A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain 9780231876933

Table of contents :
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
A DISSERTATION ON Liberty and Necefity, PLEASURE and PAIN

Citation preview

T H E

SERIES I :

F A C S I M I L E

T E X T

L A N G U A G E AND VOLUME BENJAMIN

A

DISSERTATION

S O C I E T Y

LITERATURE

5

FRANKLIN

ON L I B E R T Y

P L E A S U R E AND

AND

PAIN

NECESSITY,

Sole British Agents, B. H .

BLACKWELL,

LTD.,

50 & 5 1 Broad Street, Oxford, England.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

A

DISSERTATION

ON LIBERTY A N D NECESSITY, P L E A S U R E A N D PAIN Reproduced from the First Edition With a Bibliographical Note by L A W R E N C E C. W R O T H

T H E FACSIMILE T E X T SOCIETY N E W YORK

1930

Printed in the United States of America by T h e National Process Company, New York

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE i. Franklin's Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity was first discussed by Henry Stevens of Vermont in his Stevens's Historical Collections (18 8 1 ) , pages 1 6 1 - 1 6 3 , but the standard bibliographical description of the book is found in Paul Leicester Ford, Franklin Bibliography, No. 5, pages 3-5. Ford's account of the book begins with the following sentences quoted from the Autobiography and from the correspondence: "At Palmer's I was employed in composing for the second edition of Wollaston's 'Religion of Nature.' Some of his reasonings not appearing to me well founded, I wrote a little metaphysical piece in which I made remarks on them. It was entitled 'A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain." I inscribed it to my friend Ralph; I printed a small number. It occasion'd my being more consider'd by Mr. Palmer as a young man of some ingenuity, tho' he seriously expostulated with me upon the principles of my pamphlet, which to him appear'd abominable. M y printing this pamphlet was another erratum." (Smyth, Writings of Benjamin Franklin, I. 277-278.) "There were only an hundred copies printed, of which I gave a few to friends, and afterwards

disliking the piece, as conceiving it might have an ill tendency, I burnt the rest, except one copy. . . ." (Franklin to Vaughan, in Smyth, Writings of Benjamin Franklin VII. 412.) To these quotations may be added the explanation that James Ralph was one of the Philadelphia group with whom the youthful Franklin associated for purposes of literary and philosophic discussion. These words, too, may be quoted from the Autobiography: . . Ralph . . . as well as Collins, had been unsettled by me, for which they both made me suiter." (Smyth, Writings of Benjamin Franklin, I. 269-270.) At the time of publication of the Dissertation, Ralph was in England, beginning a literary career of some distinction. Ford points out, page 5, that Franklin was mistaken in saying it was the second, or 1724, edition of the Wollaston book that he had worked upon as compositor. The second edition appeared before its author's death on October 29, 1724, but Franklin did not reach London until December 24, 1724, and it was not until a few days later, at least, that he went to work for Palmer. Copies of the original edition are found in the Library of Congress (Stevens Franklin Collection copy); the British Museum (Ashby Collection copy); private library of William S. Mason (Huth copy); and in the John Carter Brown Library. The present facsimile has been made from the John Carter Brown copy. An interesting

account of the auction room adventures of the book is found in Henry Stevens, Recollections of Air. James Lenox, pages 174-175. The first copy of the book of which a sale is recorded is that which was bought by Henry Stevens about the year 1850 for 1 s. 6 d. 5 the Huth copy was bought by the son of Henry Stevens in 1 9 1 3 for £1005. 2.

A second edition of the book appeared in 1733 with the following title: A 11 Dissertation 11 on 11 Liberty and Necessity, 11 Pleasure and Pain. 11 In a Letter to a Friend. J | [6V* lines, containing five lines of verse, and reference, "Dryd."] 11 [type ornament] \ | Dublin: || Printed in the Year MDCCXXXIII. 8 vo. A 8 j pages 1-165 P a g e I : title, verso blank5 pages 3-16: text, with heading: A |' Dissertation ' | on j | Liberty and Necessity, &c. 11 To Mr. J . R. 11 ; page 16: "Finis." Leaf measures, approximately, 7 ^ x inches. Franklin seems to have been unaware that a second edition of his pamphlet was published, and an examination of the editing of this edition shows a formalized punctuation, changes in expression for the sake of elegance, and the suppression, when possible, of its writer's native raciness of speech—characteristics which make it certain that its author had nothing to do with the

