A documentary study of British policy towards Indian nationalism, 1885-1909

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a documentari) stumi of lintlsh pollcij touiards Indian nationalism 1889-1909 B. L. BBOVER

NUNC C0CN05C0 EX PARTE

THOMASJ. BATA LIBRARY TRENT UNIVERSITY

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A Documentary Study of British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism 1885-1909

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DETAIL OF DOCUMENTS'^ I.

THE GENESIS OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS A.

Official Reaction to Hume's Political Activities

I

1.

Dufferin to Lord Reay about Hume and the proposed Political Convention, 17 May 1885 2. Lord Reay to Dufferin about Hume’s activities, 24 May 1885 3. Lord Reay to Dufferin on ‘Hume’s Cru¬ sade’, 4 June 1885

B. * C. *

II.

111 112 112

Extracts from Allan Hume's speech delivered at Allahabad^ 30 April 1888

114

Extracts from Sir William Wedderburn's presi¬ dential address at the Bombay session of the Indian National Congress, December 1889

115

ALLAN HUME’S POLITICAL CREED A.

Correspondence about Hume's pamphlet ‘The Rising Tide' 1. 2. 3.

117 118

6.

Dufferin to Hume, 18 June 1886 Dufferin to Hume, June 1886 S. C. Bayley to Dufferin about Hume’s pamphlet, 20 June 1886 C. U. Aitchison to Dufferin about Hume’s pamphlet, 22 June 1886 D. Mackenzie Wallace, Private Secretary to Dufferin, to A. O. Hume, 26 June 1886 Hume’s letter of Recantation to Dufferin,

7. 8.

June 1886 Hume to Dufferin, 2 August 1886 Dufferin in reply to Hume, 7 August 1886

121 125 126

4. 5.

1

All documents except those marked • are from Private Papers

119 120 121

XVI

B.

Hume pleads with Dufferin for a more Realistic Approach to Indian Problems 9. 10. 11. 12.

C.

17.

23. 24.

June 1886 August 1886 October 1886 September 1887

127 128 129 130

Dufferin to Hume, 25 September 1887 Hume to Dufferin, 26 September 1887 Dufferin’s reply, 8 October 1887 Hume clarifies his position to Dufferin, letter dated 9 October 1887 Duflferin to the Secretary of State about Hume, 18 November 1888

131 131 132 134 135

Hume to Dufferin, 2 August 1886 Hume to Dufferin, 29 August 1886 Hume to the Viceroy, 31 August 1886 Hume to Dufferin explaining his disgust with the Congress Party, 27 November 1886

136 136 136 139

Lord Reay to Lansdowne about Hume, 15 February 1890 Lansdowne’s reply, 20 February 1890 Lord Reay to Lansdowne about Hume, 20 February 1890

140 141 142

Hume Decries the Bureaucracy and Urges Lansdowne for a Sympathetic Approach to Indian Problems 25. 26.

G.

28 13 28 20

Lansdowne-Reay Correspondence Relative to Hume's Appraisal of Indian Political Scene 22.

F.

Dufferin, Dufferin, Dufferin, Dufferin,

Hume's Unhappy Position in the Congress Party 18. 19. 20. 21.

E.

to to to to

Growing Estrangement between Hume and Dufferin 13. 14. 15. 16.

D.

Hume Hume Hume Hume

Hume to Lansdowne, 9 January 1891 Hume to Lansdowne, 5 March 1891

143 148

Hume's Reported Private Circular to the Congress Party 27.

Enclosure to C. A. Elliott’s letter to Lans¬ downe, 2 March 1892

I53

xvu 28.

III.

156

THE VOLUNTEER MOVEMENT A.

Duffer in-Kimberley IChurc/iill Correspondence Relative to Indian Volunteer Movement 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

B.

Dufferin to Earl of Kimberley, 19 April 1885 Kimberley to Dufferin in Reply, 15 May 1885 Dufferin to Lord Churchill on Volunteering, 10 July 1885 Dufferin to Churchill, 28 August 1885 Dufferin to Kimberley on Native Volun¬ teering, 21 March 1886

157 159 160 160 161

Dufferin-Hume Exchange of Letters about the Volunteer Movement 6.

7. C.

Dufferin to Allan Hume, 5 May 1885 Hume to Dufferin, 12 June 1885

161 162

Dufferin Consults Government Officials about Native Volunteering 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. IV.

Elliott to Lansdowne about Hume's circular, 2 March 1892

Lord Dufferin to Lord Reay, Governor

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(F) CURZON AND THE CONGRESS 41.

GEORGE HAMILTON TO CURZON ABOUT COUNTERACTING CONGRESS ACTIVITIES, 18 MAY 1899

The enclosed was given to me by a native resident in London, on the understanding I was not to mention his name. Its state¬ ment of the harm Wedderburn and Co., through his wicked paper, is trying to do, entirely tallies with my own observation. The three remedies to counteract the evil are :— 1.

To ascertain who subscribe amongst Native Princes and noblemen to the Congress, and to let them know that the Government are aware of that fact.

2.

To prefer for honours and distinctions not Congressmen.

3.

To exercise a greater control over education, its or¬ ganisation and text books.

those who are

You know this so welt that I need not repeat these formulas but, with the multiplicity of your other work and objects, it would be well not to lose sight of this counter-campaign and so I trouble you with these remarks. I note that India frequently starts lies here that are reproduced in detail by the Congress papers; in fact, nearly all information about India is derived from this poisonous little rag. We were too quick for them, otherwise they would have endeavoured to get up an agitation against the Sugar Duties.

Official Attitude Towards the Congress

207

42. GEORGE HAMILTON TO CURZON ABOUT ANNIE BESANT’S PROPOSAL FOR A COLLEGE AT BENARAS, 9 AUGUST 1899

The other papers relate to a request which Mrs. Besant has made to me, in connection with her college in the North Western Provinces. I had intended to see her, but T have been so pulled down by my recent influenza attack, that I have just been able to drag through the ordinary business. Havelock told me that Mrs. Besant has been very useful in Madras in combating the Congress leaders, and denouncing Western methods of agitation as wholly unsuited to India, and endeavouring to establish a system of modern education associated with definite religious and moral training. She has had some little difficulty with MacDonnell, who, as a Roman Catholic, in all probability, has a strong personal dislike to Mrs. Besant and her philosophy. You know very much more than 1 do as to the demerits of the present system of higher education in India and the evils to which it is likely to lead to, and it seems to me that this college might be a useful antidote, and if so, it would be worth our while to try and smooth down the difficulties which have occurred be¬ tween the Committee of this college and Sir Antony MacDonnell. Charles Lyall tells me that the Board of Trustees is com¬ posed in the main of men of position and reputation: that you, of course, will be able to ascertain. I have only told Mrs. Besant that I am unable to see her, but that I will send to India for fur¬ ther information before I can give her any answer. I have not, therefore, in any way mentioned your name or committed you to any course of action, and you will, after looking these papers, be able to judge as to whether it is worthwhile to interfere in the matter or to leave things alone. 43.

HAMILTON TO CURZON ABOUT R. C. DUTT’S PRESI¬ DENTIAL ADDRESS AT THE CONGRESS SESSION AT LUCKNOW, 5 JANUARY 1900

Have you had time to read the speech that R. C. Dutt, Presi¬ dent of the Indian National Congress delivered at Lucknow a few days after your departure ? He is a clever fellow and for years was a Professor at the London University; and he gives expres¬ sion to Indian aspirations in temperate and effective language. He urges throughout his speech the necessity of the Government taking greater trouble to secure the co-operation of the governed

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism

208

in their measures and policy. In many cases this may be impossi¬ ble: still the expression of sympathy, and the power of making any well-disposed large section of the community feel that their views and ideas are an influence, and are fully taken into con¬ sideration before Government act, is often the stepping-stone to, if not a substitute for, co-operation. Looking at the extreme difficulty of proposing any fresh measures or schemes which will fit in with the aspirations of “young India”, it is most advis¬ able to encourage in every way we can “older India”. It was through the noblemen and country gentlemen of India that the earlier civil servants of the East India Company governed the country. The telegraph and the railway have, to a large extent, pushed their influence on one side; and, therefore, I was delighted to find in your address that, whilst you awoke them to the feeling that they had responsible duties to perform, you have, at the same time, conveyed to them the idea that, if they rise to their position and opportunities, they could not fail to have their proper influence upon the course of action adopted by the British administration in this country. In Romesh Chander Dutt’s speech he lays stress upon the high assessments which are in force in certain parts of India. I sometimes myself have doubts as to whether or not we have not in certain parts, namely, in the Central Provinces and in Bombay, put our assessments somewhat too high. I am having a note drawn up here in reply to Chander Dutt’s criticisms; but revenue questions are such a sealed book to all except the experts that it is very difficult for an outsider to hold his own with them in argument, even although he may be anxious that there is a flaw somewhere in their contention. 44.

SECRETARY OF STATE TO CURZON, 22 FEBRUARY 1900

I think there is little doubt that the Congress is losing its popularity and influence. It has been some years in existence, and has effected nothing. Wedderburn has been hoisting signals of distress here. He came to see Godley and poured out his grievances to him. He said I evidently had some dislike to him which he thought he could remove if I would see him. I have declined. He has used his whole influence ever since he has-been in Parliament to discredit the Indian Government and bring them into disrepute. There is not a question that he puts

Official Attitude Towards the Congress

209

to me that is not framed with that object. I have always told those who come to me both in the Ht»use of Commons and outside and talk to me about the questions in which Wedderburn is interested, that the mere fact of a man taking up such an impossible attitude as Wedderburn does, not only prejudices all the questions which he brings forward, but also the claims to notice of those who associate with him. Years ago, Wedder¬ burn used to boast that the manner in which Natives got recog¬ nition from the Government was by associating themselves with the Congress. I think we have been able to upset this idea, and, as Natives are beginning to understand that attacks upon Government will not necessarily bring them honours and posi¬ tions, they will try some other method of achieving that object.

45.

HAMILTON TO CURZON ABOUT NAOROJI, 13 DECEMBER 1900

It is clear to me that the influence of the National Congress is waning fast, and I think this is largely due to the influence which you are exercising upon and the sympathy which you have shown with the Native communities. Naoroji has been bombarding me with letters written in his high-flaunting sentimental style, imploring me to adopt a sympathetic attitude; but this request is quite overlined with the most ridiculous and fantastic charges against the British Government. I thought it just as well to give him plainly a piece of my mind in very courteous language, which I have done and I enclose the letter. I think I shall pub¬ lish it later on, as it is very desirable to bring home to the educat¬ ed Natives, who may sincerely desire to co-operate with the British Government so far as they can, the absurdity of nourish¬ ing these dreams and hallucinations in connection with India, instead of looking at the actual facts with which we have to deal. \

(Enclosure to the above letter: Hamilton to Naoroji) I write briefly to acknowledge your two letters, and my reply must, so far as T am concerned, be the end of the correspond¬ ence you have initiated. You advance various contentions, all of which seem to me to be based upon a curious misinterpretation

British Poiicy Towards Indian Nationalism

210

of language or disregard of acknowledged and existing condi¬ tions. You announce yourself as a sincere supporter of British rule: you vehemently denounce conditions and consequences which are inseparable from the maintenance of that rule. The British Government have over and over again publicly laid down this principle that when any Native of India is by character, ability and knowledge qualified to perform adminis¬ trative or other functions he shall not be disqualified merely by his religion or race. The declarations referred to were the an¬ nouncements, wise and beneficent, of the policy that in the future government of British India the officials who should take part in its administration should not be exclusively European, but an admixture of the inhabitants of Great Britain and the Natives of India. The proportion the one should bear to the other, or the tests or qualifications by which they were to be selected were deliberately left to be decided by the experience of future governments. That policy has been continuously followed and expanded: the number of Europeans has been diminished and the number of Natives largely increased. Subject to the one condi¬ tion, which must necessarily prevail so long as India is under the direct government of the Crown, that a certain proportion of the higher administrative posts must be filled by Europeans, there is no limit to the employment Natives of India may in future obtain in the increasing number of Government appoint¬ ments. You allude in passing to “the foolish and suicidal sedition law”. Again you seem to be under a hallucination. The law of sedition in India is the same as the law of sedition in this country and milder in its definition and application than those of any of the great governments of Europe. You seem to think that a free press means that pressmen are free from the restraint of the ordinary law of the land, and at liberty through their newspapers to advocate assassinations, outrage and racial disturbance and riot. For these offences alone have prosecutions been instituted. You speak of the increasing impoverishment of India and the annual drain upon her as steadily and continuously exhaust¬ ing her resources. Again I assert you are under a delusion. Except that during the last five years the rainfalls have thrice failed and created droughts of immense dimensions, there is not a fact

Official Attitude Towards the Congress

211

to be found in support of your allegations. India is a very poor country if we take her population and area into account, but tested by every criterion that modern science or research can suggest, the condition of the great mass of the population has steadily improved during the last forty years. Heavy annual remittances have to be made to this country for monies borrowed and services rendered, but the increase of wealth and material prosperity annually given to India by the multifarious benefits of British administration far outweigh the remittances so made. I do not for a moment doubt your wish to serve India, but to effectively perform any work of that kind facts must be faced and hallucinations dismissed. I am most sincerely anxious to do everything I can to benefit India and I welcome co-operation from any quarter. I readily admit there may be flaws in our system, and that in various branches of legislation, administration and research, improvements and innovations may be instituted of value and advantage. But I attach even more importance to promoting cordial and sympathetic relations between Europeans and Natives, between governors and governed- Wholesale de¬ nunciations of British rule, crude allegations of violation of faith, charges of robbery and spoliation (sic), attempts to asso¬ ciate periodic visitations of pestilence and famine with the system of land assessment in India—these and similar indictments can only widen and aggravate existing differences. Parliament and the people of this country are profoundly anxious to do their duty towards India, but they are justly proud of the Government and the services they have in India established. Their sympathies are alienated and good intentions arrested by these unjust and exaggerated attacks upon their country¬ men in India, who are carrying out duties and functions of un¬ precedented responsibility and magnitude. Therefore, I trust that these admonitions, given in no unfriendly spirit, may induce you and those who work with you, to alter their methods of controversy, so that we may for the future be enabled to work, if not in co-operation, at least not in open antagonism, and that in criticising any defects and shortcomings of our Indian system full credit may at the same time be given for the infinite and far-reaching benefits it has conferred upon the many peoples and creeds of India.

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism 46.

212

HAMILTON TO CURZON, 3 JANUARY 1901

You point out some of the disadvantages of going thoroughly into the complaints and petitions which you receive. I would not put these disadvantages for a single moment against the lasting good, not only for the time being, but for the future, which your industry and insight have enabled you to effect in replying to the multitudinous requests and complaints that have been brought to your notice. It may be, as you say, that nine out of every ten of these petitions were absurd, and that many of the requests were improperly addressed to you which should have been direct¬ ed to the Local Governments, but this does not affect the posi¬ tion T always wish the Viceroy to take up, and which you with success have adopted. You are the Court of Appeal against the decisions of a close and united corporation, namely, the Indian Civil Service. Once the Natives realise that any reasonable com¬ plaint, made to the highest authority in the country is fully considered, but, on the other hand, that, if it be unreasonable, it is promptly rejected, and by a public analysis held up to ridicule, you reconcile, in a way which no other procedure can do, the mass of the people to the daily rule of their local officials. The daily routine of work in India is so hard that Viceroys in selfdefence have been apt to hedge themselves around with official reserve and etiquette, which prevented them from this most important duty, which is the origin of the personal power of sovereigns. I do not wish to flatter you, but there are very few men who would have the quickness, the power of speech, and the industry, to have undertaken successfully such a task. I have no doubt that in its discharge, you have, from time to time, rubbed up local officials, and that you have disappointed and possibly displeased those whose petitions you have turned inside out. But all this will tend ultimately to increase the respect and estimation in which the Viceroy is held. I note the remarkable difference in which'the vernacular Press—as to the view which they take of your discharge of your duties and that of preceding Viceroys. The great object of all personal rule is to establish a reputation for fearlessness, omniscience, and justice and action such as you have taken does, in a country like India, place the whole foundations of our Government on a stabler and more sympathetic basis than before.

Official Atittude Towards the Congress 47.

