A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty: Volume 1 9814332186, 9789814332187

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Preface
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Notes
References
Index

Citation preview

This book provides an account of the history of the Manchurian rise, its flourishing, decline and demise, but above all, it reflects the history of the development, creation and struggle for a modern China. The book, in four volumes, begins with the ancestors of the Manchu and the rise of Manchu, and ends at the Opium War in 1840.

AUTHOR

Dai Yi was Deputy Director of the History Department, Renmin University of China and Director of the National Editorial Board on the Qing Dynasty’s History. He has written and edited over 30 books, including the Draft of China’s Modern History and A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty.

A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

A Complete Account of the 268-Year History of the Qing Dynasty

A Concise History of the

Volume 1

Qing Dynasty

Dai Yi

Volume 1

Chinese Historical Studies ISBN 978-981-4332-18-7

SILKROAD PRESS

SILKROAD P R E S S

SILKROAD PRESS

Dai Yi

Published by Enrich Professional Publishing (S) Private Limited 16L, Enterprise Road, Singapore 627660

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English edition © 2011 by Enrich Professional Publishing (S) Private Limited Chinese original edition © 2006 China Renmin University Press Translated by Lan Fangfang, Liu Bingxin and Liu Hui All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage

and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without prior written permission from the Publisher.

ISBN (Hardback)

978-981-4332-18-7



978-981-4332-62-0 (epub)

ISBN (ebook)

978-981-4332-61-3 (pdf)

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Contents Preface

vii

Chapter 1 The Rise of Manchu and the Establishment and Development of the Latter Jin Regime 1 Chapter 2 The Repression of Peasant Uprisings by the Qing Troops and the Struggles against Qing in Various Regions 99 Chapter 3 The Establishment of the Reign of the Qing Dynasty over China and Its Early Policies 173 Chapter 4 The Progressive Trend of Materialism in the Latter Half of the Seventeenth Century 215 Notes

239

References 261 Index 273

Preface The Qing Dynasty was a feudal institution with the Manchu, a minority in China, as the upper class and was the last feudal monarchical dynasty in the long feudal history of China. The Qing Dynasty ruled China, a vast country, for two hundred and sixty eight years. China was an independent feudal state in the stage of late feudal society when the Qing rulers broke through the border in the year 1664 to usurp the achievements of the Peasants’ War in the late Ming Dynasty and establish its rule over the whole country. After more than one hundred years of development, the Qing Dynasty reached its peak in the mid-eighteenth century. Within the vast territory the unity of all ethnic groups in China was further enhanced, and the feudal politics, economy and culture were developed to their peak. Following this, due to the growth of internal contradictions in the feudal society and the bud of capitalism in China, the crisis of feudal rule occurred. In the late eighteenth century, peasant uprisings broke out all over the country. As a result, the Qing Dynasty began to decline. At this time the Western European countries had already completed their bourgeois revolutions and moved into a capitalist society, plundering their colonies all over the world. Finally, feudal China became one of their important targets of predation. With the outbreak of the Opium War in 1840, the armed capitalist invaders opened the door to China. From then on China gradually stepped into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and onto the stage of modern history. At the same time as imperialism colluded with feudalism in China to force China to beome a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, the Chinese people never gave up their fight against the imperialists and their lackeys. In the Opium War, the Taiping Revolution, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Hundred Days Reform and the Boxer Rebellion, the Chinese people demonstrated their indomitable courage and fighting spirit. In the Revolution of 1911 the bourgeoisie overthrew the Qing Government, which had become the lackey of imperialism, ending the autocratic monarchy of more than 2,000 years in China and establishing a democratic republic. The "long river" of the history was surging forward. These two hundred and sixty years witnessed the rise, prosperity, decline and downfall of the Aisin Giorro dynasty, but more importantly it witnessed the development, creativity and struggle of the great people of all nationalities in China. During this long and arduous period, the Chinese people suffered enormous hardship and frustration, created beautiful ideas and hopes and undertook continuous

Preface

exploration and combat. In the most difficult years of hardship the Chinese people still left an extremely rich and valuable heritage. In this two hundred and sixty eight years we can find innumerable passionate and epic battle stories; strong, brave, diligent and wise figures; brilliant economic and cultural achievements; and vivid and rich experience and lessons. The Qing Dynasty is an important chapter in China's long history, a great turning point between the past and future and a ladder used by the Chinese people to wage arduous struggles, grope in the dark, get through the "fog" and go forward to the future. Since the history of Qing Dynasty is close to us and closely associated with practical struggle, it is worth serious study and research. This book describes the history from the rise of the Manchu to the Opium War which broke out in 1840, after which China walked into its modern era in which the natures of society and revolution began to change dramatically and were fundamentally different from the early and mid Qing Dynasty. Various works of detailed modern Chinese history have been published, with which the basic content of this book can link up. This book is written by the Institute of Qing History of Renmin University of China and edited by Dai Yi assisted by Ma Ruheng. Chapter 1 of Volume 1 was written by Li Hongbin, Chapter 2 by Lin Tiejun, Chapter 3 by Du Wenkai, Chapter 4 by Zhang Jinfan, Chapter 5 by Ma Ruheng, Zhang Jinfan and Ma Jinke, Chapters 6 and 7 by Li Hua. At first, part of Volume 2 of this book was drafted by Ma Xin, Ma Ruheng, Ma Jinke, Li Hua, Zhang Jinfan, Hu Mingyang and Qin Baoqi et al. Later, due to the structural changes in the book and personnel changes, the writing work was re-organized. Finally, Chapter 8 was written by Luo Ming, Wang Sizhi and Lin Tiejun, Chapter 10 by Mu Ruheng, Chapter 12 by Lu Yingfan, Wang Daocheng and Chen Yalan, Chapter 13 by Li Hua, Chapter 14 by Lin Tiejun and Ma Ruheng, and Chapter 15 by Wang Junyi. Dai Yi wrote the other chapters and revised the whole book. Illustrations were collected by Li Hua and Li Hongbin. We would like to express thanks to institutions such as the Chinese History Museum and the First Historical Archives of China which provided great assistance in the collection of illustrations. We sincerely look forward to any suggestions on the shortcomings of this book. Dai Yi

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1

Chapter

The Rise of Manchu and the Establishment and Development of the Latter Jin Regime

A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

The Situation in China and the World in the Early Seventeenth Century The World Situation in the Early Seventeenth Century and the Invasion of Early Colonialism in China In the early seventeenth century, the Manchu rose abruptly in the regions between the Changbai Mountains and Heilongjiang River at a time when both the world and China were experiencing violent revolution and turmoil. At that time, the United Kingdom was leading the economic and political development all over the world. In the mid-seventeenth century the bourgeois revolution broke out in the UK. It was a revolution based on the whole development processes of the UK from the Middle Ages. Thanks to the progress of production technology, the expansion of social division of labor and the development of the commodity economy, the capitalist production relationship grew up inside feudal society and inevitably broke the shackles of the old feudal system. After the revolution, a new order of the bourgeoisie was established in the UK. As a turning point in the history of the world and the first major victory of capitalism against feudalism, this revolution created the conditions for further the development of British capitalism while stimulating the outbreak of bourgeois revolution in Europe and North America. When the bourgeois revolution broke out in the UK, China was experiencing the great peasant revolutions led by Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong during the waning days of the Ming dynasty. The nature and role of this revolution and the stage of social development in which this revolution broke out were different from the revolution in the UK. This revolution was a simple peasant war and indicated the new outbreak of periodic crisis in a feudal society. The peasant revolution in feudal society blazed the way for productivity development and was a great force for historical development. However, the simple peasant revolution could not change the old mode of production fundamentally and would end in failure since the feudal system would still be preserved even if some links and forms were changed. The old feudal system would be given a fatal blow only when the development of productivity provides necessary conditions and when the bourgeoisie appear on the political scene. As a general development trend in world history, capitalism would replace feudalism. Chinese history did not deviate from this trend. When the bourgeois revolution broke out in Britain, there was the bud of capitalism in society in

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China. Even if there had been no impact of external factors, China would also move slowly towards capitalism. In the early seventeenth century, the seeds of capitalism in China were not sufficiently cultivated and China was still in the late feudal society which was quite far from the establishment of capitalism. This is mainly reflected by the following points: First, the autarkical feudal natural economic structure in China was extremely strong. The landlords exploited the peasants brutally, robbing them of most of their produce so that the whole family had to engage in sideline occupations and cottage craft in order to maintain the minimum living standard since they could not improve their production and living conditions. Under the exploitation of the landlords, agriculture and small crafts combined strongly everywhere, creating the major obstacle to further development of the seeds of capitalism and providing the foundation for the powerful feudal despotism in China. Second, the insufficient development of new economic strength resulted in the insufficient development of a new political force. At that time, many handicraftsmen and some people who had become rich through business in a small number of towns launched riots and struggles. However there was no political force that was as powerful as the bourgeois in Western Europe able to fight against the landlord class. Third, with the unwieldly but well-organized governmental agency, the feudal autocratic regime in China controlled all aspects of social life by powerful and effective means of repression. The feudal regime stubbornly obstructed the growth of all things new, trying desperately to maintain the old foundation. Fourth, since China was a unified multi-ethnic country with a vast territory and a large population, the development of various regions was extremely uneven. The seeds of capitalism occurred in the most economically developed southeast coastal areas, but economic and cultural development in the vast hinterland was relatively backward. The remote areas and border regions were still in the early stage of feudal society or even in slavery society or primitive society. In Western Europe many independent states co-existed and the economic development between these states was relatively balanced. The developed countries were not much affected by the surrounding backward regions. As a result, the UK was the first to break the feudal system and erect the banner of bourgeois revolution. Within nearly two hundred years after the UK developed capitalist society, the states in Western Europe also walked into capitalist society due to their own development and the mutual impact. In China which was a tremendous feudal country ruled by one government, in which development was highly uneven, since the small area with most

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

developed economy was surrounded by a large number of backward areas it was impossible for this area to get rid of the fetters of the feudal system and enter capitalist society. Fifth, in the early 17th century, the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties as the typical feudal ideology of official philosophy had passed through its golden age but was far from decline and fall. With the strong support of the feudal regime, Neo-Confucianism was still a major stumbling block to social progress in China. This shows that it would take some considerable time to realize capitalism in China since this required the improvement of political, economic and cultural levels. During the two hundred years of the early Qing Dynasty, China stumbled forward but in general China had been left behind by some advanced countries in Western Europe since the early seventeenth century. With the bourgeois revolution in the UK as a starting point, the history of Western Europe developed rapidly, and capitalism boomed. The emerging bourgeoisie destroyed all the old feudal, patriarchal and idealistic relationships and thinking. As a result, the tools of production were improved rapidly; transportation was developed; science and technology experienced rapid advance; and productivity grew extremely rapidly. However, after all, the bourgeois class is an exploiting class and plundering is the principle of existence and development of the bourgeoisie who must ruthlessly exploit the proletariat in their own countries and the working people all over the world in order to enrich themselves. The development of the bourgeoisie is always coupled with blood and violence. From the very beginning, the capitalism and colonialism were closely correlated with each other. "The growing need for expansion of production sales drove the capitalists to run all over the world. They must nest, settle and establish relations everywhere"1. The crazy colonial plunder made a market for industrial products and raw materials, bringing about huge wealth that could be transformed into capital and promoting the development of capitalism. In addition, the further development of capitalism stimulated the greed of the bourgeoisie and enhanced its drive for colonial expansion. The under-developed countries and nationalities in Asia, Africa and Latin America gradually became the objects of colonial slavery by the European bourgeoisie. Portugal and Spain were the world's earliest colonial countries. With geographical discovery and the opening of new ocean routes, their explorers, businessmen, missionaries and armed fleets traveled all over the world. The first areas influenced by colonial aggression were located in Africa and America. In the 16th century the Portuguese established a series of colonial settlements

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The Rise of the Manchu

in Africa for slave trade and gold depredation. The Spanish slaughtered the Indians and Incas in South America and established a huge colonial empire. At the same time, colonialism began to influence many regions in Asia. The Portuguese occupied Goa, India in 1510 and occupied Malacca which was the transport hub and strategic location of Southeast Asia in 1511; they then set up forts in Colombo, Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan and other areas. In 1517 (the 12th year of the Zhengde Reign of the Ming period), the Portuguese broke into Guangzhou, forcing the government to establish a trading relationship with them. At the same time the Spanish invaded the Philippines and some islands in Western Pacific. Then the colonists from the Netherlands, Britain and France came one after another. The Netherlands crowded out the forces of Portugal and Spain and took control of Indonesia; Britain and France invaded India and Southeast Asia. The European colonial bandits were engaged in fierce competition for colonies in the Far East and other parts of the world. When colonialist aggression was rampant all over the world, ancient China and many other oppressed countries and people were caught in the vortex of history, becoming the object of European robbers. From then on the early struggle of the Chinese people against colonialism was closely related to the struggles of the people all over the world against colonialism. The oppressed countries and people supported and influenced each other. Objectively speaking, the Chinese people's struggle against aggression is an important component of the struggle of the people all over the world against aggression. From the 16th century to the early 17th century, the Western colonialists invaded the southeast coastal areas and northern border areas of China. On the one hand, the colonists from Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain and France came to China by sea. In 1557 (the 36th year of the Jiajing Reign) the Portuguese usurped Macao; in 1622 (the second year of the Tianqi Reign) the colonists from the Netherlands invaded the Pescadores and occupied Taiwan in 1624, building the cities of Chiqian and Taiwan; in 1626 the Spanish occupied Jilong and Danshui in Taiwan. On the other hand, the tsarist Russia which was still in the stage of feudal serfdom, joined the ranks of the colonial states. In the late 16th century and the early 17th century, the Cossacks crossed the vast and cold Siberia and devastated many weak nationalities which were without defense forces, and then came to the border of China. In the early 17th century the Russians came to the northwest of China, trying to trick and intimidate the Mongol tribes of Kalmuck to surrender to Russia. In 1643 (the 16th year of the Chongzhen Reign of the Ming period), for the first time, the Russians invaded the Heilong River Valley and occupied the land there, forcing the local minorities to concede defeat and offer tribute. These colonial robbers committed

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

innumerable sins in China: encroaching on land, murder, arson, capturing people, slave trading, enforcing tribute and taxes, looting gold, silver and furs. For example, after occupying Taiwan, the Dutch bled the local Chinese people for land rent and poll tax and pillaged deerskin, sugar and other native products every year. They molested traveling merchants openly at sea and often sent "their ships with huge cannon to attack the merchants in the areas between Jiaozhou and Luzon and rob all the silk and cotton goods"2. They also captured the residents in the coastal areas of China and sold them to Southeast Asia and Europe as slaves. In 1622 the Dutch colonists captured more than 1,400 Chinese people in one action, shipped them to Southeast Asia and other areas, and sold them as slaves. Another example is the burning and looting in the Heilong River Valley by the Russian invaders. In one action they killed 661 Daur people who refused to surrender, captured 361 women and children and stole a large number of livestock and precious mink furs. Another group of Russian bandits even ate 50 Chinese people one winter. The Chinese people resisted the aggression of Western colonists heroically. In 1516 (the 11th year of the Zhengde Reign of the Ming Period), the Portuguese occupied Tunmen and Nantou etc. in Dongguan County but were finally defeated by local people and the Ming army; in 1622 the Dutch occupied the Penghu islands but were soon expelled by the Ming army; in the midseventeenth century the Russian bandits seized the Heilong River Valley in China and but then fled in panic under the attack of local minorities and the Qing army, and finally withdrew from the Heilongjiang River valley; Taiwan that had been occupied by the Dutch returned to its motherland thanks to the heroic counterattack led by Zheng Chenggong. When the vast regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America were colonized in succession, the Chinese people and government could still perform effective resistance and repeatedly crush the plots of early colonist bandits to seize the land of China and were able to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the country for a very long period of time. This was because on the one hand, China is geographically far away from Western colonial powers; the colonists that wanted to come to China via the Cape of Good Hope in Africa by sea or via Siberia by land had to spend several years or months to reach China since there was a dangerous natural barrier composed of mountains and the sea. The early colonial countries were not capable of launching a large-scale expedition to China. The colonialists could encounter the resistance of many countries and people in Asia and Africa and hence they had to advance step by step. First, they would deal with these countries and people and destroy their resistance while setting up a series of strongholds along the way to China so as

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The Rise of the Manchu

to strengthen their invading forces in the Far East and China. As a result, the independence of China during the hundreds of years before the Opium War was closely associated with the anti-colonial struggles conducted by the people in Asia and Africa. On the other hand, China is a powerful country with a long history, a developed civilization, rich natural resources and a large population, and the Chinese people had the spirit of heroic struggle against foreign aggression. Before the arrival of the colonists China has long been a unified and highly organized country with a powerful defense force. Hence early colonialism encountered strong resistance in China. When the colonial bandits were rampant, China stood towering like a giant for a long time in the East, repressing the expansion of colonialism. The Chinese people's struggle against colonial aggression was an effective support for the fight of the people all over the world against colonial aggression. However the nature of the conflict between China and the early colonial powers in the 17th century was fundamentally different from that of the struggle between feudal countries. The invaders would introduce capitalist society, and their economic, political, and military forces were grew at an unprecedented rate; China, as the invaded country and being wrapped in layers of networks of old relationships, was developing slowly and behind the colonial powers. Over time the balance of power was shifting in favor of the invaders and China was losing its defense advantages. The historical changes often started from subtle points that were not observed by the people and the struggle only showed its clear outline and profound impact after an extremely long period of time. In the early 17th century, who would know that the invaders who "accidentally" broke our borders in the southeast and northeast would develop into a huge invasion power that would trample the whole of China? Who could feel that we urgently needed to do our utmost to catch up with the Western countries which were far more developed than China? The eyes and minds of people are often limited to the current situation and individual events and revel in temporary security while history progresses silently and inexorably in accordance with objective laws. People would come to the following conclusion after several centuries: the countries that develop slowly will inevitably be bullied! When China came into contact with the early colonial countries, the competition of power and development speed began. At the same time, the Ming Dynasty was changing from prosperity to decline and the Ming government was facing the following two most critical and urgent domestic problems: 1) The peasant war as the result of land annexation; 2) The domestic national struggle as a result of the decline in power of Ming government and the rise of minorities in border areas. Both the problems had periodically

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

recurred in the history of China and greatly changed the historical progress and developed into special political struggle which brought about the rise and growth of Qing Dynasty and created the historical conditions for its ruling of the whole of China.

The Decadent Rule of the Ming Dynasty and the Great Peasant Uprising in the Late Ming Dynasty In the early 17th century, the contradictions accumulated during the rule of more than two hundred years by Ming Dynasty could not be resolved. The high concentration of ownership of land, the intensification of class contradictions and ethnic conflicts, the corruption of governing institutions, the deepening of social crisis and the painful life of people indicated that the Ming Dynasty has gone through the boom and was moving towards its Doomsday. The principal contradiction in feudal society is the contradiction between the landlord class and peasant class. The landlords greedily pursued wealth, exploited the peasants and annexed the land. "They took over the farmland and occupied the houses of peasants endlessly" 3 . This brought about the high concentration of land and the sharp polarization between the rich and the poor. The Emperors of Ming Dynasty, as the most powerful and greedy landlords, occupied the farmland of peasants and built their "royal manor" while bestowing land on the princes and relatives. This land was referred to as the "land estate of princes' mansions". The Ming Dynasty granted more than fifty princes the right to establish their own spheres of influence in Shandong, Henan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Huguang, Sichuan and Jiangxi etc. Besides the "maintenance farmland" and the "burning incense land" near the capital, the princes owned large manors in their own spheres of influence, and some manors extended across two or three provinces. For example, Zhu Changxun (Prince Fu) who was the son of Shenzong had more than 20,000 qing (1 qing = 66,667 sq.m.) of manors in Henan, Shandong and Huguang. By the reign of Tianqi in the late Ming period, 500,000 qing of manors had been established all over the country. In addition to the establishment of above-mentioned "manors", the landlords and bureaucrats were furiously usurping land, occupying a lot of private land by means of usurpation, compulsory acquisition and tribute etc. In the reign of Wanli, some landlord in the south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River owned 70,000 mu of land, and some despotic gentry in Shaanxi had 10,000 mu (1 mu = 666.67 sq.m.) of land. Dong Qichang, the Director of the Board of Rites in the reign of Tianqi, bought 10,000 qing of private land by force. General officers and landlords also occupied a considerable quantity of land.

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Since much private land was wantonly plundered by the royal family and its relatives and landlords and bureaucrats, ownership of land was highly concentrated in the reign of Wanli, and the situation was more serious in the reigns of Tianqi and Chongzhen than in the reign of Wanli. More than a half of the land in the provinces in the vast regions along the Yellow River and Yangtze River was occupied by seigniors4. What was more serious was that all the land in some cities and counties was held by the gentry and local bullies.5 "The rich held hundreds of mu of land, while the poor only possessed a speck of land". The feudal landlords held a lot of farmland. However, they never operated their farmland themselves but rented the land to peasants and charged an extremely high rent As Chairman Mao said, "the feudal ruling class composed of the landlords, aristocrats and Emperors owned most of the land while the peasants rarely had their own farmland. With their own tools, the peasants worked on the farmland of landlords, aristocrats and royal families and delivered forty, fifty, sixty, seventy or even eighty percents of their harvest to the landlords, aristocrats and royal families" 6. Relying on their power, many aristocratic, bureaucrats and gentry "specified the rent rate at their own will"7. What is more ridiculous is that, in the reign of Tianqi, when Xizong wanted to bestow more than 30,000 mu of land on Princes Hui and Gui, there was no land available; in this case, Xizong collected the land rent (that should be collected from the bestowed farmland) from the cities and counties and this was referred to as the "rent from no land". At that time, Prince Fu extorted more than 46,000 liang (1 liang = 36.9 grams) of rent silver every year, and Prince Lu plundered more than 40,000 liang of rent silver every year. In this case, "all the land rent in Henan and Shandong has been plundered"8. A similar situation occurred in other regions. So we can say that the feudal land rent was a mountain on the heads of peasants. As well as the heavy burden of land rent, peasants were subject to an excessively large variety of taxes. There were primary taxes, additional taxes and future taxes. In describing the difficult situation for people at the time, it was said “new taxes was urged when the old ones were still being levied and additional taxes were imposed on people who were still troubled by primary taxes” 9, and “there were many additional taxes within one year ’s time”10. In 1618, or the 46th year of the Wanli period, the Ming regime started to levy “Liao Xiang” or literally payment for armies in the eastern Liao region, as the Ming was at the time fighting the the Houjing regime that threatened the Liao region. The payment, started at a rate of two li per mu, soon rose to nine li, which added up to nine million liang silver yearly. In 1637, or the tenth year of Emperor Chongzhen’s reign, in order to suppress a peasant uprising, the Ming

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

regime started “Jiao Xiang”, which means payments for armies fighting the peasants, amounting to over 3.3 million liang silver yearly. In 1639, or the 12th year of Emperor Chongzhen’s reign, “Lian Xiang” or payments for military drill, was invented, which took another 7.3 million liang of silver off the population. The three payments mentioned above amounted to 20 million liang 11. Moreover tariffs, salt tax, taxes on miscellaneous items etc. extracted another 2.319 million liang of silver from the peasants annually. In sharp contrast to this landlords and government officials, often in possession of large areas of farmlands, were exempt from these taxes or payments due to their tax exemption privilege. They had “no obligation to pay production taxes, do forced labor, or pay taxes on their farmlands or manors”12. Peasants, in contrast, bore all the burdens of taxes. It was said, “government sent vicious soldiers to collect taxes, and the rich and powerful collected their debts mercilessly”13. This was the real picture of how cruelly the ruling class exploited the population in the closing phase of the Ming dynasty. In the closing period of the Ming, corruption became a prominent problem. Emperor Wanli “stayed in his palace for twenty years of political inaction when he showed interest in nothing”14 but building his own mausoleum with as much as eight million liang of silver. The “daxueshi” or literally the grant secretary in charge of the daily routines of the central government was also “half-hearted in his job and often made imprudent and wrong decisions in his proposed reply to appeals. In the ailing regime and amid its bumpy ruling of the nation, they did nothing to improve the status”15. “As the Emperor resorted to inaction and stayed quietly in his palace, his officials followed suit by staying idle in their own residences” 16. As a result, the whole governing body, was like “a throat that was blocked, through which no food could pass”17. “Hubu”, a department resembling the combination of modern tax bureau and treasury department, “has stopped operating for long…it doesn’t perform its function effectively both in delivering funds and receiving tax payments”. “Xingbu”, a department resembling the modern department of justice “has stored up close to one thousand prisoners pending judgment”. “Libu”, the education department, also “ground to a halt due to the lack of personnel”18. From the very top to the foundation, the whole bureaucracy was defunct despite its seemingly complete structure. It was like a rusted machine incapable of functioning. Many of its officials were busy with political conflicts. The state of the regime was described in the following words: “cliques and clans posted distinct and increasingly widened gaps in the ruling body. The relations between these different cliques, was first surrounded by an air of unfriendliness, then morphed into a separation from each other, and finally into complete hostility. Officials, who

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often stayed out of the fight at the beginning, were inevitably drawn into these arenas, first as assistants and later as frenzied fighters. The relationships and conflicts among them constituted a complex and intricate net.”19 In the several decades before the collapse of the Ming, cliques became commonplace in the bureaucracy; and both open and secret strife intensified; political wrestling, which sometimes developed into merciless slaughter, happened from time to time. Bribery and corruption prevailed in the regime to a point that the Emperor Chongzhen admitted himself that “nowadays becoming a government official only means personal profit. It has become something like a business. While levying taxes, they focus on calculating Huohao (an extra amount of taxes levied to compensate the losses in the later process of casting the silver fragments into ingots, which was often taken by officials), and after collecting the due amounts, they want more. Even places or people that are exempted are illegally ordered to pay taxes. When they talk about constructions or repairs of any public facilities, they are actually thinking about the profits they can steal from the projects. There are so many ways of corruption, as officials may buy things from regular people without paying the equal amount, collect money in the name of building or repairing post-roads, selling government positions to the rich and ignoring the poor in the appointment of these positions and reversing rights and wrongs in ruling legal cases. If officials are biased and don’t follow their own conscience, they will feel no guilt in unscrupulously harming the innocent and honest; in exchange for bribe, officials can tolerate any evil. Both promoting and impeaching officials involve fraud, and the reputation of important high officials is so often reverse to the truth. High officials serving in the court know no limits for their greed, allowing corrupt and arbitrary officials to act freely; officials in places other than the capital eliminate anyone holding different opinions or stances, allowing bullies to rampage in the villages…those of lower ranks pander to higher officials due to for fear of their clout. Seeing all these evils in the bureaucracy, how can ordinary people subject to this rule be have one single night of peaceful sleep?”20 The above statement illustrates how corrupt the rule of the Ming had become in its last moments. Such a merciless exploitation of the population deprived it of the ability to survive natural disasters. In the two decades from 1619 (the 47th year of the Wanli period) to 1639 (the twelfth year of the Chongzhen period), flood, drought, locusts and hail occurred all over China consecutively, with Shanxi, Henan and Shandong provinces being the most severely hit. Take the drought in the Yanan city of Shanxi province in 1628 (the first year of Chongzhen period) for example “there was no rain for the whole year, and all plants had dried up. In August and September, people all went up to the mountains to collect wild

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

grass for food. By October, since all the wild grass had been eaten up, people turned to the skin of trees, which lasted till the end of the year, when the skin of trees had been eaten up. People were left with no choice but to eat small stones…more miserably stunning was the scenario that children and lone adults went out of the city never came back. Later it was found that people staying outside of the city burnt human bones and used the fire to cook the flesh, which explained the disappearance of children and lone adults.”21 Another example was Henan province which since 1634 had suffered from three years of drought. The situation was as follows: “no plants could be found in the wild, and nine out of ten households were empty...people ate the roots of plants, husbands abandoned wives, fathers abandoned children. Some chose to commit suicide in the wild, some, with ragged clothes and pale face, chose to beg for food, some chose to left their broken homes for somewhere with food, some chose to kill their family members for food.”22 At the end of the Chonzhen period, Shandong and Henan provinces were both plagued by swarms of locusts, “again, grass, grass roots and tree skin were all eaten up, and cannibalism again occurred… women and children were put in the market with hands tied behind their back and were brought home and slaughtered like animals.” 23 Such a picture of starvation and misery developed to an extremely serious level. Under such inhumane exploitation from the rulers and landlords, farmers and other working class people went bankrupt, became homeless, or sold their wives and children, yet still livied in starvation. They struggled on the brink of death, cursing the dark world they lived in and those who put them into this misery. Tortured by such profound sadness and pushed by the violent resentment, they seemed to be left with one choice only – to rise up against the Ming regime, smash into pieces the load imposed on them, tear down the palaces of the Ming and hope for a new life after a deadly fight. The social contradiction that had been accumulating for a long time and had grown to an intolerable degree finally broke into a string of uprisings of farmers that soon swept through China and led to the collapse of the Ming dynasty. In March 1627 (the seventh year of the Tianqi period), the farmers of Chengcheng county of Shanxi Province raised the banner of uprising under Waner, a fellow farmer, thus raising the curtain on a great civil war. This seemingly tiny event proved to cause a much larger stir, as by 1630 (the third year of Chongzhen period), there were already over one hundred rebel armies. They fought the government army, sometimes jointly and sometimes separately, and traveled all over the country. In these many small battles the rebel armies soon came to the consensus that the Ming regime might crush them one by one if they kept fighting separately. They gradually integrated into an army

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The Rise of the Manchu

under one man’s command, Gao Yingxiang, or Chuangwang, a title literally meaning Adventurous King. The army fought battles in many places such as Hunan, Sichuan, Shanxi, and Henan, and defeated the Ming army in all these battles. The momentum of the uprising grew rapidly, and so did the number of rebels. In 1634 (the seventh year of the Chongzhen period) the rebel army occupied Chenzhou in Henan Province (now Huaiyang) and Xingyang, causing great panic in the Ming regime which reacted by sending more soldiers to the battlefield in the hope of suppressing the rebels in the Zhongyuan region, or central China. In the face of such a formidable enemy in January of 1635 (the eighth year of Chongzhen period), Gao Yingxiang, the leader of the army, summoned all 13 armies and 72 camps of the combined rebel force in Xingyang to discuss countermeasures against the siege. In the meeting Li Zicheng, a brave and adventurous general, made the following statement, “even one man will fight bravely under such circumstances, not to mention an army as large as one hundred thousand soldiers. There is nothing the Ming army can do to us.” 24 The meeting approved Li Zicheng’s proposal to “divide the army into several parts which act according to their respective plans.” The rebel army was thus separated to several parts and advanced to confront the Ming army. The “Xingyang meeting” was a key moment in the peasant uprising at the close of the Ming, which marked the beginning of a planned strategic collaboration of the rebel forces. After the meeting, the east flank of the rebel army led by Gao Yingxiang and Zhang Xiangzhon swiftly moved to the Huai River region and took over Fengyang, thus thwarting the siege by the Ming regime. In 1636 (the fourteenth year of the Chongzhen period), Gao Yingxiang was captured and executed. Li Zicheng was therefore proposed and agreed upon as the new Adventurous King. In 1641 (the fourteenth year of the Chongzhen period), a rebel army headed by Li Zicheng defeated Zhu Changxun, the King of Fortune, and conquered Luoyang. This was closely followed by Zhang Xianzhong’s victory over Zhu Yiming, the Xiang King, and the ensuing occupation of Luoyang. After a struggle lasting over a decade the rebel army had developed two leaders, Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong, each commander of an army of several thousand thousands. In view of the social conflicts at the time, the rebel army put forth policies such as “average allocation of land and tax exemption,” “no tax and killing for three years” 25, “land seized will be given back to the multitudes after a thorough checking”26 and “selling at the cost price”27. These policies earned the rebel army great public support, encouraging more people to join them or to help them, which gave a further guarantee of victory in the revolutionary war. In November 1642 (the fifteenth year of Chongzhen period),

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

Li Zicheng occupied Xiangyang and renamed it Xiangjing or the Xiang capital. In March of the following year he was nominated and elected as Xinshunwang, or the new Shun King, under whom a peasant revolutionary regime was preliminarily formed. Soon Li Zicheng conquered Xi’an, which he chose as the capital and renamed Xijing, or the West Capital. Meanwhile he named his new Kingdom Dashun and reset his reign title as Yongchang, thus expanding his political clout beyond Xiangjing. In May 1643 (the 16th year of the Chongzhen period), the rebel army led by Zhang Xianzhong also established a peasant revolutionary regime in Wuchang. In the following year his army moved into Sichuan Province and occupied Chengdu, which was later renamed Xijing, or the West Capital. His new Kingdom was called Daxi and the new reign title of his Kingdom was Dashun. Both peasant regimes were targeted at the Ming regime. In February 1644 (the seventh year of the Chongzhen period), Li Zicheng made a written allegation justifying his war on the Ming regime and led his army of one million people directly towards Beijing. On their way to Beijing the majority of people welcomed and supported them. The rebel army advanced smoothly and was unchallenged on their journey, as “officials of all cities and counties to the west of Beijing surrendered or ran away at the mere news of the looming arrival of the rebels.”28 By March 17, the army had reached the foot of Beijing city wall and Emperor Chongzhen committed suicide on March 19. The following takeover of Beijing by the rebel army marked the end of the Ming dynasty. After Li Zicheng’s occupation of Beijing, the political picture of China underwent drastic changes. The remaining forces of the Ming dynasty such as General Wu Sangui retreated to the Shanghaiguan region, recruiting people for their counterrevolutionary force and waiting for a chance to retaliate. While the enemy was preparing for revenge, the peasant army was surrounded by victorious joy. It was at this time that a formidable military presence, the Manchu aristocracy, who had long been planning to invade central China, decided to ally itself with the remaining forces of the Ming and moved into central China once they were informed of the fall of the Ming and the rise of the peasant regimes. Without an objective analysis of the situation after their victory over the Ming dynasty, the peasant army had neither mental preparation nor a correct strategy for the new challenge, which led to a series of defeats by the Manchu army. The whole situation turned into an unfavorable direction for the peasant army. As a result, the Manchu aristocracy, who had been accumulating their strength for half a century in northeastern China, became an overwhelming force marching into the heart of China and a fierce contest over the control of China between the Manchu army and the remaining peasant army force began.

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The Rise of the Manchu

The Historical Development of the Manchu in a Multi-ethnic United China The ancestors of the Manchu—Sushen, Yeru, Weji, Mohe and Jurchen Chairman Mao stated that, “China is a populous country comprising a multitude of ethnic groups.” 29 The Manchu is a brave and diligent member of China’s ethnic family. The ancestors of the Manchu have lived in northeastern China since ancient times. Through generations of hard work, living and breeding in the vast and abundant land, they have used their own hands to make a living, contributing their wisdom and strength to the development of China’s boundaries and promoting economic development within and cultural ties among different races. The ancestors of Manchu, who had lived between the Changbai Mountains and the Heiliong River, had established close ties with central China since primitive times. The newly unearthed Paleolithic relics in the territory of the Eelunchun people’s commune of the 18th station of Huma county in the right bank of the Heilong River, whose geologic age is the later phase of Pleistocene, date back to ten thousand years ago. The 1,700 stone artifacts resemble the stone artifacts found in North China in types and production techniques.30 In the Neolithic age, ties between northeastern China and central China grew closer. In the vast area bordering south of the Changbai Mountains, north on the Stanowoigebirge, west on the upper stream of Heilong River and both banks of Nan River, and east on the seaside and Kuye island, a great number of human relics have been found. These Neoliths and other artifacts are more delicately polished and similar to those found in central China, especially those of the Longshan civilization in Shandong, in their shapes and ways of production. For example, characteristic Longshan artifacts, semi-luna stone knives and black grey potteries can be found in large quantity in various spots of northeastern China.31 Some of the potteries are basically copies of potteries of the ancient civilization of the Yellow River region, as the patterns on their surfaces were created by cutting or pressing or both, which were popular ways of drawing patterns on potteries in the ancient civilization in the Yellow River region. Moreover, the patterns drawn are basically the same. 32 Other examples are the jade plates and jade beads unearthed in the Wusuli River, which are almost identical to those found in central China.33 These all serve as evidence of the close cultural ties between the Heilong River region and central China in ancient times.

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

As recorded on ancient literature, the ancestors of the Manchu, the Sushen people, came to extend their congratulations to Emperor Zhouwuwang, who had just defeated the Shang dynasty,by “giving the new King wooden and rock arrows as gifts.” 34. After that, Sushen sent envoys to the Zhou dynasty many more times, and the Emperors of Zhou Dynasty returned the same with generous gifts. The arrows the Emperors received as tributes were given to lords with different family names. This shows how close a relationship the Sushen people had with the Zhou dynasty. This is why in the West Zhou dynasty and Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn) period, people in central China claimed that “Sushen, Yan and Hao (ancient names of locations in China), are all a northern part of Chinese territory.”35 In the Han dynasty, Sushen was renamed as Yeru. In the Northern and Southern dynasties, Yeru was renamed as Weji. In the Sui dynasty, Weji became Mohe. In the seven to eight hundred years between the Han dynasty and the Sui dynasty, although dynasties in central China underwent frequent changes and the name Sushen was changed three times, they always kept an intimate relationship with regimes in central China. According to historical records, they never stopped sending envoys or delegations into central China, sometimes as frequently as two to three times a year, 36 with the number of the envoys sometimes reaching over five hundred.37 Rubies and marten furs from the area between the Changbai Mountains and the Heilong River were the most precious among tributes and goods and enjoyed certain popularity in central China. Their frequent contact with central China also brought in advanced production skills and culture from central China, which promoted socio-economic progress in the region. In the Tang dynasty, the relationship between the ancestors of the Manchu, the Mohe and the regime in central China embraced a new era. In former times the Mohe was comprised of seven parts, Sumo, Boduo, Anchegu, Funie, Haoshi, Baishan, and Heishui. Among them the Heishui Mohe was “located in the northeast and was the strongest.”38 Its territory lay along the two banks of the Heilong River and bordered in the east on the sea and in the north on the Okhotsk Sea. In 722 (the tenth year of the Kaiyuan period), the Tang dynasty set up Boli prefecture at the junture of the Heilong River and the Wusuli River, and assigned the local Mohe leader, Nishuliji as the Cishi, governor of the prefecture.39 In 725 (the thirteenth year of the Kaiyuan period), yje Tang dynasty founded a Heishui army in the Heishui Mohe region. 40 In 726 it further set up the Heishui Dudufu, a prefectural governing body and nominated Mohe leaders as Dudu, or military commander, and Cishi, or governor. The dynasty also sent Changshi, meaning representative of the central government, to the local

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The Rise of the Manchu

governing body to take part in the administration of the region. This is clear evidence of the presence of a local governing body and the practice of Chinese sovereign rights in Heilong River region as early as the Tang dynasty, which proves that the region is an integral part of Chinese territory. The Sumo tribe of Mohe lived to the southwest of the other six, scattering in the Songhua River and Huifahe River regions. This tribe was led by Qiqizhongxiang, who was entitled Zhengguogong, a duke title, by the empress Wu Chen Tie. He was succeeded by his son, the Honorable Zuorong, who led his tribe into battles with nearby tribes and merged them into one. In 698 (the first year of the Wuzhou holy calendar), Zuorong founded the Zhen Kingdom and entitled himself the Zhen King.41 The second year of the Wenwu Emperor of Japan refers to the same year. In 705 (the first year of the Shenlong period), Emperor Tangzhongzhong sent an envoy, Zhangxingji to the Zhen Kingdom to accept it as a protectorate of the Tang. King Zuorong “sent his son as a hostage to serve the Emperor to manifest his loyalty”.42 In 713 (the first year of the Kaiyuan period), the Tang dynasty set up a Huhan prefecture in the Sumo region and sent Hongluqing, an official position in charge of ceremonial events, Chui Xin to assign Zuorong as Dudu, the military commander of the prefecture, and entitle him as the “left courageous general” and the King of Bohai prefecture. 43 Zuorong, in response, renamed his kingdom Bohai 44. This was the first time in hinese history that an ancestor of the Manchu had established a local regime. After that Bohai frequently sent its princes or envoys to the Tang dynasty to brief the Emperor on the state of the prefecture and to offer tributes. The Tang also continuously sent people to Bohai, both to collect more information about Bohai and to confer noble and official titles on its leaders. The existence of the Bohai administrative area lasted 229 years, with the throne handed down to 15 successive Kings. There were a total of 19 imperial envoys from Tang to Bohai45 and 132 tribute deliveries from Bohai to Tang.46 There were also close economic and cultural connections between the two regions. Through tributes and trade, a large number of Bohai specialties such as marten furs, ginseng, hawks and horses were transported to central China. Meanwhile, silk fabrics, and wares made of gold and silver from central China were traded to Bohai. The Tang regime sep up a Bohai Office in Yidu County of Shandong Province especially in charge of trade with Bohai.47 Culturally, Bohai sent many scholars and students to educational institutes in the capital for study of the present and historical political structure.48 They hand-copied many Chinese books and took part in imperial examinations. Under the influence of central China, the bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative division of Bohai followed those of the Tang dynasty. The characters used in Bohai “contained

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

eighty to ninety percent of Chinese characters”. 49 Moreove, the recently unearthed tomb stone of the Zhen princess of Bohai in Dunhua County of Jilin Province, who was the second daughter of the Bohai King Qinmao, was carved with an epitaph written in Chinese characters and in the literary style of the Tang dynasty. We can therefore conclude that, politically, Bohai existed as a local regime subordinate to the Tang. It had a very close economic and cultural relationship with central China, as was shown in the poem Farewell to the Prince of Bohai, which states “Our territories were separated by sea, but our culture stands on the same ground. Although you, the prince, will return to your nation, the beautiful poems you wrote will always remain here.”50 Such enthusiastic lines show that the Bohai regime and the Tang dynasty, and their people, have long been one family. The Tang dynasty collapsed in the blaze stirred by the peasant revolt led by Huangcao, and the powers from different parts took advantage of this and set up feudal separatist rules. From then on the Chinese history entered the warridden years, that is, the period of the Five Dynasties and the Warring States. It started with Khitan in the northeast. Its leader A’baoji unified different tribes and then extended the territory. In the Five Dynasties period Mohe, an ancient ethnic group of China, changed its name to Jurchen and the power around the Bohai Sea became weaker and weaker. After several years of war, it was completely taken over by Khitan. A’baoji founded the Eastern Khitan, crowned his son Tu Yu king and “demanded 150 thousand bolts of first-class cloth every year” , 51 which was rejected by the remaining people around the Bohai Sea. “The rejection developed into revolts in different areass” . 52 To suppress the revolts, the Khitan governors forced many survivors to move to Linhuang (now inner Mongolia Bazuolin Banner in Shaomeng) and Dongping (now Liaoyang in Liaoning province). Some of the rest of the survivors escaped to Korea and a few remained in their original place. This forced migration led to the destruction of the Bohai culture, which had taken over more than 200 years to develop. The places around Bohai turned into ruins. The Mohe tribe, which had lived in Heilongjiang in the north, moved back to the south and restarted their business in their old haunt. In 947 (the year of Datong of the Liao dynasty, which symbolized unification), Khitan set up the Liao Dynasty. The dynasty paid much attention to the administration of the Jurchen group.53 The Jurchen was divided into two parts. The part from Kaiyuan to the south was called the “Tamed Jurchen” while the part from Kaiyuan to the south was called the “Raw Jurchen”. The Tamed Jurchen lived in Liaodong and Inner Mongolia, administrated by Dongjing Dao belonging to the Liao’s southern Privy Council. States were set up and citizens

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The Rise of the Manchu

were recorded. The Tamed Jurchen became integrated quickly. The Raw Jurchen group, which lived along the Songhua River, Heilong River and Wusuli River were administered by the military institutions in DongBei Dao, Huanglong Fu and Xianzhoutang River, all belonging to the Liao’s northern Privy Council. Different tribes had to pay tributes such as horses, mink, Dongbei pearls, gold panned from sand, and ginseng to the Liao. In the Liao dynasty the Jurchen people kept fighting against the Liao governors’ political oppression and economic exploitation. At the beginning of twelfth century, the Wanyan tribe from the Raw Jurchen group, which were the offspring of the Mohe tribe in Heishui and had lived along the Songhua River, became stronger and stronger under their excellent leader A’Guda. Gradually A’Guda unified different tribes of the Jurchen and gained power. In the year of 1114, A’Guda started a war against the Liao and won a complete victory. In January 1125, A’Guda founded his empire Dajin with Shangjing (now E’Chen County in Heilongjiang province) as the capital, and made himself an emperor. This was the second regime of the Manchu nationality after the first regime in Bohai. In 1125, after ten years of wars, A’Guda wiped out the Liao, marched to the south and wiped out the Northern Song dynasty. In the year 1141 he forced the Southern Song dynasty to sign the Shaohe Agreement, making the Huai River the boundary between Song and Jin. To fight against the Southern Song and Western Xia, the Jin dynasty moved its troops to the central area. In 1153 the capital was moved to Yanjing (now Beijing). In order to strengthen and consolidate its rule in the northern part which had just been occupied and to learn the Han’s system, the Jin dynasty had a reform from central to regional areas and among officials of different ranks. Meanwhile, a group of Jurchen people moved into and lived together with the Han nationality. They dressed like the Han people, gave themselves Han names, and thus quickly became integrated with the Han people. Although the Jin’s political, economic and cultural centers had shifted to the south, it never relaxed its vigilance in the administration of the Jurchen people in the northern east. In Heilong River, Songhua River and the east of Wusuli River, Puyu Road, Helan Road, Xupin Road, and Huligai Road were set up. According to the Jin History in its Geographical Chronicle , “the Jin extended its territory to the barbarian areas in Jilimitu in the east and to the north and covered an area of more than three thousand Li to the north of Puyu Road with a place named Huluhuotongmouke as its border” .54 In 1975 a Chinese archaeology team discovered an ancient community on the Jin’s Puyu Road in Kedong County of Heilongjiang province, 55 more than three thousand Li north of the Jin’s northern border at Huoluhuotongmouke, near the Great

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

Khingan Mountains. People have recently discovered relics of the Jin people such as ironware, coins, stone tablets and decorations near two places named Teli and Boli along the Heilong River.56 In 1973, in Heilongjiang province, an official seal for the Xupin River in Womuaimouke was discovered. 57 In 1977 another seal named Huligai Road was found. Huligai Road lay in Yilan City in Heilongjiang province with an administrative area on both sides of the middle and lower reaches of the Heilong River. The seal was an official one awarded by the Jin government to a rich family in the Suifen River area. According to the additional notes of the Jin’s artifacts, a seal named Meng’an for a master in Helan Road58 was awarded by the Jin government to a governor in Helan Road. All the references and unearthed artifacts clearly indicate the administrative areas of the Jin dynasty. Fig. 1.1. The "Seal of the Huligai Office" of the Jin Dynasty and the Impression of the Seal

The Jin actively developed its original site in the north east. From the period of the Liao dynasty, many Jurchen people had been forced to move to Inner Mongolia and Liaoyang. Places in the north of Kaiyuan were sparse populated. At the beginning of the Jin it was decided that “since places in Shanxi had been conquered, their citizens should be moved there with Shangjing as the center. Besides, all the people who were strong and good at some skills should be moved to the central place. Meanwhile, many people were moved to Huihe Road (now in the east of Liaoning) and Lindong (now at the center of Jilin)” .59 All these movements led to the great increase in population in these areas. There were altogether 186,970 families on Shangjing Road and Dongjing Road, with 31,270 families on Shangjing Road alone.60

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The Rise of the Manchu

In the twelfth century the Mongols in the north became powerful. In 1206 (the sixth year of the Jintaihe period), Tiemuzhen was set up by different tribes as Khan, titled Genghis Khan. From then on the Mongols established their feudal state and kept extending their territory. In 1213 (the 1st year of the Jinzhenyou period), the Mongolian troops were divided into three units to attack the Jin. “This year, counties in Hebei were captured” .61 The next year the Jin was forced to move its capital to Bianjing (now Kaifeng city in Henan province). Places such as Shandong, Hebei and Shanxi were occupied by the Mongols. At that time, the official entitled Zhaotao (an official temporarily responsible for both administration and the military) in Jinxianping made P’u-hsien Wan-nu an independent state in Chenping (now Kaiyuan county in Liaoning province), and then established a state named Dongzhen, with Tiantai as the title of the emperor. In 1218, P’u-hsien Wan-nu moved to the east, made Nanjing (now Yanji city in Jilin Province) the capital and began its rule of Nanjing Road, Kaiyuan Road and Shuaibing Road. In 1233 the Mongolian troops attacked Nanjing, P’uhsien Wan-nu was conquered, and the Dongxia state declined. The whole north east was then under the rule of the Mongols. The Mongols wiped out the Western Xia in 1227, the Jin in 1234, and then the Northern Song in 1278. From then on a unified Yuan Dynasty was established, ending the chaos and confrontation that had existed among the Song, Liao, Xia and Jin since the five dynasties. The Yuan took the Jin’s place in governing the Jurchen people in the north east. It established Zhongshu province in Liaoyang responsible for the ruling of tribes living on fishing named Shuidada in Liaoyang, Shenyang, Guangning, Daning, Dongning, Kaiyuan and Helanfu. The Shuidada in Kaiyuan and Helanfu were under the rule of the department responsible for Jurchen people’s affairs. Five tribes, each having a population of 10 thousand people, naming Taowen, Huligai Clan, Odoli Clan, Tuowo Clan and Bokujiang were set up under the Shuaidada of Helanfu. In 1977 a seal from the Yuan dynasty was discovered. It was curved with phags-pa script which meant a seal for an official ranked Daluhuachi responsible for the administration for the fishermen in Shuidada. Daluhuachi was a rank for officials in the Yuan dynasty. The seal shows that the Yuan Empire had effective rule of places along the Songhua River, Heilong River and Ussuri River. In Nurgal along the lower reaches of the Heilong River, the Yuan set up a military command for eastern expeditions in charge of Telin and Kuye Island. The Yuan adopted the policy that the governors should manage the Jurchen people according to their customs 62 and enrolled the Jurchen people into military troops by displaying a rule that “those who refused to enroll must pay for the taxes per person” .63 There were 2,960 families

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

who had to pay taxes64 by means of mink, xongkoro etc. In order to explore the Jurchen areas and strengthen their links with the inland, the Yuan set up many pothouses. It was assumed that there were altogether more than 120 pothouses in Liaoyang Province. To encourage the Jurchen people to open up wastelands, the government granted the Jurchen people farm cattle and farming applicants, which promoted the social and economic development of the Jurchen areas. Fig. 1.2. The "Seal of Daluhuachi Governing the Residents of Shuidada" and the Impression of the Seal

The Ming’s administration of the Jurchen people and the development of the Jurchen tribes In 1368 the Ming dynasty wiped out the Yuan dynasty, but the remaining troops of the Yuan dynasty in the north east still had some power which was considered a threat to the newly set-up Ming dynasty. Facing such a situation, ZhuYuanzhang, the emperor who set up the Ming dynasty, on the one hand sent Huangchou together with other people to Liaodong, “ordering officials and other populace and their subordinates to give in” .65 On the other hand, the Ming troops were sent across the sea in Shandong to Liaodong, and a central executive on the first rank for the former Yuan dynasty named Liuyi offered the whole of Liaodong and the people there as a tribute. Therefore the Ming in 1731 set up an administrative department named Duwei in Liaodong. In 1375 the Ming promoted Duwei as Liaodong’s Itinerant High Commander to be in charge of Liaodong’s 25 Weis, 138 Suos, two states and one Meng.66 In order to

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The Rise of the Manchu

march to the north, totally wipe out the Yuan’s surviving forces and enhance the rule of the north and northern areas, Zhuyuanzhang subinfeudated his sons to these areas as the following: Yangwang was subinfeudated with Beiping, Liaowang with Guangning, Ningwang with Qura and Hanwang with Kaiyuan, with the purpose of “occupying the essential frontier, controlling all the key places and thus getting holding all places in the whole country” . 67 At that time, the original grand commandant called Nahachu stayed in Jinshan (now Nong’an county in Jili province). He and other of the Yuan’s surviving forces such as Gaojianu in Liaodong, Hacizhang and Yesuzhi “relied on and supporedt each other” , 68 trying to fight against the Ming. To unify the north east, the Ming had to wipe out all these surviving forces. In 1387 Zhuyuanzhang sent Fengsheng and Fuyoude leading troops to march into Jinshan, forcing Nahachu to give in. The other remaining forces gave in one by one and from then on all the surviving forces of the Yuan in the north east were wiped out completely. At the beginning of Ming, Jurchen people were divided into three parts. The Jianzhou Jurchen were distributed around the Mudan River, Razdolnaya River and Baekdu Mountains; the Haixi Jurchen were distributed along the Songhua River; and the wild Jurchen were distributed along the Heilong River and on Kuye Island. The Ming took the place of the Yuan to rule these Jurchen people, adopting a series of active exploration and development measures and thus enhancing the relationship between the Ming and the Manchu ancestors. In the Hongwu Era the Ming extended its power to places around the Songhua River, Mudan River and Yanlan River. In the Yongle Era, after moving its capital to Beijing, the Ming shifted its strategic emphasis to the north. Besides conjuring Mongolia, the Ming enhanced its administration of Jurchen places. It attacched much importance to investigating the Jurchen areas. People were sent to the Jurchen people to find out their local customs. 69 In 1403, Yong’an sent Xing Shu to “bring the imperial decree to the Nurgal and Nivkh people, asking them to yield to the Ming dynasty” .70 In 1403, Yong Le sent out another official named Ke Ren Qianhuwang to Doumanjiang and other places to appease the Jianzhou Jurchen.71 The Ming’s appeasement policy was quite effective. From Nurgal in the northern east, different tribes in Nivkh by the sea, to Jianzhou,Haixi, and the wild Jurchen in the east, all paid allegiance to the government one by one at the beginning of Yong Le. In these places Ming set up institutions such as Wei and Suo according to the actual situation.72 To enhance the management of these institutions, in 1409 (the 7th year of Yongle), officials in Nurgal Hu La Dong Nu submitted their suggestion that Nurgal was such an essential location that a military command should be set up there. The suggestion was accepted by the Ming dynasty and an Itinerant High Command

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

was set up in Nurgal with Kang Wang appointed as the assistant magistrate and Wang Zhaozhou as Itinerant Qianshi. 73 In 1411 (the 9th year of Yong Le), the Ming officially sent out the eunuch Yishiha and the assistant magistrate. Kang Wang “led a troop of more than one thousand people, and more than 25 huge ships to explore Nurgal Itinerant” 74 and especially managed administrative affairs. The administrative areas belonging to the Ming’s prefectures extended to the sea in the north, Hanjia to the west, Korea in the south, and the Northern Sea of Nurgal in the north, 75 while the areas belonging to Wei started from Nangha’erwei in Kuye Island in the east and extended to Honanhe Wei along the E’nen River in the west, Jianzhou Wei along the Hun River in the south, and Guli Wei in the Outer Khingan Range in the north. There were 370 weis and 20 suos.76 Today all of the Ming’s weis and suos have turned into ruins. However there are two Nurgal Itinerant’s monuments. One marks the construction of the Yongning Temple carved with the inscription “Yongning Temple’s Construction, the other is for the reconstruction of the Yongning Temple carved with the inscription Yongning Temple’s Reconstruction. They give a detailed description of information about the Nurgal Itinerant, weis and suos, acting as a historical Fig. 1.3. The Regions under the Jurisdiction of Nurgan Army and Government Offices in the Ming

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The Rise of the Manchu

witness of the territory of north east China. Moreover the epitaph for a general named Cuiyuan posthumously titled Shaoyong recorded that in the first year of Xuan De, he and an eunuch named Yi Xin brought the emperor ’s decree to Nurgal and in the first year of Zheng Tong he carried out the emperor ’s command to ask the wild people in Huwen to surrender. 77 In addition, the epitaph for another general named Song Guo Zhong posthumously titled Ming Wei recorded that his great-grand father carried out the emperor ’s order to occupy Nurgal.78 The records from these two epitaphs were in agreement with the inscriptions on the two monuments. We i a n d s u o w e re t h e m i l i t a r y a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o rg a n i z a t i o n s set up according to the Ming’s political system. Quite different from other organizations, they took responsibility for both military and local administration, appeasing subordinates and attaching tribes79 to the local wei80. Officials of the wei and suo were directly appointed by the Ming’s central government, adopting the policy that tribal “leaders were appointed to different positions such as area commander, Itinerant commander, conductor, Qianbaihu etc. They managed their tribes according to their own customs” . 81 All their positions were hereditary, in other words, their sons took their fathers’ places once their fathers got old or passed away. If they wished to be promoted, to change the emperor’s appointment or to have more rewards, the requirements should be submitted to the central government. If they met their requirements without letting the central government know, they were punished. Official seals rewarded to officials in Nurgal by the Ming dynasty have been discovered one after another, for example the Seal for Maolian Wei’s Commander 82, Seal for Mudali Wei’s Commander 83, Seal for Hetunji Wei’s Commander 84, Seal for Nang’ha’er Wei’s Commander85, and Seal for Tashanzuo Wei’s Commander86. All these seals were the materials used by the Ming for management in the northn east areas through setting up their local administrative organizations. According to the Ming dynasty’s rules, all the weis and suos of the three Jurchen tribes should pay their political and economic tribute regularly. Officials of the weis and suos were required to go to Beijing on a set date to report on their work and the situations in local places. They were also required to pay taxes. The Ming dynasty imposed taxes on Jurchen people in such a way that “nothing was given in return for all the tributes to the central government” 87 The Jianzhou Jurchen and Haizhou Jurchen came to the central plains and paid their tributes. The wild Jurchen were the exception. They were in such a remote area that they often could not pay their tributes on time. 88 The increase in the number of wei and suo led to the increase in the number of people who paid tributes. In 1536 (the 15th year of Mingjiajing), the number of people who paid

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

Fig. 1.4. The "Seal of the Troop Commander's Office in Maolian" under the Nurgan Army and Government Office and the Impression of the Seal

tributes increased to 2,140.89 After they arrived in Beijing, they were received by a ministry responsible for ethnic affairs agiven accommodation in the northern halls.90 The tributes were all precious local specialties such as horses, marten furs, colla asini, ginseng, Haidongqing etc. The Ming court awarded the officials according to their ranks and gave them gifts in return for the tributes. 91 The goods they brought in were sold in particular markets which were divided into two kinds, the official ones and the private ones. While the official ones were where the government purchased what it needed, the private ones dealt with the goods remaining after government purchase. Living materials and production materials were transported back to the Jurchen area. The conclusion can therefore be drawn that apart from its political function, tribute delivery also served to facilitate the exchange of commerce and goods between central China and the Jurchen area. The Ming government also established “horse markets” or street markets at important traffic junctures between the Liaodong region and the Jurchen region, so as to facilitate commercial exchanges. The horse market dated back to 1450 (the third year of the Yongle period of the Ming dynasty). The Ming government gave the order to “establish markets in places close to water and plants in Guangning and Kaiyuan city, where merchants should come with their horses and wait for officials to set a price for the goods they were to barter”92. As there were many people coming to the market, the Ming court decided to make the market official in 1460 (the fourth year of the the Yongle period) by appointing Qianhu, or literally the leader of one thousand people, such as Danashili, as

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The Rise of the Manchu

the officials in charge of the market.93 There were three horse markets in total, “with one to the south of Kaiyuan city to deal with the Jurchens, one to the east and one in Guangning region to deal with the three weis of Duoyan, all fourty miles away from the Kaiyuan city” 94. After that the horse markets continued to prosper and increased in number. In 1464 (the eighth year of the Tianshun period), a market was specially set up for the Jianzhou Jurchens in Fushun city. 95 In the Chenghua period, another horse market was set up for the Haixi Jurchens in the area to the south of Guchengbao, which in 1523 (the second year of the Jiajing period) was relocated to the north of Qinyunbao. In the first several years of the Wanli period, four markets were consecutively set up in the Qinghe, Yang, Kuandian and Yizhou areas. There were two kinds of horse markets, the official ones and private ones. Markets where the Ming government purchased military materials, such as horses, were official ones, while markets where the Jurchens and regular people of other ethnic groups exchanged living materials like food were private ones. In the prosperous horse markets merchandise being exchanged included, from the Jurchens, horses, marten furs, ginsengs and other specialties, and from the Han people, iron production tools such as hua and shovels, production means such as farming buffalos and seeds, and living materials such as rice, salt, tough silk, cloth, silk, pans, clothes etc. The Ming court sent officials to be in charge of the commercial activities in the horse markets, which used barter at the beginning and then after 1417 (the fifteenth year of the Yongle period), applied a “horse market price” for goods, namely, trade based on currency. The officials in charge of the markets had a duty to check the merchandise to be sold in the market and to levy commercial taxes on them, which was called “the proportional taxes in the horse market”.96 Jurchen leaders from the weis and suos that participated in the markets were given awards as an encouragement.97 The need to extend the horse markets became pressing due to the rapid economic and social development of the Jurchens. In response, in the Wanli period, the number of horse markets increased from four to five and their commercial activities also saw significant development. The “accounts of the proportional taxes” 98 in the horse markets in the Liaodong region in the Ming dynasty, preserved in the Liaoning Provincial Archive, offer precious materials for the study of horse markets of the time. We can draw the following conclusions after studying the accounts: the time of the horse markets was sdubstentailly extended—unlike before, when the markets were opened only once or twice monthly and lasted only five days, they became almost daily markets and had no more restrictions on opening time;99 meanwhile, the taxes levied on goods in the markets were raised, by several percentages for some

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

Fig. 1.5. The accounts of the proportional taxes in the horse markets in Guangshun, Zhenbei, Xinan and other border cities for March of the twelfth year of the Wanli period

and by several times for some others; 100 and the frequence of participation and number of participants in the horse markets from the Jurchens increased substantially compared to the past, as the number of participants ranged from several dozens to several thousands. For example, the Jurchen participants in the markets led by the Jurchen governors Mengguboluo and Daishang reached 1,100 on one single occasion;101 and the Jianzhou Jurchens led by Zhu Changge who went across the Shanghaiguan to the horse market reached 250 in number 102. Last but not the least, the flow of goods from the Ming to the Jurchens was mainly comprised of farming buffalos and iron production tools, which differed from before when most of the goods had been living materials. The No. one-seven record of the account of taxes on goods of the horse market shows that during the time covered by the record, there were 216 buffalos and 4,292103 huas transported to the Haixi Jurchens. The fragmentary archives cannot offer a comprehensive reproduction of past status or accurate data, but they still reveal a great deal about the characteristics and changes of the horse markets of the time, the close economic ties between the Ming regime and Jurchen areas, and the socio-economic development of Jurchen society.

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The Rise of the Manchu

The relations between the Jurchens and the Ming dynasty regarding politics, economy etc. grew unprecedentedly close and the Ming government constantly deployed troops in areas around Nuergandusizhisuo on regular basis and provided a large quantity of military provisions to the troops there. As a result, both transportation on land and water saw development. The Ming dynasty, based on the postroad system established in the Yuan dynasty, extended the network by lengthening existing routes or establishing new ones. As recorded in the Liaodong Record, there were six traffic lines linking the Liaodong area with different parts of northeastern China, with Kaiyuan city the starting point of all six lines. The network reached Korea in the east, Inner Mongolia in the west, Manjing of the Dateling area in the northeast, and the northern part of Manzhouli in the northwest, thus forming a postroad network that made many parts of the area accessible104. The Ming regime paid special attention to guaranteeing the connections and transportation between the Liaodong region and Nuergandusi. In 1412 (the tenth year of the Yongle period of the Ming dynasty), it set up 45 post stations along the downstream of the Songhua River and the Heilong River, including Manjing.105 In 1420 (the 18th year of the Yongle period), it founded a shipyard on the bank of Songhua River in Jilin province106 which was responsible for “ship building and transporting food” and transporting troops. The Ming dynasty’s active development of transportation in northeast China and the extension of the postroad network strengthened the communication between the Jurchens and the Liaodong region and central China. The ancestors of the Manchu had been in close contact with central China throughout Chinese history for several thousand years, no matter which dynasty or which ethnic group held control over central China. They were an indispensible member of the Chinese family.