form in which it now appeared. It is possible that the Dublin imprint may have been false, and that the book was surreptitiously issued by a London printer. One may make the suggestion that this second edition was fostered by James Ralph, who would naturally have felt a proprietary interest in the work. Ralph was now becoming prominent in London literary circles as poet, playwright, and political pamphleteer, but now as always he was poor and in search of opportunity for gain. In a contribution to Notes & Queries, ist series, volume 5, page 6, James Crossley described as in his possession a copy of the Dissertation, which, as it contained only 16 pages, must have been of this edition. This may have been the copy now in the Library of Congress (Stevens Franklin collection). There is also a copy of this edition in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 3In 1852[? ], Henry Stevens issued a line-forline reprint of the first edition, with different type ornaments, initials, etc., and with this colophon: " [This is a fac-simile reprint by Charles Whittingham, No. 2 1 , Tooks Court, Chancery Lane, London, from the original edition in the possession of Henry Stevens, Esq., G.M.B., Vermont House, 49, Camden Square, London.]" This reprint, with a separate title-page and an introduction by Henry Stevens, was announced for

republication in 1881, but according to Ford, page 7, it failed to appear in that form. 4T h e work was reprinted in James Parton, Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin, 2 volumes, Boston, 1882-1884, Volume I, Appendix II, pages 605-617. It was omitted by Albert Henry Smyth (who cites incorrectly its date of publication) from his Writings of Benjamin Frankliny 10 volumes, New York, 1905-1907, with the explanation: " T h e work has no value, and it would be an injury and an offence to the memory of Franklin to republish it." (Prefatory Note, II. vi.) T o this statement, however, may be opposed another by the same editor: . . Franklin's writings are his best biography." (Preface, X. v.) LAWRENCE C.

T h e John Carter Brown Library 6 June 1930.

WROTH.

A D I S S E R T A T I O N O N

Liberty and Necefity, P L E A S U R E and

PAIN.

Whatever is, is in its Caufes juft Since all Things are by Fute ; but purblind Man Sees but a part otti Chain, tbe neareft Linky His Eyes not carrying to tbe equal Beam That poifes all above.

Dry d.

LONDON:

Printed

in the Year

MDCCXXV.

A

DISSERTATION O N Liberty

and

NeceJJity,

&c.

To Mr. J. R. S I R , H A V E here, according to your Requeft, given you my prejent Thoughts of the general State of Things in the Univerfe. Such as they arc, you have them, and are welcome to .'em ; and if they yield you any Plcafure or Satisfaction, 1 fliall think my Trouble fufficiently A 2 compen*

[ 4 ] compenfatcd. I know my Scheme will be liable to many Obie&ions from a lefs difcerning Reader than your felf; but it is not defign'd for thofe who can't underftand it. I need not give you any Caution to diftinguifli the hypothetical Parts of the Argument from the conclufive: You will cairly perccivc what I defign for Demonftration, and what for Probability only. The whole I leave entirely to you, and fhall value my felf more or lefs on this account, in proportion to your Eiteem and Approbation.

S E c T. I . Of L i b e r t y NeceiTity.

and

I. nTHERE is faid to be a Firft Movet, who is called GOD, Maker of the Univerfe. II. He is faid to be all-wife, all-good, all powerful. Thefe two Propofitions being allow d and aiferted by People of almoft every Scit and

C s ] and Opinion ; I have here fuppos'd them granted, and laid them down as the Foundation of my Argument ; What follows then, being a Chain of Confequences truly drawn from them, will ftand or fall as they are true or falfe. III. If He is all-good, m/hatfoever He doth muß be good. IV. If He is all-wife, whatfoever doth muß be wife.

He

The Truth of thefe Proportions, with relation to the two firft, I think may bejuft* ly call'd evident; lince, either that infinite Goodnefs will ad what is ill, or infinite Wifc dom what is not wife, is too glaring a Conrradiftion not to be percciv'd by any Man of common Senfe, and deny'd as foon as underftood. V. If He is all-powerful, there can be nothing either exißing or aBing in the Univerfe 'againft or without his Confent; and what He confents to muß be good, becaufe He is good i therefore Evil doth not exiß. Unde

m Unde Malum ? has been long a Queftion, and many of the Learned have perplex'd themfelves and Readers to little Purpofe in Anfwer to it. That there are both Things and Actions to which we give the Name of Evil, is not here deny'd, as Tain, Sicknefs, fVant, Theft, Murder, &c, but that thefe and the like are not in reality E*vils, Ills, or Defeffs in the Order of the Univerfe, is demonftratcd in the next Section, as well as by this and the following Propofttion. Indeed, to fuppofe any Thing to exift or be done, contrary to the Will of the Almighty, is to fuppofe him not almighty j or that Something (the Caufe of Evil) is more mighty than the Almighty > an Inconfiftence that I think no One will defend : And to deny any Thing or Action, which he confcnts to the exigence of, to be good, is entirely to deftroy his two Attributes of Wijdom and Goodnefs. There is nothing done in the Univerfe, fay the Philofophers, but what God either does, or permits to be done. This, as He is Almighty, is certainly true: But what need of this Diftinftion between doing and permitting? Why, firft they take it for granted that