213

CURZON TO AMPTHILL, GOVERNOR OF MADRAS, ABOUT HIS POLICY TOWARDS THE CONGRESS, 15 JUNE 1903

As to the attitude you should adopt towards the Congress when it visits Madras next winter. Here I can give you a quite unequivocal reply: since I have pursued a definite policy in this respect without deviation since I came to India, and since T had to answer the same question as you have (and did it in accordance with these principles) when the Congress met in Calcutta the winter before last. My view of the Congress is that it is a movement with neither Government nor Government servants, and if so, much less the heads of Government, should feel or show any sympathy. In so far as it is innocent, it is superfluous: and in so far as it is hostile to Government or seditious, it is a national danger. My policy ever since 1 came to India has been to reduce the Congress to impotence, (a) by never taking notice of it, (b) by carrying out such reasonable reforms as to deprive it of reasonable ground of complaint, (c) by showing such sympathy with and tolerance towards the Natives as to give no excuse to the Congress to revive racial issues, but (d) by never in the smallest degree truckling to its leaders or holding any communion with the unclean thing. Over and over again has the Congress, through its spokesmen, made overtures to me, which 1 have invariably met with the same polite but frigid indifference. Sir W. Wedderburn, who attacks me virulently every week in his English paper India, wrote to me in July last to ask if 1 would use, what he described as, my unique position in India, in having won the confidence of all parties, “to lay the foundation of a lasting reconciliation be¬ tween the great official dominant power and the popular forces” by “a friendly though perhaps informal recognition of the pur¬ poses of the Congress as a constitutional means of bringing before the Government of India a responsible expression of the Indian view of Indian affairs.” From these remarks you will gather that (1) 1 would not, if I were you, lend tents or show unnecessary civility in any form to the Congress at Madras, (2) I should con¬ sider it most unfortunate, if you were to lend them the Banquet¬ ing Hall (in the shadow of Government House) or give them a garden party or entertain them in any way, (3) I would not re¬ commend you to attend any social gathering given in their honour, or by them or to address a speech to them in any capacity.

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism

214

I see that you have subscribed to their Industrial Exhibition and I find no harm in this. But I would urge you, if you go there, to be very careful, lest you suddenly find yourself upon a plat¬ form, surrounded by Congress ‘lights’ and listening to all sorts of statements tending to compromise your opinions and posi¬ tion. When the Congress came to Calcutta, an Industrial Exhibi¬ tion was similarly held and 1 had half a mind to go to it. But I found out quickly that my visit would be sure to be interpreted as a great triumph for the Congress, and as setting a discredited movement on its legs again. I therefore abstained from any expression of interest. In the early days of the Congress public men committed the grievous error of patting it on the back. Lord Dufferin led the way in this track of feeble and stupid opportunism. He gave a big garden party to the Congress at Calcutta and thought that he had thereby drawn the teeth of the Opposition. They despised him for it. When 1 was staying at Government House, Madras, in December 1887; Lord Connemara who liked to be “all things to all men” was about to offer similar hospitality to the Congress at their first meeting at that place. Since then we have grown wiser, and it would be a public misfortune if we now went back again. Of course I should not raise the smallest objection to any officer of the Government stepping into the Congress pavilion as a spectator. A certain number always do. But if he appeared on the platform or made a speech, I should require an explanation pretty sharp. 48.

AMPTHILL TO CURZON, 9 JANUARY 1904

The Madras Congress was a great failure, and it is a question whether the President’s speech or the cyclonic storm adminis¬ tered the greatest douche of cold water to the assembled dele¬ gates. The ranting reiteration of oft-refuted falsehoods by Lai Mohun Ghose disgusted most of the moderate men and they did not mind saying so. None of the Congress-wallahs from other provinces asked to see me or came near me, and all seem to have cleared out as soon as the tarnasha was over. 49.

R. NATHAN, PRIVATE SECRETARY TO CURZON, TO HENRY COTTON, 2 JANUARY 1905

I have shown to the Viceroy your letter to me of 29 December in which you express a desire to present to His Excellency per-

Official Attitude Towards the Congress

215

sonally a copy of the Resolutions passed at the recent session of the Congress at Bombay. His Excellency has ascertained that during the 20 years for which the Congress had held its sittings, the practice has been for the President to forward a copy of the Resolutions to the Government of India who have duly acknowledged the same. His Excellency is naturally reluctant to adopt a course which would not only be at variance with that pursued by the whole of his predecessors, but would undoubtedly create a precedent which some or other of his successors might not desire to follow. It would, moreover, be undesirable for the head of the Govern¬ ment, as distinct from the Government, to enter into any discus¬ sion, however informal, about the Resolutions of the Congress, when submitted: and yet unless such discussion be contemplated, it is not clear what result of any importance could be anticipated from the change. .50.

CURZON TO GODLEY*, 11 MAY 1905

I believe that the Congress deputies are likely before long to start for England to take part in the electoral campaign. Gokhale is to be one of the Bombay representatives and the Calcutta man is that vitriolic windbag, Surendra Nath Banerjea. They will seek to pose as representative of the Indian people, coming to plead for justice at the hands of the justice-loving British public and appealing impartially to the sympathies of both parties. I should not be surprised if they were to seek an interview with the Prime Minister. They come as nominees of an organization, which is exclusively in extreme Radical hands, which is engineered by men like Wedderburn and Cott¬ on, whose real views are represented weekly in the lying sheet called India and which exists for the purpose of attacking the Government and vilifying and insulting British rule. Their object in proceeding to England now is purely electoral. They want to secure pledges from the Radical Party to give them a Viceroy like Lord Ripon and Secretary of State of the type of Sir Henry Cotton. They will coo like sucking doves in London. But on provincial platforms their roars will awaken an echo in Hades,

4 Sir Arthur Godley was Permanent Under-Secretary at India Office, 1883-1909.

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism

216

and amidst such secure surroundings, to no manner or cooler destiny will they assign.

(G) WEDDERBURN PLEADS WITH CURZON FOR A BETTER DEAL FOR THE CONGRESS 51.

WEDDERBURN TO CURZON ABOUT DANGERS TO BRITAIN’S POSITION IN INDIA, 9 MARCH 1900

My general view of our position in India is that there are two principal dangers (1) from the approach of Russia and (2) from the economic collapse of the cultivating class. Of these dangers, the latter is far more serious and is now terribly empha¬ sised by famine and plague. How can it best be met ? I believe, mainly by the help of the educated Indians who are the creation of our rule, and as a body, are devoted to its maintenance. They have great influence (1) because in the caste division of labour they do the political thinking for the other classes whether culti¬ vators, traders or fighters, and (2) because they form the back¬ bone of the administration, both in our own territory and in the Native States and know the people well. I am, therefore, most anxious that they should be brought into full sympathy with us, and that we should benefit from their minute and detailed knowledge. Their employment in high office would tend to make our rule a national government, while largely reducing the expenditure. This is the keynote of the recommendation in our Report (Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure). If the rayat can be made contented and prosperous, all will be well. You will excuse my saying that my reason in thus writing to you is because I have marked your sympathy and independence of thought shown in circumstances of the most arduous kind, and I feel that it is possible for you not only to gain great per¬ sonal regard from the people of India, but to create such an enthusiasm for British rule as would make Russian ideas of aggres¬ sion hopeless. 52.

CURZON’S REPLY, 17 APRIL 1900

1 am much obliged your definition of the are in a position to the country. 1 believe the hegemony which

for your letter. I am far from hostile to service which capable educated Indians render to Government as well as to in their general loyalty, and I recognize education gives to them over the i^gg

Official Attitude Towards the Congress

217

favoured ranks of their own countrymen. 1 am a diligent student of their writings, anS I detect many signs of intel¬ lectual freedom—even though it is apt to degenerate into rather puerile licence—in their attitude, which I do not always find in the Anglo-Indian press. I also recognise the value of their knowledge of the people and the utility of their service both in our employ or in that of Native States. But there comes a point at which their utility seems to decrease instead of increas¬ ing, and at which I am obliged to apply the test not of theoretical quality but of practical experience. Your contention is that Natives are fit for almost every post, even the most exalted. I do not find that, at present at any rate, this is the case. On the contrary I find, when there is an emergency, the highly-placed Native is apt to be unequal to it, does not attract the respect of his subordinates, European or even Native, and is rather inclined to abdicate or to run away. I could give you a dozen illustrations of this since I have come to India. We have put a Native Dewan into a Native State with a dubious record and a bad ruler. The Prince threatened the Dewan: the latter ran straight away. I had trouble in a frontier district, the District Officer was a Native; as soon as danger threatened, he bolted. I have a plague row in a big city; the Municipality who are mainly Native, have abdicated, and are useless. In the face of this sort of experience, it is useless to tell me to put in Natives to positions of responsibility. No Viceroy has ever been more disposed to utilise their services, or to rule by co-operation, than myself. But I positively decline to appoint any man unless he is competent—his colour is to me a matter of complete in¬ difference—and no sentimental considerations, will persuade me to adopt any other standard than that of efficiency. You address me with frankness. I reply to you with the same. I do not mind criticism, the showing up of delinquencies, the condemnation of mistakes. But I cannot for the life of me make out why it should be the object of any Englishman, or Scotchman, to represent that British Government is persistently in the wrong, is ungenerous, misguided, malevolent, unjust. We make mistakes, and are guilty of our wrong-doings. I am ready enough to acknowledge the one, and to condemn the other, but no Govern¬ ment in the world would make less, and I firmly believe that five years of Russian rule would be sufficient to convert the dissatis-

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism

218

fied croaker (to whom India is addressed) into the most fervent Anglo-phile and loyalist. My view is that the function of a patriot is not to rail at British administration in India, but to improve it, not to flatter the Natives, but to discipline them, not to encourage discontent, but to promote tranquillity. This at any rate is my object, and with true sincerity of pur¬ pose I shall pursue it. 53.

CURZON TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ABOUT WEDDERBURN’S SUGGESTION FOR HIGHER POSTS FOR INDIANS, 23 APRIL 1900

Wedderburn wrote to me the other day, very civilly, and asked me why we do not employ more Natives in the very highest ranks of the service. I told him plainly in reply, because they are not competent, and because it is our constant experience that, when placed in authority, if an emergency occurs, they lose their heads or abdicate altogether. Some day 1 must address you about the extreme danger of the system under which every year an increasing number of the 900 and odd higher posts that were meant, and ought to have been exclusively and specifically reserv¬ ed for Europeans, are being filched away by the superior wits of the Native in the English examinations. I believe it to be the greatest peril with which our administration is confronted. MacDonnell says it is all due to Lord Dulferin, who might have insisted upon the racial qualification without exciting a murmur, whereas now there would probably be a storm. 54.

WEDDERBURN TO CURZON, 11 OCTOBER 1900

I have to thank you for your letter of 17th April, in answer to mine regarding the Royal Commission Report. You will perhaps recollect that in the concluding part you say that you welcome fair criticism, which shows up delinquencies and mistakes, but must condemn the stimulating of discontent ; “the function of a patriot is not to rail at British administration in India, but to improve it.” I have, of course, not a word to say against this view of the case. On the contrary, I heartily agree with it and my object in again writing is to do what I can towards putting matters (which are not now satisfactory) on the better lines indicated. Antagonism undoubtedly exists where there should—and 1 think might be co-operation. This condition of

Officia I Attitude Towards the Congress

219

things is much to be regretted, whatever the originating causes may have been; and the practical question seems to be: How can the antagonism be got rid of and the co-operation secured ? We on our side are exceedingly anxious that this problem should be satisfactorily solved and accordingly we propose to send a letter (to be signed by Messrs Hume and Naoroji and myself) to the President of the next Congress, which is to meet at Lahore showing the direction in which action appears to be most hopeful. I enclose here a rough draft. Our idea is that sym¬ pathetic recognition of Congress work by the authorities would remove any tendency to bitterness, and lead independent opinion to careful and profitable study of economic questions. If a con¬ trary policy is pursued, the constitutional movement may col¬ lapse, but tinged with undesirable acerbity; or it may collapse, in which case there will be serious danger of underground machinations, to defeat which was a leading object of the original Congress promoters. As regards myself, I may mention that I am being pressed from India to come as President at Lahore. For various reasons I am unwilling to do this, and have replied to that effect. But I should be only too glad if in that or in any other way, I could help forward the desired co-operation or assist in the suggested village enquiries and experiments, regarding which 1 have very hopeful views. . . 55.

CURZON TO WEDDERBURN, 31 OCTOBER 1900

I agree with you in deprecating the antagonism that has, as you say, whatever may have been the cause, sprung from the ini¬ tiation of the Congress movement. I have myself never uttered an opinion in public upon that body; nor do I propose to do so. The well-meant actions and utterances of some of my predeces¬ sors on the subject have not been attended with a success equal to the excellence of their intentions. On the other hand, the history of the Congress movement, and a study of its present position do not lead me to think that it possesses any very strong vitality or that its contribution to the public good—which is the object of us all—is worthy of the labour and outlay that have been and are expended upon it. I myself welcome any and every reasonable and authorita¬ tive expression of public opinion in India even when it is opposed

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220

to me. A minority railing a vast majority ought, so far as is consistent with principle and duty, to endeavour to get public opinion on its side. This I aspire to do. But I have never thought myself that there was any special necessity in India for focuss¬ ing so necessarily composite a public opinion, or for trying to make it speak through a single megaphone. The noise comes forth as the voice of India. But if you go to the other end of the funnel you find that it is nothing of the sort. Look, for instance, at the composition of the last year’s Congress at Lucknow. Take away the Lucknow members, and where would the Congress have been and how could the residuum be called India ? Therefore, while it is not for me to indicate to you or to anyone else what the action of the so-called popular party should be, I am rather in agreement with you in thinking that it has not so far been directed into the most useful paths. 56.

HAMILTON TO CURZON ABOUT WEDDERBURN, 24 OCTOBER 1900

Wedderburn sent me the address to the President of the National Congress, which is to meet at Lahore. I sent a civil answer to his letter, telling him that 1 was sure you would always give consideration to any reasonable request that came to you from any considerable body of Natives. I then gave him a little lecture pointing out to him that the Congress as now worked was bound to fail and bring discredit upon itself, and that its repre¬ sentatives in England were composed of the most extreme Radi¬ cals, whose ideas on almost every conceivable subject were oppo¬ sed to the Natives of India, except in joining a certain section of them in abusing the Government; and I further told him that he had throughout allowed that section of Mahratta Brahmins, who are really hostile to us, and who never lose an opportunity of attacking the foundations of our rule, to have much too great influence in controlling the actions and decisions of the Con¬ gress. I am glad, therefore, to find that he and those who are acting with him are now adopting a more reasonable attitude. 57.

WEDDERBURN TO CURZON URGING CONCILIATION WITH THE CONGRESS, 10 JULY 1902

The leaders of the Indian National Congress have expressed a wish that I should preside at their Annual meeting which will

Official Attitude Towards the Congress

221

take place at Ahmedabad next Christmas. To do this would be inconvenient to me, but I hesitate to refuse, because (if the idea at all commended itself to your approval) I think, T could, as President, assist, under existing special circumstances, in estab¬ lishing permanently cordial relations between the governing power and advanced Indian opinion. What are these “special circumstances” ? They are ; (1) your position as master of the situation and (2) the kindly feeling which at this moment exists between the British and Indian people. I have never been a flatterer of the power that be, so you will perhaps give me credit for absolute sincerity in saying that the position you have achieved in India appears to me unique in that you have impressed the Indian people with belief in your goodwill and capacity, while enjoying the confidence of all political parties at home. Should not such a position, and the conjunction of favourable circumstances, be utilised to lay the foundation of a lasting reconciliation between the great official dominant power and those popular forces, which in Russia are a danger, but which in India are really an element of safety by reason of the spirit which dictated the Queen’s Proclamation of 1858 ? Looking to the manifold sufferings of the Indian people during the last few years and their loyalty as regards South Africa and China, some royal boon on the occasion of the great ceremonial at Delhi would no doubt be appropriate and highly beneficial. But my present suggestion does not point to any such specific concession, but to a friendly, though per¬ haps informal, recognition of the purposes of the Congress as a constitutional means of bringing before the Government a responsible expression of the Indian view of Indian affairs. And I would ask a reference to the history of the Con¬ gress, as set forth in the enclosed printed paper, to show that in initiating the movement, there was no desire to be aggressive or antagonistic and that the sole object was to co-operate re¬ spectfully with the Government for the public good. I trust you will pardon the somewhat unconventional nature of this communication, but I have felt bound to place before you a suggestion, which I believe might lead to useful

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222

results. I will only add that, if the idea of the suggested rappro¬ chement at all commends itself to your approval, you will rely on my discretion as an old Secretariat official, who for many years had charge of the office boxes on the ‘Political and Secret’ Departments. 58.

CURZON’S REPLY, 15 AUGUST 1902

You speak of rapprochement between Government and the Congress, and of friendly though perhaps informal, re¬ cognition of the latter by the former. I must confess that I do not see what form this rapprochement or recognition could take. I am not aware that the Congress has anything to com¬ plain of, or to suffer from, in the attitude of Government; whilst Government patronage is, I should have thought, the last thing that it would desire. But there is also, from my point of view, a certain inconsis¬ tency in the request. While the better spirits of the Congress profess constitutional sentiments, there are plenty of Native newspapers, as you know well, hanging on the fringes of the movement, and supported by its leaders, whose utterances are bitter and even seditious and there are plenty of speakers at small meetings whose sentiments can by no means be de¬ scribed as loyal. Moreover, I find that the speakers, whom the Congress Committee send round to public meetings in England, mix with their attempt to create an interest in India (an attempt in itselfj most praiseworthy) a lot of pernicious nonsense; while the paper called India, with which I believe that you are connect¬ ed, scarcely ever represents the conduct of Government except in a disparaging and unfriendly light. I do not quite see, therefore, wherein, how the concordat is to come in. The fact is that the Congress party are trying to do two incompatible things: to retain the respect and to guide the counsels of the respectable reforming party; and at the same time to keep in with the extreme men, who want some¬ thing very different. Paranell made the same attempt in Ireland and failed utterly. I do not think that the enterprise is likely to be more successful in India. These are only my private opinions which I have given to you with frankness that is provoked by the confidence with which I know that they will be treated.

