, 2022 was selected because it is a month in which politicians may anticipate and respond to the President’s positions and communicate their own stance with the public.

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First, we identified the most-followed government and personal accounts by members of Congress on Twitter. We selected Twitter as a site of focus because of its growing utility as a means of communication for political actors and its widespread use amongst the American public (Mitchell et al., 2021; Russell, 2021a, 2021b, 2022). In addition, posts on Twitter platforms are primarily text-based (as opposed to visual or video content, as in the case of Instagram or TikTok) provide for a more comparable medium for analysis. We selected the three most-followed Democratic and Republican members of the House and Senate, a total of six members, based upon their total number of combined followers across official and personal accounts. Variation exists amongst both Democrats and Republicans and members of the House and Senate in terms of volume of Twitter followers. The most followed Democrats had a stronger Twitter following than the most followed Republicans. This finding may be explained in part by the demographic profile of Twitter users, which tends to lean younger and more Democratic than the average American. In addition, except for Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, all the most followed politicians on Twitter were members of the Senate, suggesting that Senators may have a stronger Twitter base and more visible public profile. The most followed politician on Twitter was Senator Bernie Sanders who, at the time of publication, had a total of 28.1 million followers. The other top Democrats, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Elizabeth Warren had 13.9 million and 13 million, respectively. On the Republican side, Senator Ted Cruz was clearly the most followed, with 9.9 million followers. Senators Marco Rubio and Rand Paul each had approximately 4.4 million followers (See Table 10.1). Except for Warren, all the members had a significantly greater number of followers on their personal accounts than their official Senator and House ones. We consider tweets from the government and personal accounts, regardless of whether the tweets are authored by the member or their staff, because the study is designed to assess representative style of the individual members. Each tweet was examined to identify its function, using the framework of gossip set forth by Jones (1980). We adapt Jones’ categories to create a typology of gossip on Twitter, identifying each tweet according to four mutually exclusive categories of gossip—work-talk, scandal, bitching (complaining), and chatting. Work-talk advances a genderneutral conceptualization of “house-talk” and “shop-talk” as described by Jones. Twitter posts purely informational in nature comprise this category.

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Table 10.1 Top 3 most followed democrats and republicans on Twitter Government (D)

Personal (D)

Government (R)

Personal (R)

Bernie Sanders (Senate) @SenSanders 12.5 million

Bernie Sanders (Senate) @BernieSanders 15.6 million

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (House) @RepAOC 752.6 thousand Elizabeth Warren (Senate) @SenWarren 7.1 million

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (House) @AOC 13.1 million Elizabeth Warren (Senate) @ewarren 5.9 million

Ted Cruz (Senate) @SenTedCruz 2.7 million Marco Rubio (Senate) @SenRubioPress 147.5 thousand Rand Paul (Senate) @SenRandPaul 34.9 thousand

Ted Cruz (Senate) @tedcruz 5.2 million Marco Rubio (Senate) @marcorubio 4.4 million Rand Paul (Senate) @RandPaul 3.9 million

These include tweets about legislation, constituent services, activities in Washington, and basic functions of the job. An example of a work-talk tweet is from the Senate Majority leader, Chuck Schumer, who tweets: @SenSchumer:

NEWS—The Senate just passed the Strengthening American Cybersecurity Act. As Russian actors escalate their cyber-attacks worldwide: The Senate has taken action to protect Americans, critical infrastructure, and government institutions from the dangerous threat of cyber-attacks (March 1).

Scandal tweets consist of content that conveys a sense of shared moral outrage at a perceived injustice; they foster an “us” versus “them” dynamic, asking followers, “can you believe this is happening?” House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy illustrates this type in a tweet from February 17th : @GOPLeader:

The border crisis is not just a humanitarian catastrophe. It has lethal consequences for families across America with the flood of deadly fentanyl pouring over the border. Why are President Biden and Vice President Harris ignoring the crisis they created?