[ 7 ]

that many Things in the Univerfe exift in iuch a Manner as is not for the beft, and that many Anions are done which ought not to be done, or would be better undone; thefe Things or Actions they cannot afcribe to God as His, becaufe they have already attributed to Him infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs; Here then is the Ufe of the Word

'Permit-, He permits them to be d o n f a y

they. But we will rcafon thus: If God permits an Aftion to be done, it is becaufe

he wants either Tower or Inclination to hinder it; in faying he wants Power, wc deny Him to be almighty; and if we fay He wants Inclination or Will, it muft be, cither becaufe He is not Good, or the A£tion is not evil, (for all Evil is contrary to

the Eflence of infinite Goodnefs. ) The for-

mer is inconfiftent with his before-given Attribute of Goodnefs, therefore the latter muft be true. It will be faid, perhaps, that God permits

evil AElions to be done, for wife Ends and Purpofes. But this Objeftion deftroys itfelf; for whatever an infinitely good God hath wife Ends in fuffering to bey muft be good, is thereby made good, and cannot be otherwife. VII. I f

[ 8 ] VI. If a Creature is made by God, it tauß depend upon God, and receive all iti Tower from Him j with which Tower the Creature can do nothing contrary to the Wtli of God, becaufe God is Almighty; what is not contrary to His Wtll, muß be agreeable to it} what is agreeable to it, muß be good\ becaufe He is Good > therefore a Creature fan do nothing but what is good. This Propofition is much to the fame Purpofe with the former, but more particular ; and its Conclufton is as juft and evident. Tho' a Creature may do many A&ions which by his Fellow Creatures will be nam'd Evil, and which will naturally and neceffarily caufe or bring upon the Doer, certain Tains (which will likewife be call'd Tunifhments yet this Propofition. proves, that he cannot ad what will be in itfelf really 111, or difplcaiing to God. And that the painful Confequences of his evil A&ions {focaWd) are not, as indeed they ought not to be, Tunifhments or UnhappinciTes, will be fliewn hereafter. Neverthelefs, the late learned Author of The Religion of Nature, (which I fend you here-

[ 9

]

herewith ) has given us a Rule or Scheme, whereby to difcover which of our Anions ought to be eftcem'd and denominated and which evil: It is in ihort this, "Every " Adtion which is done according to Truth, " is good; and every A&ion contrary to " Truth, is evil: To ad according to Truth " is to ufe and efteem every Thing as what " it is, &c. Thus if A fteals a Horfe from " B, and rides away upon him, he ufes him lt noras what he is in Truth, viz. the Pro" perty of another, but as his own, which " is contrary to Truth, and therefore evW\ But, as this Gentleman himfelf fays, ( Sedt. I. Prop. VI.) " In order to judge rightly " what any Thing is, it muft be confider'd, " not only what it is in one Refpeft, but " alfo what it may be in any other Re" fped; and the whole Defcription of the " Thing ought to be taken in: So in this Cafe it ought to be confider'd, that A is naturally a covetous Being, feeling an Uneafinefs in the want of B \ Horfe, which produces an Inclination for ftealing him, ftronger than his Fear of Punifhment for fo doing. This is Truth likewife, and A a£ts according to it when he fteals the Horfe. Befides, if it is prov d to be a Truth, B that

C 10 ] that A has not Power over his own Adions, it will be indifputable that he afts according to Truth, and impoflible he ihould do otherwife. I would not be underftood by this to encourage or defend Theft j 'tis only for the fake of the Argument, and will certainly have no HI Effett. The Order and Courfe of Things will not be aflfc&cd by Reafoning^ of this Kind; and 'tis as juft and neceiTary, and as much according to Truth, for B to diflikc and punifh the Theft of his Horfc, .as it is for A to fteal him. VII. If the Creature is thus limited in his Attions, being able to do only fuch Things as God would have him to do, and not being able to refufe doing what God would have done then he can have no fuch Thing as Liberty, Free-will or Tower to do or refrain an ^Action. By Liberty is fomctimcs underftood the Abfence of Oppofition ; and in this Senfe, indeed, all our Actions may be faid to be the Effefts of our Liberty: But it is a Liberty of the lame Nature with the Fall of a heavy Body to the Ground ; it has Liberty to