Official Attitude Towards the Congress 59.

223

HAMILTON TO CURZON, 13 NOVEMBER 1902

The representatives of the National Congress in this country, as you know, have attached themselves exclusively to the extreme section of the Radical Party, and Indian debates are now, not ostensibly but in reality carried on Party lines; that is to say that all the attack comes from those on the other side, and the defence from our supporters. So long as we are in a majority, this does not matter, but a Radical Secretary of State for India has no easy task, and is liable to be beaten on abstract motions, as Kimberley experienced when he had a resolution carried against him, to the effect that the examination for the Indian Civil Service should be simultaneous in England and India.

SECTION

V

CURZON AND THE PARTITION OF BENGAL 1.

CURZON TO JOHN BRODRICKi JUSTIFYING HIS PROPOSAL FOR THE PARTITION OF BENGAL, 2 FEBRUARY 1905

In the first place, the necessity for relief is indisputable. The administration of Bengal is bad, and it is bad because the work is far too great for any individual man and because, therefore, there is complete lack of touch between the Centre and the extremities. Secondly, no paltry readjustments can effect the necessary reform. Indeed, in a sense they would make it worse, because they would tend merely to reproduce the situation which already vitiates the administration of Assam, namely, the existence of a small province having no service of its own, but drawing its men from its more powerful neighbour, which takes good care invariably to send it of its worst. Thirdly, the proposals we are submitting to you represent what I should take to be an almost unparalleled unanimity of opinion among all the officers consulted, though the manner is one that might well admit of the most opposite views. Fourthly, the rival proposal of appointing a Governor or a Lt.-Governor, with an Executive Council, for Bengal is one which the whole of my colleagues as well as myself think would be fraught with grave injury to the future of the Province, and to which we should ourselves be unwilling in' any circum¬ stances to give our assent. Fifthly, the opposition to our scheme, though not without considerable force in the form in which the scheme was at first put forward, is now, in relation to our final plan, an outcry of the Congress Party alone, inspired by political motives and directed to a political end. Calcutta is the centre from which the Congress party is manipulated throughout the whole of 1. John Brodrick was Secretary of State for India, l903-5.

Curzon and the Partition of Bengai

225

Bengal, indeed the whole of India. Its best wire-pullers and its most frothy orators all reside here. The perfection of their machinery, and the tyranny which it enables them to exercise are truly remarkable. They dominate public opinion in Calcutta; they alTect the High Court; they frighten the Local Govern¬ ment; and they are sometimes not without serious influence upon the Government of India. The whole of their activity is directed to creating an agency so powerful that they may one day be able to force a weak Government to give them what they desire. Any measure in consequence that would divide the Bengali speaking population; that would permit indepen¬ dent centres of activity and influence to grow up; that would dethrone Calcutta from its place as the centre of successful intrigue, or that would weaken the influence of the lawyer class, who have the entire organisation in their hands, is in¬ tensely and hotly resented by them. The outcry will be very loud and very fierce, but as a Native gentleman told me— “My countrymen always howl until a thing is settled, then they accept it.” Though the case is very strong and complex one, I hope that you may be able to give a decision upon it in time to start the new arrangements, if accepted, in the course of the forthcoming summer, so that any agitation may have disappeared before the probable visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales to Calcutta next winter. I shall consult you later on as to the desirability of acquainting the public with our pro¬ posals here. 2.

JOHN BRODRICK TO CURZON, 3 MARCH 1905

As to the problem of the Partition of Bengal, it is far too vast a problem for me to believe it possible to study it. Indeed I should have liked to see a good many of the districts, as you have done, before hazarding a conclusion. I do not even feel competent to judge how far you are right in decrying the operation of Councils as compared to those of a single indi¬ vidual. The tendency here has become to rely upon Councils to a large extent. In India, I know, every man prefers to act for himself; and what would weigh with me more than anything else would be the extent to which our administrator is able to reverse or does reverse, the practice or decisions of his predecessors. Seeing the strong view you take upon this.

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism

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1 will back the whole of your scheme so far as it lies in my power and I hope it may emerge from Committee and Council without very material amendment. 3.

JOHN BRODRICK TO CURZON COMMENDING THE COMMISSIONERSHIP PROPOSAL, 12 MAY 1905

What I gather is the present view of the ‘pundits’ here is that a good deal might be done by establishing Commissionerships like those in Sind, and avoiding quite so drastic a measure . .. Please understand there is no obstructive feeling here in the least; it is a genuine belief that the work could be lightened better in that manner than in any other. 4.

TELEGRAM

FROM JOHN BRODRICK TO 20 MAY 1905

CURZON,

Please refer to your Despatch dated the 2nd February 1905 ' regarding the reconstruction of Bengal. It has been strongly urged here that the best way of giving relief to the LieutenantGovernor, which all admit is necessary, would be to place por¬ tions of Bengal, probably Chota Nagpur and Orissa, under a Commissioner, having a position like that of the Commissioner in Sind and invested, as may seem necessary, with the powers of a Lieutenant-Governor. It is urged that this scheme would greatly diminish the opposition by avoiding the separation of a mass of Bengalis from Calcutta, and while relieving the Lieutenant-Governor, would provide for the form of personal administration best suited for these districts. Please see Sir Denzil Ibbetson’s Minute on the Berar question which was enclosed in your Despatch dated the 18th June 1902, at page 2. I observe there is no mention of any such scheme in the Des¬ patch or enclosures, and I should be glad to know, as soon as possible, whether any proposal of this nature had been con¬ sidered by you before your Despatch was written. 5.

CURZON’S TELEGRAM TO JOHN BRODRICK REJECTING THE COMMISSIONERSHIP PROPOSAL, 24 MAY 1905

Private, Bengal partition. Please refer to your private tele¬ gram of the 20th instant. The proposal named by you was not seriously considered by us, because we deemed it absolutely impracticable. The position of Commissioner in Sind, which is unlike any other Government in India, is only possible there

Curzon and the Partition of Bengal

227

because of the isolation of Sind from Bombay and of its pecul¬ iar local conditions. It would be impossible in the case of an arbitrary area carved out of, and coterminus with rest of prov¬ ince, and within easy reach of the capital. We did, however, consider, and unhesitatingly rejected, the idea of placing Orissa and Chota Nagpur under a Chief Commissioner because it would fail to secure any one of the objects for which we recom¬ mend partition. A Commissionership would be even worse: (1) It would give a quite inappreciable and wholly in¬ adequate relief to the Lt.-Governor of Bengal. (2) By the merely nominal withdrawal of only 12 millions from Bengal it would leave the case for partition untouched and unsolved. (3) It would preclude the expansion of Assam and would stereotype misfortune of its dependence upon foreign service, while if the Commissioner became Chief Commissioner, this anomaly would be duplicated, and we should have two provinces manned from Bengal and receiving officers whom that province was least desirous to keep. (4) It would tend to consolidate the Bengali element by detaching it from outside factors and would produce the very effect that we desire to avoid. The best guar¬ antee of the political advantage of our proposal is its dislike by the Congress party. (5) It would meet with the keen opposition of the Lt.Governor and of the Bengal Civil Service. For all these reasons, in which Sir D. Ibbetson asks me to express his emphatic concurrence, we could not support such a proposal. You are surely also aware, in view of the agitation raised for exclusively political objects over our scheme, that the prestige of the Government of India will be seriously weaken¬ ed if it is rejected. May I remind you of paragraph 2 of your private letter of the 3rd March last ? 6.

JOHN BRODRICK TO CURZON, 26 MAY 1905

I found that the Commissionership idea had seized upon the men of experience here who are considering your despatch. Their anxiety was that you should thoroughly consider whether

British Poiicy Towards Indian Nationaiism

228

such a course was not possible before making up your mind to face the amount of feeling which attends the partition as you propose it. I wanted to know what you felt, because it was other¬ wise useless for me to embark on a very dreary battle to endeav¬ our to get a change in the despatch, as drafted and sent up to me. T have not the least idea whether I shall succeed. 7.

CURZON TO JOHN BRODRICK, 1 JUNE 1905

I merely asked you to reply soon for there were a large num¬ ber of practical points which it will take several weeks to con¬ sider in advance. Suddenly like a bombshell came your sugges¬ tion of a Sind Commissionership, which struck us all of a heap. I gave you in my telegraphic reply the reasons which render any such suggestion impracticable; and I am afraid that those authorities who put it forward cannot have a very clear appreciation of the problem with which we are attempting to grapple or of the possible methods of solving it. I will try to explain it to you by an English Parliamentary analogy. Let me suppose that the British Government had, after two years of arduous labour and after the turmoil of a prolonged public agi¬ tation excogitated a new Redistribution scheme for the constit¬ uencies of the U.K., which owing to the exigencies of your political constitution, you were bound to submit to a conference of the Australian Premiers sitting at Sydney. Let me then sup¬ pose that Mr. Seddon rhade the suggestion that the question would be best dealt with by merely abolishing the representation of the universities. Your sentiments, as a member of Govern¬ ment thus advised, would be such what ours will be if in place of our original proposal there comes back to us the idea of a Sind Commissionership. As I said in my telegram, I think that the originators of such a plan can hardly be aware of the impetus that would be given by its acceptance to the disloyal Bengali movement or of the discredit that would accrue to the Govern¬ ment of India. As to the debate in the House of Commons on the Viceroy’s Convocation speech, the whole matter was deliberately organised by a conspiracy of Wedderburn, Cotton and the Daily News in England and the Bengal Congress party here. The object of the agitation here was partly to stop the partition of Bengal, partly to obtain a Radical Viceroy when the next party comes in, partly to punish me for refusing to recognize the Congress.

SECTION

VI

MINTO AND THE POLICY OF COUNTERPOISES (A) EXTRACT FROM MORLEY’S SPEECH ON THE INDIAN BUDGET IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 20 JULY 1906 I am drawing to an end; but I am not sure that the end is not the most important part of what I have to say. I have heard a thousand times that India is an insoluble problem. Well, the man who runs away from problems called “insoluble” is not fit for politics. I have generally found, as I dare say some of my right hon’ble friends have found, that what is called an insoluble problem is after all a problem wrongly stated. Here we have a new Parliament. I respectfully invite the new Parlia¬ ment of today to look at the India of today with a clear, firm and steadfast gaze. I have only been in office a very few months, but I will say of myself—and I hope it will not seem egoistic— that I have lost no opportunity of placing myself in contact with as many people as possible from India, people of every type, of every class, likely to take every different point of view. .. I have done my best to read the signs of today in India, and it is for the India of today that the Government and this House are responsible. . . What I seem to discern are not at all the symptoms of crisis. I do not see or hear demands for violent or startling new departures. What I do see is a stage reached in the gradual and inevitable working out of Indian policy, which makes it wise and in the natural order of things—and I do not at all despair of securing the noble Lords’ agreement to this— that we should advance with a firm, courageous, and intrepid step some paces further on the path of continuous, rational improvement in the Indian system of government. Everyone— soldiers, travellers and journalists—they all tell us that there is a new spirit abroad in India. Be it so. How could you expect

British Poiicy Towards Indian Nationalism

230

anything else ? You have now been educating the peoples for years with Western ideas and literature. You have already given them facilities for communication with one another. How could you suppose that India would go on just as it was when there was little higher education, and when the contact between one part and another was difficult and infrequent ? How could you think that alt would go on as before ? As for education, let the House think of this little fact. There is this year a Senior Wrangler from India; and I was told by the Master of Trinity that he was Senior Wrangler after two years’ residence when all the others in the class had three years’ residence. I mention that as showing that you cannot go on narrowly on the old lines. We should be untrue to all the traditions of this Parliament and to those who from time to time and from generation to generation have been the leaders of the Liberal Party, if we were to show ourselves afraid of facing and recognizing the new spirit with candour and consideration. I said something about the Indian Princes. It is a question whether we do not persist in holding these power¬ ful men too lightly. Then there is the Congress. I do not know that I agree with all that the Congress desires; but speaking broadly of what I conceive to be at the bottom of the Congress, I do not see why anyone who takes a cool and steady view of Indian Government should be frightened. I will not at once conclude that because a man is dissatisfied and discontented, therefore, he is disaffected. Our own reforms and changes have been achiev¬ ed by dissatisfied men who were no more disaffected than you or I. If there be disaffection—and there may be some—I will not, as far as I have anything to do with the Government of India, play the game of disaffection by exaggerating the danger or by over readiness to scent mischief. There have been two books recently written about India by gentlemen who accompanied the Prince of Wales, which I would respectfully recommend hon’ble members to read. One of these books “Through India with the Prince” is by Mr. Abbot, and the other is by a gentleman, Mr. Sidney Low of proved competence in political subjects. Mr. Low is a man who knows what he is writing about, and he says; “The journey of the Prince of Wales showed clearly that there is a deep and widespread attachment to the Imperial House among the Indian people; and even where there is discontent with the mode of Govern-

Minto and the Policy of Counterpoises

231

ment, there is no feeling against the Throne. Calcutta, when the Prince of Wales visited it, was in the trough of a furious agitation against the Partition of Bengal—an agitation which on one occasion had caused every native shop to be closed in the city as a sign of mourning, yet when the Prince appeared amongst this angry populace, he was received not only with cordiality, but even with demonstrative enthusiasm.” I am not going, and I hope the House is not going, to be easily frightened when it finds such a state of things, together with other facts which are no doubt disagreeable. But that is what politics are. There is a constant ebb and flow of feeling in the countries where there is any political life, and this shows that political life is stirring in India. I deprecate this bandying between different schools of Indian opinion of charges and epithets. One says, “Sundried bureaucrats” and the other says, “Pestilent agitators”. But the duty of the Viceroy, of the Secre¬ tary of State and of the House of Commons is to rise well above that sort of thing. An observation—and a just and salutary obser¬ vation has been made that we should not adopt an attitude of nawkish or maudlin sentimentality, but a manly desire to under¬ stand and comprehend those whom, for good or for evil, we have undertaken to govern. We have not ourselves to blame for the great division that separates the European from the Native Indian. I have sometimes wondered why those who now agitate for political reforms do not turn their eyes to social reforms. But there is a root of statesmanship as well as of humanity contained in the lines “Hath not a Jew eyes ? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, affections and passions ?” That is what I should like to make the foundation of the education of our competition-wallahs. It was well said once that “great thoughts come from the heart”—a beautiful expression, but I should like to add to it a little prosaic rider of my own—great thoughts come from the heart, but they must go round the head. In all that I have said I shall not be taken to indicate for a moment that I dream you can transplant British institutions wholesale in India. That is a fantastic and ludicrous dream. Even if it could be done, it would not be for the good of India. You have got to adapt your institutions to the conditions of the country where you are planting them. You cannot transplant

British Policy Towards Indian Nationaiism

232

bodily the venerable oak of our constitution to India, but you can transplant the spirit of our institutions—the spirit, the temper, the principles and the maxims of British institutions. All these you can transplant and act upon and abide by. You cannot give universal suffrage in India, and I do not insist that India should be on the same footing as our self-governing colonies, like Canada. I am authorised to announce on my full responsibility that the Government of India is in thorough sympathy with the necessities of the day and of the hour. I only want the House to know that we are in earnest in the direction that I have indi¬ cated. I hope there will be no hurry or precipitancy on the part either of the bureaucrats or of the agitators. If there is, it can only have the effect, the inevitable effect, of setting the clock back. We are talking today about the Budget. The very limited amount of time given to the discussions of the Budget in Calcutta has hitherto been rather a scandal. All reasonable people both here and in India have admitted that that state of things cannot be endured. Then there is also the question of the moving of amendments to the financial proposals of the Viceroy and his advisers. There is the extension of the representative element in the Legislative Council—not the Executive Council, but the Legislative. . . In regard to the question of the employment of Indians in the higher offices, I think a move—a definite and deliberate move—ought to be made with a view of giving competent and able natives the same access to the higher posts in the adminis¬ tration that are given to our own countrymen. There is a famous sentence in the Queen’s Proclamation, of 1858, which says : “It is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service the duties of which they may be qualified by their educational talents, ability and integrity 'duly to dis¬ charge.” I think these words “so far as may be” have been some¬ what misinterpreted in the past. I do not believe that the Minis¬ ters who advised Queen Victoria in framing one of the most memo¬ rable documents in all our history meant those qualifying words, which were words of common sense and wisdom, to be cons¬ trued in a narrow, literal, restricted or pettifogging spirit. I do not believe that Parliament or the liberal and generous men

Minto and the Policy of Counterpoises

233

who held the helm of state in India at that time ever intended that this promise of the Queen should be construed in any but a liberal and generous sense. The Governor General of India today is, I am glad to say, a man of a firm texture of mind. I do not believe the Governor General has any intention of riding off on a narrow evasion of the obvious spirit of those words containing a promise which was as wise and politic as it was just. I do not know if there is any case in history of an autocratic, personal, or absolute government co-existing with free speech and free right of meeting; but it is quite certain that for as long a time as my poor imagination can pierce through, for so long a time our Government of India must partake, and in no small degree, of the personal and almost absolute element. But that is no reason why we should not try this great experiment of showing that you can have a strong and effective administration along with free speech and free institutions, and being all the better and all the more effective because of free speech and free institutions. That policy is a noble one to think of, but the task is arduous; and because it is noble and because it is arduous, I recommend the policy to the adoption of the House.