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Bitching tweets feature complaining, more sensational language, and may be catty, sarcastic, snarky, or spiteful in tone. They also may contain a personal attack or critique by naming an individual or individuals responsible. This differs from scandal because the former will focus on the system or parties responsible without naming individual people. Moreover, bitching can include a trolling like quality when similar messages retweeted multiple times. Congresswoman Lauren Boebert posts a bitching tweet from her personal account: @laurenboebert:

I pray someone in our country’s “leadership” is more concerned about Putin than pronouns. (February 24)

Lastly, chatting tweets engage followers in conversation through the use of collective language (i.e., “we,” “us,” “together”) and create a feeling of “intimacy” through conversation (Jones, 1980). Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez posts a chatting type tweet that serves to humanize and identify her with followers: @AOC:

Thanks! One funny aspect of this is sometimes a detractor will aggressively approach me in person, expecting me to be whatever media has led them to believe, and has no idea what to do after we start talking &they see how misleading it is. The shock creates space for conversation (February 15).

Although each of the categories in this typology are distinct, the functions of gossip are, as Jones makes clear, interrelated and often overlapping. We also identify instances in which tweets containing two or more functions of gossip.

Findings---Home Style and Gossip Reviewing the twelve Twitter accounts of the six representatives included in this study for the month surrounding President Biden’s State of the Union, we examined a total of 1,362 tweets. Cruz had the most with 476, followed by Rubio, 358 (Table 10.2). Five of the six members seemed to favor one account over the other. Cruz, Rubio, and Warren tweeted more on their Senate accounts, while Ocasio-Cortez and Paul used their

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Table 10.2 Tweets by account and member, February 14-March 20, 2022 Representative

Party

Government Account

Personal Account

Total

Senator Ted Cruz Representative Ocasio-Cortex Senator Rand Paul Senator Marco Rubio Senator Bernie Sanders Senator Elizabeth Warren Total

R D

310 15

166 36

476 51

R

55

81

136

R

192

166

358

D

69

68

137

D

116

88

204 1362

personal accounts more frequently, Sanders posted on both his accounts at the same rate. Most members advance similar styles on their official Senate and personal accounts, while Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Rubio’s official accounts are markedly different in their presentation. We identify three patterns in the way the representatives craft their styles on Twitter, as described below. Populist Bitching: Senator Cruz and Senator Paul. Cruz and Paul use their Senate and personal accounts to style themselves as defenders of liberty and the Constitution and as outsiders to the Washington D.C. establishment. The two accounts for each of the Senators resemble each other in content and tone, with slight variations. Senator Cruz. Cruz’s official Senate handle bio reads: “Representing the State of Texas in the United States Senate.” Tweets from this account focus predominantly on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, COVID policy and mandates, the trucker convoy and presidential nominations to the Federal Communications Commission, the Supreme Court, and other levels of the federal judiciary. Most of Cruz’s tweets can be characterized as scandal or bitching. Cruz often directly criticizes President Biden or the Democrats for their incompetence or past mistakes. These are often done with sarcasm or moral outrage. For example, on February 14th, in tweeting a story on Fox News about a memo from the National School Boards Association to Attorney General Garland, Cruz writes, “Unbelievable. AG Merrick Garland and the Biden DOJ play politics.”

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The Senate account also includes tweets about legislation and press releases. These are work-talk, used to inform his followers about what he is doing in Washington. In his official tweets, Cruz engages in selfpromotion, sharing his own media appearances, press releases, and his thoughts on issues, such as this tweet from February 17th that promotes his amendment to COVID policy, “RELEASE: Senator Cruz Introduces Amendment to Stop COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates on Children, Cut Off Federal Funds for Schools that Enforce Them.” His home style in this way resembles Mayhew’s advertising position-taking, and credit-claiming (1974). Cruz’s personal account shares similar content to his official one, but adopts a more strident and informal approach. Here, the senator’s bio includes personal information: “Father of two, @heidiscruz’s husband, fighter for liberty. Representing the great state of Texas in the U.S. Senate.” From this account, Cruz posts primarily bitching tweets. A key example of Cruz’s bitching comes from 13 March 2022, when he tweets, “Leftists have difficulty comprehending humor or sarcasm” in captioning a clip from an interview on The Verdict in which he says became suspect of SCOTUS nominee Jackson when she turned down his offer for Cuban coffee. Cruz also uses words such as “insane” or “insanity” to describe policies or statements with which he disagrees: @tedcruz:

The Biden White House spin that high gas prices are Putin’s fault is INSANE! (March 11).

He repeatedly uses one-liners and emojis when re-tweeting another person’s post or image of him and he re-tweets more frequently on this account than on the official one. Overall, both Senator Cruz’s accounts reflect a home style that presents him as a populist, one of the people, who is outraged on behalf of the public about what is going on amongst the Washington elite, a ground of which he claims not to be a part. Senator Paul . Like Cruz, Paul presents a similar style on the Senate and personal accounts, but tends to adopt a more professional tone on the former. The Senate account stipulates core goals: “I fight for Kentucky, individual rights, and the Constitution | This is an official government account for Senator Rand Paul.” Tweets focus on the COVID response by the Biden Administration, military aid to Egypt, and media appearances

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and endorsements of candidates. Some posts exhibit a combination of scandal and work-talk. An example of the former is a weekly tweet called “#wastereportwednesday” that highlights government waste in an agency. On March 16th, Paul posts an image entitled, “Waste on the Big Screen” with a caption: @SenRandPaul:

#wastereportwednesday The National Science Foundation (NSF) granted Giant Screen Films $2,453,100 in an attempt to promote dinosaurs and reach millions of theatrical viewers across the U.S.

Moreover, the official Senate account addresses constituent related concerns in Kentucky, like those highlighting small businesses in the state and Hope House, an addiction center for women. Additionally, in a series of work-talk, scandal , and bitching tweets, Paul highlights concerns with omnibus legislation that relate to government waste and bureaucratic overreach. A March 11th post illustrates how a tweet can be both work-talk and bitching: @SenRandPaul:

If my resolution was enacted, the current omnibus bill would take 137 days to be called for a vote in the Senate. Which would allow enough time for congress to actually READ THE BILLS and understand their impact.

Paul’s personal account bio mirrors that on the Senate account: “U.S. Senator for Kentucky | I fight for the Constitution, individual liberty and the freedoms that make this country great.” This similar language indicates a consistent home style as a defender of liberty and small government. Yet, key differences exist between Paul’s two accounts, namely, his personal account features tweets that use a biting sense of humor. On March 8th, for example, Paul captions an article from the Foundation for Economic Education about Karl Marx with, “Throw away your Karl Marx tee shirt and don your Adam Smith tie!” This pattern is especially apparent during the State of the Union address, throughout which Paul live-tweets his reactions via his personal account. In two of the several tweets about the speech, Paul writes:

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Haha wait did he just say he wants to secure our border? Who’s gonna tell him… (March 1) Your top priority is getting prices under control? Geez. I would hate to see what you did with your lesser priorities… (March 1)