The rise of the Manchu and the establishment of the Houjin Regime The establishment of Jian Zhou San Wei and the formation of Haixi Si Bu and its Development The Manchu originated from Jian Zhou Jurchen (an ancient nationality in China) and its progenitors originally lived on the northern bank of the Heilongjiang River.107 The Jurchen in the Ming Dynasty was divided into three major groups,

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

namely the Jian Zhou Jurchens, the Hai Xi Jurchens and the “savage or wild Jurchens”, based on their geographic distribution and economic development. Merger and plunder occurred constantly between or among these three groups. The “savage” Jurchen more often than not invaded and attacked the Hai Xi and Jianzhou, “they fought with Shan Zai (Hai Xi Jurchen) more than hundreds of times”.108 Some tribes and wei suo (military organization forms) of the Hai Xi and Jian Zhou gradually moved to the south in order to on the one hand avoid invasion by the “savage” Jurchen, and pn the other to directly strengthen the economic ties with Liaodong and regions inside Shanhaiguan Pass. The Yuan Dynasty set up five Wanhufu (literally: the authorities in charge of 10,000 households) in the area where the Jian Zhou Jurchens settled, assigning five marquises (Wanhu). Two of them, Ahachu who was the Hu Li-gai Wanhu and Möngke Temür who was the Wo Duolian Wanhu, lived in modern Yilan Town in Heilongjiang Province at the conjunction of the Songhua River and the Mudan River.109 At the end of the Yuan Dynasty and the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, due to intrusion from the wild Jurchens, the Ahachu Tribe migrated southward. During the Hongwu period the tribe settled down temporarily in Fengzhou. 110 In 1430 (the 1st year of the Yongle period), Ahachu paid a visit to the Ming emperor in the capital and then the Ming court established Jianzhou Wei (wei) in his tribe, designating Ahachu as the commander of the Jianzhou Wei and granting him a name——Li Chengshan (a name for citizens in the central plains of China. In 1409 (the 7th year of the Yongle period), Ahachu passed away, and his son (Shi Jia-Nu) succeeded to the title owing to meritorious action in military service in the following year. Shi Jia-Nu was promoted to be commander in the military service (Du-zhi-hui Qian-shi, the third-rank official or "Sān Pǐn") of the Jianzhou Wei, together with the granted name of Li Xianzhong. The Jianzhou Wei stayed in Fengzhou for over two decades, but because of harassment and invasion from Mongolia on the west side, in 1423 (the 21st year of the Yongle period), having gained the approval of the Ming court, it moved away from Fengzhou to the Pozhu River (now the Hun River) region111. Following Shi Jia-Nu's death his son (Li Manchu) inherited the title, being the commander of military service of the Jianzhou Wei112. As soon as the Jianzhou Wei occupied the area around the PoZhu River they suffered constant invasion from the wild Jurchens in the North together with robbing and killing by Korean troops. Longing for stability, in 1438 (the 3rd year of the Zhengtong period), Li Manchu led his forces and followers westward to settle around the Hun River in the eastern part of Zaotu Mountain.113 In 1372 (the 5th year of the Hongwu period), suffering from unbearable plundering by Nahachu (the remaining forces of the previous Yuan dynasty )

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and the wild Jurchens, Möngke Temür (the 6th great grandfather of Nurhaci, who was the 1st Manchu Emperor), the marquis of Wo Duolian Wanhu which originally was the neighboring tribe of Ahachu, was forced to leave his hometown with his whole family in exile. Then he and his family migrated to the area south of the Tumen River and Qingyuan inside the territory of Korea114, and later settled down in Womuhe (now Huining in Korea)115. Back in the 1st year of the Yongle Ahachu, the commander of the Jianzhou Wei, reported to the Ming court that Möngke Temür was capable and forward-looking. In 1404 (the 2nd year of the Yongle period) the Ming Authorities sent envoys to persuade Möngke Temür to submit and follow the Ming. In the next year, Möngke Temür was called to submit to the Ming court in person, and the Ming Emperor granted him the title of the commander (Du-Zhi-Hui-Shi) in charge of the Jianzhou Wei, favoring him with an official seal and stamp116. With the position as commander of the Jianzhou Wei, in 1411 (the 9th year of the Yongle period), he led his troops to leave Wo Muhe and moved to Fengzhou where the Jianzhou Wei was located.117 In 1412 (the 10th year of the Yongle period), the Jianzhou Left Wei was created and added by the Ming Dynasty in the local region of the Jianzhou Wei . Möngke Temür was appointed the commander of the Jianzhou Left Wei. He did not leave Fengzhou until 1423 (the 21st year of the Yongle period) and returned to Wo Muhe again, because of invasion and attack from Mongolia.118 In 1433 (the 8th year of the Xuande period), Möngke Temür and his son Quan Doujie were killed by Qixing Yeren (a group in the wild Jurchens ). After that the Jianzhou Left Wei suffered severe attack and almost fell into hopeless straits. In 1434 (the 9th year of the Xuande period), the Ming Dynasty appointed Fan Cha (Möngke Temür's half-brother) as the Commander in Chief (Dou-Du-Qian-Shi) , handling the affairs of the Jianzhou Left Wei. In 1437 (the 2nd year of the Zhengtong period), the Ming court designated Möngke Temür's second son Dongshan to succeed to his father's rank, namely, the commander of the Jianzhou Left Wei. In order to avoid being attacked repeatedly, Dongshan made a request to the Ming Dynasty to return to Liaodong. With the approval of the Ming authorities, in the Spring of 1439 (the 4th year of the Zhengtong period), Dongshan led his followers and moved to the Pozhu River.The Ming government arranged for them to live somewhere between Santuhe (now Hailong Town in Jilin Province) and the region surrounding the Pozhu River and the Yixidonggu River, which happened to be the areas settled by the Li Manchu. 119 Before long, a battle for leadership between Fan Cha and his uncle Dongshan broke out. For the purpose of containing and weakening the power of the Jianzhou Left Wei, in 1442 (the 7th year of the Zhengtong period ) the Ming Dynasty set up the Jian zhou Right Wei. Fan Cha was appointed as military governor (Tongzhi, an administrative

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

title) dealing with the affairs in the Jianzhou Right Wei120 in the Santu River area. After that the Jianzhou Jurchens clustered again centering on the Shuzi River region, which was blessed with rich soil and resourcesand a chain of undulating hills, which became the cradle of the Qing Dynasty. The Jianzhou Three Weis (San Wei) were united in the long-term process of hardship and constant immigration, which strengthened internal ties and cooperation to develop its strength. In the regime of Tianshun, Dongshan became the head of the Jian zhou Three Weis, and his power already posed a threat to the Ming Dynasty's governance over the northeastern region. The Ming court had been implementing a policy of restriction, separation and discrimination; meanwhile it reduced the numbers of envoys from Jianzhou and Haixi to the Capital. It is said that the number of envoys had reached several hundred in previous years while in the mid-term of Tianshun, the number was reduced to less than 50.121 In addition, the Ming court became choosy122 about the tributes paid to it and the return gifts from the Ming Emperor were considerably reduced123. All the above reasons caused great dissatisfaction among the various Jurchens, who all intended to rebel out of fury.124 Dongshan took the advantage of this chance and united the Haixi Jurchens to invade and attack Liaodong. Later, the Ming Dynasty tricked Dongshan to Beijing in the name of submission. On his way back to Jianzhou, Dongshan was detained in Guangning and then killed.125 In September of the same year, the Ming court sent Zhao Fu, the chief officer in charge of troops, to lead 50,000 solders to attack Jianzhou. In addition, the Ming court forced Korea to offer assistance by sending troops across the Yalu River and attack from the eastern side. Li Manchu of the Jianzhou Wei was defeated and retreated to the banks of Pozhu River, and was later killed by the Korean troops. When the Ming troops set foot on the land of Jianzhou they committed all kinds of crimes——burning, killing, and robbing. The houses of many Jurchens' were burnt and their properties taken, therefore the Jurchens had no choice but flee and hide in the depths of the mountains.126 The Jianzhou Three Weis suffered a tragedy. In the long history of China, owing to frequent contact with the advanced culture of the Han people in the process of moving southward, commerce and business exchanges increased rapidly. Therefore the economies of the northern ethnic minorities were enlivened and their living standards were considerably improved. The primitive form of ethnic economy was destroyed and some minorities even made a shift from the living style of hunting and being nomadic to farming. At that particular stage of development, combining rapid economic growth with the tough military organizational skills and brave spirits cultivated from their original hunting and nomadic life, the ethnic minorities in

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the north would definitely pose a grave menace to the dynasties ruling by the Han people. All in all, the Jurchens in the Ming Dynasty were on the path of development. Therefore although the Ming authorities suppressed Dongshan, they still programmed the farming land and built castles along Phoenix town, Qinghe Town and Fushun so as to strengthen the defence of Liaodong and to keep a close eye on the rise and fall of forces in Jianzhou. However the Jianzhou Jurchens were destined to rise from being weak and decentralized to being strong and united, which process the corrupt Ming government could not reverse. In the early years of Wanli, the Jurchens in Jianzhou began gain strangth once again and soon divided into eastern and western branches. In the east, Wang Wutang in the Jianzhou Wei around the Pozhu River region stood out; while in the west there was Wang Gao, the commander of the Jianzhou Right Wei at the upper reaches of the Hun River. They frequently robbed and attacked the Liaodong region, which caused a threat to the security of Liaodong for the Ming Dynasty. While the Jianzhou Jurchens were moving southward the Haixi Jurchens were also migrating south and formed the Haixi Four States the Four Hulun States, namely Yehe, Huifa, Hada and Wula . Among them the Yehe tribe had originally lived in Talumuwei on the north bank of the Songhua River. Da Ye, the ancestor of this tribe, was leader of the Wei. In the early 16th century (in the regime of Jiajing), Cheng Jia-nu and Yang Jia-nu, grandsons of Zhu Kongge were appointed as commanders (Zhi-Hui-Qian-Shi). They firstly built two cities in the west and east respectively at the Northern Pass (Bei Guan) and then grew stronger. Subsequently a large number of the tribes in Haixi were willing to be taken over by them. Thus their territories expanded and the reputation of their powerful troops spread, which brought more submission from other tribes127. Gradually, the Yehe tribe rose to become the powerful force in the Haixi Jurchens. The Huifa tribe originally settled in Futiwei (a place) in the Mudan River region. Ta Shi, ancestor of the tribe, was the headman of this Wei. In the regime of Jiajing, this tribe in Futiwei moved to the Huifa River region and thus was called the Huifa tribe. The Hada tribe was located at Ta Shan Left Wei (Zuo Wei) originally residing on the north bank of the Songhua River and the east side of the Hulan River. Fu La-chu, the ancestor of this tribe, was a commander in the military service (DouZhi-Hui-Qian-Shi). In the early 16th century, Su Hei-tui succeeded to the title of Commander in Chief (Dou-Du-Qian-Shi) and developed the strongest tribe in the Haixi Jurchens. Later Wang Zhong, son of Su Hei-tui, succeeded to the title of military governor in the Wei. Due to invasion and harassment from the wild

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

Jurchens, Wang Zhong moved his tribe from the Hulan River to the upper reach of the Xiaoqing River outside the Guang Shun Pass ( Guang Shun Guan, also the Southern Pass in the Ming Dynasty) in Jinganbao, Kaiyuan city. Wang Zhong's troops were so powerful that they controlled one hundred and eighty two Weis including Jianzhou, Haixi and Maolian, twenty Suos (administrative units) and fifty six Zhans (administrative units) 128. Following Wang Zhong's death, his nephew Wang Tai succeeded to the title of grand military governor (Zuo-DouDu, the first-rank official) and the other tribes in Haixi all bore allegiance to Wang Tai129. He was very loyal and servile to the Ming Dynasty. Wang Tai took credit for keeping the eastern border peaceful and stable. For a period of 30 years, the residents focused on farming and hunting130. While Wang Zhong, the military governor of Ta Shan Left Wei, left his hometown, his nephew Buyan led his forces to dwell along the Wula River. Thus his tribe was called the Wula tribe. During the regimes of Longqing and Wanli, the Wula tribe gradually conquered the Southern and Northern parts of Songhua River together with various tribes in the areas west of the Mudan River, emerging as a powerful force among the Haixi Four States. It can be concluded from the above that the southward migration of the Jianzhou and Haixi tribes basically stabilized in the Jiajing period. They lived in scattered communities along the eastern and northern parts of the Liaodong area, with the Jianzhou Three Weis distributed in the east of Fushun Pass (fǔ shùn guān) and the Haixi Four States scattered in areas north of Kaiyuan city. As the Jianzhou and Haixi tribes moved southward, their economies took a big step forward. The diligence of the Jurchen people and the advanced production skills that they actively acquired from the Han people accelerated the development of local productive forces. During that period quite a few Han people entered the regions where the Jurchens lived and spread the techniques of agriculture and promoted the skills of farming by draught oxen. Therefore farmers and draught oxen were seen in every corner of the farmland. 131 Meanwhile, large quantities of iron farm tools such as plough shares and iron hoes were brought in, which facilitated opening up wasteland for farming and pushed forward the development of agriculture. The previous situation when the Jurchens only excelled at hunting and knew nothing of farming132 had changed. As recorded in the Ming Dynasty Record (1574) of Exploration and Foreign Relations (shū yù zhōu zī lù ), the Jurchens could live in permanent houses and grew grain instead of living mainly by hunting133. In the early years of Wanli, the Jianzhou Jurchens were already shipping a small amount of grain to the Liaodong region,134 which serves as evidence that the development of agriculture in Jianzhou was swift. The progress in agriculture also boosted the improvement of the handicraft

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The Rise of the Manchu

industry. Farming industry demanded a large number of iron farm tools, and hunting and defense required quite a few iron-made weapons. The Ming Dynasty was the main source for supplying the ironware. However, since 1439 (the 4th year of the Zhengtong period), the Ming court imposed a ban on transporting ironware to the Jurchens except for iron agricultural farm tools. In 1476 (the 12th year of the Chenghua period), the Ming court issued a decree prohibiting transport of any ironware to areas where the Jurchens resided, which resulted in a situation where the Jurchen men farmed without any ironmade farming tools and the women worked without needles and scissors. 135 This had a major impact on the Jurchens' life. They were forced to develop ironworking on their own. At the beginning they could only employ the method of buying the iron of the Ming court to make the ironwares they needed.136 By breaking and melting the pots or plough shares, 137 they transformed the iron into various tools and instruments. By the time of the Jiajing period, besides processing second-hand ironware, people in the Haixi region could produce iron and began to use blast furnaces to smelt iron into steel.138 Using blast furnaces promoted rapid development of the handicraft industry. Breakthroughs were also made in other fields. Taking the textile industry as an example, the Jurchens had not mastered the skills of weaving and so could only rely on the Ming court for supply. Now they could use hemp as material to produce linen fabric, which not only met their demand but was also enough for them to trade in the Liaodong region.139 As agriculture and handicraft industry developed, commerce and exchange also became more prosperous. At that time the horse markets were bustling and thriving. As Li Gong put it in his book about Observing Trading with Exotic People at Guangning Horse Market (guǎng níng mǎ shì guān yí rén jiāo yì ), "With thousands of people in the horse market, the sound of horse carts was never-ending, The Jurchens, male or female, together with their families show up at the market. The exotic clothes were dazzling to the eye.......The goods of the Jurchens and the Han people were piled up in the market and interpreters were walking back and forth. The Han people who bought articles from Jurchens would resell them, and Jurchens who purchased goods from the Han people looked very pleased.140 The marten furs in particular met with great favour from the Han people living inside the Shanhaiguan Pass. The demand for it was very substantial. The Ming court required ten thousand pieces of marten furs per year. Every winter Emperor Wanli awarded his officials marten furs, which cost around tens of thousands of liang of silver. 141 At the same time, the Jurchens' marten furs were also transported to Korea in exchange for farm cattle and ironware. Koreans formed the habit of wearing clothes made

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

of marten furs. The rich families would boast about each other's marten furs. If they must buy a leather coat or blanket, they would definitely choose to buy those made of marten furs. If a woman was without a coat made of marten furs, she would feel too embarrassed to show up in the gathering of the village. 142 From these, it's evident that people wearing marten furs were in large number. Therefore marten furs were pricy and people who intended to make a fortune would enter this industry. At that time one piece of marten fur could be traded for one iron hoe143 or a big ox144. By selling furs, the Jurchens collected a large number of farm oxen which developed their agriculture, and ironwares which strengthened their military forces,145 which played active role in the economic development of the Jurchens. With the development of production and expansion of business exchange, it should be noted that the function of money, as an equivalent of exchange means, became increasingly evident and the demand for it became more urgent. In 1522 (the 1st year of the Jiajing period), Su Hei-tui, the military governor of the Ta Shan Left Wei, made a request to the Ming Dynasty for the first time that the gifts and reward for conciliation after paying tribute to the Ming Emperor be converted into money (liang of silver). The Ming court approved his request but made it clear that this was once only and could not become a precedent. 146 However all the other Jurchen Weis repeatedly demanded liang of silver as tribute reward. Hence in 1527 (the 6th year of the Jiajing period), the Ming Dynasty agreed to convert satins, reward for conciliation received after paying tribute to the Ming court, into liang of silver according to their wishes. 147 Meanwhilein the case of satins among the gifts made in return, envoys could choose to claim half of the value in liang of silver and half in goods 148. In 1534 (the 13th year of the Jiajing period), the Court converted all gifts in return for tributes into liang of silver. 149 In 1564 (the 43th year of the Jiajing period), the Ming Dynasty converted rewards for conciliation into liang of silver. Thus rewards for conciliation and gifts in return were both in the form of liang of silver150. According to statistics, just in reward for conciliation and gifts in return, the Jurchens accumulated no less than 15,000 liang of silver,151 and accumulated a large amount of liang of silver through official and private trading in Court tribute and the horse markets. With a large amount of liang s of silver in hand the Jurchens had the ability to purchase any necessary articles, which extended and strengthened the economic ties among Jurchen tribes as well as with other neighboring races. Noticing the rapid development in their social economy and increasingly strong power after the Haixi and Jianzhou Jurchens moved southward, the Ming Dynasty sensed an overwhelming threat. In order to strengthen its control

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The Rise of the Manchu

over the Jurchens and reinforce its governance, the Ming court took the measure of 'divide and rule' 152 to hamstring the tribes and let them work against each other. By doing so the Ming court intended to prevent the Jurchen tribes from concentrating all their forces and throw the Jurchens into chaos and battles. In order to realize this purpose, the Ming government looked for opportunities to employ means such as suppression, calling for submission and prevention. In the early Wanli period some strong powers formed, such as Wang Gao who was the headman of Jianzhou Right Wei at the upper reaches of the Hun River, Wang Wu-tang who led the Jianzhou Wei along the Pozhu River, Wang Ji-nu in the Huifa tribe along the Huifa River, Buyan of the Wula tribe along the Wula River, Cheng Jia-nu and Yang Jia-nu in the Yehe tribe dwelling in the areas of the North Pass near Kaiyuan city, and Wang Tai in the Hada tribe in the areas of the South Pass near Kaiyuan city. Among them Wang Tai was the strongest. Therefore the Ming Regime was active in winning Wang Tai over. In 1573 (the 1st year of the Wanli period), Wang Gao constantly harassed the Liaodong area until in the spring of 1575 (the 3rd year of the Wanli period) he was defeated by the Ming army and fled to the Hada tribe. Later he was captured by Wang Tai and presented as a gift to the Ming court. After killing Wang Gao, the Ming court rewarded Wang Tai with the rank of Dragon and Tiger General (lóng hǔ jiāng jun).153 In 1578 (the 6th year of the Wanli period), Wang Wu-tang opposed the Ming Dynasty’s decision to construct kuān diàn liù bǎo (castles for defence)154 and was also dissatisfied with officials of the Ming court who pegged down the market price of goods.155 Soon he turned against the Ming court. Li Cheng Liang was sent to suppress his army by the Ming authorities. In the Ya Er River Battle, Wang Wu-tang was defeated. In 1581 (the 9th year of the Wanli period), Wang Wu-tang dispatched troops to rebel, but failed again. In 1582 (the 10th year of the Wanli period), Wang Tai died and there was internal conflict in the Hada tribe. Wang Tai's sons (Hu Er Han, Kang Gu Lu and Meng Gu Bo Luo ) fought for power. Taking this as opportunity, Cheng Jia-nu and Yang Jia-nu of theYehe tribe took control of the Hada tribe. When the Ming Dynasty intended to let Wang Tai's grandson Daishang succeed to his title, Cheng Jia-nu and Yang Jianu opposed it. Later, the Ming court trapped and killed Cheng Jia-nu and Yang Jia-nu, and Daishang then inherited his grandfather's rank, governing Hada tribe. Cheng Jia-nu's son Kasai and Yang Jia-nu's son Na Lin-bo-luo who were looking for an opportunity to take revenge for their fathers’ death, made contact with Mongolia and secretly cooperated with Daishang's uncle Kang Gu Lu and Meng Gu Bo Luo. They sent troops to attack Daishang. Knowing the plan, the Ming Dynasty sent troops to suppress and stabilize the governance of Daishang. In 1583 (the 11th year of Wanli period), Wang Gao's son A-Tai, for the

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

purpose of taking revenge for his father, attacked the Ming army from jìng yuǎn bǎo (a castle) and was suppressed by Li Cheng Liang. From the above we can see that the internal conflicts and wars with the Ming army were non-stop in the early years of Wanli, which furthered the division among the Jurchens. They became a lot of small tribes under independent regimes. During that period, Jurchens were mainly composed of four branches, namely the Jianzhou tribe including sū kè sū hǔ hé (now Shuzi River in Liaoning Province), the Hun River (now the north bank of the Hun River in Liaoning Province), Wanyan (now the areas south of Tonghua in Jilin Province) and Dong E (now Huanren Town in Liaoning Province), the Changbai tribe including Nayin (now the south and east of Fusong town in Jilin Province), Zhu Sheli (now areas north of Linjiang town in Jilin Province), the Yalu tribe (now Ji;an town in Jilin Province), the Hulun tribe including Yehe (now Siping City in Jilin Province), Hada (now the Qinghe River region in Liaoning Province), Huifa (now Huadian town in Jilin Province), Wula (now Yitong town in Jilin Province), and the Donghai tribe including Woji (now east and north of Ning’an town in Heilongjiang Province), Wa Er-ka (now areas north of Yanji in Jilin Province), and Ku Er-ha (the middle reaches of the Heilongjiang River and the lower Mudan River). As various tribes rose, each tribe claimed to be the most powerful one. People of different tribes killed each other, even relatives. The strong suppressed the weak, the tribes with a larger population bullied the small ones. 156 The tribes inside Jianzhou also robbed each other's goods and money even if were related. 157 Such a divisive, hostile and warring situation could hinder and destroy the growth and development for productive forces, which brought devastating disaster to the Jurchen people. A large proportion of the Jurchens longed to free themselves from separation and ruling under independent regimes and to form a united and stable environment. In such historic circumstances, Nurhaci made his way to lead various Jurchen tribes to unification.

Nurhaci Unites Various Jurchen Tribes, and the Establishment of the Later Jin Regime Nurhaci was born in 1559 (the 38th year of the Jiajing period) in a slave-owner family of the Jianzhou Left Wei. He was a sixth generation descendant of Möngke Temür, the Jianzhou Left Wei military governor. Many of his ancestors had been granted titles of rank by the Ming court, taking the important positions such as those of commander, Commander in Chief and military governor in the Jianzhou Left Wei. Nurhaci lost his mother when he was ten. Being abused

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The Rise of the Manchu

by his stepmother, he left home and relied on himself at the age of nineteen. In order to survive he made a living by collecting pine nuts and digging ginseng, and selling them in Fushun market. Not long afterwards he volunteered to be a soldier of Li Chengliang (Ming Dynasty General in Liaodong region). Whenever there was a battle he would fight closest to front and rendered numerous meritorious services, and therefore he was favored by Li Chengliang. 158 After years of hard work and intense military training, Nurhaci became resourceful and skilled. In 1583 (the 11th year of the Wanli period), Nikan Wailan (headman of Tulun City, Jianzhou) of the Sukesuhu tribe led the Ming army to suppress the A-Tai tribe. Nurhaci's grandfather Giocangga who was the commander (Dou-zhi-hui) in the Jianzhou Left Wei and his father Taksi who was also a leader in the Wei both joined the battle. Later in Gulie town when the Ming army conquered the A-Tai tribe, Giocangga was burnt to death and Taksi was killed by mistake. So as to make compensation for his grandfather and father's wrongful death, the Ming court appointed Nurhaci as commander (Dou-zhihui-shi) of the Jianzhou Left Wei. Trying hard to swallow the pain and hatred, he made his way back to Jianzhou for the purpose of future development. Fig. 1.6.

Portrait of Nurhaci (the 1st Qing Emperor)

Nurhaci blamed the death of his grandfather and father on Nikan Wailan. In 1583 (the 11th year of the Wanli period), he started his battle with the thirteen suits of armor left by his grandfather and father to attack Nikan Wailan at Tulun City. Nikan Wailan abandoned the city and fled. Nurhaci then began to unify various Jurchen tribes in Jianzhou. In 1584 he managed to take Zhaojiacheng and Maerzhai, and the Dong'E Tribe was forced to surrender.

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In 1585 he attacked the Jiefan fastness and later conquered the allied forces of eight hundred soldiers in five forts including Jiefan, Baerda, Sa'erhu, Jiaha and Tuomohe, so the Hun River Tribe submitted to his control. In the same year he defeated Gua Er Jia in Antu town and killed the headman Nuomoni. In 1586 he conquered Elehui town where he killed Nikan Wailan and took the Sukesuhu tribe under his control. In 1587 and 1588, the Zhechen Tribe and the Wanyan Tribe submitted to him. At the beginning of Nurhaci's rise, his troops were not a powerful force in the Jianzhou Jurchens and he faced many much stronger enemies inside Jianzhou. After five years of war he basically unified all the scattered tribes and emerged as the most powerful force among the Jurchens. Although his rivals were strong and numerous and various tribes were fighting and chaotic, Nurhaci remained tough and brave in the face of difficulty and was able to analyse situations in a calm manner and come up with strategies. He was diligent in training his soldiers and horses, and whenever there was war he would fight bravely at the forefront of the war field to show a good example for his men. Moreover he was skillful in fighting strong enemies and defeated them with a much smaller number of soldiers. Nurhaci said, "Since a young adult, I fought alone in the war facing thousands of enemies. Arrows passed by my side and weapons cracked my elbow, I cannot count the exact number of wars that I have been through”.159 In the battle of taking Elehui town he led forty men to fight with the rival army and sustained more than 30 wounds and cuts by arrows. Such a brave fighting style was the key reason for his success. At the same time, he made formulated correct strategies and policies. In the beginning he confined his attacks to tribes inside the Jianzhou region and focused his revenge on Nikan Wailan. He tried to avoid any conflict with the more powerful Haixi Jurchens for the time being He also showed respect to Mongolia and Korea and built a relationship with them. In addition, he displayed respect and loyalty to the Ming central government. Every year he would send envoys with money and tributes to show friendship with the Ming court160. Nurhaci many times personally paid visits to the Emperor in Beijing. Therefore, at the early stage, the Ming court assumed him to be trustworthy. After Nurhaci unified the Jianzhou tribes, in 1589 the Ming court granted him the title Commander in Chief ,in 1591 he was promoted grand military governor (Zuo-dou-du) and,in 1595 he was rewarded with the rank of Dragon Tiger General (Longhu Jiangjun) for his contribution in protecting the fastness. So he was regarded as a loyal local official who showed integrity and did a good job on defence161. Nurhaci also paid attention to harboring soldiers who surrendered, organizing internal order and developing the economy. He made national policies, caught

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The Rise of the Manchu

and punished robbers and thieves, and made laws to govern the area162. Thanks to his wise management, all tribes gathered together and the residents of Manchu were settled.163 Trade and business thrived and people led a good and stable life.164 The unification of the Jianzhou Jurchens and the rise of Nurhaci aroused conflicts with the Haixi Jurchens which were equally powerful. In 1593 (the 21st year of the Wanli period), Na Lin-bu-lu, leader of the Yehe tribe in Haixi, assembled leaders of nines tribes including the Hada,Wula, Huifa, Keerqin, Xibe, Gua Er Jia, Zhusheli and Neyin. The allied forces were thirty thousand soldiers who were divided into three groups launching attacks against Nurhaci. It was the first crucial battle since Nurhaci began his series of fights. The alliance formed by the nine tribes seemed overwhelming and gained the ascendancy over Nurhaci. However, Nurhaci stayed calm in the face of this risk. He made a correct analysis of the insurmountable contradictions existing inside the alliance. In his opinion, even though the number of tribes in the alliance was huge there was little discipline within the troops. They would watch the situation before acting165. If one or two leaders of the tribes were attacked and wounded, their troops would retreat166. “We are inferior in number, but if we fight an all-out battle, we surely will win.”167 So he was full of confidence and encouraged his men to take quick action and leave the alliance behind to station then on Gule Mountain. Then his troops could be stationed on precipitous spot to tempt the enemies to fight168. In the battle, he centralized the superior force and attacked the crucial enemies. Buzhai, leader of the Yehe tribe were killed and Buzhantai, the younger brother of Mantai who was the leader of te Wula tribe was captured. After seeing that Buzhai had been killed, a Beile (lord) of the Yehe tribe cried bitterly. The other Beile (lords) became frightened and ran away regardless of their soldiers 169. Nurhaci succeeded in breaking thirty thousand soldiers of the nine tribes, which laid the foundation for his further steps in unifying other Jurchen tribes. After his victory in defeating the nine-tribe alliance, Nurhaci did not stop. Instead he led his army eastward to conquer the Zhusheli and Neyin tribes, which made him much stronger. At that time Nurhaci had over 150 military officers 170 leading an army of over ten thousand soldiers, and his younger brother Suerhachi had 40 military officers with an army of over five thousand soldiers171. Their military power was quite strong. For over two decades after that Nurhaci struggled to unite the Jurchens. The problem which exhausted most of his energy was the Haixi Four States which were powerful and had many tribes. By and by he realized it was impossible for him to defeat the Four States by himself. He made the comment, “If you want to cut down a big tree, it

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

is difficult to cut it off all at once, therefore, you must use an ax to cut it inch by inch. Sooner or later the tree will fall down. In the same way, in order to defeat a whole country, it is impossible to completely break it overnight."172 Therefore he adopted the policy of dividing and encroaching. On the one hand he united with the stronger tribes such as Yehe and Wula in the form of alliances and marriage. In order to build closer ties with Buzhantai, leader of the Wula tribe, Nurhaci and Suerhachi married the niece and younger sister of Buzhantai respectively, Suerhachi also married his daughter to Buzhantai so as to break the union of the Haixi Four States and defeat them one by one. On the other hand, he first attacked the weaker tribes, namely the Hada tribe and Huifa tribes. At that time the Ming government was afraid that if the Jurchens became unified they would be strong. So the Ming court hoped to keep each tribe apart and played the game of balancing and “dividing and ruling". The weakening tribes in the Four States would be supported and the emerging Jianzhou Jurchens suppressed. In order to avoid conflict with the Ming army, Nurhaci still followed orders from the Ming authority. In 1599 Nurhaci had already defeated the Hada tribe and captured the leader Menggebulu. However, under the intervention of the Ming court, he had to pretend to leave the Hada tribe alone, so Wu Gu-er-dai, son of Menggebulu, was chosen as Hada headman by Nurhaci while he himself was ruling behind the scenes. Nurhaci spared no effort in winning the Mongolians over. Soon the Khorchin tribe and the Zhalute tribe in Mongolia both followed Nurhaci and became a major support in his process of unification. During the fight with the Haixi Four States which lasted over two decades, the fight for the Dong Hai Jurchens became a focus. The Dong Hai Jurchens were scattered in areas east of the Wusuli River, on both banks of the Heilongjiang River, and in the vast area north on the Stanowoigebirge, and who still remained on lower level of social development . They were soldiers or backups for the slave labour force, which was also a source of wealth. Whichever of the Haixi Jurchens or the Jianzhou Jurchens won Dong Hai Jurchens over would surely be the winner in the war of unifying the Northeastern region. Therefore, the fights among races for neighbouring tribes were intense. In 1607 (the 35th year of the Wanli period), Mu Tehe, leader of the Wa Er-ka tribe in Fei Youcheng town of Dong Hai (now Huichen, Jilin Province) suffered harassment from the Wula tribe and volunteered to follow Nurhaci. Suerhachi (younger brother of Nurhaci) and Chu Ying and Dai Shan (sons of Nurhaci) led a troop of three thousand soldiers to Fei Youcheng to welcome Mu Tehe's tribe, and Buzhantai of the Wula tribe led ten thousand soldiers to attack them along the Tumen River. On his way back to the troops, Suerhachi encountered the Wula

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soldiers in Wu Jieyan. Chu Ying and Dai Shan led the army and spared no effort in the battle, and in the end the Wula soldiers were defeated. They killed three thousand of the Wula soldiers and took 5,000 horses and 3,000 suits of armour173. The victory in the Wu Jieyan battle opened the door to the Dong Hai tribes .After that Nurhaci exerted great influence over the Yidong tribes and the Wula tribe did not dare to turn against his forces. Wherever Nurhaci's troops intended to conquer, no one dared to stand in the way. Sensing danger, the Wa Er-ka tribe also followed him174. In 1609, Hu Er-han was sent to take Hu Yelu which belonged to the Wo Ji Tribe (now the neighbouring area of Xing Haihu). In 1611 (the 38th year of the Wanli period), Eyidou was dispatched to win over the four branches (Namudulu, Sui Fen, Ningguta and Ni Macha) of the Wo Ji Tribe and take Yalanlu (now Yalan River on the eastern coast of Russia). In 1611 (the 39th year of the Wanli period), Abatai was sent to take Wuerguchen and Mulun of the Wo Ji Tribe. In the same year the Zhakuta people of the Dong Hai Hūrha tribe also started to follow Nurhaci. As the battle to unify all the Jurchens tribes proceeded smoothly, it required centralization of internal powers in Jianzhou and operating together under one command. The traditional military democracy cherished by the primitive tribes could not adapt to the new circumstances. Conflict and contradiction appeared inside Jianzhou, which had a profound influence on the history of the Manchu's rise, and a series of political intrigues and domestic tragedies occurred. At that time, Nurhaci's younger brother Suerhachi who shared the same mother possessed troops and property of his own and ran affairs in Jianzhou together with Nurhaci. However these brothers later had political conflict and difference of opinions. In the battle against Wu Jieyan, although Suerhachi was a leader, he did not agree with Nurhaci's attitude towards the Wula. Therefore he gave up directing the army; instead he just watched passively “with five hundred soldiers at the foot of a mountain......unable to gain bigger victory”175. Nurhaci scolded him for being a coward and complaining too much 176, which caused disobedience from Suerhachi. Later on Nurhaci ordered him to send his soldiers to build and maintain the fort and castle, but he asked his men not to provide service. Instead he insisted on building another city for himself 177. In 1609 Suerhachi planned to lead his troops to live in other areas178, which plan was discovered by Nurhaci. He was confined and his property and slaves were confiscated. Those who supported him were executed. Eliminating the separatist forces helped to clear the way to unifying the Jurchens. After Nurhaci eliminated the separatist forces he brought the war for unifying the Jurchens to a climax. In 1612 (the 40th year of the Wanli period), Nurhaci led troops to attack the Wula and achieved victory. The next year he

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launched an attack against the Wula which brought an end to the Wula tribe. From then on, the barrier blocking the way to Dong Hai and the Heilong River region was removed. In 1614 Nurhaci sent troops to conquer Yalan and Xilin of the Wo Ji tribe. In 1615 he dispatched troops to take Kunlun City in eastern E He (now the neighboring area of the Nal Hutta River in Russia) of the Wo Ji tribe. In July of 1616 (the 44th year of the Wanli period, the first year of Houjin), Nurhaci led his army and entered the Sahalian regions along the Heilong River, Jingqili River and Niuman River for the first time and conquered fifty-two stockade villages 179. In September of the same year, he subdued the Shiquan tribe scattered around the area east of the conjunction of the Heilong River and the Wusuli River. In 1617 he sent troops to continue conquering the tribes scattered around Dong Hai. In the case of any who refused to submit and took the risk of moving to small islands, Nurhaci's soldiers would go there by boat and kill them 180. Finally he took Kuye Island and its neighbouring islands. After that the Kuye tribe became willing to follow him and every year brought marten furs as tributes. Nurhaci appointed officials such as heads of districts and townships to govern them181. In 1619 Nurhaci sent soldiers to win over the remaining residents of the Hurha tribe in Dong Hai and destroyed the Yehe tribe in the same year. The Haixi Four States were finally unified. Nurhaci was an outstanding historic figure in the history of China and a national hero of the Jurchen people. He started his battle with the thirteen suits of armor and fought for over three decades to unify the Jurchen tribes. His force went from small to big, from weak to strong, and developed into a wellequipped army of sixty to seventy thousand soldiers. “Beginning from Dong Hai to the border of Liao, north to Mongolia and the Nen River, south to Korea and the Yalu River”, the tribes that spoke the same language were conquered and various tribes were unified into one182. He basically completed unification of all the Jurchen people. Nurhaci followed the trend of historic development and by making use of the power of the Jurchens he brought the long-term unstable and divided situation to an end, which made a remarkable contribution to the social development of the Jurchen, encouraging economic and cultural exchange among races, and strengthening and securing the defence of northeast China. As the Jurchens tribes were gradually unified, all aspects of social life such as agriculture, handicraft industry, hunting and commerce were developed. The development of agricultural production soon became key. In order to reinforce governance, in the new circumstances, Nurhaci gradually discarded the outdated and created the new. He set up a wide variety of policies and organizations and made many reforms in aspects such as politics, economy, military affairs and culture etc.

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Firstly, he established the eight banner military system, which was a means of social organization that combined the military with both politics by “administering people with the banner, namely, administering soldiers by the banner”183 and civilians by letting the population “fight outside and cultivate inside” 184. The system was applied in three aspects, namely administration, the military, and production. It was gradually developed during the war of unification and was based on the “Niru”, an organization used by the Jurchens in hunting. In previous times, “on occasions of sending troops to war or going hunting, regardless of the number of people, the participants were required to act on a tribal basis. Before they went hunting, every ten people should contribute one arrow and should select one leader among them, called Niru Erzhen, meaning the big arrow leader, while the other nine subordinates should act upon the leader’s command.”185 In1601 (the 29th year of the Wanli period), Nurhaci established a banner system based on the Niru system with reference to the Menganmouke system applied in the Jin dynasty. He set up four banners at first, namely the plain yellow, plain white, plain red and plain blue banner. Every Niru comprised three hundred men and one Niru leader, who was in charge of all affairs in the Niru. By 1615 (the 43rd year of the Wanli period), as more and more people came under his reign, he extended the system by adding four banners, namely, the bordered yellow, bordered white, bordered red and bordered blue. Every three hundred men formed a Niru and were commanded by a Niru leader, and every five Nirus formed a Jiale under the command of a Jiale leader. Five Jiale formed a Gushan, or banner, commanded by two vice leaders called Meiling Erzhen, and one Gushan Erzhen, who was the leader of the banner. Therefore the banner leader commanded 7,500 subordinates. Nurhaci was the supreme commander of the eight banners, and also controlled an elite troop called Bayale comprised of over five thousand horsemen. Each banner leader also possessed an elite troop with varying number of horsemen. Nurhaci commanded the two yellow banners, Daishan, his second son, the two red banners; Huangtaiji, his eightth son, the bordered white banner; Mangguertai, his fifth son, the bordered blue banner; Dudu, his oldest grandson, the plain white banner, Amin, his nephew, the plain blue banner.186 They were the supreme leaders of their own banners, holding the highest power in the military, administration and the organization of production. The eight banners were parallel. “All orders concerning production, life and war were given by Nurhaci to the eight banner leaders, who then conveyed them to Niru leaders and thence to soldiers. No delay was allowed for any order.”187 The fundamental building block of the banners was the Niru, which mainly reflected the geographic relationship and sometimes pre-existing lineage among

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

its members. Two vice leaders called Daizi, four lower ranking leaders called Zhangjing and four called Boshiku supplemented the Niru leader’s control over his Niru, which was divided into four Tatan, namely villages or tribes, each under the command of one Zhangjing or Boshiku.188 We can see from the above that the eight banner system was a complete military organization and political administration instrument, which placed the scattering Jurchen tribes under a unified banner system to engage in production and war, guaranteeing the victory of the unification war. The second measure Nurhaci took was building a walled city. He originally lived in the south hill of Erdaohe village, which was shaped like a square with a side length of one li (里)189, with a wall as high as over ten chi (尺). There was “no defensive city wall, archery platform, separation stages, or trenches.”190 The city was narrow and humble, and was thus called an old and dated city. In 1603 (the 31st year of the Wanli period), Nurhaci built another city on the east bank of the intersection of the Suzi River and Jiaha River. He “built a city along a hill with its wall made of soil.”191 It was also square, “with a side length of four li , one door in the south, two in the east, and one in the north.”192 The city was called Hetu Ala and was referred to as the old city. In 1605, Nurhaci built another outer city wall that was six zhang (丈) in height with eight doors. 193 “The wall was built with a mixture of soil and rocks, and sometimes with wood. Holes could be observed due to damage by arrows. The wall looked like a Nu wall (a kind of low wall with a rough surface). Wooden boards were used to make doors.”194 It can be seen from these descriptions that the city had an inner wall and a outer wall. Nurhaci and the aristocracy lived in the inner city, and the soldiers under various banners lived in the outer city. Slaves lived inside the city and craftsmen lived outside the city. The total population of the city reached thirty thousand. Hetu Ala city was big and built according to certain arrangement. It was the political, military, economic and cultural center of the territory under Nurhaci’s rule. Moreover Nurhaci also made an effort to choose skilled people to hold political discussion and handle judicial issues. The increasing territory and population as a result of military success inevitably generated more administrative issues. In order to secure his reign, Nurhaci needed a large number of officials who he decided to select based on a recommendationselection mechanism. He made it clear that the basis of selection was not blood lineage but ability, namely whether the person in question had a certain desirable skill and suited the recruitment conditions.195 In 1615 he set up five senior official positions in charge of discussing administrative issues with the eight banner leaders. “A gathering was held every five days where military

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Fig. 1.7.

Dazheng Plalace and the Shiwang Pavilion

Fig. 1.8.

Tianmingtongbao, the currency of the latter Jin dynasty

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A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

and administrative issues were discussed and decided.” 196 Such a political gathering or meeting was the decision-making center of Jianzhou’s politics and military. Meanwhile Nurhaci promulgated laws and nominated ten people to be Zhaerguqi (officials in charge of different aspect of administration), who were authorized to rule on judicial cases. When there were criminal cases, the ten Zhaerguqi would be jointly in charge of questioning and of briefing the five senior officials afterwards. After a recheck of the cases by the five officials, they would brief the Beile about the cases and then reach a decision. Either the plaintiff or the defendant could appeal if they found the ruling on a case unfair. Then Nurhaci would make the final verdict. Although the laws they applied at the time were still at a primitive stage, with many customary laws and punishments such as whipping, fines and the death penalty, Nurhaci’s emphasis on the rule of law raised people’s awareness of law to which they should temper their behavior and reduced the arbitrary punishments that used to cause chaos, thus establishing a multi-level juridical system. Fourthly, a Manchu writing script was created. In the early years of Nurhaci’s reign, the original Jurchen writing script was no longer in use. Therefore the Jurchens had only a spoken language but no written one. “60–70% of their books and articles were written in Mongolian, and the rest in Chinese.”197 This situation failed to meet the requirements of the new circumstances. In 1599 (the 27th year of the Wanli period), Nurhaci asked Ererde and Hegai to create a Manchu script using Mongolian letters and Jurchen pronunciation. The Manchu script thus created was very similar to Mongolian in shape and is called the old Manchu script or the Manchu script without circles. Despite many flaws in the script, such as an imperfect grammar, the script was still promoted and applied as their own script, marking remarkable progress of Jurchen society. All the above-mentioned measures were adopted by Nurhaci to underpin and consolidate the rule of the slave owners led by him. These measures, a result of the unification war, in turn reinforced the war which was progressive in that it exerted a positive influence on the unification of he Manchu, promoted the development of social productivity, and strengthened economic and cultural exchanges among different races. What Nurhaci did was historically in line with a unifying trend of the Jurchen tribes. In 1616 (the 44th year of the Wanli period), Nurhaci founded the Great Jin Kingdom, or Later Jin Dynasty, and established a new ruling era called Tianming. He unified the scattered Jurchen tribes under the local Jin regime, rapidly increasing the power of the regime, which eventually becoming a powerful local force that matched the Ming regime.

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The Saergun battle and the Later Jin’s entry into the Liaoning and Shenyang region Chairman Mao once stated that “the reactionary rulers in the history were mostly Han ethnic rulers, who created divisions among the different ethnic minorities in China and bullied them”. 198 This was exactly what the Ming rulers did, as they carried out policies colored by racial discrimination and suppression. They adopted a policy towards the Jurchens described as “separating the tribes to undermine their overall strength. Sowing discord among the different tribes. Allowing some of them to rise to prominence above others, but preventing unification.” 199 The Ming dynasty created hostility among the Jianzhou and Haixi tribes many times. For example, the Ming supported the Wula tribe’s repeated invasions of Jianzhou and persuaded Yehe to become a longtime enemy of Nurhaci. These were all measures taken by the Ming regime to prevent unification. Meanwhile the Ming officials in the Liaodong region “treated Jurchens like insects, holding them in contempt”.200 They beat the Jurchens whenever they wanted to, sentenced them arbitrarily, and killed them for no reason, breeding resentment between the Jurchens and the Han people. Economically, the Ming dynasty tried all it could to stop the economic development of the Jurchen region. Officials in charge of Chaogong, or the tribute deliveries from the Jurchens, and Mashi, a king of the street market, abused their power by forcing the Jurchens to sell at unreasonably low prices and levied excessive taxes for their own use. In the later phase of the Wanli period, the Ming dynasty went to the extreme of blockading the Jurchens, as in 1608 (the 36th year of the Wanli period) it stopped the planned tribute deliveries from the Jurchens and in the following year shut down the street markets, causing fifty thousand kilograms of ginseng to decay. It forbade Han people from entering the Jurchen region, seized farmlands in the Caihe River and Fana River region, and forbade the Jurchens from harvesting the crops on their farmlands. Such vicious deeds stirred up violent resentment among the Jurchens, whose leader Nurhaci once said bitterly that, “I administered the Ming’s border for thirty years without doing one single thing to impede the peace of the border. Is not this a perfect docile attitude?201 However, some of their officials in the Liaodong region have no better things to do but undermine me to get political credit.”202 Wherever there is racial suppression, there will be racial resistance. In January 1618, Nurhaci secretly told his aristocrats and officials that “we will definitely fight Ming this year”. He also added, “There is enmity between the Ming and me. There are seven grievances and countless small matters. I am left

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with no choice but to fight them.” He ordered the eight banners to “prepare armor, weapons and horses,”203. He ordered forty armored soldiers out of a total of fifty of every Niru to participate in the coming war, leaving the remaining ten to look after the city. Their actions should closely follow the orders of the Niru leaders. On April 13 of the same year, he led twenty thousand horsemen to fight the Ming regime. He wrote an allegation based on the “seven grievances” and divided his army into two parts in their expedition to the Ming territory. The part led by Nurhaci (bordered yellow, plain white, bordered red, and bordered white) attacked Fushun city, whose defending troops surrendered under the command of General Li Yongfang. The other four banners as the left flank (plain yellow, plain red, bordered blue and plain blue) attacked Dongzhou city, Magendan city and other regions. In response, the Xunfu (local administrative official of the Ming dynasty) of Liaodong region, Li Weihan, ordered General Zhang Chengmeng to fight the intruders with ten thousand soldiers, who were later ambushed by the Jurchens and wiped out. In July Nurhaci led all the eight banners to advance across the Yaguguan and lay siege to Qinghe city, where the defending general Zhou Chuxian and his troops fought a tenacious battle but were still defeated and wiped out. Nurhaci went on to conquer both Yiduqiang and Jianchang cities. The consecutive military success of Nurhaci caused not only excitement back home, but was also a shock to the Ming court. Even Emperor Shenzhong, who lived an extravagant life and assumed no responsibility as a ruler said, “the troops in the Liaodong region were severely damaged while the clout of the Jurchens is growing day by day. The status of the border is really grievous.”204 In order to pacify the revolt in Liaodong region and consolidate its reactionary rule, the Ming regime decided to start a large-scale war on the Later Jin regime and suppress its growing might. However the corrupt Ming regime found that its army stationed in the Liaodong region had long fallen into decadence, leaving slightly over ten thousand able soldiers in an army of nominally one hundred thousand soldiers. Moreover the state of the army was described as “army provisions were insufficient and morale was low. Production of weapons had stopped for years and the old ones were rusted and could not be used any more. There was almost never a single sound of battle drums or weapons. When occasionally put on military actions, the soldiers would tremble and their faces would turn pale.” 205 Obviously such an army could not withstand the slightest attack. In view of this, the Ming regime could only “deploy all the armies in the rest of the nation in the Liaosheng region allied with armies from Korea and the Yehe tribe.”206 Even so, as corrupt as the troops in the Liaodong region, many people in the armies from the rest of China

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“lay down on the ground crying out their unwillingness to fight” and even generals “cried and pleaded for relocation”.207 As can be clearly seen, the Ming regime’s attack was far from a sure win but rather a deadly gamble. The Ming dynasty assigned Yang Gao as the Liaodong Jinglue, a position equaling the general commander of the Liaodong troops, and Du Song, Li Rubai and Liu Deng as his adjutants. They allocated troops and supplies for nine months. By April 1619 (the 47th year of the Wanli period and the 4th year of the Tianming period of the Later Jin), all Chinese armies were in position. Together with thirty thousand Korean soldiers there were over one hundred thousand soldiers in total, which were claimed to be four hundred and seventy thousand. 208 After a discussion between Yang Gao and his subordinates, the army was divided into four parts. Liu directed his army to advance from the Kuandian region in the east; Lin from the Sanchakou region in the north; Du from the Fushun region in the west; Li from the Yaguguan region in the south. All four armies were headed for Hetu Ala city with Du’s army from the west as the main force. Wang Shaoxun was put in charge of supplies while Yang Gao stayed in Shenyang. The Ming court was deceived by the seemingly overwhelming momentum of its own army and boasted that, “under the attack of so many armies, the war would be successfully completed in ten days”.209 Nurhaci, having grasped the strategic intentions and plan of the Ming army, made a correct analysis of the situation and believed that the Ming army was feinting. He said, “the Ming regime wants us to think there is an attack from the south so that we will go to the south, while their main force will actually attack us from Fushun in the west, which will be the key to the war. If we defeat the troops from the west, the troops will not threaten us.”210 He therefore sent only five hundred soldiers to fight and delay the advance of the troops headed by Liu from the east, while concentrating his strength on countering the main force of Ming headed by Du Song from the west, acting in accordance with the principle of “regardless of the number of enemy troops, fight them with all the soldiers on our side in one troop”. 211 Such an arrangement was correct. Seemingly the Ming army had more than one hundred thousand soldiers while the Later Jin army had only sixty thousand, putting the latter in a unfavorable position. But the Ming army was divided into four parts and thus its power was dispersed. Moreover, the three troops headed by Liu, Ma Lin and Li Rubai had a long and harsh journey which made it hard for them to reach their destination quickly. Only Du Song’s troop arrived at Hetu Ala city in two days, as they traveled from Fushun, crossed the Huihe River and advanced along the Suzihe River, where the route was flat. Nurhaci sent his sixty thousand soldiers to fight Du Song’s thirty thousand soldiers, winning the initiative by starting the war

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in a favorable situation. He commanded the eight-banner troops in person and headed to the west. The two armies confronted each other in the Saerhu region, and the famous Saerhu battle was thus started. Fig. 1.9.

Route of the War of Saerhu

The battle can be divided into three phases: The first phase was the combat in the Saerhu and Jilinya region. On April 13, Du Song led his thirty thousand soldiers across the Fushunguan, reaching Saerhu on the next day. After learning that the Later Jin troops were building a defense line in Jiefan city to block the advancement of the Ming troops, he led

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ten thousand soldiers to attack the city, further dispersing the already dispersed force. By then, the eight-banner troop had reached the east of the city. Nurhaci quickly took the chance of defeating his enemy separately. He said, “if we defeat the army installed in Saerhu, those near Jiefan city will be so frightened they will lose the ability to fight”.212 He then sent two banners headed by Daishang and Huangtaiji to fight Du Song’s troop. He himself led other six banners to attack the troops in Saerhu. Under sudden attack, the Ming soldiers all fled to the west bank of Saerhu River only to be slaughtered in the Deliaha region. While under the Jilinya, or Jilin Cliff, Du Song and his troop were besieged and wiped out. It was said that, “dead bodies were scattered everywhere, blood flowed like water. Weapons and dead bodies fell into the Hunhe River and were washed downstream, swirling like ice.”213 The second phase was the battles in Shangjianya, or the Shangjian Cliff and Feifeng Mountain. On April 14, Ma Lin led his Ming army and the Yehe troop from the Sanchakou region and occupied the Shangjian Cliff of Fuleha Mountain. He sent Pan Zhongyan to occupy the Feifeng Mountain with a troop, and Gong Niangshui and another troop to Wohuiemo, occupying three points of a triangle, with which they hoped to help each other in battle. After defeating the main force of the Ming regime in the west, Nurhaci moved northwards with victorious momentum. On April 15, the Later Jin regime army defeated the Ming army in Wohuiemo first and then those at Shangjian Cliff. Ma Lin succeeded only in escaping from the battlefield. Eventually the Ming troop at Feifeng Mountain was also defeated. The third stage was the battles in Abudaligang and Fucha. On April 10, Liu’s army started their expedition from the Kuandian region. Although this flank of the Ming army started advancing the earliest, due to the precipitous road and heavy snow, they reached Shenhe on the 15th. Along their advance a few defending troops of the Later Jin dynasty skirmished with them and delayed their progress. On 16th, Liu Jin’s army reached Abudaligang and Jiang Hongli’s Korean army reached Dafucha (Fuche), 50 to 60 miles away from Hetu Ala city. By this time Nurhaci had defeated the Ming in the west and the north. He made no delay in sending Boerhan, Amin, Daishang and Huangtaiji to the east and soon had gathered thirty thousand soldiers in the east who “hid in the valley and waited for a good time to attack”. In contrast, the Ming army burnt and robbed Jurchen villages along their progress and advanced without vigilance. As a result, when the Later Jin army “rushed out and cut the Ming army into halves,” Liu was killed and the whole army was slaughtered.214 Dai Shang then summoned the eight-banner troop to attack the Korean army in the Fucha region and laid siege to Jiang Hongli’s camp. Jiang’s army “stayed in

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such a narrow space that there was no standing room for men and horses. After a few days, the soldiers were both tired and hungry. They could not retreat as the path for retreat had been blocked. They could not fight either, as the soldiers were all too frightened to do so. Some soldiers were throwing away weapons and sitting on the ground. In such circumstances, there was nothing Jiang could do.”215 Therefore, under Jiang’s command, the whole army surrendered. Informed of the loss of three armies, Yang Gao sent an urgent order to Li Rubai to retreat. As a result, only Li’s troop safely retreated among the four armies. The Saerhu battle was a typical military example of concentrating force, choosing a favorable location and time for fighting, fighting continuously and swiftly, dividing the enemy and defeating the enemy with an inferior number of troops. In the war, Nurhaci manifested his flexible commanding ability and the Later Jin army also demonstrated its bravery. Within five days they fought three battles in three locations. Before the battles they made thorough plans; in the battles, they fought bravely; after the battles, they left the battlefield as soon as possible and advanced to the new battles. As a result the Later Jin regime won a landslide victory over the Ming regime. The battle was the turning point for both regimes. The Ming dynasty’s power greatly declined and its policy to impede the unification of the Jurchens also failed, forcing the regime to turn from offense to defense; the Later Jin’s regime power surged and its political aggression and desire for more wealth grew, which turned its policy towards the Ming regime from defense to offense. After Nurhaci won the battle, he led his army westwards and trampled through the Liaodong area. He conquered Kaiyuan and Tianling, stealing people, wealth, and crops. In August wiped out the Yehe tribe. The whole Liaodong area was plunged into chaos. “The armor, weapons and firearms” of the Ming army were all lost, and the soldiers and generals “lost all courage when hearing the alarm sounded for a Jurchen attack”. “Without armor and weapons, all the soldiers knew nothing but plundering the army provisions and would do anything if they could avoid fighting the Jurchens.” “There were thousands of deserters a day.” “Every man and every camp were trying to flee.”216 The armies deployed and cities of strategic importance settled by Ming regime were all destroyed. The Ming government sent Xiong Yangbi as the general commander to command the army in the Liaodong region and take back the land occupied by the Jurchens. Xiong realized that, after the recent defeat, the military balance between the two sides was very unfavorable to the Han regime. The only way to regain a favorable position was to adopt a “defensive posture and gradually advance”, namely to use a long-term defensive policy

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so as to dampen the momentum of the Later Jin regime and accumulate power to make a counterattack.. He supervised the defense in the Liaodong region, during which he reorganized the administration of the army, enforced strict discipline, built castles, drilled his soldiers, produced weapons, developed farmlands, stored food, and took a defensive posture, all of which had a marked effect and therefore prevented Nurhaci’s next attack. Zhu Tongmeng commented that, “it is only ten months since Xiong became the general commander, but the dilapidated Liaoyang city has taken on a new look. Those who were scared of the Jurchens calmed down, while the two empty cities Fengji and Shenyang have become two important bases for border defense. Now people all go about their daily business, commerce has revived, and the places are buzzing with travelers and merchants. This is the place where both defense and assault can be relied on.”217 However in the ruling class there were always idealists who were groundlessly arrogant, held unrealistic views and refused to face reality. They looked down upon the rising Later Jin regime due to their racial discrimination. They were against the long-term defensive policy adopted by Xiong. They criticized Xiong for using a large budget but taking no offensive measures. They urged him to change to an offensive posture and launch a quick attack on the Jurchens. Under such pressure, Xiong was forced to resign and his position were taken by Yuan Yingtai, who was not capable person in military matters. After Yuan took office he abandoned many of Xiong’s measures. He thought Xiong had adopted too strict a discipline and “made a lot of changes to loosen the once rigid rules”.218 He also made blind plans to attack the Jurchens. Before he launched his attack, in March 1621 (the first year of the Tianqi period), Nurhaci laid siege to Shenyang and took over the city after a few fierce battles. The Jurchens went on to attack Liaoyang. The defending soldiers in Liaoyang were less than ten thousand, but they fought a brave battle. The Jurchens “attacked the city with armored cavalry from all sides” while the Ming army “countered them bravely, first defeating the white banner then the yellow banner and killing two to three thousand horsemen”. However after three days of deadly battle, due to the great differences in numbers, Liaoyang fell on March 21st and Yuan Yingtai committed suicide. The army of the Later Jin dynasty swept across the eastern area to the Liaohe River, taking over more than 70 cities including Zhenjiang, Haizhou, Yaozhou, Gaizhou, Fuzhou and Jinzhou. In order to underpin his reign in the newly conquered region, Nurhaci moved his capital to Shenyang. The whole Ming court was shocked by the fall of Shenyang. Xiong was again made the head of military and Wang Huazhen was made Xunfu, the general

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governor of the region. Yet the dispute over defense and offense became even more heated. Xiong was still maintaining his defensive policy, in which he suggested strengthening the defense of the Guangding region and pacifying the turbulence on the west river bank, and then making a gradual advance into the lost territory. Some other high ranking officials, drawing no lesson from the recent defeat, still wanted to attack. Among them Wang Huazhen was the most hard-line. He “knew nothing about tactics and despised the formidable enemy”219 and wanted to use all the soldiers on the border to fight a decisive war with the Jurchens. A situation where the military head supported defense while the general governor supported offense was thus formed. “After their debate, their hostility towards each other grew.” 220 Wang Huazhen held the real power as he controlled over one hundred thousand soldiers, while Xiong controlled only four thousand and could not do anything substantial. In the first month of 1622 Nurhaci took advantage of the dispute between Xiong and Wang, leading his army across the Liaohe River and moving west. Xiong wanted to concentrate the troops in defense of Guangning city, but Wang dispersed the troops among different castles, forming a situation where the Ming side could only wait for attack. The Later Jin army surrounded and attacked Xiping city. Wang sent his trusted subordinate Sun Degong to relieve the city from the siege. But Sun was defeated and rushed back to Guangning. After arriving in Guangning, Sun showed a clear intent to surrender to the Later Jin regime as he “called on soldiers and regular people to shave their hair and yield to the Jurchens”. As a result, “the whole city fell into chaos, with people escaping in all directions.”221 Wang Huazhen also made a hurried escape to the west, and Guangning fell. Soon afterwards the Later Jin army occupied another forty cities, expanding the regime’s control over a vast area on the west bank of the Liaohe River. Afterwards, to facilitate his later war with the Ming dynasty, Nurhaci moved his capital again from Liaoyang to Shenyang. He claimed that “the history of rise and fall normally follows the course of big power declining while small powers grow…the Later Jin dynasty acts on the behalf of justice and is thus preferred by heaven. Places such as Nanjing, Beijing, and Pyankung should not be populated by only one race in the first place. They should be run in turn by Jurchens and Han people.” 222 Nurhaci was by then in possession of a strong army that had defeated Ming army many times and was in control of almost the entire Liao region. He had the power and ambition to seize control of the whole of China from the Ming dynasty. After Guangning’s fall, both Xiong and Wang were put to death by the Ming court. The regime then assigned Wang Zaijin to be the Jinglue, or military commander, of Liaodong region. Wang was a coward who proposed giving up

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the land beyond the Shanhaiguan, and building a defense line eight miles to the north of Shanghaiguan where the army would be deployed. Such a negative defensive strategy was opposed by middle and lower ranking military officials, such as Yuan Chonghuan. Yuan was originally a low ranking civilian official who excelled in strategic thinking and bravery. At the time of Guangning’s fall, he used to patrol on his own outside Shanhaiguan. He was given an order to “go to the Qiandun region and hide among the Liaodong people at two in the morning, and to go to places with dangerous terrain and vicious enemies”.223 He was “brave enough to confront any hardship and fulfill his missions”. After researching the situation outside Shanhaiguan, he claimed “if I am given sufficient weapons, horses, money and food, I can protect the place all by myself”.224 He believed that “to protect the land inside Shanhaiguan, we should protect the land outside it. To protect the land outside Shanhaiguan, we should protect Ningyuan city (what is now Xingcheng County of Liaoning Province)”. Therefore he held that “as Ningyuan was to the east of Shanhaiguan and to the west of Guangning, it was of great strategic importance”225 and that a navy could be deployed to contain the enemy at nearby Jueyuan Island, where food could also be stored. He also held that after the loss of Guangning the area had become a protective screen for the Shanhaiguan and should therefore be properly defended from the enemy. Yuan Chonghuan’s proposal was approved and supported by the Binbushangshu, or the military minister, Sun Chengzong, who before long replaced Wang Zaijin to be the Liaodongjinglue, or military commander of the Liaodong region. Sun followed Xiong Yanbi’s defensive policy and adopted Yuan Chonghuan’s suggestion. He reorganized the defense of Shanghaiguan, intensified the defenses in Liaoyuan city, and appointed Yuan Chonghuan, Zu Dashou and other officials to settle in and construct Ningyuan city. He also built strongholds in Jinzhou, Dalinghe, Xiaolinghe, Songshang, Xingshan, Youtun and other places. By doing all this he constructed a defensive line relying on Jinzhou and Ningyuan outside the Shanhaiguan, leaving very little chance for Nurhaci to invade further. However in September 1625 (the fifth year of theTianqi period and the tenth year of the Tianming period of the Later Jin dynasty), Sun Chengzong resigned after he lost the battle at Yaozhou and was criticized by the eunuchs. The Ming court appointed Gao Di to in place of Sun Chengzong. Gao believed that the defense outside Shanhaiguan was doomed to fail, so he reversed what Sun had done. He “removed the defenses in Jinzhou, Youtun, Dalinghe, and Xiaolinghe and the strongholds in Songshan, Xingshan and Tashan, relocating all the soldiers inside Shanhaiguan and leaving behind five thousand tons of food. On the expedition, the “sound of people crying could be

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heard everywhere. Soldiers grumbled and the morale of the army was low.”226 Yuan Chonghuan tried to talk Gao out of this wrong action but failed, so he chose to refuse Gao’s order and stayed in Ningyuan city, which then stood alone outside the Shanhaiguan. On the first month of 1626 (the sixth year of the Tianqi period and the eleventh year of the Tianming period of the Later Jin dynasty), Nurhaci led a large army westwards to lay siege to Ningyuan city and sent a letter to Yuan Chonghuan asking him to surrender. Yuan encouraged his subordinates to fight for the city to the death. They made a very solid defense of the city that stood the Jurchens’ tide of fierce attacks. Nurhaci went to the frontline to supervise the battle in person, and the city responded with artillery attack. After a long battle the Later Jin army “was greatly frustrated by the unwavering defense and retreated”. 227 The victory in Ningyuan city was the Ming’s first military success in the long string of battles with the Later Jin. It frustrated the Jurchens, and dampened Nurhaci’s ambition to seize the entire Liao region and pose a direct threat to the Shanhaiguan. It guaranteed the safety of the Shanhaiguan and the area inside it. After the defeat, Nurhaci retreated to Shenyang. Falling into a long-term depression, Nurhaci caught gangrene and died from it on August 11. This was the most grievous loss for the Manchus during the rise of the Qing dynasty.