(B) MINTO AND THE CONGRESS 2.

MINTO TO MORLEY, 9 MAY 1906

My inclination would certainly be to grant such an interview, although one would have to be careful about it. I think we are bound to look upon the Indian National Congress as a factor in Indian politics, and that it would be best not to ignore it. Gokhale probably represents the best elements in the Congress. On the other hand, there is much connected with it which may fairly be called disloyal, and even, whilst admitting the best of its ambitions to be good, its influence is often mischievously directed. At the same time I believe one can do a good deal by keeping in touch with such leaders as Surendra Nath Banerjea and Moti Lai Ghose. I believe the mere fact of their receiving notice and becoming aware that one is ready to discuss matters with them may do good.

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism 3.

234

MORLEY TO MINTO, 11 MAY 1906

Most of all I was delighted with Prince of Wales’ watchword. If we can show “sympathy” as well as firm justice, all may go well, and it will be a vast help both to you and to me if the Prince’s talk of sympathy is generally felt to hit the mark. He talked of the National Congress as rapidly becoming a great power for evil. As it happened, I had a short preliminary talk with Mr. Gokhale the day before (I shall have more by and by). My own impression formed long ago, and confirmed since I came to office, is that it will mainly depend upon ourselves whether the Congress is a power for good or for evil. There it is whether we like it or not (and personally I don’t like it). Probably there are many rascals connected with the Congress. So there are in most great popular movements of the sort. All the more reason why we should not play the game of the rascals by harsh¬ ness, stiffness, Fullerism, and the like. Mr. Gokhale is to stay in London until the end of the session and I am in good hopes of finding him a help to me, and not a hindrance, in guiding the strong currents of democratic feeling that are running breasthigh in the House of Commons. Say what we will, the House of Commons is your master and mine, and we have got to keep terms with it. As Roosevelt said to me—“I must try not to quarrel with Congress—if I do, I am no use; Cleveland broke with Congress, and it was the ruin of him.” You know that I will not yield an ineh to them in the way of mischief—but the British Radical now prominent in the House of Commons does not mean mischief; and I think Gokhale does not mean to lead him that way, if the said Gokhale is rightly handled.

4.

MINTO TO MORLEY ABOUT CONGRESS LEADERS, 16 MAY 1906

I like what I have seen of Gokhale and hope he is honest, but I cannot help feeling that the supporters of Congress at home either strangely ignore existing conditions in this country or are carried away by sentimental inclinations for the interests of what they wrongly believe to be an oppressed race. I had conversation yesterday with Dr. Mukerjee, the Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University, whom you no doubt know by repu¬ tation and who, I suppose, stands probably higher than any

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other Indian gentleman in the position he occupies both as a Judge and a deep thinker, during which we discussed the present situation in respect to Partition and the aims of the Congress leaders. He told me that he himself had originally been against Partition, and then agreed exactly in what I said to you that the recent occurrences at Barisal were due entirely to the action of disappointed agitators headed by Surendra Nath Banerjea, and that, though there had been no doubt much discontent in respect to Partition on account of loss of legal business in Calcutta and inconveniences caused to landowners who have property in the new Province as well as Bengal, he believes that the people so affected have by this time settled down and accept¬ ed the Partition. He considers Surendra Nath most unreliable, whilst I was a little surprised in his unwillingness to express much appreciation of Gokhale. I hope you have seen a recent speech by Mr. Broacha at Bombay. A full report of it is in the Times of India of May 10th and that part in which he deals with British rule and the Bengali movement is most interesting ... I believe the danger he alludes to of attempting to import into India English political institutions is a very real one. How¬ ever much we may admire our constitutional history, our con¬ stitution, as the writer says, is the result of a long course of his¬ torical experience unknown to India, whilst our political ma¬ chinery, which the Bengali would imitate, is, as we know, full of faults, which we ourselves regret, and which it would be fatal to encourage here. 5.

MINTO TO MORLEY, 28 MAY 1906

As to Congress, I agree in all you say as to our treatment of them. We must recognise them and be friends with the best of them. Yet I am afraid there is much that is absolutely disloyal in the movement, and that there is danger for the future. I have no doubt you see extracts from the vernacular press, the great bulk of the tone of it can only be termed disloyal and the Bengalee Editor is spreading his influence throughout India. I like what I have seen of Gokhale, and am very far from saying he is in sympathy with much of his party literature, but he is playing with dangerous tools. I have been thinking a good deal lately of a possible counterpoise to Congress aims. I think we may find a solution in the Council of Princes; or on an elaboration

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of that idea, a Privy Council not only of native rulers, but of a few other big men to meet, say once a year for a week or a fort¬ night, at Delhi for instance. Subjects for discussion and procedure would have to be carefully thought out, but we should get differ¬ ent ideas from those of Congress, emanating from men already possessing a great interest in the good government of India. I have wondered too if it would ever be possible to start a small club, probably at Delhi, for British and Indian members. I do not see the impossibility of it, but I am very ignorant as to the rules of caste. Still Sindhia, Bikaner, some of the leading zamindars, and the Viceroy might be able to set it on foot. I cannot say how much I am with you as to “sympathy”, if we could only get more into touch with the people we live amongst ! But the want of permanent residence of the British population tells against it; it is a fleeting population always looking ulti¬ mately to home; its permanent interests and affections are not here. It strikes me very much, and there is a feeling of sadness about it all—one of the chief results is this want of touch with Indian native life, and I am afraid better means of communica¬ tion are daily increasing the number of people who run home on leave and similarly decreasing the permanency of English career in India. But with all one’s desire for “sympathy” one must not lose sight of hard facts. We are here a small British garrison, surround¬ ed by millions composed of factors of an inflammability un¬ known to the Western world, unsuited to Western forms of Government, and we must be physically strong or go to the wall.. . 6.

MORLEY'S REPLY, 6 JUNE

1906

Fundamental difference between us, I really believe there is none. Not one whit more than you, do I think it desirable or possible or even conceivable to adopt English institutions to the nations who inhabit India. Assuredly not in your day or mine. But the spirit of English institutions is a different thing, and it is a thing that we cannot escape, even if we wished, which I hope we don’t. I say we cannot escape it, because British constit¬ uencies are the masters, and they will assuredly insist—all parties alike—on the spirit of their own political system being applied to India. The party of ascendency fought that spirit

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in Ireland for a good many generations, but at last ascendency has broken down; no Unionist denies it. This is what Gokhale and his friends have found out, and you make a mistake if you don’t allow for the effect that they may produce in the press, on the platforms, and in the House of Commons. Cast-iron bu¬ reaucracy won’t go on for ever, we may be quite sure of that; and the only thing to be done by men in your place and mine, is to watch coolly and impartially, and take care that whatever change must come, shall come slow and steady. You and I are one in all that, I am sure. . . Everybody warns us that a new spirit is growing and spread¬ ing over India. Lawrence, Chirol, Sidney Low, all sing the same song: “You cannot go on governing India in the same spirit; you have got to deal with the Congress party and Congress principles, whatever you may think of them: be sure that before long the Mohammadans will throw in their lot with. CongressVnen against you” and so forth and so forth. That is what they all cry out. I don’t know how true this may or may not be. I have no sort of ambition for us to take part in any grand re¬ volution, during my time of responsibility, whether it be long or short. Just the very opposite. You need have no apprehension whatever if a private telegram reaching you from me some fine morning, requesting you at once to summon an Indian Duma. On the other hand, I don’t want to walk blindfold in the ways of bureaucracy, as the Court at Peterhof and its precious Tchin has been walking blindfold in the ways of autocracy. Take the Fuller case. . . You argue against making Fuller ‘a scapegoat’. Why scapegoat ? If I wanted to show that Fuller had done his business as ill as it could be done, I should simply repeat your own uniform story of him and his doings. Every¬ thing said or written to me about him convinces me of his un¬ fitness for handling delicate situations. How then, would he be a “scapegoat” if he were removed ? Now, I don’t want to punish him; I am as strong for supporting executive authority as any man; I want to make no row; I plead no urgency. But I still hold very firmly that he ought, when other arrangements suit you, to go to some other place, where his peculiarities will be less injurious. I don’t believe—with deep and sincere respect for your judgement—that a mere letter, addressed in official privacy to Fuller, will meet the case. If it is private, it will do no good.

British Policy Towards Indiar) Nationalism

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If public, it will do harm, and certainly will make his position impossible. 7.

MINTO TO THE PRINCE OF WALES ABOUT THE INDIAN POLITICAL SCENE, 6 JUNE 1906

I cannot but feel that we are at the commencement of a great change in India. Better means of communication are making it easier for the Indian official to run home for a holiday and he may consequently gradually lose that touch with the Native population which used to exist in old days, whilst, as your Royal Highness is well aware, the political influence of the Congress is making itself more and more felt. At present, if things are left alone here, I do not think the Congress movement is much to be feared; the danger exists at home, where a few Members of Parliament, with a very doubtful Indian connection, manage to keep the pot of disaffection boiling, and to disseminate en¬ tirely false views upon the position of affairs in India. A Bengali agitation in India carries no weight and little meaning—in Eng¬ land there is the danger that the British public may assume it to be representative of what people at home call the people of India, in utter ignorance of the fact that the population of India is a conglomeration of races, the majority of whom would not put up with Bengali supremacy for five minutes. If British influence were withdrawn tomorrow, what would become of Bengali ideas or all the Bengali eloquence which has lately played so great a part ! All the same, I am sure it is wise to listen to and be good friends with the Congress leaders. I like Gokhale and believe him to be honest, but I am sure no one knows better than your Royal Highness that it would take countless Gokhales to rule the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Province, to say nothing of the rest of India. 8.

MORLEY TO MINTO ABOUT GOKHALE AND THE BIRTHDAY DINNER, 20 JUNE 1906

Your telegram to me as to Gokhale and the Birthday Dinner was rather a riddle. I was not sure at first what answer to send you. One cannot get rid of the fact that he is a paid emissary of the Congress, and as such alone I do not think it would have been advisable to invite him. On the other hand, he is a member

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of the Viceroy’s Legislative Council and it appeared to me after a good deal of thinking over that there was no doubt an invi¬ tation might well be sent to him. I think it is right to recognise Indian gentlemen holding high official positions. In fact, that it is more than right and that is very necessary to do so. Moreover, I believe Gokhale to be honest in his intentions and to represent the best of the Congress school though in respect to the King’s Birthday I think that the recognition of him required to be based entirely on his position as a Member of the Legislative Council. Possibly you may have been able to invite some other distin¬ guished Indian gentlemen, whose presence would no doubt cancel any exaggerated value set upon the invitation to Gokhale. There may be an attempt to make political capital out of it here, but I do not think that much matters. 9.

MORLEY TO MINTO REGARDING POSSIBLE COUNTER¬ POISES TO THE CONGRESS, 22 JUNE 1906

The question of a Council of Native Princes—on which Some people, including the Prince of Wales, seems to be a good deal set—is not one on which I feel that I have as yet much right to an opinion. I don’t know the ground well enough. But I think about it pretty often. So far I doubt what would the Coun¬ cil discuss ? What power of directing or influencing the exec¬ utive ? How far could they be allowed to look into the secrets of Government ? Would they not try to find them out ? In your Foreign Department, they would be sure to try for a finger in the pie. Curzon, I believe, thought such a Council would be a coun¬ terpoise to the Congress party. All this will need a vast deal of reflection. And it is with the liveliest satisfaction that I perceive, in your letter of May 28th, how much cool, equitable and pene¬ trating reflection you are giving to all your puzzles. 10.

SIR ARTHUR LAWLEYi TO MINTO ENQUIRING ABOUT THE POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED TOWARDS THE CONGRESS, 22 JUNE 1906

The Congress-wallahs of this Presidency—from the various political associations throughout the country—are holding a con¬ ference at Tinnevelley. They will of course proceed to pass a num¬ ber of resolutions and I have good reasons for believing that 1

Governor of Madras.

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they will ask that a deputation of their members may be allowed to present their resolutions and a memorial to me in person. My own decided inclination is to accede to such a request. I know of course that they are not a representative body as we understand the term, that they have in point of fact no consti¬ tution and that it may very fairly be argued that they have no locus standi. But in my opinion the Congress has come to stay. It is an organisation which includes some of the best educated and able men in the Presidency. They have the Native Press behind them, and I believe that less harm is done by allowing them to come and let off steam than by giving them the opportunity of posing as martyrs, as they do if they are refused all recognition. Their President, Krishnaswamy Aiyar, is a remarkably welleducated and clever man, a High Court Vakil. His opening address was extremely clever, eloquent and temperate. As I said before, my own inclination would be to receive these gentle¬ men. But I know that we are not starting with a clean slate in this matter and I am particularly anxious not to do anything which would embarrass you or any of the other Governments. Would you very kindly let me know whether you would prefer that I should receive them or not ? After being told that we are to inculcate the doctrine of sympathy, no doubt the most would be made of my refusal; but, on the other hand, I might pre¬ judice the question of your attitude towards the Congress, and this I should not like to do. 11.

M INTO’S REPLY, 29 JUNE 1906

I entirely agree with all you said as to receiving a deputa¬ tion from the Congress. You would of course see their memorial and resolutions beforehand and you should insist on elimination of anything objectionable or refuse to receive them. I am personally on very good terms with some of the Con¬ gress leaders and have seen them privately on several occasions, always telling them that T was most glad to hear their views but that they must not consequently think that I was bound to agree with them! The Congress is a factor we must be prepared to recognise in the future. The best of their representatives I believe to be honest, though they advocate much that is not adaptable to India—and the worst of it is that they are taken at a far higher

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valuation at home than they deserve. But we must recognies them, and it would be the greatest mistake to attempt to ignore them. Still one cannot disguise from oneself the danger ahead— the close connection of Congress with the vernacular press, generally disloyal, and the growing control of the press over newspapers throughout India—whilst at home political agitators frc'm India, in close co-operation with Members of Parliament, are, I am afraid, bringing influences to bear on His Majesty’s Government which may make things very difficult here. In the meantime I am thoroughly in accord with all you say in your letter and, when you have time, should be grateful if you tell me what happens. P. S. I know you will be very careful in any reply you make to a deputation. They will be ready to twist anything they can. 12.

MINTO TO MORLEY, 27 JUNE 1906

I feel, as you say, that there is no fundamental difference between us as to our wishes for the future here. Perhaps I am more face to face with the everyday difficulties due to the diver¬ sity of character between a great Western Power like ourselves and an Eastern people composed of many nationalities, whilst I believe that, strange as it may seem, the mysteries of the East become more unfathomable with a closer acquaintance. I am afraid there is an idea far too prevalent at home as to the want of sympathy in British rule towards the people of this country. British rule in India is no doubt a bureaucratic administra¬ tion, but it possesses many great administrators of whom we may well be proud, and I am bound to be in close and friendly touch with the best Indian thought and full of sympathy for the races we rule over. At the same time everyone who thinks at all feels that there is a change in the air. Lawrence, Chirol, Sidney Low have said nothing that I am not constantly hearing here. What the change will be and how and when it will come it is impossible to say, but accepting the Congress Party—as one of the chief factors in that change, I have said ever since I have been here that one must recognise it as a power with which we have to deal and whose leaders we must recognise. But having said this one must not be blind to its dangers. The movement at present is entirely Bengalee—amongst a population with a great power of imitation of Western political methods—whose leaders have

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succeeded in obtaining far higher value at home for their pro¬ nouncements than they could ever possibly hope to obtain in India. And whilst admitting the honesty of some of the best of them one cannot but be anxious as to the almost universal disloyal tone of the Native Press with which they are so largely connected, and the control of which they are acquiring through¬ out India. I had a very curious conversation a few days ago with the Raja of Nabha, a note of which I enclose. (Enclosure) The Raja raised the question of the increase in the number of samajs or political associations all over the country. He said that though they might speak few words and profess innocent aims, the majority of these associations had a canker in their hearts (literal, there is an ulcer inside them) and from disease nothing but harm could come. He said, if this disease spread to the Army, it would be a terrible thing. His Highness fully recog¬ nised the difficulty Government would have in repressing or even checking this tendency. He said we must support our local authorities. He said Government and their officials should stand on one side and let the chiefs and leading men of the province undertake the task. That it is much easier for them to know what was going on than it is for us. . . The Raja then said that he thought there ought to be a Coun¬ cil for the whole of India to advise Government, as to the measures to be undertaken for the people and to interpret the thoughts and prejudices of the different sections of the community to their rulers. 13.