Thus, while his brand is consistent, Paul utilizes his personal account to connect with voters using a less formal, bitchier tone, as displayed in a series of live tweets that he posts exclusively from her personal account during Biden’s SOTU address. His snarkier tweets may give the impression that he is being more “real” with his constituency that may extend beyond Kentucky. The Scandal of Economic Inequality: Senator Sanders and Senator Warren. Like Cruz and Paul, Sanders and Warren present a consistent style on their Senate and personal accounts. Sanders and Warren burnish their brand as anti-corporate warriors opposed to economic inequality and in support of labor and the working class. Most of the tweets can be characterized as scandal , followed by work-talk, and a few chatting tweets by Warren on her personal account. Senator Sanders . The Vermont Independent adopts a business-like approach to crafting his style on Twitter across both his official and personal handles. His Senate account simply states Sanders’ position and status, “U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, Chair of the Senate Budget Committee, is the longest-serving independent in congressional history.” His personal account complements this shortening to say that he is the “U.S. Senator for Vermont” but cultivates his populist brand by adding “Not me, us.” Sanders often tweets about economic inequality, corporate greed, and workers’ rights. On his personal account, though, he tends to post tweets specifically mentioning unionization drives, such as those involving Starbucks employees. In addition, he tweets endorsements for progressive candidates in House primary races such as for Jessica Cisneros in Texas on February 14th. For the most part, Sanders tweets can be characterized as scandal, meant to draw followers’ attention to perceived injustices: @BernieSanders:

Take a look around the economy today. McDonald’s: profits up 59%. They’re raising prices. Starbucks: record profits. They’re raising profits.

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Amazon: record profits. Shock of shocks! They’re raising prices! Maybe – just maybe – we’ve got a corporate greed problem (February 22). Sanders also occasionally posts chatting tweets, presenting rationale for unionization and congratulating workers. During a live stream Town Hall to discuss the organization efforts at Starbucks, Sanders illustrates the character of a chatting tweet by speaking directly to younger voters: @BernieSanders:

Let me say a word to the younger generation. You have had it tough — but in my humble opinion, you are a great generation. You are anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-homophobia, anti-xenophobia. And your generation has shown the courage to take on corporate greed (February 23).

He does not tweet any bitching posts. Senator Warren. Warren’s Senate account states her position and includes her pronouns, “She/her/hers,” signaling her awareness of and efforts to engage issues of gender inclusivity. Her personal account also provides biographical information: “U.S. Senator, former teacher. Wife, mom (Amelia, Alex, Bailey, @CFPB), grandmother, and Okie. She/her. Official campaign account.” In both, she tweets on economic inequality, corporate malfeasance and greed, labor, childcare, and student debt. The tweets are predominantly scandal . But there is more of a balance on the other tweets between work-talk and chatting. For example, a work-talk tweet argues that: @SenWarren:

All workers deserve the right to a union, and it’s critically important to hold our trade partners to their labor commitments. I commend @AmbassadorTai’s work to advance @POTUS’worker-centric trade policy (March 2).

And on the campaign account, she presents a scandal tweet about oil: @ewarren:

Big surprise: Big oil isn’t walking the walk when it comes to tackling climate change. But fossil fuel giants

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have awarded bonuses to top execs based on supposedly making progress towards climate goals. I’ve called for an SEC investigation (March 3). And chatting tweets on fighting for democracy: @ewarren:

@ewarren:

So as we continue to fight to save our democracy, remember: Choose to fight only righteous fights, because when things get tough—and they will—you will know that there is only one option ahead of you: Nevertheless, you must persist (March 7). Let’s talk about what’s hurting people’s pocketbooks. There’s the pandemic—so let’s get more vaccines & tests out. There’s price gouging—so let’s enforce antitrust laws. There’s child care & health care costs—so let’s lower those. Democrats have plans. Republicans point fingers (March 13).

Overall, Sanders and Warren craft styles that reinforce each other across their Senate and non-Senate accounts. Sanders tends to be more specific and strident in voicing support for unionization efforts on the personal account than his Senate one, and Warren can be chattier on her personal/campaign account than the other one. Thus, like Cruz and Paul, Warren conveys an impression of greater intimacy on the nongovernment account to help foster greater connection with her followers in Massachusetts and beyond. Gossip as Truth-telling: Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Rubio. Ocasio-Cortez and Rubio differ from the other four representatives examined in this study in that they draw sharp distinctions between their government and personal Twitter accounts. Whereas it is unclear whether Cruz, Paul, Sanders, and Warren’s accounts are personally controlled or managed by staffers, Ocasio-Cortez and Rubio state at the outset that their House and Senate accounts, respectively, are managed by members of their staff. Here, the implication is that their personal accounts contain posts that are written and managed by the politicians themselves. True or not, this distinct affects a starker delineation between the two accounts and contributes to a more intimate style on the personal account.