The Economic Development of Manchu Society — a Transition from Slavery to Feudalism The time of slavery in the Manchu society As Marx pointed out, “because slavery is an economic category it has always existed among the institutions of different peoples”.228 The Manchu society was no exception. The direct ancestors of the Manchu people, the Jurchen people who lived in the Heilong River region, had adopted slavery very early. In the middle of the Ming Dynasty they migrated southward to north Kaiyuan on the upper reaches of the Hun River. At this point they were already in the stage of household slavery. They captured Han people and “ordered about them as slaves” 229. As well as being domestic slaves, some of the Han people were “ordered to farm” 230 , and were “sold among slave-owners” 231 , who “made substantial profits out of such business”232. Jurchen practice of slavery progressed a lot during the Nurhachi period. The slave-owner class with Nurhachi as the leader founded the Eight Banners system, “governing people under the banners”. They assigned subjects governed by the Later Jin dynasty

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into banners, therefore the entire labor force was controlled by the leaders of the eight banners. The stage of household slavery moved into a stage of farming estate slavery. In this period, the social productivity of the Jurchens surged. By 1616, when Nurhaci founded the Later Jin dynasty, his territory had expanded to over four thousand li (里), and his population grew to somewhere between four hundred thousand and five hundred thousand. From the east of the Kaiyuan region, in the vast land along the Hun River, Suzi River and Tongjia River to the bank of the Yalu River, there were many river valleys where fertile land with sufficient water supply offered perfect conditions for agriculture. Some Han people living in the Liaodong region escaped from the excessive exploitation and oppression of the Ming dynasty to the Jianzhou region to make a living. There were also a large number of Han people and Ming soldiers captured and taken there, who resided and became peasants in the Later Jin kingdom. Among them the Han people who lived in areas bordering the Later Jin territory had the closest ties with the Jurchens. Some of them swore brotherhood and some intermarried with Jurchens. 233 These Han people later went to the Later Jin kingdom and introduced the Jurchens to advanced and sophisticated agricultural techniques. Moreover Nurhaci paid great attention to agricultural production, actively promoting the use of iron agricultural tools and buffalos in plowing and outlawing the killing of buffalos. As a result, the farmland in Jianzhou expanded rapidly and production surged. Its agriculture saw tremendous development. In 1619 (the 47th year of the Wanli period, the fourth year of the Tianming period) a Korean, Li Minghuan, witnessed the prosperous agriculture and commented, “Lands are fertile, the growth of crops is pleasing. There are both crops in dry farmlands and wet farmlands.”234 He also said, “The harvest is good. The storehouses are filled with crops.” 235 This shows that agriculture had by then become a primary sector of the social production of the Later Jin dynasty. Based on the prosperity in agriculture, the handicraft industry also developed rapidly. The dynasty’s handicraft industry evolved a division of labor, which “categorized craftsmen into gold and silver craftsmen, iron craftsmen, leather craftsmen, and wood craftsmen”.236 In the capital Hetu Ala, “blacksmiths who specialized in making armor lived outside the north gate, while craftsmen who specialized in making bows and arrows lived outside the south gate”. 237 Among all craftsmen, “blacksmiths had the most sophisticated technique”.238 At the time, iron smelting was primary in the handicraft industry. Before Nurhaci’s rise to prominence, Jianzhou was only capable of utilizing second-hand iron and making it into some weapons and agricultural tools, but was not capable of mining and smelting iron on its own. Nurhaci laid great

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stress on iron smelting and gave preferential treatment to blacksmiths by “giving them abundant living necessities and beasts such as buffalos and horses”. By 1599 (the 27th year of the Wanli period), Jianzhou was capable of iron smelting and had then “enjoyed a prosperous iron industry”239 which greatly improved the situation from its earlier reliance on imports from the Ming dynasty and Korea. Its textile industry was also under fast development. In 1616, Nurhaci made a nationwide announcement that “called on his people to start to breed silkworms to make silk and plant cotton to make cotton cloth”.240 Jianzhou also saw progress to various degrees in the ceramic industry, ship building industry, construction industry, silverware industry and other industries. The progress in agriculture and handicraft industry intensified the division of labor and facilitated commerce. During Nurhaci’s reign, the production and trade of merchandise saw a significant rise. He expanded the exchange of goods with the Ming dynasty through horse markets and tribute deliveries to the Ming. Specialties such as ginseng and marten furs were used to exchange for a large quantity of production materials and living necessities from the Ming. To guarantee the export of ginseng, namely to protect it from decaying, a process of cooking and drying it was applied. Afterwards “ginsengs were sold in small batches,241 so as to keep a high level of profits. Accompanying the growing production and trade of goods, some Jurchens became professional merchants who travelled between Jianzhou, the Ming territory and Korea. After the founding of the Later Jin dynasty, the types of goods being traded increased rapidly and the existing horse market and the markets among the Jurchen tribes could not feed the demand. To meet the demand at a new stage of exchange of goods, in 1616 the dynasty began to cast its own coin called “Tianmingtongbao”, or “Tianminghanqian”242 which circulated within the entire territory of Later Jin and facilitated the development of commerce. The progress of agriculture, handicraft industry and commerce promoted the development of slavery. The time of Nurhaci’s reign saw a transition of the dynasty from domestic slavery into farm slavery. Slaves, as an important production means, mainly came from captives from war. During the rise of Nurhaci, in every war, slave-owners allocated their captives in such a way as “the one who grabbed the captive owned the captive,”243 thus leading to a situation where “in the contest for valuable things (including slaves), even brothers and relatives turned into foes” 244 and engaged in fierce fighting with each other. To resolve this internal contradiction and to strengthen his reign, Nurhaci abolished the old way of allocating captives and adopted a regime under which “captives were all taken by the government and then allocated equally among people” 245 and those who did not hand over their captives would be severely

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punished.246 Nurhaci, who gradually became the supreme ruler of the Jurchens as the unification war continued successfully and a regime was founded, owned all the land and subjects nominally and he allocated his land among his people and gave them to the banner leaders and officials as gifts. Nurhaci controlled his kingdom with a slavery system, the eight banner system, which administered both the army and civilians in the entirety of social production. The Niru under the banners were the fundamental unit of social production. Some Nirus, in the sense that they provided labor for social production and cultivated private fields, should be classified as internal Nirus. Some others, as they provided their services for the kingdom, should be called external Nirus. “Tuokesuo” was farmland that was cultivated by internal Niru. As stated in the “Qingwenjiang”, or literally the record of Qing, “the places where the farmers lived were called Tuokesuo”.247 The six fields the Korean, Shen Zhongyi, saw in 1596 (the 24th year of the Wanli period) were all Tuokesuo. All these farm villages belonged to the Nurhaci family and his subordinates. For example, Nurhaci himself owned one farm, his younger brother, Surhaci owned two, his son-in-law owned one, his cousin, Tongadou owned one and Tongliushui owned one.248 There were farm attendants who managed these farms. The attendant for Nurhaci’s farm was called Wang Zhi and the one for Surhaci was called Shuang Gu, both in charge of supervising and urging the slaves to cultivate the land, which made the farms typical slavery farms. At the end of the sixteenth century, there were not many Tuokesuo in Jianzhou, as the “Jianzhoutulu” or the pictured record of Jianzhou written by Shen Zhongyi said only five out of 31 leaders of slave-owners owned Tuokesuo. Moreover each Tuokesuo did not take up very much land. For example, Tongliushui’s Tuokesuo, located near the Manzhechuan River (what is now the branch of Hun River, the Xinkai River), was only over twenty “ri ” (日,the measure of land adopted by the Jurchens) when cultivation started 249 which equaled only about one hundred mu . However, with their continued military success, their territory and population of slaves grew and so did the number of Tuokesuo. The new status of farms can be seen in the “Jianzhouwenjianlu” or the record of Jianzhou written by Li Minhuan in 1619, which said that both Nurhaci and Beiles, and the soldiers of the eight banners had “attendants, slaves and farms”, proving that the number of farms was far different from the original five to six. Although the book does not provide an accurate number of farms, the description that only a banner military officer could owned a maximum of “over fifty farms” shows that at the time farms were numerous. These farms were all owned by banner military officers who “did not cultivate

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the farms themselves” but “forced slaves to work on the fields”.250 It is clear that slavery farms were commonplace at the time. As well as the Tuokesuo there were fields cultivated by the external Niru. In the early days of Nurhaci’s reign, the army suffered from lack of food and the subjects did not pay taxes. Such a undeveloped economic system was not in line with the requirements of the unification war and the progress of the society. To change this, Nurhaci “enclosed fields in the territories of tribes and appointed the head of the chieftains of these tribes to administer the harvest so as to store crops in case of need”.251 In 1615 (the 43rd year of the Wanli period), Nurhaci wanted to levy taxes but was concerned about “imposing too much pressure on the people by levying taxes”. He therefore reorganized the public fields and ordered that “every Niru should contribute ten men and four buffalos to serve the country by developing wild lands and cultivating farmlands. The harvest thus obtained should be put in the kingdom’s storage, so as to increase the nation’s income of food”. 252 The people sent to do this kind of work were all free men and the crops harvested were sent to government storage to be in the disposal of the Later Jin regime. In its nature, this kind of labor was the free men’s obligation to the regime to provide labor service and thus contained elements of feudal labor service. The formation of social hierarchy is in conformity with the development of social production. The two exert mutual influence on each other, but the factors of social production restrict the social hierarchy. At the time there were four hundred thousand to five hundred thousand people under Later Jin dynasty’s rule, and the society organized its production based on the Niru in the eight banner system. In the process of social production there arose three classes namely, the slave owners, the slaves and free men. Slave owners could be divided into the following: (1) Nurhaci and his family. They were the banner leaders and had top political power in the country as they participated in political discussion and policy making process. Moreover they “were given what they seized in the war” and therefore were in possession of vast land, numerous slaves, cattle and wealth. They were the most powerful and privileged clan and slave owners in the Manchu and were the center of the ruling class of the Later Jin dynasty. (2) Officials of different levels in the eight banners. They were both military leaders and local administrators. They also gained a large number of slaves and a lot of wealth through plunder in wars and awards. Their status was only second to the Beile. They were the backbone of the reign of the Later Jin. (3) Surrendered officials. They comprised the leaders of Jurchen tribes other than the Jianzhou Jurchens and leaders from tribes of other races, including

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officials and landlords from the Ming dynasty who surrendered to the Later Jin dynasty with their followers, either during wartime or peacetime. Nurhaci gave them preferential conditions, not only by giving them many rewards but also by “giving them certain official positions to command a certain number of people”.253 They were incorporated into the eight banners and became military leaders. The above-mentioned three types of people constituted the slave owner class. They possessed a large number of Tuokesuo and slaves which they could trade, slaughter and bury with dead people at funerals. They also had a varied degree of possession over Zhushen, or free men. Driven by the development of slavery, Manchu slave owners tried to steal more slaves and wealth from other regions so as to increase the source of slaves and their possession of wealth. Therefore plunder became the profession and aim of slave owners. They only “engaged in military activities but did not work on the fields”,254 namely they did not participate in production but lived by exploiting all the surplus labor from the slaves. It was exactly as Engels said, they looked down upon the idea of using one’s own labor to exchange for living materials and believed this was what slaves should do. Their behavior was even more shameful than robbery. There were two categories of slaves: (1) War captives. Nurhaci treated those who surrendered and those who were captured in war very differently. Generally speaking, those who surrendered in war would be treated as ordinary citizen while those captured would be put into the hands of eight banner officials as slaves, who were also called Aha. For example, in 1613 (the 41st year of the Wanli period), “the surrendered soldiers from the defeated Wula army had their wives and slaves back and were incorporated into society as regular citizens in ten thousand households, while those captured were given to the banners as slaves”.255 Another example was in 1618 (the 46th year of the Wanli period), after Nurhaci took over Fushun and other cities, all the three hundred thousand captives and cattle were distributed among the soldiers while the surrendered people were accepted as regular citizens into one thousand households” (the second volume of The Record of Emperor Taizu of Qing Dynasty )…it can be therefore concluded that all captives, either Han people or Jurchens, would be used as slaves of the officials and soldiers. (2) Free citizens descended into the status of slaves. Frequent wars at the time made it possible for a continuous growth of wealth, resulting in polarization within the free men class in the Manchu society. While some became slave owners, some became slaves due to natural disasters or misfortunes in life. Some free men’s whole families were “used as slaves due to excessive debt”.256

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These slaves were used not only in domestic labor but more often they in agriculture. For example, in 1618, Nurhaci transferred as many as eight hundred slaves from the Tuokesuo of Beile to dry crops in the Hun River region. 257 Nurhaci wanted the “Aha (slaves) to share the crops cultivated and harvested by them with the Erzhen (slave owners)”, 258 which proved that the Aha were the direct producers in the society. However the slave owners possessed the production means and slaves, and all the products produced by the slaves were all taken by slave owners, as written in the Record of Jianzhou: “slaves worked on the fields to provide food for their owners” and in the Official History of the Manchu State : “slaves dared not keep any of the crops grown by their own hard labor”. Moreover slaves had no political status as they had no personal freedom in their residence, life or marriage and could only follow their master ’s arrangement. Slave owners had the right of life and death over the slaves. They could trade them, beat them and slaughter them to their heart’s content. Slaves suffered from inhumane treatment and were viewed as the same as cattle, except that they could speak. The descendents of slaves were still slaves and were not allowed to leave their owner without permission; otherwise they would be punished by law. As Stalin pointed out, “under slavery, the basis of relations of production was the slave owner ’s possession of the production means and the producers, namely the slaves, who their owners could trade and slaughter like animals”.259 Free men comprised of following two groups of people: (1) The free men in Jianzhou. In the earlier days of the Jianzhou Jurchens “they did not use each other as slaves”. Therefore among the Jurchens, apart from those slave owners, the rest were all free men. When it came to the era in discussion, although there began to be polarization within classes, most of the people had by then become soldiers in the eight banner troops who saw war as a path to glory and wealth. This is why “whenever the troops were to embark on new expedition, everyone was happy, including the wives and children of the soldiers and military leaders, who hoped the war would bring them more wealth”.260 They were rewarded with slaves, cattle and money after every war. This is where the slaves and farms came from as described in the Record of Jianzhou in the following words, “from the chieftain to his subordinate officers and to the soldiers, everyone possessed slaves and farms.” (2) Surrendered regular people and soldiers. Nurhaci gave these people land, cattle, production tools and living materials. Rather than using them as slaves, he gave them the citizenship of the Manchu state. Most of them became eight banner soldiers and were also rewarded by their participation in the war.

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These free men enjoyed relatively more freedom, as they owned their own possessions. However they still had to rely on banner leaders and Erzhen for protection and were obliged to provide certain services for them, such as going to war with their own horse, weapons and food, and serving as free labor. Nurhaci and Beile saw the free men as their own possessions which they could give to subordinates as rewards. This shows that the social status of free men was still relatively low. For example, when four chieftains from the Sukesuhu tribe came to surrender to the Later Jin with their own subordinates, they asked Nurhaci to “take into consideration their early surrender and previous friendly relations, and not to treat them as free men.”261 From perspectives such as the ownership of production means, the relationship among classes, and the allocation of products, we can see that before Nurhaci took over the Liaodong region the Manchu were in the stage of slavery which developed under the eight banner system, and was in transition from domestic slavery to farm slavery.

The transition from slavery to feudal serfdom After Nurhaci took over Liaoyang and Shenyang, and the vast region around them, the Later Jin society gradually moved from slavery to feudalism. This was a slow, difficult and painful process. However, at the end, advanced feudal serfdom outweighed slavery and became the primary mode of production. Normally speaking, the fall of slavery is more usually caused by the slavery country being defeated in war, the revolt of slaves or insufficient resources of slaves; however the replacement of slavery by feudalism in the Later Jin dynasty was accompanied by a string of military successes, the expansion of territory and a surge in the number of slaves. It was the fierce resistance by the captured population against enslavement that forced the regime to adapt itself to the more advanced production model in the vast land it had conquered. The Liaoshen region was densely populated by Han people and had a relatively developed agriculture where the feudal production relationship was the mainstream. For a long time the Ming government had established a Juntun system under which population, food and weapons were self-contained and soldiers both cultivated farmlands and attended military training. In the middle of the 16th century (the later period of the Jiajing period), there were around 96,400 military households containing thirty-eight hundred thousand people who cultivated 3.68 million mu ( ) of military farmlands,262 and a large number of civilian households and vast civilian farmland. In the Liaoyang region “every year there was a surplus of food that was stored in castles”, 263 which was a

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vividly prosperous picture. Moreover the region enjoyed fairly developed handicraft industry, commerce and transportation. It sent to the Ming court an annual two hundred tons of cast iron. When the Later Jin regime seized control of the region, production was seriously impeded by wars and the population was slashed as people were killed or fled the region. As a result, the prosperity of the region disappeared as the original relationships among classes were brought into chaos. However the original advanced mode of production could not be totally destroyed. The Manchu moved here, settled down, built their reign and restored social order. In so doing they were forced to change slavery into something more in line with the level of productivity of the region. To adapt to the new situation and the new requirements, the Later Jin regime implemented a series of adjustments and reforms. This situation was summed up by Marx and Engels, who stated that, “the conquerer who settles down should adopt a social system in line with the level of productivity. If there is no such adaptation in the first place, the social system will undergo a gradual change in accordance with productivity”.264 How did the Later Jin regime change its original mode of production to adapt to the level of productivity in the Liaoshen region? It was a difficult process with many conflicts. In July 1621 (the first year of the Tianqi period and the sixth year of the Tianqi period of the Later Jin dynasty), the year the regime took control of the Liaoshen region, Nurhaci made an order to “calculate the population and allocate farmlands”. The unused farmland of an area of three hundred thousand ri (日) 265 in the region was allocated to the soldiers. Every man was allocated six ri and was told to use five of them to grow crops and one to grow cotton. The tax was levied in this way: every three men were in charge of one ri of government land, and of every twenty men one of them should serve in the army and one serve as labor for the government.266 “Calculating the population and allocating farmland” was a measure taken to relocate Manchu slave owners, soldiers and civilians to the Liaoshen area. The kingdom owned the land, which was distributed to slave owners and free men according to the number of slaves they had. The measure transferred part of the land previously owned by landlords, officials and civilians of the Ming dynasty into the hands of Manchu slave owners and free men. It kept the hierarchy inside the Manchu society intact and did not create a new mode of production. Used to relying on their slaves, the slave owners would not participate in labor and soldiers were too busy with battles, training duty and other service to work on farmlands. As a result, all the burden of agricultural labor was shouldered by slaves and free men. Therefore after the Later Jin regime entered the Liaoshen region there still existed a large number of slaves. The regime also continued

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its taking of slaves so as to guarantee the source for its exploitation. In the year when the measure of “calculating population and allocating farmland” was carried out, Nurhaci said, “Slave owners should treasure their slaves, and slaves should work together with their owners; slaves should share the crops they harvest with their owners while the owners should do the same with the wealth and food they earn”.267 This was the universal standard of the social relations he wanted to build and was an ideal based on the existing mode of production using slavery. Han farmers who originally lived in the Liaoshen region, except for those who died or fled during the war, still lived where they had lived before and continued to work on their farmlands. At the beginning they did not lose their land nor were they allocated any more land. The policy of “calculating population and allocating land” stipulated that “the one hundred thousand ri of land in the Haizhou region and the two hundred thousand ri in the Liaoyang region, amounting to three hundred thousand ri, should be allocated to military officers and soldiers deployed there so as to keep the land from dilapidation. The land owned by the original residents will still be cultivated by them”.268 Allocating sixty ri to every man meant only fifty thousand men would be given land, given the total land area of only three hundred thousand ri. At the time, the number of Later Jin soldiers was more than fifty thousand. Therefore there would not be sufficient land even if all the land was allocated to the Jurchen soldiers. There would be no extra land to be allocated to Han households. The policy was actually one of allocating farmland among the Later Jin officers and soldiers, not among all residents in the region. However it was impossible for the Manchu slavery mode of production to coexist harmoniously with the original feudal mode of production adopted by the Han people. Soon fierce conflicts emerged between the two. Shortly after the Later Jin regime’s occupation of the Liaoshen region, Nurhaci ordered the newly arrived Manchus and the Han people to live together, in which they shared the same residence, shared their food and cultivated the same farmland. As was recorded by the Official History of the Manchu State , “the Jurchens and Han people lived in the same village, ate together and fed their horses together”,269 and “the Jurchens were ordered to live together with Han people who resided near the Liaodong region. They shared food and were allocated farmlands to cultivate.” 270 Nurhaci made an order that “the Han people who share a home with the Jurchens should not hide their food. They should report the actual amount of food they have to the government, which will then calculate the total amount. All Han people are obliged to hand in four sheng (升) of crops by September. The crops left will then belong to the original owner. We,

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the Jurchens, moving so far away from home and bringing our whole families here, have been through a lot of hardship. The Han people who live with the Jurchens, providing their residences, food and farmlands, are also experiencing a difficult time.”271 Seemingly this was a provisional measure to accommodate the newly arrived Jurchens, but in fact it was an attempt to enslave the Han farmers. A large number of Manchu people moved into the Han farmers’ home as conquerors. This was like putting predators amongst a group of sheep. The so-called “living, eating and cultivating farmlands together” was actually exploitation and suppression. These eventually started unstoppable conflicts between the two races and between the two modes of production. Han people’s escape, resistance and revolt occurred one after another. In the year of the “calculating population and allocating farmlands”, revolts broken out in many places. It was recorded that, “uprising Han people killed dozens of Jurchens, scaring away the rest of the Jurchens”; the uprising Han people “gathered five to six hundred people and went southward, no Jurchens dared to stop them”; “the miners in the eastern mountain sworn not to surrender and killed every Jurchen who walked near them”.272 The peasant uprising in the Tieshan Mountains killed and injured three to four thousand Jurchen soldiers in one battle. Other small-scale resistance never ceased. Nurhaci stated in his imperial edict that, “it is said that recently there are evildoers poisoning the water and salt, and people who feed pigs with poison and sell the pork to others”. 273 He even made an order “forbidding Manchu to walk alone in the street, and stipulating that they can only go out when there are more than ten people going together”.274 Even two years later (1623, the eighth year of the Tianming period), the Manchu rulers were still complaining that “theft occurs more and more frequently.”275 It was the intense class struggle that frustrated the Manchu rulers’ arrogance and stopped the enslavement in the Liaoshen region. To counter the resistance of the people, the Manchu ruler started a bloody crackdown, sending troops to slaughter the Han people living in the food storage castles. For example, in 1623 (the eighth year of the Tianming period), Daishan led twenty thousand soldiers to suppress the revolt in Fuzhou. The troop went on a rampage of killing and left only few peasants, who were later made the slaves of five hundred households, marking formal enslavement in the region. Troubled and angered by the resistance of Han people, Nurhaci said, “we never stop summoning Han population to surrender, and they respond to my good will by preparing cudgels”.276 He ordered officials of different levels to conduct detailed investigation on Han people and to kill the resistant and literate ones. Such a savage massacre spread great horror in the Liaoshen region, for which even the Latter Jin rulers themselves made repeated apologies. Huang

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Taiji said, “Those Han people in the Liaodong region who used to surrender to us but turn rebellious again were slaughtered by us, and now I feel sorry for this.” 277 The son of Daishan, Yuetuo said, “all the killings of the soldiers and civilians in the Liaodong region was caused by the situation back then, but still I regret it”.278 Killing was not a solution to the problem. In fact it backfired by further disturbing social stability and causing a swift downturn in production. The aristocracy and slave owners of the Later Jin regime saw a continuing rise in the need for military supplies and daily expenses after their occupation of the region, and therefore could only rely on the exploitation of the Han peasants to maintain their existence. For this reason they could not kill all the Han peasants who were not willing to become their slaves, thus leading to a change of policy that slowed down the enslavement of Han people and reorganized those who survived the slaughter. As recorded by the Official History of the Manchu State , “the royal family members and officials of the eight banners carried out separate missions in which they stopped in different villages and killed the Han people. After the slaughter, they put thirteen of those passed the previous investigation and seven buffalos into one farm. Officials from the general officers to the Beiyu (official position) were all given one farm.” The book also writes that, “the Han peasants were distributed to the farms of the king and his relatives. Every farm was given thirteen men and seven buffalos for one hundred chao (朝or日). Twenty chao (朝) were for the officials and the other eighty chao were used as the peasants’ own.”279 Such a policy was made in reference to both the original Tuokesuo system of the Later Jin regime and the “Juntun” system of the Ming dynasty. While the land was owned by the state, each man was given 6.15 ri (日) of land and was obliged to cultivate 7.69 riof land. Every farm had a leader of the farm, who was in charge of managing the production and other matters in the farmland. He was also obliged to report to the Zhangjing in the Niru on the number and names of men on the farm and the growth of cattle. He allocated the eighty ri out of the total one hundred ri to the thirteen men, who support themselves by cultivating the land. The other twenty ri of land was cultivated by all the thirteen men and its harvest should all be handed in to the owner of the farm. Every man was obliged to provide labor to the state. When men left the farm for service, the rest of the men should cultivate the land left uncultivated. Therefore every man had a very heavy burden of labor. The producers were closely tied to the land and were not allowed to move freely or to develop new land. The slave owners had the right over their life and death. Their status was very similar to that of slaves, but at least they had their own land to live on and thus their own economy. Historical

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record shows that, “the peasants in the Liaoshen region gave all their annual harvest of crops to the eight banner people. How could they have spare crops to trade?”280 In the description we can see that on the one hand the producers were under very heavy exploitation which put them in a slave-like position; but on the other they were self-reliant and were allowed to trade crops if they did have a surplus, which shows they did have their own economy. In some farms, exploitation of a fixed amount had long been applied. For example the great aristocrat Engedeererfu, who possessed eight thousand serfs, “had eight thousand men from which he could receive 528 liang of silver and 880 hu (斛) of grain, and sent to public service 140 men and 70 buffalos”.281 Under such a fixed amount exploitation it was possible for the producers to gain a surplus after meeting necessary daily needs, which was a great leap forward for slavery. Due to its continuous military successes, the Later Jin occupied a vast territory and governed a large population. Farms of this kind were built in a large number. For example, in the area near Shenyang, “every royal member built their farms, which were ten to twenty miles from each other. These farms varied in size, with big ones housing dozens of households and small ones less than eight or nine households. These households were mostly made up by Han people and Wudong (Korean) captives…farms were dense in the area.”282 Among these farms owned by aristocrats, some were still in the stage of slavery while some had already developed their own economy, starting to morph into the stage of serfdom. But their development was slow and productivity low. Some of them failed to make ends meet every year.283 Tundi enjoyed a higher productivity and thus developed faster. Tundi refers to the land of civilians who were previously Han subjects but surrendered to Later Jin, and the Manchu free men. They received their land based on the “calculating population and allocating land” policy and were viewed as civilians. They formed small clusters, cultivated their own land, paid their taxes and provided service to the state. These households were the de facto serfs of the Later Jin. They were included in the eight banner system and worked under the Niru Erzhen’s supervision which was supplemented by Guanzhuangjiangbei and Boshiku (both officials in the Later Jin dynasty), and therefore enjoyed a limited freedom. But they were not slaves under the control of aristocrat slave owners. The Later Jin, according to its principle of “capturing those who refuse to surrender and treating those who surrender as civilians”284 made the captive population into slaves and the rest into civilians. As early as 1618 (the third year of the Tianming period) when Nurhaci attacked Fushun, some Han people surrendered to the Later Jin following Li Yongfang. It turned out that “the one thousand households which surrendered to the Later Jin got their

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family members back intact…they even received horses, slaves, buffalos, and clothes. And for those who were good to the Jurchens, they received five sets of the above-mentioned living necessities…everything that was useful in daily life were given to them. All levels of officials were set in accordance with the Ming dynasty’s institutions and Fushun city was still governed by Youji (official position), Li Yongfang.”285 But both Han and Manchu people who had civilian status were also severely exploited by the state. They were limited within the eight banner system and paid tax every year to the state. “Three men were obliged to pay two hu (斛) of grain.” 286 The service they provided for the state amounted to as many as over thirty, including military service. They were different from Baoyi (slaves) or men of the farm. They paid a fixed amount of tax and provided service to the state based on household, which demonstrates more elements of feudal exploitation. They could use their own cattle and agricultural tools to work on their land, and could keep their own harvest after handing in a due amount to the state. They could even own a small number of slaves. The productivity of Tundi of this kind was higher productivity than that of farms. The economic advantage powered the rapid development of Tundi, which was also fueled by the Later Jin government’s encouragement. The growing budget of the regime increased its dependence on the harvest from Tundi. Its soldiers and labor service were also mostly provided by civilians. The foundation of Later Jin’s reign became more and more reliant on this feudal exploitation. Banner leaders and aristocracy’s farming estate economy was increasingly lagging behind. Their support to the regime declined and sometimes became more of an obstacle than a support. In 1626, Huang Taiji was crowned as the khan. He followed the trend of history and greatly facilitated the process of feudalization. In the first year of the Tiancong period, he sent Mengatu and other officials to “measure farmland,” and nationalized the “extra land”, which he later allocated to civilians. He also forbade any more building of farming estates. He then proceeded to reduce the original number of a Zhuang team from thirteen to eight. “Other Han people were assigned to different places as civilians.” 287 In November 1630, (the third year of the Chongzhen period and the fourth year of the Tiancong period of the Later Jin dynasty), he ordered the reorganization and examination of adult males and stressed that, “every Niru Erzhen should conduct research on the number of able-bbodied men in the rearrangement and examination, and the number of adult males should be accurately recorded” and that “in the rearrangement and examination, if it is found that the number of adult males were underreported, the adult males concerned should be recorded in the official list while the slave

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owners, Niru Erzhen and Boshiku who administer the adults will be punished accordingly. If the Niru Erzhen or Boshiku concealed the fact that they know the actual number of adults, they should be fined five liang (兩) of silver for each adult they failed to report, and punished accordingly288.” In October, 1634 (the seventh year of the Chongzhen of the Ming dynasty and the eighth year of the Tiancong period of the Later Jin), Emperor Huangtaiji announced that, “the new found adults should not be equally distributed among the eight banners, they should be allocated to banners lacking work force. All Niru under the banner system should follow the limit on number. If there are additional Nirus other than the original thirty, the extra Niru should be reallocated to other banners.289” With such measures, a large area of land was turned into Tundi and the adult work force hidden by slave owners became civilians under the Later Jin regime’s control. The economic privilege of the aristocracy was severely hit. In 1631 (the fifth year of the Tiancong period), in order to further limit the power of banner leaders and undermine slavery, Emperor Huangtaiji promulgated the Regulation on Leaving Slave Owners which stipulated that “slaves are allowed to lodge accusations against their owners if their owners did the following: unauthorized hunting, unauthorized killing, hiding spoils of wars, raping subordinates’ wives, unjustifiedly accepting credits and recommending officials groundlessly, and suppressing appeals” 290 . In the following year, the supplementary part of the regulation was implemented which stipulated that, “if accusation is made of several acts, in the case that these parallel each other in severity, the accusations will not be deemed false or malicious if one accusation is proven true and the accusers will be set free or allocated to new slave owners when most of the accusations are true or half of the accusations are true”.291 The Regulation on Leaving Slave Owners became a weapon to weaken slave owners. After its promulgation, many slaves accused their owners. Many of the servants became serfs after their accusations about their masters were proven true; some were allocated to other slave owners. The slaves used the regulation as a weapon to fight their owners and to change their status. Emperor Huangtaiji used it as a tool to utilize the power of the slaves to limit and weaken the privilege of the aristocracy, so as to consolidate his power as the khan. In 1631 (the third year of Tiancong period), Emperor Huangtaiji, who at the time had centralized great power on himself, directly ordered a liberalization of some slaves. He ordered that, “when we obtained control over the Liaodong region, those among civilians who resisted our control were killed, and those captured were turned slaves. I sympathize with these good civilians, who are now miserable slaves in regular households and thus want the banner leaders

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and their subordinates, and regular households to free those among their slaves who, as research revealed, were previously good civilians, and register them as regular civilians.292” The measure weakened slavery. Emperor Huangtaiji, as the supreme ruler in the Later Jin regime, encouraged feudalism and weakened slavery, and encouraged agricultural production. He paid special attention to the agricultural production in the Tundi, an important source of tax income, as he talked to officials and Niru leaders many times urging them to do a better job in supervising agricultural labor. He said, “farming and residence are the pivots of regular people’s life, while agriculture and the military are the pivots of a country. You should all go to the Tundi of the region under your administration and conduct detailed research on the status. This is your obligation, which you are not allowed to shirk”.293 As the agricultural production of the Later Jin region relied heavily on Han people, Emperor Huangtaiji also carried out measures to protect the ethnic Han, for example, putting Manchu and Han people in different Tundi and forbidding Manchus to raid the property of the farmers in the Tundi such as “buffalos, sheep, chickens and pigs”294. He also gave orders to supply those who were in need with “farming tools or farming buffalos” so as to let them “start farming at the right time”. 295 Emperor Huangtaiji also revoked the previous ban on developing new farmlands, “legalizing those who wanted to relocate because their original farmlands was ruined by flood or who did not own any farmland”.296 He repeatedly put out official notices to reassure the ethnic Han so as to “allow them to concentrate on farming”.297 As well as giving protection to Han farmers, Emperor Huangtaiji also encouraged Manchus to engage in agricultural production. Due to years of wars almost all adult males of Manchu ethnicity had been fighting leaving agriculture production to the hands of old people, women, children and slaves, which was why the production remained at an unsatisfactory level. To change the situation where Manchu adult males went to war instead of farming, a policy called “one out of three adult males” was put into force during the Tiancong period, which stated that only one in every three adults males should go to war while the other two should stay at home and engage in farming. The two staying at home should provide living materials for the one going to war, while the latter should share the spoils from war with the other two. In order to protect agricultural production, Emperor Huangtaiji stopped all big-scale construction projects. He explained that, “projects like construction hinder agricultural production”. Therefore he ordered that, “all projects for repairing old buildings or constructing new ones should be stopped, and the work force should be cherished and put to farming, so as to let agriculture

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receive our primary concern”. 298 He continued to promulgate a series of protective laws and regulations in favor of agriculture, such as forbidding aristocrats to fly their hawks in suburban areas which would “disturb people, ruin farmlands and harm cattle and livestock” and “imposing severe punishment for violations”.299 Other examples included the law that when cattle strayed into farmlands and ruined the crops, the owners of the cattle should pay both the compensation for the damage and a fine, and imposed a ban on the killing of cattle as sacrifices in funerals or religious ceremonies. He also ordered that, “if farmers are assigned too heavy labor tasks for officials or aristocracy to the degree that farming labor is impeded, the Zhangjing and junior Boshiku, and other officials in charge of the Niru, will all be punished by law”300 and that “kings, Beiles and officials should not allow their family servants to trample on the farmlands of regular civilians, or they would receive legal punishment”. In the fifth year of the Tiancong period, Emperor Huangtaiji and Beile Daishan were fishing on the riverbank and “saw two horse riders allowing their horses to eat the crops in the farmland and punished them at the site using an arrow to penetrate an ear of each of the two riders as they violated the law forbidding people to allow their stock to eat crops”. 301 In order to improve production, Emperor Huangtaiji implemented a system of “atoning for crimes with crops” and allowed trade in crops at the same time. “Those who were convicted were allowed to pay their fine in crops according to the crop price at the time; if the people were willing to hand in more crops, they would be rewarded; those who were willing to sell their crops in hand were allowed to trade.”302 Emperor Huangtaiji also placed great emphasis on agricultural technologies as he required farmers to pay attention to “the timing and choice of land for farming”. He said, “whether farming is suitable or not all depends on the land; moist land of lower altitude is suitable for rice and broomcorn, while land of higher altitude is suitable for other crops; hard work in cultivating and fertilizing the land when the land is still moist will lead to an abundant harvest later in the year, which will give happiness to every household; in contrast, if no one works in the fields at the right time, where can we harvest food?”303 He also said, “anything related to farming must have something to do with the kind of land in question. If the land is dry, millet should be planted; if the land is moist, rice should be planted. The Boshiku of every Tundi, regardless of how far away the farmland may be, should be diligent in supervising farming-related matters. If they do not, and if the farming in the region they administer thus deteriorates, they will be punished by law.”304 Due to the encouragement and measures to facilitate agricultural production adopted by the Later Jin dynasty, the soicio-economy of Manchu society saw

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further development and feudal serfdom gradually replaced slavery. Of course, the vanishing of slavery took a long time during which a battle between the two production models never stopped. The battle, in its political sense, indicated the battle between the power of the Khan, represented by Emperor Huangtaiji, and the power of banner leaders and Beiles. Throughout the eighteen years of Huangtaiji’s reign accompanied by the gradual take-over of slavery by feudal serfdom, the battle remained fierce.

Political Reform in the Later Jin Empire and the War against the Ming Dynasty Political Reform and the Feudalization of the Later Jin Regime Fig. 1.10.

Portrait of Emperor Huang Taiji

Huang Taiji implemented economic reform and simultaneously adopted a series of important regulations and measures in politics in order to consolidate his rule and further promote the feudalization of Later Jin political power. Originally, Nurhaci established the Eight Banners System and he appointed his nephews masters of each banner. According to this system, each banner had its own office, and each occupied a dominant position among its soldiers and people. But, from then on, masters and dukes of the banners had never stopped

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infighting to expand their rights and interests. In his old age, Nurhaci intended to reconcile the conflicts among them with attempts to make an alliance of the eight banners and implement the co-ownership of social wealth. This sort of collegiate system, which was originally used to reflect the military democracy of the clan society, was transplanted into the Later Jin which began to enter into the feudal society at that time; however, it did not work. At the time when Huang Taiji ascended the throne, he handled the administrative affairs together with three great dukes – Daishan, Amin and Mongoortai. Furthermore “Each month they had a duke on duty. He would be in charge of all the state affairs at that time”. 305 But in fact the four dukes ruled the country in turn and the four divided the populace and property they obtained equally among the eight banners. “If they captured some men, they would divide them into eight groups and govern the people separately; if they got some new land, they would divide the land into eight parts and then occupy their own part; in this way, even if the land and the population were very small, dukes could not transfer their possession to the emperor and the emperor could not transfer its possession to the dukes either”.306 For example, if Korea sent some presents to the state, “after confirming the number of the presents, they distributed the presents. If there were some left over, they would still divide it into eight parts”.307 “The emperor was constrained by the dukes in almost every affair. Although he was called Khan by the dukes and other people, actually he was no different from the master of the yellow banner at all”308. Obviously, Huang Taiji could not bear this “bubble reputation” so he adopted the Han method to replace the old system to concentrate his power and carry out reformation: First, he consolidated and improved the political power of the Khan. In order to strengthen his power, Huang Taiji severely weakened the power and influence of the dukes and dealt a heavy blow to the three great dukes who could usurp his leadership. At that time the council, the policy-making body of the Later Jin, was controlled by the masters of the eight banners which seriously constrained the power of the Khan. In October 1626 (the 6th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youxiao and the 11th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Nuerhaci), Huang Taiji appointed a general minister, who was in charge of the general affairs of his banner, in the eight banners. These general ministers “gathered in the same hall with the dukes to discuss national affairs and led their own soldiers when hunting and going out to the battlefield. And all the affairs would be investigated by the special inspectors”. 309 Shortly after that, Huang Taiji required all the dukes to attend the state council and asked each banner for another three men to participate in the discussion of state affairs. In this way the control of the dukes was shattered and the previous

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policy-making body was turned into an advisory one. In the first month of 1629 (2nd year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 3rd year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), the three great dukes were removed by Huang Taiji from their monthly leadership positions under the pretext that “because of the monthly duty of each duke, all the confidential work was very cumbersome”. Therefore he “assigned other dukes to act for them in their posts”.310 In February 1632 (5th year of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 6th year of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji replaced the old system which specified that “the emperor should dominate the state with the three great dukes” with a new one which stressed that “he was the only one to govern the state”311 to highlight his supreme authority. Meanwhile Huang Taiji never stopped looking for the opportunity to root out the dissidents to consolidate his authority. In July 1630 (3rd year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 4th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji convicted the First Great Duke Amin of 16 crimes on the pretext that “he abandoned four cities——Luanzhou, Yongping, Qian’an and Zunhua and turned back in defeat”; later Amin was put under house arrest and was deprived of all his soldiers, slaves and property for “his considering himself as the emperor”, “evil intentions”312 and other accusations. Soon Amin died of illness. In August 1631 (4th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 5th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji had a quarrel with the Second Great Duke Mongoortai. Mongoortai drew his sword and pointed it at Huang Taiji. Huang Taiji exploited the situation to punish Mongoortai. Mongoortai was deposed from the title of Great Duke and was demoted to an average duke. Furthermore he was deprived of 1,500 of his soldiers and given a fine of ten thousand liang of silver. Soon afterwards Mongoortai died of indignation. After the death of Amin and Mongoortai, Daishan was the only Great Duke remaining alive. In November 1635 (8th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 9th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Daishan was accused of four crimes by Huang Taiji for his disrespectful behavior. He was given a fine of his saddles, horses, corselets, and ten thousand liang of silver. Thereafter Daishan was submissive to every word of Huang Taiji and the threatening power of the three great dukes had been removed. Huang Taiji had the Plain Yellow Banner, the Bordered Yellow Banner and the Plain Blue Banner of the Eight Banners well in hand, which greatly increased his power and made the other masters of the banners impotent against him. Through such means his power and authority was consolidated and reinforced. Second, he reorganized and reformed the state institutions. In 1616, Nurhaci declared himself Khan and established the Later Jin Regime. He exercised

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the function of state political power organs with the implementation of the Eight Banners System. At that time the Later Jin, a country with a small population occupying little land, was in the slavery period so the Eight Banners System established on the basis of the slavery system could still replace state institutions for a while. But when the Later Jin entered the Liaoyang and Shenyang regions, it became a country with a vast land and large population and it began to move to a feudal society. As a result, the Eight Banners System adapted itself to the new developing circumstances, and consequently reform needed to be carried out. Although Nurhaci embarked on reorganizing and reforming the state institutions in the late days of his reign, the reorganization and reformation were not achieved due to the limited time and the conditions at that moment. When Huang Taiji ascended the throne, he made an utmost effort to learn the Han culture and reformed the state institutions significantly so as to strengthen his power, which accelerated the feudalization of the Later Jin regime. He required that “everything should be carried out according to the Ming Code, which offers the right resource and strategy” 313 so the administrative institutions followed the code of the Ming Dynasty. In 1629 (2nd year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 3rd year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji established the School, “divided the civil servants into two groups, required Scholar Dahai, Ganglin and their group members to translate the books of the Han language and required Scholar Kurchan, Wubashi and their group members to record the gains and losses of his reign”314. Despite the incompleteness of the system and incompetent work, the School at that time was already the embryonic form of the Cabinet. In April 1636 (9th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 10st year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), the School was changed into the Inner Three Centers, namely the Inner National History Center, the Inner Secretary Center and the Inner Culture-Promoting (Hongwen) Center. The Inner National History Centre was responsible for drafting the imperial edicts and compiling the books of the earthly branches; the Inner Secretary Center took charge of the management of foreign documents and the imperial edicts; the Inner CulturePromoting Center was in charge of preaching, making annotations to the history and implementing the various systems of the state. 315 Huang Taiji appointed eight officials Ministers of the Inner Three Centers, whose main duties were to take charge of all the affairs of the Centers. In June 1636, Huang Taiji reformulated the bureaucratic system. He appointed one grand secretary and two scholars in the Inner National History Centre; two grand secretaries and one scholar in the Inner Secretary Center; one grand secretary and two scholars in the Inner Culture-Promoting Centre.316 Compared with the School, the Inner

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Three Centers had a better organization and a broader scope of jurisdiction. The grand secretaries and scholars in the Centers, participating in the deliberation and administration of the state secrets, were not only the right-hand men assisting Huang Taiji to handle administrative affairs but also they restricted down the influence and power of the Eight Banners with their participation in deliberating the affairs of the Banners and the powers they held. In August 1631 (4th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 5th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji “established a new bureaucratic system and created the Six Ministries”. The Six Ministries were the Ministry of Official Personnel Affairs, the Ministry of Revenue, the Ministry of Rites, the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Punishments and the Ministry of Works. Huang Taiji appointed one duke to administer one ministry and he appointed two Manchu ministers, one Mongolian minister, one Han minister, eight vice ministers and one master. Each position was established according to the “complication of the affairs”317 so the number of officials under the vice ministers were not the same in the Six Ministries. Although the dukes took charge of the administrative affairs of the Six Ministries, they did not enjoy the same rights as Huang Taiji as they had done before. Now the relationship between the dukes and Huang Taiji were that of emperor and ministers and the dukes were subordinate to the emperor. Before long, Huang Taiji gave orders to “suspend the dukes from their duties in the Six Ministries”318 to further weaken the power of the dukes and to control the Six Ministries directly. Consequently the dukes were eliminated from the state institutions and Huang Taiji was at the helm of the state on his own. In June 1636 (9th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 10th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), in addition to the Three Centers and the Six Ministries, Huang Taiji established a Procuratorate. The Procuratorate was responsible for participation in the administration and discussion of state affairs, conducting a joint trial, inspecting Yamens, monitoring the examinations and so on. If a minister or other official did something illegal the Procuratorate could accuse him of his wrongdoings and impeach him to the emperor. Even if the impeachment was not true, the Procuratorate would not be punished. In July 1638, the Mongolia Yamen was replaced by the Lifan Court. The Lifan Court took charge of the affairs of Inner and Outer Mongolia and later became a governing body ruling the minority groups. The Inner Three Centers, Six Ministries, Procuratorate and Lifan Court were called the Three Courts and Eight Yamens and were patterned after the establishment of the state institutions of the Ming. Although it coexisted with

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the Eight Banners System, it gradually replaced the state power exercised by the Eight Banners. With the establishment of a series of government institutions, Huang Taiji successfully concentrated his authority. Third, he united Han officials and scholars. In order to reinforce his power and promote the feudalization of the state, and especially in order to fight against the Ming and dominate the eastern Liaoning region with its large population of Han people, Huang Taiji had to expand the class basis of the Later Jin. Moreover he felt it necessary to take advantage of the Han officials and scholars. The scholars were knowledgeable and influential in society, which was indispensable to the foundation and the consolidation of his political rule. Therefore without prejudice to the fundamental interests of the Manchu aristocrats, Huang Taiji attached great importance to letting them make their contribution to his reign. Han Scholars such as Fan Wencheng, Li Yongfang, Ma Guangyuan, Gao Shijun, Gao Hongzhong were put into very important positions and became the trusted subordinates of Huang Taiji. After the enthronement of Huang Taiji, Fan Wencheng, for example, was “promoted to royal adviser” and was appointed as “the grand secretary of the Secretary Center to take charge of the confidential work”. “From then on, Fan Wencheng accompanied Huang Taiji to pacify Lushun, capture the island in peace, and occupy Korea and Mongolia. Whenever a great policy was made, Huang Taiji would be sure to ask if Fan knew about it. If he knew that Fan had not participated in the policy-making, he would ask about the reason. If Fan was off duty on account of illness, the affairs would be piled up like a mountain. And all the cases were left to be settled after Fan recovered”319, which showed Huang Taiji’s trust in Han officials. With the expansion of the dominant area of the Later Jin and the growth of the population, more officials were needed. In 1629, the Later Jin enlisted skilled people through the civil service examinations and required the pupils within the borders to take the imperial competitive examination. If one showed outstanding writing techniques in the examination, he would be rewarded and his articles and works would be published as models; moreover “the pupils in the residences of the dukes and the Mongolia, Han and Manchu pupils were all required to take the examination and their masters must not intervene with the examination. If they got the highest marks in the examination, they would be given the same rewards as the common people”320. More than 200 people were accepted after this examination. Later, in 1634, 1638 and 1641, the Later Jin continued to enlist skills through the civil service examination, through which a large number of intellectuals were selected to enhance the government institutions at different levels. This skills selection system not only emancipated the Han intellectuals from their enslaved

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position but also won their support for Huang Taiji. The intellectuals and talented personnel selected through the examination became the right-hand men for Huang Taiji’s reign. “If these intellectuals were put into the common positions, their contributions would be small; but if they were put into the important positions, they would be make great contributions” 321. The selection system achieved great political results. With the measures he took to consolidate his political power, Huang Taiji solved the contradiction between the power of the Khan and the dukes and the contradiction between the concentration and separation of power, which strengthened his authority as Khan and enabled him to establish a powerful political machine. He used this political machine to fight both inside and outside the state. On the one hand, he fought against the Ming Government and achieved successive successes; on the other hand, he carried out economic reform in the Later Jin to accelerate the feudalization of Manchu society. One thing that should be pointed out is that the reformation carried out by Huang Taiji was not a drastic one. He imposed restrictions on the old system, then reformed it,.and eventually established a new system which was parallel to the reformed systems and enjoyed the same rights as the old systems. For example, he set up the Eight Yamens in addition to the Eight Banners System and established the Inner Three Centers beside the State Council. This kind of progressive reformation carried out in the Manchu society successfully avoided Fig. 1.11.

Huang Taiji’s Tablet on Redeployment of the Troops

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severe national disintegration and civil war. But the new political systems set up by Huang Taiji were still influenced and restricted by the other systems, so the authority of the Khan was restricted to some degree. The masters of the Banners and the dukes still held great political and economic power. Fourth, in order to expand his manpower resources to fight against the numerous Ming troops and to balance the military power between the masters of the Manchu Eight Banners and the dukes, Huang Taiji founded the Han Eight Banners and the Manchu Eight Banners. Originally, the soldiers serving in the Eight Banners were not all Manchu people. There were also Han and Mongolian soldiers. In 1633 (6th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 7th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji gave orders to let one Han person out from every ten Han men living in the residence of the Manchu aristocrats form a Han Banner whose token was a black flag. Tong Yangxing, Huang Taiji’s sonin-law, commanded this banner. The Han Banner changed its name the next year. It was called “wuzhenchaoha” in the Manchu language (“wuzhen” in the Han language means “heavy” and “chaoha” means “army” or “troop”). In 1637, (the 10th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 11th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji divided the Han Banner into two banners. He appointed Shi Tingzhu as the master of the Left Wing and Ma Guangyuan as the master of the Right. Able-bodied men were also assigned to different niulu according to the system of the Manchu Eight Banners. In 1639, Huang Taiji again divided the two Han Banners into four and appointed Ma Guanyuan, Shi Tingzhu, Wang Shixuan and Ba Yan as the masters of each banner. In 1624 another 4 banners were set up, which made up the Han Eight Banners. The colors of each Han Banner were the same as the Qing Eight Banners. Each Han Banner had a master, two vice masters and five military officers. Additionally, in 1634 (7th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 8th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji selected the best Mongolian soldiers from the Eight Banners and organized them into two Mongolian Banners. In 1635 the two Mongolian banners were expanded into eight and the eight Mongolian Banners had the same flags and the system as the Qing banners. Although the Han and Mongolian Eight Banners were the same as the Manchu Eight Banners in composition, the masters and the vice masters in both the Han and Mongolian banners were appointed by Huang Taiji. If the masters and the vice masters of the Han and Mongolian Banners were incompetent they would be replaced at any time, which was different from the hereditary system among the masters of the Manchu Eight Banners. Huang Taiji was the supreme commander of the Manchu, Mongolian and the Han Eight

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Banners. He could command and redeploy the troops directly. According to the statistics, before Huang Taiji entered the central plains, the Manchu Eight Banners had 319 zuolings (the basic unit of the Qing Eight Banners; the Han translation of niulu) and had more than 63,000 soldiers. The Mongolian Eight Banners had 129 zuolings and about 25,000 soldiers. The Han Eight Banners had 167 zuolings and about 33,000 soldiers. Altogether there were 615 zuolings and more than 120,000 soldiers. Meanwhile, Huang Taiji continued to promulgate military laws and sped up the production of firearms. In 1634 (7th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 8th year of the reign of the the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji considered that “the redeployment of the troops should be restrained by a very strict regulation and this regulation should be made into the law, which would be helpful to rectify people’s thoughts”, so he promulgated a military law which stipulated that “the troops should march in teams and the soldiers should not talk loudly and leave their banner when marching… Do not destroy the temples and kill the pedestrians. Kill the enemies who revolt against us and support those who surrender to us. Do not deprive the captives of their clothes. Do not break up couples… Do not rape the women… Do not drink… Anyone who breaks the law will be executed”322. Later on, Huang Taiji reiterated the military law many times. Furthermore, although the Eight Banners were very flexible and swift in action, they were not suited to fortified battles. For example, the defeat of Nurhaci in Ningyuan and Huang Taiji’s two failures in attacking Guangning were attributed to the incompetence of the Qing Banners to fight against the strong power of the firearms of the Ming troops. Therefore in 1631 (4th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 5th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taji assigned Wang Tianxing and other officials to accelerate the pace of the development of the firearm. In June 1631 the first firearm was created and was named “Senior General with God’s Blessing”. Huang Taiji’s troops had also captured some “Red Cannons” from the Ming army and distributed these to the banners. After that Huang Taiji not only had the cavalrymen of the Eight Banners who were good at field battles but also had artillerymen who were able to fight in a fortified battle. In this way the fighting capacity of the Eight Banners was greatly enhanced. Fifth, he created a new Manchu script and took advantage of Lamaism. The Emperor Nurhaci had used Mongolian letters to create a Manchu script but the letters created by Nurhaci “did not have punctuation marks and the upper part of article looked the same as the bottom part. If the children learned Manchu and encountered the language in books they find it easy to identify the basic meaning of the sentences. But if they met some names of

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some places or persons, they would certainly be at a loss”323. The old Manchu script had many shortcomings and the grammar was imperfect. In 1632 (5th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 6th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji assigned Daihai and other scholars to add the punctuation marks into Manchu and created 12 syllables which were frequently used in Manchu language and special letters which were used to spell the alien words. Thus the new Manchu with punctuation came into being. The new Manchu script had clear structures and could be widely used, so it was universally used in the Qing Dynasty for about 210 years. Secondly, in order to take advantage of Lamaism to befriend Mongolia and Tibet, Huang Taiji strongly advocated and supported Lamaism. Early in the first year of the reign of Emperor Nurhaci, a Tibetan Lama whose name was Woludaerhannangsu preached in Mongolia. Nurhaci sent someone to invite this Lama to the Later Jin and “built a temple and bestowed land on him” 324 and “gave him a great mission”325. But unfortunately this Lama died shortly after he came to the Later Jin. When Huang Taiji ascended the throne, with the increasing number of Mongolian tribes conquered by him, Lamaism spread more widely. Huang Taiji attached great importance to taking advantage of it. In 1629 he built a pagoda and a monument especially in memory of Woludaerhannangsu. This policy played an important part in the unification of south and north Mongolia and in the consolidation of the relationships with Tibet and Mongolia. In 1634 (7th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 8th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), a Lama named Moergen from Chahar carried a gold statue of the “Mahagala” 326 Buddha to the Later Jin. Shortly after this, the Tibetan Dalai Lama also sent an envoy to Mukden. Huang Taiji treated the Dalai Lama with utmost cordiality “because at that time the Khalkha region was very difficult to capture and both Mongolia and Tibet were submissive to the words of the Lama”327. Huang Taiji hoped to use the envoy of the Dalai Lama to consolidate the relationship with Mongolia and Tibet to reinforce his own power. The series of measures implemented by Huang Taiji in politics, economics, military affairs and culture enabled him to greatly consolidate his position. On the one hand, he weakened the power of the masters of the Banners and the dukes so as to consolidate the power of the Khan, stabilize the social order of the Liaoning and Shenyang regions and accelerate the feudalization of the Manchu; on the other hand, with the enhanced military power and more flexible political strategies, Huang Taiji reunified the Northeast, made an alliance with Mongolia and Tibet and held on to his aggressive military superiority in the long-term confrontation against the Ming Government.

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Huang Taiji’s Enthronement and Strategy of Peace Negotiation with the Ming Government Before his death, Nurhaci planned to pass his throne to the Ninth Prince Dorgon (his 14th son). But because Dorgon was too young, he assigned the eldest duke Daishan (his 2nd son) to be the regent. However after the death of Nurhaci his sons did not obey his will. They fought fiercely against each other for the throne. Finally his 4th son, with military power at hand and the help of Daishan, became the Khan of the Later Jin. 328 When he came to the power he was so ambitious that he decided to follow his father ’s will to enter the central plains and overthrow the reign of the Ming Government, which became the basic principle of the Later Jin. But at that time the political situation of the Later Jin was not “stable”. Huang Taiji was faced with many internal and external contradictions. One was the national conflict between the Manchu aristocrats and the Han people. The common people in the eastern province “who fled from their home when invaded” 329 rose up in arms to fight against the Manchu aristocrats. The second one was the class contradiction, namely the contradiction between the serf owners and the serfs. The serfs cultivated the land and served their owners. “The son and grandson of a man servant would still be the servants. And the grandsons were not allowed to do what their grandfather required them to” 330 , so many serfs could not bear their owners’ exploitation and oppression and some of them chose to flee from their homes and some revolted against the aristocrats. The third contradiction lay in the inner ruling class of the Later Jin government, which was mainly the contradiction between the Khan and other dukes. The fact that Huang Taiji came to power caused aggrieved and resentful feelings in the dukes’ hearts and they fought fiercely against each other for power. The fourth problem Huang Taiji faced was the economic one. The Ming Government stopped trade with the Later Jin and also stopped paying the tribute to the imperial court, which caused “currency depreciation and the inflation of prices although the state government had enough money” 331. Worse, the Later Jin was struck by serious natural disasters so its people “suffered a lot from starvation”332 and “it became a dogeat-dog world”. The last contradiction was about the military. The Later Jin was surrounded from three directions by its enemies: Korea in the east, Mongolia in the west and the Ming to its north. They never stopped battling for domination for many years so that a large number of able-bodied men left their homeland to fight. They “sold their draught animals and mortgaged all their clothes and furniture to buy horses and armor” 333. The Later Jin was hit by economic recession in these years and its people were weary of the war. Huang Taiji

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realized that series of measures should be taken to solve these contradictions in order to overthrow the sovereignty of the Ming Government. Whether these problems could be resolved or not depended on time, especially the time gained from the Ming Government. So he negotiated with the Ming as a cover to gain time to ensure it did not deploy its military force and to wait for the right time to enter the central plains. As Gao Shijun, a minister of the Later Jin, said: “our government (the Later Jin government) benefited a lot from the negotiation with the Ming, while the Ming government benefited nothing from it. With the time gained from the negotiation, our Emperor increased the military force but the Ming became as lazy and idle as before. We took advantage of the negotiations and made concessions in order to achieve a bigger success”334. So Huang Taiji constantly expressed his wish for peace through the envoys of the Korean, Mongolian and Ming Governments. At the death of Nurhaci, Yuan Chonghuan, governor of Ningyuan of the Ming, sent Fu Youjue and Liunanmuzuo Lama (Li Lama) as mourners to the Later Jin, but his true intention was to ascertain the political situation of the Later Jin. Huang Taiji treated these two with courtesy and conveyed his wish for peace. When the two mourners planned to return, Huang Taiji ordered Fang Jina and others to accompany them and asked his men to deliver a letter, in which he expressed his wish for reconciliation, to Yuan Chonghuan 335. In February 1627 (7th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youxiao, 1st year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji again wrote a letter to Yuan Chonghuan, in which he proposed the conditions for peace. In November 1627 Huang Taiji presented a memorial to the Ming emperor especially to express his will for peace. In 1629 (2nd year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 3rd year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji avoided mentioning the title of his reign in his letter to the Ming emperor but instead he adopted the calendar promulgated by the Ming emperor336 to show his respect and his sincerity for peace. Later he wrote another seven letters to sue for peace. In December of 1629, Huang Taiji led his troops to enter the central plains and reached the city of Beijing. At this moment he “still carried a letter to the Ming emperor to express his wish”337. From 1631 to 1632, Huang Taiji frequently expressed his wish for peace to the Ming emperor. He “called himself the minister of the Ming emperor in his letters and asked for the economic help from the Ming”338. Moreover, in order to “show his sincerity”, he turned to Korea for help to “convey his wish for peace and his willingness to send back Kong Youming and Geng Zhongming, the two surrendering generals, to the Ming government”339. Huang Taiji’s high-sounding words for peace were a means instead of an end. While he shouted loudly the slogans of peace he still did not stop plundering Korea and the Ming. But a

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series of his military actions were under the cover of the peace-making slogans. The purpose of the military actions was not to dominate the countries to expand his territory, but to grab money and men to tide over the Later Jin. Huang Taiji won enough time to reinforce his power, develop the productive forces, stabilize the Later Jin, remove the threat from Korea and Mongolia and unify the whole northeast area. He threw away the slogan for peace later on and concentrated his forces to attack the Ming.

Huang Taiji’s Two Attacks on Korea When Nurhaci became the Khan of Later Jin, both the Ming government and the Later Jin tried hard to establish a close relationship with Korea because of its important military position. The Later Jin wanted to cut off the intercourse between Korea and the Ming and Korea’s support for Ming general Mao Wenlong’s troops in the Dongjiang area so the Later Jin would have nothing to worry about in the future. But the Ming government intended to make an alliance with Korea to contain the Later Jin and “to make the troops of Ming and Korea depend on each other”. The Ming government often “contacted the governor of Denglai, who helped the Ming a lot to tide over the difficulties and to get and exchange information” 340. Although the Later Jin made every endeavor to drive a wedge between the Ming and Korea, Korea still made an alliance with the Ming for historical reasons. When Huang Taiji ascended the throne he resolved to solve the problem of Korea as soon as possible. It chanced that the civil strife broke out in Korea so Huang Taiji seized this great opportunity to dispatch his troops there hoping to crush Mao Wenlong’s troops. On February 23, 1626 (7th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youxiao, 1st year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji started an undeclared war. He dispatched Amin, Jierhalang, Ajige and other officials to lead more than 30,000 banner soldiers to Korea. At their departure to Korea, he said: “Crusading against Korea is just one purpose. In addition, we are aimed at wiping out the troops of Mao Wenlong, who opened doors to the rebels fleeing from our state”341. On February 28, the Later Jin troops suddenly crossed the Yalu River and besieged Yizhou, which aroused the soldiers and the civilians of Yizhou to courageous resistance but in the end “they were hopelessly outnumbered and had to give in”. After they captured Yizhou, the Qing troops killed thousands of Ming soldiers and civilians 342. Later the leaders of the Qing troops divided their forces to attack Mao Wenlong, who at that time was quartered in the Tieshan Mountains. Soon Mao was defeated and retreated to Pi Island. Amin led the troops to the south

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and captured Dingzhou, Xuanchuan, Guoshan and other cities in succession. Wherever the Qing troops went, they encountered resistance from the Koreans. After the Qing troops took the city of Pinshan they stopped their attacks but “plundered the city” and “waited for the success of the peace negotiation”. At this very moment, the Korean Emperor Lizong fled to Jianghua Island and sent his envoy to Amin’s station to sue for peace. Later Amin assigned Liu Xingzuo to accompany the Korean envoy back to Jianghua Island to negotiate the provisions of the peace treaty. The Later Jin put forward a requirement that Korea break off relations with the Ming, the brother of the Korean emperor be sent to Later Jin as a hostage and Korea pay tribute to the Later Jin every year. Under the Later Jin’s great military pressure, Korea was forced to sign the “The Treaty of Jiangdu”. On the day they signed the treaty, before they retreated, Amin led his troops to Korea for plundering, which lasted for three days. The Korean people suffered a lot because of their barbarous acts. After the treaty was signed, Korea was again forced by the Ming to start trading in Zhongjiang and Huining, return the Ming fugitives, and increase its tribute, which resulted in the resistance of the Korean people. The treaty contributed a lot to cut off the contacts between the Ming and Korea and forced Mao Wenlong to retreat to the island where he ran out of food and money and was cut off from all the help. The Later Jin seized this great opportunity to lure Mao Wenlong into surrender. By this time Mao already had the wish to capitulate. But Yuan Chonghuan was informed of his wish and in 1629 (2nd year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 3rd year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji) he executed Mao Wenlong on the charge of treason. Owing to the death of Mao Wenlong the military officers once under his command, such as Kong Youming, Geng Zhongming and others, led their troops to surrender to the Later Jin. From then on, the threat from the east was basically removed. The Later Jin then conquered the Liaoxi area and Inner Mongolia and its power continued to increase. It attempted to change the former brotherhood relationship with Korea and made Korea became one of its vassal state under its direct control. On December 27, 1636 (9th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 10th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji attacked Korea again on the excuse that “Korea disobeyed the pledge several times” and “it had helped the Ming to annihilate its soldiers”343. The next day Huang Taiji, leading more than 100,000 soldiers, crossed the Yalu River and headed directly to the capital of Korea. On January 9, 1637, the Later Jin’s troops besieged the capital. The Korean Emperor Li Zong withdrew to the mountainous city of South-Han. But this city was later surrounded by the Later Jin troops. Huang Taji sent Dorgon to lead troops to attack and occupy Jianghua

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Island. Two princes, the emperor’s concubines, eunuchs and many royal family members were all taken prisoner. Thus the Korean emperor was compelled to surrender and signed the treaty under coercion. First, this treaty required that Korea must cut off contact with the Ming and become a subordinate to the Later Jin. Second, it requested that the Korean emperor send his eldest son and another son to the Qing troops, who would be taken back to Mukden and held as the hostages. Last, Korea was required to pay tribute to the Later Jin every year, to consist of 100 liang of gold, 1,000 liang of silver, 200 bolts of cloth made from ramie, 2,000 bolts of silk of all colors, 400 bolts of fine linen, 10,000 bolts of fine cloth of all color, 10,000 bags of rice and so on. When the Qing troops were about to retreat from Korea, they did not forget “to stay for a longer time to plunder valuable things, as many as possible”. It was recorded that “the villages, far and near, were all plundered; farmers lost farming time and they did not have any surplus food to eat, so the living condition of the Korean people was very miserable” 344. The Qing government also recruited soldiers from Korea and recruited 12,500 men for the first time (please refer to The Description of Shenyang , 10). The Qing government also compelled Korea to redeem its captives. “The Qing government demanded an exorbitant price so almost nobody had enough money. And they demanded a higher price if a captive intended to redeem his parents, wife, children and other family members. Thus it was very difficult for the poor Koreans to redeem their family member. The city was filled with their cries and shouts. If a captive was the only member of his or her family, he or she had nothing to do but wait for the government to redeem him or her. The captives wept outside the embassy, which was so miserable that one could not bear seeing it.” 345 To sum up, the invasion by the Qing had a disastrous effect on the people of Korea.