[ II ] to fall, that is, it meets with nothing to hinder its Fall, but at the fame Time it is neceilitatcd to fall, and has no Power or Liberty to remain fufpended. But let us take the Argument in another View, and fuppofe ourfclvcs to be, in the common fenfe of the Word, Free Agents. As Man is a Part of this great Machinc, the Univerfe, his regular A ¿ting is requifite to the regular moving of the whole. Among the many Things which lie before him to be done, he may, as he is at Liberty and his Choice influcnc'd by nothing, (for fo it muft be, or he is not at Liberty ) chufe any one, and refufe the reft. Now there is every Moment fomcthing bejl to be done, which is alone then good, and with refped to which, every Thing elfe is at that Time evil. In order to know which is beft to be done, and which not, it is requifite that we fhould have at one View all the intricate Confequenccs of every Action with refpett to the general Order and Scheme of the Univerfe, both prefent and future > but they are innumerable and incomprehenfible by any Thing but Omnifcience. As we cannot know-thefe, we have but as one Chance to ten thouiand, to hit B i on

[

" 3

on the right A&ion; we fliould then be perpetually blundering about in the Dark, and putting the Scheme in Diforder} for cvery wrong A&ion of a Part, is a Defed op Blemifh in the Order of the Whole. Is it not neceflary then, that our A&ions fhould be over-rul'd and govern'd by an all-wife Providence ?—How exaft and regular is every Thing in the natural World ! How wifely in every Part contriv'd ! We cannot here, find the leaft Defed! Thofe who have iludy'd the mere animal and vegetable Creation, demonftrate that nothing can be more harmonious and beautiful! All the heavenly Bodies, the Stars and Planets, are regulated with the utmdft Wifdom! And can we (up* pofe lefs Care to be taken in the Order of the moral than in the natural Syftem ? It is as if an ingenious Artificer, having fram'd a curious Machine or Clock, and pm its many intricate Wheels and Powers in fuch a Dependance on one another, that the whole might move in the moft exaft Order and Regularity, had neverthelefs plac'd in it feveral other Wheels endu'd with an independent Self-Motion, but ignorant of the general Intereft of the Clock ; and thefe would every now and then be moving wrong

[ 13 ] wrong, difordering the true Movement, and making continual Work for the Mender; which might better be prevented, by depriving them of that Power of Self-Motion, and placing them in a Dépendance on the regular Part of the Clock. ¿J VIII. If there is no fetch Thing as FreeWill in Creatures, there can be neither Merit nor Demerit in Creatures. IX. And therefore every Creature muß be equally efleem d by the Creator. Thefe Propoiitions appear to be the neceflary Confequenccs of the former. And certainly no Reafon can be given, why the Creator fhould prefer in his Efteem one Part of His Works to another, if with equal Wifdom and Goodnefs he deiign'd and created them all, fince all 111 or Defett, as contrary to his Nature, is excluded by his Power. W e will fum up the Argument thus, "When the Creator firft defign'd the Univerfc, either it was His Will and Intention that all Things fhould exift and be in the Manner they are at this Time ; or it was his Will they (hould be otherwife e. in

[ '4] in a different Manner: To fay it was His Will Things ftiould be otherwife than they ace, is to fay Somewhat hath contradided His Will, and broken His Meafures, which is impoifible becaufe inconiiftent with his Power j therefore we muft allow that all Things exift now in a Manner agreeable to His Will, and in confequence of that are all equally Good, and therefore equally efteem'd by Him. I proceed now to fhew, that as all the Works of the Creator are equally efteem'd by Him, fo they are, as in Juftice they ought to be, equally us'd.

SECT. II. Of Pleafure

and Pain. I. TI7HEN. a Creature is fornid and endud with Life, 'tis fuppos'd to receive a Capacity of the Senfation of Uneaftnefs or Pain. It is this diftinguifhes Life and Confcioufnefs from una&ive unconfcious Matter. To know or be fenfible of Suffering or being afted

[ ir ] atted upon is to live; and whatfoever is not ib, among created Tilings, is properly and truly dead. All 'Pain and Uneajinefs proceeds at firft: from and is caus'd by Somewhat without and diftind from the Mind itfelf. The Soul mutt firft be atted upon before it can re-aft. In the Beginning of Infancy it is as if it were not; it is not confcious of its own Exiftence, till it has receiv'd the firft Senfation of cPatn; then, and not before, it begins to feel itfelf, is rous'd, and put into A&ion; then it difcovers its Powers and Faculties, and exerts them to expel the Uneaiinefs. Thus is the Machine fet on work ; this is Life. Wc are firft mov'd by Tain, and the whole fucceeding Courfe of our Lives is but one continu'd Series of Action with a View to be freed from it. As faft as we have excluded one Uneaiinefs another appears, otherwife the Motion would ceafe. If a continual Weight is not apply'd, the Clock will flop. And as foon as the Avenues of Uneaftnefs to the Soul are choak'd up or cut off, we are dead, we think and aft no more. II. This