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Representative Ocasio-Cortez. Ocasio-Cortez’s official House account “is maintained by federal staff to share services and legislation relevant to constituents of NY-14” with an informational focus that contains worktalk tweets, such as job postings and speaking events, and taking credit for benefits, such as money going back to her district. Ocasio-Cortez’s personal account uses a conversational approach that underscores her brand as a truth-teller, speaking out against economic inequality and money in politics. This is reflected in her bio: “US Representative, NY-14 (BX & Queens). In a modern, moral, & wealthy society, no American should be too poor to live. 100 % People-Funded, no lobbyist. She/her.” Tweets from this account represent types from the scandal , bitching and chatting categories. For example, on February 18th, Ocasio-Cortez posts a bitching tweet in response to a commentary about her by Tucker Carlson on Fox News. She posts the clip and captions it with: @AOC:

This is the type of stuff you say when your name starts with a P and ends with dejo

On March 14th, Ocasio-Cortez posts a scandal type and chatting, respectively: @AOC:

@AOC:

Truly bizarre how in Washington it’s totally allowed + acceptable to accept hundreds of thousands in fossil fuel money + own millions in fossil fuel investments while brazenly killing clean energy policy, but what’s NOT acceptable is raising that fact &questioning (sic) the connection. I mean seriously. Next time someone wants to brag about how capitalist they are & pop off about how much they believe in and love free markets, challenge them to name them. Name the significant markets that impact people’s lives that are actual free markets. You’ll learn a LOT.

On the personal account, Ocasio-Cortez uses gossip to develop a style that appeals to younger voters, and who can identify with working-class politics and historically marginalized communities. Senator Rubio. Like Ocasio-Cortez, Rubio’s government account is managed by his staff, “Official account of U.S. Senator Marco Rubio’s press shop. For more information please visit his website.” As a result, it

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contains mostly work-talk, such as appearances and legislation, and refers to Rubio to in the third person, such as: @SenRubioPress Sen:

Rubio led the entire #Florida congressional delegation in urging the @NationalGuard to allocate additional resources to the @FLGuard (February 15).

Rubio uses his personal account to craft a more engaging style that presents his brand: “Christian,Husband,Father,AMERICAN,Senator for Florida, BANNED in China & Russia. Instagram: @marcorubio Truth: @marcorubio #GatorNation #FinsUp.” To that end, he tweets standalone bible quotes and, due to his standing on the Foreign Relations Committee, tweets predominantly about foreign policy, the bulk of which are focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the US and international response. For the most part, these tweets are scandal types, attempting to highlight Putin’s aggression and the heroism of the Ukraine people. These also focus on Biden’s response to the war and rising gas prices, tweeting bitching content when referring to Biden as weak for pursuing oil deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Further bitching tweets concern Venezuela, specifically Biden’s renewing relations with the nation in pursuit of oil. Rubio condemns these actions but does so in a personal way that calls into question Biden’s integrity: @marcorubio:

This is Biden’s NSC staffer for Western Hemisphere posting on Instagram like he is a celebrity as he flies in the luxury of a government jet to #Caracas to meet with a narco-dictator responsible for 6 million refugees who have had to flee #Venezuela (March 10).

This is obviously done to burnish Rubio’s credentials with Venezuelan ex-pats and Cubans living in Florida. He tends to repost the same tweet in Spanish. Lastly, Rubio refrains from posting about the State of the Union, but does focus on local matters, such as fires in the state.