The Unification of Mongolia and the Valley of the Heilong River By the end of the reign of the Ming Dynasty, Mongolia consisted of three parts. They were Monan (the southern part of the Mongolian Plateau), Mobei (the northern part of the Mongolian Plateau) and Moxi (the western part of the Mongolian Plateau). But Mongolia at that time was chaotically divided. Huang Taiji considered that he must conquer both Korea and Mongolia to defeat the Ming for fear that Mongolia would make an alliance with the Ming to attack him from two sides simultaneously. Meanwhile the Ming Dynasty needed to make an alliance with Korean on the east and Mongolian on the west to fight against the increasingly powerful Later Jin as if Mongolia sided with the Later Jin its capital would be the target of the Qing troops. Consequently

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Mongolia, especially Monan-Mongolia, became the key point of the battle. At that time Monan-Mogolia had a vast territory with Jilin Province on its east, the Helanshan Mountains on its west, the Great Wall on the south and the desert on the north, where lived the descendents of the Yuan Dynasty. Chahar was the most powerful region of the Monan area. “With Liaoxi on its east and the Taohe River on the west”, Chahar interfered with the affairs of the two places and forced them to obey the treaty of alliance and it also greatly influenced the west part of the Taohe River”346. Chahar had 8 battalions and 24 tribes with Lin Danhan as its leader. “He had numerous and strong soldiers and horses and ran amuck in the Hannan area”347. He called himself Khan of Mongolia and invaded and harassed the regions around so the people of the nearby areas could not stand this kind of affliction. The tribes in the Monan area held two opposite attitudes toward the fights between the Ming and Qing. Some tribes, with Lin Danhan as their leader, advocated seeking refuge with the Ming and striving for its support to control the tribes in the Monan area and fight against the Later Jin; but the majority of the tribes in Monan hoped to get rid of Lin Danhan’s domination and bullying and to submit to the authority of the Later Jin so as to obtain its protection. However the Ming government strongly supported Lin Danhan. The Ming increased the tribute paid to him and bestowed on him the tribute which they originally intended to pay to the tribes in Monan. Therefore the Ming government and Lin Danhan reached an agreement to resist the Later Jin together. Huang Taiji “applied the carrot and stick judiciously” and in this way he united the tribes which were willing to submit to his authority and won over the tribes which held a wait-and-see attitude. He bestowed generous gifts and titles of nobility on the leaders of the tribes and governed the tribesmen as a whole. Consequently Khorchin, Mengniute, Guoerbote, Zhalaite, Keshenketeng and other tribes submitted to the Later Jin in succession. Huang Taiji conquered Chahar, whose leader was Lin Danhan, by armed force. In October 1628 (1st year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 2nd year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji himself supervised and directed his troops to assault Lin Danhan and conquer the area of the Xilamulun River. In May 1632 (5th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 6th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji led his troops to attack Lin Danhan again. Lin Danhan was defeated this time and fled to the west Tumd tribe first and then to Qinghai. In 1634 (7th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 8th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Lin Danhan died in the vast grass plain in Qinghai. In 1635 Huang Taiji assigned Dorgon and others to march west to the area of the Huanghe River. During the western expedition they wiped out the remnants of Lin Danhan’s

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troops and captured Lin’s wife and his son Ezhe. They also seized the great seal of the Ming Dynasty and returned home. After the extinction of Chahar, the tribes once ruled by it submitted to the Later Jin one by one. In 1636 (9th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 10th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), 49 feudal lords from the 16 tribes in Monan held a conference in Mukden. At this conference they worshipped Huang Taiji as the Khan and all the tribes in Monan submitted themselves to the Latter Jin. So Huang Taiji “had vanquished Korea and subdued Mongolia and the region of Yalu River and the Helan area beyond the Great Wall.” From then on, whenever the Qing troops entered the central plains, they often passed through Mongolia with the Mongolian cavalrymen as guides. After he had unified Monan-Mongolia, he actively made contact with MobeiMongolia. By the end of the 16th century there were three groups of strong feudal lords—the Khan of Tuxietu, the Khan of Zhasaketu and the Khan of Chechnya, which were also called Three Tribes of Khalkha. In 1636 Huang Taiji sent his envoy to the Three Tribes of Khalkha to persuade them into submitting to him. In the same year the Khan of Chechnya sent Weizheng and other Lamas to “bring his letter to Huang Taiji and at the same time they offered camels, horses, martens and other valuable things”348. In 1638 (11th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 12th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), the Three Tribes of Khalkha “sent their envoy to the Later Jin”349. Huang Taiji required that each tribe of the Three Tribes of Khalkha must pay a tribute to Qing. The tribute should consist of one white camel and eight white horses, and was called the Nine White Tributes 350.Thus the Three Tribes established a submissive relationship with the Qing Dynasty. The unification of the tribes in Monan and Mobei Mongolia not only eliminated the threat from Outer Mongolia and made the Mongolian cavalrymen into an important force for attacking the Ming Dynasty, it also played an important role in the resistance against Russia’s intrusion on the north frontier of the Later Jin. When he unified Monan and Mobei Mongolia, Huang Taiji at the same time, carried on the unfinished works of his father Nurhaci and unified the Basin of the Heilong River. The Basin of the Heilong River was the homeland of the Manchu people. When Nurhaci came to power, he actively tried to reunite his homeland. By the end of his reign he had basically reunited the lower reaches of the Heilong River. When Huang Taiji ascended to the throne he attached great importance to the cause of unification and he decided to unify the upper reaches. He said: “people lived in the upper reaches of the Heilong River spoke the same

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language as we did. So we were of the same family, which was recorded clearly in the books.” Therefore people living in the upper reaches should be “consoled and comforted with kind words” 351. In August 1631 (4th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 5th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), four leaders of the Hurha tribe from the middle reaches of the Heilong River “brought the furs of kolinskies, foxes, leopards and macaques as their tribute to the Later Jin”352. In May 1634 (7th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 8th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji) the leader of the Solon tribe, Bardaqi, (who came from Jingqiliwula, now called the Jieya River) “was willing to submit to the Later Jin with all his heart and paid tribute every year”353. He “led 44 people to the Later Jin and brought 1,818 pieces of mink fur”354. Under his leadership and influence the Solon tribe and other tribes in the southern part of Outer Xinganling submitted to the Later Jin in succession. Due to his great contribution to the Later Jin, Hung Taiji let a princess marry Bardaqi and so Bardaqi became his son-in-law. In June 1637 (10th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 11th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji) the leader of the Solon tribe in the upper reaches of the Heilong River, Bomuboguoer, “led eight men to the court and brought horses and marten furs to pay his tribute to the Later Jin”. Consequently “cities on both sides in the upper reaches of the Heilong River all submitted to the Later Jin” 355. In addition, the Mongolian Maoming’an tribe beside the E’nen River and Nibushu City and the Shilu tribe on the east of Baikal Lake both submitted. In 1639 (12th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 13th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Bomuboguer rebelled and sent an envoy to ask Bardaqi work with him. But “Bardaqi was not moved by him and waited for Huang Taiji’s troops” 356. He set himself against the rebellion of Bomuboguer. When Huang Taiji sent Samushenka, Suohai and other military officials to lead the troops to quell the rebellion, the Qing officials obtained continuous support from him 357. After the Qing troops’ arrival at the Huma River, they attacked Bomuboguoer from different directions. The city of Yakesa was captured. Bomuboguer was defeated and fled. Then the troops captured Fengchen, Ashajin, Duojin, Wukule, Wulusu and other cities. In January 164 (14th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 15th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Qing troops arrived at Luotai (Chita in Russia) and captured Bomuboguer and his wives and children. Altogether “they captured 956 people, including women and babies, and 844 cows and horses” 358. Huang Taiji quelled the rebellion and reunited the vast region of the east Baikal Lake So, “the Okhotsk sea to its northeast, the Baikal Lake to its northwest, the tribes in the Heilongjiang area and the places where

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abounded in black foxes and sables…the Elute Tribe, the Wonan River area and other countries all submitted to the Later Jin”359. After he unified the Basin of the Heilong River, Huang Taiji “appointed Halada and Geshada (Halada and Geshada: titles of leaders of the minority groups) to govern the people”360 and the leaders of the tribes were “responsible for civil affairs and taxation”. He enrolled all the people in Heilong River Basin in the register of the Banners and called them “New Manchu”. The people there were subordinate to “different banners” and all the men were ordered to “put on the suit of armor’ and became members of the Qing Eight Banners. The new soldiers of the Eight Banners played an important part in frontier defense in the northeast area of China.

War against the Ming Dynasty In order to enter the central plains and overthrow the Ming Dynasty, at the very beginning Huang Taiji carried out his activities under the banner of peace negotiations to sap the Ming’s morale. However under the cover of peace negotiations he never stopped starting wars against the Ming Dynasty. In May 1627 (7th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youxiao, 8th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji led his troops to the west to attack the Ming after he had succeeded in his war of aggression against Korea. At first he did not conqure Jinzhou and Ningyuan, so he destroyed all the riverside cities and sacked them before returning to Shenyang. In December 1629 (2nd year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 3rd year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji himself led his troops and entered first into the Xifeng Pass, keeping away from the defense area of Yuan Chonghuan but making his way through Mongolia with Mongolian cavalrymen as his guides to capture Zunhua, and arrived at Beijing. The whole of the Ming was afraid. Yuan Chonghuan and Zu Dashou led their troops from outside Shanhaiguan to support the crumbling regime. But Huang Taiji sowed the seeds of discord among them. He killed Yuan Chonghuan with a knife borrowed from Emperor Zhu Youjian. Later Zu Dashou retreated outside Shanhaiguan. Just at that moment, Ming’s reinforcements from all the directions came to the capital. Huang Taiji met the troops for a decisive battle in the suburbs of Beijing. At last he killed the valiant military officer of the Ming, whose name was Man Gui. In 1630 (3rd year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 4th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji withdrew his troops from Beijing but marched to the east. They captured Yongping, Shenzhou, Qian’an and other prefectures. Later Amin, who stationed

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his troops in these four prefectures, was isolated from other reinforcements. As a result he was defeated by Ming troops and retreated outside the Shanhaiguan. In 1634 (7th year of the reign of th Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 8th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji accessed Shanhaiguan again and divided his troops into four columns to attack the Ming from different directions: one attacked Xuanfu and Datong from the direction of Shangfang Fortress; one drove straight ahead to Xuanfu from the entrance of Longmen; another attacked Yingzhou from Dushikou; and the last column attacked Datong from the direction of Desheng Fortress. The Eight Banners of the Later Jin attacked and destroyed the places they reached and plundered many captives and money before they returned to Shenyang. By 1636 Huang Taiji had reinforced and consolidated the reign of the Later Jin through nine years of effort. He eliminated the threats from Korea and Mongolia, which prepared him for the seizure of the Ming regime. In May 1636 Huang Taiji declared himself the Emperor, historically known as the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji, and changed the title of the reign to Chongde. From then on, Huang Taiji focused his main forces on attacking the Ming. The relationship between the Ming and Qing entered a new era. In the autumn of 1636, Huang Taiji assigned Ajige to lead troops to start from the entrance of Dushi and then to arrive at Beijing through the Juyong Pass. Ajige went down into the country and conquered over ten cities, including Baoding. He plundered 180,000 people and livestock before they started to return to the capital city. In 1638 (11th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 12th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji designated Dorgon and Yue Tuo to lead troops to attack the Ming from two different directions: one of their troops entered the Qiangzi Mountains and the other entered the Green Hill Pass. The two troops joined their forces in Tongzhou. They were then divided into eight columns. One column marched along Mount Taihang; one came along the canal; the other 6 columns launched strikes from th north to the south. Zhending, Guangping, Shunde, Daming and other cities were all overrun. Later the Qing troops crossed the river from Linqing, arrived at Shandong, and conquered Jinan. The Ming Emperor Zhu Jianlin was captured. Over 50 cities were occupied. The Qing troops seized 460,000 people and tens of thousands of liang of gold and silver. In the spring of the next year the Qing troops marched northward from Tianjin and returned to Mukden in triumph. Before and after Huang Taiji’s enthronement, although he led troops to invade and harass the area inside the pass and plundered numerous people, livestock and property, he still did not have the courage to set his foot on the

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central plains. One important reason was that at that time the Shanhaiguan and the cities outside the pass, such as Jinzhou, were still under the control of the Ming troops so the Qing troops did not dare to linger in the central plains. Shanhaiguan, as the shield of Beijing, was a key fortress. But Jinzhou was the gateway of the pass. In order to occupy Beijing and contend for domination of the whole nation, Qing had to first seize Jinzhou and Shanhaiguan. Therefore these were two places of great military importance before the collapse of the Ming. In 1640 (13th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 14th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), the Qing troops launched strikes on Jinzhou. The defender of Jinzhou, Zu Dashou, stood fast against the enemy. As a result, the Qing troops “were defeated. Several senior generals were killed”. “People in Shenyang wore extremely anxious looks on their faces”361. In January 1641, Huang Taiji again assigned Dorgon to lead troops to besiege Jinzhou, but they were defeated. In April, Hung Taiji decided to redouble his attacks. He assigned Prince Jierhalang, Prince Ajige, Duke Duoduo and others to replace Dorgon. They brought large numbers of soldiers of the Eight Banners and cannons and launched fierce attacks on Jinzhou. The Mongolian soldiers outside Jinzhou city surrendered and the Qing troops occupied the outer city of Jinzhou362. Zu Dashou reported the emergency to the Ming Emperor. In July the Ming assigned Hong Chengchou, who led 130,000 cavalrymen, to rescue Jinzhou. He took gradual steps, took defense for offence, and did not dare to launch one single attack rashly. He and his troops camped in the northwest area of Mount Songshan, which was 18 li (Li: a length unit in China, 1 li is about 500 meters) away from the south of Jinzhou. Jierhalang led the right wing of the Eight Banners to attack the troops of the Ming, but “was defeated” and “his camp on the top of the mountain, and the camps of two Plain Red Banners and Bordered Blue Banners were all captured by his enemies; his soldiers and horses were seriously injured”363. The Qing troops “could not resist the attacks and asked the court for assistance urgently”; “the Qing soldiers in Jinzhou were defeated in the battle and retreated to the north of Jinzhou”. “Huang Taiji and other officers wore extremely anxious looks on their faces”364. Huang Taiji “was burning with anxiety so he ordered the soldiers in Shenyang to support the troops in Jinzhou” 365. Meanwhile the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian secretly assigned Hong Chengchou to march forward to rescue Jinzhou from the siege. The Ministry of War also kept launching wars against the Qing. Consequently Hong Chengchou stored his army provisions at Mount Xing and Mount Bijia which were 30 li from Jinzhou. Then he led 60,000 soldiers to clear the way. The rest of the troops followed. Their cavalrymen surrounded three sides of

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Mount Song and the infantry occupied Mount Rufeng in the north of the city. The main forces led by Huang Taiji left Shenyang on September 19 and headed for the frontline on September 23. He stationed himself between Mount Song and Mount Xing and concentrated all the forces to attack the reinforcements of the Ming. He first cut off the Ming’s path to their army provisions, defeated the Ming troops at Mount Ta who protected the provisions, and seized the Ming’s army provisions at Mount Bijia. The Ming troops lost their provisions and were at a disadvantage at the same time so that the morale of the army was shaken. The leader of the Ming troops tried to withdraw the soldiers who were stationed at Mount Rufeng to Mount Song. But on their way they fell into Qing’s ambush, so they retreated to the coast. Only a small number of the Qing soldiers, such as Wu Sangui and Wang Pu, broke through. “A large number of Qing soldiers were drowned by the rising tide and both the land and the sea were littered with corpses”366. Huang Taiji concluded that the Ming troops hiding in Mount Xing would be certain to flee to Ningyuan so he stationed ambushes between Mount Song and Mount Xing, waiting for the Ming troops. The Ming troops were again slaughtered. Wu Sangui and Wang Pu fled to Ningyuan alone. In this battle the Qing captured over 53,000 Ming soldiers, more than 7,400 horses and more than 9,300 suits of armor367. The Qing won a landslide victory and their martial spirit was greatly roused. At that time Hong Chengchou only had 10,000 remnant soldiers and was besieged at Mount Song. Altogether he organized five breakthrough attempts but all failed. The reinforcements were reluctant to move ahead. In March 1642 the Ming troops ran out of ammunition and food. The vice general of the Ming, Xia Chengde, surrendered to the Qing and led the Qing troops to Jinzhou. Xia Chengchou was also captured. Jinzhou, besieged for such a long time, was utterly exhausted. “People in Jinzhou were so hungry that they ate their compatriots”368. Zu Dashou, noting the defeat of the Ming troops at Mount Song and Mount Xing and feeling hopeless, surrendered to the Qing. So the Qing won all the cities except Ningyuan outside Shanhaiguan. After the Qing won the great victory atn Mount Song and Jinzhou, they were in a very good position. As Huang Taiji said: “Capturing Beijing is like cutting down a big tree. You must cut it from two sides and then the big tree will fall down automatically… Now, the Ming soldiers were exhausted and they were besieged by our troops. The Ming becomes weaker and weaker, but we become stronger and stronger. So we are ready to occupy Beijing”369. At that time, the decadent Ming Dynasty was on the verge of collapse under the attacks of peasant soldiers led by Li Zicheng. Because of his landlord class, the Ming Emperor tried to negotiate with th Manchu aristocrats and concentrate

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his forces to suppress the insurrectionary army of peasants. Emperor Zhu Youjian authorized Chen Xinjia, the minister in the Ministry of War, to assign Ma Zhaoyu to negotiate with Huang Taiji and bring back the provisions of an armistice. When this was revealed, the whole of Beijing city became chaotic. In order to shirk his responsibilities, Zhu Youjian executed Chen Xinjia. The Ming failed to negotiate with the Qing. Huang Taiji seized this opportunity to put pressure on the rulers of the Ming. In November, Huang Taiji assigned Duke Abatai and his troops to enter Shanhaiguan. They conquered Jizhou and penetrated into Jinan and Shandong. Eventually they occupied over 80 cities and killed the Lord of Shandong. Along the way the Qing troops captured 360,000 people and 550,000 cattle. Then they arrived at Beijing, where they met no resistance from the Ming troops and allowed to return to Shenyang. On September 21, 1643, (16th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, 17th year of the reign of the Qing Emperor Huang Taiji), Huang Taiji died of cephalemia. His son Fulin ascended the throne and changed the title of its reign to Chih. Fulin was only six years old at that time. His two uncles, Dorgon and Jierhalang, helped him to administrate the national affairs. On March 19, the 17th year of the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, Li Zicheng led the insurrectionary army to occupy Beijing. They overthrew the reign of the Ming Dynasty. But the feudal landlord class with Wu Sangui as their leader was not resigned to retreat from the stage of history. With their fierce hatred for the peasant army and the hope of recover the domination of the landlord class, they joined with the Qing troops to enter Shanhaiguan to suppress the insurrectionary army. Hence with the guidance of Wu Sangui and other people, the Qing troops drove straight to Shanhaiguan. They occupied Beijing and launched a series of fierce fights with the insurrectionary army and the remnants of the Ming troops.

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Chapter

The Repression of Peasant Uprisings by the Qing Troops and the Struggles against Qing in Various Regions

A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

Invasion by the Qing Troops of Shanhaiguan and the Anti-Qing Struggles of th Peasant Uprising Armies led by Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong The Collusion between Manchu and Han Aristocrats, Bureaucrats and Landlords and the Invasion of Shanhaiguan by Qing Troops In the early April 1664, the peasant uprising army led by Li Zicheng arrived at the capital city with an irresistible force. The fate of the corrupt Ming Dynasty hung by a thread. The peasant army began to launch the attack on April 23. After two days of fighting, all the armed forces of the Ming Dynasty in the capital were disarmed. The old Beijing city was full of joy and people decorated the street with lanterns and streamers. Yellow paper scrolls with the words “Long live the Sunch’on Empire of the first year of Yongchang” could be seen at the door of each household. The celebration of the overthrow of the Ming dynasty by the peasant uprising filled every corner of the city atmosphere of gaiety. At noon of April 25, the peasant army which was led by Li Zicheng headed for Beijing which for over two hunred years had been the center of government of the Ming dynasty. The peasant uprising had entered a new stage. Li Zicheng, Liu Zongmin, Li Guo and dozens of generals acted as the core of the leadership of the peasant army. With extreme hatred of the existing society and the desire for a good life of the peasantry which they represented, they attempted to achieve an ideal social order through their experience, wisdom and talents. Before the peasant army entered the Beijing city, Li Zicheng once shot three arrows in a row to the back of the army as a warning and declared that anyone who harmedt the citizens after entering the city would be sentenced to death1 Notices stating that all trade should be conducted with fairness2 and that taxes would be exempted were put up everywhere after the arrival of he army. The day of their entering into the city, the military government announced that the army would not commit the slightest offence against people and anyone who dared to plunder the citizens would be sentenced to death with their body split part. People were all extremely happy and spread the news far and wide3. Li Zicheng himself met the citizens from inside and outside the city twice to learn about the hardships of the people and to monitor the military discipline. The idea that the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty was to save people from their suffering was widely disseminated4. Afterwards, citizens set their heart at ease and were relieved to live a normal life5. The peasant army established the new revolutionary order quickly.

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After the peasant army entered Beijing city much work was done to destroy the political organization of the Ming Dynasty and to establish and improve the peasant political organization. For example, the bureaucratic establishment was improved, and government officials of each level were appointed. Effort was made to enlist skilled personnel through the old civil service examination system to unite the feudal intellectuals who supported the peasant regime. The peasant regime showed the supreme authority of protecting the interests of the people and suppressing the resistance of the landlord class. The government had a clearcut stand on what to approve of and what to hate. The order to immediately release all the innocent prisoners imprisoned by the secret service of the imperial court (a spy organization of the Ming Dynasty under the direct control of the empire) was given. Meanwhile the department of reception and conciliation which was managed by Liu Zongmin and Li Guo was established to exclusively suppress the feudal bureaucrats and landlords and to order the return of stolen money or goods. At that time, most parts of North China and a part of Central China were under the control of the peasant regime. The trend called for further consolidation of the peasant regime and support from the vast peasantry and other classes of citizens. It was necessary to remove the threat of the Qing army from the northeast and to destroy the imperial remnant of the Ming Dynasty. Although the Dashun regime had accomplished much, due to the class limitations of the peasantry the new contradictions and problems could not be solved completely after the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty. With the changes in the situation, the leaders did not realize the arduous tasks in front of them and thought that they had won the battle. As a result, thinking was paralysed and discipline was slack. The soldiers who had fought for years were eager to go home to do farm work; the generals in the army were contaminated with hedonism and corruption. They occupied the elite housing, greedily pursued money and gave no regard for the further development of the revolution. The contradictions among the generals deepened which worked against unity; the army expanded quickly but its fighting capacity was largely impaired and rectification and training lagged behind due to the lack of provisions and funds; large numbers of bureaucrats and landlords sneaked into the peasant army and brought with them many feudal and corrupt habits; the recovery of the stolen money from the bureaucrats and aristocrats was necessary but the punishment was too severe, which was due to improper strategy. The peasant rebel army exhibited many insuperable weaknesses. General Li Yan proposed that firstly, Li Zicheng should ascend the throne; secondly, the recovery of the goods should be dealt with differently; thirdly, the army should be withdrawn from the Beijing

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city; and fourthly, Wu Sangui should be summoned to surrender. However these political and military proposals of vital importance were not completely implemented. Although the Ming Dynasty had been overthrown, the feudal landlord class was not reconciled to leaving the stage of history and prepared to launch an attack in retaliation. After learning of the fall of the Ming Dynasty and Empire Chongzhen hung himself, the big landlords and bureaucrats in Nanjing of the Ming Dynasty mourned and promised that they would fight and take revenge at the cost of their lives 6. In June 1644, the big landlords and bureaucrats constituted the Hongguang regime in Nanjing which aimed at competing with the peasant regime and restoring their governance nationwide. Not far from Beijing, the elite troops led by the Ningyuan general Wu Sangui was settled in the Shanhaiguan, which was a threat to the safety of Beijing. Wu Sangui whose father Wu Xiang was a general of the Ming Dynasty, was from a wealthy family. Wu Sangui was a military jinshi and greatly influenced by his father 7. His uncle Zu Dashou was the man behind the scenes in the Liaodong area. There were rumors on the northeast frontier that security was ensured by Zu Dashou 8. Wu Sangui participated in the military bloc which was led by Zu Dashou and thus made rapid advances in his career. Under the leadership of Wu Sangui, the forty thousand elite soldiers and seventy or eighty thousand Liao people were all good at fighting. The thousands of Yi soldiers who were strong guarded the strategically important area and left nothing to worry about 9, which served as a protective screen for the Ming government to resist the attack of the Qing armies. Wu Sangui and his father Wu Xiang possessed many country estates and properties in Liaodong and Beijing. Before the peasant army led by Li Zicheng had taken over Beijing, Wu Sangui’s superior Hong Chengchou and his uncle Zu Dashou and most of the people in the political bloc surrendered to the Qing dynasty. By taking advantage of the special relationship between Wu Sangui and the bloc, the ruler of the Qing once delivered a letter to warn Wu Sangui of the consequences to persuade him to surrender. Hong Chengchou, Zu Dashou, his brother Wu Sanfeng, his cousin Zu Kefa and his friend Zhang Cunren all wrote to persuade Wu Sangui to surrender to the Qing dynasty sooner or later. But Wu Sangui hesitated and did not take a clear stand as he was not familiar with the balance of power of the Ming, Qing and the peasant armies. The prospect of who would be the winner was not very clear at that period of time. To keep his high post with matching salary and his great estate, his did not make any move and sat on the fence. It was not until the beginning of March when the peasant army led by Li Zichen captured Yanghe and Dingzhen with irresistible force, Emperor Chongzhen hastily appointed Wu

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Sangui as Pingxi Earl and ordered him to abandon Ningyuan and lead his army quickly into the Shanhaiguan to protect the capital. On April 22nd the army led by Wu Sangui arrived at Shanghaiguan while three days later the peasant army seized Beijing. It was on April 26 that Wu’s army arrived at Fengrun. Having learned of the fall of the capital and the death of Emperor Chongzhen, he withdrew his army back to the Shanhaiguan. Wu Sangui was representative of the bureaucrats and landlord class of the Ming dynasty. He was at daggers drawn with the peasant army and once announced that he would shirk no responsibility to take revenge and eradicate the peasant army even at the cost of his life10. He showed that there was root conflict as to the class interest between him and the peasant uprising army. Wu was also insidious and ambitious. It was not difficult for him to realize that it was like throwing eggs against rocks to try and fight the millions of the peasant army who had just won great success with his isolated force. Therefore when Li Zicheng sent people to persuade Wu Sangui to surrender, on the one hand Wu accepted the reward of forty thousand liang of silver to submit to the Dashun regime due to the great pressure of the peasant army, and pretended to be willing to negotiate and surrender. On the other hand, by making use of the old relationship with the Qing dynasty, with the Shanhaiguan the only route for the Qing armies to reach the central plain, he colluded with the Qing dynasty and asked for their help to jointly wipe out the peasant army. To the north of Wu’s army, the local Manchu regime developed their forces with no restraint with an aim to taking the place of the Ming dynasty and establishing national control. Fulin took the throne after the death of Huang Taiji. The prince regent Duo Ergun, who had the real power, had a conflict with Haoge, the first son of Huang Taiji. When Chongzhen ordered Wu Sangui to protect Beijing, the Manchu ruler thought it was the right time to seize the reins of power over the whole nation. So they eased the inner conflicts and raised the army to the south. The Qing rulers immediately changed their policy from plundering and used revenge for the death as an excuse 11. They attempted to pluck the prize from the grasp of the peasant army to assume control of the whole nation. As Duo Ergun said, the current attack was not the same as previously, and with the blessing of heaven it was necessary to stabilize the nation and pacify the people12 To this end the Qing rulers directed the spearhead of the attack at the peasant army and threatened to eradicate them. They would cut off all means of retreat and never return if they did not succeed 13. They summoned the bureaucrats and landlords which were the remnant of the Ming dynasty to surrender and to suppress the peasant uprising. The Qing rulers have won the approval of many Han bureaucrats and

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landlords as they had a common enemy, the peasant uprising force, which laid the foundation for their collusion. On May 20, 1644, when Duo Ergun led the army to the Wonghou near Fuxin, Liaoning province, Wu Sangui sent a letter to him. The letter said that Wu begged that the troops marched forward for property and lands. Wu would like to lead his army to assist the Manchu forces to attack the capital city and to fight the peasants 14. For the Qing rulers, the actions of Wu Sangui fit exactly with their wishes. Duo Ergun wrote in reply that the Qing armies not only wanted to suppress the peasant uprising but also to govern the whole country. Duo Ergun tempted Wu that he would be given lands and awarded as a royal if he led his army back15. Wu accepted Dou Ergun’s conditions immediately and made another proposal. He suggested that Dou Ergun should inspire the forces and march straight into the Shanhaiguan. Wu would assist the attack from the rear. The peasant revolt could be suppressed and the official call to arms could be spread in Beijing. By doing this citizens would be genuinely convinced, land would be seized, and nothing would get in the way16. It can be seen from the letters between Wu Sangui and Dou Ergun that the bureaucrats and landlords of the Manchu and Han nationalities had already colluded to suppress the peasant uprising. The leading bloc of the peasant army did not give due consideration to the situation. In particular they did not realize that the Manchu and Han nationalities had already colluded and that the Qing army might possibly enter the Shanhaiguan. They were not aware that the process of Wu Sangui pretending to negotiate with the peasant army about surrender was his preparation to suppress the peasant army. It was too late when Li Zichen came to realize the tight situation and decided to fight. On May 18, Li Zicheng led 200 thousand peasant soldiers in person to march to the Shanhaiguan. On May 24 the peasant army surrounded Shanhai city, which was inside the Shanhaiguan, from three sides. Twenty thousand cavalrymen were ordered to take the Shibei road in the west of Shanhai, make a sudden attack on the outside city and cut off Wu Sangui’s route to northeast China. The troops of Wu Sangui were trapped, which was favorable for the peasant army. However, by May 26, the Qing army was only ten li outside the Shanhai pass and defeated the peasant army led by Tang Tong who was a general of the Ming dynasty in the area named Yipianshi. Wu Sangui took the opportunity to bombard the ring of the encirclement and took a side way to the Qing military camp to acknowledge allegiance to Duo Ergun. Moreover Wu used sacrificed a white horse and a black cow to the heaven and earth; he drank the animal blood, cut his clothes and broke the arrow to show his loyalty to the Qing dynasty17. Wu opened the Shanhaiguan to welcome the Qing army and made himself the daring vanguard

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in suppressing the peasant army. On May 27 the army of Duo Ergun branched out into three parts to enter the Shanhaiguan18. She was one of the five country gentlemen who met Duo Ergun at that period of time. The entrance of the Qing army into the Shanhaiguan fundamentally changed the situation. The anti-peasant force composed of the picked troops led by Wu Sangui and the crack force led by Duo Ergun grew sharply. Since the peasant army did not know about the attack of the Qing army, they relaxed. As the battle raged on, both sides had tough fighting. They were rounds of fighting in which either side was on the upper hand. Li Zicheng’s army took the hillock with the white army flag on the right side of Wu’s army. The fighting so fierce that Li Zicheng commanded the rearguard to forge ahead 19. When the peasant army stirred themselves to fight against the enemy, suddenly troops and horses rushed over. It turned out to be the Qing army in armor and pigtails. In a twinkling, the peasant army collapsed and victory was converted into defeat. The soldiers threw away their shields and armor and trampled each other. Tens of thousands of people died in the battle20. The chief commander Liu Zongmin was shot and seriously injured. On May 31, Li Zicheng led his army back to Beijing. After the battle had been lost, the Qing army was preparing to storm Beijing. The Han bureaucrats and landlords in the north viewed it as the ripe time to turn their hatred of the peasant uprising into actions. They sought refuge with the Manchu aristocrats and colluded with the Qing army. In the area of Qingzhou and Linqing along the canal in Shandong and Hebei province, the landlord class revolted and killed many officials of the peasant regime. The peasant army’s south supply line of provisions was cut and the peasant army was threatened both by the attack from within and without. The Ming forces which submitted to peasant regime in the beginning collapsed in disorder in succession and even fabricated rumors in the city to shake the morale of the army. Before marching into Beijing, the peasant army had swept away all obstacles and achieved one victory after another. However, the victory corroded the revolutionary army in a very short period of time. After the defeat in the Shanhaiguan pass the peasant army lost the strength and willpower to pull itself together and protect Beijing. They decided to give up Beijing and return to the central Shaanxi plain to reorganize. On June 3 (April 29 of the lunar calendar), Li Zicheng proclaimed himself emperor in a hurry. The title of the reign was Dashun and the designation of the imperial reign was Yongchang. On the following day, the Dashun army withdrew from Beijing. At that time the deployment of the peasant army was in disorder. They did not organize

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resistance outside Beijing city to hinder the pace of the Qing armies. They also carried with them large quantities of heavy equipment and belongings which slowed down the speed of the march. When Wu Sangui leading the Qing army caught up, the peasant army fought back bravely and overcame the Qing army in Baoding, Dingzhou and Zhengding. But Li Zicheng was injured in the battle and the army suffered a lot. The peasant army retreated to the west from Guguan. The peasant army only occupied Beijing for forty-two days. The balance of power changed due to the appearance of a new and strong enemy but the fundamental reason was that there was no new productivity and no new production relations at that time, neither was there new class power and an advanced political party. Therefore the peasant uprising and peasant war was undertaken without the guidance of a modern-type proletariat class and the Communist Party21. For idealistic and political reasons, such a large scale peasant uprising was bound to meet setbacks and fail. The peasant army led by Li Zicheng did not realize that although Empire Chongzhen who represented the Ming dynasty had been defeated, the landlord class still existed as a small class. There were small reactionary forces everywhere, some of which even possessed strong armed forces and were willing to put up a desperate struggle. The peasant army was eaten up with pride. After entering Beijing they thought that the revolution had succeeded and they could go home to live a happy life. Some generals developed a hedonistic and corrupt mentality and their combat readiness was slack, which badly hurt the fighting capacity of the troops. That explained why they stopped the armed struggle after they seized Beijing. They did not give due consideration to the threat that the Qing dynasty would usurp the fruits of the victory of the peasant uprisings, and despised the anti-uprising force of Wu Sangui who was obstinate and crafty. They even claimed that they could defeat Wu and his army with the least amount of effort 22. They committed the mistake of arrogance when they achieved victory, which led to a series of serious political and military consequences. As a result they lost the opportunity and were forced to withdraw from Beijing and lose the regime. When the Qing army was approaching Beijing, Duo Ergun further drew the Han bureaucrats and landlords over to his side and claimed that the Qing army’s arrival was to take the revenge for them and the Qing would cooperate to defeat the peasant army led by Li Zicheng. If the officials of the Ming dynasty came over and pledged allegiance, their official positions would be regained 23. With this high-sounding excuse, many bureaucrats of the Ming dynasty, including those who had surrendered to the peasant armies, now yielded to

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Duo Ergun and went for five li outside the city to welcome the Qing army. The bureaucrats flattered the Qing army as the army of humanity and justice and advocated the Manchu aristocrats’ usurpation as the destiny of nature to sympathize with the people and to crusade against the sinful rulers. They praised the Qing army as their savior rescuing them from suffering 24. The bureaucrats and landlords who had fled to the valleys and rural areas were all pleased about the news, returned to their hometown and shaved their hair to surrender to the Qing dynasty. On June 6 Duo Ergun led the Qing army into Beijing and declared in public that the Qing dynasty would choose Yanjing as its capital. All the people were the subjects of the imperial court25, which revealed the ultimate goal of the Qing armys’s entrance into the Shanhaiguan. At the same time a series of measures were taken to adjust the relationship with the Han landlord class, to expand the ruling foundation, to concentrate the efforts to suppress the peasant army and to reestablish the landlords’ governance over the peasants26. In October 1644 Fulin, the ruler of the Qing dynasty moved to Beijing and took the throne on October 30 (October 1 of the lunar calendar). The dynarty was named Daqing with Yanjing as the capital, and the reign title was Shunzhi. It marked the establishment of the central government of the Qing dynasty and one feudal dynasty replaced another by usurping the fruits of victory which belonged to the peasant uprising.

The Struggle of the Peasant Uprising Army of the Dashun Regime Led by Li Zicheng against the Qing After the entrance of the Manchu aristocrats bloc, on the one hand they drew the upper class of the Han nationality to their side and on the other side they implemented a policy of the coercion policy towards the overwhelming majority of the people and the middle and small landlords. Militarily, anyone who did not pay allegiance and surrender would be sentenced to death 27; politically, the governing privileges of the Manchu aristocrats were strictly stipulated. The Han people were forced to shave their hair, alter their dress and become servants. The land and the property of the Hans were occupied and confiscated. The aim of the ethnic coercion policy was to protect the system of feudal exploitation. The policy directly dealt with the land and viewed the oppression and exploitation of the peasants as the biggest interest of the Manchu rulers. The nation’s farmers fell victim to the ethnic coercion policy which at the same time endangered the interests of the Hans and other ethnic groups nationwide. Therefore it was unavoidable that many anti-Qing struggles whose participants were peasants broke out.

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From June 1644 to the end of 1646, with the desperate fight of the Dashun army led by Li Zicheng and the Daxi army led by Zhang Zizhong, the anti-Qing movement was in full swing in the south and north of Qinling and along the Yellow River. At that time the Qing dynasty possessed a powerful army and had achieved a succession of victories which raised morale, improved the military strength and caused many generals of the Ming dynasty to surrender. The Qing dynasty viewed the peasant army as the biggest obstacle to its seizing the power of the national governance. The top priority was to eradicate the peasant army 28. If this was done, the great undertaking would be achieved 29. Therefore the Qing dynasty concentrated its forces and directed the spearhead of the attack at the Dashun army led by Li Zicheng. Although the Dashun regime had withdrawn from Beijing and lost much land, there was still a deep class foundation for the anti–Qing struggle supported by the overwhelming majority of the people. As to the Dashun army itself, Taiyuan was guarded by Chen Yongfu with massive forces; Yan’an and Suide were occupied by Li Guo and Hao Yao with powerful armies; the strategic and difficult terrain of the Yellow River and Tonguan were favorable conditions for the Dashun army. How the peasant army would do battle with the Qing army was the problem that the leaders of the Dashun army needed urgently to solve. After Li Zicheng had retreated to Xi’an he formulated the strategic plan of seizing Hanchung to the south, capturing Gansu to the south, occupying Lanzhou and ensuring the safety of the central Shaanxi plain. The plan treated the central Shaanxi plain as the base for the anti-Qing movement. Li order the Quan general Liu Tichun to lead a hundred thousand Dashun soldiers to cross the Yellow river and to march north. In August and September, the Qing army went south along the Taihang Mountaina and entered Daizhou and Qizhou by way of Datong. They occupied Pianguan and prepared to seize Taiyuan, which posed a threat to the boarder of Shaanxi. The Dashun army attacked Datong by way of Fuguo and united the rebel alliance to block the enemy in Jinan to cut off the road of return of the Qing army. They resisted the assault of the Qing army and defeated the Qing army in Jingjing, Xuanhua, Weizhou and some other areas. Despite the military efforts made by the peasant army, it could not save the day. The trend of the class struggle and national struggle had drastically changed. Due to the lack of consolidation of the peasant regime established in the previous occupied area, the peasant regime in various areas was destroyed which meant that the Dashun army had lost reliable logistic support. The contradictions within the leading bloc further intensified. Under such

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circumstances, Li Yan volunteered to go to Henan and to lead twenty thousand soldiers to suppress the insurgency of the armed guards of the landlords. Li Yan’s purpose was to protect the peasant army but Li Zicheng doubted his motives. At the time of victory of the revolution, Niu Jingxing who was a landlord infiltrated the peasant army, solicited power and corrupted the generals. At that time Niu began his sabotage and spoke slanderously to Li Zicheng, saying that Yan Wuxiong was astute and resourceful and could not remain in a subordinate position for a long time. As Henan was Li Yan’s hometown, if Li was allowed to lead a powerful army the result might be disastrous30. Niu incited Li Zicheng to kill Li Yan and his brother Li Mou, which caused dissatisfaction from many leading generals. Learning about the death of the Li brothers, Song Xiance felt very indignant. Gnashing his teeth and with a sword in his hand, Liu Zongmin criticized Niu for not having performed any meritorious military service for the regime but daring to kill the two generals. He stated that he should kill him with his sword. If the military and civilian officials were at odds, how could the army go into battle and achieve victory31? In November, 1644, the Qing army branched into two columns, of which one column was sent to attack the Dashun peasant army and the other was led by the Ying prince Ajige who was appointed as the Jinyuan senior general with Wu Sangui and Shang Kexi as the assistant generals. They led the Manchu, Meng and Han armies to advance to Yulin and Yanan by way of Datong, and then southward to Xi’an. On the way the Yu prince led the armies of Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming to attack Tonguan (a country in Shanxi Province) through Huaiqing, Henan province. The two armies originally planned to meet in Xi’an and attempt to defeat the peasant army there. In November, Ajige’s army paid a heavy cost in capturing Taiyuan, Pingyan and other cities. Having lost the whole of Shanxi, the Dashun army retreated to Tongguan while the army led by Duoduo did not advance further than Weihui, Henan Province, out of fear. Rebuked by Duo Ergun, Duoduo’s army arrived at Menjin in January the second year and fought vigorously with the Dashun army in the area of Luoyang, Shaanzhou and Baoling until thirty li outside the east of Tongguan. The Tongguan defence was a fierce battle which lasted for more than a month until February 8, 1645. Li Zicheng commanded the troops in person but the Dashun army still lost Tongguan due to the reinforcement of the Qing army. At that time, Ajige and Wu Sangui led the Qing army into into Suide, crossing the river through Baode. Tangtong who was a general of Ming dynasty defected and surrendered to the Qing dynasty. The Dashu army led by Li Guo and Hao Yaoqi was forced to retreat southward to Northern Shaanxi after a fierce battle. Yan’an and Shaanzhou fell to the enemy. As a result, Xi’an became the main

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assault target for the Qing army and the Dashun army was between the hammer and the anvil. On February 9th Li Zicheng abandoned Xi’an and went down to the south of Shaanxi by way of Lantian, passing Wuguan through Longju village, Shangzhou, and retreated to the mountainous areas of Shangluo where they used to fight. The army passed the Wuguan, arrived in Hubei in April 1645 and entered Xianyan. It then took the city of Wuchang. Although the Dashun army experienced successive defeats in fighting against the Qing army, there were still hundreds of thousand soldiers left when arriving at Hubei, who were reorganized into forty-eight sections32. The armies led by Li Guo, Gao Yigong and Hao Yaoqi were stationed in the area of Jing and Xiang (the city of Hubei). The army led by Li Zicheng and Liu Zongmin was stationed in Chengtian (the Zhongxian county of Hubei today). During the stay in Wuchang of the Dashun army, Jiangxi was named as the Ruifu county where the regime was established. Officials were appointed and Yongchang coins were casted. Li Zicheng assumed that although the northwest part of the country was not stable, they could not afford to lose the southeast part 33. He proposed to occupy the eastern part of Zhoudong and the Xuan areas to establish a base in the southeast area to continue to confront the Qing armies. At the end of May, as the peasant army was preparing to leave, the Qing army surprised it with an attack from both land and water. The Dashun army abandoned Wuchang and moved to the south in a hurry and arrived at Tongshan (today’s Tongshan county in Hubei province). In the battle the Dashun army suffered a lot. Liu Zongmin, the brave chief general of the army and the battle companion of Li Zicheng was seriously injured and captured and died a heroic death. The revolution was at a low ebb as the army marched into areas it did not know. After the retreat from Beijing, the remnants of the Ming dynasty and the landlord armed forces colluded to fight against the peasant army in Beijing, Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Anhui, Hubei and Guangzhou34. The landlords in the Dashu army began to go over to the enemy and turn traitor. They were as bold as brass and betrayed the army35 to act as mercenaries for the Qing army in the attack. There were several enemies the Dashun army had to face. The army suffered a great loss and the anti-Qing movement was in a difficult and dangerous situation. But Li Zicheng and the majority of generals and soldiers refused to yield. In June 1645, when Li Zicheng and over twenty soldiers climbed the mountain to do pathfinding, they were ambushed by the armed forces of the landlords. Li Zicheng died at only 39 years old. The whole life of Li Zicheng was a heroic record of the oppressed peasants’ fight against feudalism, which wrote a glorious chapter for the history of

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peasant uprisings and peasant wars of our nation. Although Li Zicheng died, the anti-Qing struggle of the Dashun army did not stop. The rebel force turned sorrow into strength, upheld the anti-Qing banner, and fought for an entire twenty years.

The Anti-Qing Struggles of the Peasants in the Northern Provinces under the Influence of the Troops of the Dashun Regime The anti-Qing flame fired up by the Dashun army was initially spread in the northern area. After the entrance of the Qing army into the Shanhaiguan, the Qing rulers claimed much land in Hebei and Beijing and large numbers of people were taken away as slaves. The situation was much more severe in the eastern part of Beijing. Under the influence of the Dashun army, peasants in Sanhe county began to rise in revolt. Next were the peasants in Changping, Haizihongmen of Beijing and Tianjin. They revolted with swords and spears in their hands and nearly besieged Beijing. The coal demanded by the royal court could not be transported from Shanxi to Beijing for two months due to the impedence of the uprisings36. The safety of the capital37 was directly threatened. The armed peasants in Baoding, Zhending and Bazhou of Hebei province cooperated with the Dashun army in tying down the forces of the Qing army which led to a situation where for the first time officials dared not enquire why the taxes could not be collected with the bandit claiming strategically important areas38. In August 1664, when Liu Tichun led a hundred thousand soldiers to attack Daming, Guguan and Jingjing from the area of Zhangde and Cizhou, the local peasants responded vigorously to the battle. Taking advantage of the favorable conditions, the local peasants fought hard with the peasant armies. The peasants in Daming and Neihuang claimed the country of Neihuang. The governers, commanders in chief in Shandong and Henan, united to cope with the peasants whose spark has developed into a conflagration39. The peasants were ready to go into action in their hundreds to seize the city40. In the following year the anti-Qing movements in Xuanhua and Datong were like rising wind and scudding clouds, which made the Qing rulers exclaim that “the peasant soldiers with spade and arrows can be seen everywhere. Women in red dress had broadswords in their hands and showed great courage. Our army had a battle with the enemy from the morning to the afternoon and could not defeat them, but could only withdraw the troops”41. Peasants in Raoyan, Jiaohe, Quyang, Baoding, Dingxing, Nangong, Pingshan and Chengde of Hebei province attacked the county in succession to fight against the domination of the Qing dynasty. Peasants in Huailai county took the opportunity of the uprising

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of Li Zicheng’s army, seized Weizhou in the west, attacked Huailai in the north, occupied Zhaitang and took over Mashuikou; they snatched Bananzhou and defeated the Qing army once and again. The martial spirit was greatly roused42. It could be seen that the anti-Qing struggles in the areas near the capital areas forcefully cracked down on the Qing army and made the Qing rulers remain in a constant state of anxiety. The peasant revolt in Shandong flourished in the late years of the Ming dynasty. In August and September of 1644, after the Dashun army had retreated westward, the banner of Chuangwang (Li Zicheng) still held great appeal in Shandong. The peasant armies in Yan, Qi, Zou and Teng switched to the fight to intercept and hold back the marching of the Qing army to the south. There were more than ten anti-Qing troops of which the biggest was composed of hundreds of thousands of people in villages and towns in the Yan and Qi areas. There were many famous troops such as the Manjiadong peasant army which was composed of several hundred thousand people43. This troop occupied four counties and had thousands of bases which extended two or three hundred li44. The peasant armies established their own camps, conquered territories and even possessed various kinds of weapons. The reign title of Li Zicheng was written on their banner45, which terrified the soldiers of the Qing army who ran away at the sight of it46. There were nearly a dozen of peasant armies in the Zou and Teng areas. The Tengze peasant army was very famous as it united other peasant armies and built the anti-Qing base in the Cang Mountains, Huapan Mountains and Baodugan. The troop fought with the Qing army for as long as eight to nine years. Peasants in the eastern part of Shandong killed the conciliatory officer of the Qing dynasty in Qingzhou in the autumn of 1644 and rose in revolt. Peasants in the Deng, Lai and Qing areas were its support and millions of people assembled which even extended to the East China sea47. Some claimed to be the Shandong military general; some claimed to be the commander in chief, which displayed impressive power and influence. In August 1646, peasants in the eastern part of Shandong captured Gaowan, Changshan, Xincheng and other counties. The Yuyuan peasant army in Caozhou of the western Shandong used to be a strong troop which opposed to the ruling of the Ming dynasty. When the Qing army entered Beijing, the Yuyuan army began to fight the Qing army. After the death of Li Zicheng in 1645, the Yuyuan army carried out a policy of uniting powers from other classes to fight the Qing dynasty. Within only several days the peasant army seized four cities and gathered millions of people48. The anti-Qing center was founded at the junction of Shandong, Hebei and Henan. After the peasant army led by Li Zicheng retreated westward, the twenty

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thousand-strong Dashun army in Henan was anxious to cross the Yellow river and capture Huaiqing49. They continued to fight with the Qing army in Weihui and Huaiqing, promoting and influencing the anti-Qing struggle in Yuanwu and Xinxiang. Shanxi was under the control of the peasant army. In August 1664, the main force of Qing army captured Taiyuan, Pingyan, Fenzhou and Lu’an. In 1645, peasants began to revolt in Yangqu, Lan county, Jiaocheng, Kelan, Meng county, Jingle, Wutai, Shuozhou, Yongning, Pingyan and other areas50, which became a trend throughout the whole province. The place of origin of the peasant uprising was Shaanxi. After the Qing army attacked Xi’an, peasant armies in various parts were suppressed. From 1645 the local Xi’an people and peasants from the nearby villages rose to resist the Qing army. Afterwards, the peasant army in south Shaanxi rose in revolt in the Wulang Mountains and collaborated with other peasant armies to besiege Xi’an for as long as seven months. In conclusion, under the influence of the Dashun army, the peasant struggles against the Qing dynasty in Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Shanxi and Shaanxi only fought separately and were without a unified command and coordination. But the struggle stopped the march to the south of the Qing army while the rule of the Qing dynasty was not stable. It played an important role in forming the first nationwide wave of opposing the Qing dynasty as ir these were the main forces combating the Qing armies. A small number of landlords revolted in Xiong county, Jize of Hebei province, but they did not hold on to the last. The armed forces of the landlords were centered in Runing, Nanyang and Luoyang. They camped there and possessed strong power. The landlord armies were originally formed to resist the peasant armies and fight the peasants to the end. As the Qing army entered Henan, some of these armed forces surrendered to the Qing while some of them fought the Qing. But under the assault and temptation of the Qing army, their stand was gradually shaken.

The Attack by the Qing Troops on Nanjing and the Collapse of the Hongguan Regime of the Southern Ming Dynasty On June 19, 1644 (May 15 in the lunar calendar), with the support of the bureaucrats and the warlords of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yousong, the Fu prince of the Ming dynasty who was the grandson of Shenzong Emperor proclaimed himself emperor in Nanjing with the reign title Hongguang. The establishment of the regime was aimed at taking revenge and suppressing the peasant

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armies51. The imperial edict of Hongguan’s accession accused the peasants of uprising wantonly and called for all the landlords in the nation to help them to wipe out the peasant armies52. The Hongguang royal court possessed great military power. Zuo Liangyu, the chief commander, and his son led twenty to thirty hundred thousand soldiers stationed in Wuhan; commander Liu Zeqing, Gao Jie and Huang Degong possessed thirty to forty hundred thousand troops stationed on the Yangze River and Huai River. Some of the Ming remnants and armed landlords in Hebei, Shandong, Henan and Sichuan which were against the peasant armies joined the troops of the South Ming court. These millions of armed forces directed the spearhead of their attack at the peasant armies. The Hongguang court made a series of military arrangements and came up with the idea that the area north of the Yangtze River bordered on the territory of the peasant armies where conflicts might be prevalent. The area should be divided into four towns with separate jurisdiction 53. Shi Kefa was appointed as the governor of Yangzhou. Gao Jie was appointed to defend Sizhou (Si county in Anhui) and to govern Xuzhou and other fourteen regions. He was responsible for managing persuasion and suppression in Hebei, Henan, Kaifeng and Guide; Liu Zeqing was stationed in Huan’an and administered Huaihai and another eleven regions, managing the same issues in Shandong; Liu Liangzuo was stationed in Linhuai and administered Fenyang and another nine regions, managing the same isuues in the Chen and Qi areas of Henan province; Huang Degong was stationed in Luzhou and administered Chu and another eleven regions, managing the same issues in the Guguang area54. The four towns were established as military posts to protect Nanjing. If the peasant army was in Hebei, the other three towns should cooperate to guard Huaixu; if the peasant army was in Henan, the towns should guard Sifeng; if the peasant army was in both Henan and Hebei, each town should defend itself with armed force55 and prepare for a northern expedition. They attempted to achieve resurgence by eradicating the peasant uprising. The Hongguang court did not view the entrance of the Qing army as the main threat. The Qing rulers claimed to be taking revenge for the people to ease the opposition of the Han bureaucrats and landlords. After they entered and garrisoned Beijing, the main forces were used to suppress the peasant uprising. Towards the South Ming dynasty, the Qing dynasty chose compromise for the time being and to draw big bureaucrats and landlords onto their side so as to make the false appearance of negotiation as it realized the incompetence and love of ease of the South Ming court. At the beginning of July 1644, when the news that the peasant army led by Li Zicheng had been defeated by the collusion between Wu Sangui and the Qing army spread to the Nanjing regime,

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the ruler appointed Wu Sangui who had surrendered to the Qing dynasty as Ji lord protector. The ruler even wanted to transport by sea millions of kilograms of silver to reward him for borrowing the Qing army to defeat the peasant army. In July it was said that Duo Ergun proclaimed that the country should not belong to one person56. The Hongguan regime just made the imperial edict to Hebei and Shandong to declare the existence of the regime. The ruler of the South Ming regime asserted the intent was to settle people’s mind at ease 57 and dared not go into open revolt against the Qing dynasty. In August, the Hongguang regime sent the messenger for peace talks to Beijing. They used a thousand liang of gold, a hundred thousand of silver, ceded territory and offered millions of liang of silver every year as conditions to pledge the Qing army not to march southward, and suggested taking cooperative action to attack the peasant army58. The Hongguang regime was the product of conflict among the big warlords, bureaucrats and landlord class of the Ming dynasy. The existence of the regime was based on several opposing military blocs. The Zuo Liangyu bloc which suppressed the peasant uprisings settled in Wuhan and the middle reach area of the Changjiang River; Gao, Huang, Liu of the four towns north of the Yangtze River were stationed in the Jianghuai area. Each warlord had its territory and army. They snatched land from each other and preyed upon the people. For example, in the four towns north of the Yangtze River, all the soldiers and citizens had to obey the orders of the government. Thirty thousand soldiers should be drafted from each town; twenty hundred thousand kilogram of rice handed over; and four hundred thousand liang of silver turned in. The quantity of the goods turned in was decided by each region59. The soldiers and civilians were usually in conflict with each other as civilians regarded soldiers as thieves and soldiers viewed civilians as rebels60. There were irreconcilable contradictions between each military blocs, such as the contradictions between Zuo Liangyu and the four towns and the inner contradictions among the four towns. Even in the South Ming regime, there was the Maruan (short for Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng) clique attached to the four towns and the Donglin party attaching to Zuo Liangyu. They contended for power and profit, assaulted each other and were as incompatible as fire and water. Both cliques proposed to stamp out the peasant armies with all their strength but put their hopes in compromise with the Qing dynasty. Only when the messenger was sent back, the peace talks broke down and the southward march of the Qing army threatened the safety of the South regime did Shi Kefa and other officials begin to realize that if peace could not achieved, warfare would be the only way61. Emperor Hongguang who was under the wings of the big warlords and bureaucrats was an extremely

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fatuous and corrupt puppet. He built the Ning palace and Cixi temple which demanded a lot of funds and labor 62. He indulged in debauchery and took playing drama, drinking spirits and having sex with little girls as his pleasure63. He lived a dissolute and shameless life. This reactionary of the feudal small regime used the degraded life philosophy of eat, drink and be merry as his motto, which explained why he could not undertake the anti-Qing struggle. At the beginning of 1645 the Qing army occupied Tongguan and Xi’an, which forced the Dashun army to retreat to the south. The remnant forces of the Ming dynasty surrendered one after another which increased the strength of the Qing army. The next move of the Qing rulers was to destroy the Hongguang regime and to seize control over the whole nation and to order the Yu prince who was in Xi’an to lead his army to march eastward. On April 3, Duoduo and his army passed the Hulao and divided the forces into three sections to march forward from Longmen Pass and Nanyang. They occupied Guide on the 18th. Then the army took separate routes to march eastward without encountering any resistance64. The army captured Xuzhou, a strategically important post, on May 4th. The commander on guard ran away upon learning the arrival of the Qing army and the Hongguang regime was faced with a moribund and precarious situation. The South Ming regime was so corrupt that the leaders of the four towns north of the Yangtze river were busy grabbing land and fighting with each other when the Huai, Xu and Jiangbei areas were nearly lost. Gao Jie who possess the largest armed forces was killed by Xu Dingguo who had already surrendered to the Qing dynasty. After learning about the death of Gao, other warlords stormed to his territory to divide up his army 65. Ma Shiying dominated court politics and suppressed the remnants of the Donglin party. Zuo Yuliang, the Ningnan marquis who camped in Wuhan gave protection to the remnants of the Donglin party and led millions of soldiers to march eastward to Jiujiang. With ridding the emperor of evil ministers as the excuse, Zuo started a battle with Ma Shiying in the struggle for power. On May 8th, Zuo’s army reached Anqing. The following day the Qing army crossed the Huai River through Sizhou. The two generals of the four towns were frightened and held back. They used the excuse that they should go back to their positions to avoid action and went to the south 66. Although Shi Kefa spared no effort in planning the defense, the generals in Jiangbei were all timid and domineering and did not take orders. As a governor, he had no one to govern but had to retreat to Yangzhou. On the 13th the Qing army reached the city gates and besieged the city. On the 14th Emperor Hongguang called in all the officials. Some officials proposed that Huaiyang was in danger and the armies should be reinforced there, and protested against

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the way that Ma Shiying withdrew the defending army to retaliate against Zuo Liangyu. However Ma claimed that he would rather all the officials and the emperor were killed by the Qing army rather than killed by Zuo Liangyu67. He shouted that anyone who dared to talk about guarding the Huai area would be sentenced to death68. Even the emperor dared not utter a word. Shi Kefa’s report was ignored 69. The clique fighting became fiercer and the issue of the Qing army ignored70. They viewed the sectarian strife as the most important. It can be seen that the corrupt and disintegrated Hongguang regime would collapse at the first encounter. On April 20, the isolated city of Yangzhou with few armed forces and no reinforcement could not resist the violent artillery attacks of the Qing army and eventually fell. Shi Kefa was captured. Although Duoduo tried to persuade him to surrender, Shi replied heroically that his life was tied to the city. He would rather die than betray his heart71. He was then killed by the Qing army. His subordinate Liu Zhaoji led the rest of the army and the citizens in continuing to fight with the Qing army until they were out of arrows and people died. The Qing army hated the people’s revolt and conducted a massacre after it entered the city, turning a prosperous and lively city into a wasteland72. After the Qing army looted Yangzhou, they took the opportunity to cross the Yangtze River and captured Zhenjing, the gateway to Nanjing. In the dead of night the drunken Emperor Hongguang fled from Nanjing to Wuhu with the protection of Huang Degong, the chief general. The South court became a scene of turmoil. Some of the officials fled like scattered birds and wild animals; some prepared to pay tribute and to surrender to the Qing army with maps and other document. The basic power of the armed forces in the South Ming regime,such as the remnants of the forces of Zuo Menyin, the son of Zuo Liangyu who was killed and of Liu Zuoliang and Gao Jie who had also been killed all went and sought refuge with the Qing dynasty. Even the twenty-three hundred thousand troops which guarded Nanjing laid down their arms in no time 73. The Qing army met no obstacles and entered the city of Nanjing on June 8th (May 15th of the Shunzhi year), which marked the collapse of the South Ming regime. Liu Zuoliang who had surrendered to the Qing army caught Emperor Hongguang and sent him under escort to Nanjing. People spit and cursed him at him along the street and some even threw rubble at him 74. The corrupt regime which did not last for a year could not resist the attack of the Qing army or the antiQing struggle of the people in the regions south of the Yangtze River. However the had regime oppressed and exploited the people to the utmost and caused much suffering. At the end of June, the Qing army seized Suzhou by way of Changzhou and Wuxi. They fought all the way to Hangzhou on July 4th. The Lu prince who had hiden himself in Hangzhou opened the city gate to welcome the

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Qing army and surrendered. After that, the Rui prince and other imperial clan members in Shaoxing surrendered one after another. When Duoduo entered the city of Nanjing, despite heavy rain, a large number of bureaucrats of the South Ming dynasty knelt down along the road to surrender. The civil and military officials scrambled to pay their tribute to the Qing dynasty. There were dozens of heaps of tribute articles 75. The Qing rulers appointed 373 officials below the position of Jiangning and Anqing grand coordinator as the foundation for their rule south of the Yangtze River. Nanjing was renamed the Jiangning office and massive forces of the Manchu eight banners were sent to guard the office. The Qing army moved forward to the south with Nanjing as the center to eradicate the anti-Qing forces and the remnant of the Ming dynasty.

Movement of the Qing Troops to the South and the Collapse of Several Regimes of the Southern Ming Dynasty Within a year of the entrance of the Qing armies to the Shanhaiguan they had defeated the peasant insurrectionary army led by Li Zicheng, destroyed the Hongguang regime of the South Ming and swept across half the land of China. But this was just the beginning of the seizure of national political power and there was still a way to go in future struggles. The highly organized Qing dynasty which possessed relatively stable leadership and strong fighting capacity was a new rising force. Therefore the military actions of the Qing dynasty were incomparably swift and fierce, which contributed to its dazzling success in such a short period of time. However the bloody suppression of the peasant army, the savage killing and plunder, the series of coercion policies due to the misunderstandings between nationalities and the gap between the social systems set the Manchu aristocrats and Han peasants into serous conflict. There were also major contradictions between the Manchu aristocrats and the Han landlord class. The national conflicts, especially those between the Manchu and Han, increased dramatically. With the Qing army marching to the south, a strong feeling of protection of national rights and national culture surged up among the massive number of Han people. This national feeling not only cultivated many anti-Qing armed forces but also revived the endangered remnants of the Ming dynasty, which was the serious handicap to Qing dynasty’s seizing the right to rule China. Although the armed forces of the Qing dynasty were courageous and skillful in battle, it was not possible to seize national sovereignty solely based on military force. Only by making great efforts in politics, diminishing the killing and plunder, changing some coercion policies

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and easing the national conflicts could the anti-Qing powers be impaired and national control be obtained. When the Qing army attacked the Hongguang regime, the remnants of Li Zicheng’s peasant army had retreated to Hunan. It was a period of adjustment and rest time for the peasant army. They had just lost the battle and their leader. Having suffered a great loss, they rested and reorganized the army and watched the fight between the Qing dynasty and the South Ming regime and planned for their next move. The peasant army led by Zhang Xianzhong was fighting hard with the landlords in Sichu. It had been a decade since the peasants started fighting with the landlords and the accumulated hatred could not be dissolved. Even when the situation had changed and their cooperation was the key to the prospect for the anti-Qing struggles. Due to its decadence and internal dissent, the Hongguang regime was doomed to die out rapidly. The Qing army pointed the spearhead of its attack at Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian and the southeast of Guangdong. With the scope of the Qing army’s ravages increasing national conflicts continued to sharpen and the two sides were not aware that the strategic goal and targets of attack should be changed accordingly. Only when the Qing army had further advanced did peasants and landlords come to realize that they had a common enemy. They were forced to cooperate to a certain extent. However whether the two sides could cooperate was the problem. There were voluntary revolts against the tyrannies of the Qing armies from the lower peasants and citizens and against the narrow-minded planning of the Han bureaucrats to restore the rule of the Ming dynasty. Some defended their cities loyally and fought bravely with the enemy; some fled to live in remote mountainous areas to ensure their own safety; and some held fast on the sea islands and adhered to the chosen course. When the Hongguang regime collapsed, the anti-Qing movement was in its heyday and people were actively engaged in the national conflicts. The Han landlords and intellectuals participated in the anti-Qing movement, and motivated, organized and led many battles. With the banner of restoring the Ming dynasty, they advocated the supreme honor of the emperor and the national border. With disheveled hair and bare feet, they went around campaigning for the cause to boost the national sentiments. With doubt there was real class interests behind the high-sounding and spirit-lifting catchwords. In the national war, except for those who surrendered, the interests of many landlords were damaged. Their families broke up, their homes were destroyed, they were deprived of their property and rights, and their lives were threatened. Their call for the restoration of the Ming dynasty was aimed at reestablishing the governance of the Han landlord class.