[

Itf

]

II. This Uneajtnefs, whenever felt, produces Defire to be freed from it, great in exaft proportion to the Uneajtnefs. Thus is Uneajtnefs the firft Spring and Caufe of all Aftion j for till we are uneafy in Reft, wc can have no Defire to move, and without Defire of moving there can be no voluntary Motion. The Experience of every Man who has obferv'd his own Actions will evince the Truth of this 5 and I think nothing need be faid to prove that the T>efire will be equal to the Uneajtnefs, for the very Thing implies as much: It is not Uneajtnefs unlefs we defire to be freed from it, nor a great Uneajtnefs unlefs the confequent Defire is great. I might here obferve, how neceflary a Thing in the Order and Defign of the Univerfe this Tain or Uneajtnefs is, and how beautiful in its Place ! Let us but fuppofe it juft now baniih'd the World entirely, and confider the Confequence of it: All the Animal Creation would immediately ftand ftock ftill, exattly in the Pofture they were in the Moment Uneafinefs departed; not a Limb, not a Finger would henceforth move; we

[ 1 7 ] we ihould all be reduc'd to the Condition of Statues, dull and una&ive : Here I fhould continue to fit motionlefs with the Pen in my Hand thus and neither leave my Seat nor write one Letter more. This may appear odd at firft View, but a little Confideration will make it evident j for 'tis impoilible to allign-any other Caufe foe the voluntary Motion of an Animal than itsiweajinefs in Reft. What a different Appearance then would the Face of Nature make, without it! How neceflfary is it! And how unlikely that the Inhabitants of the World ever were, or that the Creator ever defign'd they ihould be, exempt from it! I would likewife obferve here, that the VHIth Propofition in the preceding Section, viz. That there is neither Merit nor Demerit, &c. is here again demonstrated, as infallibly, tho' in another manner : For fince Freedom from Uneafinefs is the End of all our A&ions, how is it poilible for us to do any Thing difinterefted ? -- How can any A&ion be meritorious of Praife or Difpiaife, Reward or Punifliment, when the natural Principle of Self-Love is the only and the irrcfiftible Motive to it ? C

III. This

[ 18 ] III. This Defire is always fulfilled or fatisfy'd, In the cDefign or End of it, tho' not in the Manner: The firft is requifite, the latter not. To exemplify this, let us make a Suppofition; A Perfon is cdnfin d in a Houfe which appears to be in imminent Danger of Falling, this, as foon as perceiv'd, creates a violent Uneafinefs, and that inftantly produces an equal itrong Defire, the End of which is freedom from the Uneafinefs, and the Manner or Way propos'd to gain this End, is to get out of the Houfe. Now if he is convinced by any Means, that he is miftaken, and the Houfe is not likely to fall, he is immediately freed from his Uneafinefs, and the End of his Defire is attain'd as well as if it had been in the Manner defir'd, viz. leaving the Houfe. All our different Defires and Pailions proceed from and are reducible to this one Point, Uneafinefs, tho' the Means we propofe to ourfelves for expelling of it are infinite. Onepropofes Fame, another Wealthy a third Tower, See. as the Means to gain this End, but tho' thefe are never attain'd, if the

[ 19 ] the Uneafineis be remov'd by fome other Means, the Defire is fatisfy'd. Now during the Courfe of Life we arc ourfclves continually removing fucceillve Uneafineffes as they arife, and the laß we fuffer is remov'd by the fweet Sleep of Death. IV. The fulfilling or Satisfaction of this Defire, produces the Senfation of Pleafure, great or fmall in exatt proportion to the Defire. Tleafure is that Satisfa&ion which arifes in the Mind upon, and is caus'd by, the accomplifhment of our Beßres, and by no other Means at all; and thofe Defircs being above fliewn to be caus'd by our Tains or Uneafineffes, it follows that Tleafure is wholly caus'd by Tain, and by no other Thing at all. V. Therefore the Senfation of Pleafure is equal, or in exaft proportion to the Senfation of Pain. As the T>efire of being freed from Uncaiinefs is equal to the Uheafinefs, and the Tleafure of fatisfying that Dciire equal to the