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Discussion and Conclusion Politicians use Twitter to craft their home style to reach a constituency beyond their geographic boundaries to appeal to a national, “digital constituency”. This study focuses on six representatives. As a result, the conclusions drawn here are exploratory and must be considered as a basis for future research. Overall, the analysis reveals how representatives utilize Twitter to develop a gossip-style approach that enhances their public visibility, engage the public, and communicate their political brands. Gossip fosters a more intimate connection through which the public can more closely identify with the representative. Findings suggest that, for the most part, politicians who are most followed on the platform attempt to craft a consistent home style across their official and personal accounts. Yet personal Twitter accounts afford an opportunity for congresspeople to engage in a rhetorical style that is more direct, less formal, and that uses irony, sarcasm, and humor, to convey an emotional response. It appears that this style resonates with the public since, apart from Senator Warren, all the sampled members had a significantly larger number of followers on their personal accounts than on their government ones. Of the four types identified in this study, we find that tweets most frequently take the form of bitching and scandal . The former expresses complaints and dissatisfaction with observed phenomenon, while the latter also provide politicians with an opportunity to express a sense of righteous indignation at policies and actions with which they disagree. These are often coupled with, or refer to, tweets about work-talk, which set forth information about and the stakes of issues at play. Chatting tweets, those which work to create a sense of intimacy and person-to-person discourse, are least common in the tweets we observed; however, here it may be important to note that Senator Warren posted chatting tweets from her personal and official accounts, a point which may speak to the gendered (feminized) notion of chatting as an inclusive, relationship-building communicative style. This is a critical dynamic, as the discursive nature of Twitter as a platform allows politicians to incorporate news and policy information within tweets, many of which also contain other elements of gossip. Thus, tweets allow for information delivery coupled with personal opinion and delivered in a more conversational style, thus making work-talk more appealing and entertaining to the public.

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Twitter remains a key space for politicians to build their political brands, foster PSI with users, and enhance their public influence and politicians’ posts on the platform routinely draw upon the functions of gossip as a means of crafting a home style and connecting with followers. Our findings speak to our contemporary political moment in which one’s political brand and social influence may play a critical role in building a public profile, and in which political talk and gossip are inextricable.

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Index

A American Media, Inc., 5 B BBC, 14, 23, 24, 29, 30, 35, 39, 62 Biden, President Joseph, 104, 108, 110, 136, 137, 142, 146, 147, 159, 160, 162–164 Blasey Ford, Christine, 7, 117–119, 122–128 C Carlson, Tucker, 6, 170 Celebrity, 2–4, 6, 27, 45–47, 49, 57, 68, 69, 71, 72, 80, 99, 102, 133, 136–138, 144, 150, 151, 157, 158, 171 political celebrity, 5 Chicago Tribune, 67, 74, 78 Clickbait, 3 Clinton, President Bill, 5, 6, 83, 84, 89, 93, 96, 136, 149, 150

Communism, 77–79 Confidential Magazine, 69 Congress, United States, 104 Conspiracy, 69, 77–79, 100, 102–104, 106, 108, 110, 143, 148, 149 conspiracy theories, 7, 79, 80, 100–105, 110, 134, 149–152 Constituency, 167, 172 Cruz, Senator Ted, 103, 161–165, 167, 169

D Democracy, 6, 11, 24, 76, 107, 169 Digital constituency, 156, 157, 172 Discourse analysis, 6, 28, 104

E Emotion, 85, 103, 139 Eyewitnesses, 90–92

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. McDonnell and A. Silver (eds.), A Gossip Politic, Rhetoric, Politics and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15119-4

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178

INDEX

F Feminism, 4, 119 Framing, 4, 7, 31, 33, 119–127, 135 gossip style framing, 5, 7, 119–123, 126, 127 in news media, 120, 121

G Gawker, 3 Gender, 6, 11, 13, 14, 122, 160, 161, 168, 172 and taste, 13 and women’s talk, 4 Goffman, Erving, 12, 15, 16, 28–30, 40, 44, 52, 157 Gossip definition, 48, 150 functions of, 49, 152, 159, 160, 163, 173 and politics, 4, 62, 68