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Although the Han bureaucrats and landlords started from their own interests, we should not view the battle between them and the Qing armies as a fight within the landlord class. The Qing army started a savage and predatory war, which did great damage to China’s economy and culture with the lower class people suffering the most. The domestic national conflict was a right or wrong question. The masses had every reason to oppose oppression and plunder. It was because of the anti-oppression wave among the lower class people that heroic and indomitable figures such as Shi Kefa, Qian Sule, Zhang Mingzhen, Zhang Huangyan, Huang Daozhou, He Tengjiao, Chu Yinxi, Qu Shisi and Zheng Chenggong appeared in our history. Of course, driven by the motive of their own class, the landlords participated in the anti-Qing fight, but evaluation of historical figures and political slogans should not only be based on motive and the surface meaning. The effects of the behavior of a historical figure may exceed narrow motive and the same political slogan might have entirely different meanings in terms of different classes and at different period of time. Naturally, there were differences and conflicts between the peasant anti-Qing armed forces and the landlord anti-Qing armed forces. But both of them were on the same battlefront and both were the constituent parts of the anti-Qing movement. We should make a positive historical evaluation of those who took a firm stand in the anti-Qing movement. In July 1645 with the support of Qian Sule, who was the alliance leader, landlord and official of the Ming dynasty, the grandson of the tenth generation of Emperor Taizu of the Ming prince Lu established political power in Shaoxing. The regime of Prince Lu controlled Shaoxing, Ningbo, Wenzhou and Taizhou in the east of Zhejiang and possessed the Zhezhong division and the armies led by Fang Guo’an and Wang Zhiren. With the support of the local people, taking advantage of the difficult territory of the Qiantang River, they fought with and defeated the Qing army. A foreign minister who lived nearby at that time said that if they continued and crossed the Yangtze River, the cities and towns might be recovered. However they did not build on their success and were content with…setting defense lines to confront the Qing army, which blocked the expeditionary army for a whole year 76. It was the political decadency that prevented the regime of Prince Lu from actively fighting against the Qing army. At that time, warlords were imperious and the relatives of the empress and eunuches grabbed all the power. They took control of the limited provisions and financial resources based on extorting excessive taxes and levies while the real anti-Qing soldiers and righteous army could not acquire fundamental subsistence. As Qian Sule said, the fruits of the labor obtained with the sweat and blood of the people cannot satisfy the smallest greed of the warlords,

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while the combination of the armed forces of the warlords cannot provide the slightest safety to the people77. Since the Prince Lu’s regime was fighting against the Longwu regime in Fujina for the inheritance of the imperial authority, the internal and external contradictions prevented it from resisting the Qing army. In July, 1646, because of drought, the Qiantang River was shallow. The Qing army crossed the river and captured Shaoxing. The army of Fang Guo’an, the chief general, fled at the mere sight of the oncoming force and collapsed in disorder. Fang Guo’an and other officials surrendered to the Qing dynasty and Prince Lu fled for his life. The regime which had not existed for a year collapsed. When Prince Lu was governing the country, with the support of the Fujian warlord Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Hongkui and Huang Daozhou, the officials of the Ming dynasty, the grandson of the ninth generation of Emperor Taizu of Ming, Tan Wanlujian, proclaimed himself emperor in Fujian. The title of the reign was Longwu. At the start of the establishment of the regime, arrangements were made about the anti-Qing cause which seemed to be major ideas. The regime regarded Jianning, Tianxing, Yanping and Xinghua as the upper reaches; Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, Shaowu, Tingzhou as the lower reaches. Grand coordinators were appointed in each region. Soldiers were sent to guard over a hundred and seventy regions beyond the Xianxia Mountain in the north of Fujian. A hundred thousand soldiers were sent to guard the towns while anther hundred thousand were sent to suppress the enemies. However, the military and political power of the Longwu regime lay completely in the hands of Zheng Zhilong, the Fujian warlord. Zheng Zhilong alternative name was Zheng Yiguan. He was born in Nan’an county of Quanzhou, Fujian. Zheng used to be a pirate leader and was offered an amnesty by the Ming dynasty. He had been the governor and a military officer possessing twenty to thirty hundred thousand armed forces and controlling the marine trade. Merchant ships coming and going from and to Japan and Southeast Asia had to obtain his permission and pay taxes to him. He was the formidable regional power of Fujian. The reason why he supported the Longwu regime was that he wanted to take this opportunity to gain some political say and to expand his political power which could facilitate his exploiting of the people. At the time when the righteous armies nationwide were engaged in brave and tenacious fights against the Qing army, Zheng Zhilong did not make any move although possessing elite soldiers, superior weapons and abundant provisions. The Longwu regime attempted and accomplished nothing, despite having advisers such as Huang Daozhou and Zhang Jiayu who were determined to revive the Ming dynasty. When the Qing

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army was approaching directly to Zhejiang and Fujian, Zheng Zhilong thought that the Longwu regime could do him no good. In order to maintain his power in Fujian and his tremendous property, he surrendered to the Qing dynasty in the dark. In June, 1646, after defeating Prince Lu’s regime, the Qing army marched on to the south. The Xianxia Mountains were the natural defense between Fujian and Zhejiang, but Zheng Zhilong withdrew all his forces. The Qing army marched straight through the mountainous area encountering no defense and entered Fuzhou. The civil and military officials of the Longwu regime either fled or surrendered. None put up a fight. Zheng Zhilong shaved his hair and surrendered, and was sent to Beijing. A foreign missionary who witnessed the collapse of the regime wrote that Emperor Longwu acted as if he was a cowardly sheep and fled with his mighty army. The word mighty here referred to the large number of the callous people. But his escape could not save his life. When the swift Qing army caught up with him, they shot these stupid sheep with arrows78. In December 1646 with the support of Su Guansheng, the bureaucrat of the Ming dynasty, Lu, the little brother of Longwu proclaimed himself emperor in Guangzhou. The title of the reign was Shaowu. This regime never fought against the Qing army. Instead the Shaowu regime and the Yongli regime fought each other for the throne. In January 1647 the Qing army captured Guangzhou. It marked the end of the Shaowu regime which had existed for only forty days. The Yongli regime established in Zhaoqing in December 1646 was the last regime of the South Ming dynasty. The name of Emperor Yongli was Youlang, and he was the grandson of Emperor Shenzong. After the death of Longwu, with the support of Ding Kuichu and Qu shisi who were the officials of Guangdong and Guangxi of the Ming dynasty, Emperor Yongli firstly administered the country and then proclaimed himself emperor in Zhaoqing. Shortly after the establishment of the Yongli regime, the emperor drifted from place to place homeless and miserable. In 1647, when the Qing army entered Guangzhou, Emperor Yongli fled form Zhaoqing to Wuzhou. When Wuzhou was endangered by attack, he fled to Guilin. The bureaucrats who had supported him either surrendered to the Qing dynasty or abandoned the position to escape. After that Emperor Yongli fled from Guilin to Quanzhou, then to Liuzhou and then back to Guilin. He actually ran away on hearing the warning. Yongli was timid, indecisive, fatuous, content with temporary ease and afraid of death. The regime which was full of contradictions and did nothing was politically corrupt with the decision power lying in the hand of the eunuchs. It was only with the support of He Tengjiao, Qu Shisi, Chu Yinxi

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and Zheng Chenggong who steadfastly fought against the Qing dynasty and especially due to the support of the Dashun peasant army and the Daxi peasant army that the regime survived for as long as fifteen to sixteen years.

The Anti-Qing Struggles Launched by the People South of the Yangtze River and in the Southeast Coastal Areas The Qing army achieved a series of successes in the south of the Yangtze River and in the southeast coastal areas. It defeated several regimes of the south Ming dynasty in succession. It swept away all obstacles and gave full play to its function as a war machine which exhibited military power and swiftness. However, after having seized a city, the army burned, killed and pillaged, and plundered properties and treasures for the enjoyment of the Manchu aristocrats. The southeast area which used to be bustling and prosperous was in ruins and presented a desolate scene, which seriously damaged the production and made people suffered more. The greater the oppression, the greater the revolts. People in the south of the Yangtze River and the southeast coastal areas rose to resist the harassment and intrusion of the Qing army. Anti-Qing struggles surged. In the area south of the Yangtze River, there were peasant revolutionary organizations which had fought against the oppression of the landlord class even before the Qing army marched southward. Examples are the Xuebi gang led by Panmao and the Quliang gang led by Panzhen in Liyao. After the Qing army marched to the south, these peasant organizations united the poor farmers to fight against the Qing army. In the area of Liyan alone, the peasant power developed into sixteen sections79. The peasant army in Xuzhou once occupied the west part of Xuzhou and stopped the march of the Qing army80. When the Qing army was attacking Nanjing, the decadent officials and armies of the South Ming regime collapsed. In contrast, the peasants in the rural areas near Nanjing, such as in Jinniu, Liutang, Niecun, Taocun, Dengcun and Longdu rose to fight bravely with the Qing army in the name of troop training81. With the spreading of the anti-Qing movement, in August and September of 1646, twenty hundred peasant armies from Liyan, Jintan and Xinghua cooperated with the Ming imperial clan to attack Nanjing. Due to the fact that the military strategy was revealed, the support inside the city was suppressed by the Qing army and the attack did not succeed. Even so, the anti-Qing peasant force developed by leaps and bounds. Their courage in attacking such a big city like Nanjing was beyond the wildest expectation of the Qing rulers. The peasant armies launched several other attacks on Nanjing afterwards, which filled the Qing rulers with anxiety.

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The anti-Qing struggles spread to the Taihu area. Under the leadership of Zhang San, the mass of poor farmers and fishermen using Dianshan, Changbaidang and Chenghu as their base organized an insurrection against the Qing dynasty. The anti-Qing armies composed of farmers and fishermen had a clear class stand and distributed the landlords’ food and properties to the poor people. They kidnapped the children of the rich families, hid them in the mountainous areas, and asked for thousands of liang as ransom. They then used the ransom for soldiers’ pay and provisions. With the poor people in the rural areas, fair trade was conducted and many people returned home82. They won warm support from the Taihu people. The uprisings of the farmers and fishermen in the area of Suzhou and Songjiang threatened the rule of the Qing dynasty and encouraged the struggles of people of all strata of life. In July 1645 the Taihu peasant army participated in the anti-Qing revolt started by Wu Risheng. All the soldiers wore headcloths which earned them the name White Head Army. Farmers and fishermen were the main force of the White Head Army. They overran Wujiang and fought actively in the Taihu area. They took the initiative in attacking the Qing army which held back some Qing forces. The White Head Army attacked Haiyan, Zhejiang and Jiashan and gained considerable fame in the south of the Yangtze River. However due to the complexity of its inner structure, after June 1646 the army was defeated several times by the Qing army and Wu Risheng was killed. Under the leadership of Zhang San, the farmers and fishermen of Taihu continued to fight tenaciously and dauntlessly. They captured Yixing and fought in Suzhou and Changzhou. The Qing army was defeated by them time after time, which meant the Qing army dared not battle with them directly, for the lakes and roads there were strategically located and nobody could predict what was in front of them83. The White Head Army became the banner of the antiQing movement in the area south of the Yangtze River. In Anhui and the area north of the Yangtze River, the anti-Qing struggles were based in the mountainous area of Yinghuo. There were twenty-four sections in the central part and forty-eight sections in the outside part84, which were warmly supported. Among these anti-Qing armies there were peasant armies and landlords’ armed forces established by the imperial clan of the Ming dynasty with support from the local gentry. Sometimes they fought by themselves and sometimes they cooperated. Their influence spread to Liu’an, Yingshan, Huoshan, Shucheng, Qianshan, Taihu of Anhui province, Guoshi of Henan province and Luotian of Huguang province. The Chizhou Office in the south of Anhui belonged to the Dongliu and Jiande peasant army, who allied with the peasant armies of Pengze, Boyan, and Duchang of Jiangxi province

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to establish an anti-Qing base in the mountainous area of Jiande. Under the leadership of the monk Liaowu and the Black Pioneer, the army developed into millions of people and they fought vigorously in Pengdu85. They marched west as far as Raozhou, Boyao and Yongfeng in Jiangxi. The uprisings of the peasant armies displayed an impressive power and influence. They collaborated with each other and united as a whole, which threatened the rule of the Qing dynasty in the south Yangtze River area. The thousand miles of Anhui and Jiangxi witnessed these uprisings, which brought anxiety and worry to the Qing rulers86. After the Qing army took control of the south Yangtze River by military force, in order to achieve further governance of people nationwide, the Qing government adopted some strategies aimed at eliminating the vestiges of influence of the Ming dynasty from the aspects of social structure to custom and culture. In August 1645, orders were given by the Qing government that hair should be shaved, pigtails worn and the clothes of the Ming dynasty not used. The Qing dynasty forced people to recognize the Qing’s national control over the country both through their dress and mentality. This was aimed at establishing the master and man relationship between the Manchu aristocrats and the people of Han and other nationalities 87. The ruler of the Qing dynasty stipulated that within ten days of the issue of the order, people everywhere should shave their hair. Anyone who refused to do so or hesitated and petitioned for preserving the system of the Ming dynasty should be sentenced to death88 The order given to counties and cities were that a person could either keep his hair or his head89. Meanwhile the Qing government sent soldiers to patrol the streets and forced people to shave. Should there be any resistance, a death sentence would be executed. The savage acts of the Qing armies in the south Yangtze River area and the series of coercion policies had already aroused the ire of the people. The issue of the shaving of hair order doubtlessly added insult to injury. The anti-Qing struggles spread like blazing fire in every social class. Apart from a fraction of the Han bureaucrats and landlords who had surrendered to the Qing dynasty, people including fishermen, cooks, urban residents, merchants, artisans and many landlords and intellectuals all sprung into action. They organized antiQing armies in various forms and claimed that they would rather die than shave their hair 90 in order to conduct large scale struggle against the hairshaving. This was a constituent part of the anti-Qing movement. In cities such as Changzhou, Wuxi, Yixing, Jiangyin, Changshu, Songjiang, Kunshan, Huating, Wujiang, Chongming, Jinshanwei in Jiangsu province; Jiaxing, Pinghu, Jiashan,

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Huzhou and Shaoxing in Zhejiang province, peasants rose in revolt. Especially in Songjiang, Souzhou and other cities, the Wulong gang mainly composed of servants stood at the battle front of the anti-shaving struggle91. The anti-shaving movement was most violent in Jiangyin, which was a big city in the area south of the Yangtze River. Jiangyin was an important and prosperous city with three rivers and five lakes. It was the gateway city from Suzhou, Songjiang, Zhejiang and Fujian to Nanjing. People there rose in revolt in August 1645. The Huangtian port north to the city was the most important port in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River, which was related to the strategic posts for the Qing army’s marching south. It took one day and one night to reach Haikou by sailing boat 92. After the Jiangyin people occupied the city, Yan Yingyuan who was a lower-level official and the previous historical graghper was appointed as commander. Yan reorganized the army and deployed protection to fight against the Qing army. The Qing rulers deployed a total of 240 thousand soldiers. They fought with each other and peasants from near and far bravely participated in the battle. Peasants from fifty or sixty li out of the city went to fight in the city by day and abandoned their farm work. They never regretted this even if they had to die. The peasant armies were disorganized and were not clear about when to attack and when to retreat. However when they fought with the Qing army they spared no effort and mostly made some achievements. Even if they did not achieve victory, they never surrendered to the Qing army, which worried the Qing dynasty considerablyt 93. With the support of 200 thousand peasants, Jiangyin people defended the city for eighteen days. Due to the imbalance of power and the running out of provisions, the defenders fought street battles with the Qing army valiantly and all died heroic deaths 94. The Qing rulers ordered all the residents of a conquered city killed and they would not stop until all the people were dead95. Seventy Qing army soldiers died. They occupied Jiangyin but the anti-Qing movement of local people and the nearby areas did not stop. The city of Jiading which was two hundred li to the southeast of Jiangyin also witnessed a large scale revolt against the hair shaving. Under the leadership of Huang Chunyao and Hou Tongzeng, with weak military power, Jiading people firmly guarded the city, fearless of confronting the Qing army. They met three attacks by the Qing army in succession. Apart from that, the armies led by Chen Zilong and Xia Yunyi revolted in Songjiang. They allied with the anti-Qing armies in Taihu to attack Suzhou but did not succeed. Afterwards, Chen Zilong tried to persuade Wu Shengzhao who had surrendered to the Qing dynasty to come over from the wrong side but failed. Wang Zuocai, Gu Yanwu, Gui Zhuang and Wu Qihang led the uprisings in Kunshan and supported the fighting against

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the formidable enemy. Having been defeated, Kunshan was conquered and residents were killed. Lu Xianggun rose in revolt in Maoshan and planned to capture Nanjing. Due to a leak of the information, they had to retreat to the Taihu area. Shen Tingyan and Jing Benche led their armies to withdraw to Chongming Island, but were soon defeated by the Qing army. Jin Sheng, Jiang Tianyi and Wu Yingqi revolted in Huizhou and established an anti-Qing base in the mountainous areas of south Anhui. They allied with other peasant armies to fight violently with the enemy. In the end, betrayed by spies, the revolt was suppressed by the Qing armies. There were many moving stories and heroic figures in these battles. They gave no regard to their own interests and would rather die than surrender to the Qing dynasty96. The Qing rulers hated these revolts by the people and ruined the cities by burning them and killing all the residents. The anti-shaving battle was a form of the fight against the coercion policies of the Manchu aristocrats. It was the battle of the Han people to protect their own national customs which signified that the masses did not recognize the sovereignty of Qing dynasty. The anti-shaving fight had wide mass foundations. However, with the banner of rejuvenating the Ming dynasty, its leadership lay in the hands of the landlords and bureaucrats. By taking advantage of the national sentiments and traditional concepts, some imperial clan members and past officials of the Ming dynasty attempted to lead the battles with the aim of restoring the rule of the Ming dynasty. After the Qing army had occupied the south of the Yangtze River and marched to Zhejiang, the anti-Qing fights of the local people in Zhejiang developed rapidly. Peasants in Haining and Pinghu fought against the occupation of the Qing army with armed forces. There were peasanr armies in the area of Quzhou, Yanzhou and Chuzhou and they held the neighboring cities 97. There were twenty thousand peasant armies in Taishun and they occupied Funing, Shouning, Fu’an and other cities. They besieged the city of Taishun and expelled the Qing army. The Qing soldiers scurried off like frightened rats and the chop of the county magistrate was lost98. It was well-known and influential that the anti-Qing armies of the Siming Mountains, Zhejiang and Zhoushan Island stalemated the Qing army. In July 1645, the anti-Qing battles in Jiangxi were numerous following the march of troops to Jiangxi led by the south Ming general. Ever since the first peasant uprising in south Jiangxi province, there had been more than ten revolts in places 99, such as Ruijin, Shicheng, Xingguo, Longnan, Shangyou, Jiujiang and Nanchang100. These troops responded to and cooperated with the troops in Fujian and Guangdong. The Nan’an and Ganzhou offices were in remote south

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China 101 where the anti-Qing fights were the most fierce. The land here was barren and people were poor for they were oppressed by the landlords. Miners who mined in the mountains and refugees from Fujian, Sichuan, Hunan and Guangzhou gathered here to reclaim the wasteland and lived in sheds. They were called shed people. These people were the lowest class in society with a tradition of fighting to resist oppression and exploitation. After the Qing army’s occupation of Jiangxi, the peasants shouldered the responsibility to fight against the Qing army and organized various kinds of armed forces to revolt. Among the revolts the famous ones were the peasant army based in Yugu, Lianhua and Dingtian of the Ganzhou mountainous area; the shed people of Yuanzhou and Yichun who captured Yuanzhou and Waizai; the fifty thousand-strong peasant army in Xingguo which occupied Xingguo city and their influence spread to Yongfeng, Wan’an, Taihe, and Yudu. Moreover the Red Head army in Guiyan captured Wugang and Baoqing; the peasant army in Yudu entered Guangdong from Yudu; the peasant army in Yongfeng stocked provisions in the Jiuxian mountains and determined to fight the Qing army to the death. All these anti-Qing troops either took advantage of a natural barrier to put up at strong defence or launched an attack proactively, which stopped the Qing army from occupying Jiangxi and establishing stable control. The Qing rulers viewed them as a mortal malady but were at a loss what to do 102. With the support of the people, Wan Yuanji and Yang Tinglin, officials of the South Ming regime defended Ganzhou and fought the Qing army for as long as two years. The Qing army’s attack on Fujian and its plundering provoked Fujian people to resist the oppression. The anti-Qing revolts covered Fuzhou, Xinghua, Jianning, Yanping, Tingzhou, Shaowu, Quanzhou and Zhangzhou. The uprisings of the peasant armies in Zhangzhou, Quanzhou and Tingzhou were the earliest and were warmly welcomed by the people. Even the Qing rulers exclaimed that there were peasant armies all over Fujian province103. All in all, the continual anti-Qing struggles south of the Yangtze River and in Southeast China and other places were the greatest barriers to effective rule by the Qing dynasty over the whole nation. Therefore the Qing rulers focused the main military force on eliminating the peasant armies. Since the anti-Qing struggles were scattered, even within one one province and within one city, they could only fight for themselves. They failed to form a united and powerful political and military force and were defeated by the Qing army. However these anti-Qing movements were a blow to the arrogance of the Qing forces and held a large number of Qing troops at bay which provided favorable conditions for their fighting against the Qing army. By doing so they supported the Dashun and Daxi armies which were fighting in Hunan and Sichuan and provided

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temporary peace to the endangered Yongli regime. The morale of the Qing army was damaged and the whole anti-Qing situation began to change. The anti-Qing armed forces with the Dashun army and Daxi army as the mainstay brought the Qing forces to a stalemate for a very long period of time.

The Anti-Qing Struggles of the Peasant Army of the Daxi Regime Led by Zhang Xianzhong The last climax of the anti-Qing movement was the struggles of the Daxi peasant army led by Zhang Xianzhong. At the beginning of 1644, the peasant army led by Zhang Xianzhong rose in revolt and entered Sichuan from Hunan by marching westward. They proclaimed that they would seize Sichuan province and use it as a base, and dispatch troops to liberate the whole nation104, determined to carry the peasant movement to the end. The peasant army occupied Chengdu in September. The army branched into sections to attack Chongqing, Xinjin, Pengxian, Shifang, Mianzhou, Renshou and other cities. In November they captured Pujiang. In December, Zhang Xianzhong declared himself the emperor in Sichuan and established the peasant regime with the reign title Daxi. Chengdu was renamed Xijing and was chosen as the capital. The Daxi peasant regime appointed officials of the east court, five offices and six departments105. A new chronology was set and the coin Dashun Tongbao was cast. The regime recruited skilled personnel through the civil service examination system 106. Troops were sent to guard the places which they had occupied107 and were divided into a hundred and twenty barracks. Sun Kewang was appointed as the Pingdong general to take charge of the nineteenth barrack; Li Dingguo was appointed as the Anxi general to supervise the sixteenth barrack; Liu Wenxiu was appointed as the Funan general to take charge of the fifteenth barrack; Ai Nengqi was appointed as the Dingbei general to supervise the twentieth barrack108. The four generals above controlled the main military forces of the Daxin peasant forces. In 1645 the Qing rulers sent officials to persuade Zhang Xianzhong to surrender. They assumed that the Daxi army would lay down its arms and submit to the Qing dynasty. In November, Emperor Shunzhi proclaimed that what Zhang Xianzhong’s army had done took place in the Ming dynasty and we should let begones by begones. Provided Zhang Zizhong and his army surrendered, he would be appointed an official and his children would enjoy honor and wealth. If the peasant army adopted a wait and see attitude and did not surrender, they should not be surprised when the Qing army approached109.

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However, neither the social position nor the killing could sway the mind of the peasant class represented by Zhang Zizhong. The Daxi peasant army bravely shouldered the arduous task of the anti-Qing movement. At the beginning of 1646 the Qing rulers sent Haoge, the Suqin prince, and Wu Sangui to march southward to Hanzhong. They prepared to attack Sichuan and do all they could to defeat the Daxi army. There were many remnant armed forces stationed in Sichuan, such as Zeng Ying, the general in chief stationed with two hundred thousand troops in Chongqing; Yang Zhan who led several hundred thousand people stationed in Jiading; Zhu Hualong camped in Maozhou with his troops; Cao Xun occupying the area of the Dadu River; Zhao Ronggui stationed in Laigui; Ma Qian, the grand coordinator of the Ming dynasty led thirty thousand armies and guarded Neijiang; Fan Yiheng, the governor-general, and his lieutenant Hou Tianci defended Luzhou; Tu Long, the deputy general garrisoned in Naxi etc. They fought with the peasant army violently. From 1644 to March and April of 1646 there were also thirty-nine armed forces of landlords scattered in every part of Sichuan. By taking advantage of the strategically located valleys, they occupied towns and villages to destroy the new-born peasant regime. The landlord armed forces fought violently with the peasant army. The reactionary power in north Sichuan used horse dung to smear the reign title of Dashun and rewrote it as Hongguang. They killed and drowned or burned the officials of the regime110. Some were killed two or three days after assuming office, in one city more than ten county magistrates were killed within three to tens months111. The bureaucrats and landlords of Sichuan retaliated fiercely to the Daxi peasant army, which threatened the existence of the Daxi regime. In order to protect the fruits of victory, the peasant army led by Zhang Zizhong fought back against the landlords and bureaucrats. In the summer of 1646, after studying the national situation, Zhang Xianzhong decided to lead the army north to Shaanxi to attack the rear of the enemy when the main force of the Qing army marched south to the south of the Yangtze River and the southeast coastal areas. This was the beginning of a new battle by the peasant army against the rule of the Qing dynasty. Before leaving, Zhang expressed his determination to die and appointed Sun Dingwang, Li Dingguo and another four generals to form a preliminary leading bloc to prepare for any contingency. In October Zhang Xianzhong abandoned Chengdu and ordered each of the four generals to lead over a hundred thousand troops to march northward. There were five to six hundred thousand troops, which displayed enormous power and influence. They were warmly welcomed by the masses. In December the army arrived at Fenghuang Mountain in Xichong. On January 2, 1647

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(November 27, the third year of Shunzhi) there was a sudden attack by the Qing army in collusion with traitors. The Daxi army was unprepared to fight and was unsure who the enemies were. Unfortunately Zhang was shot and died. After the death of Zhang Xianzhong, Hao Ge, the Su prince, order four troops in pursuit. Without a commander in chief, most of the army was in disorder. The new leading bloc of the Daxi army made the prompt decision that the route of the army should be changed to move southward through Shunqing. They covered hundreds of li in a day and night, thus preserving part of the effective strength of the army and achieved the success of the Quhe battle, which cleared the way for the march. With formidable courage, the Daxi army fought their way across the Yangtze River and shot Zeng Ying, the general in chief, to death. They destroyed two hundred thousand of the remnant armies of the Ming dynasty and captured Chongqing. They followed up the victory with hot pursuit and seized Qijiang, which provided them the opportunity for reorganization. The new leading bloc of the Daxi army released a famous statement in Qijiang. It pointed out that Zhang Xianzhong had fought for over two decades and the occupation of the west part of the country was due to the efforts and collaboration of all the soldiers. He had intended to capture the land of Zhao, Yan and Qing to establish a new regime for the well being of the people. It was unfortunate that he had died suddenly before having completed even half of this work. All the generals, officials and soldiers should act together to achieve the noble cause112. Although the Qijiang statement has been altered by the feudal ruling class and landlords, it still sparkles with revolutionary and fighting spirit. The statement highly estimated the righteous nature of the peasant uprising and peasant war which lasted for two decades; it cherished the memory of the achievements of Zhang Xianzhong and lamented his death; it called for the unity of the whole army and fighting to finish what Zhang did not achieve. It was recorded that after the issue of the statement, the barracks were filled with joy and soldiers pasted the statement on the wall113. This showed the anti-Qing determination of the peasant army.

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The Anti-Qing Struggles of the Dashun Remnants Cooperating with the Ming Government The Implementation of the Anti-Qing Strategy of the Dashun Peasant Army in Cooperation with the Ming Government By 1646, the Qing army had occupied the area north of the Yellow River and the southeast coastal area. The Dashun and Daxi peasant armies and the troops of the South Ming regime failed one after another. They retreated to Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi and the south of Sichuan to continue fighting. However after nearly three years of fighting, the advantageous and disadvantageous factors on both sides had changed. Firstly, in the area occupied by the Qing army, the anti-Qing movement of the masses grew like a raging fire which made the Qing rulers attend to one thing and ignore another; secondly, despite the strong military power of the Qing army, with a small number the further the army went the weaker its attack; thirdly, with a common enemy, the relationship between the peasant army and the Ming army had changed. They began to cooperate to fight against the Qing dynasty and the anti-Qing strength increased; fourthly, through reinstating the surrendered armies of the Ming dynasty, the increased power of the surrendered leaders worried the Manchu aristocrats who began to guard against them. Their contradictions became acute and several events backfired in succession. The irresistible advancement of the Qing army had been restrained while the anti-Qing forces achieved some victories in some important battles and even launched a counterattack in some areas. There was stalemate between the two sides. After the capture of the area south of the Yangtze River, they Qing army marched southward to Fujian and Zhejiang on the one hand, and coveted Jiangxi and Hunan. The anti-Qing armies were under great pressure. He Tengjiao, the governor general of the South Ming regime, was stationed in Changsha with the small military forces. There had been no military forces in Changsha for quite a long time. He Tengjiao called in Huang Chaoxun in the Youheng mountains. There were less than two thousand soldiers in Huang’s army and most of them were thin and weak 114. At that time there were still several hundred thousand soldiers left of the Dashun army which had split into many branches and fought in west Hubei and north Hunan. It is obvious that after being defeated and losing the leader, it was not easy for the scattered army to hold off the attack of the Qing forces. All the anti-Qing forces should be motivated and united to resist the attack of the Qing army in such a desperate

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situation. In such conditions, the leaders of the peasant armies decided to change their strategy and give priority to the anti-Qing struggle. In the autumn and winter of 1645, Hao Yaoqi and Liu Tichun led tens of thousands of troops to Xiangyin to draw close to the army led by He Tengjiao. The officials of the South Ming dynasty thought that the peasant armies would attack Changsha; some proposed to flee and some proposed to fight. A troop of the South Ming army attacked the peasant army and Hao Yaoqi’s army immediately wiped it out. The city of Changsha was filled with fear and people ran from place to place115. Hao Yaoqi realized that the upcoming Qing army was the main enemy and indicated to He Tengjao his willingness to cooperate to resist the Qing army. In view of the imminent attack of the Qing army and his weak armed forces, He was not in the position to fight the peasant army and accepted the proposal to cooperate with the Dashun army. Hao Yaoqi and others asked Yuan Zongdi, Lin Yangcheng, Wang Jincai and Niu Youyong to return and accumulated over a hundred thousand troops 116. Before long, the largest division of the remnant Dashun army, Li Guo, Gang Yigong and the wife of Li Zicheng entered west Hunan to collaborate with Chu Yinxi, the grand coordinator of the South Ming regime. The united front of the Dashun army and the south Ming army took an initial shape. The defense of Hunan was strengthened with the large numbers of the brave and skillful peasant army. The Dashun army changed the situation of fighting in isolation and turned the army of the Ming dynasty into their ally, which was an important change in the anti-Qing strategy. With the strategy of collaboration with the Ming army to fight the Qing dynasty coming true, the anti-Qing power in central and southern China increased. Apart from the Dashun army there were the armies summoned by He Tengjiao, such as the armies led by Zuo Liangyu, Ma Jinzhong, Zhang Xianbi and Huang Chaoxuan; the allied army of Sichuan led by Yu Dahai, Li Zhanchun, Yuan Tao and Wu Dading; and the army in Yunnan led by Zhao Yinxuan and Hu Yiqing. These military forces were stationed in Hunan and awaited their opportunity. The guards of the Qing dynasty made an urgent request for help from the royal court. If the emperor did not dispatch troops to the south, the territory which had been previously occupied might be lost117. In the spring of 1646 Le Kedehun, the Pingnan general, led the Manmeng vexillary to attack Hunan and Guangzhou. The Dashun army united with the anti-Qing powers to fight more than ten times with the Qing army in Yuechang and once in Tengxi, and achieved victory. They effectively prevented the Qing army from marching southward. At the beginning of 1647 Kong Youde, Shang Kexi and Geng Zhongming led the Qing army to attack Hunan. They seized Yuezhou at the beginning of

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March. In mid-March, the army marched straight to Changsha through Hunan and collaborated with the army led by He Tengjiao. They fought and killed until the city was empty because of burning and plundering118. The Qing army entered the city and captured Changsha. Governor He Tengjiao fled. The Ming armies did not take any action and the Dashun army was an isolated force. As a result, most of the cities and counties were occupied by the Qing armies. In July the Dashun army led by Liguo, Gao Yigong, Liu Tichun and Yuan Zong retreated to Wushan and Bashu in the east of Sichuan. They camped in the remote mountains and allied with other anti-Qing armies, which made the situation unpredictable119. During September and October, Kong Youde led the Qing army to occupy Qiyan and Baoqing and intended to attack Wugang where the Yongli regime stationed. At that time, Li Chengdong, the surrendered general of the Ming dynasty, led the Qing army into Guangxi along the Pearl River and fought all the way to Guilin. The armies in Hunan and Guilin were arrogant and suspicious of each other. The Qing army plundered and ordered people to shave their hair and hand in the seals at the gate of the Youde barrack120. With the development of the anti-Qing armies, Guangzhou was seized. Li Chengdong led the army to the rescue and He Tengjiao governed Hao’s Dashun army tossed about and arrived at Guilin. In December they defeated the Qing army in Quanzhou. The famous horses and camels got were returned to the owner; the road for transport extended for as long as three hundred li 121. The Qing army withdrew to Hunan, and Guangzhou for the moment was out of danger. In the spring of 1648, when the anti-Qing movement came to a climax, the armies led by He Tengjiao and Qu Shisi gathered in Guangxi and smashed siege of Guilin by the Qing army. They marched forward to Hunan and recaptured Jingzhou, Yuanzhou, Quanzhou, Wugang, Baoqing, Changde, Yongzhou, Hezhou etc. After Li Guo and Gao Yigong led the Dashun army to seize Yicheng and Jingzhou they moved the army eastward into Hunan. They captured Yiyan, Xiangtan, Xiangxiang, Hengshan and other counties in succession. The Dashun army also collaborated with other Ming armies to besiege Changsha and marched straight to the northern river bank of Hanshui, and recovered almost all the lost territory in Hunan. The Dashun army cooperated with the Ming army to fight against the Qing dynasy, which saved the faltering Yongli regime, stopped the march south of the Qing army and effectively supported the Daxi peasant army to lay a foundation in the southwest area. Moreover they conducted the anti-Qing struggles with Hunan, Guangzhou and Guilin as the main battlefields and started a new high tide of the anti-Qing movement.

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The Upsurge of Struggles against the Qing Regime all over the Country after the Establishment of the Dashun - Ming Anti-Qing Front After the the Dashun-Ming Anti Qing Front was established the anti-Qing movement was in full swing. The peasant army pushed the development of the anti-Qing movement in other classes. Some generals of the Ming dynasty who had surrendered to the Qing dynasty changed sides and began to fight against the Qing. The anti-Qing battles of the Guangdong people gave support to the battlefields of Hunan and Guizhou. After the Qing army’s capture of Guangdong, peasants, salt workers, fishermen, furnacemen and minority groups such as the Yao nationality all gathered to form a force of millions of people122. The allied army even spread to the sea123. People actively responded124. The revolts first started in over ten counties and influenced the uprisings of other anti-Qing troops. In the spring of 1647, people in Guangdong took advantage of the weakness of the Qing army stationed in Guangzhou when Li Chengdong led the army marching for Guilin and revolted one after another. Chen Bangyan, Zhang Jiayu and Chen Zirang led armies to besiege Guangzhou from both the sea and overland. They forced Li Chengdong to return from Guangxi to reinfore the Guangdong army, which saved the Yongli Regime from its predicament and supported the fighting of the Dashun army in Hunan and Guizhou. In August Chen Zizhuang and Chen Bangyan united with Wang Xing’s army in Enping, Huang Gongfu’s army in Xinhui, Mo Tinglan’s army in Yangchun, Liang Weizhuo’s army in Xinxing, He Shizhang’s army in Dong’an and Hu Jing and Liang Bin’s army in Shunde. There were three hundred thousand soldiers prepared to attack Guangzhou again. They fought valiantly for three month before being suppressed by the Qing armies. After that, the anti-Qing battles in Guangdong surged. The peasant armies and allied forces fought actively in Boluo and Longmen125. The anti-Qing armies in Gaoming, Xinhui, Zengcheng, Zhenpieng, Yangchun and Dianbai fought with the enemy day and night126. In the winter of 1647, people of the Yao nationality in Shaozhou revolted to fight the Qing army127. There were ten hundred people in the Yao army and they attacked Ruyuan and Lechang. Afterwards the fishermen living on boats in Fanyu and the blacksmiths of Qingyuan staged an uprising. The leader of the fishermen was called General Hui Yue. They possessed hundreds of boats which had several stories. The arms were stored in the boats and the ships sailed like swords 128. The anti-Qing battles of the fishermen lasted for a very long time. In the first year of Kangxi, the army

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composed of fishermen captured Shunde. The flame of the battle lit up the city but the residents were not disturbed 129. The peasants in Dapu and Lianzhou rose in revolt one after another. The peasants came from all around to threaten Zhoucheng130 and the base of the Qing army in the southern part of China. The anti-Qing slogan of the Dashun army aroused a strong response in Fujian. At the beginning of 1647 anti-Qing struggles were common and peasants in Zhangzhou besieged the city. In July, the peasants of Ju captured Jianning, and many counties in the north of Fujian were seized by the peasant army. The peasant army in Tingzhou revolted in Jiulongzhai and attacked Guihua. The peasants in Nan’an wrapped their heads in white cloth and were named White Head Army. They launched an attack on Quanzhou. The event that influenced Fujian the most was the attack which was launched in 1647 by the joint antiQing army and the peasant army. At that time the anti-Qing armies rose in revolt from eight counties in the same day. There were allied forces outside the city. Farmers and fishermen assumed the positions of grand governor; even women and monks had the power to coordinate military forces131. The residents inside the city supported them by lighting fires. The thirty-six villages east of the city were plundered and burned by the Qing army132. All the people there rose in revolt and the Qing armies was besieged until June of the following year. With the reinforcement of a large force, the Qing army was rescued. The Qing army wiped out the Longwu regime in Fujian with no difficulty but their formidable enemy was the power of the people which was represented by the peasants. Although faced with massive forces the peasant army besieged Fuzhou for as long as a year, which was rare. The grand governor of Fujian once remarked that since the establishment of the country, the army was invincible. There was no enemy force which was as indomitable as the peasant army in Jianning. He exclaimed that although Fujian was occupied it was more difficult to deal with than the places which had not been occupied yet133. From the reflection of the Qing rulers, we can see the strong power of the anti-Qing struggles of the Fujian people. The anti-Qing movement swept through the area south of the Yangtze River. Peasants in Pizhou, Huaiyang, Haizhou and other counties located in the north of the Yangtze River revolted together to resist the Qing dynasty. In Huai’an (Anhui province), the peasants occupied Chahe to cut off the route from the north to the south. In October, 1647, the peasant army captured Miaowan within one day and wiped out the defending Qing army. Hong Chengchou, the grand governor, deployed Xu Yang’s army to its resucue but the effort was of no use. People in Miaowan and the coastal areas participated in the anti-Qing army one after another134. The peasant army marched directly to Huai’an, which

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threatened the rule of the Qing dynasty. Hong Chenchou asked for help from the Qing emperor to send Manchu and Han troops to suppress the revolt before it was too late135. The revolt of Dalan village in the Siming Mountains in the east of Zhejiang was influential. The revolt was led by Wang Yi and Wang Jiang , who were scholars. In 1647, after the anti-Qing struggle in which they involved failed, they retreated to Siming with part of the troops. The armies led by Huang Zongxi gathered in the Siming Mountains and enhanced the anti-Qing power. In the spring of 1648 the allied army seized Shangyu and killed the officials, which shocked the whole of east Zhejiang136. The components of the army were complex. Both peasants and feudal landlords with armed forces were involved. When the army achieved victory, the surrendered landlords colluded with the Qing army and launched an attack. The army was defeated in Dingshan. The landlords of the army again brought in lots of peasants. There were ten thousand people in the army within one month. In the spring of 1649, the army of Dalan Mountain defeated the Qing army and captured Shangyu. They occupied eight hundred li of the Siming Mountains and their influence spread to Fenghua in the east137. The anti-Qing army built and reorganized the Siming base. Five barracks and five departments were set up. The five barracks took charge of military issues and the five departments dealt with the logistics. The army farmed and stored foods, which made no disturbance to the people. The soldiers never stole grain from the residents. The rich landlords were persuaded to pay tax according to the amount of their land138. The reward and punishment system was fair in order to convince the people. The plaintiffs of Siming went to Dalan instead of to the government and the people in the villages of Siming handed the tax to Dalan instead of to the government139. Therefore, within one year, people were rehabilitated and the anti-Qing power increased. The Qing armies near the city were frightened to stay within the city and closed the gates even in daylight. In October, 1650, the superior force of the Qing army was sent to besiege the villages. They burned and killed barbarically. The Dalan army was hopelessly outnumbered. After fierce fighting the Dalan army was defeated. However the anti-Qing struggles of the peasants in the Siming Mountains continued until the reign of Emperor Kangxi. The anti-Qing struggles in Zhejiang lasted until 1665. The thousands in the peasant army in Dongyan county of Jinhua, the six to seven thousand of the army in Yongkang, two thousand soldiers in Kaihua and about ten thousand soldiers in Yiwu united and attacked the city to resist the rule of the Qing dynasty. In 1654 the flames of war spread to Jinhua, Quzhou, Yanzhou, and Chuzhou. Although the Qing rulers adopted evil means to

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suppress the uprisings, the peasant army would make a feint to somewhere and attack in another place. The anti-Qing struggles came to a climax140. Since 1647 the peasant army in Yuyuan, Shandong had been attacking the Qing army. One of the Yuyuan peasant armies marched southward to Guide through Caoxian and attacked Lanfeng. Over ten counties were recovered and the army approached Kaifeng and defeated the Qing army. Another army marched eastward to Guide, approached Xunzhou and arrived at Ganyu. Thousands of soldiers were sent to launch a sudden attack in the south of Shandong to cooperate with the peasant army there to capture Zexian. They planned to join forces with the army in Henan and seize Damingfu, an important town in Hebei. The two years after 1647 were the heyday of the Yuyuan power. In August 1648 the Yuyuan army captured Zaozhou, Puzhou and other two cities within several days. The peasants nearby all actively participated in the battle. “Hundreds of poor peasants pledged allegiance to the army”141. The Qing rulers sent a large number of troops on a punitive expedition for both killing and pacifying142. The Yuyuan army fought to the death with the Qing army in this area. In 1615, Zhang Qi and Huang Zhenshan were killed in a battle on the south bank of the Yellow River, but the struggles of the Yuyuan force lasted for five years after that. Due to the fact that the Qing army let the river burst the bank at Jinglong, the water flowed to Yuyuan and the army was suppressed. Based on Juchi Mountain, in 1648, a peasant army attacked Ninghai and developed quickly which lasted until 1662 (first year of the reign of Kangxi). The sieges and slaughter by the Qing army frustrated the anti-Qing struggles in the area. The peasant army and the Yuyuan army in Shandong united in about 1648. They attacked Lanfeng to the west through Guide and Kaocheng, which threated the safety of Kaifeng. By taking advantage of the favorable conditions on the border of Hebei, Shandong and Henan, they could attack Hebei and threaten the safety of Beijing by marching northward; and seize Xuzhou and arrive at Jianghuai by marching southward. The rulers of the Qing dynasty were afraid of the peasants marching east along the Yellow River and uniting with the army of the south bank. The development of the armed forces of Hebei also worried the Qing dynasty considerably143. In Kaifeng, Luoyang and other areas of south Henan, thousands of peasants gathered and captured Baofeng, Xinye and Shangcheng. Their forces developed by leaps and bounds. The peasant army in Guangshan and Gushi defended the area of Dabie Mountains and defeated the Qing army several times. The peasant army in Lingbao and Shanzhou once united with the thirteen Jingxiang armies

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in Yunyang to attack Nanyang. When the peasant army seized Lushi in 1651 the Qing army attacked the peasant army, which led the flaring up of anti-Qing struggles in Henan. In 1647, the peasant army attacked Mengxian, Wutai, Yongning, Jingle and Jiaocheng. In October the next year, the Jiaocheng peasants of the Luliang mountainous area entered the Yinshan stockade and lured the Qing army into Yingshan. They took the chance to seize the nearby counties and launched a massive attack. At the end of the year 1648, since the chief general Jiang Xiang changed sides in the war to the anti-Qing power and the army cooperated with the peasant army, the Qing army was defeated. Within a year they had captured Taigu, Wenshui, Xugou, Kelan, Fenzhou, Quwo and other forty to fifty counties. The Qing army defended the siege in Taiyuan. The peasants in Shanxi provided the favorable conditions for the antiQing struggles in the whole country. They intercepted the road to Yangping and Lu’an. “The road to the north was blocked and nothing could be heard from there 144.” The Qing army besieged in Taiyuan asked for reinforcements and claimed that the isolated city was endangered. Whether the city could be preserved or not could not be foretold 145. The strategically located Shanxi province served as a protective screen for Beijing and the attack by the peasant army shocked the Qing rulers. Duo Ergun, the regent of the Qing dynasty, confronted the enemy personally and appointed Boluo, the Ruizhong prince, as the Dingxi general. He led the army to attack Shanxi and to reinforce the army from the south. After the defeat in Jinci, the anti-Qing movement had a difficult time. The only existing peasant army was the Jiaocheng army in the Lianyen Mountains of the Luliang area. They continued to hold the banner of the antiQing movement. The territory of this area was steep, easy to hold but hard to attack. The castles there were like those in cities and there were abundant provisions and a large number of horses 146. They were self-sufficient based on the rich resources. The peasant army united with farmers, miners and woodcutters to establish a solid anti-Qing base in the Luliang area147. It had been twenty-eight years since the uprising of the Jiaocheng peasants in 1646, which fully exhibited the strong willpower of the peasant class to fight against the national and class oppression of the Qing dynasty. When the Luliang peasant army launched its attack, the Qing rulers assembled the army in Shaanxi to attack Shaxi. The anti-Qing struggles in Shaanxi developed further. In 1647 the previous Ming army united with the peasant army to attack Xingcheng, seized Ziyan and tied up the country magistrate148. In 1648 the peasant army in Zhen’an attacked Qinchuan, Lantian

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and approached Xin’an. The road was blocked 149. Peasants rose in revolt in Jiezhou and Yan’an. Peasants and vagrants in Luonan formed the Gan army. They fought in Shangzhou and Xin’an. The battles did not stop until 1645150. The anti-Qing movement spread to Beijing and Zhili. In May 1647 the peasant army in Changping , Beijing launched another attack. After that peasants in Baxian and Wen’an began to struggle against the Qing army. Mrs. Zhang, the peasant heroine in Tianjin, led the peasant army to attack Jinghai and Cangzhou, which had a major influence. The Qing officials fidgeted and exclaimed that the elite army had been sent to march southward. There were too few soldiers to guard the city. There was a great disparity between the peasant army and their army. It was difficult to defeat them151. Peasant armies in Hejian, Xianxian, Dongguang, Cangzhou, Jiaohe, Gaoyang and Lixian either attacked the city or harassed the rear of the army. They made a clamor when entering the city 152 and sent the prisoners out when they left 153. The Qing rulers had fallen into the sea of the struggle of the masses. Seven to eighty percent of the residents were in peasant armies, which made it difficult to kill them all154. The Qing rulers were in a panic and had no way out.

The Further Development of the Struggle against the Qing all over the Country Ever since the anti-Qing climax in 1647, the anti-Qing struggle had swept through the whole nation. The scale of the anti-Qing struggle was larger than that led by Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong. There were many different classes participating in the movement. All kinds of allied armies, including the armies of the Ming dynasty, joined forces to fight the Qing army and displayed an impressive power. Under this influence some Ming generals who had surrendered to the Qing dynasty changed sides and cooperated with the peasant army to resist the rule of the Qing dynasty. The famous ones were Jin Shenghuai and Wang Deren in Jiangxi; Li Chengdong in Guangzhou and Jiang Xiang in Shanxi. Moreover the Huis in Hexi, Gansu province and the Zhuangs in Guangxi rose in revolt. These struggles all showed the further development of the anti-Qing movement. In February 1648 Jin Shenghuai and Wang Deren changed sides to raise an army to fight the Qing dynasty. Jin Shenghuai used to be a military officer of Zuo Liangyu and a general under Xu Huai of the south Ming regime. He followed Zuo Mengyin to surrender to the Qing dynasty and led the army to occupy Jiangxi. Jin thought that he alone had led the army to capture thirteen offices and seventy-two counties and gave away the territory to the Qing

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dynasty, which saved the Qing army a lot of effort. Ever since the entrance of the Shanhaiguan by the Qing army, no one had achieved such a meritorious and respectable deed. He assumed that the Qing rulers would confer a rank of nobility on him or make him a marquis at the least155. However the Qing rulers only appointed him a deputy general and the provincial commander of Jiangxi. His lieutenant Wang Deren was only appointed as a military officer. These were lower positions than their previous ones in the Ming dynasty. This disappointed them a lot and they felt depressed 156. Moreover the Qing rulers did not trust them and sent Zhuang Yutian, the governor general, to monitor and control them, which left them no way to go. At that time many allied army and peasant armies rose in revolt in Jiangxi. Under the influence of the anti-Qing struggle, Jing Shenghuai and Wang Deren declared opposition to the Qing dynasty. They killed the governor general and the patrolling officer and changed sides to resist the Qing army. They united with Jiang Yueguang, an official of the Hongguan regime and an anti-Qing figure to plan a revolt together. In March, Wang Deren seized Jiujiang. However, being short of political foresight and military strategy, they did not make full use of the national anti-Qing trend of which the main body was the peasant army, and launched a prompt attack. At that time someone proposed that if the soldiers were dressed like the Qing army and marched along the river, the Qing armies south of the river would certainly open the gates to welcome them if they claimed to be the army of the military official Zhang and asked for help. The civil and military officials could be caught. The reign title could be changed. Armies in Shandong and the central plain would respond to the event actively. The areas south and north of the Yellow River and west to Shanxi could also be reclaimed from the hands of the Qing dynasty157. Although the suggestion was exaggerated, the opinion that the anti-Qing forces should take the initiative was absolutely right. Jin and Wang did not take the advice but instead led the army back to Jiujiang and defended Jiangxi. The army besieged Ganzhou and the two sides were locked in a stalemate for seventy days, which was a stalling tactic by the Qing army. In June, Er Zhentantai and He Luohui led the army by way of Jiangning and captured Jiujiang, Nankian and Raozhou, and besieged Nanchang. Jin and Wang were in a tight corner and led their army back to Nanchang to defend the isolated city. Although they possessed the elite army, they could not make a move and looked forward to reinforcement day and night158. They were surrounded by the Qing army until February the next year when it broke through into the city. Jin Shenghuan drowned himself in a lake and Wang Deren was killed. Although partially influenced by the anti-Qing struggle, the change of

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sides by Jin and Wang was mainly out of their personal interests. As was said in their official notice after their yielding to the Qing dynasty, they performed a valuable service but their achievements were not recognized and they were humiliated by the superior authorities. Being indignant and furious, they had no choice but to pledge allegiance to the original master159. But in any case the move by Jin and Wang held many Qing forces at bay, which contributed a great deal to the anti-Qing struggle. In May 1648 Li Chengdong changed sides to oppose the Qing dynasty in Guangdong. Li used to be a military officer of Shi Kefa and defended Xuzhou as the chief general. When the Qing army marched southward, he led the Ming army to surrender to the Qing dynasty and acted as the vanguard to suppress the peasant uprisings. In 1646, Li Chengdong led his army and swiftly captured Guangdong but his military contribution was not well recognized by the Qing rulers. He was only appointed as the provincial commander of Guangdong and Guangxi. His disappointment and resentment was quite obvious 160. In 1647, Li’s army suffered a great loss from the suppression of the peasant army in Guangdong and withdrew his army back to Guangxi. He feared that his army might drown in the anti-Qing tide. The armies in Jiangxi had yielded to the Ming and opposed the Qing dynasty, which cut off the direct connection between Guangdong and the Qing court. Li Chengdong weighed the advantages and disadvantages and said to his trusted follower that he had heard that the new emperor (Emperor Yongli of the South Ming regime) was in the west of Guangdong. If he led the army to assist him, he would be conferred with a rank of nobility should it be successful; were it not, his actions could be deemed as loyalty 161. Eventually Li declared a change of side to the Ming dynasty and pledged his allegiance to the Yongli regime. He captured Tong Yangjia, the governor-general of the Qing dynasty, and the whole of Guangdong was under the control of the Yongli regime. However, Li Chengdong also did not make full use of the anti-Qing trend. He did not enter Jiangxi and join the forces of Jin Shenghun. Instead he occupied himself with the investiture of Emperor Yongli and welcomed Emperor Yongli to return to Guangzhou. The banners stood so thick that they hid the sun for hundreds of miles from Wuzhou to Zhaoqing 162. He grasped authority for himself and was the man of the hour at that time. The affairs of the state were under the control of Li Chengdong and his son 163. Everything both small and large should be submitted to Li Chengdong and then reported to the emperor164. In September 1648, Jin Shenghuan was stranded and asked for help. The Yongli regime decided to send the army to attack Ganzhou to rescue Jin from the siege. Li Chengdong then led two hundred thousand soldiers to march

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to Nanxiong. In November the army was defeated in Ganzhou and retreated for six hundred miles back to Meiling through Yuguan. Li felt too humiliated to see Emperor Yongli and fled to Guangzhou in a hurry. He decided to send out his troops in January 1649 and was stationed in Xinfeng, Ganzhou. In March Li’s army was besieged by the Qing army and Li Chengdong was drowned. At the moment when the anti-Qing struggles in the southeast China were raging, Jiang Xiang changed sides in Shanxi. Jiang used to be the military general in Datong of the Ming dynasty. When the peasant army of Li Zicheng approached the Ningwu Pass, he surrendered to the peasant army. After the Qing army had entered the Shanhai Pass and Shanxi province, he surrendered to the Qing dynasty. Troops under his command were all valiant and had long wanted to revolt. After the chaos of Jiaoshan, they were tempted to rebel 165. Under the influence of the anti-Qing struggle in Shanxi and the change of sides of the generals in the South Ming dynasty, Jiang proclaimed himself the chief commander in January 1649. Afterwards he divided his force to attack Shuozhou and Qizhou. They brought north of Shanxi and Saibei under their control, which strongly promoted the development of the anti-Qing struggles of the whole province. The excellent situation motivated various kinds of troops to respond and to capture cities and counties. The troops included the precious Ming armies in Shaanxi and Gansu and the remnant Ming armed forces. They collaborated with the peasant armies which were widespread and numerous, which posed a threat to the rule of the Qing armies in the north. This worried the Qing rulers a lot. Duo Ergun assumed personal command in the Kou stockade in Hunyuan and deployed Ajige, the Ying prince; Nikan, the Jingjin prince; Boluo, the Ruizhong prince; and Man Dahai, the Xun prince to each lead an elite army to fight the peasant army and allied army in Shanxi. After several fights with the Qing army, Jiang Xiang was killed by his military officer in September 1649 and the anti-Qing allied troops were suppressed. The anti-Qing flames spread to the Hui Muslim region of Hexi, Gansu province. Under the rule of the Manchu aristocrats, the Hui people were oppressed and exploited. The local government could give justice to people and they suffered a lot in Gansu province166. In 1648, the Huis in Hexi took the opportunity of the Qing rulers ordereing the Hui army to fight the peasant army in east Sichuan and launched a largescale uprising. In April, the Hui leaders Mi Layin and Ding Guodong rose in revolt in Ganzhou which was well received by the majority of the Hui people. The uprising army suppressed the grand coordinator of Gansu and other Qing officials and swiftly seized Gongchang, Minzhou, Lanzhou, Lintao and

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Weiyuan. They brought the whole of the west of Gansu under control. The antiQing troops of the Hui people called for ten hundred thousand people to fight and the government was deeply shocked (“Shengwu History”, the seventh volume, by Wei Yuan; “The Second Suppression of the Hui people in Gansu by the Qing Dynasty”). The revolt exerted a tremendous influence. It was the result of Manchu aristocrats’ national coercion policy towards people of other nationalities. In order to suppress the anti-Qing struggles of the Huis in Hexi, the Qing rulers deployed Bei Zitunqi who was appointed as Pingxi general and Han Dai who was the offspring of Er Zhen in Gushan to lead the Manmeng troops to attack the anti-Qing Hui troops. After the Hui troops’ refusal of the Qing inducement, the Qing army branched into three sections to attack Gongchang, Lintao, Lanzhou and other cities. Hedong was lost again. In June the Qing army marched westward by crossing the river and entered Liangzhou. Mi Layin, the revolt leader died in Shuiquan in the northwest of Yongchang. The anti-Qing struggles were frustrated. Ding Guodong led the remnant armies and supported Tai Lun, the son of Ha Mibabai to be the king and entered Suzhou (Jiuquan) by way of Ganzhou. He continued to fight and won the support of the Hui people. The Hui people inside and outside the Pass all responded to the uprising 167. People of Uyghur nationality in Hami, Xinjiang came to the rescue. In the spring of 1649 (the sixth year of the Shunzhi reign), the anti-Qing Hui army and the anti-Qing army in Shanxi echoed each other at a distance, which brought a response in Shaanxi and Gansu. In December the Qing army besieged Suzhou. Militarily, Ding Guodong committed the mistake of conservatism; politically, he did not pay enough attention to organizing and uniting the Hui people. When the Qing army besieged the city, Ding’s army fought alone with its few forces and eventually ran out of provisions. Ding Guodong, Tu Luntai and most of the soldiers died. The rest of the army continued to fight until the end of 1653 and was then suppressed. Guangxi was located in the ethnic minority area. After 1648 the Zhuang, Miao and Yao people in Xin’an, Guanyang and Fuchuan rose in revolt one after another. In 1657 the ethnic minority armed forces in Yunlin, Huaiji, Fuchuan and Taiping built castles on the steep hills and established an antiQing fortified port. The Zhuang anti-Qing forces captured Lingui, Yongfu, Lifu, Xiuren and other cities. They cooperated and fought together with the peasant armies in Guizhou, which forced the Qing rulers to change their strategy. Both suppression and persuasion were used to deal with the peasant army. People should be grateful for the grants and thus pay allegiance to the Qing dynasty168. This was the pacifying means used to eradicate the revolt.

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Although the valiant struggles of the Hui and Zhuang people were suppressed by the Qing troops, they echoed the fight of the Han people and exhibited a firm and indomitable spirit to fight against national oppression and class oppression of people of all nationalities.

The Weaknesses of the United Front and the Failure of the Struggles By uniting with the Ming army, the Dashun peasant army and the Ming formed an anti-Qing united front, which thwarted the attack of the Qing armies and promoted the development of the anti-Qing movement. However the situation was complicated and the two sides conducted a life-and–death struggle to give full play to the subjective initiative. They attempted to turn the situation to their benefit but the decisive factor kept changing endlessly. In view of the defeat in central and south China and the large-scale antiQing struggles in the rear, the Qing rulers made an adjustment militarily and politically in order to turn the tables. Firstly, they consolidated and stabilized the rear and deployed a large number of elite troops to suppress the peasant uprisings and changes of side of the surrendered leaders. Shortly after their entrance to the Shanhaiguan princes such as Duoduo, Ajige and Haoge led the army to march south. Princes such as Ajige, Nikan, Boluo, Man Dahai and Le Kedehun fought in north China to suppress the uprisings and defend against the attack from Mongolia in the north. At the same time, the garrison system was established and the Eight Banners were stationed in important towns in the occupied area. Secondly, the Manchu aristocrats promoted the strategy of using the Han people to deal with the Han people to improve relations among the surrendered generals and officials. The surrendered officers should be highly rewarded and endowed with power. The surrendered Hong Chengchou was stationed in Nanjing to stabilize the situation in south China. In 1648 the Qing army attacked Sichuan with Wu Sangui, the Pingxi marquis, established in Hanzhong. The following year, Kong Youde was conferred as Dingnan marquis; Geng Zhongming was conferred as Jingnan marquis; and Shang Kexi was conferred as Pingnan marquis to attack Hunan, Guangdong and Guangxi. Military affairs and the troops were all deployed and controlled by them 169. More importantly, the policies were gradually changed from the coercion policy of the large-scale enclosure of land. Effort was made to draw the Han landlord class to their side to divide the anti-Qing united front. With a series of adjustments and reformations, the Qing dynasty weathered the climax of the anti-Qing struggles and crushed the anti-Qing forces one by one. With the support of the Dashun army and the national anti-Qing forces, the

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Yongli regime of South Ming controlled the southwest area of Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangdong and Guangxi but it did not achieve bigger success by making use of the favorable situation. This was due to the decadence of the South Ming regime. With the nature of the landlord class, the regime suspected, guarded against and controlled the Dashun army. Even He Tengjia who had a firm antiQing stand did not entrust the Dashun army with important posts. He also tried to rearrange the peasant army and sent officials of the South Ming regime to infiltrate the peasant army to assume the leadership. The remnants of Zuo Liangyu’s officers, such as Huang Chaoxuan, Zhang Xianbi, Liu Chengyin and Ma Jinzhong, were deployed to monitor the peasant army and to create friction. The warlords of the South Ming regime were undisciplined and lacked fighting capacity. They wandered about and had no fixed stations and sources of provisions. They obeyed the orders of whoever provided them with provisions. They were lacking in the anti-Qing spirit and intrigued against each other to expand their own power. He Jiaoteng plundered the people to the utmost in order to support the unruly commanders and soldiers. The land tax was prerequisite for a year and the amount of tax increased to six times the previous tax. If it was not enough, the government pay had to be given out. The property of the rich was divided up to be used for provisions. Huang Chaoxuan, Zhang Xianbi and Liu Chengyin all followed this example. Half of the people in Hunan died or fled170. There was no discipline in the army and provisions were in short supply. The armies were on the brink of collapse. Petty criminals were drafted in and insulted each other. Farmers were forced to stop farming to become soldiers, which led to mutual hatred and killing. In serious drought, no smoke or fires could be seen in the villages171. The decadent Yongli regime viewed the bandit army as its backing and was resigned to the circumstances. Although Li Guo, Gao Yigong, Hao Yaoqi and Liu Tichun leading the Dashun peasant army fought valiantly and achieved glorious combat success, the peasants could not handle the anti-Qing situation correctly due to the limitations of the peasant class. They could not come up with the right policies and could not maintain political, mental and structural independence. The peasant army not only accepted the titles and given names of the South Ming dynasty, but also obeyed the control and command of the decadent small regime. The fought for their lives, rushed about and wasted much energy in vain. They were in trouble under the attack and exclusion of the landlord armies. In spring 1648, Kong Youde attacked Guilin once again. Hao Yaoqi and Liu Tichun leading the Dashun army spared no effort to fight the Qing army in Lingchuan. Without the assistance of the South Ming army, they lost the battle and retreated to Guilin. The general of the South Ming regime wanted to take the chance to wipe out

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the Dashun army in Guilin. This behavior of ignoring the anti-Qing overall situation left the Dashun army with no foothold. Hao Yaoqi and Liu Tichun had no choice but to send the troops to the Jingxiang mountainous area to keep fighting the Qing armies. Afterwards, only the army led by Li Guo and Gao Yigong continued to cooperated with the South Ming regime. The remaining Dashun army continued to suffer attack and discrimination by the South Ming regime. They could not cooperate to the end. After Jin Shenghuai and Li Chengdong changed sides, the national anti-Qing situation was quite good. But the Yongli regime was busy with the factional fight between the Chu clique and the Wu clique, the founding father of defence and the meritorious statesman for setting things right172. The warlords occupied themselves in the struggle for power and did not notice the increasing success. The Dashun army became involved in such contradictions, which blurred the class nature of the peasant army and critically affected the development of the anti-Qing struggle. In November 1648, at the critical moment when He Tengjiao united other armies to retake cities in Hunan and prepared to attack Changshang, Ma Jinzhong who was under the leadership of He recovered Changde. There were contradictions between Chu Yinxi and Ma Jinzhong. Chu deployed the Dashun army led by Li Guo and Gao Yigong to be stationed in Chande and asked Ma to withdraw his army. Ma was arrogant and willful, and he ignored the deployment of Chu Yinxi. Afraid that the Dashun army would attack his army, Chu set fire to the grain depot and moved to Hunan through side routes173. He drove the people to flee out of the city and set fire to the city 174. The houses in town and boats on the river were all burned 175. He plundered in Changde and fled westward. When Li and Gao leading the Dashun army marched into Changde, the city was empty and they had no idea how to defend it. So the Dashun army marched eastward and retook Yiyang, Xiangtan, Xiangxiang, Hengshan and other counties. Due to the reinforcement of the Qing armies, they did not capture Changsha. Ma plundered in Changde and marched to the west, and other Ming soldiers burned all the barracks and fled 176. They lost the newly seized counties and cities and the situation in Hunan was out of control. Having heard the news, He went to Xiangtan but the city was already empty. In February 1649, the Qing army took advantage of the weak point and He Tengjiao was killed in Xiangtan by the Qing army. The armies of the Yongli regime in north Hunan were defeated and their territory was lost. In April and May, the Dashun army led by Li and Gao retreated to Guangxi by way of north Hunan. In winter of that year Li Guo, the peasant army leader who rose in revolt with Li Zicheng, died because of sickness. The Dashun army suffered a great loss and had only ten

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hundred thousand soldiers left. Gao Yigong and Li Heng, the adopted son of Li Guo, commanded the army. The anti-Qing situation went from bad to worse and the conflicts within the Yongli regime also increased. The Wu clique and Chu clique were as incompatible as fire and water 177. They fell over themselves for power and fought each other, ignoring the anti-Qing overall situation. At the beginning of 1650 the Qing army fought all the way to Nanxiong, Guangdong province. The general in Shaozhou abandoned the city and fled. The city of Guangzhou was besieged. Emperor Yongli was frightened and wanted to flee to Guangxi. After hearing this Qu Shisi dissuaded him from leaving. He thought that there were many mountains and rivers in east Guangdong.The wealth and property in Guangdong was ten times that of west Guangxi. The armies were composed of soldiers both from north and south and they could improve themselves and fight with the enemies. Moreover, there were thousands of miles between Zhaoqing and Shaozhou. The city was solid and difficult to capture. We could wait for the arrival of the Qing prince…On learning aboutdanger and ran way by boat, where could we go back 178?” however, The proposal of Qu was not accepted. When Qu made his proposal again, Emperor Yongli had already arrived at Wuzhou. In order to turn the situation around, in June 1650 Gao Yigong and Dang Shousu made a special trip to Wuzhou to meet Emperor Yongli and suggested to the generals of the South Ming dynasty that armies should be controlled by the Ministry of War and taxes should be managed by the Ministry of Revenue. Although the army was weak, if it was well coordinated and managed, things could be achieved. If separated, in spite of the large number of armies and honorable generals, the emperor could not get the right person to work for the regime179. The leaders of the Dashun army were too naïve. It has been seen that the Yongli regime was too decadent and was beyond remedy. It was not possible for the warlords of different cliques to unite to fight the Qing dynasty. Once the proposal had been made, the court was in commotion180 and the proposal was turned down. Bizheng (Gao Yigong) knew that what he suggested could not be done and felt deeply depressed181. Before the Dashun army was sent to march to Guangdong to assist the anti-Qing army, the warlord Chen Bangfu left no stone unturned to obstruct the army on its way to Guangdong. He tried every means to attack the Dashun army and deployed armies to attack its camp182. This made Gao Yigong realize that he could not cooperate with these warlords. In October the Qing army captured Quanzhou and then seized Guangzhou in December. The armies united to attack Guilin. The Ming armies guarding Guilin abandoned the city and ran away, leaving the governor Qu Shisi alone.