[ to ] the Dejire, the TUafure thereby produe'd muft neceifarily be equal to the Uneajinefs or Tain which produces i t : Of three Lines, A, B, and C, if A is equal to B, and B to C, C muft be equal to A. And as our Uneajine([es are always remov'd by fome Means or other, it follows that Tleafure and Tain are in their Nature infeparable: So many Degrees as one Scale of the Ballance defcends, fo many exa&ly the other afcends; and one cannot rife or fall without the Fall or Rife of the other: *Tis impoifible to tafte of Tleafure^ without feeling its preceding proportionate Tain; or to be fenfible of Tain, without having its neceiTary Confequcnt Tleafure: The highefi Tleafure is only Confcioufnefs of Freedom from the deepeft Tain, and Pain is not Pain to us unlefs we ourfelves are fenfible of it. They go Hand in Hand ; they cannot be divided. You have a View of the whole Argument in a few familiar Examples: The ( Pain of Abftincnce from Food, as it is greater or lefs, produces a greater or leis 'Tiefire of Eating, the Accompliihment of this Dejire produces a greater or lefs Tleafure proportionate to it. The Tain of Confinement caufes the Dejire of Liberty,

[ XI ] which accomplifh'd, yields a Tleafure equal

to that Tain of Confinement. of Labour and Fatigue fur e of Reft, equal to Tain of Abfence from the Tleajure of Meeting on. &c.

The Tain

caufes the Tleathat Tain. The Friends, produces in exad proporti-

This is the fixt Nature of Pleafure and Pain, and will always be found to be fo by thofe who examine it. One of the moll common Arguments for the future Exiftence of the Soul, is taken from the generally fuppos'd Inequality of Pain and Pleafure in the prefent ; and this, notwithftanding the Difficulty by outward Appearances to make a Judgment of another's Happinefs, has been lodk'd upon as almoft unanfwerable: but fince Tain naturally and infallibly produces a Tleafure in proportion to it, every individual Creature muft, in any State of Life, have an equal Quantity of each, fo that there is not, on that Account, any Occafion for a future Adjuftment. Thus are all the Works of the Creator equally us'd by him; And no Condition of Life or Being is in itfelf better or preferable

t

]

" while others are conftantly burden'd with u a heavy Load of Maladies and Misfor" tunes, remaining for Years perhaps in " Poverty, Difgrace, or Pain, and die at " laft without any Appearance of Recom" pence." Now tho' 'tis not neceflary, when a Propofition is demonftrated to be a general Truth, to ihew in what manner it agrees with the particular Circumftances of Perfons, and indeed ought not to be requir'd; yet, as this is a common Obje&ion, ibme Notice may be taken of i t : And here let it be obferv'd, that we cannot be proper Judges of the good or bad Fortune of Others $ we are apt to imagine, that what Would give us a great Uneafinefs or a great Satisfaction, has the fame EiFeft upon others: we think, for Inftance, thofe unhappy, who muft depend upon Charity for a mean Subfiftence, who go in Rags, fare hardly, and are deipis'd and fcorn'd by all 5 not coniidering that Cuftom renders all thefe Things eafy, familiar, and even pleafant. When we fee Riches, Grandeur and a chearful Countenance, we eafily imagine Happinefs accompanies them, when oftentimes 'tis quite otherwife : Nor is a conftantly forrowful Look, attended with continual Com-

[

]

" while others are conftantly burden'd with " a heavy Load of Maladies and Misfor" tunes, remaining for Years perhaps in " Poverty, Difgrace, or Pain, and die at " laft without any Appearance of Recom" pence." Now tho' 'tis not neceflary, when a Propofition is demonftrated to be a general Truth, to ihew in what manner it agrees with the particular Circumftances of Perfons, and indeed ought not to be requir'd j yet, as this is a common Obje&ion, fome Notice may be taken of i t : And here let it be obferv'd, that we cannot be proper Judges of the good or bad Fortune of Others; we are apt to imagine, that what Would give us a great Uneafinefs or a great Satisfa&ion, has the fame Eife£t upon others: we think, for Inftance, thofe unhappy, who muft depend upon Charity for a mean Subfiftence, who go in Rags, fare hardly, and arc deipis'd and fcorn'd by all 5 not confidering that Cuftom renders all thefe Things cafy, familiar, and even pleafant. When we fee Riches, Grandeur and a chearful Countenance, we eaftly imagine Happineis accompanies them, when oftentimes 'tis quite otherwife : Nor is a conftantly forrowful Look, attended with continual Com-