MINTO TO MORLEY ON THE AIMS AND OBJECTS OF THE CONGRESS, 1 AUGUST 1906

I am very anxious as to the future. You know the feeling of change that is abroad in India, of which I have so often written, and I am sure you know how thoroughly I am in accord with you in every desire to meet reasonable demands for reform, but though there are many honest men connected with the Congress movement, I cannot disguise from myself that we are everyday being brought more face to face with absolutely disloyal inten¬ tions, the ultimate object of which is the overthrow of British administration. I know how serious these words are, but we

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must not blink the fact and that the whole initiative emanates very largely from the so-called Bengalee agitation under cover of plausible arguments claiming to be put forward on behalf of popular demands. There is no doubt too, I am afraid, that this movement is aided by constant questions in the House of Commons, which, though I readily recognise their honesty of purpose, convey the idea here that the people of India are recognized at home as a down-trodden race by a bureaucratic British administration. I am very far from saying myself that this idea is accepted throughout the length and breadth of India, but our most loyal supporters, the great Native Chiefs and others, are thoroughly aware of it and recognise its danger. It is a grow¬ ing danger, eagerly assisted by the Vernacular Press, and what I want particularly to make clear is that I am convinced we have got to deal, not with an honest desire for administrative improve¬ ments, but with a deliberate attempt towards the ultimate over¬ throw of British rule. In saying this I am only referring to what I believe to be going on in Bengal and Poona, which in no way represents the feelings of the mass of different population in this country. But the danger exists, and it is all important that the natural sympathies of the British people should not be misled by the misrepresentation of eloquent speakers who visit Eng¬ land from India. . .Only the other day Count Quadt, the Ger¬ man Consul-General, gave a note to our Foreign Department as to circumstances which he thought we ought to know, which he had received from a thoroughly reliable source, though was not at liberty to give us his authority. It was to the effect that India throughout was thoroughly disloyal, including the Punjab; that the Native Chiefs were likewise so; that it was intended that personal servants should combine to strike work; and that their masters would be killed, and that the whole movement was now only waiting for necessary leaders. It is curious that this possible strike of servants has also been recently alluded to by one of the Bengalee leaders, a Mr. Roy, in a speech at Calcutta. Count Quadt, I am told, attaches great value to his authority. We only suspect the information comes from Poona. Personally I think very little of it indeed. I believe the Native Chiefs are generally our most loyal friends, but there is a dangerous movement going on I have not the shadow of a doubt, and all I can say is we must be very just and firm and keep our eyes open.

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism 14.

244

MORLEY TO MINTO ABOUT GOKUALE, 2 AUGUST 1906

Yesterday I had my fifth and final talk with Gokhale—the first talk since my Budget deliverance. I challenged him, as I told you I would, without using the language of despair, saying he was convinced that he must look to the Indians alone &c. &c. He denied it completely, was a good deal perturbed by it and was most anxious to disabuse my mind of any feeling about it. T don’t know how this may be, but it is undoubtedly to your interest and mine that he should be an honest man. It is of vast advantage that we should be on terms with him. I believe, from all I learn, that his influence on the Indian section in the House of Commons has been most salutary, that he has stood up for my speech, and its promise of good against the men who complained of it as vague, timid, hollow &c. &c. So I shall continue to believe him honest, until I find him out in tricks. He has a politician’s head; appreciates executive re¬ sponsibility; has an eye for the tactics of practical commonsense. He made no secret of his ultimate hope and design: India to be on the footing of a self-governing colony. I equally made no secret of my conviction that, for many a day to come— long before the short span of time left to me—this was a mere dream. Then I said to him—“For reasonable reforms in your direction there is now an unexampled chance. You have a V.R. entirely friendly to them. You have a Secretary of State in whom the Cabinet, the House of Commons, the Press of both parties, and that small portion of the public that ever troubles its head about India, reposes a considerable degree of confidence. The important and influential Civil Service will go with the Viceroy. What situation could be more hopeful? Only one thing can spoil it, perversity and unreason in your friends. If they keep up the fuss in Eastern Bengal, that will only make it hard, or even impos¬ sible, for Government to move a step. I ask for no sort of engage¬ ment. You must of course be judge of your own duty, and I am aware you have your own difficulties. So be it. We are quite in earnest in our resolution to make an effective move. If your speakers and your newspapers set to work to belittle what we do, to clamour for the impossible, then, all will go wrong. That is all I have to say.” Forgive this fearfully long speech of mine. He professed to acquiesce very cordially in all of it, and assured me, that, immediately after my Budget speech, he had written to

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his friends in India, and pitched a most friendly and hopeful note. By this time—or before you get this—you will see whether this turning fork has done its business. 15. MINTO TO THE PRINCE OF WALES ABOUT BENGAL AGITATION, 13 DECEMBER 1906

The Bengal agitation is, I hope too, subsiding but I do not like being too contident. Much of the bad feeling, as Your Royal Highness knows, is engineered from home, and the agitators may still think it worth while to keep the fire smouldering. All the same, the Mohammedan movement has been a most tell¬ ing reply to Bengali agitation and people can see well enough now that if they go too far in backing up the latter, they run the risk of running their heads against sterner stuff than they are accustomed to deal with. The knowledge of this, I am sure, has a great influence towards keeping things quiet. 16. THE PRINCE OF WALES TO MINTO, 1 JANUARY 1907

I see Mr. Naoroji has been holding forth before the National Congress and inciting them to agitate until they get what he calls ‘their rights’. The Mohammedan movement is indeed most satisfactory and ought to have a salutary effect upon the Bengali agitation. But although I know there are many difficulties in the way, I feel very keen about a Council of Princes being summoned from time to time, and I am sure that the fact of the existence of the Council would greatly tend to take the wind out of the sails of the National Congress especially as so many of the Princes happen to be Hindus.

(C) OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE SPLIT IN THE CONGRESS PARTY 17. MINTO TO MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, 4 APRIL 1907

Things are in a curious state here—they have moved onenormously—but the mistake the outsider makes, and a great many “officials” too, is in'assuming that the Congress agitation is all we have to deal with. There is a much bigger factor getting stronger everyday that has little or no connection with the Con¬ gress ideas viz., the educated class outside political agitation.

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the big zamindars etc., who are putting forward claims for a greater share in the executive administration, and there is a great chance, if we ignore them, of their joining hands with the Congress. The Congress has split into two—one party preaching open sedition, the other fairly reasonable, but the tendency of the whole younger generation, including many Mohammedans, is to be fascinated by the ambitions of the Extremists and the temptation they hold out of getting rid once for all of British rule. My whole inclination is to meet the reasonable hopes of the Moderate people as far as possible and get them on our side; but the official world is very stiff. However, on the whole, just now things are rather better than they were, at least the ‘parti¬ tion’ and ‘swadeshi’ friction is becoming less. 18.

MORLEY TO MINTO ON CONGRESS SPLIT, 31 OCTOBER 1907

One of the most interesting Indian things that has come my way this week is a letter from Gokhale to Wedderburn, dated the 11th October. The one absorbing question, he says, is how the split in the Congress, now apparently inevitable, is to be avert¬ ed. The outlook at this moment is as “dark as dark could be”. He has no hope that any solution can be found, short of re¬ moving the sittings of the Congress from Nagpur. But this “means a split, as the New Party in that case will probably insist on holding their “own separate Congress at Nagpur”. “If a split does come, it means a disaster, for the Bureaucracy will then put down both sections without much difficulty”. They will brush Gokhale and his friends aside on the ground that they have no large following in the country, and will put the New Party down, on the plea that the most thoughtful people are against them. The crisis, he says, in the affairs of the Congress is bound to affect the work of the English Committee, and of India (the newspaper). Even Sir Mehta says he has lost heart, and the only thing consistent with self-respect is to stop all agita¬ tion in England and India for a time and let the officials do as they please.” So much for that. I have often thought during the last twelve months that Gok¬ hale as a party manager is a baby. A party manager, or for that matter any politican aspiring to be a leader, should never whine. Gokhale is always whining, just like the second-rate Irish men between Dan O’Connell and Parnell. There was never any whine

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about Parnell (unless may be at the bottom of the useful fireescape). Now if I were in Gokhale’s shoes—if he wears shoes, I forget—I should insist on quietly making terms with the Bureau¬ cracy, on the basis of Order plus Reforms. Why should you “brush them aside”, I wonder ? We are no more in love with Bureaucracy in its stiff bad routine etc. than they are. If he would have the sense to see what is to be gained by this line, the “split” when it comes, should do him no harm, because it would set him free to fix his aims on reasonable things, where he might get out of us 60 or 70 per cent of what he might ask for. 19.

MORLEY TO MINTO, 8 NOVEMBER 1907

I have now before me a letter of Gokhale to Sir W. Wedderburn dated October 18th. The prospect is “the darkest he has known” since he began to interest himself in public affairs. Yet even now “if these men (whether you or his Extremists, I am not sure) will have a little true statesmanship, things could be put right again in three or four years. After passing this mons¬ trous Bill (Meetings), let measure after measure of conciliation be undertaken—first, the restoration of Lajpat Rai to liberty; next, the undoing of partition without withdrawing from the Mohammedans the advantages that have been secured to them; then the recasting of the scheme of Council reforms (the present offensive attitude towards the educated classes being abandoned) with the appointment of at least one Indian to the Executive Coun¬ cil of the Viceroy.” He goes on to urge free primary education, and separation of judicial and executive, and says that the Decen¬ tralisation Commission gives you and me “an opportunity to extend local self-government.” All this is moderate and sensible enough (probably intended to meet any eye), though to touch partition at this moment is quiet out of question. I do not hide from myself, however, that it may be nothing better than the compulsory—or politic—moderation of a revolutionary leader who, from one cause or another, has for the time at least got the worst of it, and found his authority shaken both in his own camp and with the Government. Gokhale reports the Congress situation as having “slightly improved, but the elements of anxiety are all there and 1 for one do not feel very hopeful”.

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism 20.

248

MINTO TO MORLEY, 23 NOVEMBER 1907

What you tell me of Gokhale’s letter to Wedderburn is also an excellent indication of the times. I do not know Wedder¬ burn, but I really hope he receives such nonsense very much cum grata. I never for an instant thought that our reforms would be welcomed by the Extremists, but I hardly expected that Gokhale would play such a stupid game as he is doing. It is such trash his talking about the bureaucracy putting down the Congress and brushing him and his friends aside. He could have played a great game if whilst asserting his own political honesty he had recognised our good intentions and done his best to assist the Government of India. I spoke very openly to him on these lines, but he has evidently no intention of coming to our support and what he now has written to Wedderburn entirely gives him away. In the meantime all that you hear of the political weather is satisfactory. How long the sky will keep clear it is impossible to say, but certainly just now there seems to be a general idea in the Anglo-Indian and Native Press that for the present we have come to a pause at any rate in our difficulties. So far I have seen very little in the newspapers about the release of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh. The Pioneer had a somewhat sneering little paragraph about it, and I have no doubt many people would have preferred to keep them locked up, though I do not suppose they have ever taken the trouble to consider how long it was possible to do so. They seem to have reached their homes quietly and the only symptom of demonstration of which I have heard is that boys paraded the streets of Calcutta shouting praises of the clemency of the King instead of Ban'ie Mataram. It was a mere chance that the prisoners left Mandalay on the 9th of Novem¬ ber, but the date was perhaps somewhat opportune. I hear too from Kohat that when my message to the troops appreciating their loyalty was read to them on parade they voluntarily broke into cheers for the King and the Viceroy, and that their Native officers came forward to express their gratitude for the trust that was shown in them. So really things are beginning to look better at last.21.

MINTO TO A. T. ARUNDEL ABOUT INDIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 9 DECEMBER 1907

Things have been going much better lately, there is an evident lull in the agitation, and Gokhale and others seem evidently to

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feel they have got the worst of it. He has very much disappointed me. I was always inclined to believe that he was honest and hoped he would support us in our reforms, but on the contrary he clearly means to do nothing of the sort. I had a long talk with him after our last Council meeting (when the Meetings Act was passed). He said it was hopeless for him to attempt to urge moder¬ ate views, that they would simply fall flat etc., that the present quiet was only superficial and that things under the surface were as bad as could be. The only cure he knows of for the agitation would be reconsideration of “partition”. All our information goes to prove that “partition” is dead, and I feel sure Gokhale’s wish to revive it is only the desperate effort of a dying cause. I do not believe it would be possible now to resuscitate the partition cry, but I expect an attempt will be made to do so. The split in the Congress too is fortunate—in fact everything looks better. But though the air is undoubtedly clearer, we shall always have the unrest to deal with, and in many ways it must grow in proportion to the increase of education. The only way I see to meet it is not by any faddist attempt to imitate parliamentary government, but to see that powerful communities are represen¬ ted as suggested by your Committee, and to give to Indian gentlemen greater opportunities of high executive authority, such as appointment to the Viceroy’s Council. The argument against this, to my mind, will not hold water, and objections simply amount to racial prejudice and nothing else, but one must not ride the horse too hard in the face of British feeling here. The change is sure to come at last, but the more the idea is sug¬ gested and ventilated the better. •

•

•

•

Of course no one ever expected the Extremists to welcome our proposals, they hate them—largely, I hope and believe, be¬ cause they feel we have taken wind out of their sails. 22.

MORLEY TO MINTO ON CONGRESS SPLIT AT SURAT, 26 DECEMBER 1907

Today or is it tomorrow—the Congress meets. I shall be rather surprised if it does not go off very flat. If it is moderate, and in the hands of Moderates, it is almost bound to be flat. But we shall all make a mighty mistake, if it is thought that the

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flatness of the Congress is any reason why we should fold our arms, and leave the Moderates in the lurch. Only what we are exactly to do yv'hen we have unfolded our arms, I assuredly don’t profess to know. We shall see what goes on at Surat. December 27th—^The news has just come in that the Congress, so far from being merely “flat” as I expected, has gone to pieces, which is the exact opposite of being flat, no doubt. For it means, I suppose, the victory of Extremists over Moderates, going no further at this stage than the breaking of the Congress, but point¬ ing to a future stage in which the Congress will have become an Extremists’ organisation. Meanwhile the line taken by the Cottonian faction here will apparently be that by prosecutions, deportations. Meetings Act, and the ungenial tone of the Secre¬ tary of State, have played into the hands of the Extremists, and broken the hearts of those Moderates whom we hypocritically pretended to wish to bring over to our side. With more interest and curiosity than ever, do I look for your own interpreta¬ tion. 23.

MINTO TO MORLEY ON CONGRESS SPLIT, 15 JANUARY 1908

It is quite impossible to see how the Congress collapse will work out, but so far everything points to the disappearance of the Extremists and to some reasonable recognition by Moder¬ ates of our intentions. I feel pretty sure that this will be the case for a time—it is a great triumph for us. Gokhale had a long talk with Dunlop Smith yesterday. I enclose a note of his conversation. He seems to be very much impressed with Sir George Clarke, but I am amused to hear that he says his evident fault is a wish to centre everything in himself ! It is curious that Gohkale should have hit on this point at once. . . Gokhale has proposed that I should receive privately two or three lead¬ ing native gentlemen from Eastern Bengal, and he believes that a few words from me to them would do much to pacify feeling there. I have always believed that an immense deal may be done by personal intercourse with honest leaders. Extremists though they may be. There is much of the sentimental child about the Bengali, and a sympathetic word here and there does untold good. It is a most curious state of affairs. The unrest we shall always have, it will probably increase as years go on, but already there is a general feeling of more friendliness in the

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air, and really if the agitators from Eastern Bengal hold out a hand to me, it will be marvellous after all we have gone through. (Enclosure) Mr. Gokhale came to see me tonight. He says that ever since he left Simla he has been engaged in the most strenuous work trying to reconcile the Extremists, but has failed, and when the Surat fiasco happened, he was really glad as it cleared the air. He said that the difference between the two parties may be very briefly put. It is this—that the Moderates wish to proceed along the lines along which Englishmen have made their political pro¬ gress viz., persistent and orderly agitation on constitutional lines. The Extremists, on the other hand, wish to avow open implacable hostility to the British Government and to work by secret methods based on those of the Russian Terrorists. There is no possiblity of the two parties coming together again, and although individuals will go on from one side to another, the line of cleavage will be always very marked. At present the Extremists are discredited practically all over India, and their only chance of regaining any influence at all with the great majority of educated Indians depends on Government. If the Government pursue a wise and sympathetic policy, and more especially if they show that they are prepared to carefully consider the criticism of the educated classes on the proposed Council Reforms which were lately published, the Extremists will cease to be a factor of any importance in the country. They never had any hold in the United Provinces and Madras: they have ceased from troubling in the Punjab partly, Mr. Gokhale re¬ luctantly admitted in reply to a question by me, because of the two deportations last May: in Bombay and the Central Provinces their influence and action are confined to narrow limits. Their only strength is in the two Bengals and their centre is in Eastern Bengal. It is quite a mistake to suppose that the agitation is worked from Calcutta. The directing power is in Eastern Bengal just as the racial feeling is bitterest there. It is not so much that the partition is resented. It is an anti-British feeling and an anti-Police feeling as the Police are the instruments of Govern¬ ment. It is therefore necessary for the Viceroy to take some step which shall relieve the feeling and Mr. Gokhale proposed that a

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few representative men from Eastern Bengal should have an in¬ terview with Your Excellency. They would state their case and need be promised nothing. They only wish to feel sure that their plaint has actually reached the Viceroy. This will do much to quiet the leaders, but more is wanted. Mr. Gokhale then referred to the Jubilee of the Queen’s Proclamation, and expressed a hope that something would be done to mark it. It is curious he should have hit upon this idea of Your Excellency’s. At present matters are in the embryo stage, so I did not discuss the proposal with him at all. He told me that he had seen a good deal of Sir George Clarke and had the highest opinion of him, that he had both ability and sympathy and shows a most remarkable grasp of the polit¬ ical situation in India generally and of the particular problems in Bombay. He added that his one weakness was an evident desire to shake off the control of the Government of India and to establish a more or less independent position tempered by occasional references to the Secretary of State. I gathered that Gokhale is somewhat tired of the Bengalis. He says that Moti Lai Ghose is not straight and is a ‘sneak’^ that S. N. Bannerji is incapable of organisation, that he never does any real work and habitually mistakes the form for the sub¬ stance. The only non-official Bengali with any real purpose and any capacity for self-sacrificing work in a national sense is Babu Aswan! Kumar Dutt. Mr. Gokhale spoke quite impressively of the belief that educated classes have in Your Excellency’s sincere wish to meet their aspirations, wherever possible, and to play them fair. I have jotted down the main heads of what Mr. Gokhale said, as his memory and imagination sometimes lead him astray when he gives his account of interviews. 15-1-1908. 24.