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Guilin fell and Qu died. Qu Shisi and He Tengjiao were of the firm anti-Qing faction of the Han landlord class and they did not yield until death. The last poem of Qu read: In the face of death and the fall of the city, I stayed calm… even my hair was suffusing an exquisite fragrance all around183. This exhibited both vehemence and solemn passion. At that time, Emperor Yongli had fled to Nanning. Jiangxi, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan and other areas were recaptured by the Qing army. Gao Yigong led the Dashun army in retreat to Qingyuan by way of Xunzhou and then to Guizhou to the west. On their way to Guizhou, because of the incitement of Chen Bangfu, the Dashun army was attacked by the army led by Sun Kewang. Gao Yigong died in the battle. Under the leadership of Li Laiheng, the Dashun army marched from the Shizhouwei in Guizhou to Xishantun in Badong, Sichuan province. The army united with Liu Tichun’s army in 1651 to keep fighting against the Qing dynasty.

Another Force against the Qing Regime – the Thirteen Troops in the Kuidong Area The Remnants of the Daxi Peasant Army Persisted in the Anti-Qing Struggle Since the Dashun army was forced to transfer to Hubei and Badong, the antiQing struggle in the middle south area went into a low ebb. The Qing rulers concentrated their forces and prepared to march into the southwest to wipe out the peasant army and the remnants of the Ming dynasty. In 1651 Emperor Yongli, who was known for fleeing, had arrived at Shurui on the border from Nanning. The Yongli regime had no officials and no land. The emperor drifted from place to place homeless and miserable, and lived a precarious life. Except for a few servants, the emperor and the regime had no soldiers and no citizens 184. In this period the remnants of the Daxi army struck a heavy blow to the Qing army in the southwest area and once again brought the anti-Qing struggles to a peak. After the defeat in Xichong the remnants of the Daxi army was led by the four adopted sons of Zhang Xianzhong, namely Sun Kewang, Li Dingguo, Liu Wenxiu and Ai Nengqi. In February 1647 the Daxi army left Qijiang, entered Guizhou, attacked Zunye, crossed the Wu River and captured Dingfan. With the support of the local ethnic minority groups, they seized Guiyang in one action. In April, the Daxi army marched to Yunnan and occupied Kunming in May. Its power and influence had expanded from Guizhou to Yunnan.

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Under the long-term oppression and rule of the Ming dynasty and the minority hereditary headmen, Yunnan and other provinces were sunk in the turmoil and chaos of war. People lived on the edge of starvation. Mu Tianbo, the lord and political representative of the Ming dynasty in Yunnan had usurped over half of the land of Yunnan which totaled sixteen thousand qing. The exploitation was so cruel it was as if he had eaten the bone marrow of the peasants185. People of all nationalities were forced to suffer hunger and cold and to become robbers and thieves186. The uprisings to oppose the exploitation of the Ming ruling at this period of time were fully recorded in history. When the Daxi army was stationed in these areas, the peasant army was brave and courageous in suppressing the armed forces of the Ming bureaucrats and the landlords who resisted. They never infringed on the people’s interests187. The army was warmly welcomed by people of all nationalities. The local people prepared sumptuous food and went for ten li to greet the army188. After its capture of Kunming, the Daxi army branched out to attack the west, south, central part and the east of Yunnan province to achieve military occupation of Yunnan. Then the army went back to Guizhou and accepted the surrender of the grand coordinator. Then part of of Sichuan, Hunan and Guangxi were captured. The anti-Qing base which centered on Yunnan and Guizhou with southwest Sichuan, west of Hunan and west of Guangxi involved was established. Before long the four generals proclaimed themselves princes and appointed Sun Kewang as the chief general. Four ministers were set up and the Heavenly Stems and Earthly Branches were used 189. The reign title was Xingchao. The local areas were reorganized and the peasant regime was established. The neighborhood administrative system was established; tax was set; salt tax was settled; coin was cast and weapons were manufactured 190. In order to follow the revolutionary tradition of Zhang Xianzhong, the Daxi regime built the magnificent Imperial Ancestral Temple to memorize Zhang Xianzhong. Zhang Xianzhong was addressed respectfully as the “Old Emperor”. On major occasions they would go to the temple first and then put things into practice191. Proper arrangements and care were given to the peasant army and their familes. One litre of rice was distributed per soldier per day; a family was given one dou of rice a month; a child under one year old was given a half fen for a month; a child more than three years old would be treated as a grown-up. Horses were divided into three kinds. The first kind was given three litres of forage a day; the second kind was given two litres of forage and the third kind was given one litre. The horses would be examined now and then to make sure each kind got the right treatment192. For a soldier’s family, a cotton robe was given to each

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person. If a soldier had no family then apart from the robe, a pair of socks, a pair of shoes and a hat would be distributed. If the soldier lived in the barracks, the soldier and the horse would be well fed193. The number of soldiers amounted to over two hundred thousand. The Daxi army had good discipline and trained very often. When troops were sent out to fight, general turmoil would be made194. Money was requested from landlords and bad officials to finance the expense of the army. People who had fled were asked to return home and resume their previous lifestyle. Cows and rabbits were distributed to the poor. As a result, residents all gathered here 195. Troops were sent to fight the landlord forces and the bandits. Social order was stabilized. In Yunnan, people were wealthy and lived a happy life. Soldiers never harassed the people and generals never bullied the soldiers. Fair trade was conducted and the nation was arranged in good order196. The Daxi regime also led the “grain movement ” to force the rich merchants to hand in the stored grain to serve as food for the army and as food relief. The top priority was to resume and develop production. Irrigation works were conducted and intensive farming was promoted. The river mouth was dredged. Everything that could be done for the benefit of the people was done197. As a result, the next year the south of Yunnan harvested and people became wealthy. The following third, forth, seventh and eighth years all saw good harvests. People settled down in Yunnan and lived a happy life. The wealth they obtained from farming was enough to support the soldiers 198. People lived in happiness; production developed and the army had enough provisions. Since the Daxi army carried out a relatively correct national policy, national conflicts and misunderstandings within the anti-Qing base were soon eradicated. People of all nationalities actively participated in the Daxi army. The quality and combat capability of the army improved considerably. The Daxi army established a solid anti-Qing base in the southwest area. In 1649, after careful consideration, the Daxi army put forward the strategy of uniting with others to wipe out the Yongli regime. Based on the historical conditions at that time, this strategy was both necessary and possible. It was necessary because the Manchu aristocrats colluded with the Han bureaucrats and suppressed the peasant uprisings; the class oppression was related to national oppression. The Qing army, the bureaucrats and landlords who had surrendered to the Qing army were the major enemies of the peasant army. The Qing army spearheaded its attack on the peasant army, the remnant Ming forces and the Han landlord class who were not willing to surrender. In order to fight against and isolate the Qing dynasty which was the major enemy of the peasant uprising; to stop the Ming remnants surrendering to the Qing army and to unite

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more power to fight the Qing dynasty, it was necessary and right for the Daxi army to put forward the strategy to unite with the Ming to oppose the Qing. As to the possibility, the Daxi army had spent three years establishing a solid anti-Qing base; had trained a strong anti-Qing force; stored abundant battle good and materials; and basically adhered to the independent policy of the peasant uprising. For the Yongli regime which drifted from place to place, the only solution was to unite with the Daxi army to protect themselves from being wiped out. After three years’ preparation, the leading bloc of the Daxi army sent a delegation to the Yongli regime in May 1649. The delegation brought twenty liang of gold, four lynx stones and four horses to Nanning to negotiate with the regime over the alliance199. Since the Daxi army possessed a solid base and strong armed forces, the Daxi regime held the initiative during the negotiation. The letter to Emperor Yongli was written on yellow paper to maintain an equal status with the Yongli regime. The Daxi army made it explicitly clear that the proposal was for a united fight against the Qing dynasty, not for a position in the court200. In the letter it was pointed out that Emperor Qin united the country and wiped out bad officers. The justice of the peasant uprising was reiterated. The Daxi regime was legal as it had inherited the country from Qin201. Two conditions were put forward for the union. Firstly, the leader of the Daxi army continued to maintain the title of “Emperor Qin” which was previously used by Zhang Xianzhong. This exhibited the determination of the Daxi army to follow the will of Zhang Xianzhong. Secondly, the leading bloc of the Daxi army should possess the power to control all the armies to maintain its independent position in the anti-Qing union. There were conflicts within the Yongli regime in terms of the attitude towards the Daxi army. Some were against giving the supreme power to the leaders of the Daxi army while others held that their regime was going downhill but the Daxi regime was in its heyday. They should take advantage of the title and unite with the Daxi army202. It was better for them to cooperate with the Daxi regime, at least for the time being 203. The negotiations lasted for over a year. Eventually the Daxi army took decisive action to break down the barriers in the negotiations. In May 1651 troops were sent into Nanning and several diehard officials who opposed the union and had harmed the negotiations were captured and sentenced to death. At that time the Qing army launched an attack on Guangxi and the Yongli regime could not continue without the protection of the Daxi army. Therefore the regime had no choice but to accept the proposal to unite and fight the Qing army to the north. The Daxi army accepted the reign title of Yongli and moved Emperor Yongli and the small regime from Nanning to Anlong, Guizhou province. The safety and life of the emperor and other

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people of the regime were taken care of. Salaries were given each month. The emperor was given a dan of rice; the eight imperil concubines and the prince were given three dou each204. The Daxi army had wiped out the problems from the rear and led people in the southwest area independently to start another climax in the anti-Qing struggle. In 1652 the leading bloc of the Daxi army decided to divide the army into two columns to march northward to fight the Qing army. One branch which consisted of over eighty thousand soldiers was led by Li Dingguo. They went through Guizhou, Hubei and Guangzhou, marched straight to Guilin by way of Wugang and Quanzhou, and approached Zhaoqing, Guangzhou. The other branch which consisted of over sixty thousand soldiers was led by LiuWenxiu. They passed through Xuzhou, Sichuan, and Chongqi, captured Chengdu and Hanzhong and approached Guanzhong. The leading department of the Daxi army moved from Yunnan to Guizhou. The chief general Sun Kewang commanded the whole army. The Daxi army made a thorough strategic deployment for the march. The army swore to obey five principles: no killing, no burning, no raping, no slaughtering of cows and no robbing for goods 205. After three years of regime building and preparation, a powerful army came into being. The morale of the soldiers was lifted. When the battle started, the two branches of the army achieved great success. In the spring of the year when Wu Sangui led the Qing army to attack south Sichuan though Jiading and Xuzhou, the Daxi army led by Liu Wenxiu entered Sichuan and fought with irresistible force. They captured Xuzhou, Luzhou and Chongqi. They marched on to attack west Sichuan; seized Chengdu and held Wu’s army in the north of Sichuan. However, after achieving several successes, Liu Wenxiu took the Qing army lightly and ignored tactics when fighting with it in Baoning. As a result the main force suffered a great loss and Wu’s army broke out of the encirclement and fled to Hanzhong. The other branch led by Li Dingguo entered Hunan by way of east Sichuan, swept away all obstacles and achieved a major victory. The main enemy on this battlefield was the Qing army led by Kong Youde, the Dingnan marquis. Kong Youde attempted to intercept the Wu army in Yunnan and Guizhou. Therefore the Daxi army had to cut off all the connections between Kong Youde and the Qing army in Sichuan and Hubei in order to capture Guilin and destroy Kong’s army. This battle was of strategic significance. In June the Daxi army seized Jingzhou, Wugang and Baoqing. In July they recaptured Quanzhou which was the gateway to Guangxi, and then led the elite forces to approach Yanguan. In the battles of Quanzhou and Yanguan, the Qing armies were

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defeated and dead body could be seen everywhere 206. On August 4 (July 1 of the lunar calendar), Kong Youde picked the elite army and fought in Rongjiang. A group of elephants confronted his army. Hearing the noise of the elephants, horses galloped in all directions. The soldiers chased after the horses and were defeated. Kong Youde had a narrow escape and spurred his horse into the city 207. The Daxi army followed up the victory with a hot pursuit to Guilin. The city was tightly besieged. The banners filled the horizon and the sound of drums and gongs could be heard thousands of miles away, which frightened the Qing troops in the city. On August 7 the Daxi army attacked the city with scaling ladders. Kong had no way out. With his wealth and properties were accumulated in one room, he killed his concubines and burned himself to death with the door closed 208. The life of the executioner of the anti-Qing struggles ended. The Daxi army captured Guilin and ordered that there should be no arbitrary killing so as to enable people to live in peace209. The whole of Guangxi was soon recovered. In September, Li Dingguo led the army to attack Hunan to the north and captured Yongzhou (Linglin, Hunan province)210. In October, they seized Hengzhou. After adjustment they marched to the east and took Yangshan and Lianzhou. The army seized Changsha to the north and captured Changde, Yuezhou. The army went down to Yongxin, Anfu, Yongning and Longquan. The important town of Ji’an in Jiangxi was besieged. After seven months, the army had recovered sixteen counties and two cities with a total area of three thousand li211. The combat capability of the Daxi army was strong and the discipline strict. People commented that after arriving in Changsha, people there said that the army was of good discipline. But half a year after the army stationed there, the residents did not know of their existence. Half of the stationed army was of Yao nationality and was restrained by the laws and disciplines212. When Li Dingguo attacked Guilin, the city was silent. People in the city even did not know that the army had withdrawn. The discipline of the army was so good that earned it the name Restrained Army. It was no wonder that the thirty thousand soldiers could capture Guangdong and Guangxi213. In December 1652, the Qing rulers sent Nikan, the Jingjin prince, to lead over ten hundred thousand soldiers to attack Changsha. The Daxi army withdrew from Changsha in a planned way and set a ambush ring in Hengzhou to destroy the Qing army. Nikan was killed and the Daxi army won another battle. The two victories in Guilin and Hengzhou made the Daxi army known all over the country214. Upon hearing the news, the Qing rulers even planned to abandon Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangdong, Guangxi, Jiangxi and Hunan. In 1653 Li Dingguo led the Daxi army from Guangxi to Guangdong. The army attacked Kaijian and Deqing to the east and approached Zhaoqing. At

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that time, the anti-Qing army led by Zheng Chenggong in Fujian, Zhejiang and other coastal areas planned to march southward to Huizhou and Chaozhou to join the force of the Daxi army and to oppose the Qing dynasty. The thirteen armies of Kuidong led by Hao Yaoqi, Liu Tichun and Li Laiheng worked in close coordination with Li Dingguo’a attack in Guangdong and Guangxi. They attacked Shangluo to the north and Hubei and Hunan to the west, which held a lot of Qing forces at bay. Peasant armies and anti-Qing allied forces responded in succession and an excellent anti-Qing situation came into being.

The Failure of the Daxi Peasant Army The Daxi peasant army achieved a series of victory, struck a heavy blow to the Qing army and recovered great areas of land in the southwest and the central south. That was attributed to the brave fighting of the soldiers and the direct and proper command of Li Dingguo. It was also because after a period of rest and reorganization in the southwest, the power of the Daxi army was strengthened. With the realization of the strategy of union and extermination, the anti-Qing power of all classes and nationalities was united and a relatively solid rear base was established. The anti-Qing front with the South Ming regime was not the same as in the previous period. The Daxi army had become the main force. The remnants of the South Ming army suffered repeated defeats and its power was impaired. The South Ming generals such as Zhang Xianbi, Ma Jinzhong and Wang Yuncheng accepted the command of the Daxi army under the slogan of “United with the Ming regime and fight with the Qing dynasty”. Although the army of the South Ming regime did not assume the dominant position, the landlords, bureaucrats and generals were not reconciled to cooperating with the peasant army or being led by the peasants. When the South Ming regime was in the dominant position in the united front, the officials crowded out and even wanted to wipe out the peasant army. This could be seen from the way Li Guo, Gao Yigong and Hao Yaoqi were treated. But when they lost power and took the subordinate role in the front, they left no stone unturned to cozy up to the leaders of the peasant army or to make bad blood between people or to drive a wedge between the two sides. The firm and indomitable spirit of the Daxi army exhibited heroic courage, but they could not overcome the class limitations to prevent splits and disintegration. They did not triumph over the sabotage of the landlord class. The ambition of Sun Kewang grew and he started internal strife in order to become the emperor. The South Ming officials encouraged him and Li Dingguo

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to incite him to proclaim himself the emperor. Yang Weizhi, the South Ming official told him that he had achieved as much as other three generals. He had sought no undeserved reputation. In the past, Cao Mengde controlled the emperor and commanded the nobles and achieved a successful career in Xudun. Now the army was in Zhaoqing, did he not have any intention of acting like Cao?215 Fang Yuxuan said to Weiqi, the son of Sun Kewang that once your father became the emperor, I will be the founding father 216. They set regulations and systems for Sun and stipulated that the Imperial Ancestral Temple could only hold three emperors. Zhu Yuanzhang, Emperor Taizu of Ming should be in the middle; Zhang Xianzhong should be on the left; the grandfather of Sun Kewang should be on the right. They built palaces in the city of Guizhou. Civil and military officials were appointed; new chops were made; a prime minister was appointed; and the palace guard troop was organized. Sun Kewang had a strong desire to be the emperor and completely ignored the anti-Qing mission. He even worried that Li Dingguo might make too much of a contribution, which would make it difficult for bring him under control. As a result he spared no effort to obstruct the anti-Qing struggle of the Daxi army led by Li Dingguo. The provisions and rewards for Li’s army were delayed and decreased. Sun planned to kill Li Dingguo and prepared to start an inner battle. Li Dinguo who took a firm stand in the anti-Qing struggle was the second leader of the Daxi army. He was resourceful and skillful in fighting, which earned him a lot of meritorious military service. The bureaucrats in the regime tried to draw him to their side and instilled various feudal thoughts into him. The partisan politics within the regime were very fierce which caused contradictions between Sun and Li. Li achieved a great victory in Guilin and marched to Hunan. Sun order Feng Shuangli in secret to deploy the army to isolate Li Dingguo in Hengzhou, which went against the planned strategic disposition. Li defeated the Qing army in Hengzhou and sentenced Nikan, which earned him resounding fame. With jealousy, Sun Kewang asked Li to discuss official business Yuanzhou and plotted to kill him. In order to avoid a head-on confrontation with Sun, Li gave up the opportunity to launch a counterattack in the battlefield of Hunan and retreated to Guangxi to transfer to Guangdong. Li wrote to Sun that although the overall situation had become more favorable, it was not possible to ensure victory in view of the enemy’s strong military force. It was necessary to make concerted efforts to achieve the great cause instead of hearing and believing slanders and fighting with each other, which would lead to the collapse of the country217. However Sun was too ambitious to take Li’s advice. Sun took his own course and made the victories which were achieved with the life and blood of the soldiers go up in smoke.

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Taking the opportunity of Li’s retreat to Guangxi, the Qing army launched a counterattack. Sun’s arrogant guarding army made light of the enemy and was defeated in Baoqing and then withdrew to Guizhou. All the previously captured counties and cities were reoccupied by the Qing army. Li united with the allied army in Guangdong to besiege Zhaoqing to the east. In August, Li led twenty thousand soldiers to attack Guilin but failed, and stationed himself in Liuzhou. Sun planned to deploy Feng Shuanli to lead the army to attack. Thanks to the divulging of the secret, more loss was avoided. In 1654, in order to guard against Sun’s provocation and to join the forces led by Zheng Chenggong, Li Dingguo led the Daxi army out of Liuzhou and seized Gaozhou, Lianzhou and Leizhou in Guangdong. The allied armies in Guangdong and Guangxi, such as the armies led by Wang Xing, Chen Qice and Zhu Shengnong, all accepted the command of Li Dingguo and fought with Li’s army. In October 1654 the Daxi army besieged Xinhui. Shang Kexi, the Pingnan marquis, and Geng Jimao, the Jingnan marquis, who use to be the vanguards of the Qing dynasty defended Guangzhou and could find no way out but to report the emergency to the court. Xinhui was located in the Pearl River Delta and was the marine gateway to Guangzhou. The Qing army defended the city to the death and supplied food and rescue armies to the city by sea. The Daxi army was good at fighting on land but was short of the experience in fighting on water with ships. So the Daxi army did not succeed in capturing the city even after a long period. Li and Zheng Chengong agreed to meet in Guangdong. In the letter he wrote that Shang Kexi and Geng Jimao had occupied the city by taking advantage of the sea. As to the strategically located Xinhui, the Qing army would support the city with armies and foods. If they could cooperate to capture this city, the efforts to attack the areas around could be saved. Since their army was not good at fighting at sea they should make full use of their advantages to achieve victory218. Li Dingguo expected that the powerful navy led by Zheng Chenggong would cooperate with his army to attack Guangzhou jointly. However the navy sent by Zheng was behind schedule and the plan of joining the forces to attack Guangdong was not realized. Moreover, pestilence became prevalent in the Daxi army and many soldiers were sick or dead. The morale of the troops was sinking lower. At that time Zhu Mala, the Jingnan general, was deployed by the Qing dynasty to lead the Manhan army to reinforce Guangdong. Zhu pressed forward day and night from Jiangxi to Xinhui. The Daxi army suffered successive defeats in its battles with the Qing army. In March 1655, the Daxi army led by Li Dingguo withdrew to Nanning, Guangxi by way of Binzhou. Gaozhou, Lianzhou, Leizhou in Guangzhou, three states and eighteen counties belongeing to Zhaoqing and Luoding and two

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states and four counties in Guangxi were recaptured by the Qing army. The army was frustrated and the southwest area was lost 219. Afterwards the Daxi army branched out to attack Xunzhou and Hengzhou to the east, trying to get the ball rolling in Guandong and Guangxi. But the anti-Qing situation could not be recovered and the army was defeated and withdrew to Nanning at the end of the year. The contradictions between Sun and Li caused a serious crisis for the Daxi army. The Qing rulers appointed Hong Chengchou to take the command to suppress the southwest anti-Qing struggle in Changsha. Hong possessed much military experience and experience in suppressing and placating the peasant armies. He had the position of governor general and administered the revenues in Hubei, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Yunnan Guizhou and other areas. By exploiting the contradictions and splits within the leaders of the Daxi army, he put forward the strategy to compress Nanjing with a concentrated force and to wipe out Li Dingguo’s forcea with a view to destroy the Yongli regime. Although defeated in the frontline and having lost a large area in Hunan, Sun Kewang’s ambition did not decrease. Sun ordered Guan Youcai to lead forty thousand soldiers to be stationed in Tianzhou, Guangxi to cut off Li’s rout of retreat. Sun was eager to be the emperor and he forced Emperor Yongli to abdicate. The civil and military officials of the regime were killed by Sun. Exiled in Anlong, a remote place in Guizhou, the Yongli regime had no real power and depended on Sun for a living. Despite its decadence and incompetence, the Yongli regime was the symbol of the anti-Qing struggle for all classes. It held together the anti-Qing power which was scattered everywhere. The arrogant and rude behavior of Sun Kewang was unpopular, which jeopardized the overall situation of the antiQing struggle. Emperor Yongli sent an edict written in blood to Li Dingguo. In the edict he recounted how Sun had forced him to abdicate and asked Li to come to his rescue. Li Dingguo said that he would give priority to killing the usurper and then set about recovering the land 220. The contradictions between Li and Sun became increasingly aggravated. In 1656, under the pressure of the Qing army, Li Dingguo withdrew from Guangxi. There were only six thousand soldiers left after the long period of fighting. Fortunately the army led by Guan Youcai which intended to cut off Li’s army in Tianzhou put down its arms and joined Li’s forces. Thus the route of retreat to the west was opened up. In March, Li Dingguo went to Anlong, Guizhou to welcome Emperor Yongli to Kunming. At that time, Sun Kewang’s army was still in east Guizhou and the armies stationed in Kunming all joined Li Dingguo. Li Dingguo was conferred as Jin marquis and Liu Wenxiu was conferred as Shu marquis. Li still wanted to compromise with Sun. Li asked

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Liu Wenxiu to write a blood letter to Sun and sent Bai Wenxuan to mediate in Guizhou. Sun’s conspiracy of removing the emperor and making himself king did not come true, and the route of retreat was occupied by Li Dingguo. Sun became so agitated that he detained Bai Wenxuan and was determined to provoke a battle, and the reconciliation became a pipedream. In September 1657, under the name of ridding the emperor of evil ministers, Sun Kewang deployed over a hundred thousand soldiers to cross the Panjiang and to attack Kunming. The Yongli regime deprived Sun of the title of Qin marquis and dispatched Li Dingguo and Liu Wenxiu to confront the enemy. The parties put up fierce fighting in Jiaoshui, Qujing. With very few armed forces, there was a great disparity between Sun’s army and that of Li’s. The battle provoked by Sun was against the wish of the people and opposed by the majority of generals and soldiers of the Daxi army. Sun Kewang was unpopular among the generals and soldiers221. Bai Wenxuan, Ma Jinzhong, Ma Weixing, Ma Bao and Feng Shuangli who were military officers under Sun’s command all changed sides before the battle. Sun was defeated utterly, fled to the east and surrendered to the Qing dynasty. At first, he was appointed as marquis but was shot to death while hunting in the name of a mistaken shooting. Sun Kewang ended in ignominious fiasco. Li Dingguo’s conservative and paralytic thought grew and he lost the entrepreneurial spirit. Ma Jixiang and Pang Tianshou who were good at flattery were entrusted with important posts. After defeating Sun and his army, there was an atmosphere of peace and prosperity in the city of Kunming. Fireworks, music and dances could be seen everywhere. The Qing rulers did not relax their vigilance and at first they were frightened by the valour and vigour of the Daxi army and adopted a conservative attitude on the southwest front. They watched closely the conflicts between Sun Kewang and Li Dingguo. Li Guoying, the governor of Sichuan, was stationed in Baoqing; Hong Chengchou was stationed in Changsha; the chief general Chen Tai and A Erjin were stationed in Jingzhou one after another; Shang Kexi was stationed in Zhaoqing. If armies attacked Hunan, Guangzhou, the north of Sichuan and the east of Guangdong, the Qing army would beat them back. The areas were strategically located and the terrain was steep, and the generals and soldiers deployed to Yunnan, Guizhou and the east of Sichuan were all battle-hardened222. After surrendering to the Qing army, Sun revealed all the military secrets of the Daxi army. Sun even presented a detailed map of Yunnan to the Qing rulers which enabled the Qing army know the Daxi army like the palm of their hand. The Qing rulers assumed that it was the right moment to launch an attack since the peasant army was in internal disorder

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and people were not of one mind 223. In April 1658 (the 15th year of Shuzhi), the Qing army branched into three columns to attack Guizhou. The main force of the middle way led by Tuoluo, the Jingkou general, and Hong Chengchou marched westward from Hunan; the western force led by Pingxi marquis Wu Sangui and Dingxi general Mo Le Genxia (Li Guohan) marched southward from Sichuan; the eastern force led by Zhuo Butai, the Zhengnan general, marched northward from Guangxi. Duo Ni, the Xin governor, was ordered to govern the three routes of the army. With the Qing army pressing on the border, Li Dingguo still stayed in Yongchang, west of Yunnan, to suppress the revolts of Sun’s remnant army. The Qing army was divided to capture Zuiyi, Guiyang and Dushan. With the front in an emergency, Li Dingguo led the army back from the west of Yunnan. The divided forces of the Qing army attacked together but the troops did not concentrate. Luo Tuo’s army was stationed in Guiyang. If the Daxi army had focused on the fight and defeated this army, it would have been possible to retrieve the situation. But Li hesitated and did not make a prompt move. He deployed troops to fight in the area of Panjiang, adopted a passive defense strategy, and missed the opportune time to attack. In December, with full preparation, the Qing army branched into three columns to intrude into the area. The northern force led by Wu Sangui attacked the Tiansheng bridge by way of Zunyi and launched a sneak raid on the retreat route of the Daxi army; the middle way force marched directly to Shuixi and captured Qujing; Li Dingguo led his main force to fight the southern force led by Zhuo Butai in Luoyan and Liangshuijing. Li’s army was defeated and faced the risk of full collapse. Li Dingguo’s family and relatives were killed. The number of the dead people and soldiers amounted to three to four hundred thousand. The crack troops of the Daxi army were wiped out. On January 5, 1659 (December 13 of the 15th year of Shunzhi), Li Dingguo returned to Kunming. People in the Yongli regime were agitated. Some proposed defending the city while others advocated fleeing to Sichuan. The South Ming bureaucrats Mu Tiabo and Ma Jixiang suggested fleeing to the west of Yunnan while Li Dingguo advocated retreating and defending the south of Yunnan. On the 7th the Yongli regime fled helter-skelter to the west with the Qing army led by Wu Sangui in hot pursuit. Li Dingguo set up three circle of ambuscades and prepared to annihilate the Qing army in the Mopan Moutains (to the northwest of Malong county), west of Yunnan. Since Wu Sangui revealed the secret, the Qing army attacked the ambush with gunfire. Although the Daxi army killed many Qing soldiers in the battle, the Daxi army suffered a great loss due to the large disparity in numerical strength. With the outcome of the battle being a foregone failure, Li Dinguo withdrew to Menggen and Emperor Yongli

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crossed the border into Burma. In August 1661 Wu Sangui led the Qing army into Burma and captured Emperor Yongli in January 1662, which marked the collapse of the last South Ming regime. Li Dingguo’s army was stationed in Yunnan, which posed a threat to the Qing army. Li led the army to save Emperor Yongli and stationed in a very small place without provisions. Pestilence was rampant. The army was heavily burdened with the families of the soldiers and did not have much combat capacity. In 1622 (the first year of the Kangxi reign), after learning that Wu had led the army to Burma and Emperor Yongli had been hanged, Li Dingguo was furious and grieved and died on August 10 ( June 27 of the lunar calendar). The Daxi army fought for over ten years in the southwest and was supported by people of all nationalities. A solid anti-Qing base was established; production was developed and people’s life was stabilized and improved. The generals and soldiers of the peasant army kept the glorious tradition of the peasant uprisings. They fought valiantly with perseverance. Although the army failed in the end, the heroic achievements of the Daxi army in the anti-Qing struggle were ineffaceable. After the death of Li Dingguo, the thousands of peasant soldiers would rather return to farming than fall on their knees in surrender. They followed Li Dingguo’s last wordsthat he would rather die in than wilderness than surrender 224. Afterwards, the anti-Qing struggle of the peasants in the southwest area continued and lasted for quite a long period of time.

Another Force against the Qing Regime – the Thirteen Troops in the Kuidong Area The failure of the Daxi army declared the end of the anti-Qing struggle in the southwest. After that, except for the thirteen armies in the Kuidong area on the border of Sichuan, Shanxi, and Hubei and the army led by Zheng Chenggong in Taiwan, the nationwide large-scale anti-Qing struggles passed out of existence. Under the leadership of Hao Yaoqi, Liu Tishun, Yuan Zongdi and Li Laiheng, the remnants of the Dashun army retreated from the central south battlefield entered Hubei and east Sichuan. They elected Liu Tichun as the chief general and obeyed his orders 225. They united with the previous Ming generals and officials in this area and formed the thirteen armies in the Kuidong area226. They continued to fight even though the national anti-Qing struggle had entered a low ebb. After two to three years of struggle by the thirteen armies they established a large anti-Qing base among the Daba Mountains, Wudang Mountains, Wu Mountains and Jing Mountains. Liu Tichun’s army was stationed in Badong;

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Yuan Zongdi’s army in Dachang (north of Wushan, Sichuan); and He Zhen’s army in Daning (Wuxi, Sichuan). The west front spread to Kuizhou, Sichuan. Hao Yaoqi’s army was centered in Fangxian and occupied Baokang, Zhushan and Zhuxi, which was called the north front; Li Laiheng’s army was stationed in Guizhou , Xingshan and centered in the Maolu Mountains, which was called the east front. The south front was located in the ethnic minority area south of Jingjiang. The southwest front was in Lichuan where the previous Ming officials the Tanwen brothers and Wang Guangxing used to station their armies. They united the anti-Qing armies of all classes around them227. The remnants of the Dashun army had learned the importance of an antiQing base from the battles. In the mountainous areas they called up the people to reclaim the land, developed production, and eradicated exorbitant taxes and levies to alleviate the burden of the people. They farmed and harvested grain and cotton to provide food and clothes for themselves. They traded salt and iron with the local residents 228. Within their jurisdiction, people traded fairly and lived and worked in peace and contentment. People came over to their side peacefully. They won the support of the masses229. Gradually, a large anti-Qing base where people could fight the Qing army and farm and train soldiers was established230. Because of the correct policy, a large number of peasants participated in the thirteen armies. The number of the soldiers quickly increased to several hundred thousand. After 1615 the thirteen armies usually took the initiative to attack the Qing armies. They attacked Xiangyan, Yiling, Guizhou, Yichang and other areas. In 1658, in order to foil the Qing army’s plan of attacking the Daxi army in Yunnan and Guizhou, the thirteen armies ignored the long journey and started two battles to besiege Chongqing. The first battle took place in August 1658. Liu Tichun, Li Laiheng, Yuan Zongdi and Tan Wen led the army to attack Chongqing by water. Due to the tight defense of the army led by Wu Sangui, the thirteen armies did not succeed and retreated. The second battle occurred in January, the following year. The three Tan brothers acted as the vanguard army and besieged Chongqing. The river was full of warships and the forces were confident231. Because of internal strife, Tan Hong and Tan Yi killed Tan Wen and surrendered to the Qing army. Since the situation has changed to such an extent, the peasant army retreated halfway. Although the two battles did not live up to the expected result, they held part of the Qing forces at bay, blocked their march southward and supported the struggle of the Daxi army led by Li Dingguo. After the failure of the Daxi army and the collapse of the south Ming regime, the Qing rulers were free to cope with the existing thirteen armies in the Kuidong area. In 1661 Li Guoying, the governor general of Sichuan and Shaanxi,

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advised combining the armies to fight the enemy. The Qing rulers appointed Mu Lima, the brother of Ao Bai as Jingxi general and Tu Hai as Dingxi general and Li Guoying as the governor general to lead three hundred thousand soldiers on three routes to besiege the anti-Qing base of the thirteen armies of the Kuidong area. In 1662 (the first year of the Kangxi reign), the armies in Xing’an and Yunyang were deployed along one route to attack Fangxian and Zhushan; the army in Sichuan was deployed to attack Jianshi, Wushan, Daning and Dachang; and the armies in Jingzhou and Yichang were deployed as one route to capture Yuan’an, Xingshan, Bazhou and Guizhou. The three hundred thousand main force of the Qing army was concentrated in the area. With the great disparity in military power between the peasant army and the Qing army, the peasant armies were isolated and at a disadvantage. After over a year ’s hard-fought battle, the major generals such as Liu Tichu, Hao Yaoqi and Yuan Zongdi were dead 232. Many areas were captured by the Qing army. The betrayal and surrender of the previous Ming official put the peasant army in a passive position. Although Li Laiheng defeated the Qing army in Qi Liping, Fangxian and achieved a big success, the army was isolated and besieged in the Maolu Mountains, west of Xingshan. Li Laiheng made use of the favorable terrain which was hard to attack to continue to fight hard with the Qing army, which showed unyielding heroism. In September 1664 the Qing army sent the traitor to lead the army to climb from the back hill and launched an attack on the base. Out of provisions and reinforcements, Li could not save the day and burned himself and his family233. There were altogether thirty thousand soldiers in the army. Except for hundreds of people who were captured, no one surrendered to the Qing army, which exhibited the resolute and unyielding spirit of the peasant class in resisting class oppression and national oppression. The anti-Qing struggle of the thirteen armies of the Kuidong area took place when the national anti-Qing battle was in the low ebb. The national reign of the Qing dynasty in the military, political and economic fields gradually took shape. The isolated Badong area could not withstand the siege of the main force of the Qing army and the peasant armies were not able to fulfill the task. The peasant army led by Li Laiheng and other generals inherited the brave and heroic tradition of Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong to resist the class oppression and national oppression of the Qing dynasty. They abandoned the limitations of the South Ming regime and commanded the armed forces independently. They carried out political and military policies which were in favor of the people within the anti-Qing base and maintained the true qualities of the peasant armies. It was rare and commendable for the army to keep fighting for over a decade on the border of Sichuan, Shaanxi and Hubei.

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The Anti-Qing Struggle Led by Zheng Chenggong and the Recovery of Taiwan The Anti-Qing Struggle Led by Zheng Chenggong It was the marine armed forces led by Zheng Chenggong that kept fighting with the Qing dynasty to the end. The given name of Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662) was Sen. He had another name Damu. He was the son of Zheng Zhilong. He attended school in the early years and became a scholar. He won the recognition of Emperor Longwu of the South Ming regime and was bestowed the family name Zheng. His given name was changed to Chenggong. Zheng Zhilong surrendered to the Qing dynasty, ignoring the persuasion by Zheng Chenggong. Zheng Chenggong led the army and refused to surrender to the Qing dynasty. He did not obey the order of the Qing rulers and did not shave his hair. His will was as strong and firm as the mountain234. Zheng Chenggong recruited followers and organized allied armies in Nan’ao, Guangdong. He hoisted the ensign of going against his father and saving the nation, and maintained the anti-Qing struggle, firstly with the reign title of Longwu and then of Yongli. From 1647 to 1649, Zheng Chenggong led the marine allied forces to attack Tong’an, Haicheng and Zhangfu, and captured Quanzhou, Minan and other coastal areas. The army established an anti-Qing base in Jinmen and Xiamen. Xiamen was named Zhouzuosuo in Ming dynasty. Zheng Chenggong renamed it as Simingzhou after his occupation. He set appointed six officials to manage the affairs, amplified organizations and united all kinds of anti-Qing powers. The social order of Jinmen and Xiamen was stabilized and marine trade developed further. Merchants and people from various regions gathered in Simingzhou. The place exhibited a scene of peace and prosperity235. The antiQing allied armies grew quickly and their influence expanded to Chaozhou, Chaoyang, Huilai and Jieyang in Guangdong. In 1652 the Daxi army set off an upsurge of anti-Qing struggle. Zheng Chenggong led a hundred thousand soldiers to attack Haicheng, Changtai, Zhangzhou, Zhangfu and other areas. In 1653 (the tenth year of the Shunzhi reign, the seventh year of Yongli of the South Ming), to coordinate with Li Dingguo’s army in Guangxi, Zheng deployed the navy southward to Chaozhou. Zheng also cooperated with Zhang Mingzhen, the previous officer of the Lu prince, and joined the forces to move northward and was stationed in Chongming island. The following year, Li Dingguo and Zheng Chenggong

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agreed to meet in Guangdong and attack Xinhui together. But due to the delay of the troops under Zheng’s command, the plan to join forces was not realized. Li Dingguo’s army was defeated and retreated to Guangxi. In 1655, Zhang Mingzhen once again crossed Yangtze River, attacked Yizhen and anchored ships in Jinshan to hold a memorial ceremony for the Mausoleum of the Ming Emperors from afar. Afterwards Zheng fought in the coastal areas of Fujian and defeated the Qing armies several times. Zheng looked forward to marching north together with Li Dingguo. They planned to launch a sudden attack from the front and rear and conduct coordinated actions from within and without. After that, they aimed to seize hold of the Qing palaces and meet in Jifu. The plan could make their wishes to destroy the Qing dynasty come true236. After the death of Zhang Mingzhen, the reminding armies were led by Zhang Huangyan and cooperated closely with Zheng Chenggong. The four armies led by Li, Zheng, Zhang and the thirteen armies fought in the mountainous areas and islands. They fought tenaciously and assisted each other, always holding high the banner of the anti-Qing struggle. Fig. 2.1.

The portrait of Zheng Chenggong (Painted by Huang Zi)

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In 1658 the Qing armies carried out a large scale military operation to attack the army led by Li Dingguo in the southwest area. Zheng Chenggong and Zhang Huangyan realized their relationship of sharing weal and woe with Li’s army and sent armies to attack the coastal areas in Zhejiang to relieve the critical situation in the southwest area. Unfortunately they were hit by a hurricane at sea and the boats were sunk. The armies were forced to retreat. But Zheng and Zhang were not discouraged. With adequate preparation, in June 1659 (the sixteenth year of the Shunzhi reign, the thirteenth year of Yongli of the South Ming), Zheng and Zhang marched to the north with massive forces. Zheng Chenggong was the chief general and Zhang Huangyan was marshal of the army. They led seventeen thousand soldiers of thirteen barracks by land and by sea. The army landed on Chongming Island, arrived at Jiaoshan in July, captured Guazhou and Zhenjing, the gateway town on the Yangtze River, and besieged Nanjing. Zhang Huangyan led an army along the river and seized Wuhu. The army was split into four columns to recover Huizhou, Ningguo, Taiping, Chizhou and over thirty towns, counties and cities. The anti-Qing flames of battle were once again ignited in the area south of the Yangtze River and in the south of Anhui. The local people cheered the arrival of the antiQing army and actively joined the army237. The army led by Zhang Huangyan occupied Wuhu. Although the number of soldiers was less than a thousand and the number of boats was less than a hundred, the army appealed to people with its righteous cause. The army strictly forbad plundering and local people strived to provide them with food and drink. At the sight of the soldiers, people were move and burst into tears, which had not been seen for fifteen years 238. The masses supported the anti-Qing armed forces in various forms. The overall situation was quite favorable for the anti-Qing struggle. This event shocked the whole nation. Emperor Shunzhi viewed the situation as urgent and prepared to confront and suppress the enemy personally 239. However Zheng Chenggong was arrogant and took the enemy lightly. He was content with the deference and submission of the nearby cities and counties. He once claimed that cities would pay allegiance to him and the Qing dynasty would be isolated. They had no choice but surrender to him 240. He held that Nanjing could be occupied within several days and with the slightest effort. Lang Tingzuo, the governor general of the Qing dynasty, was trapped in the city and was powerless to resist. He pretended to negotiate with Zheng and Zheng believed in his trick. He did not go all-out to attack Nanjing but delayed for two months. Soldiers were stationed there and had nothing to do. Assuming that they would achieve the immediate success, soldiers entertained themselves with music and dances on the ships 241. They indulged themselves in drinking and

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fishing242. Liang Huafeng, the Qing general took advantages of the lax discipline of the South Ming army and launched a sudden attack by leading the army from within the city. The South Ming army was defeated. Gan Hui, Zheng’s major general, was captured and died. The whole army was in disorder and began to retreat. Zheng Chengong withdrew from the Changjiang area in a hurry and returned to Xiamen. Zhang Huangyan was in a high and dry situation in south Anhui. The Qing army pressed forward with to capture the towns and cities. Zhang’s army was defeated and collapsed. In the end Zhang escaped to Tiantai, east of Zhejiang, through the mountains. He planned to stage a comeback but he could not do anything major due to the great loss he had suffered. In August 1664, Zhang Huangyan was arrested on the island by the Qing army. In October, Zhang died in Hangzhou. Zheng Chenggong had lost half of his land forces and scores of generals under his command were dead. Back in Xiamen, he planned to regain power and strength but the Qing army was at their heels and attempted to wipe the anti-Qing power out. In May 1665, after rest and reorganization for half a year, Zheng defeated the siege of the Qing army in Haimen port, Zhangzhou. Da Su, the Qing’an general, ran way in panic. Many boats were captured. The victory in this battle recovered the morale of the army and enhanced its strength, which enabled Zheng’s forces to have enough power to expel the Dutch invaders and to recover Taiwan. After Zheng’s army retreated from the south of the Yangtze River, the Qing rulers released orders to prevent the army from marching northward and to wipe them out. The order said that residents living in coastal areas in Shandong and Guangdong should migrate thirty li inland. Fishing boats and merchant ships were prohibited from going to the sea. Waste land should not be cultivated. The lives and the property of people suffered immeasurable loss. At that time the Qing dynasty had formed a unified situation in the north. The anti-Qing struggle led by Li Dingguo in the southwest was at a low ebb. The Qing rulers could concentrate more forces to deal with Xiamen which was located in the southeast corner. Faced with this situation and with the patriotic thought of driving the foreign invaders out of China, in February 1661 Zheng Chenggong called his officials together in secret and said that he intended to occupy Taiwan and establish that as a base where they could settle with their families. They could unite together and accumulate strength there, and then launceh attacks on the Qing dynasty and march to fight with enemies without family considerations243. The decision was then made to avoid the attack of the Qing army and to recover Taiwan Island which could be used as the base for gaining strength and continuing the anti-Qing struggles.

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Zheng Chenggong Recovered Taiwan and Expelled the Dutch Invaders Taiwan is an island in the southeast sea of China. It lies across the sea from Fujian. From of old, Taiwan had been part of China’s territory. Back in the Neolithic age, Taiwan and mainland China had common cultural connections. In the Han dynasty, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands were called Yizhou or Chanzhou 244. In the Three Kingdoms period and the Sui and Tang dynasties, people of the mainland and the Taiwan people were in close contact. From the Tang dynasty, to the Five Dynasties and to the Song and Yuan dynasties, more and more people in the southeast coastal area, especially the Fujian people, sailed acrross the sea to settle down in Taiwan. People of the Gaoshan nationality and the Han people have made great contributions to the development of Taiwan. The Taiwan people and the mainland people had close relations in politics, economy, culture, ideology and consanquinity. In the Song Dynasty, Taiwan and the Penghu islands were under the jurisdiction of Jinjiang county of Quanzhou, Fujian. The Yuan dynasty once established an agency to patrol Penghu to further administer the islands. The Ming dynasty also set up an agency of patrol and sent soldiers to guard the Penghu islands. In the Tianqi years of the Ming dynasty, a large number of refugees fled there and Zheng Zhilong organized tens of thousands of famine victims to migrate to Taiwan245. In 1640 (the 32nd year of the Wanli reign), the colonialist Dutch invaded Taiwan and Penghu several times and were repulsed by the army and people of our country. In 1624 (the 4th year of the Tianqi reign), the Dutch invaders intruded into Luermeng, the sea port southwest of Taiwan, and built the city of Taiwan (the city of Anping today) on Shazhou. In the following year they occupied the Xin port and the Wen port. They lied and defrauded to gain a large area of land with fifteen rolls of cloth and built the city of Chiqian (today’s Tainan). In 1642 the Dutch invaders seized Jilong and Danshui in the north of Taiwan. The intrusion into Taiwan of the Dutch colonialists destroyed the integrity of China’s territorial sovereignty. The Taiwan people were under their cruel colonialism. They controlled and oppressed the Taiwan people relentlessly. The land was appropriated and peasants were forced to hand over heavy land rent 246. Residents over seven years old were subject to a poll tax. The local products were plundered wantonly. For example, the granulated suggar which transported and sold in Japan amounted to seven to eight million jin; and fifty thousand pieces of deerskin were sold there. The interest they gained from the trade alone amounted to over three hundred thousand Holland dun. The aggressor troops burned and killed unhumanely in the local areas. A Swiss officer

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who was involved in the punitive expedition wrote that four troops of soldiers fired, drummed and trumpeted at the same time, which frightened the Chinese a lot. They were in panic at the sight of the cannon as most of them had never heard the sound of guns and artillery. “We injured and killed many people. We stayed there for three days and burned everything before leaving”247. As Marx, the great proletarian revolutionary mentor said: “Holland was the typical capitalist state in the 17th century. Their history was a history of punic faith, bribery, massacre and doggery. Wherever they went, the place would become desolated248. Taiwan under the rule of the colonialism proved this assertion of Marx was utterly right. The Dutch colonialists wanted to use Taiwan as a springboard to invade mainland China. From 1633 to 1634 they intruded into Xiamen and Zhao’an from Taiwan. They plundered and burned wantonly249. The colonialists viewed Zheng Chenggong’s army which fought the Qing dynasty in the coastal area of Fujian as the biggest barrier to their intrusion into mainland China. Therefore the Dutch officer in Taiwan and the council proposed to attack the base of Zheng Chonggong’s army250. The invaders held that if they wiped out Zheng’s army, they could be more prosperous and could take root in China251. This fully exposed the greedy nature of the invaders. It was in the interests of the people to recover Taiwan, to maintain the integrity of territorial sovereignty and to prevent China from becoming a colony. It was the most glorious move of Zheng Chenggong to put the people’s aspiration into action. The Taiwan people with glorious patriotism and anti-invation tradition started revolts once the Dutch colonialists began their intrusion. The largescale struggles were the uprisings led by Guo Huaiyi in 1624, 1629 and 1652. Although these uprisings were suppressed one after another, the anti-invasion struggles of the Taiwan people never ceased. They were the most reliable support for Zheng’s recovery of Taiwan. The patriotic spirit of the Taiwan people inspired Zheng Chenggong’s struggle against the Dutch invaders. On April 21, 1661, Zheng led twenty-five thousand soldiers from Luowan, Jinmen and arrived at Penghu on the following day. They reached Luermeng, Taiwan on April 29. The Dutch army made preparations in advance. They plundered and stored large quatities of provision, built the battery port and blocked the channel. Zheng Chenggong was warmly supported by the Taiwan people. The Taiwan merchant He Tingbin who detested the ravages of the Dutch invaders provided a map and information for the Chinese army. He guided the Chinese army to land on Wei Island and Heliao Island, thereby avoiding the artillery and the blockage of the channel. After learning that the Chinese troops had arrived, people of the Han and Gaoshan nationalities all came to welcome

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and support them. It was recorded that when the Chinese army approached the coast, there were thousands of Chinese people who greeted them and used vans to help them land on shore252. The nearby landlords and people of Gaoshan nationality trod on the heels of one another. They lined the streets to give the army a warm welcome 253. The Chinese army quickly gained a foothold and began the battle to recover Taiwan. The Chinese army dealt the Dutch colonialists a heavy below both on land and water. In naval warfare, Zheng’s army surrounded the Dutch warships with wooden boats and bombarded and sank the Hector. The Chinese warships cut off the transport links of the invaders between the city of Taiwan and the city of Chiqian. In the land battle, the invaders suffered a disastrous defeat. The Dutch army was attacked from both sides by the Chinese army. The leader of the invasion army Thomas Bedell and over 180 invading soldiers were shot dead. The Dutch army was armed to the teeth while the Chinese army only had arrows and broadswords. The Chinese army fought the invaders who had advanced firearms with these simple weapons, which fully exhibited the unswerving stance of the Chinese people to safeguard national independence and the integrity of sovereignty. It also showed the unyeilding heroic spirit of the Chinese people to resist foreign invasions. Zheng Chenggong’s army fought under harsh and tough conditions. In order to alleviate the burden on the Taiwan people, the provisions of the army depended on the support transported from the mainland. They reclaimed land and farmed, developed the economy and stabilized the social order. The army stipulated that no one should disturb the local people’s life 254 or plunder the local people’s properties 255. The Taiwan people actively participated in the struggle against the invaders. According to the records of the Dutch invaders: “Many residents living in the mountainous areas and plains and almost all the people living in the south surrendered to Zheng Chenggong. The elders were each rewarded with a light silk robe, a hat and a pair of boots. These people now abused the Christian truth which we transmitted to them…On hearing of the arrival of Zheng’s army, they killed one Dutch soldier”256. “The local people were against us and fought us with quiants and sticks. They deprived the Dutch leader of his sabre and wounded him257. With the support and collaboration of the Taiwan people, Zheng’s army won a complete victory. The Dutch invaders retreated to Chiqian and Taiwan city and attempted to put up a death struggle. Zheng led the army to surround the city of Chiqian and stated to the invaders that the island had always belonged to China. The island shoud be returned to the original owner. If they continued not to listen to reason and disobeyed the orders, the Chinese would

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immediately storm and capture their castles 258. Faced with the righteous and powerful Chinese army, the Dutch invaders were forced to surrender and withdrew from the city of Chiqian. Zheng’s army immediately besieged the city of Taiwan. Zheng Chenggong assumed that the city was isolated and people would definitely be killed or wounded if an attack was launched. He decided to besiege the city and wait for surrender259. Until the spring of the following year, despite asking for negotiations, begging for reinforcements and attempting to collude with Zheng’s army, Zheng’s resolution to recover Taiwan and to expel the invaders never wavered. After eight months of siege, Zheng Chenggong decided to take the offensive to punish the greedy Dutch invaders severely. In January, 1662, the Chinese cannons fired. The defence works of Taiwan were destroyed and the ring of encirclement of the invaders was tightened. After nine month of siege over 1,600 Dutch soldiers had starved to death, leaving a combat force of only 600 soldiers 260. There was no reinforcements, or if there were they could not land on the island. The cornered invaders had no choice but to lay down their arms. Frederick Coyett, the leader of the Dutch invading army decided to write to Zheng Chenggong immediately to say he would like to negotiate with him and hand in the castle under favorable conditions 261. On February 1, 1622 (December 13, the 18th year of the Shunzhi reign), the Dutch invaders signed their name on the capitulation. Zheng adopted a policy of leniency to the invaders who surrendered and handed over their arms. The leader of the invading army surrendered to Zheng, and Zheng sent him back to his country. Taiwan was recovered262. The thirty-eight years of rule of the Dutch invaders over Taiwan came to an end and the beautiful treasure island returned to the embrace of the motherland. The victory in the great struggle to expel the Dutch invader, the oriental colonial overlord, struck a heavy blow to the western colonialists and inspired the anticolonialism struggles of the Asian people and people of other areas. It was a pioneering undertaking in anticolonialism which has great historic significance. Not long after the recovery of Taiwan, Zheng Chenggong died of illness on June 23, 1662. Zheng was an outstanding national hero who made a glorious contribution to safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, during his short period of stay in Taiwan, Zheng endeavored to stabilize the social order and to develop the economy. He dispatched soldiers to reclaim the land and made soldiers do the work of farmers as in times of peace. He excercised strict constraints on the soldiers to protect the interests of people of Gaoshan nationality. With his help, people of Gaoshan nationality became good at farming and lived a better life 263. Zheng Chenggong was not only a

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Fig. 2.2. The picture of the Dutch invaders surrendering to Zheng Chenggong

hero in resisting the foreign invasion but also a pioneer in uniting people of all nationalities, and devloping production and Taiwan. In the third chapter of The Concise History of the Qing Dynasty , we will discuss the establishment of governance by the Qing regime over the whole country and the early policies of its rule.

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3

Chapter

The Establishment of the Reign of the Qing Dynasty over China and Its Early Policies

A Concise History of the Qing Dynasty

As the economy is the basis of everything, legal institutions and all other policies are in essence superstructures built upon the economic foundation. After the Qing dynasty entered central China, it was impossible for the dynasty to change the prevailing economic relations in this vast area. Therefore the only practical approach for the new order was to adjust and reform itself according to the economic relations and actual needs it encountered and to establish a feudal ruling regime based on a coalition with the Han landlord class. Despite the fact that economic regime and policies are the reflection of the interests and wills of the ruling class, they are both subject to the limitations of the objective conditions. The Qing rulers, in order to build a lasting empire, could only adapt to the economic relationships and actual needs in the vast area populated by Han people, which is where the actual content and gist of the notion of the “Qing succeeding the Ming institution” lie. There were three contradictions contained in the construction of institutions and policy making in the early days of the Qing dynasty’s rule. The first contradiction was the conflict between the fact that the vast Han area had been in the economic and political relationships of the latter phase of feudalism, and the Manchu still remained in the serfdom of early feudalism (the Manchu social structure was still strongly colored by some remaining characteristics of slavery and primitive military democracy). A question was thus raised: should they push the economy and politics of the vast Han area backward to accommodate the social developmental stage that the Manchu was on, or should they make some great leaps forward to adapt to the new circumstances in central China? The contradiction in the social institutions raised two opposing requirements on the Manchu aristocracy, developing two contrasting political trends within the very center of the ruling class. The wrestling between the two requirements and trends resulted in the back and forth movement in the political institution and policy making at the beginning of Qing dynasty, and various reforms and abolition of the reforms. Both very often lasted for only a brief time and were characterized by a contradictory and volatile nature. The second contradiction was the ethnic conflict between the Han and the Manchu. As an ethnic minority in China, the Manchu rulers, in order to rule the whole country, had to make themselves look like the political representative of the universal interests of the people of China as a whole and ally themselves with the Han landlord class to form an authoritarian feudal regime. However, it was certain that the Manchu aristocracy would try to prevent the Han local bureaucrats from outweighing them so as to retain the power in their own hands. Therefore the Qing dynasty applied a policy combining alliance and resistance towards the Han landlords, with alliance being the primary part.

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The third contradiction was the temporary need for further military and political conflicts and the interests of the ruling class. As the rulers at the beginning of the Qing dynasty viewed the establishment of a long-time reign over the whole nation as the their supreme goal, they understood the importance of measures such as restoring order, developing production, lifting taxes, and easing various contradictions. They never stopped announcing good-to-hear edicts, orders and commitments to the people and landlords of the Han race. However the unceasing military conflicts and the presence of the conservative force within the ruling class confined these actions within a limited boundary, practically nullifying most of these commitments. For these reasons, the institutions and policies in the early days of the Qing dynasty presented a complex, contradiction-ridden and volatile landscape. Still, it is acknowledgeable that the long-term trend of the Qing ruling class was a painstaking adaptation to the vast Han area they ruled. This trend, as time went by, became more and more prominent and definite. The supreme rulers of Manchu, Duoergun, Emperor Shunzhi and Kangxi all remained open-minded and sober-minded in decision making and maneuvered between obstacles and interruptions to adhere to measures that were in line with the momentum of history, which proved to be the key to their continuing military success at the founding of Qing dynasty. When the Qing rulers were designing the new institution and various policies concerning the economy and politics, the resistance against the Qing dynasty in the south was at its most fierce. The result of the battles of the two sides depended to a large extent on their competition in economics and politics. In a string of policy adjustments, institutional reforms and enforcement of policies, the Qing regime succeeded in both keeping its progressive momentum and retaining internal solidarity. Thanks to this, it gradually established a relatively stable reign over a vast area which effectively provided support for the battling frontline, where they eventually defeated the corrupt Southern Ming regime that was confined in a small area with its forces scattered far away from each other. By the time Emperor Kangxi won his war on the three feudatories an authoritarian feudal regime had been steadily established, which centered on the Manchu aristocracy and allied with the Han landlord class.