[»+] Complaints, an infallible Indication of Unhappinefs. In (hort, wc can judge by nothing but Appearances, and they are very apt to deceive us. Some put on a gay chearful Outfide, and appear to the World perfectly at Eafe, tho' even then, fome inward Sting, fome fecret Pain imbitters all their Joys, and makes the Ballance even : Others appear continually dejcftcd and full of Sorrow 5 but even Grief itfelf is iometimes pleaf ant, and Tears are not always without their Sweetnefs: Beitdes, Some take a Satisfaction in being thought unhappy, ( as others take a Pride in being thought humble, ) thefe will paint their Misfortunes to others in the ftrongeft Colours, and leave no Means unus'd to make you think them throughly miferable; fo great a Tleafure it is to them to be pitted; Others retain the Form and outfide SKew of Sorrow, long after the Thing itfelf, with its Cauie, is remov'd from the Mind; it is a Habit they have acquir'd and cannot leave. Thefe, with many others that might be given, are Reafons why we cannot make a true Eftimate of the Equality of the Happineis and Unhappincfs of others; and unlefs we could, Matter of Faft cannot be oppofed to this Hypo-

[

]

Hypothecs. Indeed, we arc fometimes apt to think, that the UneafineiTes we ourfelvcs have had, outweigh our Pleafures 3 but the Reafon is this, the Mind takes no Account of the latter, they Hip away un-remark'd, when the former leave more lading Impreifions on tne Memory. But fuppoie we pais the greateft part of Life in Pain and Sorrow, fuppofe we die by Torments and think no more, 'tis no Diminution to the Truth of what is here advane'd; for the Tain, tho* exquifite, is not fo to the laji Moments of Life, the Senfes are foon benumm'd, and rendcr'd incapable of tranfmitting it fo iharply to the Soul as at firft; She perceives it cannot hold long, and 'tis an exquifite Tleafure to behold the immediate Approaches of Reft. This makes an Equivalent tho' Annihilation ihould follow : For the Quantity of Tleafure and Tain is not to be meafur'd by its Duration, any more than the Quantity of Matter by its Exteniion; and as one cubic Inch may be made to contain, by Condenlation, as much Matter as would fill ten thoufand cubic Feet, being more expanded, fo one fingle Moment of Tleafure may outweigh and epmpenfate

an Age of Tain. D

It

[ rf ] It was owing to their Ignorance of the Nature of Pleafure and Pain that the Antient Heathens believ'd the idle Fable of their Elizium, that State of uninterrupted Eafe and Happinefs! The Thing is intirely impoffible in Nature ! Arc not the Pleafures of the Spring made fuch by the Difagreeablenefs of the Winter ? Is not the Pleafure of fair Weather owing to the U n pleafantnefs of foul > Certainly. Were it then always Spring, were the Fields always green and flourifhing, and the Weather conftantly ferene and fair, the Pleafure would pall and die upon our Hands; it would ceaie to be Pleafure to us, when it is not ufher'd in by Uneaftnefs. Could the Philofopher vifit, in reality, every Star and Planet with as much Eafe and Swiftneis as he can now vifit their Ideas, and pafs from one to another of them in the Imagination ; it would be a Tleafure I grant; but it would be only in proportion to the 'Defire of accompliihing it, and that would be no greater than the Uneaftnefs fuffer'd in the Want of it. The Accompliihment of a long and difficult Journey yields a great Tleafure; but if we could take a Trip to the Moon and back again, as frequently and

[ 17 ] and with as much Eafe as we can go and come from Market, the Satisfa&ion would be juft the fame. The Immateriality of the Soul has been frequently made ufe of as an Argument for its Immortality; but let us conftder, that tho' it ihould be allow'd to be immaterial, and confequently its Parts incapable of Separation or Deftrudion by aiiy Thing material, yet by Experience we find, that it is not incapable of Ceflation of Thought, which is its Aftion. When the Body is but a little indispos'd it has an evident Effed upon the Mind; and a right Difpoiltion of the Organs is requifite to a right Manner of Thinking. In a found Sleep fometimes, or in a Swoon, we ceafe to think at a l l ; tho' the Soul is not therefore then annihilated, but exifts all the while tho' it does not a d ; and may not this probably be the Cafe after Death? All our Ideas are firft admitted by the Senfes and imprinted on the Brain, increaitng in Number by Obfervation and Experience; there they become the Subje&s of the Soul's A&ion. The Soul is a mere Power or Faculty of contemplating on, and comparing thofe Ideas when it has them ; hence fprings Reafon : But as it can