H Habermas, Jurgen, 39 Hashtag, 103, 107–109 Hobson, Dorothy, 13, 14 Home style, 156–159, 163, 165, 166, 172, 173 Hopper, Hedda, 2, 6, 67–80 Human-interest story, 24

I Identification, 102, 103, 105, 158, 159 similarity identification, 158 Ideology, 6, 69, 100, 102, 149 Infowars, 3 Internet, 3, 11, 24, 45, 84–87 Interview, 6, 28, 30, 35, 36, 40, 43–62, 70, 77, 91, 94, 105, 146, 165

celebrity interview, 44–46, 57, 61 J Jones, Deborah, 1, 4, 156, 159, 161, 163 K Kavanaugh, Justice Brett, 7, 118, 121–126 Kennedy, President John F., 6, 67, 71–77, 89, 103 L Lewinsky, Monica, 7, 84–95 Libel, 45, 68, 79, 80 M Mapp and Lucia novels, 15 Markle, Meghan, 6, 43, 45, 49 McCarthy, Senator Joseph, 2, 126 N News and discourse, 28, 29, 35, 40, 41 and entertainment, 2, 6, 84, 95 and gossip, 2–4, 62, 83 and tabloidization, 2 and talk, 4, 41 trustworthiness, 88 Newspaper, 5, 11, 23, 24, 49, 62, 67, 69, 74, 75, 86, 92, 95 Newsworthiness, 14, 16, 21 Nicki Swift, 7, 136–138, 140–143, 145, 147–150 O Ocasio-Cortez, Representative Alexandria, 6, 161–164, 169, 170 Oprah Winfrey Show, 45, 46

INDEX

P Parasocial interaction, 158 Parsons, Louella, 68 Partisanship, 101 Pecker, David, 5 Perez Hilton, 3 Polarization, 102, 105 Populism, 100–103, 107, 134 R Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 2, 70, 89 Royal family, 43–45, 49, 58, 60, 62 S Sanders, Senator Bernie, 161, 162, 164, 167–169 Scandal, 7, 49, 69, 75, 84–93, 95, 96, 119–121, 126, 159, 161, 164, 166–168, 170–172 Semiotics, 31, 134, 138, 150 Sex, 47, 87, 95 sex and scandal, 71, 87, 96 sexual violence, 118–128 Smith, Liz, 1, 6 Soap opera, 12–14 Social media TikTok, 3, 161 Twitter, 3, 5, 7, 24, 30, 100, 103, 107–109, 156–158, 160–164, 167, 169, 172, 173 YouTube, 7, 133, 134, 136, 139, 141–143, 150, 151 Star Magazine, 89 Starr, Ken, 87, 90–94, 96 State of the Union, 159, 160, 163, 166, 171

179

Style of Representation. See Home Style Supreme Court, United States, 7, 78, 118, 119, 122–124, 127, 164

T Tabloids, 3–5, 45, 49, 60, 69, 75, 85, 89, 99, 133 tabloidization, 2 tabloid press, 46, 49–52 Talk as authority, 28, 29 feminization of talk, 4 as gossip, 3, 4, 15, 27, 28, 31, 74, 104, 122, 159, 173 public talk, 29, 34, 38, 40 Television, 3–6, 11, 13–15, 24, 70, 84, 86, 87, 117, 158 cable, 86 moral hierarchy, 13 The Drudge Report , 3, 84, 93 The National Enquirer, 5, 89, 95 Trump, Melania, 136, 137, 144, 145 Trump, President Donald, 5–7, 24, 80, 99–111, 118, 119, 124, 134, 136–138, 144, 145, 158 Trustworthiness, 88 Truth, 2, 5, 11, 22, 28, 29, 76, 79, 97, 118, 128, 137, 138, 170, 171

W Winchell, Walter, 2, 68 Winfrey, Oprah, 6, 43, 45, 46. See also Oprah Winfrey Show