Dunlop Smith

MINTO TO VISCOUNT MIDLETON, 29 APRIL 1908

Things in India generally are much quieter, and in the “agitat¬ ed” districts, Bengal and Eastern Bengal and Assam, there is an inclination to make friends; and no doubt some of the most leading agitators can be got hold of if our own people will only show a little tact and forbearance. But we are bound always

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to have “unrest”—we must expect it. The results of educa¬ tion are telling more and more everyday, and new and justifiable ambitions are coming into being and we shall have to recognise them. At the same time I set little value to Congress aspirations and Congress makes itself heard—the Bengalis, who have largely directed the movement, have wonderful power of ini¬ tiation, they aim at initiating political machinery at home, and their endeavours appeal to a certain class of politicians at home; but it is absurd to suppose they represent the best Indian hopes and aspirations. I do not believe that outside Congress circles there is any desire in India amongst thoughtful Indians for increased representation according to English ideas, either in Legislative Councils or other public administrative bodies— the thinking Indian gentleman knows how utterly unfit the mass of the population is for such a change and also that, if it was introduced, the Bengali babu and the “pleaders” would immediately get things into their hands. There is, however, amongst the better classes throughout India, including Ruling Chiefs a growing desire for a greater share in the executive gov¬ ernment of the country. That is what we must recognise, and if we do not, we shall have to face an ever-growing danger. Again, we must throw some employment open to the sons of Chiefs and territorial magnates—if we do not, the younger gen¬ eration will grow up discontented and disheartened. We must do it somehow but at the present moment there is that solid Anglo-Indian determination to disregard the signs of the times, and to think the old ways unchangeable, but people in high places here are beginning to see the change and their numbers will grow, though slowly, from year to year. But in attempting to introduce any radical reforms one has to consider—even though one knows them to be right—the effect they will produce on the Anglo-Indian world—if Anglo-Indian opposition is too bitter. One may stir up racial feeling which would cancel the good of any reform—one must not ride the horse too hard, and must be prepared to bid one’s time. What we must really try to do is to strengthen the classes who have a real stake in the country—the Ruling Chiefs, the great landowners, the great interests of all sorts —they are really loyal to us, and they know the weaknesses of their countrymen much better than we do, but the strengthening of this part of

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the community of course does not appeal to Congress or to the politician at home, who in his ignorance is blinded by what seems to him the patriotism of the fluent Indian political adven¬ turers who visit England, but are nonentities in India, dangerous and troublesome though they be. 25.

MORLEY TO MINTO, 31 DECEMBER 1908

The year seems to end pretty prosperously for us all . . . The Congress has done all that we had a right to expect, and will do a good deal to justify our policy^ both in persevering with Reforms and in making them liberal. Here the chorus of approval has been very satisfactory indeed. The pig-headed section of the ultra-Radicals pretend to think that our chances are ruined by deportation; that the Congress counts for little because it excluded the Extremists; that Chandra Pal is the live man, not Gokhale: that without the release of Tilak &c,, and the undoing of partition, all the Reforms are no good. But the croaks of these few sour-blooded critics count for nothing. (D) THE MOHAMMEDAN DEPUTATION AND CONNECTED MATTERS 26. SYED HUSSAIN BILGRAMI TO C. S. BAYLEY, BRITISH RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD, ABOUT MORLEY’S POLICY, 24 JULY 1906

(Enclosure to Bayley’s letter to Dunlop Smith) I see that Mr. Morley is going ahead in a most reckless manner. Ministers who know nothing of the conditions of life in India and yet wish to carry out their theories at any hazard can only bring about the ruin of the country. We Indians do not want to be governed by pleaders and vakils—mostly beg¬ gars o \ horse-back. The fall in British credit in the European money market seems to be due to the military policy of the present Ministry or is there any other reason ? Poor Sir Bampfylde Fuller is in far some gratuitous ragging. He is, in my humble estimation, one of the most capable of our Provincial Governors and a man of boundless energy, and yet this is the way he is treated.

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I am afraid Mr. Morley knows more about Voltaire and 18th century Literature than the conditions of contemporary India. 27.

MOHSIN-UL-MULK, MANAGER MOHAMMEDAN ANGLOORIENTAL COLLEGE, ALIGARH, TO ARCHBOLD. PRINCI¬ PAL M.A.O. COLLEGE, ALIGARH, 4 AUGUST 1906

You must have read and thought over Mr. Morley’s speech On the Indian Budget. It is very much talked of among the Mohammedans in India and is commonly believed to be a great success achieved by the National Congress. You are aware that the Mohammedans already feel a little disappointed, and young educated Mohammedans seem to have a sympathy for the “Congress”; and this speech will produce a greater tendency in them to join the “Congress”. Although there is little reason to believe that any Mohammedans except the young educated ones, will join that body, there is still a general complaint on their part that we (Aligarh people) take no part in politics, and do not safeguard the political rights of Moham¬ medans: they say that we do not suggest any plans for preserving their rights, and practically do nothing and care nothing for the Mohammedans except asking for funds to help the College. I have got several letters drawing attention particularly to the new proposal of “educated representatives” in the Legislative Councils. They say that the existing rules confer no rights on Mohammedans, and no Mohammedans get into the Councils by election; every now and then the Government nominates a stray Mohammedan or two by kindness, not however on the ground of his ability, but of his position, who is neither fit to discharge his duty in the Council, nor to be considered a true representative of his community. If the new rules now to be drawn up introduce “election” on a more extended scale, the Mohammedans will hardly get a seat, while the Hindus will carry off the polls by dint of their majority, and no Mohammedan will get into the Council by election. It has also been proposed that a memorial be submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy to draw the attention of Govern¬ ment to a consideration of the rights of Mohammedans. I feel it is a very important matter, and if we remain silent, I am afraid people will leave us to go their own way and act up to their own personal opinion.

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Will you therefore inform me if it would be advisable to submit a memorial from the Mohammedans to the Viceroy, and to request His Excellency’s permission for a deputation to wait on His Excellency to submit the views of Mohammedans on the matter? You have, there, an opportunity of knowing the opinion of Government officials on the matter, and you can thus give me valuable advice in this connection. I shall be highly grateful if you will consider this a very im¬ portant matter and inform me of your opinion as soon as pos¬ sible after enquiring everything and giving it full considera¬ tion.

28.

MINTO TO MORLEY ON MOHAMMEDAN FEELING IN INDIA, 8 AUGUST 1906

We have not as yet got the full report of your Budget speech. The last English newspapers just missed it by a day, so it will not reach us till next mail. But the telegraphic accounts have created a good deal of interest, and I think it is worthwhile to enclose you a copy of a letter to Mr. Archbold, Principal of the Aligarh College, from Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the Manager of the College. It was only put before me to-day and is important as illustrating the trend of Mohammedan-thought and the appre¬ hension that Mohammedan interests may be neglected in dealing with any increase of representation on the Legislative Councils. I have not had time to think over the advisability of receiving the proposed deputation, but am inclined to do so. There have been other signs besides the letter to Mr. Archbold pointing in the same direction, and there is no doubt a natural fear in many quarters lest perpetual Bengalee demands should lead to the neglect of other claims to representation throughout India; so that we must be very careful in taking up these questions to give full value to the importance of other interests besides those so largely represented by the Congress. Unfortunately it is the voice of the Congress leaders that makes itself so generally heard, and any attempt to further an increase of representation which, however justly, may recognise other claims than those put forward by them, will meet with no favour from their hands.

Minto and the Policy of Counterpoises 29.

257

ARCHBOID TO DUNLOP SMITH, 9 AUGUST 1906

I have written to the Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, telling him to do nothing till he hears from me, and asking him to write to Syed Husain Bilgrami suggesting that he should wait too. There is one consideration which I am sure you will not overlook in thinking what had best be done. The Dacca Mohammedans are very much interested in the matter we were talking of, and will certainly join in any deputation of the kind suggested in the Nawab's letter; we have had a good deal of communication with them of late. It might be a good thing, if in their present excited state, their energies could be directed in a natural and legitimate direction, and it would, I am sure, quiet things if some reas¬ suring statement could be made to the deputation, all of which need not involve injustice to the Hindus or to anyone else. If the Mohammedans were informed (privately) that a dep¬ utation would be received and a statement made, what would hap¬ pen would be that representative Mohammedans from various parts of India would come to Simla and present a carefully drawnup petition. The number would not be very large, as the people who ought to be on it are very well known. From my know¬ ledge of those who would lead I am sure that nothing in the slightest degree disloyal or objectionable would be brought forward. There is no wish on the part of Mohammedans to give trouble to the Government in any way, only, if I may judge, a certain widespread nervousness and uneasiness as to the future, a fear lest they should be left in the cold. Please forgive this long letter. When I read of the meeting and uneasiness in Dacca, and saw the names of those concerned, I was very anxious to suggest the deputation as a solvent of the difficulties there, as well as possibly elsewhere. P.S. I have told him His Excellency will agree to receive the deputation. 30.

ARCHBOLD TO DUNLOP SMITH, 20 AUGUST 1906

I see and hear that things in Eastern Bengal and Assam are still in a very unhappy condition. If there is any danger of trouble from the side of the Mohammedans at any time, I need hardly say how glad I should be to go and talk with the leaders, and do my best to keep them within bounds.

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What I am thinking of is this. His Excellency the Viceroy has consented to receive the deputation, provided all is in order. I have drawn up the “formal request” for the Mohammedans, and they are by this time, I hope, busy getting it signed. It would be quite easy to show the leading people how fatal to their own cause any violence would be, and how much better it would prove to stick to the constitutional course, even though they may feel it difficult in the present excited state of feeling to do so. We are all very anxious that the Mohammedans should not put themselves in the wrong; it is just what their enemies would like. As you know, they are rather backward in the arts of political agitation, and the danger is that they may go wrong through ignorance. I am very glad that they have restrained themselves as well as they have done. P.S. In the above suggestion I do not of course mean that I should have any sort of commission or authority. It would be absurd to think of such a course. The plan will, I sincerely hope, prove unnecessary. 31.

DUNLOP SMITH TO ARCHBOLD, 21 AUGUST 1906

I showed the Viceroy your letter of yesterday, and am directed to thank you for your kind offer. His Excellency thinks it would be better to ask Mr. Hare first whether he thinks it would be necessary for you to visit Dacca. I will let you know when I get his reply. Mr. Hare is sure to take an early opportunity of bringing home to the Mohammedans that Government is by no means inclined to neglect them in the interests of Hindu agitators. 32.

ARCHBOLD TO DUNLOP SMITH ENCLOSING A LETTER EROM MOHSIN-UL-MULK, 22 AUGUST 1906

Many thanks for your letter. The enclosed from Mohsin-ul-Mulk I obtained permission to show. It might be worth while having a copy sent to Mr. Hare for his private information, so that he might have it before him, not that it contains anything that he will not know. So much for the dark side of things. I have just had a wire from S. Husain Bilgrami of Hyderabad, saying that he fully agrees with a long letter 1 sent to him, so that he is on the side of order and constitutional action. This is. a

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great moral gain, as he will have much to say, and is in many ways a leader. I hope that he will now keep the rather excited Mohammedans of Bengal within bounds. Bilgrami is going to meet Mohsin-ul-Mulk at Bombay. I have written a long letter to Syed Nawab Ali Chowdry of Dacca, telling him to keep all his friends quiet and talking about the coming deputation. I have had letters from him before. Please don’t trouble to write, as I know how busy you must be, but, when you have done with Mohsin-ul-Mulk’s letter, you might send it back to me. P.S. Of course, if a copy of Mohsin-ul-Mulk’s letter is sent to Mr. Hare, it will be marked strictly confidential. (Enclosure to the above letter) Dear Archbold, Thanks for your letter of the 14th instant, together with a draft of the formal application. I am sending it to a few of my friends, but I am sure nobody will like the opening phrases which give an assurance of a deliberate aloofness from political agita¬ tion in the future. Probably also they will not like me to repre¬ sent their cause to Government without the means of a political association. I shall, however, let you know what is decided. I find that Mohammedan feeling is very much changed, and I am constantly getting letters using emphatic language, and saying that the Hindus have succeeded owing to their agitation, and the Mohammedans have suffered for their silence. The Mohamme¬ dans have generally begun to think of organising a political association and forming themselves into political agitators. Although it is impossible for the Mohammedans, on account of their lack of ability and union and want of funds, to attain any success like the Hindus, and they are likely to lose rather than gain by such a course, it is yet impossible for anybody to stop them. The Mohammedans of Eastern Bengal have received a severe shock. I have got a letter from Syed Nawab Ali Chowdry of Dacca which gives utterance to the extremely sorrowful feeling prevailing there. He says : ‘'Up till now the Mohammedans of Bengal have been careless. They have now begun to feel the consequences of their carelessness. If only the Mohammedans of Bengal, instead of following the Government, had agitated like the Hindus and had enlisted the sympathies of the Moham-

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medans of the whole of India, and raised their voice up to the Parliament, they would never see those unfortunate conse¬ quences. “The resignation of Sir Bampfylde Fuller has produced an unrest throughout the Mohammedans in the whole of Bengal, and their aspirations for higher education and increased rank and responsibility are being subsided. Looking at it from one point of view the Government has taught a good lesson to the Mohammedans by accepting Sir B. Fuller’s resignation. It has served to awaken them after a sleep of carelessness. We shall now have to proceed on the same lines as the Hindus, not only in India, but in England.” This is only a brief quotation of what I am getting from the whole of India. These people generally say that the policy of Sir Syed and that of mine has done no good to Mohamme¬ dans. They say Government has proved by its actions that without agitation there is no hope for any community, and that if w'e do nothing for them we must not hope to get any help for the college; in short, the Mohammedans generally will desert us, because the policy of the college is detrimental to their interests. My dear Archbold, nobody can say that the present state of Moham¬ medan feeling is without its justification. The Liberal Govern¬ ment is at the bottom of it, and is responsible for it. I consider it a wrong policy arising out of the ignorance of the real condi¬ tions in India. Mr. John Morley is a philosopher and might well have been contented to give lessons in philosophy; and one cannot but feel sorry that the destiny of India has been placed in his hands. His policy has done a lot of injury to India and may do more. Is it right for the Government to allow an important section of the Indian population, which has always supported and even depended on Government to safeguard their interests, to be dis¬ appointed and get up a spirit of agitation like the Hindus ? I only hope that the Government of India will do something to subside the growing Mohammedan feeling and remedy their hopelessness. P.S. I have informed Sir James La Touche of the proposal to send a memorial and deputation to the Viceroy because I thought it was necessary.

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33. DUNLOP SMITH TO L. HARE, LT.-GOVERNOR OF EASTERN BENGAL AND ASSAM, 24 AUGUST 1906

Archbold first of all wrote and offered to go to Dacca— strictly in a private capacity—if His Excellency thought he could be of any service. I was instructed to reply that His Excellency did not think the Mohammedan unrest was so acute as to neces¬ sitate heroic measures. 34. TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MINTO ABOUT A MOHAMMEDAN DEPUTATION, 27 AUGUST 1906

Your private letter of August 8th. Feel with you how strongly advisable to put things right with Mohammedans. I should think receipt of memorial and deputation excellent occasion for vindicating our entire and resolute impartiality between races and creeds, and deprecating any other construction of either language used by Government or action taken. We view all these questions in genuine good faith. Might you give instruc¬ tions to your Committee in this sense ? Or would you tell the deputation that you only do not give Committee such instruc¬ tions, because it would be wholly superfluous ? I have no uneasi¬ ness whatever about defending ourselves here. Kindly direct that I am kept informed about meetings and do not trust Reuter. 35. L. HARE, LT-GOVERNOR OF EASTERN BENGAL AND ASSAM, TO DUNLOP SMITH, 1 SEPTEMBER 1906

. . .The next point which I think must be taken up is whether the Government of India can accept the Mohammedans who address them, and the other several Mohammedan bodies who have met and expressed their views, as representative of the feeling and opinions of the Mohammedans generally. If Government can do so, and if it can say it does so, I think it will have a great political effect. It is then unnecessary for the Mohammedans to start on a campaign of political agitation. I think it is necessary for the Government of India to know what are the views in this respect of the Home Government. If I had no Indian experience, I should probably be inclined to view, as most Liberals at home I think do view, the opinions expressed in political meetings as the only political opinions of importance. This is not a bit true of India, where the condi¬ tions of political life in England have hardly any counterpart.