D 2

think

[

]

think on nothing but Ideas, it muft have them before it can think at all. Therefore as it may exift before it has rccciv'd any Ideas, it may exift before it thinks. T o remember a Thing, is to have the Idea of it ftill plainly imprinted on the Brain, which the Soul can turn to and contemplate on Occafion. T o forget a Thing, is to have the Idea of it defae'd and deftroy'd by fome Accident, or the crouding in and imprinting of great variety of other Ideas upon it, fo that the Soul cannot find out its Traces and diftinguifh it. When we have thus loft the Idea of any one Thing, we can think no more, or ceafe to think, on that Thing $ and as we can lofe the Idea of one Thing, fo wc may of ten, twenty, a hundred, &c. and even of all Things, bccaufe they arc not in their Nature permanent j and often during Life we fee that fome Men, ( by an Accident or Diftemper affe&ing the Brain,) lofe the greateft Part of their Ideas, and remember very little of their paft Anions and Circumftanccs. Now upon Death, and the Dcftru&ion of the Body, the Ideas contain'd in the Brain, (which are alone the Subje&s of the Soul's Adtion) being then likewife ncceifariJy deftroy'd, the Soul, tho' incapable

[

]

capable of Deftru&ion itfclf, muft then neceffarily ceafe to think or having nothing left to think or ad upon. It is redue'd to its firft inconfcious State before it receiv'd any Ideas. And to ceafe to think is but little different from ceafing to be. Neverthelcfs, 'tis not impoflible that this fame Faculty of contemplating Ideas may be hereafter united to a new Body, and receive a new Set of Ideas; but that will no way concern us who are now living; for the Identity will be loft, it is no longer that fame Self but a new Being. I (hall here fubjoin a ihort Recapitulation of the Whole, that it may with all its Parts be comprehended at one View. 1. It is fuppos'd that God the Maker and Governour of the Univerfe, is infinitely wife, goodt and powerful. 2. In confequence of His infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs, it is ajferted, that whatever He doth muft be infinitely wife and gOOd

5

3. Unlefs He be interrupted, and His Meafttres broken by fome other Being, which is tmpoffible becaufe He is Almighty. 4. In

[ 30 ] 4. In confequence of His infinite Tower, it is ajferted, that nothing can exijl or be done in the Unwerfe which is not agreeable to His Will, and therefore good. 5. Evil is hereby excluded, with all Merit and Demerit s and likewife all preference in the EJleem of God, of one 'Tart of the Creation to another. This is the Summary of the firft Part. N o w our common Notions of Juftice will tell us, that if all created Things are equally efteem'd by the Creator, they ought to be equally us'd by Him ; and that they are therefore equally us'd, we might embrace for Truth upon the Credit, and as the true Confequence of the foregoing Argument. Neverthelefs we proceed to confirm it, by ihewing how they are equally us'd, and that in the following Manner.

1. Creature when endu'd -with Life or Confcioufnefs, is made capable of Uneafinefs or Tain. 2. This Tain produces Tie fire to be freed from it, in ex ail proportion to itfelf. 3. The Accomplifhment of this Defire produces an equal Tleafure. 4. Tleafure is confequently equal to Tam. From

[

]

From thcfc Propofitions it is obfcrv'd, 1. That every Creature hath as much Tleafure as Tain. 2. That Life is not preferable to Infenfibility i for Tleafure and Tain deftroy one another: That Being which has ten 'Degrees of Tain fubtrafted from ten of Tleafure, has nothing remaining, and is upon an equality with that Being which is infenfible of both. 3. KAS the firjl Tart proves that all Things muft be equally us d by the Creator becaufe equally efleem'd ; fo this fecond Tart demonflrates that tbey are equally efleem'd becaufe equally us'd. 4. Since every AEtion is the Effett of Self-Uneafinefsy the DtftinBion of Virtue and Vice is excluded; and Prop. VIII. in Se£t. I. again demonftrated. 5. No State of Life can be happier than the prefent, becaufe Tleafwre and Tain are tnfeparable. Thus both Parts of this Argument agiee with and confirm one another, and the Dcmonftration is reciprocal. I am fenfiblc that the Do&rine here advane'd, if it were to be publiih'd, would meet

[ meet with but an indifferent Reception. Mankind naturally and generally love to be flatter'd: Whatever Tooths our Pride, and tends to exalt our Species above the reft of the Creation, we arc plcas'd with and eafily believe, when ungrateful Truths fhali be with the utmoft indignation rejected. " What! bring ourfelves down to an Equa" lity with the Beafts of the Field! with the " tneamft part of the Creation! 'Tis in" fufferablc!" But, ( t o ufe a Piece of common Senfe) our Geefe are but Geefe tho' we may think 'em Swans ; and Ttuth will be Truth thoJ it fometimes prove mortifying and diftafteful.