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The Landlords of Man and Han Nationality Based on Aristocrats of Man Nationality The establishment of the class regime Measures for maintaining the privileges of aristocrats of Man nationality The national regime, established after the entry of the Qing dynasty into the Shanhaiguan, was based on the government institutions and political system used before their entry, further adopting the feudal political system of Ming dynasty, and making great efforts to protect the privileges of aristocrats of Man nationality. The “Council of Princes and Ministers”, monopolized by the monarch’s close relatives and trusted followers, had great power. Its members “all called themselves ministers of the Qing dynasty”, and “half of them are nobles and aristocrats”1, and the officials of Han nationality could not take part in this council, which expressed the privileged position of aristocrats of Man nationality in the regime. The “Council of Princes and Ministers” was called “the council of the State”2 in the preliminary stages of the Qing dynasty. It managed important confidential affairs of the army and government in the country, and its power far surpassed any institutions in which officials of Han nationality could take part. The Council of Princes and Ministers had a “department of state affairs’ deliberation”. The emperor’s ministers “deliberate the state affairs outside the Zhongzuo Gate when it is the date to go to court and their ceremonies are like in the imperial court”3. Tan Qian said in Travelling to the North that “once the big affairs in the Qing dynasty are deliberated and decided by all the emperor’s ministers, even the emperor should obey”. He also said, “the six ministries’ affairs should be decided by the head of the council”. When Kangxi was the emperor, he ordered that “all the affairs to be deliberated by the head of the council, Beile (a rank of the Manchu nobility below that of Prince) and ministers are all important national confidential affairs. So during the meeting, they should be extremely careful.” 4 This remaining custom of the noble collegial system which was used to protect the superior group’s political privileges among the Manchu could not adapt to the demand of effective rule of the vast and turbulent Han area after their entry into the Shanhaiguan, and the tendency of centralization was enhanced increasingly. During the struggle of the growth and decline of the power between the emperors of the Qing dynasty and the

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head of the Eight Banners and princes, the power of the Council of Princes and Ministers continually declined. The power was transferred to the emperor. Kangxi’s issuing decree in the South, especially the establishment of the Grand Council at the region of Emperor Yongzheng, “the power of the Council of Princes and Ministers is much smaller, but this institution still exists and is an additional post of ministers of the Manchu.”5 In the fifty-sixth year of Qianlong, the emperor abolished the Council. Another measure to protect the privileges of Manchu aristocrats was that central institutions put aristocrats and officials of the Manchu in important positions. Although the number, status and power of Han officials later increased, in the Qing dynasty, the Manchu aristocrats held tightly onto the power of central institutions from the beginning to the end. When the six ministries were set up in 1631, or the fifth year of Tiancong, they were in charge of the Manchu princes. The Ministries of Official Personnel Affairs, Revenue, and Rites were administered by Dorgon, Degelei and Sahalin respectively; while the Ministries of Works, Penalties, and War were in the charge of Abatai, Jierhalang and Yuetuo respectively.6 Afterwards, during the struggle between the imperial power and the heads of the Eight Banners and princes, the heads of the six ministries changed over and over again among the princes. After Dorgon became the regent in 1643, or the eighth year of Chongde, he very soon cancelled the policy that the six ministries were in the charge of princes. In 1651, or the eighth year of Shunzhi, princes administered the six ministries again but this again was cancelled soon. When the princes dealt with the affairs of the ministries, this in fact meant that it was “one person who controlled everything” and the other officials of Man and Han nationality in the ministries could only “follow his orders without rejection…and do his bidding”7. After abolishing administration of the six ministries by the princes, the affairs of the ministries were still in the charge of officials of the Manchu and there were only ministers of Man and no ministers of Han in every ministry. Han officials could only be only appointed as Shi Lang which was inferior to minister. In every ministry, “there is only one minister of the Manchu, and the left and right Shi Lang are restrained by the rule…without any words”8. In 1648, or the fifth year of Shunzhi, Han ministers in the six ministries were appointed, but the power remained in the hands of the Manchu minister. In order to draw landlords of Han over to their side, the Qing dynasty boasted that there were “no differences between the Man and Han nationalities, and they enjoy the same treatment” when they appointed Han officials, but in fact the cooperation between Manchu and Han governors was not on an equal fooring and nor was political power divided equally. In the central government few Han officials could approach

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the emperor, but “Manchu officials accompany the emperor, and often receive the emperor ’s orders” 9, while and “Han officials seldom see the emperor” 10. Especially after the death of Dorgon, the supreme governor of the Qing dynasty maintained the dominant position of Manchu ministers to a higher degree. Shunzhi admitted that “since I took over the reins of government, I just see ministers of Man who present a memorial of their ministry to me, instead of any officials of Han” 11. At ordinary times, ministers who approached the emperor were Manchu, and at the same time ministers who had actual power in central institutions were also Manchu. “Officials of Manchu are always in charge of every Yamen’s seal.”12 Until the reign of Emperor Kangxi it was the same that “ministers of Man hold the power, and officials of Han in the six ministries and nine departments just pursue the policy. If people of Manchu say something, nobody dares to disobey them”13. During the reign of the Qing dynasty, the Manchu aristocrats always tried hard to maintain their privileges in case these were usurped by Han officials. In 1653, or the tenth year of Shunzhi, Li Chengxiang, the small Zhan of Zhanshi House, proposed that “Manchu officials should be dismissed from departments and Yamen, and only Han officials be appointed”. This was a challenge to the privileges of the Manchu aristocrats. As a result this proposal was considered as “unreasonable” by the emperor and Li was reprimanded for “talking nonsense”. Because of this, Li Chengxiang was banished to Mukden. That April, in dealing with a case, twenty-eight Han officials such as Chen Mingxia, a minister of the Official Personnel Affairs’ Ministry and Chen Zhilin, a minister of the Revenue Ministry, had different opinions from the Manshu officials, so the twenty-eight Han officials were called together to the Wu Gate to be reprimanded. The reason for this was the Han officials’ “inharmonious opinion” and “not pursuing wholeheartedness”, and their “frequent violation” of the Manchu officials’ authority. So their punishment was a decrease in salary and a downgrading of their official title. The Manchu aristocrats not only used some institutions and systems to consolidate their privileged position as “superior Manchu” but also attempted to continue this kind of privilege for ever through various measures. Take the hereditary system for example, in which “people of Manchu who have made contributions at the beginning of establishing the Qing dynasty, no matter which class they belong to, all inherit the title of nobility”. 14 A regulation of 1648, or the fifth year of Shunzhi, said that “since the establishment of the Qing dynasty, officials of the Manchu go out to battle time and again and their contributions should be immortalized…the grant officials will be given the hereditary imperial mandate.”15 Through the provision of hereditariness,

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the privileges which the aristocrats already had could be passed down from generation to generation. For sons and brothers of imperial clansmen, nobles and aristocrats, there were other provisions which could help them get high offices. The imperial bodyguard system formulated in 1647, or the fourth year of Shunzhi regulated that “officials higher than the third grade in the capital, and viceroys, grand coordinators and heads of army out of the capital all work for the country and make contributions…they can send one of their sons to be an imperial bodyguard in the royal court in order to study the etiquette. I will observe and test their ability, and grant them official positions.” 16 Although this provision included sons of Han officials, the emperor regarded sons of the superior three Banners with special respect, giving them better treatment. “The three Banners of Bordered Yellow Banner, Yellow Banner and White Banner are all led by the emperor himself, so the emperor likes choosing their sons and appoints them as imperial bodyguards to safeguard himself”. The emperor ’s bodyguard was the highest position in the imperial bodyguards, “the emperor’s bodyguards are mostly sons of princes, relatives and ministers, and Yudian work at the emperor’s side while the retinue take care of the emperor’s daily life; most military and political leaders of the Manchu come from these official positions.” 17 Therefore the sons of the Eight Banners were different from the sons of Han officials and did not need to go through the imperial competitive examination to become officials. When the Manchu aristocrats protected their class privileges they always whitewashed themselves as representing the interests of the Whole Manchu, trying hard maintain the disparities among different nationalities and advocating their own customs such as dress, riding and shooting, language, and characters. The aristocrats were always vigilant and tried hard to avoid being swamped and assimilated by the large Han population. The maintenance of their own features and advantages, the setting of barriers between nationalities, and the deepening of the estrangement in their heart were aimed at protecting the dominant position of the aristocrats. The Manchu were good at riding and shooting, so maintaining the fighting ability of the army could maintain their dominant power in politics. “If the Manchu abolish riding and shooting and change their dress into loose clothes, they will be subject to invasion”18, so every year they went hunting two or three times to exercise riding and shooting. For convenience when riding and shooting, the Manchu had their own style of hat and clothes. They forced people of Han to braid their hair and change their clothes as a sign of submitting to the dominance of the Manchu. In order to keep their old system and resist the customs of Han, they did not allow intermarriage between Man and Han. They also asked sons of imperial clansmen to “study

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the books of the Manchu”, stopping them from studying the Han language and books. However, since their entry into the Shanhaiguan the Manchu lived in Han areas, and the mingling of Manchu and Han was an irresistible historical tendency. The Manchu had a small population, and their economy was behind that of the Han, so they had to adapt to the higher “economy” of the Han. During a long historical process, in the aspects of living style and language, they inevitably had to accept the influence of the Han and so the differences between Manchu and Han faded away. In 1654, or the eleventh year of Shunzhi, an imperial edict warned that “studying Han books and customs makes the Manchu forget our old system”19; it also stated that “now I find that people of the Eight Banners are glad to study literature and seldom practice martial arts, regarding entering the field as dangerous, which makes the army different from before”20. This “Sinicization” became more and more obvious. By the end of the reign of Emperor Kangxi the phenomenon of “people of Manchu mixed with Han, and as a result they cannot speak the Manchu language” 21 appeared in Mukden. When it came to the period of Emperor Qianglong, even the imperial clansmen “could not reply in the Manchu language”. The Manchu aristocrats did their utmost to protect their privileges, holding on to and carrying out the national dominant principle of “superior Manchu”, which meant a long-term contradiction between the landlord class of Manchu and Han. However in order to effectively consolidate their dominance over the vast Han areas with their relatively weak strength, the aristocrats had to draw the landlord class of the Han over to their side and use them, keeping their alliance with the Han landlords in order to jointly exploit and repress the laboring people of every nationality. The Qing government was a joint dictatorship of the landlord class of Manchu and Han based on the Manchu aristocrats. During its reign, the alliance between the landlords of Manchu and Han was dominant and frequent while the contradiction was subordinate and temporary. This was the main reason which allowed the Qing government to govern the country for more than three centuries.

Drawing over and controlling the Han landlord class Before the entry into the Shanhaiguan, the Manchu governors had confirmed the basic principle of winning over and using Han officials and generals who had surrendered. Nurhaci and Huang Taiji appointed civil officers such as Fan Wencheng, Ning Wanwo and Hong Chengchou, and generals of the Ming dynasty such as Li Yongfang, Kong Youde, Shang Kexi and Geng Zhongming. During the long-term fight between the Qing and Ming dynasties, these officials

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who had surrendered to the Manchu made major contributions for the Manchu aristocrats, becoming an indispensable dependent power of the Qing dynasty. After the entry, the class relationship in the Pass had drastic changes. There was the conflict of striving for national political power between the ruling class of Manchu and Han, and they also had the same aim of repressing the peasant uprising, so there was a big divergence within the Han landlord class. One part of the Han landlords strived to restore the control of the Ming dynasty, and protect their interests, so they resisted the Qing dynasty and cooperated with the peasant army. The other part was attacked by insurrectionary peasants and they turned to ask for help and protection from the Qing dynasty. The governors of the Qing dynasty, in order to rule the Han and other nationalities which had a large population, did their best to win over, control and use the Han landlords to enlarge and increase their foundation of dominance over the whole country. The Manchu aristocrats entered Beijing with the excuse of “taking revenge for the emperor” in order to concentrate the hatred and attack force of civil and military officers of the Ming dynasty on the peasant insurrectionary army. They buried the Ming’s Emperor Chongzhen and his queen and built a tomb for them. They also asked the officers and people to mourn for three days to show their “leniency” and “kindness” to the former Han regime, in order to pander to the Han landlords’ emotional attachment to the Ming dynasty and decrease their contradictions with their new regime. They also persuaded the officials of the Ming dynasty that “officials are still in office; people are still doing their business; competent people are being employed, and people’s demands fulfilled” 22. They ordered that “officers in every Yamen continue in their positions…officers who retreat to the mountains to avoid the rebels can still keep their original position” 23. They also ordered that “all civil and military officers, and soldiers and civilians, no matter whether they were flow thieves or capitulationists forced by flow thieves, if they can serve us, we will employ them.” Each faction of the Han landlord class, who were incompatible with each other under the rule of the Ming dynasty, kept their office and got what they wanted under the policy of drawing over and controlling of the Qing government. Feng Quan, the former grand secretary of the Ming dynasty, gained extreme notoriety because of ingratiating himself with Wei Zhongxian, after surrendering the Qing “got into the inner court and helped to deal with affairs”. Chen Mingxia, who was originally of the Donglin party, was regarded highly by Dorgon and held the post of the minister in the Official Personnel Affairs’ Ministry and grand secretary of the Hongwen institution. Even Niu Jinxing and his son, who were of the landlord class and had taken part in Li Zicheng peasant uprising, were given posts after surrendering to the Qing dynasty.

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When they employed former officials of the Ming, besides giving them their original posts they allowed current officials to “recommend”; they also asked officials of local governments to “recommend all the reclusive competent people in their area for promotion” 24. To the famous officials of the Ming dynasty the Regent Dorgon gave a “written letter of appointment” from himself. For instance, “when the written letter reached the former grand secretary Feng Quan of Ming, he came quickly” 25. In a short while, the former ministers of the Official Personnel Affairs’ Ministry, Revenue Ministry, and Rites Ministry Xie Sheng, Feng Quan and Wang Feng of the Ming dynasty, and Qian Qian, the minister of the Rites Ministry of the later Nanming Prince Fu’s reign, all surrendered to the new political power. Confucianism had long been the dominant ideology of the feudal landlord class. Confucius was considered as a sacred idol by feudal governors. Therefore the attitude of the Manchu rulers to Confucius became an important part of the policy towards the Han landlord class. After the Manchu rulers’ entry into Beijing, they immediately “dispatched officials to hold a memorial ceremony for the Great Teacher Confucius”; stated that Confucius’ later generations “still inherit the title of Yan holy duke”; and in 1645 they conferred Confucius with the title of “Dachengzhisheng Wenxuan Great Teacher”. Dorgon personally “went to the Confucius Temple to pay his respects”. To the Han landlord class, “if Confucius was respected, and Confucianism was praised highly, they will bow their heads to any new dynasty”26. The Manchu rulers’ acts of respecting Confucius played an important role in winning the Han landlord class over to their side. The imperial competitive examination was the main way to select government officials in feudal society. Drawing over and buying off intellectuals of the Han landlord class to eliminate their resistance through the imperial competitive examination was an important aim for the rulers of the Qing in restoring this examination in the first years of the Qing dynasty. In August 1645, or July, the second year of Shunzhi, Zhang Cunren, the viceroy of Zhejiang, because of the existence of “rebels from obedience” in local areas, asked the Qing government to “please send Tixue as soon as possible to hold the imperial competitive examination, so that the intellectuals can hope to become officials and will give up their idea of treachery” 27. Consolidating the political power by examination was called “way without wasting soldiers” by Zhang Cunren who laid bare the truth of the effect of the imperial competitive examination. In November of the same year, Fan Wencheng proposed that “getting people’s support is important to govern a country. Intellectuals are excellent people. If the rulers get support from intellectuals, they will win over minds. So it is better

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to recruit intellectuals from a wide area.” 28 Hence in that year they started to hold “Provincial Examinations”, and then “tested” Juren nationwide in Beijing in March 1646. The general Caigong were the Grand Secretary Fan Wencheng, Gang Lin, Feng Quan and Ning Wanwo who held the metropolitan examination. The “final imperial examination” was held in April. In the first years of the Qing dynasty, the Han landlord class was hit by the peasant uprising at the end of the Ming. At the time “the invasion made intellectuals lose their home and job, and lack food and clothing”29. The Manchu rulers started to use examinations to select officials, which made “intellectuals have the opportunity to become officials”, so they won support from some intellectuals. In the second year of Shunzhi, when most of the country was at war, the first examination was held. In the Provincial Examination in Shuntian, “Three thousand people went into the examination room”. This made Dorgon feel surprised at “How many intellectuals there are!” 30 The examination attracted some of the intellectuals, which eased the resistance of Han landlords and intellectuals to some extent and enhanced the ruling power of the Manchu. The Manchu rulers of Manchu summoned and assimilated Han generals and soldiers to enhance their combat power against the peasant insurrectionary army and the Nanming royal court, and to decrease the difficulty of ruling a vast area without enough Manchu troops. Before the entry into the Shanhaiguan, the Manchu rulers had established the Eight Banners of Han. Kong Youde, Shang Kexi, Geng Zhongming and later Hong Chengchou and Wu Sangui were all subordinate to the Han Eight Banners. Among them, Wu Sangui made a big contribution and was very powerful. He helped the Manchu conquered Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou, and repressed the remnant troops of Zhang Xianzhong peasant insurrectionary army, ending the Nanming Prince Gui’s political power at last. People in the Eight Banners of Han were all of Han nationality but using the organizational form of the Manchu Eight Banners of Manchu with the feature of combining Manchu and Han. Using the Han Eight Banners’ officials to offer amnesty and enlistment to rebels in various regions had an important effect which could not be attained by the Manchu rulers. In the early stage of the Qing dynasty, most local governors were bannermen of the Han military. In the first years of the Qing dynasty, Zhang Cunren (White Blue Flag of Han) offered amnesty and enlistment to rebels in Jin, Yu, Zhe and Min, and suppressed the Yuyuan troops, and was the appointed viceroy of Zhili, Shandong and Henan. Meng Qiaofang (White Red Flag of Han) was the viceroy of Shanxi. He offered amnesty and enlistment to rebels in Shanxi and suppressed the uprising of the Hui people. Hong Chengchou (White Yellow Flag of Han) was in charge of the south. He employed Han officials to suppress

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scattered insurrectionary armies and “all the insurrectionary armies nationwide were exterminated”; he then administered Huguang, Jiangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou, “the stability of the southwest is all due to his contributions” 31. The Banners of the Han military became an indispensable power in enhancing the control of the Qing dynasty. Especially in local districts, from the beginning of the Qing dynasty to the middle stage of it, the rulers asked the Manchu Eight Banners to garrison important places while they were always focusing on the dependence on the Han Banners. According to the statistics, in the reigns of Shunzhi, Kangxi and Yongzheng, “in the local governors and members of the Eight Banners, seven out of ten are Han nationality, and three of ten are Manchu, while only two are Mongolians”32, which demonstrated the role that Han bannermen played in enhancing the rule of the Qing dynasty. The policy of drawing over the Han officials and landlord class was aimed at maintaining the leadership of the Manchu rulers and the control of the Qing dynasty, therefore winning over and controlling were combined. At different times to different people, the principles would be different and have a different emphasis. In each district the circumstances of the Han landlord class were different, and their attitudes to the Qing rulers had disparities at some stages. Generally, the landlord class in areas which went had been attacked heavily by the peasant insurrectionary armies of the Ming had been submitted to the Qing rulers quickly. They “felt quite happy” with the principle of employment widely carried out by the Qing rulers, and felt deeply grateful. In the southern areas where the Qing military did not arrive for a short while, because of the existence of Nanming Prince Lu, Prince Tang, and Prince Gui who were the political power resisting the Qing government, and in addition the backward and barbaric measures of tonsure and “massacre” undertaken by the Qing rulers, led to a resistant attitude in some Han landlords for a certain time. Moreover when the control of the Qing dynasty was not consolidated, their policies to the Han officials and landlords were mostly “lenient” but after their control was consolidated step by step their attitude became severe. According to the different attitudes of Han officials and landlords to the control of the Qing dynasty, in June 1646, or April, the third year of Shunzhi, the rulers of the Qing dynasty released an edict to “dismiss all the students who are not selected by examinations in the former dynasty, and they have to pay taxes and enlist in the army like any other civilian. If someone tries to deceive and escape from this, he will be heavily punished.” 33 Originally, the Ming landlord class enjoyed various political and economic privileges to exploit and oppress the peasants. Their sons, who were Juren, Jiansheng and Shengyuan, could also enjoy exemption of a certain quantity of grain. Not only did current

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officials at all levels “collect taxes privately, and lead to people live in misery”, but also “these former officials who live in villages now mostly bully the weak, and protect each other, so people have no place to appeal to”34. When the Qing government issued this order, it already controlled the north and the Yangtze River Valley. However the peasant insurrectionary army of Zhang Xianzhong in the northwest, and Prince Lu’s and Wang’s political power, supported by some officials and landlords of the Ming in the southeast, still continued the struggle of resistance against the Qing, and some of the Han officials and landlords were resisting the Qing rulers. Therefore this order was mainly aimed at two sorts of Han officials and landlords. One was those who refused to cooperate with the Qing rulers and had still not submitted to the Qing government, meaning, “in Zhili and other provinces, all current officials who were not appointed by the Qing dynasty” and still acted illegally depending on the privileges of the landlord class of the Ming, “acting arbitrarily in the village and deceiving and escaping from military service and taxes”. The other was those “in Min, Guang, Shu and Dian who support fake kings”, meaning the officials and landlords of the Ming who took part in the struggle of resistance against the Qing. “They depend on their military power and resist the Qing, but their male relatives still act recklessly”35. The rulers of the Qing dynasty restrained the privileges they had from the Ming, and canceled the status of “Xiangguan” and “Jiansheng”, which was the way that when the rulers of the Qing dynasty drew over the Hab landlord class, they restrained their interests and privileges to a certain degree as well. In 1657, or the fourteenth year of Shunzhi, the Qing rulers suppressed the officials and landlords of the Han with the excuse of malpractice in the imperial competitive examination in Shuntian and the regions south of the Yangtze River. This was an important event in that it was the beginning of suppression of Han officials and landlords with law cases and jail. All the chief examiners, examiners and Juren were sentenced to die by guillotine or hanging, or were sentenced to exile. Their family property and household registration were confiscated and even their parents, brothers and wives were exiled to Shangyang Fort and Ninggu Tower. According to the records, “all the Juzi from the north and the south have to take part in the examination again. In the northern exam hall (Fengtian), the emperor arrived at the hall in person, and the scholars carrying brushes and inkstands stand miles away. They freeze in the ice and snow, and stand under the palace. Numbers of soldiers patrol disorderly along them. This stops after three examinations”; “in this examination, teachers and students who involved in it were arrested or put in a cangue immediately, or were locked up kilometers away. They lose their family property, and their

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wives and children become homeless. This also affected several ministers. They were badly mutilated, and their blood flowed far”36. In 1661, the eighteenth year of Shunzhi, the case of Zouxiao happened in the four local government offices of Su, Song, Chang and Zhen in south of the Yangtze River. At this time, the control of the Qing dynasty had been consolidated gradually, the resistanance of the Nanming princes against the Qing dynasty had been exterminated successively, and the peasant insurrectionary armies’ struggles against the Qing on a large scale were drawing to a close. However among the intellectuals of the Han landlord class south of the Yangtze River, the national consciousness that the surname Zhu of the Ming dynasty was the legitimacy was still strong. In addition, the Qing dynasty imposed heavy taxes and corvee here: “taxes and corvee south of the Yangtze River are a hundred times more than in other provinces, especially in Su and Song”. Often “the past taxes were not cleared, and the new taxes are arriving; the taxes in arrears are always more than hundreds of thousands. When Sinong says that it lacks taxes, the government begins to collect taxes of ten years. But people have nothing to hand in, so they are still behind in payment”. When Zhu Mingzhi became the grand coordinator of Jiangning he tabulated all the landlords and squires. In the book “he lists 13,000 squires south of the Yangtze River, and accuses them of objecting to food taxes. Then he removes their scholarly honors and puts them in a cangue. They are also scourged, and their hats and clothes are scattered everywhere. For example, a Tanhua owes a qian of silver, and is also removed. So a ballad says that ‘Tanhua is not worth a qian of silver’”. All the Xiucai, Juren and Jinshi who did not hand in enough money and grain were deprived of their scholarly honors and current officials were demoted two ranks. At that time, “the registers of officials and schools are empty.”37 Because of this blow to Han landlords, literati and officialdom, “there are few intellectuals in the Hanlin Academy of Su and Song”38. This situation recovered over twenty and thirty years, and became better until the middle of the reign of Emperor Kangxi.

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The economic policies at the preliminary stage of the Qing dynasty and the inner contradiction of the ruling class The economic restoration in the preliminary stage of Qing dynasty Due to years of chaos and wars, the dynasty inherited an ailing social economy. Farmlands were dilapidated, as peasants fled from home. Everywhere in the nation was the same desolate picture. The area around present Nanjing was described as “abandoned and dilapidated farmlands…fugitives everywhere… wherever one goes, dilapidated farmlands are all he can see; both in cities and suburbs, no signs of cooking can be observed”39. In Shandong Province, “lands are abandoned; on average, one household has at most two members; only one to two mu ( ) of farmlands of ten mu are cultivated due to lack of labor”40. In Henan Province, “areas to the north of the Yangtze River are full of dilapidated farmlands, and those in Henan province are the worst. ..abandoned farmlands extend to the farmost point and human activities are rarely seen. It has been like this for more than two decades”41. In the several provinces to the south of the Yangtze River, the Qing army undertook a prolonged crackdown on resistance against the Qing regime by the several exile governments, called the Southern Ming regimes, and by the peasants. The crackdown lasted more than two decades. “Wherever the army arrived, farmlands and residences emptied” 42, which illustrates the consequences of the wars to society in the region. In Yingshan County the working population, which used to be around 11,135, was reduced to 542 in the eighth year of Shunzhi, or 1651; the farmland of the county, which used to be over 1195 qing (頃) and 80 mu , was reduced to slightly over 26 qing and 40 mu 43. In Hunan, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, “filling your eyes is an extensive void without a single sign of human activity” 44, and in Changsha, “both inside and outside the city, rubble piles high where there used to be houses…such a bleak landscape casts a sadness too deep to be articulated” 45. Sichuan Province, until the tenth year of Kangxi, or 1671, still had “more farmlands than peasants” 46. In order to suppress resistance along the southeastern coastal line, the Qing dynasty rulers issued a maritime ban in coastal provinces such as Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong, forbidding maritime trade and fishing and ordering the residents there to resettle fifty li inland, “razing villages to the ground and evacuating people”47. As a result, “refugees are deprived of their original means of living”48. The Qing rulers encountered the same problems that all the dynasties had

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faced at the beginning of their rule: the land was laid waste, many able-bodied men had died and the country was bled white. Moreover the class contradictions were very incisive. The Qing rulers could not exploit the public as much as the Ming rulers did. And they could not copy the exploitation methods of the Ming completely. Thus the so-called “Light Tax” policy appeared. In the Qing Dynasty, it was the only way for the ruling class to consolidate their political power. The Han bureaucrat ethnic group, who had a long experience in ruling, found from the fall of the Ming Dynasty that the heavy exploitation was an important reason that caused the peasant uprising. “Over the past decades, robbers often steal from others, and although rulers attempt to wipe them out many times, they always miss the point. And thus taxes and corvée become more and more heavy”49. Therefore they suggested to the Qing rulers that “the best way to gather popular support is to abolish exorbitant taxes”50. “Exempting obligation of corvée and collecting light tax can lessen peasants’ suffering from shortage of money and grain. Therefore the number of rebellions will disappear spontaneously.” 51 To some extent, the policy alleviated the exploitation of farmers. Social productions was restored and class conflict was eased. Thus it became the most urgent task in consolidating the rule of the Qing ruling class. From July 1644 (the first year in the reign of the Shunzhi Emperor), according to different conditions of different places, the government relieved land taxes. Some were fully exempt, some were half exempt and still some were one-third exempt. In addition, some were exempt for one year, some for two, and some for three. In August, prince regent Duo Ergun ordered the abolition of the three most deplored Ming taxes. “The most brutal exploitation among the former dynasty’s abuses is increasing the number of taxes on wars with Liao. It results in the public become poorer and poorer and the number of robbers becomes more and more. Furthermore, together with suppression taxes and taxes on troop training in many places, the three taxations is several times more than the normal tax and exploits the peasants cruelly. Besides, the long term tax is up to more than twenty years, while the short term tax is up to more than ten years. Voices of discontent are heard everywhere and the country and the public are in a critical condition. Moreover, sometimes the government demands to buy more food and goods. Nominally the officers want to adjust the price; in fact, they impose more taxes on the peasants…Besides the three taxations, the Ming Dynasty collects double taxes. The rulers get money by cheating or taking away by force…From the first year in the reign of the Shunzhi Emperor, except for the formal taxes, taxes on wars with Liao, suppression, troop training and calls to buy grain and beans are exempted.”52 The Qing rulers ordered that the number provided in the “Pandect of Taxes” was the positive amount and the remainder could be exempted.

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To determine the basis for collecting taxes and avoid officials adding or subtracting at will when collecting taxes, in 1646 the Qing government ordered the rehabilitation of the “Pandect of Taxes” and the amendment was finished in 1654. The formulation of the “Pandect of Taxes” was based on the following principles: resume the original sum before the collection of the three taxations in the period of Wanli; tax paid according to the quality of the land (barren or fertile) and the situation of the peasant (poor or rich); all taxes to be paid in silver or grain that should be rice, beans or straw, according to different productions; the amount of land, population, fixed amount of taxes and the amount of deserted and reclaimed land recorded in the pandect were all bases for collecting taxes; registeration of adults over the age of sixteen; removal of the names of people over sixty years old from the rolls; and more adults, more taxes. 53 From the provisions of the “Pandect of Taxes”, compared with the period of the Emperor Wanli, the Qing rulers somewhat alleviated the exploitation of peasants. In order to let taxpayers know how much tax and grain they should pay and to avoid corrupt officials, in October 1649 (in September of the sixth year of the reign of emperor Shunzhi) the Qing rulers promulgated the “Easy to Know Inventory” which lists the amount of funds that all prefectures and counties should hand in: the total amount to be handed over and the total amount to be stored as well as the amount of tax per mu the government should collect. The lists were distributed in public and then written pledges collected signed in the peasant’s name in person. If there any official collected more than the stated amount the public were allowed to denounce them. 54 Moreover in 1653 the Qing rulers changed the rule that the peasants should transport the tax to the capital by water into “the officials collecting and the officials transporting. They must not assign this to the public”55. It saved the public from paying for the lost. The “Light Tax” policy was the product of particular historical conditions, not a gift from the ruler. Long-term war damage meant that the newly established feudal dynasty could not plunder an immense amount of treasure as the previous dynasty had. Moreover the great peasant war had disrupted some of the old links in the distribution relationship and the new dynasty could not completely recover the old system. These reasons were the conditions for tax reform. In order to ease the class contradictions and consolidate their rule, the new feudal dynasty had to adapt to the established objective situation and made certain adjustments and reforms on collecting taxes. This was the substance of the “Light Tax”. Of course such a policy played a positive role in the recovery of the social productive forces in the early stages of the Qing Dynasty. However, it should be noted that large-scale military operations of suppression of those who resisted the Qing Dynasty and to put down San Fan’s

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rebellion had been carried out in the early period of the reigns of emperor Shunzhi and Kangxi in Qing Dynasty. Therefore the Qing rulers could not adjust and reform finance and the economy seriously and comprehensively. Most of the “Light Tax” policy remained on paper and the tax burden on the peasants was still very heavy. For example, in Henan Province, “the national army fights several times and flood prevention works are in an emergency state. Besides, the dispatched grain and straw have to be transported to hundreds of miles away. In addition, adults have to hand in taxes to the officials and bump along the long road, haggard with exhaustion”56. In the late period of the reign of emperor Shunzhi, the Qing rulers fought battles in Yunnan, Guizhou, Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces. From north to south, there were several provinces that were involved in battles. These battles cost a lot in boats, grain, straw and beans, and thus several provinces were trapped”57. “There were battles in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces. And the people suffered from requisition. They had to supply soldiers, horses and grasses…Nine houses out of ten were deserted”58. With the continual warfare it was hard to turn the situation that the land was laid waste and able-bodied man escaped from the army around. Tax revenue did not increase, but there was increase in expenditure on the maintenance of a large-scale war. Thus “income cannot cover outcome”59. Short of military expenditure, the Qing government suffered lack of good policies. Statistics for revenue and expenditure in 1652 (the ninth year in the region of the Emperor Shunzhi) show that military expenditure took up the vast majority of the government revenue. “The income of money and grain is more than 14,859,000 liang , but the outgoing is more than 15,734,000 liang . The imbalance between revenue and expenditure is more than 875,000 liang . One year ’s provincial military expenditure is three hundred million liang of silver, however the various kinds of funds only amount to two hundred million liang. That is to say, more than half of the national revenue is assigned to military expenditure”60. On the one hand, in order to ease the conflict and consolidate their rule, the rulers could not increase taxes (which is similar to draining the pond to catch all the fish); On the other hand, the flames of war raged along the frontline but rulers could not raise the huge amount of military expenditure to meet the urgent need. Thus in the early stages of the Qing Dynasty, the government faced an extremely difficult financial situation and so the Qing rulers attached great attention to the issue. In 1647 and 1649, how to resolve the contradiction between relieving taxes and having enough military expenditure were questions in the final imperial examination (presided over by the emperor)61. Only by recruiting the population in exile, reclaiming abandoned fields, and restoring and developing agricultural production could poverty be shaken off. In September of 1644 (the 8th month of the first year of the Shunzhi reign),

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Fang Dayou was the earliest promoter of having garrison troops open up wasteland and grow food grain in Fushun, Shandong Province. “Wasteland without an owner could be transferred to exiled persons and officials; people without wasteland could be given flowing cattle three years for free” 62. In December of the same year, Luo Xiujin in Fushun, Henan Province had asked the soldiers to implement reclamation because the wasteland of Hebei prefecture amounted to more than 94,500 qing .63 In June of 1649 (the 4th month of the 6th year of Shunzhi), the Qing Government had determined formally that all exiled persons, no matter where they came from should be recruited into neighbourhood administrative systems in order to enjoy a good and prosperous life. If there was wasteland without an owner, the magistrate gave the license to open up the wasteland for farming for six years for free. The department official could check the amount of fertile land personally. If it was a fact, they would present a memorial to the emperor to levy grain taxes. Before the sixth year, tax was forbidden. It was necessary to make sure the fugitives returned to agriculture and reclaimed more wasteland.64 In May of 1657 (the 4th month of 14th year of Shunzhi), punishment and reward regulations were issued for the officials who were in charge of wasteland reclamation: in a year if the amount of reclaimed land was more than 6,000 mu , officials of Du or Fu rank could be promoted by one rank; if the amount was more than 2,000, officials of Dao or prefecture rank could be promoted one rank higher; if the number was over 300, officials from the prefecture or county could be promoted too ··· if the reported reclamation was not a fact or the reclaimed land was turned into wasteland again, both the new and old official should be penalized. 65 Since the government used the amount of reclaimed land as one item in the official assessment, many officials were promoted through effective land reclamation. The process of land reclamation was not balanced because of the different local condition. According to fragmentary and uncompleted data, we can see that the land reclamation in Henan was very effective: in 1658 (the 15th year of Shunzhi), Henan “had checked that the reclaimed land was over 90,000 qing , and gained silver more than 480,800 liang as tax each year” 66. Besides Henan, in the 10th and 11th year of Shunzhi, places such as Xuanda of Shanxi had cultivated wasteland of about 3,800 qing 67. The first reclamation of areas north of the Yangtze River was started in 1654 (the 11th year of Shunzhi) “the reclaimed wasteland north of the Yangtze River was more than 9,900 qing , the taxed silver was over 22,000 liang ”68. Hubei and Guangzhou “in the 13th (1656) and 14th year of Shunzhi had cultivated wasteland of more than 8375 qing and 28 mu ”69. In Jiangning, “prefectures such as Lufeng reclaimed more than 3000

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qing ”70. In 1661 (the 18th year of Shunzhi), all the prefectures and counties of Hunan reclaimed wasteland of 2,890 qing and 72 mu ”71. In addition, places such as Shuntian, Guangxi and others had also made some progress in wasteland reclamation. The policy to reduce taxation, recruit exiled people, and reclaim wasteland was introduced in the Qing Dynasty and was conducive to the slow recovery of the war-devastated social economy. Laboring people restored agricultural production in extremely difficult conditions that “although they offered amnesty and enlistment to rebels, then gathered some mourning people, the people were so poor that their strength could not be regained. As a result, some families bought a cow together, or cultivated few mu by labor power ···cattle were insufficient so the life was extremely tough”72. Thus the social production began to recover; population and cultivated land showed a certain growth. In 1651 (the 8th year of Shunzhi), the population was more than 10,630,000; in 1661 (the 18th year of Shunzhi), it was more than 19,130,000. For arable land, the total number of fields, lands, hills and shallow lakes in 1651 was 2,900,000 qing . It was up to 5,260,000 qing in 1661, a increase of 80 percent. But due to the continuous war during the period of Shunzhi, the implementation of all policies concerned with production recovery was greatly affected. Although part of the wasteland had been reclaimed, much other wastelands was not yet cultivated: “the fields in every province began to open up gradually, but there was failure to break them in completely”73. A portion of taxes had been reduce and canceled, but some new named taxes appeared again as the rulers of the Qing Dynasty recognized: “tax elimination was appearance without reality” 74. Although the three military taxes were abolished, “many kinds of taxes with names such as taxes for suppressing bandits, training troops and so on were levied much more than in the past”75. Because the Qing government carried out unprogressive measures on land enclosure, semiserfdom and punishment for runaways, the class contradiction in some areas was intense and so the social economy could not be further recovered. In the Kangxi period, substantial adjustment and reform were continuously carried out; meanwhile various measures were taken to promote the development of agricultural production. Finally the “Revolt of the Three Feudatories” was pacified and then the massive warfare was over.

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Land Enclosure, Semi-serfdom and Runaways In order to safeguard the privileged noble position of the Manchu headed by the Emperor and to protect the lives of the soldiers lives of the “Eight Banners” (military-administrative organizations of the Manchu nationality in the Qing Dynasty), the Qing Dynasty carried out land enclosure and a semi-serfdom policy in the economy. With the aim of strengthening its domination, it seized a lot of land and labor to consolidate its political status and address the needs of the military. After 1644 (the first year of Shunzhi’s reign), the Manchu nobility, government officials, the soldiers of the “Han, Manchu, Mongol Eight Banners” as well as attendants and servants poured into Beijing. In addition to the Manchu, people of the other nationalities in the northeast territory also accompanied them through the Shanhaiguan. At that time an Italian Jesuit who was a witness in Beijing recorded: “a large number of Tatars came into China, which contained not only the people of Nüchen (an ancient nationality in China), but also the Nu people, the ancient western Tatars and the Yupi Tatars ···Not only that, I also saw a lot of people from the Volga, Tatars called them ‘Alga Tatars’.”76 With the large number entering with the Manchu, much land was occupied. In the first month of 1645 (the twelfth month of the first year of Shunzhi’s reign), since the people came from the north like feudal kings, officials with meritorious records and soldiers were unable to be properly placed. The government ordered that “there was much wasteland in all the prefectures and counties near the capital without an owner, as well as that of royalty, the emperor's son-in-law, dukes, marquis, earls and eunuchs of the Ming Dynasty who had died in the disturbances···this kind of land should be distributed to people such as feudal kings, officials with meritorious records, soldiers and so on”77. This was the first large-scale land enclosure after the entry through the Pass. In the 11th month of 1645, there was a second extensive land enclosure which extended to prefectures and counties such as Hejian, Luanzhou, Zunhua etc. “All the wasteland with no owner, once investigated, should be given to the Eight Banners for cultivation”78. In 2nd month of 1647 (the 1st month of the 4th year of Shunzhi), the government took “the Manchu who came from the east this year did not have the land for cultivating” as a reason and ordered that the third large-scale land enclosure be implemented in 42 prefectures, states and counties such as Shuntian, Baoding, Hejian, Yizhou, Zunhua, Yongping etc. The land enclosure mainly happened before the 4th year of Shunzhi at the start of the Qing Dynasty. After that, large scale land enclosure activities

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stopped. According to the Guidebooks on Taxes and Corvée of Zhili to Provinces, the amount of enclosed land before the 4th year of Shunzhi accounted for eighty-nine percent of the total, but fragmentary land enclosure, exchange, and semi-serfdom with land continued. “One county presently reports the enclosed land, the other presently reports also”; land linked to the boundary of the Banner region “had been enclosed”, that far away from the boundary “had also been enclosed”79. At first, it was ordered that only “no-owner land” could be enclosed; later, no matter whether the land had an owner or not, it would be enclosed without exception; first, within the capital city and its environs, later “three hundred mile was not enough, so as far as five hundred miles away”80. Originally the enclosed lands were mainly in the four prefectures of Shun, Yong, Bao and He, then besides Guangping and Da’ming these two prefectures, nine provincial prefectures as well as Nanjing all had no village belong to the Banners. There were 77 prefectures and counties in total, covering more than 2000 li ”81. These places were full of land belonging to the Banners and officials. The government enclosed not only land but houses as well; not only the land of Zhili provinces but also in places such as Jinan, Dezhou, Linqingzhou of Shandong province, Xuzhou of Jiangbei, Taiyuan, Lu’an, Pingyang, Puzhou of Shanxi and so on, along with the garrisons of the Manchu Eight Banners. Within the enclosed land, the rulers of the Qing Dynasty assigned officials of the Ministry of Revenue to ensure that “all the villages arrived at would be measured by riding two horses, and then taking down the length of the land circle to calculate the total area. Each circle would be reward several hundred or ten xiang (餉)... once the number of the circle was fixed, all the houses and farms were belong to the soldiers station.” 82. In the enclosed prefectures and counties most of the land had been seized so there was not much farmland left. For example in Wuqing county, “the land enclosed by the Banners accounted for eighty to ninety percent, leaving little left” 83; in Yutian county, “the land of the Banners was more than that of the peasants”84; in Mancheng county “since the land was enclosed and taken as the land of the garrison, only one tenth of the farmland remained” 85; in Tongzhou and Yongping prefectures, “there was not much farmland left”86; in Dong’an county, “after the enclosure was settled, nothing remained” 87; in Shunyi county, “after the enclosure by the Banners, there was little left in scattered pieces”88; in Daxing county, “the garrisons of the Banners were arranged densely, so the land was in the control of the officials not the people”89; in Bazhou, “by the 2nd, 3rd, 4th or more year of the Shunzhi, there was no more land for enclosure”90. In the process of land enclosure, the rulers of the Qing Dynasty seized a large amount of no-owner land in the name of “circle allocation”, “exchange”,

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and “appropriation”, so that they could occupy land near the capital. In the 3rd month of 1645 (the 2nd month of the 2nd year of Shunzhi), the government stipulated that “all the nongovernmental houses encircled by or exchanged with the Manchu should be recompensed according to the quality of the land. They will be rewarded as soon as possible, and the process must be implemented equally.” 91 As stipulated, the people whose land was enclosed would be appropriated land in other place on the basis of their original land. But in fact the enclosed “fertile farmland” was replaced by “alkaline and unfertile garrison soil”; moreover, “the people left their fields and gardens, and family tombs; they did not have acquaintances around their new appropriated farmhouse and were even without prepared seeds”92. There were many problems because they were strangers in a strange place. Some appropriated land was seven or eight hundred miles away, some was three or four hundred miles closer, thus although in the name of appropriation most land taken from the owner-peasants and landlords was not compensated for. The enclosure by the early Qing Dynasty was firstly caused by the exploitation of the Manchu nobility. Before the entry into Shanhaiguan, the Manchu nobility had set up various sizes of farm village outside the Pass and driven serfs or slaves to work them. After entering Beijing, in order to maintain the exploitation, the Imperial Household fields enclosed by the emperor reached up to 9,000 qing , while the fields occupied by the nobility and imperial clansman of all the Banners reached more than 13,300 qing .93 Another reason for the land enclosure was the need for the military. Keeping the military forces of Manchu Eight Banners was a major issue which concerned whether the Manchu rulers could obtain and consolidate political power, while land enclosure to a large extent was to meet the needs of the Eight Banners armed forces. Different from the army in the Ming Dynasty, the Qing government did not provide the equipment for the Eight Banners. The horses and weapons used for fighting which was led by the cavalry of the Manchu Eight Banners were all self-provided by the soldiers — the “armored people”. If they went out to battle, their servants and reserve horses would be taken with them. In order to purchase the horses and weapons and raise horses, the Qing ruler implemented “land arranged by the number of men”, that was to say that a soldier’s life and military equipment in the Eight Banners were dependent on the production revenue of the established given land — “our country has just pacified the central plains, so all families of officers and the army should be given land according to the number of members” 94. “The horses and military equipment were all gained through our dynasty’s policy of land arranged by the number of men”95. The Banner land of the Eight Banner soldiers amounted to over 140,000 qing 96, which accounted for the majority of the total enclosed land.

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The measures taken by the Qing rulers to enclose a large amount of land showed that “the counter position of economic development” between the Qing Government and the areas inside Shanhaiguan “hindered the economic development, and destroyed a massive amount of productivity”97. After the land enclosure and house seizure, a desolate scene was presented in the Qing Dynasty. The Manchu “were possessed of so much land that some lands were abandoned and dilapidated” 98. The land which was the richest arable land previously was overgrown with the weeds. Instead of cultivation, the land was used for grazing horses and cattle. It was said that “the rest of the cultivated lands in adjoining regions of the capital were exploited as pasture which would then be divided into several portions among the nobles. The princes and the rulers of the prefecture occupied the least part with several li . The upper three Banners (Bordered Yellow Banner, Yellow Banner, and White Banner) and the Blue Banner occupied tens of li . And the other four Banners (the Red Banner, Bordered Blue Banner, Bordered White Banner and Bordered Red Banner) occupied the majority of the land that which was counted in qing . All this land was essentially obtained by enclosure.” 99 The land appointed to the Eight Banners had “no harvest over the years. As the people were ordered to combat, the land was mostly dilapidated.” 100 Without cultivation, much of the land turned into wasteland. Some was submerged year after year by water. Some was basified and some was covered by sand. The people whose lands were enclosed were uprooted from their homes. It was described as “most of the land was occupied forcibly; wives and children were forced to wander from place to place; the sound of sobbing could be heard all the way”101. When flood or drought struck “it was much harder for the poor people to survive”102. The poor people who lost their houses and lands joined the wandering procession that had existed for a long time. Thus the problem of the wandering people was even more pressing than before. Wei Yijie, the officer of the Court of Censors, recorded the tragic scene of the wandering people in the south of the capital as “among the wandering people who fled to the south, death from hanging normally happened to the whole family in one day; some drowned their children first and then drowned themselves; to obtain a sum of money, the children were sold by their parents; some fed on bark and grass roots; and there were untold persons lying dead and cold beside the road and waiting to be eaten by the vultures and jackals”.103 As the houses and land were forcibly occupied, the peasants suffered all kinds of hardships. They had nowhere to turn for help but had to carry on the struggle. The resistance of the peasants and the enclosure of the land occurred at about the same time. In 1646 (the third year of Shunzhi’s reign), the censor Wei

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Zhouyin pointed out that “unemployment made the good citizens desperate after the enclosure” 104. Xiang Yuxuan, the executive assistant in the Office of Scrutiny of Personnel, also said that “the people wandered with so much pain around them…the incarnate spirits and the rebels of today were the lawabiding people of the day before”105. As long as the enclosure was going on, the struggle of the peasants also would not cease. Up until 1659 (the sixteenth year of Shunzhi’s reign), the problems were still about the peasants in Zhili province. It was said that “the people have suffered from hunger and cold since the enclosure and the house-seizure. And an empty stomach has no conscience”106. The struggle of the peasants came as a blow to the rulers of the Qing Dynasty. Even in imperial edict, the tragic scene was described as “the people were uprooted by the enclosure; rumor was wrongly informed; thieves increased; and more and more people committed crimes”107. The enclosure also damaged the interests of some Han landlords. “When the nobles came to enclose the land, the landlord would be kicked out immediately. The nobles would take charge of everything in the house. The wife and children of the landlord and the ugly were forced to leave away. And of the persons the nobles wanted to stay, nobody dared to leave”108. Thus the relationship between the Han landlords and the Qing Dynasty became strained. And the discontent of the landlords with the Qing government grew. The imperious land enclosure policy sacrificed future gains to satisfy present needs, so it could not be carried out long term. The policy undermined the productive forces, caused people to flee, made people bankrupt, and disrupted the social order. Moreover it did not fit the long-term ruling interests of the Qing government, so inevitably the policy was changed. In 1647 the Qing Government ordered: “From now on, it is prohibited to enclose or reallocate the people’s fields and houses forever.”109 After the order was issued the large-scale land enclosure stopped but scattered ones continued. So in 1651 (the 8th year of Shunzhi), the government ordered again: “give all the enclosed land back to the owners”.110 In 1653 it restated: “the preceding decree should be obeyed hereafter and the people’s houses and fields are never allowed to be enclosed.”111 They reaffirmed the banning of land enclosure over and over again, which showed that it was continuing. Early in Kangxi’s reign the large-scale land enclosure started by the Ao Bai clique caused people to revolt and triggered the Emperor Kangxi to struggle against him. After the Ao Bai clique was eliminated, the emperor developed production, stabilized social order and put stress on the limitation of illegal rights of the nobility. In 1669, it was decreed again that land enclosure be stopped: “in recent years the people’s fields and houses were enclosed by the Banners, so that people lost their jobs, had no food and

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clothes, became homeless and wandered from place to place… so afterwards the enclosure of people’s houses and fields was forbidden forever”.112 Thus decadeslong land enclosure was basically stopped. The land seized by the rulers of the Qing Dynasty through land enclosure was estimated to be 150,000 to 220,000 qing .113 Besides the land which was used for setting up the imperial country estate for the emperors of the Qing Dynasty, enclosed land was allocated according to the grade of imperial clansman, noble and official as well as the number of able-bodied men they had. The amount of farmland and able-bodied-man land given to these people was different; and soldiers of the Eight Banners only got the later kind of land. Therefore there were different sizes of courtyards such as the country estates of the emperor, king and officials on the enclosed land, “in each enclosed area, the occupied land of the Banner accounted for seventy to eighty percent, while the residents’ was twenty to thirty percent114. Huangzhuang was also called Guanzhuang. As it was managed by the Accounting and Treasury Department that was attached to the Imperial Household Department, it also obtained another name – Imperial Household Department Guanzhuang and was mainly distributed over Jifu (royal capital and surrounding districts) and Shengjing. “At the very beginning of new Dynasty, 132 Guanzhuangs were set up around the capital city. 300 shang of cropland were granted to each village and the land which was counted in sheng (繩) was handed out to the leader of the village (1 sheng equals 42 mu ). Guanzhuang was subordinated to the Imperial Household Department. It had the right to collect tax”. Later, as there was no adequate space in the inner city, the suburbs were gradually cultivated. And the manors of the Eight Banners were consequently moved to the surrounding areas such as Shengjing115. According to their different productions, Guanzhuang could be divided into various manors: food manor, beanstalk manor, rice manor, pumpkin manor, fruit manor, honey manor, reeds manor and cotton manor etc. Along with the increase of Guanzhuang, the region of the Guanzhuang also expanded. Besides Jifu and Shengjing, Guanzhuang were also established in Jilin, Heilongjiang, Rehe and Chaher. In each manor there was a leader who worked the able-bodied men on many projects as the food, grass, vegetables, fruits and poultry. Or the leaders would convert the produce into money to support and serve the Royal Family to live a prodigal life. Wangzhuang referred to the manors belong to the imperial clansmen. After the army of the Qing Dynasty invaded Shanhaiguan, manors were bestowed upon dukes and aristocrats on the basis of their ranks. “Each land in a big zhuang (莊) was generally 130 shang (or varying from 70 shang to 120 shang );

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the land in a half zhuang was 65 shang (or varying from 40 shang to 60 shang ; the land of the garden was 30 shang (or varying from 10 shang to 25 shang )”116. In addition, substantial amounts of land also could be allotted to the nobles according to their possession of young laborers. The Eight Banners of the royal clan, whose manors were not located in Jifu, Outer Shanhaiguan, Zhangjiakou and Lengkou owned 1,355 of big zhuang , 259 of half zhuang , 475 of garden, and 34 of half garden, with a total area of 13,338 qing 117. The official manors referred to the ones that belong to Eight Banners officials or the generals. Each member of the Eight Banners who was raised to the nobility or nominated for an office would obtain land according to his rank. At least 60 mu would be allocated to him. “Officials under the position of Canling (an officer equalvalent to a colonel) are to be granted 60 muof land…the land is allotted by the present population and position and increase or decrease of labor, promotion or demotion of position will not change the amount of land”118. Meanwhile the generals occupied a great deal of land as they had plenty of young laborers. “A junior general has more than 10 young laborers; a senior general has dozens of laborers and occupies uncountable land.” 119 “The rankand-file soldiers who worked for government offices were all allotted land by the size of manpower. The rich and powerful families were often allotted hundreds of shangof land”120. Various manors mentioned above were established on the basis of the enclosure movement. The land brought by the “Touchong People” (the slaves of the manor who were previously peasants) was also a source of land for various manors. To increase the number of serfs, the Qing rulers carried out the forcible policy of “Touchong” in the early stage of Shunzhi’s reign. The policy allowed the Eight Banners to enroll the “poor people” to be “slaves”. Gradually it developed to the extent that “whether poor or rich, the people went to and flung themselves at a bannerman one after another”. As people were scared of losing their land and paying tax, many people turned their land over to the Banners to seek a shelter. “The accepted men were all those who had a wealth of houses and land”121, some even “took others’ land secretly”122. At the earlier stage of Kangxi’s reign Yao Wenxie, county magistrate of Xiong, wrote a folksong called the “Touren Song” in which it said that “once one joined in the shelter, the owner of the land would be changed; then both man and land are free from tax”123. The common situation at that time was reflected in this song. The Manchu nobility plundered a great deal of land in this way. The Eight Banners’ soldiers had only a few slaves. Generally, one soldier possessed two or three servants, some owned as many as four or five, some even had none. “The Manchu armored soldiers , being only father and son or

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brothers, or just a singleton, gained only a few shang of the fields. Although military service was frequent, the appropriated land was very little” 124 . Generally speaking, the amount of land granted to common Manchurian armored soldiers was small. However the leaders of the Eight Banners appropriated land to the equivalent of about 20,000 Banner soldiers. So the total amount of allocated land obtained by the common Manchuria armored soldier took up a large portion in the amount of enclosure land in the early of Qing Dynasty. Due to having few servants, the appropriated land was mainly cultivated by the soldier himself or with several servants. A lack of adequate manpower or the fact that servants were required to accompany their master in the case of expedition usually meant “the farming production stopped and land was deserted, once in a drought year, grain rations was be supplied by Ministry of Food” 125. Therefore the Qing government gave an order in 1654 that the banner soldiers who owned less than 4 servants could give up their farmland and rely on provisions and funds for living. Some of the enclosed lands were still farmed by the previous farmers who paid rent to the Banner landlords. It was just as Sun Jiagan said: “at the beginning of establishing a capital, the country enclosed the land and gave it to the Banners. But the land was still managed by the people in the form of handing in land rent. That is to say, people still cultivated the land by themselves and the Banners sat back and waited for their rent” 126. Basically, this maintained the feudal tenancy system established in the Ming Dynasty. However during the early years of Shunzhi Kiangxi, the main exploitation form in banner lands was not the feudal tenancy system but the feudal serf system, which was formed in the process of the Manchu nobility organizing Zhuangtun (a special village for enclosure) where serfs and slaves were forced to work and farm. The Manchu exploiting class forced the serfs and slaves to do farming, to graze horses, to deal with home drudgery, to accompany them to battles, and to go out for trading. Direct producers had no personal freedom and rarely owned an independent economy. The Imperial Palace Zhuangtun was a typical representative of the serfdom Zhuangtun. There were “for every ten young men in each village one was voted to be a leader. The leader was given 130 xiang of land, another 4 xiang were granted as yard and feeding field. The other men, staying in the village for complementation, were offered eight cattle, land for building and farming, as well as provisions and wares. In addition, freedom from tax was awarded in the first year.” 127 The manor of Ning’guta, located outside Shanhaiguan and full of the young men who were banished criminals, was no different from the manor of the imperial household in the composition and the exploited status of labor. “For every ten young men in a village, one of

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them was the leader and other nine were laborers. They either worked in the fields or assisted in hunting or burning charcoal. Each person was responsible for 12 shi (石) grain production, 300 bundles of grass, 100 grams of pig, 100 grams of carbon, 300 grams of lime, and 100 bundles of reeds. All the things in their homes belonged to government officials.”128 The servants in the Zhuangtun bore heavy rent and taxes. They were unable to leave the Zhuangtun freely and the host could torture and mistreat their serfs at will. Imperial edict in the 22nd year of Kangxi’s reign said: “I often saw maids and servants commit suicide by hanging themselves or jumping into the river. It must be that their rulers are too strict for them to make a living. In such circumstances, suicide is not strange.”129 The imperial edict in the 37th year of Kangxi’s reign stated: “Manchus often killed their family members having little consideration for old age. I gave that a special kind of penalty, and now thet tendency had been gradually appeased”130. There were several sources of maid-servants and serfs used by the nobility and feudal lords of the Manchu. Firstly, these maid-servants and serfs were prisoners of war. “In the first years of the establishment of the Qing dynasty, they captured the people of Liaoshen and made them become the servants of the Manchu” 131. Before the entry into Shanhaiguan, the captured people from every war reached a hundred thousand people. When these able-bodied men were brought into the Shanhaiguan they were called “people from the East”. Some of them were used as servants of the feudal lords of the Manchu; others were all organized in villages to make production. “People taken in war are all used for cultivating and pasturing”132. After the entry they still “capture people, and award them to those who were wounded in conquering the city”133, but the number of the prisoners had decreased a lot from before. Secondly, they bought and sold people. Before the entry into the Pass the Manchu bought and sold people, and after the entry this phenomenon still existed. There was “people market” in Beijing. “There are horse, cow, sheep and people markets in the Shuncheng Gate inner street. Women under the Eight Banners who want to sell themselves come here.”134 Buying and selling people were permitted by the law of the Qing government. A provision of the twentysecond years of Kangxi regulated that: “if officials and soldiers who were members of the Eight Banners want to use servants, except that various civil and military officials, garrison generals, and vice-generals in the provinces of Zhili are not allowed to buy the people within their areas, others can buy people as usual.”135 Thus civil and military officials competed to “buy good citizens as servants, and even buy more to present to their relatives as gifts”136. Thirdly, they confiscated criminals and their dependents to be servants. There were a large quantity of this kind of maid-servants. The family property

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of all criminals who commited grave crimes was forfeit, and their dependents were given to the “armored people” as servants. The Qing Law regulated that “the dependents of criminals of “treason felony”, “males under 15, and their mother, daughter and wife…be given to meritorious statesmen’s family as servants”137. Fourthly, maid-servants volunteered to be servants. After the entry into the Pass of the Qing dynasty, they claimed that “poor people without clothes and food” were allowed to “come to a Manchu family as servants”. In fact depending on their power and influence, the feudal lords of Manchu forced a large number of Han people to be servants. “The heads of villages and their servants, who are at the place cultivating Manchu farmland more than three hundred miles away from Beijing, force people in various counties and villages to become servants. Those who do not want to be servants they threaten with words and menace them. They also try hard to search out various craftsmen and force them to work for them”. After the Manchu people came they were degraded to servants. The masters could sell maid-servants, but the maidservants could not leave their masters at will. “If these servants escape, the escapees and people who shelter them…all are sentenced the same as the escapees.”138 Where there is oppression, there is resistance. The Manchu rulers enclosed ground and forced people to be servants. They also carried out the policy of high pressure and pillage, and pushed forward the laggard feudal serf system. All of the above intensified class contradiction and national conflict, and drove a number of servants to escape. The “escapees” became a serious social problem at that time. According to the records, in 1646, or the third year of Shunzhi, “within several months, there are hundreds of thousands escapees”139. In 1649 servants “all escape now, and officials and soldiers all complain” 140. In 1652 “every Banner reports escapees everyday, and few escapees are arrested”141. In 1654, “in one year, there are almost thirty thousand escapees, but the seized escapees do not reach one in ten”142. In 1657, because of so many escapees, the government punished people who sheltered escapees severely, so that “half of the important criminals who are executed in autumn are people who sheltered escapees” 143. In 1658, or the fifteenth year of Shunzhi, “in these years, crimes done by escapees have never stopped and many common people are involved and affected”144. The escape of servants caused a crisis to the exploitation and control by the Manchu nobility. The establishment of various villages based on enclosed ground mainly depended on forcing servants to cultivate it. The escape of servants affected the interests of the Manchu rulers directly. The escape of

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servants also endangered the power of the Manchu Eight Banners: “in these years of using military forces, the armored people buy horses and make weapons. When their servants escape, their business collapses and it becomes hard to live.”145 “We used force to set up this dynasty and organize able-bodied men into the register. Now the able-bodied men escape, and the register is destroyed…so there is no way to comfort their masters and encourage these meritorious statesmen.”146 In order to maintain the interests of Manchu rulers, the Qing government formulated the “Escapee Law” to forbid servants to escape. In 1646 it regulated that: “the escapee is slashed one hundred times and given back to his master. People who shelter escapees shall be executed and their family property confiscated. The nine right neighbors, the head of Jia, and Xiangyue are slashed one hundred times and are exiled to a remote area”147. Then it set up the arrest Yamen, which specialized in arresting robbers and escapees. In the first years of the Qing Dynasty, the feature of the “Escapee Law” was to punish the “person who harbours criminals”” severely. When the escapee was arrested, if it was his first or second escape, he was only punished with lashes or tattooed on the face or arm, and then sent back to his master. But people who harbored criminals were put to death. Their family property was confiscated and awarded to the people who reported it. The neighbors would also be involved. The so called “in the case of arresting escapees, people who harbor criminals are punished severely. Once they accommodate escapees, although they are like father and son, they are punished as a rule. This makes fathers and sons of common people like enemies. When they see the escapee, he is caught immediately.”148 The escapee law emphasized punishing “person who harbours criminals”, which protected the interests of a few Manchu serf owners but damaged the interests of various classes and ranks, causing a long-term turmoil in society. For the sake of money and interests, local criminals always colluded with gangs to frame common people for harboring escapees. Some corrupt officials instigated escapees they caught to frame people in order to racketeer, “causing no rich or poor, no good or bad, and no officials or common people through the country, and all the people being anxious and fearful to protect themselves and their family”149. Some officials of Han such as Wei Guan, Zhao Kaixin and Li Yin objected to the law on punishing people who harbor criminals severely, and they thought that the punishment of people who harbor criminals were heavier than escapees, and involved more people. They asked to modify the “Escapee Law”, and confer a lenient sentence. They also advised the Manchu serf owners to decrease their persecution of maid-servants, and change their treatment to reduce the number of escapes. At first, in order to maintain the interests of

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the Manchu nobility, the Qing government was stubborn and insisted on the “Escapee Law” and thought that “the reason why there are so many escapees is because there are people who harbor them”. It also accused Wei Guan of “taking sides with the Han people, distressing the Manchu, and being unfaithful to the country”150. They were demoted or exiled. The social instability and disparity between the Qing rulers and the Han caused by the “Escapee Law” showed the existent conflict between the feudal serf system and the feudal tenancy relationship. Depending on political power, the Qing government tried hard to maintain the serf system but this backward serf system could never adapt to the level of productivity at that time. Its decline was inevitable and irremediable. The severe law could not turn around the progress of the history, and neither did the “Escapee Law”. Therefore “the stronger emphasis the government puts on it, the more escapees there are”, “and the people suffer starvation, and lose their hope in living. Bandits spread like a flame, which nearly developed into a conflagration.”151 “Those strong thieves and robbers are expelled without having a place to settle down, so they will risk danger in their desperation.” 152 The escape and resistance of servants hit the serf system seriously, making it difficult to stabilize the Qing dynasty’s control. It also made problems for the banner land in production and no economic profits because of the lack of labor. The feudal serf system broke up quickly. Many soldiers of the Eight Banners had to sell land, and then the Huangzhuan and Guanzhuang had to change their business pattern, transiting to the tenancy system. The process of the feudal tenancy system replacing the serf system was the process of solving the problem of escapees. With the strength of the resistant struggle the Qing government had to admit that “if we only rely on severe law to forbid people without understanding and sympathizing them, the escapees will be numerous, and there are no profits to us.” 153 Relaxing the implementation of the “Escapee Law” gradually, people who harbored escapees were exempt from the death penalty; in addition, they restricted the sale of maid-servants and people were ordered not to maltreat maid-servants. If maidservants were beaten to death, the master would be punished. Although this order could not be carried out exactly, the problem of escapees was eased. In 1699, or the thirty-eighth year of Kangxi, the Arresting Yamen of the Ministry of War was changed into the Arresting Department which was subordinate to the Ministry of Punishments. The Arresting Department “did not impeach an official with oversight, and did not punish any person for their harboring escapees for a year”154, so it lost its original authority. The problem of escapees which had persecuted people for more than ten years eased a lot.