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If the Home Government will not accept the assurance that these representative Mohammedans do truly represent Moham¬ medan opinion, so far as any opinion has been formed at all, thea I think the Mohammedans will decide that they must organise meetings to voice Mohammedan opinion. They can do it. The Mohammedan organisation, through the Moulavies, and based on religious practices is far and away in advance of the Hindu organisation, which is only a political organisation and dependent on the engineering of the agitators. The recent events in Dacca prove this, and we all know it well. We have advised the Mohammedans so far that it was unnecessary to organise coun¬ ter demonstrations. If these are started, the fat will be in thefire, and we do not know where it will end. There will be a recrudescence of all the old disturbances in a much worse and more dangerous forms, and the country wants peace. There area thousand badmashes in Dacca ready to take advantage of any disturbance. Mr. Morley may ask, do these Mohammedan representativesreally represent Mohammedan opinion ? I answer most certainly they do. The Hindu papers may talk of the three Tailors of Tooley Street, and no doubt in Eastern Bengal Mohammedan leaders of position and distinction are few; but unless these leaders go counter to the Moulavies which would only be in some religious or quasireligious questions (e.g., a blow at the Madrasas, which train Moulavies, might be such an issue) the Mohammedans will follow their leaders without question, and to a man almost. As a matter of fact, all political agitation must be engineered. Not one in a thousand of either the Hindus or Mohammedans in the districtscare one iota about partition; how can they even know of the partition unless they are told; whether I live at Calcutta or Dacca,, or whether Sir A. Fraser or I give orders to the District officers, does not interest them at all, but they will follow their leaders... Let their leaders tell the people that they are ill-treated and must demonstrate and they will demonstrate, whether Mohammedans or Hindus. But what the Hindus have done the Mohammedans can do, and they can go one better. For when they start, if they do start, and do not sit down in sullen apathy, which- is alsopossible, they will boycott their Hindu landlords; the military cannot be called to collect rents, and a whole countryside cannot be evicted or sold up. It will be the landlords that will have to be

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evicted or bought out in the end, if it comes to a determined fight. If Government cannot give the assurance that it accepts the views of the representative Mohammedans as the views of their co-reli¬ gionists, it had better perhaps say nothing about the subject, but the Mohammedans may draw their own conclusion that Government does not believe they are representative, and that they must agitate. They can easily organise a mass meeting of a million, if they understand that is required as evidence. 36.

C. S. BAYLEY, RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD, TO DUNLOP SMITH ABOUT SYED HUSAIN BILGRAMI, 17 SEPTEMBER 1906

His Excellency, may, I think, be interested to know that Syed Husain Bilgrami, who is one of the leading spirits in the matter of the Mohammedan Representation Memorial, applied for permission to accompany the Deputation to Simla. I let the Nizam know that I saw no objection from the point of view of the Government of India to the permission being granted, but His Highness decided to refuse to allow one of his officials to take part in a political demonstration. In this particular instance I should have been glad if Syed Husain’s wishes could have been met, but His Highness’s decision was, I think, far-seeing and wise. Had leave been given, it would be difficult to refuse it to others, with whose objects the Nizam might not agree. 37.

MUSLIM ADDRESS TO LORD MINTO, 1 OCTOBER 1906

May it please Your Excellency,—Availing ourselves of the permission accorded to us, we, the undersigned nobles, jagirdars, talukdars, lawyers, zemindars, merchants, and others, represent¬ ing a large body of the Mohammedan subjects of His Majesty the King-Emperor in different parts of India, beg most respectfully to approach Your Excellency with the following address for your favourable consideration. We fully realise and appreciate the incalculable benefits conferred by British rule on the teeming millions belonging to diverse races and professing diverse religions who form the popu¬ lation of the vast continent of India, and have every reason to be grateful for the peace, security, personal freedom, and liberty of worship that we now enjoy. Further, from the wise and enlight¬ ened character of the Government, who have every reasonable ground for anticipating that these benefits will be progressive, and

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that India will, in the future, occupy an increasingly important position in the comity of nations. One of the most important characteristics of British policy in India is the increasing deference that has, so far as possible, been paid from the first to the views and wishes of the people of the country in matters affecting their interests with due regard always to the diversity of race and religion, which forms such an important feature of all Indian problems. Beginning with the confidential and unobtrusive method of consulting influential members of important communities in different parts of the country, this principle was gradually extended by the recognition of the right of recognised political or commer¬ cial organisations to communicate to the authorities their criti¬ cisms and views on measures of public importance; and, finally, by the nomination and election of direct representatives of the people in Municipalities, District Boards, and—above all—in the Legislative Chambers of the country. This last element is, we understand, about to be dealt with by the Committee appointed by Your Excellency, with the view of giving it further exten¬ sion; and it is with reference mainly to our claim to a fair share in such extended representation and some other matters of im¬ portance affecting the interests of our community, that we have ventured to approach Your Excellency on the present occasion. The Mohammedans of India number, according to the census taken in the year 1901, over sixty-two millions, or between onefifth and one-fourth of the total population of His Majesty’s Indian dominions ; and if a reduction be made for the uncivilised portions of the community enumerated under the heads of animists and other minor religions, as well as for those classes who are ordinarily classified as Hindus, but, properly speaking, are not Hindus at all, the proportion of Mohammedans to the Hindu majority becomes much larger. We therefore desire to submit that, Under any system of representation, extended or limited, a com¬ munity in itself more numerous than the entire population of any first class European Power, except Russia, may justly lay claim to adequate recognition as an important factor in the State. We venture indeed, with Your Excellency’s permission, to go a step further, and urge that the position accorded to the Mohammedan community in any kind of representation, direct or indirect, and in all other ways, affecting their status and infiuence, should be

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commensurate not merely with their numerical strength, but also with their political importance, and the value of the contri¬ bution which they make to the defence of the Empire; and we also hope that Your Excellency will, in this connection, be pleased to give due consideration to the position which they occupied in India a little more than a hundred years ago, and of which the traditions have naturally not faded from their minds. The Mohammedans of India have always placed implicit reliance on the sense of justice and love of fair dealing that have characterised their rulers, and have, in consequence, abstained from pressing their claims by methods that might prove at all embarrassing; but earnestly as we desire that the Mohammedans of India should not in the future depart from that excellent and time-honoured tradition, recent events have stirred up feelings, especially among the younger generation of Mohammedans, which might, in certain circumstances and under certain contin¬ gencies easily pass beyond the control of temperate counsel and sober guidance. We, therefore, pray that the representations we herewith ven¬ ture to submit, after a careful consideration of the views and wishes of a large number of our co-religionists in all parts of India, may be favoured with Your Excellency’s earnest attention. We hope Your Excellency will pardon our stating at the out¬ set that representative institutions of the European type are new to the Indian people. Many of the most thoughtful members of our community, in fact, consider that the greatest care, forethought, and caution will be necessary if they arc to be successfully adapted to the social, rehgious, and political conditions obtaining in India; and that, in theabsence of such care and caution, their adoption is likely among other evils, to place our national interests at the mercy of an unsympathetic majority. Since, however, our rulers have, in pursuance of the immemorial instincts and traditions, found it expedient to give these institutions an increasingly important place in the government of the country, we Mohamme¬ dans cannot any longer, in justice to our own national interests, hold aloof from participating in the conditions to which their policy has given rise. While, therefore, we are bound to

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acknowledge with gratitude that such representation as the Mohammedans of India have hitherto enjoyed has been due to a sense of justice and fairness on the part of Your Excellency and your illustrious predecessors in office, and the Heads of Local Governments by whom the Mohammedan members of Legislative Chambers have, almost without exception, been nominated, we cannot help observing that the repre¬ sentation thus accorded to us has necessarily been inade¬ quate to our requirements, and has not always carried with it the approval of those whom the nominees were selected to represent. This state of things was probably, under existing cir¬ cumstances, unavoidable; for while, on the one hand, the number of nominations reserved to the Viceroy and Local Governmentshas necessarily been strictly limited, the selection, on the other hand, of really representative men has, in the absence of any reliable method of ascertaining the direction of popular choice,, been far from easy. As for the results of election, it is most un¬ likely that the name of any Mohammedan candidate will ever be submitted for the approval of Government by the electoral bodies as now constituted, unless he is in sympathy with the majority inall matters of importance. Nor can we, in fairness, find fault with the desire of our non-Muslim fellow-subjects to take full advantage of their strength and vote only for members of their own commu¬ nity, or for persons who, if not Hindus, are expected to vote with the Hindu majority, on whose goodwill they would have to depend for their future re-election. It is true that we have many and important interests in common with our Hindu fellowcountrymen, and it will always be a matter of the utmost satis¬ faction to us to see these interests safe-guarded by the presence, in our Legislative Chambers, of able supporters of these interests, irrespective of their nationality. Still it cannot be denied that we Mohammedans are a distinct community with additional interests of our own, which are not shared by other communities, and these have hitherto suffered from the fact that they have not been ade¬ quately represented. Even in the provinces in which the Moham¬ medans constitute a distinct majority of the population, they have too often been treated as though they were inappreciably small political factors that might, without unfairness, be neg¬ lected. This has been the case, to some extent, in the Punjab; but in a more marked degree in Sind and in Eastern Bengal.

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Before formulating our views with regard to the election of representatives, we beg to observe that the political importance of a community to a considerable extent gains strength or suffers detriment, according to the position that the members of that community occupy in the service of the State. If, as is unfortu¬ nately the case with the Mohammedans, they are not adequately represented in this manner, they lose in the prestige and influence which are justly their due. We therefore pray that Government will be graciously pleased to provide that, both in the gazetted and the subordinate and ministerial services of all Indian prov¬ inces, a due proportion of Mohammedans shall always find place. Orders of like import have, at times, been issued by Local Govern¬ ments in some provinces, but have not unfortunately, in all cases, been strictly observed, on the ground that qualified Moha¬ mmedans were not forthcoming. This allegation, however well founded it may have been at one time, is, we submit, no longer tenable now; and wherever the will to employ them is not wanting, the supply of qualified Mohammedans, we are happy to be able to assure Your Excellency, is equal to the demand. Since, however, the number of qualified Mohammedans has increased, a tendency is unfortunately perceptible to reject them on the ground of rela¬ tively superior qualifications having to be given precedence. This introduces something like the competitive element in its worst form and we may be permitted to draw Your Excellency’s attention to the political significance of the monopoly of all official influence by one class. We may also point out in this connection that the efforts of Mohammedan educationists, have, from the very outset of the educational movement among them, been strenuously directed towards the development of character, and this, we venture to think, is of greater importance than mere mental alertness in the making of a good public servant. We venture to submit that the generality of Mohammedans in all parts of India feel aggrieved that Mohammedan Judges are not more frequently appointed to the High Courts and Chief Courts of Judicature. Since the creation of these Courts, only three Mohammedan lawyers have held these honourable appoint¬ ments, all of whom have fully justified their elevation to the Bench. At the present moment there is not a single Mohammedan Judge sitting on the Bench of any of these Courts, while there are three Hindu Judges in the Calcutta High Court, where the proportion

British Policy Towards Indian Nationa'ism

2Sa

■of Mohammedans in the population is very large; and two in the Chief Court of the Punjab, where the Mohammedans form the majority of the population. It is not therefore an extravagant request on our part that a Mohammedan should be given a seat on the Bench of each of the High Courts and Chief Courts. Qualified Mohammedan lawyers eligible for these appointments can always be found if not in one province then in other. We beg permission further to submit that the presence on the Bench ot these Courts of a Judge, learned in the Mohammedan Law, will be a source of considerable strength to the administration of justice. As Municipal and District Boards have to deal with impor¬ tant local interests, affecting to a great extent the health, comfort, educational needs, and even the religious concerns of the inhabit¬ ants, we shall, we hope, be pardoned if we solicit, for a moment. Your Excellency’s attention to the position of Mohammedans thereon before passing to higher concerns. These institutions form, as it were, the initial rungs in the ladder of self-government, and it is here that the principle of representation is brought home intimately to the intelligence of the people. Yet the position of Mohammedans on these Boards is not at present regulated by any guiding principle capable of general application, and practice varies in different localities. The Aligarh Municipality, for exam¬ ple, is divided into six wards, and each ward returns one Hindu and one Mohammedan Commissioner; and the same principle, ■we understand, is adopted in a number of Municipalities in the Punjab and elsewhere, but in a good many places the Moham¬ medan taxpayers are not adequately represented. We would, therefore, respectfully suggest that Local Authority should, in every case, be required to declare the number of Hindus and Mo¬ hammedans entitled to seats on Municipal and District Boards. Such proportion to be determined in accordance with the numeri¬ cal strength, social status, local influence and special require¬ ments of either community. Once their relative proportion is authoritatively determined, we would suggest that either com.munity should be allowed severally to return their own repre¬ sentatives, as is the practice in many towns in the Punjab. We would also suggest that the Senates and Syndicates of Indian Universities might be similarly dealt with; that is to say, there should, so far as possible, be an authoritative declaration

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of the proportion in which Mohammedans are entitled to be represented in either body. We now proceed to the consideration of the question of our representation in the Legislative Chambers of the country. Beginning with the Provincial Councils, we would most respect¬ fully suggest that as in the case of Municipalities and District Boards, the proportion of Mohammedan representatives entitled to a seat should be determined and declared with due regard to the important consideration which we have ventured to point out in paragraph 5 of this address ; and that the important Mohamme¬ dan landowners, lawyers, merchants and representatives of other interests, the Mohammedan members of District Boards and Municipalities, and the Mohammedan graduates of universities, of a certain standing, say five years, should be formed into electoral colleges, and be authorised, in accordance with such rules of procedure as Your Excellency’s Government may be pleased to prescribe in that behalf, to return the number of members that may be declared to be eligible. With regard to the Imperial Legislative Council, whereon the due representation of Mohammedan interests is a matter of vital importance, we crave leave to suggest;— (1) That, in the cadre of the Council, the proportion of Moha¬ mmedan representatives should not be determined on the basis of the numerical strength of the community, and that, in any case, the Mohammedan representatives should never be an ineffective minority. (2) That, as far as possible, appointment by election should be given preference over nomination. (3) That, for purposes of choosing Mohammedan members, Mohammedan landowners, lawyers, merchants, and repre¬ sentatives of other important interests of a status to be subsequently determined by Your Excellency’s Govern¬ ment, Mohammedan Members of the Provincial Councils and Mohammedan Fellows of Universities should be invest¬ ed with electoral powers to be exercised in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed by Your Excellency’s Government in that behalf. An impression has lately been gaining ground that one or more Indian Members may be appointed on the Executive Coun-

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cil of the Viceroy. In the event of such appointments being made, we beg that the claims of Mohammedans in that connection may not be overlooked. More than one Mohammedan, we venture to say, will be found in the country fit to serve with distinction in that august Chamber. We beg to approach Your Excellency on a subject which most closely affects our national welfare. We are convinced that our aspiration as a community and our future progress are largely dependent on the foundation of a Mohammedan University, which will be the centre of our religious and intellectual life. We therefore most respectfully pray that Your Excellency will take steps to help us in an undertaking in which our community is so deeply interested. In conclusion, we beg to assure Your Excellency that, in assist¬ ing the Mohammedan subjects of His Majesty, at this stage in the development of Indian affairs, in the directions indicated in the present address, Your Excellency will be strengthening the basis of their unswerving loyalty to the Throne and laying the foundation of their political advancement and national prosperity, and Your Excellency’s name will be remembered with gratitude by their posterity for generations to come, and we feel confident that Your Excellency will be gracious enough to give due consi¬ deration to our prayers. 38.

MINTO’S REPLY TO THE MUSLIM DEPUTATION, 1 OCTOBER 1906

Your Highness and Gentlemen—Your presence here today is very full of meaning. To the document with which you have pre¬ sented me are attached the signatures of nobles, of ministers of various States, of great landowners, of lawyers, of merchants, and of many other of His Majesty’s Mohammedan subjects. I welcome the representative character of your Deputation as expressing the views and aspirations of the enlightened Muslim community of India. I feel that all you have said emanates from a representative body basing its opinions on a matured considera¬ tion of the existing political conditions of India, totally apart from the small personal or political sympathies and antipathies of scattered localities; and I am grateful to you for the opportu¬ nity you are affording me of expressing my appreciation of the

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just aims of the followers of Islam and their determination to share in the political history of our Empire. As your Viceroy, I am proud of the recognition you express of the benefits conferred by British rule on the diverse races of many creeds who go to form the population of this huge contin¬ ent. You yourselves, the descendants of a conquering and ruling race, have told me today of your gratitude for the personal free¬ dom, the liberty of worship, the general peace, and the hopeful future which British administration has secured for India. . . . But, Gentlemen, you go on to tell me that sincere as your belief is in the justice and fair dealing of your rulers and unwilling as you are to embarrass them at the present moment, you cannot but be aware that “recent events” have stirred up feelings amongst the younger generation of Mohammedans which might “pass beyond the control of temperate counsel and sober guidance.” Now, I have no intention of entering into any discussion upon the affairs of Eastern Bengal and Assam, yet I hope that, without offence to anyone, I may thank the Mohammedan community of the new Province for the moderation and self-restraint they have shown under conditions which were new to them, and as to which there has been inevitably much misunderstanding, and that I may at the same time sympathize with all that is sincere in Bengali sentiment. But above all, what I would ask you to believe is that the course the Viceroy and the Government of India have pursued in connection with the affairs of the new Province, the future of which is now I hope assured, has been dictated solely by a regard for what has appeared best for its present and future populations as a whole, irrespective of race or creed; and that the Mohammedan community of Eastern Bengal and Assam can rely as firmly as ever on British justice and fair play for the apprecia¬ tion of its loyalty and the safeguarding of its interests. You need not ask my pardon, Gentlemen, for telling me that ^‘representative institutions of the European type are entirely new to the people of India”, or that their introduction here requi¬ res the most earnest thought and care. I should be very far from welcoming all the political machinery of the Western world amongst the hereditary instincts and traditions of Eastern races. Western breadth of thought, the teachings of Western civilisation, the freedom of British individuality can do much for the people of India. But I recognise with you that they must not carry with

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them an impracticable insistence on the acceptance of political methods. And, now, Gentlemen, I come to your own position in res¬ pect to the political future—the position of the Mohammedan community for whom you speak. You will, I feel sure, recognise that it is impossible for me to follow you through any detailed consideration of the conditions and the share that community has a right to claim in the ad¬ ministration of public affairs. I can at present only deal with generalities. The points which you have raised are before the Com¬ mittee which, as you know, I have lately appointed to consider the question of representation, and I will take care that your address is submitted to them. But at the same time I hope I may be able to reply to the general tenor of your remarks without in any way forestalling the Committee’s report. The pith of your address, as 1 understand it, is a claim that, in any system of representation, whether it affects a Municipality, a District Board or a Legislative Council, in which it is proposed to introduce or increase an electoral organisation, the Mohamme¬ dan community should be represented as a community. You point out that in many cases electoral bodies as now constituted cannot be expected to return a Mohammedan candidate, and that, if by chance they did so, it could only be at the sacrifice of such a candidate’s views to those of a majority opposed to his own community, whom he would in no way represent, and you justly claim that your position should be estimated not merely on your numerical strength, but in respect to the political importance of your community and the service it has rendered to the Empire. I am entirely in accord with you. Please do not misunderstand me; I make no attempt to indicate by what means the representation of communities can be obtained, but I am firmly convinced, and I believe you to be, that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent. The great mass of the people of India have no knowledge of representative institutions. I agree with you. Gentlemen, that the initial rungs in the ladder of self-government are to be found in the Municipal and District Boards, and that it is in that direction tha

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we must look for the gradual political education of the people. In the meantime I can only say to you that the Moham¬ medan community may rest assured that their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded in any administrative reorganisation with which I am concerned and that you and the people of India may rely upon British Raj to respect, as it has been its pride to do, the religious beliefs and the national traditions of the myriads composing the population of His Majesty’s Indian Empire. . . 39.

MINTO TO MORLEY ON MOHAMMEDAN ADDRESS AND HIS REPLY, 4 OCTOBER 1906

As to the Deputation, I was very anxious to avoid appearing to take sides, while yet heartily acknowledging the soundness of Mohammedan arguments, I also kept clear of any direct allu¬ sion to Partition, or to Fuller’s resignation. As far as I can judge the whole affair was an immense success. The members of the Deputation were more than satisfied, and we had a garden party for them in the afternoon, when I had the opportunity of talking to many of them individually. The Agha Khan, who headed the Deputation, lunched here a few days ago, and I had much talk with him. He agrees with all the Natives with whom I have talked, who are worth mention¬ ing that India is quite unfit for popular representation in our sense of the word, but that a greater share should be given to Natives in the higher administrative posts. 40.

MORLEY TO MINTO IN REPLY, 5 OCTOBER 1906

Your address was admirable alike in spirit, in the choice of topics and in the handling. As I told you by telegraph yester¬ day, it has been thoroughly appreciated here by the press, and by people—I wish there were more of them—who take interest in our Indian things. A man came to me -at the Athenseum yester¬ day—“What a difference between the gravity and steady dignity of it—and Curzon’s style in public utterances’’! I hope that I shall receive some good account of the scene. It seems as if all had gone excellently. It will be interesting to see how our Hindu friends take it. Anyhow, you have done a valuable day’s work, whatever the future may produce.

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41. MEHDI ALI KHAN TO DUNLOP SMITH, 7 OCTOBER 1906

You will allow me, on behalf of the members of the Dep¬ utation, to assure you that His Excellency’s great speech in reply to the Address as it does, a clear and sympathetic recognition ■of the rights of the Mohammedans of India as a distinct com¬ munity based on a generous appreciation of their political im¬ portance as being inferior to that of no others, has put a new heart in us, and will always with gratitude, be treasured by us and our posterity as a historic declaration of the policy of the Indian Government. I also take this opportunity of expressing to you our sincere thanks for the valuable help that you have rendered in ensuring the success of the Deputation and for the considerations with which you consulted our convenience and wishes on all the arrangements that were made on the occasion. . . 42. MINTO TO MORLEY, 9 OCTOBER 1906

I cannot say how really pleased I was to receive your tele¬ gram, telling me you approved of my reply to the Mohammedan Address. The papers have almost universally approved, the only exception being a Madras English paper, which says that I missed a magnificent opportunity of pitching into Surendra Nath Banerjee and his friends! apparently with the idea that I should have made an onslaught on Congress ideas. Whatever one may think of them, it is really extraordinary that there should be anyone so narrow and short-sighted as to imagine that the Mohammedan Deputation gave me an opportunity of attacking Bengali sentiment. I believe the recent expression of Mohammedan feeling will do an enormous amount of good. 43. MORLEY TO MINTO ABOUT MOHAMMEDAN DEPUTATION, 26 OCTOBER 1906

All that you tell me of your Mohammedans is full of interest to me, and I only regret that I could not have moved about un¬ seen at your garden party. What a difference from your life and work at Ottawa! The whole thing has been as good as it could be, and it stamps your authority and personal position deci¬ sively. I am glad you had your talk with Agha Khan. He is a pleas¬ ant man, though a trifle too Europeanised for my tastes. I have

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275

no Strong turn for Orientals, but when I have to do with them I d rather dispense with Parisian, Cosmopolitan, or even London varnish. I saw him at Oxford before he came to see me here, and I seemed to hear an account of the Plausible. Still, he is an important man; I believe he is a real friend of the Raj, and what¬ ever he is, he knows a great deal of all sorts of men and press that you and I can get but scanty and deceptive glimpses of. I saw two letters of his this week to English friends—of a de¬ cidedly gloomy kind: I mean, he traced with marked clearness a number of currents running that by no means promise smooth times. I’m sure that you hear this sort of thing all day long from all sorts of people; and by now you probably know the exact amount of discount that is to be taken off every given man’s story. . . Among other good effects of your Mohammedan deliver¬ ance is this, that it has completely deranged the plans and tactics of our Cottonians; that is to say, it has prevented them from any longer presenting the Indian Government as the ordi¬ nary case of a bureaucracy versus the people. I hope that even my stoutest Radical friends will see that the problem is not quite as simple as this. But there is a case against bureaucracy all the same.

44.

THE AGHA KHAN TO DUNLOP SMITH, 29 OCTOBER 1906 t

In order to reach the definite objects mentioned by the De¬ putation in the petition to His Excellency the Viceroy, I have asked all the members of the Simla deputation to form into a Permanent Committee, and I have given to my old friend, Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, who, as you know, is a most loyal and zealous Mohammedan, certain instructions regading the methods by which he is to proceed during my absence. I have asked him not to move in any matter before first finding out if the step to be taken has the full approval of Government privately, as other¬ wise unintentionally he might be led to do something or other that would leave the Government in an inconvenient situa¬ tion. He is going to be the Honorary Secretary of this informal Committee, and we cannot have a better and a more trustworthy man.

British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism 45.

276

MORLEY’S COMMENTS ON THE AGHA KHAN’S SUGGESTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF A ROYAL PRINCE AS VICEROY OF INDIA, 22 FEBRUARY 1907

Tne Agha Khan called on me yesterday, and talked with his usual intelligence and aberration and comprehension of mind. Like all the rest of us, he breaks down when pressed for definite suggestions; and I am beginning to get a little sick of vague general talk. On that ground forgive me for saying that your proffer of a despatch on “general principles” gave me a little shiver. Of that admirable commodity we have any quantity in Whitehall and Westminster. The Aga Khan’s particular sugges¬ tion made in the National Review this month, that a Royal Prince should be made into a constitutional ruler, with Prime Ministers and all the other paraphernalia, has attracted some attention. Lord Roberts commended it to me, and the Prince of Wales thought it an excellent idea. I enclose you my reply in case the topic interests or amuses you. (Enclosure) Copy of a letter from Mr. Morley to Sir Arthur Bigge^ dated the 19th February 1907 I had already read the Aga Khan’s article with much atten¬ tion, and of course I was greatly struck by the suggestion that has attracted the notice and approval of the Prince of Wales. I cannot doubt that the appointment of a member of the Royal Family to the office of Viceroy would be immensely agree¬ able to the population of India, and more especially to the great Chiefs and Princes, whose goodwill is so important a thing for us. This is clear, for, say what they will, India is not a democra¬ tic country, not at all likely to become one. On the other hand, when the Government of India was transferred to the Crown in 1858, the intention of the great Act of Parliament of that date was to entrust Indian Government to a Viceroy who should be held strictly res¬ ponsible to Parliament, through a Secretary of State. I fear the relations of a Sectretary of State to a Royal Viceroy— a prince of the blood, I mean—would be horribly diffi¬ cult. It is true the Agha Khan contemplates a Prime Minis¬ ter, to be responsible to the Viceroy Prince; but this would not

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really at all lessen the responsibility of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, who is himself responsible to Parliament. I Confess I do not see how this difficulty is to be overcome. At the same time, I often have doubts of the permanency of the existing Vice-regal constitution. Some day I believe there will be great modifications. This is the line of criticism I would respectfully submit to His Royal Highness. 46.

MINTO’S REACTION, 13 MARCH 1907

As to the Aga Khan’s article, the Royal Viceroy proposal, however, I can only call childish. I should have found it diffi¬ cult to answer Arthur Bigge’s letter as temperately as you did. To my mind, the arguments against it are so palpable that it would be a waste of time to write about it. No doubt there is throughout India a reverential affection for the King, which somewhat would apply to any member of the Royal family, but the reasons you gave in your reply to Bigge are quite sufficient to illustrate the impossibility of the idea. Also, the duties the Agha Khan allots to the Royal Viceroy, though they do not comprise affairs of state, are such as would require energy and tact of a marked degree and it does not at all follow that, because a man is a Royal Prince, he possesses such qualities. In fact, it is utter nonsense. Please forgive me the strong language. 47.

J. P. HEWETT, LT.-GOVERNOR OF UNITED PROVINCES OF AGRA AND OUDH, TO DUNLOP SMITH ON APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARY FOR ALIGARH COLLEGE, 4 NOVEMBER 1907

I have heard from Sir Faiyaz Ali Khan that he will come to see me here on the 12th about the Secretary to the Aligarh College. I shall probably have a clearer idea of what can be done when I have seen him and heard his views. As you know the appointment of Secretary rests with the Trustees. Though the majority of the Trustees are resident in these Provinces, there are a certain number belonging to other parts of India. There is no doubt that a certain amount of wire-pulling has been going on in order to get Mushtak Hussain appointed to succeed Mohsin-ul-Mulk. He was one of the dissentients to the report of the Committee of Trustees upon the troubles that occurred in

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278

spring. He is very conservative, not very fond of English ideas, and his appointment would certainly be most unpopular with the staff. The situation is made easier by the fact that poor old Mohsin-ul-Mulk rather yielded during this last years to the breath of every wind, and that since my visit to Aligarh in March last he came considerably under the influence of Mushtak Hussain. As you know, at other times they had been distinctly antagonistic one to the other. I am told that Mushtak Hussain is very anxious to come to me and give an engagement that he will, if made Secretary, work in concert with the Government in every way, and that if I do not wish it he will not allow himself to be nominated. If I interfere to prevent hiy nomination he may be expected to throw himself strongly into opposition, and to be¬ come a fervent supporter of Mohammad Ali and his gang, to the great detriment of the College. If, however, he becomes Secre¬ tary, he may be the best and most efiicient engine with which to squash Mohammad Ali and his followers. I think it is possible that I may be able to make terms with Mushtak Hussain. If so, I shall require him to subscribe in writing to what I expect him to do. The whole question will require very careful handling. At present there are only two other candidates whose names are being considered: one, a very straight man, is not of sufficient position and influence. The other is Major Hussain Ali Bilgrami, but his appointment would be an experiment, and he has cer¬ tainly one disadvantage, that is, that he is not well off. The Secre¬ taryship is an honorary office and one which involves, if justice is to be done it, considerable amount of expenditure.

(E) CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO FORMATION OF A COUNCIL OF PRINCES 48.

THE PRINCE OF WALES TO MINTO, 11 JULY 1906

On my return home, I had some long conversations with Mr. Morley and Sir Arthur Godley, and we discussed various questions which struck me most while in India. Amongst these questions was one that I strongly urged, namely, the constitution of a Council of Indian Princes, presided over by the Viceroy, to be held twice a year at Calcutta and Simla respectively, \Vhere matters connected with their states and questions affecting

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their interests might be discussed and settled. The great ob¬ ject gained being that they should become acquainted with one another and their various opinions stated and argued out. There would be another advantage in the great saving of time. All those I spoke to in India on this subject assured me, if adopt¬ ed, that it would secure most beneficial results and prob¬ ably help to take the wind out of the sails of the National Congress. I quite agree with you in thinking that the danger is not so much with the Congress, as from irresponsible Members of Parliament, with very scanty knowledge of India and her peoples. 49.

MINTO TO MORLEY ABOUT A COUNCIL OF PRINCES, 11 JULY 1906

I would for the present put aside the question of the Council of Princes. . . There is much no doubt to be said about the Council of Princes. It is in itself an attractive proposal, but I do not feel quite positive as to the result of combined delib¬ erations amongst them or of the subjects which we could wisely submit for their deliberation, whilst from the fact that the Council could itself be composed of Ruling Chiefs, the¬ oretically at any rate foreigners in respect to British administ¬ ration in India, we could not look to them for any direct assis¬ tance in that administration. Moreover, the oganisation of such a Council would, as far as I can judge, in no way assist us to meet the requirements of the advanced views with which we have to deal. I do not at all say that a Council of Princes is out of the question, but at present the consideration of it would, I think, be somewhat beside the mark. 50.

MINTO TO MORLEY, 19 MARCH 1907

I was at one time, as I think my earlier letters to you will show, inclined to set little value on this proposal. It seemed to me attractive, but I was doubtful as to its real value. I have, however, come to the conclusion that such a Council would be of the greatest assistance to the Government of India and would to a great extent meet the aspirations of the great nobles and landowners. The subjects which might be submitted for consid¬ eration of such a Council are more numerous that I had thought

British Policy Towards lr)dian Nationalism

280

possible. An objection has been raised to the inclusion of large landowners in the Council on the ground that Ruling Chiefs would object to co-operate with their inferiors. I spoke to Sindhia as to this, and he said that, though he had heard of such an objec¬ tion, he most decidedly recognized the necessity of including them. He has, I know, thought a good deal of the possibilities of such a Council, and I doubt if one could find a sounder or more representative opinion amongst Ruling Chiefs. 51.

MINTO TO MORLEY ON IMPERIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL, 26 DECEMBER 1907

The views of the Chiefs themselves are generally most interest¬ ing and most satisfactory, whilst the tone of the Political Officers indicates a sort of inert disapproval of the scheme. They fail to grasp the broad meaning of it in the sense that, though possi¬ bly it may not produce great political results at first, it is a sym¬ pathetic attempt on the part of the Government of India to recognise the natural wish of its leading inhabitants to have a further say in the administration of this country. Political Officers seem inclined to miss this point entirely and to argue that they themselves could have obtained all the information necessary quite as well as the Viceroy can do through an Advi¬ sory Council of Chiefs themselves. On the other hand far more clearly recognise the immense importance of the new departure in its sympathetic sense. I am in no hurry for it, not till November next. 52.

MINTO TO MORLEY ON COUNCIL OF CHIEFS, 30 NOVEMBER 1908

I have been raminating a geat deal over the Council of Chiefs and much appreciate your recognition of my arguments. But after all I am inclined to think you are right. Such a Council would do good if we could be quite sure of the lines we could run it on, but as yet we cannot be quite sure. In early days I thought the proposal “faddy” and subsequently took it up in deference to what seemed valuable wishes. We can however obtain much the same results without a Council. It would, at any rate, want more organisation than I could find time for in the midst of all that is going on, and whilst not absolutely dismissing the idea, we can, I think, wisely let it stand over for the present.

Minto and the Policy of Counterpoises

281

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