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The inner conflict of the ruling class and the strength of the imperial power In the first years of the Qing dynasty, its system and policies changed a lot. In the economy, the feudal serf system established in Beijing and the northeast met insurmountable contradictions, giving place to the feudal tenancy system. In politics, the collegial system with the original military democracy declined and the feudal despotism centralization of state power of the Han had been adopted whereby imperial power was concentrated increasingly. The evolution in politics was not a plot by the emperor and several trusted followers and ministers who sought power. It was the natural outcome of history. China had a vast territory and a large population, and it was also a multinational country which had been unified for nearly two thousand years. A scattered feudal smallscale peasant economy had advantages. There were no centrifugal and local forces with strong power to contend against each other. In such a country, the centralized system of the feudal autocracy was not only possible but was also necessary to control such a country. The politics was the centralized expression of the economy. The long-term control by the feudal autocracy of imperial power expressed the national conditions in Chinese history. Therefore it was necessary for the Qing dynasty take the path of autocratic centralization and move away from the “collegial system”. However, the realization of this inevitability was through the governors’ will to power, cruel and merciless inner conflict and bizarre motley conspiratorial events. The inevitability was within the elusory occasionality, and the inevitable trend of the history was expressed and realized by the anfractuous accidental events. The strength of the feudal autocracy of the imperial power of the Qing dynasty had experienced one hundred years from Huang Taiji, Shunzhi, Kangxi to Yongzheng. The emperors had a long-term struggle with the heads of the Banners, princes and various groups of powers, and the imperial power won a complete victory. The Emperor Yongzheng set up the Grand Council, concentrating the power to the emperor himself. This marked that the feudal autocracy of the Qing dynasty based on the imperial power had developed to its peak. Emperor Lurhaci formulated the heads of the Eight Banners’ political system of “serving the country with one heart”, and “discussing the country’s policy together”. 155 When it came to the reign of Huang Taiji, the political power of the heads of the Eight Banners and the princes was expressed through the establishment of the Council of Princes and Ministers, and the administration of the princes of the six ministries. When he made decisions on the important

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matters, Huang Taiji still needed to “put vassals together” to discuss this and then “select and adopt their suggestions” 156; but at the same time, he took measures to enhance the imperial power, limiting the power of the heads of the Banners and the princes and gradually changing Nurhachi’s system. In 163, or the fourth year of Tiancong, when Huang Taiji reprimanded and imprisoned the second Beile Amin, despoiling the Plain Blue Banner, he owned the Bordered Yellow Banner, the Yellow Banner and the Blue Banner (the three superior Banners). He broke the balance of power whereby each head took charge of one Banner, starting the situation of control of three Banners by the emperor of the Qing dynasty, which became the basis of enhancing the imperial power. He also set up three inner departments which took orders from the emperor. However the five inferior Banners were still headed by princes, and each head of Banner could allocate and deploy their own army. The ministers and officials under the Banner regarded the head of Banners as the king. The head of the Banner owned the power of military and administrative decision for his Banner, becoming the centrifugal strength of the centralization. Half a year before the start of the Qing dynasty, Huang Taiji died. He did not appoint a successor while he lived, so the Qing dynasty faced the struggle of fighting for the inheritance between the princes. The ambassadors of Korea who were in Shenjing at that time had seen that because of “the uncertainty of the emperor of this country”, a struggle for the throne would happen after the death of Huang Taiji. “At that time, each Prince had their own party, and they are always in competition; when Huang Taiji dies the country will be in a mess”157. There was the same record in The Record of the Qing Dynasty Shunzhi, “Once the emperor died, all Princes were on watch for the throne”158. At that time, Haoge and Dorgon had the power to strive for the throne. The Prince Su Haoge was the eldest son of Huang Taiji. The two Yellow Banners headed by Huang Taiji supported Haoge. “The Ministers of the two Banners want to acclaim Prince Su to be the emperor”159, “while the country is in misery, eight people of Tuerge, Sony, Tulai, Xihan, Gongadai, Aobai, Tantai and Tazhan come to Prince Su’s home and say that they will acclaim him as the emperor”160. Jierhalang, the Zheng Prince who headed the White Blue Flag, also tended to support Haoge, “Heshuo Prince Zheng discussed acclaiming Er (Haoge) as the emperor at first, but because of his kind character he cannot make all people obey him, so he give up this suggestion” 161. Daishan Prince Li was the elder brother of Huang Taiji and was the senior at that time, also considered Haoge as “the eldest son of the emperor who should be the successor”162. Dorgon was the fourteenth son of Nurhaci, and was Huang Taiji’s younger brother, who had excellent political and military ability. He had taken part in the battles in Chahar, and Korea, and was also in the campaign of besieging

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Jinzhou. Huang Taiji thought highly of him, “I love Er (Dorgon) more than my other brothers and sons, and on confer you distinct reward”163, and he granted him the title of “Moergendaiqing” (meaning clever), and conferred on him the title of Heshuo Prince Rui. Dorgon with his brothers Ajier and Duoduo who had the same mother owned two White Banners, was a powerful contender for the emperor. The powers of two Yellow Banners headed by Haoge and the two White Banners headed by Dorgon were in sharp opposition. The two White Banners set themselves against Haoge being the emperor and said that “if Prince Su is the emperor, we cannot live”164. They acclaimed the head of their own Banner, Dorgon. “Ying Junwang Aqige and Yu Junwang Duoduo advised Prince Rui to be the emperor.” 165 The two Yellow Banners insisted on acclaiming Huang Taiji’s son, and they claimed that “the former emperor (Huang Taiji) has sons, so we must acclaim one of them”166. The two Yellow Banners were on the verge of starting a fight and, on the alert, “when Huang Taiji died, Tuerge (the inner minister, belonging to the Bordered Yellow Banner) who was usually in conflict with the princes of the White Banners, asked three bodyguards of Niulu to protect the gate with armor and arrows” 167. When each prince discussed the appointment in the Chongzheng palace, “the ministers of the two Yellow Banners allies at the Da Qing Gate asked Bayala soldiers of the two Banners to stretch their bows and surround the palace…Sony and Baturu Ebai said to acclaim the emperor ’s son firstly” 168, “the emperor (Huang Taiji)’s generals stepped up with their swords and said ‘the emperor gives us food and clothes, and his love and care are as high as the god, so if the next emperor is not the son of Huang Taiji, we would rather follow Huang Taiji and die.’” 169 In this situation the rulers of the Qing dynasty managed to pull through this divisive crisis and keep their unification, and they had an eclectic scheme in which they proclaimed Fulin who was six years old, the ninth son of Huang Taiji, to be the emperor, and Dorgon and Jihaerlang to assist him. To the two White Banners, acclaiming the younger son rather than the elder one meant it was easy for them to control the political power in the future. Although Dorgon did not become the emperor, Fulin was young and so the power lay with Dorgon who was competent and had the title to assist the emperor naturally. To the two Yellow Banners, Fulin was the son of Huang Taiji, and two Yellow Banners were still “headed by the emperor himself”, so they were satisfied in power and dignity. The problem of inheriting the throne had an eclectic solution, which avoided a chaotic situation of conflict beween the princes. Then the situation changed, and the Qing soldiers entered the Shanhaiguan, attacking Li Zicheng’s insurrectionary army. Dorgon was always the political power holder and

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decision maker. He implemented Huang Taiji’s policy and tried hard to fight for the right to rule the whole country. When he commanded Qing military entering the Shanhaiguan he stated the profound meaning of this military action explicitly, “in the past, we went out to war with the Ming dynasty three times, but those were all for plunder; this time, if we win, and will be different from before. Thanks to the god, we should stabilize the country and give peace to the people, hoping to have big contributions.”170 When the Qing military conquered Beijing, some people were attached to their native land and wanted to go back. They proposed that “Princes stay here and guard the capital of Yan, and most soldiers go back to defend Shanyang or protect the Shanhaiguan”. Dorgon set himself against this shortsighted and regressive opinion. He said that, “the former emperor once said that if we got Beijing, we should move the capital to Beijing in order to make progress. In addition, now the will of the people is not stable, so we cannot give up and return to the east.”171 Under the command of Dorgon, the Qing military swept through more than half of China with irresistible force. In the hubbub of victory, the inner conflict between the princes and each Banner relaxed, and the power and prestige of Dorgon rose steeply. In November 1644 he was entitled “Uncle Regent” and in December 1648 he was respected as “The Emperor Father Regent” and “Regent for the God”, and “Rewards and Punishments were equal in the imperial court”. “The memorials and seals are always stored in the imperial palace, and it is inconvenient to dispatch and request them, so he stored them in his Prince’s House” 172. Thus the seal of the emperor had been moved to Dorgon’s home. For a short while, “Dorgon has the power in his hand, and all the people know Prince Rui”173. Dorgon’s full brothers Ajige and Duoduo had taken charge of the two White Banners and the Plain Blue Banner 174. Then they split up and drew up two strong Yellow Banners, and many ministers of the two Banners went and sought refuge with Dorgon. Haoge said angrily that “Gushanezhen Tan Tai and the head of the guards Tu Lai, Qixinlang Sony all submit to us. Now they lead two Banners to submit to Heshuo Prince Rui…you use these competent people, and I collect those incompetent people”175. In August 1647, Jierhalang was dismissed and Duoduo was entitled “Policy Assistant Prince Deyu”. In 1648, they used a petty crime as an excuse and imprisoned Haoge where he died, so eliminating their political enemy. The concentration of power was an inevitable trend. The open political enemy had to be clear and elements which hindered the concentration of power such as independent Banners, princes holding power and the “collegial system” in policy could not be tolerated but must be limited. Dorgon used his power of regent to take various measures to consolidate his position. Firstly, he impaired

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the power of the Council of Princes and Ministers. Dorgon thought that “in the past, all the national affairs were discussed and agreed by ministers, and then were settled. Now they all gather in the imperial court to hold discussions and cannot make decisions, which delays the country’s political affairs”176. He concentrated power in his hands with the excuse of the Council’s discussions being “too hesitant”. Then he dismissed princes from dealing with ministries’ affairs and asked Shanshu who followed the regent’s order to administer these affairs. Since the six ministries had been set up they had been administered by the princes, and although this had been stopped the princes had influence over the six ministries. Therefore, in 1649, or the sixth year of Shunzhi, Dorgon reaffirmed that “all princes and ministers who intervene in the political affairs of any Yamen and pick faults and criticize Han officials…whether speak correctly or not, are to be punished”, and regulated that all princes were not allowed to “call the Yamen’s officers to their home privately” 177, in order to push forward centralization. Although Dorgon’s action of restricting and impairing all princes’ power had the nature of controlling the inner conflict of the ruling class, due to Dorgon’s status of “Regent for the God”, it was consistent with concentrating power to the regent and enhancing the absolute centralization of authority. In January 1651, or December of the seventh year of Shunzhi, Dorgon died and Shunzhi administered political affairs by himself, so the political situation changed a lot. At this time Duoduo, Prince Yu, whose power and status ranked only second to Dorgon had died previously and Prince Ying Ajige was imprisoned and sentenced to death. Th two White Banners lost their leaders. Under the joint counterattack of two the Yellow Banners (Shunzhi) and the White Blue Banner, the two White Banners were in the inferior position. After Dorgon’s death, he was demoted and his property was confiscated. Some ministers he had put in important positions changed sides and countercharged against Dorgon; others were executed or demoted with the accusation of being “attached to” Dorgon. This palace coup made the power of Jierhalang and Aobai who were conservatives in politics rise, and some policies and measures had a regressive tendency. For example, in 1651, they restored the old system of princes administering ministries, and controlled Han officials and intellectuals severely. They also “changed” and “discriminated against” Han officials in central ministries. According to their different performances, some remained in their office, or were demoted, while others were ordered to “retire” or were reduced to the ranks of the people and were never to be appointed. Chen Mingxia, Chen Zhilin and Liu Zhengzong who were appointed by Dorgon were put to

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death. Jierhalang asked the Emperor Shunzhi to “follow the example of the first founder of the Qing dynasty” and “discuss political affairs” with the princes and Beile. They also used their ancestors’ admonishment of “we fear that our next generations will give up the pure and honest customs to study Han customs”178 to remind the Emperor Shunzhi. This showed that the conservative forces tried to maintain the privileges of the Manchu nobility and resist Han culture. It should be pointed that the conservative forces rose to some extent, changing the emphasis of political policy, but if the Qing dynasty wanted to govern the whole of China and defeat the resistance forces of the Ming Fig. 3.1.

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The Edict of Dorgon (A)

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Fig. 3.2.

The Edict of Dorgon (B)

government in the south, they had to adapt advanced economy, politics and culture in a wide area and draw in the Han upper class. This general political tendency could not be reversed by the conservatives. In particular the young Emperor Shunzhi had a sober brain, and wanted to act. He had a deep understanding of Han culture. Although he was Dorgon’s enemy in politics, they followed one continuous line in the direction of policy. He ignored the objection of the Manchu ministers and continued to put Han officials in important positions. He advocated Han culture and continued to adjust and reform the internal affairs, administration of justice and finance along Dorgon’s road. For example, he set up a monument for the Emperor Chongzhen of Ming dynasty to show his good treatment to the ruined Ming dynasty, and won

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Fig. 3.3.

The icon tablet of Shunzhi’s imperial order

over and pacified Han landlords and officials, such as Fan Wencheng, Hong Chengchou, Feng Quan, Jin Zhijun and Wei Yijie who were still given important positions. He also changed three inner departments into the Cabinet, and adopted the system of Ming organization. In addition, he sought missing books, built Confucian temples and respected Confucian culture. He also changed the old rule that only Manchu officials could hold the seal in every Yamen so that Han officials also could keep the seal, and changed coining money bearing Manchu language into coin mixing the Manchu and Han languages. The conservatives were dissatisfied with these measures, which reflected the conflict between Shunzhi and some of the Manchu aristocrats. In February 1661, or January the eighteenth year of Shunzhi, Shunzhi died. Crown prince Xuanye (Kangxi), eight years old, became the emperor, and Sony, Sukesaha, Ebilong and Aobai assisted him to administer the country. The conservative forces rose again. They falsified Shunzhi’s testament and framed him of fourteen crimes, including “since I administer the government myself, I do not follow the first founder of the Qing dynasty’s law and policy of

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using people, and I was lazy and idle, being content with temporary ease and comfort. Moreover, I study Han customs and changed our old pure and honest customs. As a result, the administration of the country is not competent and the people’ livelihood is not very good, which is one of my faults. Ministers of Manchu have been faithful to the country for many generations, or have served the country for many years. I should rely on them as they try their best to make contributions. However I do not trust them and ignore their talent. Moreover the reason why the Ming dynasty lost their country was that they use more civilian officials, but I do not learn a lesson from this and appoint Han officials, which means the seals of ministries and departments are in charge of Han officials recently so that Manchu officials are reluctant to do their jobs, which is also one of my faults.”179 Shunzhi’s testament reflected conservative and backward political points from Jierhalang to Aobai. They wanted to boycot “Han customs”, and keep the “old pure and honest system”; they wanted to put Manchu officials in important positions and objected to trusting Han officials. However this reversed tendency of history could not last very long. The Emperor Kangxi grew up. In order to restore the economy, stabilize social order and consolidate the developments of history he had to go back to the road of Dorgon and Shunzhi, so inevitably conflict between Kangxi and the Aobai group became acute.

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4

Chapter

The Progressive Trend of Materialism in the Latter Half of the Seventeenth Century

A Concise Histroy of the Qing Dynasty

The Progressive Trend of Materialism in the Latter Half of the Seventeenth Century was the Result of the Times The Creation of the Progressive Trend between the Ming and Qing Dynasties The 17th century in Chinese history was a period of acute class contradiction and national contradiction. The social struggle, turbulence and constantly changing political conditions promoted the development of struggles in the field of ideology. There were outstanding thinkers at this period of time, such as Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu, Wang Fuzhi and Yan Yuan. They were passionate and incisive. They expressed their own original viewpoints on politics and philosophy and formed a new thinking trend with a critical and pragmatic spirit which was in contrast to the old and decayed Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. These great thinkers wrote a glorious chapter in our intellectual history. Engels said: “All the struggles in history, no matter whether in the fields of politics, religion, philosophy or in any other ideological field, are more or less the reflections of the struggles of social classes in nature.” 1 In the late Ming period, feudal society had entered into the later stage; various social contradictions became more acute and the feudal ruling system did not work properly. The spectacular peasant uprisings exposed the decadence of the feudal system and broke the spiritual shackles of the Ming dynasty and Neo-Confucianism, which had a decisive effect on the development of the progressive thinking trend. After entering the Shanhaiguan, the Manchu aristocrats carried out barbaric national oppression policies in suppressing the peasant uprising and establishing the rule of the Qing dynasty, which made the national contradictions more acute and the national political situation changed drastically. The instant collapse of the Ming dynasty and the march to the central plains of the Manchu aristocrats brought a huge shock to the thoughts of the feudal ruling class. In the face of the drastically changing situation, the feudal ruling class kept a watchful eye on the emerging social issues and reflected on the causes of the collapse of the dynasty. Why was the seemingly solemn and solid rule of the Ming dynasty destroyed in such a short period? Why could the feudal system which had governed China for over two thousand years neither prevent the internal or external crises nor overcome the crises smoothly? What was wrong with the governing system?

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How sound was the system? Could the new dynasty established by the Manchu nationality and following the system of the Ming dynasty last long? The thinkers at the beginning of the Qing dynasty could not figure out the nature of the feudal system, nor could they answer the series of social and political issues correctly. However, they lived in the age of class struggle and national struggle and were deeply affected by the various disadvantages of the last phase of the feudal society. Therefore they could attack the feudal system and idealism and Neo-Confucianism with unprecedented depth. They advocated putting what is learned into practice and opposed national oppression, which led to the fresh and powerful social ideological trend at the beginning of the Qing dynasty. Their long-term wandering and drifting lifestyle provided them with more chances to make contact with social realities and the lower classes. As a result, their knowledge was enriched and their field of study was expanded. In a word, what the thinkers learned from the fierce class struggle and national struggles was more direct, more real and more important than what they had learned from the ancient classics. Were it not for the peasant uprisings against the feudal system, there would not be the advanced thinking of the thinkers in the early period of the Qing dynasty. The class struggle was the impetus for the development of society and history as well as the development of ideology. “People’s thinking, such as concepts and opinions, change with the change of living condition, social relationship and social being”2. The development of capitalism in the late Ming dynasty had something to do with the formation of the progressive ideological trend. Ever since the reign of Wanli and Jiajing of the Ming dynasty, based on the development of the commercial economy, the initial form of capitalism came into being in the Yangtze River area. Although the new economic factors which emerged from the feudal society was very weak, they began to exhibit social influence. The thinkers in the early Qing period mostly live in the southeast area, which might have relations of one sort or another with commerce and industry. That the thinkers could slip the leash of feudal thought and put forward democratic thoughts was related to the relatively developed economy. The social progressive ideological trend of the latter half of the 17th century was based on the achievement of its predecessors and what they had passed down 3. The thinkers inherited the simple materialism traditions in China’s ancient history, but due to the more complex and acute contradictions and struggles in the latter period of the feudal society, the aspects referred to were broader, materials were richer and contributions were greater. In the Song, Yuan and Ming dynasties, the idealism was prevalent. The idealism tradition had existed in Chinese history for a long time. In the late Ming dynasty, Li Zhi was

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the most courageous thinker to fight against Neo-Confucianism. Holding the banner of criticizing feudal politics and feudal culture, he came up with many thought-provoking philosophical issues and social issues. However, since Li Zhi lived in a relatively early age, his thought was not tempered by the class struggle and national struggle. He did not rid himself of the idealism. His world outlook was more this-worldly than otherworldly. Only after the peasant uprising in the late period of the Ming dynasty and the collapse of the Ming dynasty did the reactionary and decadent nature of the idealism expose itself. The thinkers in the early period of the Qing dynasty resumed and developed the ancient materialism, and severely attacked Neo-Confucianism and idealism. Although the thinkers in the early Qing dynasty disagreed with Li Zhi on his opinion of despising etiquette and his unrestrained lifestyle, they developed Li’s fight against the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasty. In the late years of the Ming dynasty, with the development of production, natural science developed accordingly. Li Shizhen’s “Compendium of Materia Medica”, Song Yingxing’s “ Heavenly Creations”, Xu Guangqi’s “On the Art Thought of Agriculture” all reflected the level of science and technology at that time. Western natural science, such as astronomy, mathematics and geography were introduced into China in succession. The spread of scientific thought was conducive to stripping out the mysterious elements in the world view and conception of history; and getting rid of the limitations of Neo-Confucian opinion and superstitions of the thinkers. They began to look into political issues and social issues with pragmatic and relatively scientific methods. In conclusion, the creation of the progressive ideological trend in the latter half of the 17th century had profound social and historical causes. It was the outcome of various contradictions and the continuation and development of advanced thoughts against the new historical background. In the long development process of China’s ideological history, there is always someone who makes the conclusion that could be made at his times in every transitional period of the society. Faced with the drastically changing society, the thinkers in the early Qing period criticized the past in a summative manner and turned a new glorious page in Chinese ideological history.

The Schools and Thinkers between the Ming and Qing Dynasties An ideological trend usually includes several schools, the important ones of which have outstanding figures as the representatives. Outstanding figures stand in the forefront of the times and pave the way for the development of history. Ideological trend is the combination of opinions, aspirations and

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prevailing customs of some classes and groups in a certain historic environment. The schools and figures which belong to the same ideological trend possess common thought tendencies. But because of different experience, living areas, teacher-student relationship, research method and dispositions, their theories, writing styles and research field vary greatly. An advanced and restrained social trend is definitely not monotonous and stereotyped repetition and imitation but the exhibition of a rich and ever-changing style through the common tendency. Just like a spectacular flower nursery in deep spring where trees flourish and flowers contend with each other for beauty, which is a real feast for the eyes. The various schools and thinkers took different paths which led to the same destination. Each had its advantages and focus. They influenced and helped each other, which was conducive to the formation of the social ideological trend with characteristics of the times and a broad mass base. The outstanding thinkers and important thinking schools in the early Qing period were as follows: 1. The Huang Zongxi and Zhedong School. The given name of Huang Zongxi (1610-1695) was Taichong. He was called Nanlei or Lizhou. Huang was born in a bureaucrat and landlord family in Yuyao, Zhejiang. His father Huang Zunsu was an important figure in the Tung-Lin faction who was persecuted to death by the eunuchs in the decadent political environment. With the march southward of the Qing army, Huang contributed all his properties to the Fig. 4.1.

A Portrait of Huang Zongxi

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country and devoted himself to the anti-Qing struggle for over a decade. After the failure of the anti-Qing struggle, he lived in seclusion in the countryside, lecturing and writing. He repeatedly rejected the recruitment attempts of the Qing dynasty. He wrote “The Record of the Ming Dynasty to Be Researched”, “Nanlei Essays”,“ Studying Records of Scholars in the Ming dynasty” etc. The main contribution of Huang Zongxi was on politics and history. In his book “The Record of the Ming Dynasty to Be Researched”, he sharply criticized the feudal politics and described a “utopia” with democratic features, which had an important influence on the ideology of modern China. His historical thoughts focused on noting and applying ancient classics, doing research with a historical perspective and fighting against empty talk. He said: “People of the Ming dynasty stressed learning the dregs of the Quotations, which should not be based on “the Six Classics”. Leaving out the books and engaging in discussion was promoted. Therefore, one should first study the classics to put what is learned into practice. Learning history is a must to avoid pedantry 4. This viewpoint broke with the tradition of Neo-Confucianism and was a revolt against the undesirable style of study. As Zhang Xuecheng said: “The Zhedong School emphasized the study of history, which explained its excellence 5 .” Quan Zuwang said: “The previous undesirable style of study was improved immediately6.” In his book “Studying Records of Scholars in the Ming dynasty” Huang summarized the ideological development over nearly three hundred years in the Ming dynasty. The book is the first and systematic academic history in ancient China. Afterwards, Huang’s students Wai Sida, Wan Sitong, and Quan Zuwang and Zhang Xuecheng in the later period, were all directly or indirectly influenced by Huang Zongxi and they finished compiling the “Academic Record of the Song and Yuan Dynasties” which was a monumental work, and “The History of the Ming Dynasty”. They made a great contribution in compiling history, historical essays and historical materials and formed the Zhedong School which was characterized by historical research. The features of the Zhedong School were as follows: focusing on practice instead of empty words; based on ancient classics and historical science; upholding national integrity and a diligent and cautious learning attitude; emphasizing the research of historical evidence. Although Huang Zongxi was inclined to materialism, he was greatly influenced by the school of Wang Yangming. His thoughts were mingled with the dregs of idealism in the aspects of politics and history, which prevented him from revealing their nature. Huang Zongxi could not get rid of these limitations. Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) was born into a large family in Kunshan, Jiangsu. He

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Fig. 4.2.

A portrait of Gu Yanwu

had the given name Ningren and was also named Tinglin. He once attended the Fu agency to promote learning and dealing with concrete issues. When the Qing army marched southward and captured Kunshan, Gu’s mother and his two younger brothers all died in the battle. His foster mother went on a hunger strike, which greatly affected Gu Yanwu. He united with Gui Zhuang and Wu Qihang of the Fu agency to rise to fight against the Qing army. After the failure of the uprising, he traveled around the north of China, made many friends, and attempted to restore the reign of the Ming dynasty. He never dropped the idea7. His famous books include The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Countries Worldwide, Ri Zhi Lu, Five Books on Music, The Poem Collections of Tinglin etc. Gu Yanwu made academic achievement in many aspects, especially in economics, music, history and geography. In terms of the lack of talent and learning of the bureaucrats of the Ming dynasty, Gu maintained that one should know everything about the world and relate academic study with solving social issues. “Learning covers both the improvement of oneself and the development of the country8”. To reverse the decadent learning style in the late Ming period, Gu held the banner of “applying what one has learned into practice”, which was against “ignoring the straitened circumstances and burying oneself in academic learning9”. This caused a stir in the intelligentsia at that time.

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The idea of applying what one has learned into practice determined Gu’s particular learning style. He paid great attention to research and evidence. He investigated geography and various social systems to advocate creative thinking and oppose blindly following and plagiarizing. His books “The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Countries Worldwide” and “Ri Zhi Lu” were the illustration of the method. He made a lot of on-the–spot investigations and “he spent almost half a year living in inns10.” When he reached a place, “he would investigate the geography and observe the customs and learned about the difficulties and illnesses of the local people11.” Gu redressed the learning trend of “casting away books and talking without theoretical basis”, and opened up a new approach to learning in the Qing dynasty, which occupied an important position in the ideological history of the Qing dynasty and had a great influence on the later textual research school. Liang Qichao remarked: “Many academic trends in the Qing dynasty were started by Tinglin and developed by later generations12.” However, Gu Yanwu was greatly under the influence of Zhu Xi and his proposals for political reform was relatively temperate. Gu did not give full play to the idea of materialism, and could not rid himself of metaphysics. The Qing rulers looked down upon Gu’s thinking on realistic usage and claimed it pedantic and unworkable for ruling the country. His detailed investigation was praised by the Qing rulers to defend the textual research school with the aid of Gu’s prestige. In fact, although the textual research school partially accepted Gu’s learning tradition, they changed Gu’s realistic usage theory into fussy academic learning far from reality, which deviated from Gu’s original intention. Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) was born in a small landlord family in reduced circumstances in Hengyang, Hunan. His given name was Ernong and he was also called Jiangzhai, and Mr. Chuan Shan. He was concerned with current politics and the conditions of people when he was a teenager. He explored the relationship between social economy and regulation systems. Wang attended the Fu agency and called for reform. In 1648, when the Qing army seized Hengzhou, Wang Fuzhi rose in revolt go fight the Qing army. Being outnumbered, he was defeated. He then joined the South Ming regime and was elbowed out in the factionalism. He lost heart in national affairs and decided to live in seclusion and write books to declare himself. “He aimed at carrying forward the knowledge of the past generations and working for the peace of the country13”. In arduous circumstances he wrote many great works, such as the “Unofficial Biography of Zhouyi”, “The Notes of Zhang Zizheng”, “The introduction of Shangshu”, “Eassys on Deliberation and Inquiring”, “The Nightmare”, “The Yellow Book”, “The Reflection on Tongjian” etc.

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Fig. 4.3.

The portrait of Wang Fuzhi

The complicated and sharp class contradictions and national contradictions in the late Ming and early Qing period motivated Wang Fuzhi to draw the lessonS from the rise and fall of a nation. He criticized systematically the idealistic Neo-Confuciansim which had governed China for over 500 years and established the simple materialism and advanced conception of history. His philosophical thinking was profound and meticulous, and was a momument in the history of ancient China’s materialism. His political thought and social thought were innovative and he attempted to provide experiences from exploring the rule of history. The great academic achievement of Wang Xizhi won him a high reputation. Liu Xianting said: “Wang’s achievements covered so many aspects and contained much innovative thinking 14”. Tan Sitong spoke highly of him as the first insightful person ever seen for five hundred years15, for Wang’s thinking was out of the mainstream at that time and was against the philosophy of the ruling class. As a result, his books were banned and until the middle of the 19th century when they were printed in a great quantity. As a thinker of the landlord class in the 17th century, Wang could not overcome the remaining trace of idealism in his philosophical thoughts, which was clearly shown in his social conception of history. He was hostile to the peasant uprising and despised peasants. Wang was ethnocentric and discriminated against the ethnic minorities. Despite all his exploration to save

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the social crisis, he did not put forward a correct solution to solving the basic social contradictions. 2. Yan Yuan and the Yan and Li School. Yan Yuan (1635–1740) was born in a poor village in Boye, Hebei. His given name was Yizhi and he had another name Xizhai. The long period of life in poverty made him understand well the social contradictions and people’s suffering, which greatly affected his thought which focused on practice and utility. Yan spent his life practicing medicine and teaching. He once traveled to the south, visiting some scholars and discussing academic issues with them. In his later years he took charge of the academy of classical learning and set four disciplines, namely, literature, military defense, economics and history, and arts. Yan tried to put the educational thought of learning into realistic usage in practice. His main works include The Compiling of the Four Cun (Cun Xing, Cun Xue, Cun Zhi and Cun Ru), The Correction of The Four Books etc. The age Yan Yuan lived was later than Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu and Wang Fuzhi. At that time Neo-Confucianism was promoted by the Qing rulers, but Yan Yuan was not afraid and made a thorough critique of Neo-Confucianism, especially Zhuxi. He exhibited a fearless and daring spirit. Lian Qichao said: “Yan liberated the old thoughts to the utmost, and he attacked NeoConfusianism directly16”. Yan Yuan stressed the importance of practice to cognition and opposed idealistic transcendentalism. He advocated the utilitarianism of making the country rich and its military force efficient and opposed the philosophy of inaction. His student Li Gangzhu who was also named Shugu (1659–1733) inherited and disseminated his theory. They were called Yan Li School. Different from Yan Yuan who lived in a small village, Li often appeared in Beijing and made friends with well-known people. Li wrote “Discussion on Daxue”, “The Notes on The Analects of Confucius”, “Liao Wang Bian” etc. These books complemented Yan Yuan’s theory. Moreover Wang Kunsheng, Yun Gaowen and Cheng Tingzuo and others inherited Yan’s theory. In the latter half of the 17th century, apart from Huang, Gu, Wang and Yan, there were many important thinkers, each of which had his own speciality and attainments. Zhu Zhiyu (1600–1682) was born in Yutiao, Zhejiang. His given name was Luyu. He was also named Shunshui. He fought against the Qing dynasty in Zhoushan and fled to Japan, Annam and Southeast Asia. Zhu continued his anti-Qing stuggle until he died in Japan. His works were compiled into “The Posthumous Papers of Shunshui”. Zhu was an outstanding representative of the bureaucrats who had strong national consciousness and fought against the

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Qing dynasty. He wrote many poems and essays with a passion for fighting. In view of the unhealthy style of study, Zhu emphasized learning to rejuvenate the country17”. He held that one should start from small things to improve one’s morality and opposed idealism concerning life. Chen Que (1604–1677) was born in Haining, Zhejiang. His given name was Qianchu. Chen Que was a pioneer who advocated materialism and fought against New-Confucianism in the 17th century. He and Huang Zongxi were the classmates. In outlook on nature he was against the theory that Heaven had will and could bless or punish people; he doubted whether “Daxue” was a saintly book with the spirit of quest for truth; and he attacked the governance of NeoConfucianism over the academic circle. In his “Letter to Huang Lizhou” he said: “The current style of study attacks the theories of Confucius and Mencius but dares not go against Neo-Confucianism, which is really diappointing 18.” His radical opinions on human nature and epistemology were directed at NeoConfucianism. He wrote “The Discussion on Daxue” and “Burying Books”. Fu Shan (1607–1684) was born in Taiyuan, Shanxi. His given name was Qingzhu. After the collapse of the Ming dynasty, Fu refused to be recruited into the academic division of the Qing dynasty. Fu’s essays and poems reflected his passion for fighting against national oppression. He drew lessons from the collapse of the Ming dynasty, opposed Neo-Confucianism and called scholars of Neo-Confucianism slaves19”. “Neo-Confucianism is too rigid20”. He wrote the book “Collections of Shuang Hong Kan”. Fu Shan’s knowledge was encyclopedic and he was good at phonology, thinker ’s science, painting and medical science. Fang Yizhi (1611–1671) was born in Tongcheng, Anhui. His given name was Mizhi. He was a successful candidate in the highest imperial examinations and a civil official of the Hanlin Academy. After the collapse of the Ming dynasty, Fang moved southward and joined the South Ming regime, which he later left. After the Qing army captured Guangdong, Fang became a monk to avoid being captured. He was a man of great learning and had a mastery of natural science and philosophy. He wrote Some Knowledge of Physics, Tong Ya, Yao Di Pao Zhuang, and Essays of Fushan . Starting from studying natural science, Fu persisted in materialism. He maintained that “There are all objects in the whole universe21” and that fire was the source of all the movement. In epistemology, he held that concept was embedded in objects and fought against the idealism of Neo-Confucianism. But there were defects of mechanical materialism in his philosophical thoughts. Tang Zhen (1603–1704) was born in Dazhou, Sichuan. His given name was Zhuwan. He was a juren of the early Qing period. After assuming the position

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of magistrate of a county of ten months, he went into business in the south of the Yangtze River and led an abundant life of living in the market22. He taught in his later years and wrote The Qian Book . Tang Zhen was a courageous publicist. He violently attacked the feudal autocracy and viewed the feudal emperor as an evil executioner. He revealed the inequality of the rich and poor and the inequality in the political field, and opposed the obsession with hierarchy. Since he operated his business in the urban area, he attached great importance to commerce and industry and stressed “farmers depended on farms while merchants depended on markets” “Farmers and merchants live and work in peace and contentment23.” Tang held that business was as important as agriculture and refused his friends’ advice to abandon business. Tang would rather live a plain life and rely on business. He claimed that “Lu Shang once sold food in Mengjin, and Tang Zhen traded in Wushi, which showed righteousness24”. In his later years, Tang believed in the philosophy of the mind of Wang Yangming and his thoughts had many factors of idealism in it.

The Contents of the Progressive Trend of Materialism in the Latter Half of the Seventeenth Century Against Feudal Autocracy In the late 17th century, the advanced thinkers found the autocracy decadent and the emperor fatuous. They fought against the tyrannical Qing regime and had a deep understanding of the maladies of the feudal autocracy. Huang Zongxi and Tang Zhen violently attacked the regime. In 1663, Huang Zongxi wrote a political work Things to be Researched of the Ming Dynasty to criticize the feudal autocracy with hatred of the subjugation of a nation. In this book, Huang boldly crossed traditional boundaries of moral order and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the sources and nature of monarchical power. Huang pointed out that “the monarch has all the benefit of the world all to himself while leaving all the calamity to its people”. To this end, the emperor would poison people’s thought and scatter their families. The emperor would exploit people to the utmost for the entertainment and benefit of himself. Therefore, in people’s eyes, the emperor was the enemy and a dictator. He thought highly of the ancient times of Yao and Shun when people were the masters of the world and opposed the current situation. Huang declared in public that the emperor was the greatest harm to the world25. In the tyrannical age, the conclusion was like a thunderbolt which violently shocked the tedious ideological field.

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As to the doctrine of the ruler guides subjects, Huang Zongxi stated that the ruler and the subjects were the same despite their positions. They were equal and different from the relationship between the emperor and concubines. The responsibility of the subjects was to serve the people, not the emperor 26. He despised the Neo-Confucianists who held that the existence of the subjects was for the emperor and the relationship between them the objective reality. Huang viewed them as narrow-minded and showed contempt for their loyalty to the emperor. He said: “The doom of the emperor who is not concerned about the country and people before anything else is the doom of a family. There is no need for the subjects to die for the emperor27”.The concept that the sorrow and happiness of people was more important than the emperor was a negation of the traditional feudalism. In the ideological trend against the feudal autocracy, Tang Zhen did not support the relationship between the emperor and the subjects28. His clear-cut position assaulted monarchical power with sacred Confucianisim. Tang pointed out that “despite the nobleness of the emperor, he is a human himself29”, and “the emperor is not God but a person30”, which rid the emperor of the saintly air of the monarchy. Based on the view that people treated the monarchy as an enemy, Tang further revealed that emperors of all generations were executioners of people. “Ever since the Qin dynasty, all the emperors were executioners; people killed by generals and officers were actually killed by the emperor 31”. “The viciousness of the monarchy has reached such an extent32”. Tang’s violent attack was not only directed at the evil of emperors of various generations but also at the social reality of the early Qing dynasty. The sentence that “Half of the killings of the two or three decades should be imputed to the emperor 33” referred to the military suppression by the Manchu aristocrats. However, neither Huang Zongxi nor Tang Zhen drew the conclusion of abolishing the autocratic monarchy from revealing the evil of the monarchy. Their violent attack released long-term dissatisfaction and resentment; Huang even came up with the question “what if there is no emperor?” They focused on decentralization to give more power to the prime minister to restrict the power of the emperor. This was “to make the emperor consider people’s benefits and suffering before his own34”. Huang Zongxi even thought of monitoring the execution of the monarchical power by school and the rule of law. He maintained the school should assume the function of distinguishing right and wrong. He expounded and proved the functions of the school by citing the examples of the Eastern Han dynasty and the Song dynasty. “The monarch should not discriminate right and wrong based his own understanding 35”. “The teaching officer in the county school could

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correct small mistakes and punish the officials of the local government if they commit glaring errors”. Schools of this kind were like the current discussion mechanism36. This was the most radical thought with preliminary democracy of Huang and showed his aspiration for wise politics. Meanwhile, Huang put forward the idea of rule by law that “the rule of law comes before the rule of man” to replace the law of the emperor which governed the country in order to restrict the “rule of man” of the monarch 37. Although its nature was the feudal rule of law, the thought of the rule of law contained some factors of constitutional monarchy and reflected the desire of the people for equal judicial rights. Gu Yanwu thought highly of the “Things to be Researched of the Ming Dynasty” and wrote a preface for it. Gu named it “Ri Zhi Lu”. Gu came up with the idea of replacing dictatorship 38 with democracy, which meant to expand the power of the county magistrate and to balance the monarchical power and the power of the regional government. The anti-despotism political thought of Huang Zongxi and Tang Zhen had something in common with Wang Fuzhi’s “the monarch should not have the nation all to himself 39 and “the country should be in the hands of the people”. National thought The anti-Qing struggle in the early Qing period was a national struggle within China, which was different from the struggles among nations in modern times. However national oppression and the protection of proper national interest existed in the national struggle. The nation had to face the problem of whether to compromise and surrender or resist to the utmost. The ruthless massacres and coertion policies of the period when the Manchu rulers entered the Shanhaiguan aroused the revolt of the Han people and many landlord intellectuals. With strong national consciousness, the thinkers who engaged in the anti-Qing struggles used pens as weapons to resist the national oppression and national discrimination of the Manchu rulers. In many of his books, Wang Fuzhi expressed that the protection of the national interest was the morality from ancient times and the those who failed to protect it were sinners. He narrated anecdotes of the past alluding to the present to criticize the surrenders in history and eulogized the heroes who defended the national interest. The patriotic Gu Yanwu viewed “nation” and “country” as two different concepts. “Nation” was the imperial court of a family while “country” belonged to people. The subjugation of a nation was simply the transformation of the reign title while the death of the country was the collapse of customs and culture.

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Therefore he maintained that the responsibility for defending a nation lay with the civil and military officials, and “safeguarding a country was the obligation of every common man40. Gu placed the national interest over the imperial court, which deviated from the sacredness of the monarchical power. In Gu’s view, to defend a country, the customs should be corrected, and the correction of customs should start from giving more say to the landlord bureaucrats. “People should be encouraged to have a say if the customs were not perfect41”. Thus Gu to some extent connected the thought of protecting the national interest with thought of opposing the autocracy. Most of the thinkers in the early Qing period were of strong national thinking which had both a positive side and a negative side. With national prejudice they could not discriminate between the rulers and the ruled and viewed people of ethnic minorities as enemies. They exhibited a strong national chauvinism. Humanistic pragmatism The thinkers in the early Qing period were against the fuddy-duddy style of study and advocated the utilitarian theory of humanisitic pragmatism. Gu Yanwu resisted Wang Yangming’s theory that ignored the national situation and focused on academic research42, which led to “the overthrow of the country and the collapse of the nation43”. Gu held that learning was the study of ruling the country. He said in his book: “One applied what he has learned into practice to manage the state affairs44”. “The aim is to bring order out of chaos, to learn from the past in order to administer a country well45.” He emphasized the integration of theory with practice. Although Gu’s philosophical thought was not as rich as that of Wang Fuzhi and his political thought was not as radical as Hong Zongxi, humanistic pragmatism was the main feature of his academic thought. Zhu Zhiyu, Fu Shan, Li Yong (1637–1705) and Yan Yuan all paid great attention to the practical effect of learning and thought highly of the utilitarianism of Chen Liang and Ye Shi. Zhu Zhiyu treated “learning for realistic usage and doing good for society46 as the substance of learning. Li Yong advocated learning the time of the day and said the “valuable feature of people was to know the time of day and to tide over the current difficulties47”. Yan Yuan actively promoted practical learning. Yan stressed that the rejuvenation of a country depended on practical learning not on empty words. “A person can do no good to society if he only does academic research and knows nothing about practical learning48”. He once summarized the content of practical learning as: reclaiming the wasteland, equalizing the fields, and irrigation would make

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the country rich; making each person the soldier and each official the general would strengthen the nation; recruiting skilled people, learning Confucian classics and music could make the nation peaceful 49”. He criticized the NeoConfucianists who acted as if they were morally better than other people as decadent scholars50. He changed the doctrine held by the Neo-confucianists to “learning for the utilitarian purpose 51”, which reflected the anti-Confucianism which focused on practical usage measured by academic standards. The humanistic pragmatism was formed by the thinkers in the early period of the Qing dynasty by drawing lessons from the fall of Ming dynasty and struggles against the Confucianists. It aimed at getting rid of the social crisis of the feudal society, rectifying the endangered feudal order, and recovering and strengthening the control of the landlord class over peasants. As a matter of fact, it was a cry for salvation from the feudal bureaucrats. Since it attempted to free itself from the dogma of Confucianism and pursued social reform, it had a progressive meaning at that time, which was the prominent feature of the antiConfucianism in the early Qing period. The Theory of Equal Division of Farmland and the Idea that both Industry and Commerce are the Foundation of Society The thinkers who experienced the peasant uprisings in the later Ming period realized that the root of the revolts was the unequal distribution of land caused by the merger of land by the bureaucrats and landlords. To ease class contradictions, improve the policies in the late Ming and to preserve the foundations of the feudal system, the peasants came up with the reform which centered on limiting the merger of land by the bureaucrats and landlords. Wang Fuzhi supported reclaiming land by oneself and opposed the appropriation of land. He said: “the monarchy could administer the people of the country but could not expropriate the land 52” “The land claimed and owned by a person should be less than 300 mu 53”. In Huang Zongxi’s book he put forward the idea that land should be equally distributed among people. Huang envisaged the blueprint of restoring the nine square system of land ownership. In terms of the landlord’ exploitation of the peasants54, Gu Yanwu was in favor of “equal distribution of land” and “reclamation”55. Gu’s sympathy for the suffering of the peasants can be seen in his poems and essays. Yan Yuan not only revealed the social unequality of “one landlord had land of several hundred qing while several hundred peasants had less than one qing” 56, but also attacked the enclosure policies of the Qing dynasty. He proclaimed that “the land of the country should be shared equally among the people of the country” 57.

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“Other policies had no foundation without the equal distribution of land” 58. As to measures, Yan Yuan’s opinion was similar to that of Huang Zongxi’s. He maintained reorganization of the tenancy relationship with the idealized nine square land system. He said “no one should be punished for a month and the land should be equally distributed” 59. Li and Wang Kunsheng held that “the equal distribution of land was the policy of benevolence”60. They put forward some specific measures for collecting the land, offering the land and selling the land to complement the proposals of Yan Yuan. In conclusion, the theory of equal distribution of the thinkers in the 17th century had its realistic pertinence. Starting from safeguarding the foundation of the feudal system, the policy revealed the sources of the turmoil in society, fought against the merger of land and reflected the requirements of ownerpeasants and middle and small landlords. The proposal of equal land distribution was consistent with their requirement for equal rights to participate in public affairs, which was an important part of the progressive ideological trend in the 17th century. However the proposals for equal land distribution all focused on top-down progressive reform, which was not only difficult to realize but left room for land merger. In class content, method of execution and purpose, the theory of equal distribution of land was different from the egalitarian land policy of the peasant uprising in the late Ming period. Huang Zongxi also put forward the idea that both commerce and industry were the foundations of society, which was against the traditional economic thought and policy of giving weight to farming and curbing business. He said: “It is not right to view commerce and industry as insignificant and curb their development. Instead we should encourage the flourishing of commerce and industry” 61 Wang Fuzhi attached great importance to commerce and said: “Merchants who bring wealth to the nation is where the national life lies”. Wang was opposed to the constraints on rich people and held that “by punishing the greedy officials and rewarding the rich merchants a nation can become prosperous and peaceful”62. Tang Zhen also attached great importance to commerce and thought that commerce was as important as agriculture, and that both were the important constituents of the proper governance of a state. He proposed improving the straitened agriculture, commerce, market and governmental operation63 by developing production and trade. Marx held that the emergence of all thought, theories and opinions was not casual. “Thoughts, theories and opinions are the reflections of social being and their roots can only be found in the material living conditions”64. In the early Qing period, the thought that commerce and industry were the foundations was the product of the develpment of capitalism and represented the ideology

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of the public. Of course, the thought was not systematic at that time. Although the power and influence of commerce and industry increased, there was no strong social power that could fight against the feudal forces. The ideological reflection of the underdeveloped force was obscure. The thinkers in the early Qing period realized to some extent the importance of the industrialists and businessmen and anchored their hope on the public force, but they could not give more support to the force. The commerce mentioned by them was mainly commodity circulation instead of commodity production; the rich referred to by them included landlords who were not in power as well as industrialists and businessmen.  he fight against the confucian School of Idealist Philosophy of the Song and T Ming Dynasties From the upheaval in society the thinkers in the early Qing period deeply understood the maladies of the Confucian school of idealist philosophy of the Song and Ming dynasties. They addressed, criticized and attacked Confucianism. The idealistic philosophy which had governed China’s ideological circle for over 500 years became the target of public criticism, which undermined its supreme authority. The attack of Huang Zongxi and Li Yong was rather temperate for their thoughts had a lot to do with the Confucian school. They realized its disadvantages and attempted to redress and complement it. Huang was against the empty talk of the scholars of Neo-Confucianism. Li Yong said: “Tao is not based on empty talk and learning should be put into practice”. Gu Yanwu and Zhu Zhiyu were radically against the Confucian school of idealistic philosophy. Gu Yanwu held that today’s Confucian thought was Buddhist theory65”. Zhu Zhiyu denounced scholars of the Confucian schoolsaying they “had achieved nothing and were no different from the monks 66 ”. Wang Fuzhi criticized the idealistic Confucian theory. He said: “The theory of Lu Zijing destroyed the Song dynasty 67. The theory of Wang Shouren had an evil effect on the country 68’. With the critical spirit of “learning the theory, getting to know the disadvantages and figuring out the flaws69, Wang Fuzhi violently attacked the Confucian school of idealistic theory. The criticism of Gu, Zhu and Wang was directed at the school of Lu and Wang while their attitude towards Zhu Xi was rather temperate. The criticism of Fu Shan, and Pan Pingge was more acute. Fu Shan scolded the scholars of the Confucian school as “slaves”. After getting to know NeoConfucianism, Fu said: “I was confused and had no idea what their theory was

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about70” He assumed that: “The Five Classics and The Four Books served the reign of the monarch instead of morality71”. Pan Pingge compared Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan to monks and Taoists72. He even treated Zhou, Cheng, Zhu, Lu and Wang who were the idols of the ideological field as monks or Taoists of Confucianism. Ya n Yu a n l i v e d i n t h e a g e w h e n t h e Q i n g ru l e r s a d v o c a t e d N e o Confucianism again. Yan showed his contempt for the attack of the scholars of the Confucian school and the threat of severe law and put forward the slogan “Neo-Confucianism kills people”. He said: “Both the theories of Wang and Zhu could kill people73”. He attacked Wang’s thought, saying that “Wang Yangming was rather like a monk with his evil thoughts74.” He condemned Zhu Xi, saying that Zhu had ruined his life and did not regret this until death. “He attempted to lead the whole world into ancient classics and to become weak, sick and useless persons 75”. Yan denounced Zhu’s theory as “keeping inactive and the more one talks, more confused he will become76” and as heresy77, useless to the state and the national life. “If all the people just read, wrote and sat quietly, the economy, morality and the national life would stop developing and suffer a great loss 78”. So “the poisonous effect of Neo-Confucianism was as fatal as arsenic79”. Under the ideological rule of the Qing dynasty, Yan’s violent attack on Neo-Confuciansim was remarkably forceful, which raised the eyebrows of scholars of Neo-Confucianism. Materialist philosophy The thinkers in the early Qing period struck a heavy blow at Neo-Confucianist idealistic philosophy from the fundamental issues of the philosophy. Wang Fuzhi denied the viewpoint of the idealism of “Qi is prior to Li”. He affirmed the materiallistic monism theory of “Qi comes from Li” and “Li is the Li of Qi80”. He reversed the relationship between matter and mind which as defined by Neo-Confucianism and established a relatively complete materialistic system composed of the concept of nature and epistemology. Based on the study of natural history, Fang Yizhi drew the conclusion that there were “all matters in the world 81”, and “all the matters were made of qi 82”. He expouned the rules governing the perpetual motion of matters. The rules were the principles of the matters83”. Gu put forward the materialistic view that there was “all qi in the world84”. Li Ye remarked explicitly: “The rules and principles consisted of the matters. If there were no matters, surely there would be no principles.85” In terms of the relationship between the objective law of things and specific matters, Wang Fuzhi criticized the idealistic world outlook which viewed tao

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as the world origin. He pointed out that there was qi in the world. “The tao is the tao of qi”86. There would be no objective law without specific matters, just as there would be no lane were it not for horses. Gu proposed that there would be no tao without qi”87. Fang Yizhi demonstrated that “the law of matters was contained in everything” 88. All the above viewpoints were the materialistic expressions of the ultimate question of the philosophy. In epistemology, the thinkers in the early Qing period stressed that cognition came from matters and knowledge relied on practice. Wang Fuzhi held that the combination of matter, entity and spirit would give rise to consciousness.89 Fang Yizhi maintained that the correct cognition should accord with the true features of the objects. “The knowledge will lead to the true understanding of the matters” 90. Chen Que focused the importance of learning and practice to cognition. “The formation of objects is based on qi while the development of people relies on learning” 91. Yan Yuan emphasized the importance of direct experience and perceptual knowledge in the process of learning, which was a heavy blow to the quietly-sitting theory of Neo-Confucianism. He said: “What words can do is limited while what practice can do is infinite.92” “One cannot make it if one stops learning” 93. For example, reading medical books was not enough to be a doctor. One should put what one has learned into practice. His maxim was “reading thousands of books is not as good as practicing once or twice”94. He despised the Neo-Confucianist theory as “never seeing the date, but pretending that one had tasted it”95. “Learning the classics of the past 500 years has been a complete lie.96” In an age when attacking Neo-Confucianism would lead to penalties Yan Yuan fought against the Qing rulers, which showed the valuable spirit of sticking to the truth. The thinkers in the early period Qing period possessed rich materialistic thought but were short of ideas of dialectics. Wang Fuzhi was an outstanding person for he not only established a relatively rigorous simple materialistic system but developed to some extent the viewpoint of contradiction, development and change. He maintained that the universe was “in perpetual motion instead of stillness.” 97 “Motion exists everywhere and is necessary for tao.”98 He demonstrated the origin of motion with contradiction and conflicts and criticized forcefully the Neo-Confucianst maintaining of stillness, which improved China’s ancient simple dialectical thought to a new level. Wang Xizhi explained the developing process of nature and society with the view that everything was in constant motion. He pointed out that the world was in continuous motion and changed every day. With his long experience of living with ethnic minorities, he demonstrated that the highly-praised heyday could actually be seen in Sichuan and Guangzhou. He also illustrated that the people

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The Progressive Trend of Materialism

of ethnic minorities in Zhejiang, Hubei and, Fujian were civilized “today.”99 As a proof of historical evolution, the viewpoint was rather outstanding. The Theory of Human Nature and Human Desires The theory of human nature and human desires was an important battlefield in the struggles between thinkers of the early Qing period and scholars of NeoConfucianism. Scholars of Neo-Confucianism divided human nature into the “nature of destiny” and the “nature of disposition”. So there were good and evil natures of disposition. On the one hand, the reactionary theory viewed the moral order of the feudal society as the nature of destiny and called for people to obey unconditionally; on the other hand, the scholars denounced life requirements as the indecent effect of material desires. Scholars of NeoConfucianism advocated “Cherish Heaven’s laws, deny human desires” to stifle the anti-feudal thought and actions. With the materialistic standpoint, thinkers in the early Qing period criticized the idealistic transcendentalism of the scholars of Neo-Confucianism. They held that human nature developed and changed with the environment. Wang Fuzhi said: “Habits can lead to the formation of disposition”, “Dispostion is a physiological feature, which explains why it is constantly changing”.100 Cheng Que said: “matters are characterized by qi and humans are characterized by learning.”101 YanYuan said: “Dispostion is affected by one’s character, and selfcultivation cannot be done without disposition.”102 Li Wanggong said: “were it human nature apart from people’s behavior, there is no use for such a human nature”. 103 Although what these thinkers talked about was super-class, they destroyed the lies of “nature of destiny” and viewed human nature as the product of acquired learning, which was a great step in the right direction. Thinkers in the early Qing period fought violently against the theory of “cherish heaven’s laws, deny human desires”. They related laws with human desires and affirmed the rationality of desire and private interest. They assumed that “laws exist in desires” 104, “It is rational to have private desires and interests” 105, “If people’s desires were all satisfied, the great harmony of the world could be achieved” 106; “The law can be seen from human desires and the satisfaction of human desire is the law. If there had never been human desire, there would be no laws”.107 They were assured and boldly argued that the natural requirements of human beings should be met and cruel asceticism should be opposed. The theory of laws and human desires reflected the requirements and features of the initial developing stage of capitalism. In the early and middle period of the feudal society, the pursuit of private gain and

235

A Concise Histroy of the Qing Dynasty

the lust of the landlord class was behind the veil of the authority of ruler and father as well as moral orders. But the legitimate human desire and interest of the people could not be morally recognized. It was not until the later period of feudal society, with the development of commodity exchange and the emergence of new economic factors, that the feudal bondage of human relationships were gradually loosened. It was possible for the advanced thinkers to deal with the instinctive requirements of people with completely different viewpoints, and even defend them. Tang Zhen said: “It is with human desire that I was born and grew up. Things would never work if one abandons human desire and pursues laws”.108 Yan Yuan who was more radical said: “Humans are the masters of the world, and how can they live without emotions? The sexual desire between men and women is the manifestation of intense feeling. 109 “Those who have sexual feeling and do not let it out are like monsters in the remote mountains” 110. Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu also established their political blueprint on the base of admitting the private interests of people. Huang Zongxi was against the autarchical regality and held that the private interests of the emperor undermined the interests of his subjects. Gu Yanwu encouraged people to pursue their own interest, and the thought which advocated sexual desire and private gain became a trend in the late period of Chinese feudal society. With the class stand of the proletariat, it is the manifestation of the nature of the exploiting class to discuss human nature without giving consideration to class character, which is anti-science. However, at that time, it stood for the interest of the oppressed middle and lower classes whose legitimate interests could not be met. Its attack was directed at the privilege and morality of the feudal class, which possessed progressive significance and was favorable for the development of capitalism. Limitations of Progressive Thinkers in the Early Qing Dynasty The advanced thinkers in the latter half of 17th century exposed and attacked the decadence of the feudal system, which presented an active and dynamic scene on the ideological field. It should be pointed out that since capitalism and the political power of the people was underdeveloped, the thinkers could not find the right way out which was beyond the economic and political development. Their thoughts inevitably were limited by class and history. The preliminary democratic thoughts and simple materialism reached unprecedented high level in history. However these bold and radical thoughts involved some backward factors, such as obscure illusions. The advanced thinkers stopped and hesitated where they could have obtained a clearer and

236

The Progressive Trend of Materialism

more thorough conclusion. The whole ideological system did not break away from feudal thought which remained the ideological thought of the landlord class.

In terms of materialistic thought, many of the advanced thinkers gave

full play to their materialistic thought, but there were a lot of ideological factors involved. The thinkers paid little attention to the contradictions and

movement of objective things. Therefore they were just mechanical materialists. Although the outstanding thinkers such as Wang Fuzhi illustrated his view on development and contradictions, he stressed the two balanced aspects and the

gradual change of contradictions, and ignored the effects of qualitative change.

In terms of political opinions, they fought against feudal despotism, monarchy (Huang Zongxi and Tang Zhen) and advocated limiting autocracy and the centralization of state power (Gu Yanwu and Li), but they could not find the

solution to replace the feudal autocracy. When the social material conditions

were not mature to reach the correct solution, the thinkers could not invent it out of thin air. They tried to give more power to the prime minister and local government to realize wisdom politics. They trusted in their reverie of utopia.

The thinkers spare no effort to attack Neo-Confucianism, but claimed to resort to the theories of Confucius and Mencius. Since they valued practice and utilitarianism, they averted their attention from the inner world onto objective

reality. However the development process of Chinese feudal society did not lay a solid ground for research by the thinkers. In their views on moral order, although they affirmed the rationality of human desire and private interest and criticized the theory in which laws opposed desire, they still hoped to readjust

the relationship. They aimed at seeking harmony between feudal political rules, moral rules and people’s thought and behavior.

In conclusion, the thinkers in the early Qing period did not and could not

break away from the feudal limitations. They deeply felt the decadence of the feudal system, but where should they go and how could society transform? They were afraid of the oppression of the feudal despotism and the peasant

uprising. They worried about it but there was nothing they could do. However

the achievements of the thinkers in the early Qing period was irreplaceable. They speculated on the current issues from their own standpoints and their age.

They criticized the idealistic Neo-Confucianism, developed China’s advanced ideological tradition and enriched the ideological history of our country. This was all that we can expect from the advanced thinkers.

237

Notes Chapter 1 The Rise of the Manchu and the Establishment and Development ofthe LaterJin Regime 1.

2. 3. 4. 6.

7. B.

9. 10. 1L 12. 13,

14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Marx, K., and Friedrich Von Engels 1972: 254. Shen Guoyuan, Liangchao oongxin Iu. Liu Tongsheng: Xiantian junmin yi. ChenJiru,Biji,voL2. Nan'an:rlanzhi, Iiwen zhi • Jt ~ (The Account ofUterature), vol. 17. Mao Zedong 1991: 624. Wu Weiye, suikou juue, voL 8.

Shen Guoyuan, Huangming cong:nn Iu, vol. 40. Zheng Lian, Ynbian jilue, vol. 1. Xia Xie, Ming tongjian, voL 82, 3157. Please refer to Mingshi, voL 78, Shihutl *jt (Consumer Goods) 2, P. 194. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Fushejuue,vo1.2. Ji Liuqi: Mingji beilue, voL 23, ~1.Jyan zuoquan zbenge~ (~The Encouragmgand Relieving Song Wrote by Li Yan~). Shenmiao wushu, U Bu tI'MI (The Department ofLi), vol.2, Yang He • • , ~Shenggong jingsbe duoni»n shu~ :MM... ;' ... l! eThe Suggestion about the Emperor Political Jnaction~).

*-*-tt:ibJltt

.It. ••

eThe

Ibid., vul6, Tang Shiji ,fit_, ~Gechenshiwei shu~ !VI IfF {fLlA. Suggestion abouttheMinistets PolitkalJ:naction~). Cheng Kaiyou: Chouuao shuohual, voL35, Xue Fuzheng1Utit. ~Liaosha baibuai nanzhi shu~ :t.tt eThe Suggestion for the COlTUpt Regime in East Liao~). Xia Xie: Ming tongjian, vol.74, p. 2,873. Ibid. Mingji jilue, vol. 11. Ji Iiuqi: Mingji bei1ue, vol. 13, ~Zechenzuijt JJ E. (~The Emperor's ReproachMinister and Self-Accusation~). Ibid. , vots, -Ma Maow beichm daiji" • • C-The Starvation Described by Ma Maow"). Zheng Lian: Yubian jiliie, vol. 1. Ji Yun: Yue weicaotang biji, vol. 2. Mmgolti,"'. 309, "U Zi,hong ,J,mm' ~.Iil!~ ("Th. Biog! "'~¥1 w"=.• • • Jt.

Chapter 2 lhe Repression ofPeasant Uprisings by the Qjng Troops and the Stroggles against Qing in Various Regions 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

10. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

248

Qian Ping: Jiashen chuamin Ill, the fist volume. Ji Liuqi: Mingju beilue, vol. 20, "Shiwu jiyongguan:lian" JiM 11l1li M(The Collapse ofJu Yong Pass). Tan Qian: Guoque, voL 100, in March on the 17th year of the Chongzhen reign Jiashen jbm, vol. 6; Yamiu fiji, vol. 5. See note 371. Wen Rnilin: Nanjiangyishi. voL 5, "Shike fa muan" ..t 1iJ~. (The BiograpbyofShiKefa). Qing .hiS'a, roL 261, Wu Smgui !I\: i'.

41. 42.

43. #. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71.

n. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

Qing Sbizu shilu, vol. 8. Mingqing shiliao, voL 3, book S. Ibid HuailaiIianzhi, voL 15, Notes. Mingqing shiIiao, voL 3,book 5. Qing Sbizu shilu, vol. 17. Mingqing shiliao, voL 1, book 1. Ibid., vol. 3, book 6. Ibid., vol. 3, bookS.

Ibid., vol. 3, book 7 Qing Sbizu shilu, vol. 10. Referred to Qing shigao, voL 26, Zhu Sbichang :fR.1!t ~. Xu Zi: Xiaotian jinian, voL 12, ~Liu Zongzhou muan" IIJ (The BiographyofLiu Zongzhou), Ji Uuqi: Mingju nan1ue, vol. 3, "Hongguangzhaoshu" !I.~• • (The Edicts ofHongguang). Ibid., vol. 3, ·Shi Kefa qingshe sizhen" .5tiif ~.... \!!I'M (Sm Kefa Required to Establish Four Towns). Ibid., vol. 3, Shi Kefa Required to Establish Four Towns; Ming tongjian, p. 3496. Seenotc422. Xu Zi: Xiaotian jinian, voL 6, P. 189. Ji Liuqi: Mingju nan1ue, vo13. Hongguang shilu chao, vol. 3; Ji Liuqi: Mingju nanlue, vol. 8; Xu Zi: Xiaotian jinian, vol. 8, p. 33; Unofficial History ofLou Dongmei, Luqiao jiwen. Ji Liuqi: Mingju nanlue, vol. 3. Gu Yanwu: Sheng'an benjL Referred to Ji Liuqi: Mingju nanlue, voL 7, ·Shi Kefa zou yihe buchen( J!. '\if7! • •lP.f:.lit (Shi Kefa's Suggested Negotiation will not Work. Out). Ibid., vol. 5, ·Chaozheng zhuoluan hunyin" *1 tk.JIf (The State was Decadent and Corrupt). Luqiao jiwen, vol. I, the first volume ofFu Wang. Xu Zi, Xiaotian jinian fukao, voL 9, P. 347. Nanjiangyishi, vol. 49. Xu Zi, Xiaotian jinian, vol. 10, p. 356. Zoo Liuqi: Mingjo yiwen, vo1.3; Xu Zi: Xiaotian jinian, voL 2, Hongguang Regime. Ji Liuqi: Mingju naniue, vol. 8, YI}'U beibing • .,:!t:A. (DisCUSllions on the Northern Anny); Yang Lorang: Sanfim jishi benmo, vol. I. Referred to Yang Lurong: Sanfan jishi benmo, vol. 1.

*}if.

-,,;it

Mingju bmh; mub"" ",lI6, "l-g ",,"u" _*l'flf (Th. Rocoro ofSumml), "N",du fP 'I' ill # if1/: ("The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party"). In Mao Zedong xuanji ~~JIlll!. (Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung). Vol. 2. Beijing: People's Publishing House. Mao Zedong ~~JIl. 1991. Lun shida guanxi ,*-t-*lIIIili (On the Ten Major Relationships). Marx, K., and Friedrich Von Engels. 1972. "Gongchan dang xuanyan" # if. t:i ~ ("Communist Manifesto"). In Ma Kesi En Gesi Xuanji ~ :t,il! ~1*Mll!~ (Selected Works of Marx and Engels). Vol. 1. Beijing: People's Publishing House. Marx, K., and Friedrich Von Engels. Ma Kesi En Gesi quanji ~:t,\!!,~1*M±. (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels). Meng Zhengfa i:jE~. Sanxiang congshi lu .=.)#J1it$'~ (The Record of Three Xiang). Ouyang Xiu ~1lJ!*, Song Qi Xin tangshu *'f.t' (The Latter History Book of the Tang Dynasty). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Peng Sunyi ~lii:R/l. Jinghai zhi it~1t (The Record of Jinghai). Peng Sunyi ~lii:R/l. Pingkou zhi 'l'-lOClt (The Records of the Suppression of Peasant Armies). Peng Sunyi ~ lii:R/l. Shanzhong wenjian lu W'I' IlIJ Jt ~ (Record of the Frontier Wars). Qi Yunshi 'I~~±. Huangchao fanbu yaolue .l:t'l JI.$:JPIj\- (Sketches of the Vassal States of the Later Jin). Qian Ping ~~. Jiashen chuanxin lu lf1 $1*1s~ (The Letters of Jia Shen). Qu Changwen -I1!J:>t. Yushan ji • W~ (The Record of Yushan). Qu Dajun !iii *J!ii. Guangdong xinyu IA JIl*'f~ (Concerning Land and Concerning the Reclamation). Qu Dajun !iii*J!ii. Sichao chengren lu 1!9~~1::~ (Chengren Lu of Four Dynasties). Qu Jiusi flfL,il!. Wangli wugong lu "!!H~JjJ~ (The Record of the Peasant Uprising in the WanIi Reign). Quan Zuwang ±'lJl.1l. Jieqitingji n~" ~ (The Collection of Jieqiting). Que Ming 1iJiJ;it,: Jishi lue ~e.:$'PIj\- (The scratch of Events). Ruan Kuicheng Wt~!I:. Chayu kehua ~ti~~ (Literary Sketches of the Qing Dynasty). Ruan Minxi Wt:l\':~. Haishang jianwen lu ~..I::.JtIllJ~ (Observations at Sea). Shaoshang Yugong :fi ..I::.,,&-. Dongyi kaolue JIl.ll{,lfPlj\- (The Records of the Eastern Race). Shao Tingcai llil1t lI!:. Dongnan jishi JiliW ~e.:$' (Observation in the Southeast).

*'Ir

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